Ambedk Enlightened India
Ambedk Enlightened India
Ambedk Enlightened India
Ambedkar
Towards an Enlightened India
PENGUIN BOOKS
Contents
Dedication
Introduction
Footnotes
Two: ‘We are against Brahmanism but not Brahmans …’: Beginning the Fight for Dalit
Human Rights
Three: ‘Gandhiji, I have no homeland’: The Round Table Conferences, the Poona Pact and
Nationalist Dilemmas
Five: ‘Against capitalism and Brahmanism’: Years of Class Radicalism
Eight: ‘Building a palace on a dung heap’: The Post-Independence Years
References
Bibliography
Acknowledgements
Copyright Page
PENGUIN BOOKS
AMBEDKAR
Among her numerous books focusing on social and economic issues are
Buddhism in India: Challenging Brahmanism and Caste (2003), Dalit
Visions (1995), Dalits and the Democratic Revolution (1994), Reinventing
Revolution: New Social Movements and the Socialist Tradition in India
(1993) and Cultural Revolt in a Colonial Society: The Non-Brahman
Movement in Maharashtra (1966). She has also collaborated with Bharat
Patnakar in translations from the Marathi into English.
To Prachi, and all the young generations of Indians, Indian-
Americans and other Americans who are learning to see
Ambedkar as one of the greatest leaders of modern India and
to struggle for the overcoming of caste and Brahmanism
Introduction
It was clear from his youth that Bhimrao Ambedkar would be a leader of
his community. Not only were there the extravagant prophecies of greatness
made by his mendicant uncle but his father had also pushed him in the
direction of ‘social service’. The young Bhim had expressed this aspiration
himself, arguing to the maharaja of Baroda that he hoped to combine a
career of employment in the state with social service and academic writing.
So highly educated a member of the untouchable community would take a
position of leadership. Thus in the 1920s, when Ambedkar returned from
London to take up a life of earning, he inevitably turned his attention to
politics.
It was a period when India was ablaze with social turmoil. The nationalist
movement was taking on new vigour with the leadership of an unlikely
South-Africa-returned lawyer named Mohandas Gandhi. A working- class
movement was surging, fuelled by a new doctrine fresh from revolutionary
triumphs in the old land of tsarism. And, finally, though less organized,
searching for leadership and ideology, and sporadic but ever-stronger,
movements of the caste-oppressed were rising. Along with the Marxists and
nationalists, Dalits and non-Brahmans throughout India were stirring and
turning to direct political assertion as the Montagu–Chelmsford reforms
opened up possibilities of empowerment, promising opportunities for them
if they could only gain political support to prevent upper castes from
monopolizing political and economic positions.
Dalit movements had been going on throughout India since the
nineteenth century. Dalits had fought for education, for gaining wastelands
for cultivation, for temple entry and, above all, for access to public space
and the use of roads and public transport. They had gained patronage from
various social reform organizations and from Christian missionaries. In
Maharashtra the Dalit movement won support and inspiration from the
Satyashodhak Samaj, founded by Phule in 1875. It also had an additional
cause, as demobilized Mahars began to agitate for re-entry into the army.
With some resources—a little land, a base in the textile mills, jobs as cooks
and butlers for Europeans, meagre pensions from the army—they generated
caste and sub-caste associations everywhere. Mahars were the first in
Maharashtra to organize themselves. Activists even in small towns like
Ahmednagar fought to get drinking water from public tanks. Gopal Baba
Walangkar, a pensioned soldier from Ratnagiri, led intense campaigns and
petitioning against the closure of military service. Shivaram Janba Kamble,
a butler in the Masonic hall in Poona, organized conferences, movements
and petitions in the area from 1903 to 1930.
After 1917-18 the nationalist movement also began to turn to taking up
the issue of untouchability. With the Second World War coming to an end
and the Montagu–Chelmsford reforms stimulating a new assertion of Dalits
and non-Brahmans, the old position, symbolized by the social
conservativism of Lokmanya Tilak’s slogan of ‘political reform before
social reform’, was no longer viable. The first resolution on untouchability
was passed in the 1916 Congress session in Calcutta. Organizations like the
Hindu Mahasabha also began to concern themselves with the issue.
In Maharashtra the most powerful social reform organization was the
Depressed Classes Mission led by an upper-caste Maratha scholar and
social reformer, Vitthal Ramji Shinde, and backed by the Brahman
reformers of the Prarthana Samaj. Shinde, a supporter of the Congress, had
founded the Depressed Classes Mission in 1906, focusing on education and
the propagation of a reformed Hinduism. He was also a major opponent of
the Non-Brahman Party in Maharashtra, attempting to bring Marathas into a
Congress-oriented political front. Thus Shinde’s educational efforts were
linked to drawing untouchables into the Hindu political and cultural
framework.
The direction of upper caste reform efforts was shown by three
Asprushyata Nirvaran (Untouchability Relief) conferences held in 1917 and
1918 by the nationalists. The first had intended to draw in Ambedkar by a
resolution felicitating him, but he had left for Baroda and the meeting had
to be held in his absence. A resolution at this conference called for backing
the joint proposals for reform made by the Indian National Congress and
the Muslim League, though this motion was opposed by the most important
Dalit present, G.A. Gavai of Nagpur. Gavai was a Hindu-Mahasabha-
oriented Mahar, who later was to become a major opponent of Ambedkar.
In a second meeting held in Bombay in March 1918, the organizers opposed
Dalit conversions. A third meeting in May held in Bijapur was attended by
Mahatma Gandhi, who himself strikingly made the point that a resolution
on untouchable support for Congress efforts had no meaning since no one
responded to his request for all actual untouchables present to identify
themselves. Thus none of these efforts could claim to be representative of
the untouchables themselves.
The growing non-Brahman movement became a stronger contender for
untouchable support. The Satyashodhak Samaj spread throughout much of
rural and urban Maharashtra after 1910, with the powerful support of the
maharaja of Kolhapur. It propagated the rejection of caste and Brahmanic
authority, and identified Shudras and Ati-Shudras (non-Brahmans and
Dalits) as original inhabitants enslaved by oppressive Aryan invaders. This
‘non-Aryan’ theme had wide appeal, with the non-Brahman movement in
Madras Presidency seeing non-Aryans as Dravidians and Aryans as
northern invaders. It was also adopted by most of the Dalit movements of
the 1920s, which began to define themselves as ‘Original inhabitants’—
Adi-Dravidas, Adi-Andhras, Adi-Hindus and Adi-Dharmis.
By 1917 non-Brahmans everywhere began to mobilize politically. This
gave rise to the Justice Party in the Madras Presidency and in Maharashtra
to the Non-Brahman Party.
The patron of the Maharashtra movement, Shahu Chhatrapati, the
maharaja of Kolhapur, was not himself an adherent of the Satyashodhak
Samaj. As a descendant of Shivaji, he claimed Kshatriya (and thus, in the
language of the time, Aryan) status, but he was fervently anti-Brahman.
Initially provoked by the refusal of his family priest to use rituals
recognizing his Kshatriya status, he turned against the entire Brahman
elite’s nationalist establishment. This led to an all-around programme of
reforms, which aimed to bring non-Brahmans into the administration of the
state and provide them with education and economic opportunity. In 1902,
while on a tour of Europe, he issued a government order for the recruitment
of only non-Brahmans into state service until they formed 50 per cent of the
posts. This was the beginning of the reservation system in India.
Untouchables were part of these reforming efforts. Shahu sponsored a
hostel for them in Kolhapur city and helped them set up small businesses
such as tea shops. He also struck a personal blow against untouchability by
stopping for tea there when he returned from hunting trips and forcing his
proud hunting companions to do likewise—a remarkable action in the early
twentieth century. *
The fierce attacks on casteism and Brahman dominance of the movement
may have appealed to the young Ambedkar, but the relationships he formed
with leaders like Shahu also had a social base. Shinde and his Depressed
Classes Mission antagonized Ambedkar by their apparently bland
assumption that they could represent the interests of untouchables; they
made no effort to take him or other untouchable leaders into their
confidence when they were formulating demands. Nor was there any effort
to share food with untouchables. In contrast, Shahu was not only willing to
take tea and food from them but also understood the need for autonomy.
Shahu met Ambedkar in 1920, when he made a donation to support a
bimonthly, Mooknayak, which Ambedkar was to supervise and which
would be managed by a young graduate, D.D. Gholap. (The paper ran only
for a year or so.) He sponsored a two-day conference at Mangaon in
Kolhapur state on 19 and 20 March 1920 felicitating Ambedkar. At the
conference Shahu said that previously he had also alienated himself from
Dalits, but from this time he intended to behave with full equality and
humanity. He also provided monetary support at crucial times, as with
Ambedkar’s second trip to London.
Perhaps as important was a personal rapport established between the two
leaders from the beginning. They could meet as equals, in spite of
considerable differences in their social and economic conditions, and
discussed the problems of caste and Brahmanism in a way that didn’t seem
possible for Ambedkar with the elite social reformers. Whatever the
qualitative difference between the humiliation that Shahu experienced in
being treated by his family priests and the Brahman elite as a ‘Shudra’ and
the bitter discrimination Ambedkar had to confront, they still shared a
common experience of caste discrimination. In spite of the occasional help
from Brahman supporters throughout this early period of Ambedkar’s life,
he seems to have found more of a ‘social’ meeting ground with non-
Brahmans. His own traits of stubbornness and a fierce determination to win
were given more scope by the way in which Shahu could couple his
patronage with scope for autonomy.
Ambedkar’s first political act brought him into conflict with Vitthal
Ramji Shinde. This was with regard to giving testimony before the
Southborough Commission, which had been set up after the Montagu–
Chelmsford reforms to tour India and survey the opinions of Indians on the
franchise. With regard to untouchables, Shinde and Chandavarkar, as the
most well-known social activists working on the issue, were invited by the
government, which did not seem to feel a need to seek any direct
untouchable testimony. Shinde’s proposals called for a franchise for
untouchables wider than the general one but still limited to those with
fourth standard education. Ambedkar submitted his memorandum on his
own, calling for separate electorates with eleven untouchables to be selected
by vote (with a much lowered franchise) from delineated constituencies in
Bombay Presidency; these would then choose one representative to the
Legislature. Thus, the two memoranda from Maharashtrians were the most
important ones on Dalit issues laid before the committee.
Ambedkar followed this up with a direct attack on Shinde. Along with
Shahu Maharaj, he travelled to Nagpur for a three-day ‘All-India
Conference of the Boycotted’ (Akhil Bharatiya Bahishkrut Parishad). Here
Ambedkar pushed for a resolution against Shinde, arguing that Shinde’s
proposals would leave untouchables under the domination of the upper
castes. Even after this Ambedkar continued to campaign against Shinde’s
leadership, and when resistance to autocratic behaviour within the hostels
arose from some of the Dalit students, he supported them. Shinde ended up
retiring in some disillusionment from his efforts for the uplift of
untouchables.
More sustained organizing began with Ambedkar’s return from London
in 1923. People of the community gathered at his house constantly; the
demand for taking up action programmes was growing. On 9 March 1924
he took the first step by forming the Bahishkrut Hitakarni Sabha, with
himself as president of the managing committee and with distinguished
supporters such as Sir Chimanlal Setalvad, K.F. Nariman and others on the
board. The term ‘bahiskrut’, which had been used by a small organization in
Akola district in 1920, was perhaps the first effort by untouchables
themselves to find an appropriate nomenclature. Its stated objectives were
to spread education, improve economic conditions and represent the
grievances of the Depressed Classes. The sabha started a small library in
Parel and, with a grant from the municipality, a hostel for Depressed Class
students in Sholapur. It also began to hold rallies and conferences
throughout the Marathi-speaking areas.
Through the Bahishkrut Hitakarni Sabha, Ambedkar emerged as a mass
organizer. He proved to be a powerful speaker, rationally expounding Dalit
problems but at times being emotional and impulsive. Khairmode (1958,
2:99, 144–45) gives an example of a meeting in Satara at which a Brahman
speaker, Soman, criticized untouchable requests to be taken into
government service at a time when the national movement was calling for
boycott of official positions. Ambedkar rose and turned on him, savagely
and relentlessly attacking the hypocrisy of Brahmans who had monopolized
the bureaucracy for so long and were objecting on nationalist grounds now
that Dalits were beginning to get some education.
At the same time, untouchable issues were beginning to be put forward in
the Legislative Council. S.K. Bole, a member of the Non-Brahman Party
from the Konkan, moved a bill opening up public places to untouchables,
which was eventually passed, though without mention of temples.
Similarly, a bill was brought by the untouchable representative, D.D.
Gholap, to abolish the Mahar Watan—the first shot in what was to be a
protracted struggle on this issue. Watan lands were those traditionally held
by Mahars in exchange for their village services; the British had ratified the
lands at lower than usual revenue rates while continuing to extract the
unpaid services.
In 1926 Ambedkar was appointed, along with Dr P.G. Solanki, a Gujarati
untouchable leader, to the Bombay Legislative Council. It was the
beginning of a long, distinguished, articulate career as legislator that would
continue until his death. He participated vigorously in council debates;
when he confronted hostile questions—which was often, given his
provocative (to the orthodox) speeches and interruptions—he was always
ready with a reply. Once challenged by nationalists to remember that he was
‘a part of the whole’, he replied, ‘But I am not a part of the whole, I am a
part apart!’
