Theories of the

Democratic State

John S. Dryzel<
and
Patricl< Dunleavy
© John S. Dryzek and Patrick Dunleavy 2009
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Chapter 3

Elite Theory

An enduring critique of liberal democracy originated at the end of the

nineteenth century in two newly unified and very imperfectly democra-
tized European states; Germany and Italy. This critique contrasted the
inherent concentration of power in any political system within a small,
leadership group, the elite, with the powerless situation of the bulk of
citizens, the mass. Elite theorists argued that whatever the ostensible
form of government, an elite minority must always rule. They scorned
both liberal claims about democratization under capitalism and
Marxist beliefs that after a social revolution the working class majority
could effectively govern.
An even older tradition of normative elitism argued that elite domina-
tion is both natural and desirable. This position can be cultural as well
as political, contrasting the vulgar masses with a refined elite. At the
end of the nineteenth century many anti-modern intellectuals recoiled
from the consequences of large-scale industrialization, technology,
urbanization and democracy. The original elite theorists formed part of
this anti-democratic reaction.
Crossing the Atlantic in the 1920s and 1930s, in the United States
elite theory progressively metamorphosed into a more professional,
sociological approach. The more recent social science version of elite
theory is essentially empirical and descriptive in that it sets out how
social and political processes actually work. Most of the new genera-
tion of American elite theorists used their findings not to celebrate elite
domination, but to criticize the imperfections of representative govern-
ment and popular control. They offered a radical but non-Marxist cri-
tique of pluralist orthodoxy, and this is the form in which much elite
theory is found to this day.
We begin this chapter by examining the historic origins and core
assumptions of the main types of elite theory. Then we look at how
elite theory depicts the relationship between society and politics. Next
we consider elite theory's account of government and policy-making,
emphasizing leadership, bureaucracy and technocracy.

57
58 Theories of the Democratic State Elite Theory 59

The Origins of Elite Theory key doctrines, such as the circulation of elites (which we discuss later).
In The Mind and Society, Pareto (1916) argued that most people most
European foundations of the time are governed by irrational emotions, prone to swings of hys-
Three key authors originated the earliest elite theory - Gaetano Mosca teria, panic and enthusiasm. Competent elites could learn to manipulate
and Vilfedo Pareto in Italy and Robert Michels, who moved from the public's emotions, as illustrated by irrational trends in consumer
Germany to Italy. Pareto and Mosca observed a new Italian liberal demand and fake democratic party politics controlled by party leaders.
democracy in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries that fea- Both Mosca and Pareto believed in the constant rising of exceptional
tured corruption, clientelism, domination by industrialists and landed individuals into ruling positions. They favoured vigorous and open cir-
magnates, and rancorous conflict between social classes. They argued Elites turnover culation of elites and interpreted many political pro blems as resulting
that society, irrespective of its formal system of government, always key from the ossification of existing elites in power, blocking the rise of new
divides into two major groups: elites. Any such blockage would lead the rising elites to turn instead to
anti-system or revolutionary politics, jeopardizing the social order. Yet
• an elite (in Mosca's terminology, a 'ruling class') controlling eco- Mosca and Pareto dismissed the utopianism of Marxist doctrines, which
nomic, social and political power through its expertise, ownership looked to create genuine majority rule by the working class through rev-
of wealth and property, social status, intelligence, and economic olution. Mosca linked his anti-Marxism to the claim that a socialist
and political guile; and transformation could only work if essentially human characteristics,
• a mass of all other citizens, disorganized and excluded from effec- such as love of family and kinship ties, were extinguished:
tive influence on public policy.
The rulers of a collectivist state pile economic power on political
These conditions are inevitable in their view, because the masses could power and so, controlling the lots of all individuals and all families,
not possibly acquire the competence to be effective participants in poli- have a thousand ways of distributing rewards and punishments. It
tics (except as followers of some charismatic leader). In contrast to the would be strange indeed if they did not take advantage of such a
pluralist interpretation of society organized into many diverse groups, strategic position to give their children a start in life ... In order to
Mosca (and later Pareto) portrayed the mass as an undifferentiated abolish privileges of birth entirely, it would be necessary to go one
amalgam, disorganized and unpredictable in its behaviour. This step farther, to abolish the family, recognize a vagrant Venus [that
analysis responded to fears of mass demonstrations, general strikes and is, foster sexual promiscuity] and drop humanity to the level of the
crowd violence in the growing industrial cities of Europe. lowest animalism. In the Republic Plato proposed abolishing the
Mosca often wrote of ordinary citizens in frankly contemptuous style, family as an almost necessary consequence of the abolition of pri-
characterizing the mass as preoccupied with immediate needs and vate property. (Mosca 1939: 418)
wants: 'Their first, their natural, their most spontaneous desire is to be
governed as little as possible, or to make as few sacrifices as possible Elite theorists predicted that even if a revolution succeeded, it would
for the state' (Mosca 1939: 411). He saw a need to 'place restraints on simply install a different elite in power, leaving the mass powerless as
the [press and media] corruption of minds that are, and will forever before.
remain, minds of children' (Mosca 1939: 492). And he remarked dis- The establishment of a tightly controlled communist regime in the
paragingly: 'Even in the lower classes every individual in the long run Soviet Union following revolution in 1917 was taken by the elite theo-
gets a loaf of bread and a mate, though the bread be more or less dark rists as further proof of the inevitability of elite rule. The elite theorists
and hard-earned and the mate more or less unattractive or undesirable' correctly predicted the actions of the communist leadership, which
(Mosca 1939: 30). quickly extinguished opponents and press freedom. The communists'
The economist Vilfredo Pareto in his thirties esp,bused left-wing, but alleged 'dictatorship of the proletariat' was in fact a dictatorship of the
non-Marxist, causes so much so that he was forced to leave Italy and party hierarchy. The pessimistic message here was later summed up in
work as an academic in Switzerland to escape police attention~cIn 1900 George Orwell's fable, Animal Farm, where the farm animals revolt
Pareto had a sudden change of heart, switching to right-wing and anti- and expel their brutal farm owner. But in many small steps the pigs
democratic elitism - igniting a feud with Mosca over who originated its who led the original revolt emerge as the new owners of all the animals,
60 Theories of the Democratic State Elite Theory 61

