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When the Soviet Union Entered World Politics
When the Soviet Union
Entered World Politics
JON JACOBSON
© 1994 by
The Regents of the University of California
The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National
Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials,
ANSI Z39.48-1984.
Contents
Acknowledgments ix
INTRODUCTION 1
4. FIRST DÉTENTE 81
CONCLUSION 273
Notes 281
Glossary 345
vi / Contents
A s the mutual hostilities of the Cold War era were finally effaced, first
with the advent of "the new political thinking" fostered by Eduard Shev-
ardnadze and Mikhail Gorbachev in what was then the Soviet Union, and
then with the end of Communism as a force in world politics, I became
increasingly interested in the prospects for thinking of Soviet foreign
relations as a thing of the past. That project entailed, it seemed to me,
transcending concerns and assumptions that had strongly influenced for-
eign policy within the nations of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact during
the era of the Cold War, matters that had also contributed heavily to the
bipolar historiography of twentieth-century international relations that
prevailed during much of that same period. I found the basis for a fresh
historical examination, first of all, in the scholarly reinterpretation of the
early Soviet Union that had been underway in North America, the United
Kingdom, and Europe during the previous two decades or more and,
second, in the new appreciation of pre-Stalinist models for Soviet politics
and economy that flourished in the USSR during perestroika. As I pro-
ceeded, two things became evident to me. On the one hand, the politics,
economy, society, and culture of the USSR during the 1920s had been
researched much more extensively than had the foreign relations of those
same years, and on the other hand, the reconsideration of Soviet society
was taking place in Russia, Europe, and America apart from any compara-
ble examination of foreign relations. My project became therefore one of
both reexamining the situation of the Soviet Union in the world politics
and economy of the post-Revolution decade and one of integrating the
study of foreign policy with research into the domestic economy and
politics of the early USSR. This work thus spans the gap between those two
research areas, examines Soviet foreign relations in the context of the
ix
x / Acknowledgments
international history of the 1920s, and restores to them their crucial place
in the story of the early Soviet Union.
My debt is to those scholars who have engaged in the study of the early
USSR, who have increased our understanding and altered our conceptions
of the period, and on whose writings this work relies. I am especially
thankful to Ronald Suny, John Hatch, and posthumously, Kendall Bailes,
for sharing with me their knowledge and for generously giving me counsel
at various stages of this work. Donald Raleigh, who read the manuscript for
the Press, has earned my gratitude for his probing insights and helpful
suggestions. Lynn Mally unstintingly provided her assistance and erudi-
tion, and I owe her much both as a colleague and a friend. Patrick Morgan,
Keith Nelson, and Sergey Plekhanov have made the Foreign-Domestic
Nexus Project of the Center for Global Peace and Conflict Studies at the
University of California, Irvine, into an invaluable environment for the
exchange of information and ideas between Russian and American schol-
ars. Led by Anthony Adamthwaite, the Political Relations and Institutions
Group at the Center for the Study of Germany and Europe at the Univer-
sity of California, Berkeley, has become a significant forum for discussion
among historians and political scientists of contemporary Europe. This
work has benefited from the dialectic within both organizations.
My deepest gratitude goes to Georgi Derluguian of the Fernand Braudel
Center at State University of New York-Binghamton and the Peace and
Security Center at Cornell University for his guidance, insight, patience,
and wonderful sense of humor; I learned more from him about both the
Soviet Union and world politics than I can describe here. Carolyn Johnston-
Viens assisted me in the preparation of this work, and Corinne Antezana-
Pernet, Lynn Sharp, and Katherine Turley each contributed their great
efforts, exceptional talents, and unfailing good will to its completion. My
younger daughter Margreta not only assisted me in the research for this
book but also teased me unmercifully lest I take myself too seriously.
Pamela LaZarr and the staff of the Interlibrary Loan Service at the UCI
Library efficiently located and obtained a multitude of sources. Eleanor
Gates edited the manuscript both skillfully and expeditiously, and Dore
Brown produced this book from it.