Meanwhile, the first great mass struggle of untouchables was about to
begin. It focussed on the issue of water rights—the most basic human need
but one which was nevertheless denied to those considered to be polluting.
The setting was the small town of Mahad in the Konkan, where the
municipality had already passed a resolution proclaiming its tank open to
untouchables. Links to Bombay were strong here, with many Dalits and
caste Hindus migrating to work in the textile mills. Ambedkar had both a
Dalit base and several supporters among progressive caste Hindus,
particularly the Kayasthas (Chandraseniya Kayastha Prabhus or CKPs as
they were known in Maharashtra). These included Anantrao Chitre, a CKP
activist of the Bahishkrut Hitakarni Sabha; Surendranath Tipnis, another
CKP leader who was president of the municipality; and G.N. Sahasrabudhe,
a Brahman of the Social Service League led by the Bombay labour leader
N.M. Joshi. Chitre and Tipnis were later to be elected members of the
Legislative Assembly from Ambedkar’s Independent Labour Party, while
Sahasrabudhe went on to become editor of Ambedkar’s weekly Janata,
which he founded in 1930.
On 19 and 20 March 1927 the Bahishkrut Hitakarni Sabha sponsored a
Kolaba District Bahishkrut conference in Mahad. On the second day,
Anantrao Chitre unexpectedly proposed to move to the tank and drink the
water. ‘As decided beforehand I threw a bombshell,’ he reported. The
enthusiastic crowd of 1500 surged forward, went to the tank and began to
drink. As the news spread throughout the town, angry caste Hindus began
to gather and, fearing a further ‘onslaught’ on the temple, they attacked,
beating up many of the offending untouchables. Subsequently, a purification
ceremony was held by Brahmans.
This incident and the rioting and resulting police cases resounded
throughout Maharashtra. Mahad now became a focus of a campaign that
roused the Dalit community throughout the state and won publicity in India
as a whole. Ambedkar announced a satyagraha conference in December to
establish the right to water and also established the Bahishkrut Bharat, a
bimonthly journal of eight to twelve pages that came out until September
and then continued at irregular intervals until 1930. It was published from
an office in Damodar Hall, with Ambedkar dictating most of the material to
a team of enthusiastic students. It reported support meetings and discussions
of the Mahad programme and of the Mahar Watan Bill—the most important
issue pending in the Assembly—and it covered all kinds of meetings of
untouchables or ‘bahishkrut’ gatherings, as they were known at the time, as
well as the ‘untouchability removal’ programmes of the Congress.
Furthermore, it reported on political events of varying kinds and discussed
religious and cultural issues.
Bahishkrut Bharat’s writers criticized the shuddhi (purification)
movement of the Arya Samaj, noting that while the original idea had been
to use shuddhi to create an Arya Samaj purified of caste, now the
destruction of caste was forgotten and the goal became simply to bring
more and more people into the Hindu fold. There was friendly but sharp
criticism of non-Brahman and Satyashodhak activities. Significantly, one
point centred on a demand raised by Dinkarrao Javalkar and Keshavrao
Jedhe, then emerging as the young militant leaders of the movement, that no
Brahman be allowed to take part in the forthcoming satyagraha. Ambedkar
replied that their movement was not against Brahmans as such but against
‘Brahamanic religion’, which included those non-Brahmans involved in it.
He summarized the differences by saying that ‘we are against Brahmanism
but not Brahmans, whereas they are against Brahmans but not Brahmanism’
(Janata 29 July 1927). Finally, reports of religious conversion, especially to
Islam, and discussions of its necessity were held, with Ambedkar
significantly announcing in bold type in his own article, ‘We have to
consider whether the Hindu religion is our own or not’ (Bahishkrut Bharat
29 July 1927). Various temple entry movements—including one in Amraoti
—were reported, and the Mahar Watan Bill was discussed extensively.
By 23 December 1927 tremendous interest had been aroused in the
Mahad tank issue, and some 10,000 to 15,000 Dalits gathered under a
pavilion decorated with a photo of Gandhi. Then the district magistrate
issued an injunction against using the tank. Ambedkar decided to honour
this, and prepared another symbolic but powerful act: a plan to burn the
Manusmriti, which had been established as the traditional law book of
Brahmanic Hinduism. The resolution to burn it was a multi-caste one,
moved by the Brahman Sahasrabudhe and seconded by the Chambhar
leader P.N. Rajbhoj. It was burned on the night of the first day of the
conference. On the third day of the gathering, a militant procession was
held with slogans shouted in the name of the Bhakti saints, Gandhi, Agarkar
and Shahu Maharaj. On the same day Ambedkar held a separate meeting
with the women, who were attending in large numbers. He began by telling
them to leave aside the heavy silver jewellery used by the lower castes and
dress as upper-caste women did, leaving no markers to indicate caste. He
concluded with the advice to educate daughters as well as sons. Mahad
from this time on became an important centre of Ambedkar’s organizing
efforts; a base of activity that had enthusiastic untouchable participation and
important cooperation from a team of upper-caste leaders.
This targeting of one of the sacred ‘shastras’ of Hinduism linked the right
to equal use of public space and facilities with the religious discrimination
from which untouchables suffered. The 1920s had seen an increased
consciousness about untouchable rights; temple entry movements were
being proposed, though the major struggle at the Guruvayoor temple in
Kerala centred simply on the rights of untouchables to use the road crossing
in front of the temple. This Gandhi had helped engineer a compromise on,
while E.V. Ramasamy ‘Periyar’ emerged as a hero of the struggle. A
struggle over the Parvati temple in Pune and then over the Rama temple at
Nashik also began at this time. Ambedkar, however, did not get involved
directly in any of these efforts, though he was the formal leader of the
Nashik satyagraha, but instead focussed on secular citizenship rights and on
actions implying to most the rejection of Hinduism itself. The issue of
Bahishkrut Bharat published at the time of the Mahad conference had in
fact contained a sharp critique of Gandhi’s effort to maintain untouchables
within the fold of Hinduism.
At the same time, Ambedkar did not accept the interpretation of caste in
terms of Aryan conquest. Nor was he willing to fully condemn ‘Hinduism’,
but was reading extensively during this period, buying books on the
literature of the Bhakti movement, Tukaram and Dnyaneswar, and studying
writings of social reformers. In this area as everywhere autonomy was the
theme—his interpretation was to be his own, worked out through his own
effort, his own study, his own experience. He may also have been working
through the tradition of devotionalism symbolized by his father’s
participation in the Kabirpanth, becoming aware of the way in which
Kabir’s radicalism was absorbed within a Brahmanical framework.
His other activities continued. In 1925–26 two politically significant
cases were taken up in his legal practice. One was the defence of Deschace
Dushman, a fiery anti-Brahman booklet written by Dinkarrao Javalkar. In it
Javalkar attacked Lokmanya Tilak and Vishnushastri Chipulunkar in
provocative, vituperative language as ‘enemies of the country’, while
holding up Gandhi as a positive alternative. Jedhe and Javalkar, along with
two other non-Brahman activists, lost the case. Ambedkar took up the
appeal and won their release, arguing bias on the part of the original judge
who had agreed with the depiction of Phule as a pseudo-Christian. In
another case, Ambedkar joined the victorious defence of India and China
written by Philip Spratt, one of the British Communists who had come to
India to build the Communist movement here. This case was also won.
In 1926 Ambedkar also gave evidence before the Royal Commission on
Currency and Finance and published a booklet on the rupee—pound
exchange rate. This analysed the effects of devaluation on different classes
in India and argued for a relatively low value to the rupee. Ambedkar’s
economic capacities were now being recognized by the British government.
As a member of the Bombay Legislative Council, Ambedkar emerged as
a powerful voice. His most important bill was on the Mahar Watan, which
continued as an issue for decades. The Mahars traditionally had village
duties as one of the twelve balutedars, or village servants, for which they
received various perquisites and small allotments of land. The British
regime used the system, assigning the land to the Mahars with revenue
payments that were reduced from the normal rent. Mahars were thus forced
to perform for bureaucrats all kinds of free labour, in unspecified numbers
and at unspecified hours. With non-Brahman support, a similar bill against
the Joshi Watan had passed, ending the legal sanction behind the traditional
payments given to village priests. The only reason for the British
government to oppose the Mahar Watan Bill was clearly because the cost of
the labour involved would have been far too much for them to pay directly.
The Mahar Watan was in fact a prime example of the way British colonial
regime could exploit a feudal type of surplus appropriation for its own use,
and it resisted changing it until the end.
Iin September 1927 Ambedkar gathered a group of caste Hindus,
Christians and untouchables to form the Samta Samaj Sangh, campaigning
for intercaste meals and marriages. Little came of this. Efforts at
intermarriage proved of no avail, when the one potential Maratha candidate
for a marriage with a Mahar girl did not turn up, but the organization also
made hesitant attempts to promote Vedic ceremonies among untouchables,
perhaps evidence that at this point Ambedkar was not ready to fight all
forms of Hinduism.
The 1920s ended with the Simon Commission and proposal for round
table conferences to create a new constitutional framework for India. The
Congress was boycotting the commission, and in a powerful nationalist
wave, the Muslim League and even the Justice Party of Madras also
boycotted it. But Ambedkar and other Dalits (urged on by Periyar in Tamil
Nadu) were determined to testify. In all, eighteen organizations of
untouchables came before the commission. Ambedkar’s long memorandum
was submitted in two parts at the end of May 1928, and his testimony on
behalf of the Bahishkrut Hitakarni Sabha was given on 23 October. His
memorandum called for provincial autonomy and adult suffrage and
rejected community- and caste-based electorates even for Muslims. He
argued that Muslims, untouchables, Anglo-Indians and non-Brahmans
should get reserved seats, and he asked for a 140-member council for
Bombay Province, of which thirty-three would be Muslims and fifteen
untouchables. He also called for representation in public services. In the
emotion-laden atmosphere of nationalism, the students in his law class
walked out in protest. In stark contrast, his Dalit supporters described his
memorandum as a ‘manifesto of untouchable rights’. Thus the 1920s closed
with the fight for Dalit human rights and a growing organizational and vocal
opposition to the spokesmen of Indian nationalism, prefiguring greater
conflicts to come.
Three
One of the great failures of the Indian nationalist movement is that it took
place so much at odds with the assertion of Dalits and other oppressed
castes. This need not have happened. Ambedkar, after all, had taken his
very name from a Brahman schoolteacher and had numerous upper-caste
friends. His instincts were fundamentally nationalist. His orientation to
development and economic issues had similarities with those of Nehru and
the leftists, in spite of his critique of their neglect of caste. He even
expressed some hope that Gandhi’s desire to combine social issues with
political concerns would help the untouchables. Yet the Brahmanic Hindu
framework of Gandhi’s concerns led to a major clash with Ambedkar.
Ambedkar’s modified scepticism about the Congress turned into
bitterness with the events of 1930–32, and at the centre of this was
Mahatma Gandhi. This period saw the Round Table Conferences, Gandhi’s
opposition to separate electorates for untouchables, bis fast in protest
against the Ramsey MacDonald Award and the setting up of the Harijan
Sevak Sangh as the main Congress-sponsored organization working with
untouchables.
On 8 August 1930, in preparation for the First Round Table Conference,
Ambedkar called an All-India Depressed Classes Conference in Nagpur.
Resolutions at the conference demanded immediate dominion status,
rejected the Simon Commission report and asked for adult suffrage with
safeguards for untouchables that included representation in legislative
councils (through reserved seats if there were adult suffrage) and
reservation in public service. This approval of reserved seats with a general
electorate contrasted with the demands of other Indian untouchable leaders,
who at that time were asking for separate electorates.
Ambedkar’s presidential speech elaborated on these themes. He argued
forcefully that the multiplicity of castes, races, religions and languages
could not come in the way of India’s readiness for independence. His
eloquent and scathing indictment of imperialism attacked Britain for the
impoverishment of India and for doing nothing to lighten either the burden
of untouchability or the exploitation of peasants and workers. Finally, his
reference to ‘capitalists’ and ‘landlords’ and his characterization of the
Congress leaders as ‘feudalists’ indicate the growing influence of socio-
economic radicalism on his thinking.
The 1930 speech shows Ambedkar as a nationalist. His nationalism was
one in which independence from British rule was a precondition for
creating an egalitarian, caste-free society. This nationalism, like that of
Phule, Periyar and other leaders of the anti-caste movement, centred mostly
on issues involving the construction of the nation as a democracy, not just
on the transfer of power to Indians. It can be described as ‘nation-building’.
His unique contribution was to give this concept a fully modernist thrust—
the society he wanted was democratic and rational, embodying
Enlightenment values, expressed in the French Revolution trinity of liberty,
equality and fraternity. British colonial rule was an obstacle to this. Still, it
was less inimical to untouchables than to elites, who suffered the immediate
loss of power. The low castes, however, had gained concrete benefits from
the opening up of education and employment. Themes such as the
‘destruction of our culture’ and calls to defend tradition could have little
appeal to those who had suffered from the dark side of that tradition. Thus
Ambedkar’s attitude towards the British was more of a tactical one; as he
said later, while they were his enemies, so were upper-caste nationalists,
and ‘we cannot fight two enemies at once’.