every bit as bad and exploitative as the original human owner. (Orwell Mussolini in 1923, ten months before his death. His defenders argue
himself was a democratic socialist and certainly no elite theorist.) that this was only an honour and that he would soon have repudiated
The third key elite theorist of this era, Robert Michels, developed an the crude abuses of the fascist regime. But fascist ideologues cited
anti-Marxist position in more detail. Born in Germany, Michels was Pareto's political and sociological work (not his economics) to justify
originally a radical socialist, following the syndicalist doctrines of their regime.
Georg Sorel, a French socialist who advocated spontaneous strikes and In philosophy, thinkers from a very wide range of different positions
crowd violence as the key routes to revolution. By 1911 Michels had were either attracted to fascism or called in support by its exponents
changed his mind. His book Political Parties argued that all parties, (see Figure 3.1). In the late nineteenth century Friedrich Nietzsche
including those espousing democracy, are inevitably oligarchic in their stressed the importance of exceptional actors in advancing the progress
internal organization, controlled by a small leadership clique. The book of culture and civilization against the dead-hand of customary and reli-
focused on the German Social Democratic Party (SPD). Influenced by gious beliefs. His disdain for the masses found many echoes amongst
the theories about bureaucracy of his German contemporary and intellectuals. 'The radical elitism of Nietzsche was felt as "the earth-
friend, the sociologist Max Weber, Michels linked large-scale, mass quake of the epoch" by many of [this] generation' (Lassman and Spiers,
organizations run by bureaucracies to elite domination. His famous 1994: xii). This inheritance is clear in the work of the Spanish intellec-
iron law of oligarchy was that 'he who says organization says oli- tual, Ortega y Gasset, who was ideologically close to the Spanish fas-
garchy'. So parties like the SPD claiming to serve the working class and cism of Franco. His book The Revolt of the Masses condemned the
represent ordinary voters in fact served mainly the interests of their failure of ordinary citizens to defer to intellectual and knowledge elites.
own leadership. Faced with a choice between radical activism and orga- The German philosopher Martin Heidegger (1977) was driven by an
nizational survival, Michels believed the party would always choose the anti-technological sentiment to embrace Nazi ideals, which he thought
latter. might enable a kind of humanity not enslaved by technology.
In 1910 Michels moved to Italy, aided by a supportive reference from
Weber, and met with Pareto and Mosca. Michels opposed World War
I. The fact that virtually all the European social democratic parties Figure 3.1 The development of elite theory
endorsed their own country's position in the war in a patriotic fervour,
instead of opposing the slaughter of the working classes in the trenches, Late 19th Century
solidified Michels' cynicism. Italy's unnecessary entry into the war in to 1914 1914-45 1945-60 1960s 1970s on
:
1915, and subsequent military disaster, confirmed the elite theorists' ---L
I[Original elite ~ascism)l
scorn for party leaders in liberal democracies.
By the 1920s Michels was supporting fascism and its cult of a single
dominant leader as personified in Italy by Benito Mussolini. Michels
accepted a prominent university post from Mussolini. He was attracted
European
elite theory
and allied
theory