I am fortunate in knowing Sheila Levine and Monica McCormick at the
University of California Press; I am grateful for their confidence in this
work; and I probably owe them more than they will ever tell me. My friend
and colleague Robert Moeller gave to me of his unfailing wisdom and his
fine cuisine often and without constraint. William Hamilton cooked for me
many more meals than I for him and has sustained me with his constant
Acknowledgments / xi
I n the late 1950s, George F. Kennan set out to explain to his fellow Ameri-
cans how Soviet Russia's place in world politics had been transformed, as he
stated it, from "the initial weakness of 1921 to the pinnacle of power and
success it occupies in the wake of World War II." In doing so, he gave a
major share of the credit for that transformation to the effectiveness of
Soviet diplomacy and to what he termed "Soviet resourcefulness and
single-mindedness of purpose." 1 In this work, I examine the beginnings of
the Soviet Union's historic rise to world power in the twentieth century
and explore the role that diplomacy and other instruments of foreign
relations played in that ascent. I consider the formative years of Soviet
foreign relations, from the time Soviet Russia first entered world politics in
1920-21—following the Russian Revolution, the Paris Peace Conference,
and the Civil War—to "the great turning point" in Soviet history in 1 9 2 8 -
29, when the economy, politics, and foreign relations of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics (USSR) were cast in the form they were to retain for
decades. The 1920s take us from Lenin's domination of Soviet politics up to
Stalin's emergence as the new leader with increasingly dictatorial powers.
It is in these years that the foreign relations of the U S S R took on their
characteristic features. In examining this period, I hope to clarify the terms
on which the USSR entered world politics, to contribute to an understand-
ing of how Soviet foreign relations were originally formulated and con-
ducted, to estimate how much credit can be assigned to diplomacy in
making the USSR a world power, and to identify some of the fundamental
tendencies of Soviet foreign relations.
Within Euro-American scholarship, the interpretation of early Soviet
foreign relations began with Louis Fischer's The Soviets in World Affairs
(1930), the work of a historian with direct knowledge of the events of the
1
2 / Introduction
time, with personal access to important Soviet diplomats, and with strong
sympathy for Georgii Chicherin, the people's commissar for foreign affairs
(1918-30), and his efforts to find for the USSR a place of equality, respect,
and stability among the major world powers. Interpretation continued
with three monumental achievements of perceptive and thoughtful schol-
arship completed at various stages of the Cold War—Theodore von Laue's
"Soviet Diplomacy: G. V. Chicherin, Peoples Commissar for Foreign Af-
fairs" (1953), George F. Kennan's Russia and the West under Lenin and
Stalin (1961), and Adam Ulam's Expansion and Coexistence (1968). 2 It was
further advanced following the détente of the 1970s by Teddy J. Uldricks in
his article "Russia and Europe: Diplomacy, Revolution, and Economic
Development in the 1920s" (1979), which analytically integrated early
Soviet politics, foreign relations, and strategies of economic development,
and which transcended the "totalitarian" and "Communist ideology" mod-
els of Soviet foreign relations that had prevailed since the 1950s. 3 Each of
these works considered the foreign relations of the 1920s comprehensively
and within a framework of concepts. Each advanced the analysis of policy to
a new level of sophistication.
The concept of early Soviet foreign relations informed by the total-
itarian and Communist ideology models was highly complex and nuanced;
specific aspects of it varied with time, circumstance, and proponent; how-
ever, it also had a basic logic, consistency, and coherence. As synthesized
briefly, it included the following concepts: (1) the USSR's foreign relations
were driven primarily by revolutionary ideology during this period; (2) the
destruction of capitalism by direct insurrectionary offensive was the cen-
tral intention of the first Soviet leadership cohort and the ultimate aim
of their regime; (3) the conduct of normalized political and commercial
relations was not genuinely representative of Soviet foreign policy and
amounted to no more than a facade and a temporary expedient to be
adopted only until proletarian revolution (aided by the Red Army if
necessary) destroyed democracy and capitalism everywhere; (4) Soviet
foreign relations were completely coherent and under the highly cen-
tralized control of the Politburo, which directed them by means of a
coordinated set of foreign policy instruments; (5) the diplomats of the
Foreign Affairs Commissariat played no influential role in the actual for-
mulation of policy; and (6) the Bolsheviks, their mentality, and their
diplomacy were exceptional in the history of world politics, not readily
comprehended by observers untrained in the ways of the Kremlin and not
to be analyzed in the same categories and terminology as were the foreign
relations of the liberal democracies of the free world.