The position was symbolized by Koregaon, a village outside Pune, where
Ambedkar began to hold yearly rallies. Here, on 1 January 1818, the British
had fought a decisive battle against the Peshwa’s forces. The British erected
a memorial to the Indian soldiers in the British army who had died during
the battle, and of the forty-nine names recorded on this, twenty-two were
Mahar. In his rallies Ambedkar said succinctly that Mahars had brought the
British to power in India and that Mahars could drive them out. The
implication was that the battle would not be undertaken to restore anything
like the hated caste-feudal regime of the Peshwas. The symbolism of
Koregaon was powerful. Many Maharashtrian Dalits still describe it as the
first battle in the untouchable liberation movement, and even today, masses
gather at Koregaon every year.
In October 1930 Ambedkar departed for London along with M.N.
Srinivasan of Madras as representatives of India’s untouchables to the First
Round Table Conference. They were given an enthusiastic send-off in a
meeting of 10,000 activists and volunteers presided over by the Chambhar
leader S.N. Shivtarkar and with a rousing speech given by K.A. Keluskar.
At the conference, Ambedkar participated in several committee meetings,
always presenting well-articulated arguments. He gave most attention to the
Federal Structure Committee, where he argued for a strong central
government, noting that a government had welfare functions to undertake—
mainly those for such oppressed groups as the untouchables—as well as
those of defence and minimal administration.
He was unequivocal in arguing that the political power needed by
untouchables could only be won in the framework of an independent India.
In his opening speech on 20 November 1930, he restated the themes of his
Nagpur speech.
The bureaucratic form of Government in India should be replaced by a government which will
be a Government of the people, by the people and for the people … The Government of India
does realize the necessity of removing the social evils which are eating into the vitals of Indian
society and which have blighted the lives of the downtrodden classes for years. The
Government of India does realize that the landlords are squeezing the masses dry and that the
capitalists are not giving the leaders a living wage and decent conditions of labour. Yet it is a
most painful thing that it has not dared to touch any of these evils … We feel that nobody can
remove our grievances as well as we can, and we cannot remove them unless we get political
power in our own hands. No share of this political power can evidently come to us as long as
the British Government remains as it is. It is only in a Swaraj constitution that we stand any
chance of getting the political power in our own hands … We know that political power is
passing from the British into the hands of those who wield such tremendous economic, social
and religious sway over our existence. We are willing that it may happen (Ambedkar 1982, 2:
503–04).
But his arguments for a unitary state and adult suffrage with reserved
seats and safeguards for untouchables remained a minority position. The
Round Table Conferences would end by shaping the 193S Government of
India Act, which constituted ‘India’ as a federation of provinces and left
princely states as autonomous units, undemocratic constituents of a
democratizing country. Suffrage was slightly expanded, but still only
qualified 30 million people to vote, and left responsible government at the
provincial level highly qualified by the residual powers given to British-
appointed governors. In spite of earlier commitments to the Depressed
Classes, separate electorates were given only to Muslims and Sikhs.
On his return from the first conference, Ambedkar was again met by an
impressive delegation of the Samta Sainik Dal. Before he left London, he
had purchased a printing press. The British secret police reported a visit of
his to the Daily Worker office, but the Indian police replied that he must
only have been seeking help for the press and that he was on the black list
of both Indian and English Communists. This press was to be used for
Janata, which remained Ambedkar’s weekly newspaper throughout most of
his career.
The first conference was followed by the Congress calling off its Civil
Disobedience movement and a pact between Gandhi and Lord Irwin, then
Viceroy of India, resulting in Gandhi’s appearance at the Second Round
Table Conference with all the prestige of the national movement behind
him. It was this that led to a full-scale confrontation between Gandhi and
Ambedkar, both claiming to be the real representative of India’s
untouchables.
Ambedkar had his first personal meeting with Gandhi in August 1931 in
Bombay. It was an uncomfortable one. When Gandhi talked about what he
had done for the sake of social reform, Ambedkar responded angrily that
‘all old and elderly persons always like to emphasize the point of age’ and
accused the Congress of giving no more than formal recognition to
untouchables and wasting the funds allotted for the work. He concluded,
‘Gandhiji, I have no homeland.’ Gandhi replied that from his reports, ‘I
know you are a person of sterling worth.’ Ambedkar retorted, ‘How can I
call this land my own homeland and this religion my own wherein we are
treated worse than cats and dogs, wherein we cannot get water to drink?’
Later, in a discussion with his secretary Mahadev Desai, Gandhi admitted,
‘Till I went to England, I did not know he was a Harijan. I thought he was
some Brahman who took a deep interest in Harijans and therefore talked
intemperately’ (Keer 1990, 165–68). This reaction was revelatory of the
stereotypes about Dalits that Gandhi held. Ambedkar was called to meet
Gandhi a second time in London on the evening of 26 September, before
Gandhi’s appearance at the Minorities Committee. In spite of initial feelings
of futility, he elaborated his position for three hours, while Gandhi,
spinning, listened mutely. Gandhi’s failure to reply contrasted with his
discussions with Jinnah and disillusioned Ambedkar, who saw Gandhi’s
behaviour as ‘Chanakya niti’, an attempt simply to gauge the position of an
irreconcilable opponent.
Exactly how irreconcilable the positions were became clear during their
confrontation at the conference itself. Speaking to the Minorities
Committee on 8 October 1931, Gandhi called for its adjournment on the
grounds that no compromise could be reached and suggested that informal
consultations would solve the ‘communal problem’. Since he had already
agreed to separate electorates in his talks with Jinnah, the ‘communal
problem’ was clearly that of the untouchables.
After this speech, Ambedkar and Gandhi faced each other with emotion
and eloquence, each claiming to be the spokesperson for the untouchables.
Ambedkar stressed empowerment and political protection of the Dalits.
Gandhi, on the other hand, argued in a paternalist vein, ‘What these people
need more than anything else is protection from social and religious
persecution’ (Ambedkar 1982, 2:661). When the Minorities Committee
failed to reach a consensus, Ambedkar responded to Gandhi’s implication
that as a government appointee he could not be considered a true
representative of untouchables, arguing that, ‘I have not the slightest doubt
that even if the Depressed Classes of India were given the chance of
electing their representative to this Conference, I would all the same find a
place here’ (Ambedkar 1982, 2:661). He denied Gandhi’s claim that the
Congress represented the untouchables by noting that there was little
evidence of that anywhere in the Congress.
Gandhi went on to make an emotional plea for his claim to represent
untouchables.
The claims advanced on behalf of the Untouchables, that to me is the unkindest cut of all. It
means the perpetual bar-sinister … I claim myself in my own person to represent the vast mass
of the Untouchables. Here I speak not merely on behalf of the Congress, but I speak on my
own behalf, and I claim that I would get, if there was a referendum of the Untouchables, their
vote, and that I would top the poll … I would rather see that Hinduism the than that
Untouchability live … I say that it is not a proper claim by Dr Ambedkar when he seeks to
speak for the whole of the Untouchables of India. It will create a division in Hinduism which I
cannot possibly look forward to with any satisfaction whatsoever … I cannot possibly tolerate
what is in store for Hinduism if there are two divisions set forth in the villages. Those who
speak of the political rights of the Untouchables do not know their India, do not know how
Indian society is today constructed, and therefore I want to say with all the emphasis that I can
command that if I was the only person to resist this thing I would resist it with my life’
(Ambedkar 1982, 2:663–64).
Here, Gandhi was speaking in religious terms, not for Indian interests; as
a Hindu and not a ‘national’ leader. Further, he was identifying Ambedkar’s
claims for empowerment with a separate identity for Dalits at the village
level—just as Muslim claims for separate electorates were being admitted
in terms of their religious identity. It was characteristic of Gandhi that
throughout his life he resisted any implication that Dalits had a separate
identity from the assumed community of Hindus.
The question of untouchable representation broke up the Second Round
Table Conference. It ended in stalemate. All the Indian representatives
returned, and both the Congress and Ambedkar attempted to rally the
support of the untouchables for their position.
Most of the known Dalit activists in the country supported Ambedkar’s
position, and most continued to do so throughout. For instance, Swami
Acchutanand of Uttar Pradesh, founder of the Adi-Hindu movement that
argued for an original egalitarian community on which conquering Aryans
imposed their caste system, toured to rally support. Hyderabad Dalit
leaders, heading a strong, if often factionalized, movement, also did so. But
M.C. Rajah, the dominant Dalit spokesman of the Madras Presidency and a
member of the Central Legislature who had originally called for separate
electorates, changed his position. He joined B.S. Moonje of the Hindu
Mahasabha, who had also originally supported separate electorates. Now
Moonje argued that separate electorates did not necessarily mean that
untouchables constituted a non-Hindu community; it would see them as
similar to Sikhs who the Mahasabha considered Hindus but who had been
granted separate electorates. Now the new Moonje—Rajah pact supported
joint electorates. It claimed the backing of Rajah’s 40,000-member
Depressed Classes Association and had the support of G.A. Gavai of
Nagpur. (Gavai’s support, however, had little mass base, which became
clear when he could do little to counter an oppressive gathering called by
Ambedkar at Kamptee, near Nagpur, on 7 May 1932.) Ambedkar then made
another trip to London at the end of May, lobbying with members of the
British Cabinet for his position. The result of all these manoeuverings was
to swing British support towards Ambedkar, and Ramsey MacDonald’s
Communal Award given on 16 August 1932 provided for separate
electorates for untouchables as well as Muslims and gave them seventy-
eight seats in the Central Legislature, along with a double vote, one in the
general electorate and one in the separate electorate.
In opposition, Gandhi announced an indefinite fast, beginning on 20
September. While Gandhi presented this protest as an attempt to arouse
Hindus against the ‘sin’ of untouchability, his focus was clearly against a
separate identity for Dalits. In a statement sent on 15 September to the
Bombay government, Gandhi stated that his fast, which ‘was resolved upon
in the name of God for His work and, as I believe in all humility, at his
call’, was ‘aimed to statutory separate electorates in any shape or form, for
the depressed classes’. It was thus a fast directed against Ambedkar.
A flurry of activity took place as Congress leaders lobbied for their
position, arranging meetings of Dalit groups to support joint electorates and
consolidating caste Hindu support. The pressure on Ambedkar became
intense, since Gandhi’s assertion that separate electorates would divide
caste Hindus and Dalits in every village was now, ironically, likely to be
proved murderously true if he should die in protest against these. On 19
September a large meeting of ‘Hindu and untouchable leaders’ was called
in Bombay, bringing together Ambedkar, Rajah and P. Baloo (the cricket
player) with Madan Mohan Malaviya, Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, M.R. Jayakar,
Sir Chimanlal Setalvad, C. Rajagopalachari, B.S. Moonje and A.V.
Thakkar, Gandhi’s main disciple in untouchable relief work. Ambedkar was
faced with a situation in which there was no alternative but to surrender,
and a final agreement, the Poona Pact, was hammered out between Sapru
and Ambedkar, and they signed it on 24 September. Gandhi then broke his
fast. There was a fairly emotional meeting, with Ambedkar making a
conciliatory speech that Gandhians described as a ‘change of heart’.
The Poona Pact replaced separate electorates with reservation in joint
electorates, but it provided for a primary election in which four untouchable
candidates would be selected. The winner would be elected from among
these in a second general election based on joint constituencies. In further
compensation for the loss of separate electorates, the number of seats given
to untouchables was nearly doubled (from seventy-eight to 148) to better
approximate their proportion of the population. Ambedkar expressed
himself as satisfied, especially since the proposal for a primary election
appeared to allow untouchables a significant voice of their own. Gandhi
went on to propose the setting up of a special organization, a kind of Anti-
Untouchability League.
Within a short time, however, the warmth of the consensus was lost. By
February 1933 Ambedkar had begun to change his mind about the system
of primaries. Untouchable candidates, he felt, could not afford two
elections; further, it would not give them any greater voice in the final
outcome. He began to agitate for a formula that would require the winning
candidate to get a certain percentage of untouchable votes even in the
general constituency. Differences of opinion were also emerging on issues
regarding the removal of untouchability. Ambedkar believed that temple
entry was a very minor issue but that social and economic issues—
including entry to public services and access to facilities like water—were
the most crucial. By 1932 the satyagraha at the Kalaram temple in Nashik,
which Ambedkar’s lieutenants had been leading, though he himself had
never personally participated, was suspended. Ambedkar was also
beginning to take an interest in peasant issues, seen in a Kolaba District
Peasants Conference held in 1934. As far as caste itself went, he wanted no
half-measures: the system itself should be destroyed. It was over this that
the major differences arose.
Ambedkar had very clear ideas about how the proposed Anti-
Untouchability League should operate. In a letter of 14 November 1932 to
A.V. Thakkar (‘Thakkar Bapa’, who was to be Gandhi’s nominee as head of
the organization), he argued that instead of ‘concentrat[ing] all efforts and
resources on fostering personal virtue by adopting a programme which
includes items such as temperance, gymnasium, cooperation, libraries,
schools, etc.’, the league should ‘concentrate all its energies on a
programme that will affect a change in the social environment of the
Depressed Classes’. Then he outlined a three-fold effort including struggles
for civil rights—access to water, schools, admission in village squares and
public conveyances—that would bring about a ‘social revolution in Hindu
society’ (Ajnat 1993). He also called for campaigns for equal opportunity
by opening up employment and programmes of social intercourse in which
caste Hindus would accept Dalits into their homes as guests or servants.
Ambedkar’s letter was ignored, never even acknowledged. Instead, in a
new inspiration, Gandhi declared that untouchables should be known as
Harijans. The name meant ‘children of God’ with a Vaishnavite implication.