Cultural
pessimists
Nietszche, Freud
r
influences
by the fascist idea that the masses of ordinary people can be mobilized
[[ Weber ~
for social change behind a leader and a party committed to national
glory. Michels's First Lectures (1927) argued for the importance of a
I
.. Schumpeter Democratic elite theory l .......
charismatic and exceptional leader to engage the masses in huge pro- -T : :
jects, which alone could overcome the conservative, oligarchic char- American
elite theory ~ Modern elite theory mainstream HNeO-elite
acter of large-scale modern organizations. (The Nazi regime in Mills, community power studies theory
Germany installed in 1933 was exceptionally effective in these terms.)
:
Mosca too had backed Mussolini's seizure 9£ power in 1923.
-
However, he did oppose Mussolini's 1926 abolition of parliamentary ~urnhal~)
control over the government, and in his later years he str~ssed the
importance of maintaining legality, implicitly criticizing Mussolini's Cold-war conservati~j
lawless regime. Pareto accepted appointment as a senator by
62 Theories the Democratic State Elite Theory 63

Sigmund Freud's pioneering work in psychoanalysis was also pes- gious certainties. Weber was equally fearful of government bureaucra-
simistic about mass capabilities, revealing the often deeply hidden dri- cies monopolizing the information and expertise for directing the state,
vers of behaviour, exposing conventional social organization as a thin without any effective political counterweight. He saw such uncon-
veneer concealing barbaric impulses. In his 1931 essay Civilization and trolled bureaucratic machines leading the European powers to sleep-
its Discontents Freud anticipated wartime excesses to come (p. 58): walk into all-out war in 1914, following a logic only of army
mobilization manuals and railway timetables (Germany wanted to
Men are not gentle creatures who want to be loved and who at the declare war only on Russia, but had to attack France as well because
most can defend themselves if they are attacked; they are, on the the only bureaucratic plan was for war on both fronts).
contrary, creatures amongst whose instinctual endowments is to be Yet Weber was also deeply critical of 'professional politicians', under-
reckoned a powerful share of aggressiveness. As a result, their pinning his diffident view of liberal democracy as an imperfect but
neighbour is for them not only a potential helper or sexual object inescapable necessity. In 1917 he wrote: 'Whether one loves or hates
but also someone who tempts them to satisfy their aggressiveness the whole parliamentary business, it is not to be got rid of' (Weber
on him, to exploit his capacity for work without compensation, to 1994: 166). He doubted that the party system and elections could gen-
use him sexually without his consent, to seize his possession, to erate politicians capable and powerful enough to command government
humiliate him, to cause him pain, to torture him and to kill him ... bureaucracies. Weber condemned the negative, oppositional parlia-
When the mental counter forces which ordinarily inhibit aggression ments of Germany under Kaiser Wilhelm before 1914. He tried (but
are out of action, [aggression] manifests itself spontaneously and failed) to get the post-war Weimar republic in Germany to adopt a
reveals man as a savage beast to whom consideration towards his powerful directly elected president, believing that parliaments elected
own kind is something alien. under proportional representation would yield only weak leaders. Yet,
whatever the defects of representative government:
More ambiguous support for elitism came from the great sociologist
Max Weber, influenced by both Marx and Nietzsche: 'Weber was the creation of orderly, responsible political leadership by parlia-
deeply affected by the peculiarly German intellectual traditions of ide- mentary leaders ... weakens as far as possible, the impact of purely
alism, romanticism and conservative cultural despair' (Langenbacher emotional influences both from 'above' [tyrannical takeovers] and
2001:1). Weber identified three types of leadership: from 'below' [street-based unrest and mob rule] .. , [O]nly the
orderly leadership of the masses by responsible politicians is at all
e Traditional rule by a leader vested with aristocratic, monarchical capable of breaking unregulated rule by the street and leadership by
or established religious legitimacy, whose rule is accepted as 'nat- chance demagogues. (Weber 1994: 125)
ural' by those subject to it.
e Rational/legal authority resting on the efficacy of management Although Weber himself never used the concept of elite, he influenced
structures in producing results and operating in line with legal the post-1945 emergence of 'democratic elite theory' shown in Figure
requirements. In the modern era the dominant form of rational! 3.1. This school seeks a reconciliation between elite theory and represen-
legal authority is bureaucracy in government administration. tative government, on the basis that even if elite rule is inevitable, com-
.. Charismatic leadership by a religious or political figure whose fol- petitive elite rule can still be responsive to popular preferences. Another
lowers vest him or her with extraordinary perceptions and influence here was ]oseph Schumpeter, whose attempted reconstruction
visionary capabilities. of democratic theory around competing party elites we discussed in
Chapter 2. In the post-war period the hallmarks of all forms of democ-
Weber saw the modernization of all aspects of life under advanced cap- ratic elite theory were an emphasis upon the inherent limitations of
italism as systematically eroding traditional rule, ~eplacing it with sys- democratic control in large, modern states; a down-playing of citizens'
tems of rational/legal authority. But he also feared that such systems knowledge and competencies; and a stress on the detailed arrangements
are inherently unsustainable in several ways. Universal burequcratiza- for (a strictly limited process of) party competition and selection of
tion would leave people unsatisfied and so receptive to dangerous leaders (see below). Usually this position also entailed a preference for
charismatic leaders offering new faiths to replace lost moral and reli- simple 'two party' politics and against proportional representation.
Trump...?
64 Theories of the Democratic State
Elite Theory 65