By the late 1970s the explanatory power of these hypotheses had sharply
Introduction / 3
diminished. The totalitarian and Communist ideology models did not stand
up well to the close investigations and the changed perspectives that had
been incorporated into historical scholarship since the 1960s. Beginning at
that time, an ever-increasing body of documentation available from gov-
ernment, business, and personal archives in Germany, England, France, the
United States, and Eastern Europe enabled scholars to reconstruct some of
the contacts made between the diplomats, politicians, and trade representa-
tives of these nations and their Soviet counterparts during the 1920s. 4 By
utilizing these records, often in conjunction with published sources from
the USSR, diplomatic historians in Canada, the United States, Europe, the
United Kingdom, and Israel defined and analyzed the policies of the govern-
ments of Europe and America toward the USSR. Along with some Soviet
historians, they arrived at a more complete understanding of early Soviet
diplomacy itself and of Russia's role in the international relations of the
pre-Stalin era. Much of this scholarship was based on primary research. It
assiduously avoided overinterpretation and eschewed the assumptions of
Cold War history writing. Meanwhile, other scholars working primarily in
the United Kingdom and America undertook a réévaluation of the econ-
omy, society, politics, and culture of the U S S R during the 1920s. 5 Much of
this scholarship depended on a continually increasing flow of documenta-
tion from the USSR. Together with work done by Soviet historians during
the period of "the Khrushchev thaw" (1956-1964), 6 it transformed the
interpretation of early Soviet history. These two research endeavors—one
directed to foreign relations, the other to early Soviet society—developed
simultaneously. For the most part, however, they were undertaken without
reference to one another, a condition which by the late 1980s had come to be
deplored by experts in the field, Soviet and non-Soviet alike. 7
From the advances made in the study of early Soviet foreign relations,
the outlines of an interpretation that differs significantly from the one
influenced by the totalitarian and Communist ideology models can be
discerned and defined. The assumption that a revolutionary offensive in
Europe remained the distinguishing characteristic of Soviet foreign policy
after the end of the Civil War is giving way to three closely related notions:
(1) that the survival and consolidation of the revolution in Russia became
the paramount concern of Lenin's foreign relations sometime between
1917 and 1921; (2) that the security of the early Soviet state depended on
preserving the status quo in Europe that had been established by 1921; and
(3) that Soviet foreign policy was based on this precept. The view that post-
Civil War foreign policy was ideologically driven is being replaced by a
picture of Lenin as a political realist second to none and by a discussion of
foreign relations conceived in terms of power politics and conducted by
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159. Håålạ, hoomạ, baron baokạs oikealla runomitalla. G.
169. mårse G.
201. baatari G.
205. korrein.
209. vuonioh G.
Päivän pojat.
Ajastaikoja ajelit,
Viimein aalloista avautui,
Hiitten ranta rapsahutti.
Siellä Hiiden nuori neito,
Sokko-ukon neulojatar,
Pesi valkian valossa, 40.
Lyöpi, kolkkii vaattehia
Visutellen, valutellen.
Somistellen sievisteli
Kipeiksi rintojansa,
Siirti silmänsä välehen,
Käänsi päälle Päivän pojan:
"Mistäs tulet, mitä etsit,
Tuonenko pöytää, Päivän poika,
Isoseni himoherkku,
Itseni imupalanen, 50.
Vaivanpalke veljieni
Lankojeni atriainen?"
Päivän poika:
"Sarakka on mulle saanut
Lujat suonet, vahvat voimat
Isästäni, äitistäni,
Maidossa Uksakka mulle
Mieltä päähäni valutti.
Asetusta myöskin etsin,
Vihan, raivon vielidytintä. 60.
Elin-, kuolinkumppalia,
Onnessani ohjausta,
Vastuksissa varjelusta,
Vaivan, tuskan vaimennusta,
Syöjää metsän veden viljan,
Ilman toisen tuntiaista,
Jälkisuvun jättäjaistä."
Hiiden neiti:
"Kaikki vierähtää vereni,
Nousee neitinen poveni, 70.
Muuksi muuttuu mieliraukka.
Yhdistäkämme veremme,
Mielemme ja sydämemme,
Ilojen ja huolten päivät,
Sinä, vesa vieraan äitin!
Isälleni armahalle
Haastan mieleni, haluni,
Haikein kyynelin mä huudan
Emon mullan, tuohten päällä."
(Kysyy isältänsä. Sokia ukko ei suostu
kosijaan ilman koettamattansa ja miettien
hänet syödä sanoo ylönkatseisesti:)
"Käypä koita. Päivän poika, 80.