*The league was named the Harijan Sevak Sangh. Ambedkar’s demands for
significant untouchable control over the new organization and for a focus on
annihilating caste were ignored. Control was to be in the hands of caste
Hindus, on the grounds that since untouchability was a Hindu sin, they had
to take the initiative in changing it. Gandhi, as a supporter of an idealized
version of Varnashrama Dharma and quite aware that many members of
Congress were supporters of much sharper versions of caste exclusiveness,
wanted its focus to be limited to issues of untouchability. The well-funded
Harijan Sevak Sangh sprang into action with campaigns focusing on
patronizing upper-caste Hindus working in Dalit slums and promoting
cleanliness, abstinence from alcohol and meat-eating and other Brahmanic
virtues—exactly the focus on personal virtue against which Ambedkar had
argued. Furthermore, Gandhi stressed that the most important item on the
league’s agenda was temple entry because it symbolized the religious
equality of untouchables, or, rather, the ending of the sin of untouchability
within Hinduism. Gandhi even renamed his paper Young India the Harijan.
Ambedkar and other Dalits protested time and again against the term
Harijan. Even the pro-Congress organizations run by Dalits themselves kept
such names as ‘Depressed Classes League’. ‘Dalit’, the term used to
translate such names into Hindi and Marathi, became prevalent about this
time. But it was not until the 1970s brought the militant upsurge of youth
movements such as the Dalit Panthers that it became generalized. ‘Harijan’
remained the dominant designation for Indian untouchables.
The issues involved in this Gandhi—Ambedkar standoff were immense.
Ambedkar stood for a more universalistic position than Gandhi. He argued
throughout the Round Table Conferences for adult suffrage and a more
unitary constitution in which the powers of the states would be minimized.
He and other Dalit leaders asserted that separate electorates for Muslims
were more dangerous than those for Dalits. An article in Bahishkrut Bharat
in 1929 criticized the Nehru Report, a major scheme outlining the
Congress’s proposal for Dominion Status. Ambedkar argued that ‘by giving
political concessions to Muslims the country will be ruined, but Brahmans
won’t …. [B]y giving concessions to non-Brahmans the country won’t be
ruined but Brahmans will be destroyed’ (Bahishkrut Bharat 18 January
1929). He concluded that Moonje and the Hindu Mahasabha, who
originally supported separate electorates, were more progressive than
Gandhi. It may be that in the end Dalits failed to win separate electorates
simply because they had less independent mobilizing power than Muslims.
Nevertheless, as Ambedkar saw it, the Congress’s acceptance of separate
electorates to Muslims but not Dalits was not simply partisan but
Brahmanic.
Gandhi’s position and his championing the cause of ‘Harijan uplift’ work
within the Congress added to his stature as a national leader. He made
Harijan work a part of the Congress’s programme, a commitment to reform
that gave a certain benevolent aura that helped the Congress gain a base
among Dalit voters. It also had important organizational results. Along with
khadi, it provided an action programme to occupy Congress volunteers in
‘constructive work’ when the waves of anti-British struggle were at a low,
maintaining a national network of cadre.
But Gandhi’s entire approach was paternalistic, as was perhaps to be
expected of caste Hindu reformism. He rejected Ambedkar’s claim to
represent untouchables as a separate group because he believed that they
were an inseparable part of his main community. This community was not
really the ‘Indian nation’, because he did not apply the same criteria or the
same emotion to Muslims, recognizing that Muslims had to be integrated
into an Indian national community by a very different process. Why not
untouchables? Because, to put it most starkly, for Gandhi they were already
an inseparable part of the community as Hindus. It was because he wanted
to keep untouchables as part of a Hindu community that he strongly refused
separate political representation. In sum, he envisioned the Indian nation as
being constituted of religiously defined communities.
Gandhi was thus a Hindu nationalist in his own way, one who saw being
a Hindu as a crucial national feature. It pervaded his praxis, his politics, his
defence of an idealized Varnashrama Dharma, his evocation of ‘Ram Raj’
as the ideal India. Gandhi could not separate his political leadership from
his understanding of himself as a Hindu. While he maintained his right to
interpret the Hindu scriptures in any way he wanted, he took for granted
their sacredness. The interpretation of Ram as an ideal ignored the reality
that the story in fact depicted a feudal patriarchal king who sacrificed his
wife to the needs of rule and, more important to Dalits, kills the Shudra
ascetic Shambuk to save the life of a Brahman. Similarly, the interpretation
of the Gita as a manifestation of non-violence ignores the reality that its
purpose is to convince Arjun to go to war.
At a personal level also, the fast represented a failure of non-violence. In
fact Ambedkar posed a unique problem to Gandhi’s whole non-violent
methodology. Ambedkar was not a colonial ruler whose inner guilt or
suppressed psychological tendencies made him vulnerable to universalistic
and moral appeals; he was a leader of the most oppressed group within
Indian society, and one who was perhaps uniquely free from the sense of
shame injected into most untouchables by orthodox Hinduism. Gandhi
could also not appeal to a genuine latent identity with Hinduism. What was
left was only external pressure: though directed against Ambedkar, the
pressure that came through the fast-to-death was one brought by Gandhi’s
caste Hindu followers—the fear of a wide village backlash against Dalits.
As a result, this fast at least genuinely represented a kind of moral
blackmail, and it was this that undoubtedly made Ambedkar’s own
bitterness so strong. While a huge and energetic involvement with the work
of ‘untouchable uplift’ and temple entry followed on Gandhi’s part, he
never had a personal reconciliation with Ambedkar. His later comments,
especially at the time of his conversion, reveal his own sense of bitterness.
Later, in What Congress and Gandhi Have Done to the Untouchables,
Ambedkar unleashed a bitter polemic on how the electoral system set up by
the Poona Pact meant that the untouchables elected in reserved seats would
be controlled by the caste Hindu majority who voted them into office
(Ambedkar 1990, Vol. 9). The Poona Pact remained a symbol of caste
Hindu domination. In the 1980s, the rising Dalit leader Kanshi Ram,
beginning a career, targeted it with demonstrations on 24 September as
inaugurating the chamcha age, the era of dependence (Kanshi Ram 1982).
While his Bahujan Samaj Party sought to overcome this by uniting Dalits
and other Shudra castes, the issues of electoral representation remain. In
multi-caste constituencies with only one winner, it is the majority group that
decides which Dalit candidate is elected. At the very least, this put severe
limits on the ability of Dalits to operate within the framework of a high-
caste-controlled party system.
The attitude towards caste was only a part of the deep-seated differences
in Gandhi’s and Ambedkar’s socio-economic visions. Gandhi was anti-
industrial and idealized a romanticized village India, where people had
limited needs and happily worked in their traditional occupations. To
Ambedkar, villages were ‘cesspools’ that harboured caste oppression and
social and economic backwardness. This had been clear since his earliest
article on smallholdings in agriculture. Speaking on a village panchayat bill
in the Bombay Legislative Council on 6 October 1921, he argued that it was
a ‘very dangerous system … I have not the slightest hesitation in saying that
[these rural republics] have been the bane of public life in India’
(Ambedkar 1982, 2:106). This was, he said, because their ‘local patriotism’
left no room for national identification or civil consciousness. For the
Depressed Classes, village society meant dependence. In contrast, it was the
urban, industrial society hated by Gandhians that represented a way out for
Dalits.
With these major differences, the confrontation between Ambedkar and
Gandhi did not end with the Poona Pact and the new upsurge of
untouchability work in the Congress. Rather it surfaced inevitably once
again over the issue of religious identity when Ambedkar and his followers
vowed to give up Hinduism.
Four
Ambedkar had not begun his political career with a focus on religion or a
concern with rejecting Hinduism. His dedication to study was focussed on
economic and social issues. His earliest essay on caste, written in 1916, did
not analyse it as irrevocably linked to Hinduism; it argued that Manu had
only justified a system that had previously come into existence. Ambedkar’s
family was conventionally religious and he himself had a rather light-
hearted attitude to some of the ritual requirements of a traditional life cycle.
For instance, when he invited Mahar students for the first celebration of his
father’s shraddh or death memorial, he had Ramabai serve them mutton for
dinner on the grounds that this was what they missed most from home.
Conventions also seemed irrelevant to him at Ramabai’s funeral ceremony,
when he wanted her dressed in a white sari rather than a traditional green
one since this was her favourite colour. There is also not much evidence
from his early years of any great turmoil on religious-philosophical issues,
of questioning the existence of God or of defiance of traditional religious
ideas. He did not see religion as greatly relevant.
He made this clear to all. While he had taken a nominal leading role in
the satyagraha unleashed against the Kalaram temple in Nashik, the actual
organizing was done by his lieutenant, the energetic B.K. ‘Dadasaheb’
Gaikwad. After the initial march, Ambedkar did not take part directly in the
satyagraha, and on 5 March 1934 in a letter to Gaikwad he wrote
I did not launch the temple entry movement because I wanted the Depressed Classes to
become worshippers of idols … or because I believed that temple entry would make them
equal members in and an integral part of Hindu society … [but] only because I felt that that
was the best way of energizing the Depressed Classes and making them conscious of their
position (Ajnat 1993, 55–56).
Thus Gandhi reiterated not only his belief in the four varnas but also in
svadharma, following the traditional caste duty, whether as a Brahman,
farmer, craftsman or scavenger. It was a position that was unacceptable to
militant Dalits, and Ambedkar rejected it.
For his part, after the conversion announcement, Ambedkar was in no
particular hurry. It is fairly clear that he had no inherent attraction to
Christianity or Islam, though he saw them as having vast resources to offer
Dalits. But a change of religion would have to be a process, one that would
start not only with him, but with the choices of the masses of the
community—in this case, primarily Mahars, the group he was most sure of
carrying with him. His early inclinations towards Sikhism and Buddhism
were clear from his 1936 article and from his speech at the Mahar youth
conference where he made reference to the saying of the Buddha ‘be your
own lamps’ as a guide to self-reliance. He had also named his house after
Rajgriha, the capital of Magadha where the Buddha had done most of his
preaching. But he was not a man to make choices lightly. The decision
inaugurated a period of study, both of the Hindu scriptures to clarify beyond
a doubt their role in the oppression embodied in the caste hierarchy and
then of Buddhism.
After 1932 Ambedkar never considered Gandhi a true reformer, but
rather a defender of caste-bound Hinduism, a romantic idealizing India’s
villages and seeking simply a continuation of the status quo, dressed up a
bit, but without fundamental change. He pronounced his verdict in harsh
terms in a 1939 lecture on ‘Federation versus freedom’. ‘In my mind there
is no doubt that the Gandhi age is the dark age of India. It is an age in which
people instead of looking for their ideals in the future are returning to
antiquity’ (Ambedkar 1979, 1:352).
Five
He went on to argue for organization and for awareness that the Congress
was supporting the wealthy. Then he made one of his major declarations of
sympathy for Marxism.
I have definitely read studiously more books on the Communist philosophy than all the
Communist leaders here. However beautiful the Communist philosophy is in those books …
the test of this philosophy has to be given in practice. And if work is done from that
perspective, I feel that the labour and length of time needed to win success in Russia will not
be so much in India. And so in regard to the toilers’ class struggle, I feel the Communist
philosophy is close to us (Janata 15 January 1938).
He went on to argue that to build the strength of the working class, the
mental hold of religious slavery would have to be destroyed; thus,
eradicating caste was the precondition of a united working-class struggle
(Janata 25 June 1938). Destruction of caste was taken as the main task of
the ‘democratic stage’ of a two-stage revolution. The article severely
criticized the Congress socialists (who at this time included the
Communists and whose policy was to bring the left within the Congress)
and Nehru, arguing that the fight against untouchability would have to be
built without their help. Both articles and poems published in the Janata
(such as the one cited at the opening of this chapter) illustrated the
combining of anti-caste and class radical themes.
Ambedkar’s movement-level alliance with Communists took another turn
during a major industrial dispute. In an effort to check the growing
influence of Communists and other radicals, the Congress ministry of
Bombay Province introduced an Industrial Disputes Bill before the
legislature. This bill, the first of many ‘Black Acts’ against the working
class, made conciliation compulsory and, under very ill-defined conditions,
strikes illegal. With an eloquent defence of the right to strike ‘as simply
another name for the right to freedom’, Ambedkar took the lead in
condemning it. In one of his several speeches against the bill, he argued on
15 September 1938 that ‘it should really be called the Workers Civil
Liberties Suspension Act’ because ‘[u]nder the conditions prescribed by
this Bill there is no possibility of any free union growing up in the country’.
He went on to call it a ‘bad, bloody and brutal’ piece of legislation
(Ambedkar 1982, 2:232).
Shamrao Parulekar, an ILP member who was about to join the
Communist Party and who had attended a conference of the International
Labour Organization in Geneva and returned to India on 8 September 1938,
called for a one-day strike. Ambedkar then announced that the strike would
be organized by the ILP’s executive committee. The council of action
formed for the strike included the ILP, the Communists and moderates,
while socialists and Royists disassociated themselves from it on the grounds
that it was an anti-Congress political strike.
Held on 7 November, the strike was a historic event for the Bombay
working class. Leaders of various organizations took part in mobilizing
workers, with Ambedkar supported by his 2000-strong Samta Sainik Dal.