Elite theory in the United States

elected politicians and their aides, and the military. His key concept
The fascist connections of the three founders of elite theory meant that was that of the 'power elite' (discussed below) and the concept travelled
after the defeat of fascism in World War II they had no successors. Elite to Europe and elsewhere.
theory then moved to the United States. The political scientist Harold . Later theorists. stressed the 'non-decisions', by means of which many
Lasswell (1936: 13) connected elites to the very definition of politic~l Issues are conscIously kept off the formal political agenda to suit the
science: 'The study of politics is the study of influence and the influen- elite's inter~sts, Bachrach and Baratz (1963). They also revived argu-
tial. The influential are those who get the most of what there is to ments harkmg back to Marxist theorists (such as the Italian Antonio
get Those who get the most are elite; the rest are mass.' Gramsci) that ruling elites can often stop important issues from
James Burnham linked elites to the structure of a capitalist economy reaching the political agenda by controlling society's ideology, such
dominated by large corporations rather than small entrepreneurs. In his that nobody can even think of raising such issues. Lukes (1974) called
1941 book The Managerial Revolution Burnham drew on Mosca and this the 'third face o~ power'. Domhoff (1978a) identified an 'ideology
Pareto and stressed the rise of 'organization man' (and they were process' whereby thIS was accomplished through control of the mass
almost always men at this time), claiming that a new class of managers media and education. So policy making on key issues is often low-visi-
and directors of giant corporations would collectively dominate the bility ~nd low-conflict, with supposedly competing party elites in fact
economy and government and so run society. Denounced by C. Wright colludmg to stop voters having any effective choice about what should
Mills as 'a Marx for the managers', Burnham copied elite theory's ~appen. AI~ this was very hard to study empirically, because it high-
founding fathers by moving right in his views, becoming a Cold War lIghted the Importance of what was not happening, and so could not be
conservative. observed. Eventually the idea of power as the capacity to keep issues
But very soon elite theory became associated with the radical left in off th~ agenda was outflanked intellectually by post-modern, 'de-cen-
the United States. US sociologists linked an account of the power of tred' VieWS of power, which we will discuss in Chapter 13.
elites not with a justification of elite rule, but rather with a radical cri- T?e 196?s. events t~~t shook pluralism also affected elite theory.
tique of that rule. This critique reached its zenith in the 1950s and ClaIms o~ lI~ltS on polItlCal access and on the dispersion of power were
1960s in the work of C. Wright Mills and a series of 'community largely vmdlCated by the revolt of excluded social groups. But in the
power' studies. The early European elite theorists did not specify exactly late 1960s and 1970s political practices in most liberal democracies
where ruling elites came from - their existence was simply asserted as became somewhat more diverse and inclusive. The elite theorists' cri-
inevitable. By contrast, American elite theorists devoted great attention tiq~e was subsequently absorbed and largely neutralized by neo-plu-
to where in society elites were likely to spring from and what they actu- rahst theory, ~hich we discuss in Chapter 6. It became a commonplace
ally did. Mills remarked dismissively of Mosca in particular: response to ehte theory to say that of course there were elites in any
sphe.re of life in any society, but that what was key was to show in
It is not my thesis that for all epochs of human history and in all detal1 whether they were democratically constrained or controlled and
nations, a creative minority, a ruling class, an omnipotent elite wh~ther differen~ kinds of elites, operating in different spher~s of
shape all historical events. Such statements, upon careful examina- sOC1~ty, behaved m separate or integrated ways. For its critics, the soci-
tion, usually turn out to be mere tautologies, and even when they olo~l~al thrus~ :)f post-war American elite theory led to a style of 'gen-
are not, they are so entirely general as to be useless in the attempt er.al.Izmg emplflc.all.y about the most readily measurable, if often quite
to understand the history of the present. (Mills 1956: 20) tnvIal, charactenstlCs and correlates of elite status. This led to a "con-
ceptu~l swamp" in which "elite" had no agreed meaning and clearly
Mills focused only on the United States and was relentlessly empirical. perceIved theoretical utility' (Higley 1984: 143).
Most of his text is taken up with description, and theory is relegated to
brief incidental comments amid the piling up ofl evidence. He drew in
eclectic fashion on both earlier European thinkers and on homespun Society and Politics
American populists (espousing the virtues of the 'small m'an'). Mills
offered a radical critique not only of the corporate rich, but also of For elite theorists of all persuasions, there are two dominant themes in
their salaried upper middle class allies, the hierarchies of labour unions, the inter-relationship of society and the political process. The first is the
 67
66 Theories of the Democratic State