Lujain suonten sormikoukut;
Käsin, kourin koittakamme,
Kumman on sormet suonevammat,
Kumman kynnet kestävämmät!"
Hiisi:
"Kylläpä tuntuvi kovalta
Päivän pojan sormisuonet,
Kourakoukut Päivöläisen."
Hiisi kysyy:
"Vieläkö varaa veneessä.
Kantaako uimaris enemmän?" —
"Varaa kyll' on." — Lisää tuodaan.
(Morsian) karisutti neitikengät,
Varui vieraan äitin varjoon.
Veljen vieraan palveluhun,
Sai piilosta loihtuneuvot.
Kolme arkkua kodasta
Kantoi nuorten kammiosta
(Sini-, puna-, vaalean arkun)
Kolme solmua lisäksi,
Rauhan, sodan, tulen, veren,
Tuonen, taudin, ruton arkut,
Pesuliinan kolmisolmut:
Sarakan, Uks-, Maderakan,
Leyhkän, tuulen, myrskyn solmut.
Siveyden solmut kolme
Säilyttää sai Maderakka.
Hiisi:
"Päivän poika purjehtiva."
Työnsivät veneen vesille,
Riensivät taka-ajohon,
Nuorta noutamaan takaisin.
Kuuluvi jo airon isku,
Kohti saa kova kohina,
Äänten melske, aaltoin polske.
Neiti päästi ensisolmun;
Tuli tuulta puhellisin, 160.
Vei se venehen edemmäs,
Ajoi aaltoja koholle,
Niin ne jäivät jättiläiset.
Kiskoit airoja kovemmin.
Hiki silmistä sirisi,
Huusit, haastit uhkain älikäin.
Sappi kieliin, vihai sehui.
Morsian muisti sulhoansa.
Silmät välkkyy (välkkymällä),
Sydän sykkii (sykkimällä). 170.
Ikävöiden hää-iloa,
Munaskuut (sisässä) hyppii,
Sukuveret vierähtävät,
Katsoi ylkähän ja lausui:
"Kestääkö vene tuult' enemmän?"
"Vahva on masto, touvit vahvat."
Päästi veriliinan solmun,
Siitä nosti länsituuli
Meren lapset liikkehelle,
Pullistutti purjehia. 180.
Näkymästä jäivät veljet.
Veri kiehui, kosto kuohui,
Viimisvoimansa viritit,
Verta kasvot hikoilivat,
Ruskat rutkui, selkä notkui,
Kourat kiskoi, jytkii, nytkii,
Sydän hehkuu, venhe väistyy
Halki aaltojen ajavi.
Veljet alkoi saavutella.
Morsian: 190.
"Vieläkö sietäisi venonen
Tuulen kahta kauheamman?" —
Päästi solmun kolmannenki:
Itse Ilmari jo suuttui,
Pääpalvelja taivaan herran;
Pohjaisvanka taivahalta
Nosti myrskyn, mastot huojuu,
Purjeet pahoin paiskelehtii,
Vene hyppii kallistuen.
Itse morsian vetihen 200.
Alemmaksi purren pohjaan,
Peitti silmänsä säkenet.
Päivä uus' kun alkoi paistaa,
Veljet kiipii kukkulalle
Katsomaan mihin sisar päätyi.
Päivän säteissä sulivat,
Kivettyivät kallioksi.
Vaakessa he nähdään vielä,
Vaskivenhe kalliona.
(Muist.)
49—53. Tyttö sitä tarkottaa, että pikku vieras vaan sentähden olisi
saapunut, että tulisi jättiläisiltä syödyksi.
2.
"Kobbu sodn?" —
"Čappis āsin kalles súollet koddī,
Valtī älume, valtī āra hauteb.
Ju leb mon tu vārutam,
I kalk čappis āsīt altait,
Baikkala pēlīt kaddīt."
Jū tē aččes käddīt,
Orrutakkait oddosti, ceggoi.
Muistutuksia.
20. mehtsin. M.
24. hankāhiste.
48. čuohčutam. —
49. niära posld, muinoin läsnä oleva palvelija, tässä: yhen käden
palvelija.
50. čoggānādtam. —
64. juhčā.
89. keärak, kiärak veden pintaa suom. kärki; kerrēk il. hastav,
hastav.
177. kute.
180. tīvam.
208. peädnakines.
211. taktites.
221. oivemus.
Herjedal'ista.