Their efforts culminated in a public rally of over one lakh addressed by
Dange and Ambedkar. There was total participation of Dalit workers,
including not only those among the most militantly organized textile
workers but also Dalit municipal workers. The event turned violent, and
clashes with the police left 633 workers injured and two dead, including a
Mahar member of the ILP, Bhagoji Waghmare. Their sacrifice was hailed
afterwards in Ambedkarite jalsas using the tamasha tradition, which had
first been made a radical cultural weapon by the Satyashodhak movement.
In Bombay, Ambedkar joined a procession and meeting organized by the
Communist-Party-led labour unions in honour of the dead workers.
Speakers stressed that the two had died in a struggle that would not end
without the establishment of workers’ rule.
The ongoing contentious issue was Mahar watan, which brought Dalits
into renewed conflict with the British government. They demanded the
transfer of watan lands into ordinary ryotwari holdings, on which the owner
would pay land revenue but have full control over the land, while any
services they performed would be for wages. The government refused their
demands, citing cost as the reason. One estimate was that it would cost Rs
30 lakh for the labour performed by the Mahar watandars. Throughout
1939-40 Ambedkar organized meetings of Mahar and Mang watandars and
threatened militant anti-government struggles if there was no response.
With some electoral and mass movement success behind him, Ambedkar
turned to the task of building a broad political front that would be an
alternative to the Congress. This meant looking to Dalit movements in other
parts of India, to non-Brahman trends everywhere, to Muslims and other
minorities, and to autonomously rising working-class and peasant
movements.
In western India the effort was hampered by the fact that the non-
Brahman political thrust in Bombay Province was dying away as young
leaders like Keshavrao Jedhe and Dinkarrao Javalkar led a movement into
the Congress. Janata carried an editorial on 9 October 1937 against this
break-up, lamenting the lack of great leaders as in the days of Phule and
Shahu Maharaj. Ambedkar felt that the non-Brahmans were being
politically naive. In a speech on the memorial day of the Mahad satyagraha,
he said, ‘Mahars have now become conscious; speaking of Maharashtra
only, only the Brahmans and Mahars understand politics’ (Janata 30 March
1940). The Marathas would become slaves of the Congress, he predicted.
Finally, he was quoted in the Bombay Sentinel of 14 July 1942 as saying
that the Non-Brahman Party had in it the germ of the great principle of
democracy: ‘… [B]y breaking up the party the non-Brahmans have
committed political suicide’ (Government of Maharashtra 1982, 252–53).
Now in its strongholds of Bombay and the Central Provinces, with the Non-
Brahman Party gone, the ILP was more or less politically isolated.
At the national level things were slightly different. Though the Congress
had emerged from the 1937 elections with 711 of 1585 provincial Assembly
seats and absolute majorities in five provinces, its dominance was not
unchallenged. Opposition parties included a number of regional Muslim-
based parties such as the Krishak Praja Party in Bengal, which was allied
with the Namshudras, the main Dalit group of the region, as well as the
Unionist Party in the Punjab, which brought together mainly both Hindu
and Muslim Jat farmers and had won the support of Mangoo Ram’s Ad-
Dharm Movement. Furthermore, peasant movements were developing
outside the Congress’s control.
The natural ally on a national scale would have been the non-Brahman
movement in Madras Presidency, the Justice Party. This was the most
powerful opposing party in the country for a long time, and its ideology was
in many ways similar to Ambedkar’s, but its influence was faltering in the
1930s. A new party, the Self-Respect Movement of Periyar (E.V.
Ramasamy), was rising from outside the party and emerging as a vigorous
force friendly to Ambedkar. A 1931 editorial in Periyar’s paper Kudi Arasu
had condemned Gandhi’s opposition to separate electorates, and members
of the Justice Party and Self-Respect Movement held protest meetings at
that time and passed resolutions asking for implementation of the
Communal Award. Periyar himself came to Bombay in January 1940 after
leading a successful anti-Hindi agitation, and he held meetings in the Tamil-
speaking settlements of Dharavi, a large slum area of Bombay. There he
argued that Brahman domination had kept the masses under religious,
economic, political and social subjugation and that the way out was to
create a separate Tamil Nadu Province. Periyar held talks with Jinnah and
Ambedkar at this time.
Yet in Madras Province itself alienation was growing between the
untouchables and non-Brahman majority castes. Periyar could get little
Dalit support. M.C. Rajah was still the most influential leader, while
Ambedkar’s supporters N. Shivraj and T.S. Srinivasan had little mass base
of their own.
Ambedkar also showed interest in the rising kisan movement in the
country. The Janata ignored efforts by Jagjivan Ram to form a Bihar State
Agricultural Labourers League to counter the Bihar Kisan Sabha and
reported on the kisan movement instead. At the end of December 1938
Ambedkar had a dramatic personal meeting with its leader, Swami
Sahajanand, to discuss the Congress’s position. Sahajanand believed that
peasants needed an independent class organization and should join the
Congress as a broad anti-imperialist organization. This was the basic
Communist–socialist line of the time. Ambedkar tried to counter it by
saying that the Congress was only bolstering the interests of capitalists and
others, while its support to the ‘Federation’ proposed in the Government of
India Act of 1935 was undemocratic.
Ambedkar wanted to build up an anti-Congress front on the grounds of
opposition to Federation, that is, to project a more democratic structure for
independent India. He put forward his position in a speech, ‘Federation
versus freedom’, to the Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics in Pune
on 29 January 1939. He stressed the undemocratic nature of the proposed
federal structure, which kept paramountcy, that is, relations with the
princely states, as a reserved subject and left the princes with inordinate
powers. He criticized the Congress for a lack of any clear policy regarding
the structure of an independent India, noting that at the Second RoundTable
Conference Gandhi ‘was so busy getting the British to recognize him as the
dictator of India that he forgot that the important question was not with
whom the settlement should be made but what would be the terms of the
settlement.’ Gandhi, said Ambedkar, ‘forgot that he was attending a
political conference and went there as though he were going to a Vaishnava
Shrine singing Narsi Mehta’s songs’ (Ambedkar 1979, 1:281–353). To
Sahajanand and other pro-Congress mass leaders, Ambedkar argued that if
Congress opposed the federation, then he would support the party; he also
offered his support to Subhas Chandra Bose if he broke away from the
Congress to form an independent party that opposed the constitutional
proposals. This was an attempt to build a radical democratic front that
would be an alternative to the Congress.
The main obstacle to the growth of such an alternative national front in
India was the Communist Party itself. The Communist and socialist left
should have been natural allies of Ambedkar, given their agreement at the
time on working-class and peasant issues. However, few of the left’s upper-
caste leaders appreciated or understood the reality of caste oppression, and
the strong economic focus of Marxism consolidated the leaders to see the
problems of Dalits and non-Brahmans as separate issues, with these
‘cultural’ issues decidedly secondary. They could understand nationalism
within a Marxist framework but not caste. The socialists had been in the
Congress from the beginning. The Communists, however, oscillated. By the
late 1930s, reacting against their earlier policy of ‘class against class’ which
had characterized all non-Communist political forces as reactionary, they
had swung to support the Congress as the major ‘anti-imperialist front’ in
India. Thus they set themselves the task of bringing all the working-class
and peasant organizations and activists under their influence into the
Congress Socialist Party (CSP). Because the CSP was officially a part of the
Congress, this meant entering the Congress and giving up attempts to form
workers’ or peasants’ parties. In Tamil Nadu in 1936 this meant bringing
many young radicals out of the Samadharma [socialist] Self-Respect
League, which they had organized and Periyar supported. In Maharashtra
they could not shake the organizational base of the ILP, but they could
deprive it of a cadre. Overall, the Communists’ policy left Ambedkar and
the Dalit forces he represented isolated, unable to do anything to build a
front to counter the Congress. Just as Gandhi was Ambedkar’s main
opponent in the nationalist movement, so the Communists proved to be the
undoing of Ambedkar’s effort to transcend the Congress.
Six
Slowly, as the world headed into the Second WorldWar, the class struggles
of the 1930s began to fade, their place taken by the national solidarity in the
face of war and religious-communal solidarity. India was increasingly seen
as a country constituted not by contending castes or classes but by widely
differing religious communities, and increasingly this depiction was
becoming a reality, with differences turning into conflict and contradiction.
As contention between Hindus and Muslims increased, the idea of the
creation of Pakistan, a pure homeland, became a beacon of hope for
Muslims.
Casting its shadow over all global conflicts was the mighty confrontation
taking shape between the fascist and democratic capitalist nations. In the
face of a growing nationalist movement and Japanese aggression
threatening its eastern borders, the question of the role of India in the
looming battle began to preoccupy the political leadership. The Congress
wanted to take advantage of Britain’s need for India as a base for military
action and financial help. Most in it wanted to ignore war needs altogether
and simply fight for independence. A few, like Nehru, argued ineffectually
for conditional support to the anti-fascist war effort. Outside the Congress,
followers of the still-revered Subash Chandra Bose actively took the
support of Nazi Germany and Japan to mobilize an armed struggle.
Communist policy veered according to the situation of the Soviet Union.
After Stalin’s pact with Hitler, the Communists characterized the war to be
one between two sets of imperialists and urged the Congress to militant
opposition. Once Germany attacked, however, the party declared the fight to
be a ‘people’s war’ and openly supported the British. These oscillations left
them with little credibility in India. Those in the Congress, including
Gandhi, who wanted to solely focus on their own struggle, gained the upper
hand.
In September 1939 Viceroy Lord Linlithgow proclaimed a state of war
between India and the Nazi forces. Though the Congress was invited for
discussions with the British rulers, its demands for a significant transfer of
power before the war were not met, and the Congress ministries in the
provinces resigned in protest on 22 December. Their resignation sparked
Hindu-Muslim antagonism, for the Congress ministries had thoroughly
alienated Muslims in the regions of their dominance, and Jinnah, the
unlikely, suave leader of the Muslim League, responded by declaring the
day of resignation a ‘Day of Deliverance’ from Congress tyranny.
Ambedkar quickly announced his support, and ILP activists took part in the
celebrations. The mood was the same among Dalits elsewhere, not only in
Bengal, where they had a political alliance with Muslims, but also in the
Madras Presidency, where M.C. Rajah announced that Dalits supported the
move.
Ambedkar himself had no hesitation in supporting the war effort. This
followed what had always been his position regarding the nationalist
movement. Although he believed independence would provide the only
political framework within which oppressed groups could get real power, he
was more concerned with what kind of nation would come to exist
afterwards than with the process of gaining independence. He saw the war
against fascism as a life-and-death democratic struggle. For him, an
independence coming on the basis of Britain’s defeat by fascists could
never lead to any true equality.
It was with regard to Pakistan, and not questions of caste, that he was
doing his most intense political thinking of the time. ‘I was the philosopher
… of Pakistan,’ he was to say later. He wrote a lengthy book first published
in 1940 as Thoughts on Pakistan and republished as Pakistan and the
Partition of India in 1946 (reprinted in Ambedkar 1990, Vol. 8). This was
his first major essay in social history and philosophy. In it he put the issue
with analytical sharpness and a logic that led to the conclusion that the
creation of Pakistan was inevitable, not because states had to be based on
religion but because the developing political mood of Muslims made it so.
Moreover, it would be in the interest of not only Muslims but also Hindus,
since the alternative of autonomous power to Muslim-majority regions
would make a centralized state impossible. He presented the argument
dialectically, first giving the Muslim case for Pakistan, next the Hindu case
against it, and then analysed the arguments in a tone of neutrality. Among
the points he discussed were the communal composition of the army and its
significance in an independent country, a subject avoided by almost
everyone else.
But the question that pervaded the analysis was the definition of
nationalism. In the strict sense, he argued, India could not be called one
nation. It is true, Ambedkar noted, that in the time of Hsuan Tsang, the
famous seventh-century Chinese traveller, Punjab, Sindh and Kashmir and
even Afghanistan were classified as part of India. Muslim invasions,
however, had changed this irrevocably. First, destruction and forcible
conversion had left a bitterness between Hindus and Muslims so deeply
seated that a century of political activity under colonialism had not
assuaged it. Second, ‘the deep deposit of Islamic culture over the original
Aryan culture in this north-west corner of India’ was decisive; compared to
it, ‘the remnants of Hindu and Buddhist culture are just shrubs’ (Ambedkar
1990, 8:65). If culture was to be the basis of a nation, as the Hindu
nationalists avowed, then they must concede that Muslims had every right
to demand a national political framework in the areas of Islamic cultural
hegemony. The predominance of Hindu culture ten centuries earlier could
not determine the present. The India of today was indeed one of widely
different religious and cultural identities with a history of some conflict.
Ambedkar, however, did not believe that nations had to be necessarily
based on a common religious-cultural identity; there were in fact several
examples of multicultural nations. ‘If Muslims want to be a different nation,
it was not necessarily because they have to be but because they want to be.’
He noted, ‘The view that seems to guide Mr Jinnah is that Indians are only
a people and that they can never be a nation’ (Ambedkar 1990, 8:353).
Nevertheless, he argued that a people could grow into a nation. It was a
question of choice, and he did not see separatism as a good choice. A Hindu
Raj along with a Muslim Raj could not be a solution ‘since Hinduism is a
menace to liberty, equality and fraternity’ (Ambedkar 1990, 8:358). But the
strength of Hindutva was also a function of reaction to Muslim political
assertion. If Muslims did not press their political identity but instead
emphasized common cause with the majority of Hindus, they could
maintain the unity of the nation. Ambedkar cited as examples the case of
most Indian provinces between 1920 and 1937, when Muslims worked for
reforms with non-Brahmans and Dalits. Thus rejection of the Brahmanic
claim to hegemony could be the basis of unity for the majority of people
including the religious minorities, non-Brahmans and Dalits.
But given the Muslims’ stubborn demand for Pakistan, Ambedkar argued
that it should be conceded; the alternative could only be freezing Muslim
and Hindu communal identities in the political framework of separate
electorates and provincial autonomy that would be necessary to keep
Muslims in India. Muslims, however, should concede to Hindustan the
Hindu majority areas of Punjab and Bengal. Once Pakistan was created, the
Muslims in India would have no motivation for a separate political identity
and would make common cause with Dalits and lower-class Hindus. This
would also take away much of the basis for a Hindu Raj.
In his analysis of Islam, Ambedkar tended to exaggerate the violence
involved in the Muslim presence in India. He also neglected many elements
of common and synthetic culture, both the political symbiosis worked out
by Mughals and Rajputs and the more mass-oriented teachings of the Sufis
and sants. He was not very sympathetic to Islam, and later his book would
be used by Hindutva forces, though only by distorting his overall
arguments. By this time he was coming to believe that the destruction of
monasteries during the early Turkish Muslim conquests was the final factor
responsible for the disappearance of Buddhism in India. This does not
mean, however, that he saw Muslim conversions, even forced conversions,
in the same way that the Hindu nationalists did. Along with much of the
non-Brahman movement, he had a different perspective on conversion
because he was convinced of the discrimination and oppression involved in
Hindu culture and its caste hierarchy. This perspective had been put most
forcefully by Jotirao Phule in his 1883 Shetkarya Asud. Phule argued that
some centuries ago the Muslim rulers ‘becoming compassionate to the
lakhs of Shudras and Ati-Shudras, had forcibly made them into Muslims,
liberating them from the snare of the Arya religion, and taking them with
them as Muslims, made them happy’ (Phule 1991, 288). Like some Hindu
nationalists, Ambedkar believed there was forcible conversion of low castes
by Muslim conquerors, but unlike them, he saw this as a benefit for the
converted indigenous Muslims. Most of the non-Brahman leaders in fact
accepted the idea that Islam had mainly spread in India as an equalitarian
alternative to the oppressive caste hierarchy of Brahmanism.
Interestingly enough, this first long analytical essay on social history by
Ambedkar showed no reflection of the economic theory of history that he
claimed to have found so useful on economic issues. Rather, he ignored
economics to stress cultural and political factors. The resulting work,
though leaving out economic interests and class divisions within the
religious groups, was still a nuanced approach that assessed conflicting
claims to national ideals in relation to a sociocultural reality.
Although reviewers perceived Thoughts on Partition as an argument in
support of the creation of Pakistan, Ambedkar saw the issue as essentially
open-ended. He summarized his position in February 1940 when he noted
that he disagreed with both the Congress’s position that India was a nation
and the Muslim League’s that it could never be a nation: ‘My confident
hope is that we can be a nation provided proper processes of social
amalgamation can be put forth’ (Government of Maharashtra 1982, 31).
The notion that an Indian nation was not an immutable reality but a
project that had to be consciously undertaken was unique at the time. As
Ambedkar noted, it contrasted both with the growing fundamentalist
Muslim assertion that Islam provided the basis for their nationhood and
with the Congress’s faith that India was already a nation, a faith that rested
essentially on unstated assumptions that made the Hindu identity, deriving
from the ancient Vedas, the foundation of national identity. The Hindu
Mahasabha was putting the case for a Hindu Raj most forcefully, but the
underlying assumptions were accepted by a majority of Congressman
(Omvedt 2002). Even in the Discovery of India Nehru, who sought to be
sympathetic to Islam and recognize its contributions to Indian culture, saw
the process and resulting synthesis as within the framework of a Hindu-
Brahmanic culture that was ultimately defined as including caste and the
Vedas as the earliest books. Whereas Buddhism was universal, Nehru
suggested, Hinduism had emerged as a kind of national religion. But Nehru,
looking to economic development as the crucial factor, offered no way to
consciously build feelings of a common national identity.
In contrast, Ambedkar’s position that the nation was still to be created,
that it had to be a conscious, thought-out process, drew much from the
thinking of the non-Brahman movement. Phule too had initiated this when
he had written in his posthumously published Sarvajanik Satyadharma
Pustak that
Due to the false self-interested religion of the Aryans, the cunning Arya Bhat-Brahmans
consider the ignorant Shudras to be inferior; the ignorant Shudras consider the ignorant
Mahars to be inferior; and the ignorant Mahars consider the ignorant Mangs to be inferior …
since marriage and social relations are forbidden among them all, naturally their various
customs, eating habits, and rituals don’t match each other. How can such a conglomerate of 18
grains be united to become a “nation” of integrated people (Phule 1982, 407)?
Unlike the ILP, the SCF took shape as a genuinely national party. It drew
on the organizational accomplishments and emerging leadership of Dalit
movements that flourished in the major provinces of India in the 1920s.
Important representatives of almost every province came to Nagpur. From
Madras came leaders like Shivraj. From Bengal came Jogendranath
Mandal, emerging as the most effective leader of the large Namashudra
group. He returned to Bengal to organize the SCF there. From Hyderabad
came all the factions of the divided Mala-based Dalit movement, including
B.S. Venkatrao, a fairly wealthy contractor in the public works department
and a powerful speaker, and J. Subbiah, who was to be Ambedkar’s most
reliable lieutenant in Hyderabad. A new group came from Uttar Pradesh,
most of them men who had been inspired by the Adi-Hindu movement of
Swami Acchutanand. It was from this period that Ambedkar’s movement
widened to northern and north-west India. Finally, in Maharashtra itself, the
entire team from western Maharashtra under Dadasaheb Gaikwad and the
Vidarbha leaders arrived, with the Chambhar leader P.N. Rajbhoj quitting
the Congress to support Ambedkar. The only major leader missing was
M.C. Rajah.
Different provincial political characteristics were reflected in the different
political tendencies of these representatives. Above all, the Hindu–Muslim
divide had a varied impact on Dalits in various parts of India. While
Ambedkar himself and most northern leaders were cautious, those from
heavily Muslim areas, especially Hyderabad and Bengal, were influenced
by the call for a Muslim–Dalit alliance. Mandal and Venkatrao were pro-
Muslim. Venkatswamy ended up supporting the demand for an independent
Hyderabad state, while Jogendranath Mandal’s close relations with Muslims
resulted in his becoming the first head of the Pakistan Constituent Assembly
until, disillusioned, he returned to India and died a poor man. But all these
developments were in the future. In 1942, the SCF was clearly emerging as
a powerful voice of Dalits throughout India.
The conference took some important decisions. Its delegates found the
proposals of the Cripps Mission unacceptable and protested them. They also
declared that no constitution would be acceptable to the scheduled castes
unless it recognized that they were ‘distinct from the Hindus and constituted
an important element in the national life of India’ (Khairmode 1998c,
9:122). They called for financial provisions for primary and advanced
education, for representation in public services and government, for
separate electorates and for rural restructuring. ‘So long as the scheduled
castes continue to live on the outskirts of the village, with no source of
livelihood and in small numbers compared to the Hindus, they will continue
to remain untouchables and subject to tyranny and opposition of the Hindus
and will not be able to enjoy free and full life’ (Khairmode 1998c, 9:124).
Thus a radical change in the village system should include the
establishment of separate villages on cultivable government land as a step
towards local economic and political autonomy.
The 1942 Nagpur conference marked the beginning of a new era of
organizing. While the class radicalism of the ILP had been given up, the
national scope of the SCF indicated a new stage of the Dalit movement in
India as a whole. Movements that had begun independently in various
provinces were now coming together and asserting their presence to help
the Dalit movement emerge in the face of staunch Congress opposition as
an autonomous force at the national level. And Bhimrao Ambedkar was
their acknowledged and sole leader.
Seven
With the SCF firmly established and his residence secured, Ambedkar
began to emerge as one of the important, if controversial, political figures of
the capital. Journalists began to visit him. Some were hostile like the pro-
Gandhi Louis Fischer, who scathingly wrote of him in a 1946 book as ‘the
bitterest man I met in India’, adding that he was ‘anti-Gandhi, pro-Pakistan
and the most pro-British Indian I encountered’ (Khairmode 1999, 8:17). In
contrast, American journalist Beverly Nicholls described him as ‘bulky,
dynamic. Very charming manners, but nervy … Seemed to be on his guard,
as though ready to parry taunts from all directions. Well after all it’s only to
be expected’ (Khairmode 1999, 8:33). Ambedkar was clearly not only as
controversial as ever, but his old trait of always being ready to take on a
verbal fight remained. He exercised it in all his discussions in the
parliamentary councils and assemblies. Frequently interrupted, often by
unfriendly comments, he responded in kind. With these skirmishes
punctuating his calmly reasoned arguments, even in parliament, he was
succeeding, almost single-handedly, in keeping the issues of caste and
untouchability in the public eye.
He was gaining recognition as a writer and prominent critic of the
Congress. This was propelled with the publication of his second major book
in June 1945, What Congress and Gandhi Have Done to the Untouchables
(reprinted as Ambedkar 1990, Vol. 9). He had written it primarily while he
was in Bombay, working at the home of Mildred Drescher, and she had
arranged an American edition, titled People at Bay. The Indian edition was,
strikingly, dedicated to his old London friend ‘F’. The book was a bitter
attack on Gandhi and on the Congress policy which won him immediate
publicity not only in India but worldwide.
The establishment of the SCF was followed by a lull in political action.
Ambedkar left the organizational work to his lieutenants. In Maharashtra,
Dadasaheb Gaikwad served as his second in command. However, when
Gaikwad became a recruiting officer during the war, his place was taken by
one ‘Madkebuwa’, or Ganpat Mahadev Jadhav. He was unpopular, and
youth working under him revolted due to lack of pay and what they
considered his bad behaviour. Some attempted to raise a ruckus during one
of the SCF meetings. This was the beginning of factionalism that would
result in the breakup of the party after Ambedkar’s death. On his part,
Ambedkar periodically expressed his dissatisfaction with the rising
generation of educated youth, and in 1956, writing to his secretary Nanak
Chand Rattu he complained that the ‘educated few … have proved to be a
worthless lot, with no sympathies for their downtrodden brethren … Not
one of them is prepared to do social work’; they were, he said, ‘fighting
among themselves for leadership and power’ (Rattu 1997, 93).
The formation of the SCF meant that Ambedkar had to give up all
attempts to build any broad united front or engage in mass struggles on
general working-class or peasant issues. This was not due to lack of desire
but to the necessities of the times. With independence on the way and with
politics revolving around the standoff between the Muslim League and the
Congress, Ambedkar had to focus on gaining political rights for Dalits
within whatever structure was formed for an independent India.
Aside from his responsibilities as labour minister, which were
considerable, Ambedkar found time in Delhi for his extensive research and
writing. His reading was shifting to ancient Indian history, examining
particularly the relationships between caste and Brahmanism. His efforts
resulted in several unpublished manuscripts and two major books, Who
Were the Shudras: How They Came to Be the Fourth Varna in the Indo-
Aryan Society (published in 1947) and The Untouchables: Who Were They
and Why They Became Untouchables (published in 1948; the two books
were reprinted together as Ambedkar 1990, Vol. 7). Ambedkar also took
part in labour conference and saw to one immediate programme of Dalits—
promoting re-entry in the military. The exclusion that had been imposed in
the 1890s was again being challenged, as Ambedkar took up the cause and
managed to establish three Mahar battalions.
Meanwhile, Pakistan continued to be the major issue haunting India.
Ambedkar returned to the question in a speech before the executive
committee of the SCF on 6 May 1945, ‘Communal deadlock and a way to
resolve it’. In it he opposed the idea of a constituent assembly, which had
been part of the Cripps proposals, on the grounds that untouchables were
excluded from it. Instead he proposed a united India that provided
representation to all three major communities (Hindus, Muslims and
untouchables) in the executive and separate electorates with generous
representation for minorities in the provinces. Provinces were to be grouped
so that the Muslim-majority areas, mainly in what was later to become
Pakistan, would be together.
This was close to what would be the final proposal of Cripps in the last
Cabinet mission, but it was never seriously considered. The Muslim League
continued to demand Pakistan while Gandhi was now insisting that Pakistan
could not be formed except on his dead body. Events, though, were moving
inexorably towards the formation of Pakistan, and in the process Dalits
were being marginalized. With the 1942 agitation now well in the past and
with the aim of reaching some understanding in the forefront of everyone’s
mind, Congress leaders were released from jail and Lord Wavell, Viceroy
since 1943, began discussions with Nehru, Gandhi and Jinnah. These were
about forming a central government with the two main parties, and an all-
party meeting was called for October 1944. With this background,
Bhulabhai Desai negotiated with Jinnah on behalf of the Congress. They
formulated a plan to join the central government in which only the two
parties would be represented, though provision was made for communal
representation. When the Wavell Agreement was finally signed, Ambedkar
and six other members, including liberals, dissented. The SCF sent a
statement of opposition to the prime minister when it appeared that a
proposal would be accepted that would give the untouchables only one seat.
While these political negotiations were going on, Ambedkar undertook a
major initiative for Dalit education. He had long envisaged a college
oriented to Dalits; the original idea for the Sikh Khalsa College in Bombay
had been part of this. In 1945 he drew up proposals for the Peoples’
Education Society and got a promise of Rs 6 lakh from the government.
The diwan of Baroda state, however, refused an appeal for a grant of Rs 11
lakh. Nevertheless, the society was established in July 1945, and in April
1946 the Siddhartha College of Arts was founded. The Milind College was
later established in Aurangabad.
During this period Ambedkar was also taking part in the beginnings of
India’s irrigation policy. His ministry included not only the labour portfolio
but also irrigation, power and other public works. On 3 January 1945 he
addressed a joint meeting of representatives of the Central, Bengal and
Bihar governments in Calcutta on the issue of flood control. A disastrous
flood of the Damodar River in 1945 had led to the setting up of what was to
become the Damodar Valley Project. Ambedkar projected his plan as
modelled on the Tennessee Valley Project. He then set up the central
waterways, irrigation and navigation committee, with Dr A.N. Khosla, a
noted engineer, as its first chairman. Ambedkar was also involved in the
planning of the Hirakud Dam in Orissa. For all these he projected his
conception of the role of ‘big dams’ in the development of India, which
were to be multipurpose projects that would include irrigation, electricity
generation and water transport. As part of the Viceroy’s council, he was
also involved in the earliest post-war planning, as a member of the
reconstruction committee and head of the subordinate irrigation and
electricity committees. Here he had full scope to develop his views on the
significance of industrialization and the roles of electric power and
irrigation and to give a thrust to the overall economic planning of
independent India (see Thorat 1998 for the only full study of this period).
Then came the general elections of March 1945, the first Assembly
elections held in India since 1937 and the first in which the SCF was
fighting as a party of Dalits on an all-India basis. They revealed a stark
division along religious lines. The Congress swept the general
constituencies, the Muslim League captured nearly all the Muslim seats, but
the SCF could not make a showing. Almost all the SCF candidates lost,
except for two in Madras and Punjab. There were numerous reasons for
this. For one, the Congress was inclined to brook no opposition and
aggressively projected itself as the party of independence, and in many
areas this aggression included slander, intimidation and violence. In
Nagpur, for instance, the young activist Vasant Moon described how all the
Dalit polling booths were placed in caste Hindu wards. There, where the
SCF was the only political party daring to oppose the Congress, militant
resistance took place, including flag marches of the Samta Sainik Dal. The
heated atmosphere before the elections saw hatred being whipped up
against Dalits, with slogans like Maharo ke rakth piunga! (We will drink
the blood of Mahars!) and wall writings branding Ambedkar a traitor. All
this led to the eruption of what became known as ‘Mahar–Hindu’ riots. The
Mahars, led by their tough wrestlers and the squads of the Samta Sainik
Dal, made a good showing. Songs that later emerged as part of a growing
cultural movement recall this period in proud boasts, such as ‘Ask the brave
Shivaji how we fought’ and ‘We killed their young men one by one’(Moon
2001).
Besides the violence, though, and the general gerrymandering,
Ambedkar’s analysis showed how the electoral process itself had aided the
Congress victory. According to the provisions of the law resulting from the
Poona Pact, primary elections, in which only Dalits voted, were supposed to
be held in constituencies where there were more than four Dalit candidates.
These were held in only forty constituencies out of 151 and were designed
to select four candidates. In Bombay Presidency, SCF candidates had polled
28,489 votes to 5333 of the Congress and won five of twelve seats,
compared to three by the Congress. In the Central Provinces, their other
strong area, they had polled 8685 votes to 1131 of the Congress and won
eleven of twenty seats to five by the Congress. In Madras they also did well,
polling 30,199 to the Congress’s 27,838 votes and winning twenty-four
seats compared to Congress’s ten. In Uttar Pradesh, finally, a relatively new
area of organizing, they polled 3093 votes to 4101 and won five of twelve
seats compared to four by the Congress. In Bengal the greater number of
seats was captured by independents. Overall, the SCF won fifty-one seats
compared to thirty-eight by the Congress out of 168, and polled 91,595
votes compared to 1,03,449 by the Congress and 1,19,273 by independents.
It was not a bad showing, and it was clear that the SCF had considerable
strength in Bombay and the Central Provinces and was a major force in
Madras Presidency. Meanwhile, in Bengal the independently organizing
Namshudras and other Dalit groups were also resisting absorption into the
Congress.
Ambedkar’s objections to the Poona Pact—that even with reserved seats
caste Hindu votes would dominate in general constituencies—were clearly
vindicated. It was obvious that even if there were primaries, the Congress
candidates just needed to make a showing by becoming part of the four-
candidate panel and then would win with the help of caste Hindu votes in
the general elections. The overall result was that India was moving towards
independence with two of its large minorities, Muslims and Dalits, feeling
left out.
The election results showed that Dalits continued to be shut out
politically. Lord Wavell’s plan was for the executive council to be made up
of Muslims chosen by the Muslim League and Hindus chosen by the
National Congress, which would include Dalits. The untouchables were no
longer treated as an independent political force. Cripps remarked that the
SCF had ‘failed in the elections and we could not artificially restore its
position. The Depressed Classes will, of course, have their full
representation through the Congress-affiliated organization’ (Khairmode
1998c, 9:85). Thus a ministry was announced on 16 June, which included
five Congress members, five League members and five minorities; Jagjivan
Ram represented the untouchables. Jinnah protested that this actually meant
one more Congress representative and responded by nominating
Jogendranath Mandal. Ambedkar welcomed this, with the reservation that it
did not represent a true autonomy, because Dalits were now being divided
among and dependent on the powerful political parties.
On 25 and 26 August 1946 in an executive committee meeting of the
SCF, Ambedkar responded to the defeat by announcing the launch of a
national-level satyagraha in the Congress’s provinces. Thousands courted
arrest, most militantly in Nagpur and Pune. In addition, Ambedkar
continued to lobby, travelling to London in November 1946 to meet
Winston Churchill and other leaders. This time he had the sympathy of the
Conservative Party, a contradiction to his general labour orientation but one
which grew out of the fact that the Labour Party identified with the type of
socialism represented by the Congress, which tended to exclude non-class
issues.
For the same meeting Ambedkar wrote a memorandum on the issues
related to the constitution, the communal problem and the rights of
scheduled castes. Published a year later as States and Minorities, this was as
much an economic manifesto as a social one. It proposed a United States of
India without right of secession. It called for separate electorates, separate
village settlements and strong measures against social boycott of
untouchables and put forth a programme for what Ambedkar called ‘state
socialism’, the nationalization of basic industries, and the nationalization of
land and its organization in collectives. This manifesto marked the height of
his economic radicalism. It had a strong section on fundamental rights,
including the clause ‘nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty
and property without due process of law’, but noted that the power of
capitalists could not be called a promoter of freedom. He wrote, ‘Obviously
this liberty is liberty to the landlords to increase rents, for capitalists to
increase hours of work and reduce rate of wages.’ State socialism, it argued,
‘is essential for the rapid industrial development of India’ (Ambedkar 1979,
1:410–12). Ambedkar called this ‘state socialism’ because it was to be
written into the constitution and be beyond the power of Parliament to
change.
Among various constitutional proposals, this was an attention-getter.
Ambedkar was thus not only present when the Constituent Assembly began
its meetings (for he was elected from Bengal after he lost in Bombay
Province) but he was a potential star, a person of controversy and
considerable reputation. On 13 December 1946 a resolution for
independence had been passed in the Assembly. Nehru proposed it, and
after an exchange between M.R. Jayakar and Shyam Prasad Mukherji,
Ambedkar was asked to speak.
Although the nationalist leaders must have been prepared to listen to him
with trepidation, his actual comments were encouraging and inspiring. He
began by reiterating his position in States and Minorities, expressing the
wish that the declaration of objectives had gone further to support a
socialist economy and nationalization of industry and land. He also noted
the lack of any statement regarding fundamental rights. Then he expressed
his desire for a united India: ‘I know today we are a group of warring camps
and I may go even to the extent of conferring that I am probably one of the
leaders of such a camp. But Sir, with all this, I am quite convinced that
given time and circumstances, nothing in this world will prevent this
country from becoming one’ (Khairmode 1998c, 9:219). This statement
evoked cheers and applause, as did his expressed hope that Muslims would
one day see that a united India would be better for them. To keep the
Muslim League in a united India, though he himself preferred a strong
centre (applause again), he argued once again that grouping, that is, division
of provinces into sections that would include the separate majority areas of
Muslims, would be necessary (Khairmode 1998c, 9:221–22).
This speech helped change the attitude of Congress leaders like Nehru
with regard to Ambedkar. Ambedkar was opposing partition, he was
speaking up for a united government, he supported a strong centre and his
left sympathies were well known. Whatever claims that the Congress might
have made to be the sole representative of untouchables, however
thoroughly the SCF had been defeated in the general elections, it had
established its base firmly in the Marathi-speaking areas, in much of the
Tamil-speaking areas and even in parts of Uttar Pradesh. Leaders like Nehru
and Sardar Patel recognized this fact. The SCF’s considerable mobilization
power, not to mention the voting pattern of Dalits themselves, was clear to
political leaders. With this background, when barrister M.R. Jayakar
resigned his position in the Constituent Assembly from Bombay Province,
Nehru and Sardar Patel suggested Ambedkar’s name to fill the vacancy in
July 1947. Thus Ambedkar came to the Constituent Assembly with the
Congress’s support. On 29 August he was made a member of the drafting
committee elected for the constitution, and then he was chosen as its
chairman. Thus when the draft Constitution of India was presented for
approval on 4 November 1948, it was done by an ex-untouchable.
It was about this time that an important event occurred in Ambedkar’s
personal life. He had been going to the clinic of Dr Madhav Malvankar in
Bombay for treatment of diabetes, a heart condition and high blood
pressure. In January 1948 during one of these visits he renewed his
acquaintance with Dr Sharda Kabir, an assistant to Malvankar. The
relationship became amicable, and on 15 April 1948 the two were married,
his wife taking the new name (a custom in Maharashtra) of Savita.
Ambedkar now had both a companion and a home nurse. While his health
problems remained, Savita found, just as Ramabai had, that there was no
way to control her husband’s tendency to overwork, but she did provide him
much-needed companionship.
Indeed, he had warned her about this in a couple of letters to her mother
prior to their marriage. In one written on 1 January 1948, he gave a
penetrating and rather eloquent self-description.
I am a difficult man. Ordinarily I am quiet as water and humble as grass. But when I get into a
temper I am ungovernable and unmanageable. I am a man of silence. There is a charge against
me that I don’t speak to women. But I don’t even speak to men unless they are my intimates. I
am a man of moods. At times I talk endlessly, at other times I do not utter a word. At times I
am very serious. At times I am full of humour. I am no gay person; pleasures of life do not
attract me. My companions have to bear the burden of my austerity and asceticism. My books
have become my companions. They are dearer to me than wife and children (Rattu 1997, 204).
The slaughter of Partition wrote in blood the cost of the inability to resolve
the dilemma of Hindu–Muslim relations. India began its life as an
independent country with a shadow hanging over it, one that was bound to
affect Dalits as well as others. Dalits in fact were being increasingly caught
in the middle of the Hindu–Muslim conflagration. Among refugees from
Pakistan were large numbers of untouchables. The Pakistan government
was reluctant to allow them to leave, since they provided menial labour as
well as cleaned latrines and swept, tasks which it felt would be hard to find
others to do.
Even when the untouchables could escape as refugees, they were
oppressed by the Hindu and Jat Sikhs of East Punjab. Although Ambedkar
carried on a correspondence with Nehru in December 1947 to try to win
them justice, little changed. The untouchable refugees could not get land for
settlement in villages since it was assumed that they were landless. They
were rehabilitated in Delhi itself, but in kaccha houses, and they were much
worse off than other refugees. Caste Hindu and Sikh refugees were settled
in well-built houses in the city or given land in villages.
In Hyderabad another tense situation developed. It was the largest
princely state in India, its ruler an autocrat who conceded little to popular
democratic aspirations. Here, though, there was a centuries-old Deccani
culture, which had in fact given birth to the first form of ‘Hindi/Urdu’ or
Hindustani. The population included a number of Dalits, some of whom
turned to Islam. The Dalit movement in this state was strong but
factionalized. Its base was primarily the Malas, the Telugu-speaking
equivalent of the Mahars. The more educationally backward Madigas were
slower to mobilize, and when they did so, they kept aloof from the Malas
and tended to support the Congress and a Hindu identity. Mahars from the
Marathi-speaking areas of current-day Marathwada were also slow to
mobilize and did so independently from the Hyderabad leadership.
Of the rambunctious Dalit movement, though all had attended the SCF’s
founding meeting in 1942, many fell away, leaving J. Subbiah to become
the organization’s leader. He proved to be flashy and assertive but not very
good at organization-building. Another important leader, B.S. Venkatrao, a
wealthy contractor who had been president of the Mahar conference
supporting conversion in 1936, tended to associate with Muslims. It was a
militant activist who was part of the Deccani Muslim culture, Shyam
Sunder, who became the leader of the pro-Nizam group. The Nizam had
been giving concessions, most notably grants of wasteland to Dalits, which
proved a source of attraction in the Marathi-speaking Marathwada region,
where Congress was dominant and lacked the radical orientation of the pro-
Communist group in Telangana. Shyam Sunder’s group supported
independence for Hyderabad and convinced Venkatrao to join them.
Ambedkar, however, opposed this. In November 1947 he issued a call.
The Scheduled Castes of Hyderabad should under no circumstances side with the Nizam and
the Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen. Whatever the tyranny and oppression which the Hindus practice
upon us, it must not warp our vision and swerve us from our duty. The Scheduled Castes need
freedom, and their whole movement has been one of freedom … [Thus] they cannot support
the Nizam (Government of Maharashtra 1982, 350).
Less than two months after the huge conversion ceremony, Bhimrao
Ambedkar was dead, found on the morning of 6 December, slumped over
the papers he had been working on late at night. His death was followed by
an outpouring of grief as great as the mobilization of hope that had
appeared with the dhammadiksha. Dalits throughout India but especially
Maharashtra wept as if it were their own father who had died, and people
from all over the world sent their tributes.
Ambedkar left behind him a massive collection of notes and books on a
variety of themes. His project of writing on the Bhakti sants of Maharashtra
was never even begun, but his unfinished manuscripts, including
‘Revolution and counter-revolution in ancient India’ and ‘Untouchables:
The Children of India’s ghetto’, were extremely significant. In his last
studies he was projecting an alternative sociocultural history of India. As in
a Marxist interpretation, his would emphasize conflict and contradiction;
but in contrast to Marxism, this would be seen in primarily ideological-
religious terms, the mortal conflict between Brahmanism and Buddhism.
Ambedkar’s life had spanned the first part of the twentieth century and all
the decisive phases of India’s freedom struggle. However, he had fought for
a correlated but different freedom struggle, one for the liberation of the
most oppressed sections of Indian society. This was a liberation movement
wider and deeper than that of fighting colonialism, focusing on the kind of
new nation that was to be built. This struggle did not emerge in a vacuum; it
was the zenith of protracted and widespread movements of those classified
as ‘Shudras’ and ‘Untouchables’ in the traditional hierarchy. Many ‘organic
intellectuals’ rose from among the Dalit-Bahujan masses to give voice to
this struggle and to theorize it—men like Jotirao Phule, Iyothee Thass,
Periyar, Mangoo Ram and Acchutanand. More than the well-known upper-
caste intellectuals of colonial India, these were the true modernizers, the
heralds of a new Enlightenment. It was understandable that Ambedkar,
emerging from the lowest section of India’s caste-oppressed to gain an
education that few could equal, would take a stand not as a proponent of a
revitalized, Vedic and Vedantic-centred tradition but of revolution, the
revolution of ‘liberty, equality and fraternity’ proclaimed first in the French
Revolution and gradually sweeping the world. It was even more striking
that he could find the roots of this in India itself, in the message of the
Buddha proclaimed thousands of years before.
His freedom fight, the freedom fight of Dalits, had many aspects. It began
with the simple demand to drink water from a public well, just as Dalits
earlier had fought for simple rights of using public roads, transport and
schools. Legislatures and municipalities had been passing resolutions for
some years making the facilities open to all, but these had been ignored.
Ambedkar’s movement to implement the claim to the source of all of life’s
nourishment, which was also a movement to constitute public space as truly
public, met with resistance from the orthodox and was transformed into a
cultural challenge when Dalits and caste Hindus under his leadership
burned the Manusmriti, the ancient Brahmanic code that was the cultural-
legal symbol of caste slavery. And this challenge to Brahmanic tradition led
Ambedkar, in spite of his own nationalism, in spite of his own initial hopes
in the new leader, into an overall confrontation with the most famous name
in India’s national movement: Mahatma Gandhi. From the time of the
Round Table Conference to Ambedkar’s proclamation in 1935 that ‘I will
not die a Hindu’, the politics of this confrontation resounded throughout
India.
The confrontation was not with an openly traditionalist leader of the
Congress, but with someone who had the image of a reformist, someone
who sought to identify with India’s poor and to overcome the division
between social reform and political reform that had existed up to then. Yet,
as it turned out, Gandhi’s reformism did not satisfy Dalit aspirations
precisely because it was rooted in the framework of a Hinduism that did not
challenge the roots of varnashrama dharma. Gandhi gained inspiration from
the Vaishnavite Bhakti movement, but without the true burning for equality
that had characterized the most radical Bhakti sants, people like Kabir,
Ravidas and Tukaram, who had rejected priestly rituals and hierarchy as
well as Muslim orthodoxy. Gandhi’s Vaishnavism was rather the milder,
orthodox form found in the Gujarati Vallabhaite movement. It meant that
never until the end of his life did he denounce even the most extreme
expressions of caste inequality found in the Brahmanic scriptures. He
proclaimed his faith in a superficially modernized varnashrama dharma that
included the affirmation of ‘swadharma’, the idea that children should
follow the professions of their fathers. This he sought to qualify with the
values that all occupations should be equally respected. This in turn was
linked to his anti-industrialism and his romanticization of traditional village
society and its social system as one of harmony and stability. The idea of
Ram Raj symbolized this in terms that the most illiterate Indian could
understand. For Dalits, though, Ram Raj meant a regime that had
persecuted untouchables like Shambuk who had tried to step out of their
place. Dalits of the modern world, following Ambedkar, were determined to
leave their place, even to destroy it.
This confrontation would not have been so important if Gandhi had only
been acting as a leader of Hindu society, but he claimed the leadership of
the nationalist movement, and with all of his concern for Hindu—Muslim
unity, he projected his religious identifications on that movement. Gandhi,
as many Congressmen, could not separate his Hinduism from his
nationalism. India’s nationalist movement was thus taking shape under the
shadow of what is today called the ‘Hindutva’ ideology, a more or less
conscious Hindu nation. It was forerunners like Savarkar who proclaimed
Hinduism as the national religion of the Indian subcontinent, but Gandhi
himself did not take so different a position when he fervently argued that
untouchables should not convert to an ‘alien’ religion. His way of
establishing unity with Muslims was through affirming the religious needs
of each, and in doing so continuing the assumption that India was made up
of religious communities.
The confrontation between Gandhi and Ambedkar was thus not simply a
confrontation of two idiosyncratic leaders but of two deeply divergent
conceptions of the Indian nation itself. It was this perspective that
Ambedkar was seeking to develop, which his unpublished manuscripts and
a few completed books such as Who Were the Shudras? were beginning to
outline.
Ambedkar’s organizing began with economic radicalism. He took up the
issues of tenant farmers and workers, allying with Communists in major
strikes and in fighting landlordism in the Konkan. The flag of his first party,
the ILP, was red like theirs. He took his left phase quite far, to the point of
looking for inspiration to Marxism for his economic policy, which he
described for some time as ‘state socialism’. Yet in the end he found
Marxism inadequate, not only because of its neglect of ideological and
cultural issues and most importantly its total blindness to caste in the Indian
context but also because it was not sufficiently democratic. Towards the end
of his life he was moving towards an economics of a liberal social welfare
state, with planning, with a focus on industrialization, but with a strong
emphasis on pragmatism, using competition to fuel the growth of the
economy and of the state to ensure social justice. Though he proclaimed
clearly his differences with Marxism, its stamp remained on him all his life,
even on the way he interpreted Buddhism. His similarities with a more
orthodox Marxism continued to be a profound concern for economic
development and industrialization as the way out of poverty. This remains
the most crucial dividing line from the Gandhian vision whose romanticism
attracts so many in today’s world.
With his breadth of economic and cultural analysis, Ambedkar should
have stood in the forefront of the men whose ideas shaped India. Yet he is
barely admitted into their ranks. With the failure of a broad political
alliance, in spite of his many writings and policies on the crucial issues of
the time, from the question of Pakistan to that of the economic structuring
of independent India, Ambedkar has retained a place in the collective
memory of India primarily as the leader of India’s untouchables. With his
movement no longer a political threat to Congress dominance, his
leadership qualities could be recognized and used when he was made chair
of the Drafting Committee of the Indian Constitution, and then law minister
in the first cabinet of independent India. But this was a failure of the
broader transformative project that Dalits and non-Brahmans had sought to
project for the new nation, a failure which in the end laid the way open for a
renewed and often ugly and brutal growth of militant Hindutva forces in
independent India. Ambedkar’s words, when he resigned after the failure to
pass a reformed law for marriage and inheritance, the Hindu Code Bill,
eloquently capture what has characterized much of the growth of
independent India: ‘building a castle on a dung heap’. What he considered
the dung heap was of course the cultural and social inheritance of
varnashrama dharma against which he posed the Enlightenment values of
liberty, equality and fraternity. The fight remains.
TWO: ‘WE ARE AGAINST BRAHMANISM BUT NOT BRAHMANS …’: BEGINNING THE FIGHT
FOR DALIT HUMAN RIGHTS
* Partly because of the land situation, the distinction between Marathas and
Kunbis was sharper in the Konkan than in the inland areas of
Maharashtra.
EIGHT: ‘BUILDING A PALACE ON A DUNG HEAP’: THE POST-INDEPENDENCE YEARS
* It should be noted that here Ambedkar was using ‘class’ to refer to caste,
as was frequently done at the time and in the Constitutional debates
themselves, e.g. ‘Depressed Classes’, ‘Other Backward Classes’. Later
this ambivalent use of the term in the pre-independence period was used
to argue that reservation for ‘OBCs’ should include economic criteria.
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Acknowledgements
I owe thanks to more people than I can name for support, inspiration and
information used in this short biography of Dr B.R. Ambedkar, which
draws on years of coming to understand and writing about this giant of
India.
I owe thanks to Eleanor Zelliot, the pioneer in the field of Dalit and
Ambedkar studies, who has been a well of information and constant source
of advice and support and information to me as well as to so many others. I
have learned much from discussions and seminars with scholars such as G.
Aloysius, Kancha Ilaiah, S.K. and Vimal Thorat, Narendra Jadhav, P.
Jogdand and S.M. Michael; and I owe special thanks to Surendra Jondhale
for years of engagement in debate, discussion and friendship, as well as the
important seminar on ‘Reconstructing the world: Ambedkar’s Buddhism’ in
1998. Sushrut Jadhav and other participants at the December 2002 seminar
on ‘Caste and mental discourses’ made an important contribution in
bringing forth the psychological costs of caste—a reality which clearly
Ambedkar also had to face. I also owe thanks to Lokamitra and other
workers of the Trailokya Bauddha Mahasangh in Pune for help on both
Ambedkar and Buddhism, and to Sharad Patil and Vasant and Meenakshi
Moon for their help and mental stimulation over the years.
This biography draws on my earlier research for books such as
Reinventing Revolution: New Social Movements and the Socialist Tradition
in India (1993), Dalits and the Democratic Revolution (1994) and
Buddhism in India: Challenging Brahmanism and Caste (2003). This
book’s period of gestation was supported by a variety of sources of income
—fifteen months of teaching at Pune University, six months at the National
Institute for Social Work and Social Sciences (NISWASS) in Bhubaneswar,
writing on caste and related issues of ‘Ambedkarism’ for the Hindu. All
these experiences stimulated my thinking as well as made time for research
possible. I owe thanks to S.M. Dahiwale, Ram Bapat, Gopal Guru and other
colleagues at Pune University, and to Raj Kumar, R.K. Nayak and
Ramashray Roy at NISWASS. Finally, I owe thanks to N. Ravi and Malini
Parthasarthy at the Hindu for providing a platform for writing and debate on
current and past issues raised by the Dalit movement.
The Dalit movement which Ambedkar’s life and struggle did so much to
shape did not belong only to Maharashtra or even to his own contributions.
It was under his leadership that movements rising in disparate areas under
disparate conditions took shape—and these disparities remain important.
For an understanding of the Dalit movement in Tamil Nadu, I owe thanks to
Antony Raj, Dr Krishnasami, Thol Thirunavalan and Ravi Kumar, for that
in Punjab to L.S. Balley, Dr Amar Singh, G.S. Bal and others, to Ross
Mallick for generously providing material and insights on the Bengal
Namashudra movement, and to Bojja Tharakkam, V. Laxminarayan and
many others for the other non-Maharashtra areas of the movement.
Immediate support during the writing was provided by friends of
Buddhist Circle, a Dalit-run yahoogroup whose centre is in Delhi, who gave
both technical and scholarly help—computer access, books and references
to more sources about Ambedkar than I could manage to use—in particular
Mangesh Dahiwale, Dhanraj and Minakshi Gedam, Santosh and all the
Vasant Kunj friends, and to Mahesh Sagar, Sakya Umanathan, Babasevak
and many others. Dalit web sites and e-mail interaction have blossomed in
the past few years, and I have found material on the groups managed by
Mangesh Dahiwale, K.P. Singh and Satinath Choudhary particularly useful.
I was a senior fellow at the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library during
the writing and editing of the book, which also draws in part on my project
‘Perspectives of the anti-caste movement on social-economic development’.
I owe thanks to the library staff for their unfailing help, to my colleagues
for stimulating discussion and especially to O.P. Kejariwal for his generous
support and encouragement.
I would also like to thank Prakash Ambedkar for his support and the use
of citations from Dr Ambedkar’s writings.
And for patience and support during the writing, I thank my family,
Bharat, Indutai and Jyoti for patience and support, especially Bharat, whose
support and stimulation over the years made up for the too-small period of
time snatched from his organizing responsibilities.
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