circulation of elites Figure 3.2 Pareto's theory of elite circulation

circulation of elites, a perennially important aspect of any society, professional politcials
whether liberal democratic or not. The second is specific to liberal
democracies, concerning the role of 'professional politicians', and how
this relates to political parties and associated interest groups.

The circulation of elites

An elite may often look static at the collective level - 'to endless years
the same' in its overall composition. Yet its personnel are ever-
changing, as established older members age and die and new people
arrive. Both Mosca and Pareto identified this process as central to
explaining why societies are stable or unstable. For Mosca the root of
(I)
many problems is an ineradicable human drive for the present genera- under-
tion of social and economic leaders to want to secure positions of structure
power for their offspring, who may not be well suited for such roles. :@
I
The forces of heredity and established inequalities of wealth constantly I
tend to make elites ossify and degrade, shown in Figure 3.2 as flow 6. I

If elites are secure and unthreatened by any counter-elites, a degree of

ossification may go undetected. Yet in modern societies, as Figure 3.2 Main circulation flows:
shows, an insurgent or counter-elite will often exist, as the most tal- 1 Upwards flow of people from within the mass (mainly in the 'under-
ented and energetic members of the mass look for ways to acquire structure' areas) into the potential counter-elites.
influence and resources (flow 1). For instance, in the early twentieth 2 Absorption of individual members of the potential counter-elites into
century the labour movement and socialist parties constituted an insur- the elite, at various levels.
gent counter-elite, with leadership from self-educated workers and dis- 3 Outwards movements of potential counter-elites' members into other
sident intellectuals. The ruling elites seek to undermine the influence of societies, mainly due to
forcible exile; or
a counter-elite in various ways. One is by co-opting, bribing or other-
permanent emigration.
wise bringing over to their side some of the most threatening and/or tal- 3a Emig~ation also has stabilizing impacts at mass level in inhibiting the
ented leaders of the counter-elite (flow 2). Alternatively the incumbent recrUItment of talented individuals into potential counter-elites.
elites may encourage the most active elements of the mass and counter- 4 Use of guile, ideology and symbolic politics by the elite to
elites to leave their society altogether (flows 3 and 3a), by fostering (a) prevent counter-elites from emerging (and hence targeted at the
emigration (pervasive in late nineteenth century Europe and in imperial 'under-structure' areas) and
countries with a far-flung empire) or by forcibly exiling potential (b) to keep the mass as a whole generally disorganized,
rebels. both supplemented by the less visible use of force.
Pareto stressed that ruling elites become vulnerable when they lose S ~irect a~d o?servable repression of counter-elites by the elite (for
the will to disrupt and suppress the processes operating within the mass mstance, lmpnsonment, executions, 'disappearances', intimidation).
that create and sustain counter-elites (flow 4 in Figure 3.2): 6 Movement of elite members into ineffectualness, mainly due to
(a) the lottery of inheritance (capable people have less capable chil-
dren); or
When an elite declines we can generally observe two signs which
(b) a loss of elite morale and ruthlessness.
manifest themselves simultaneously: 7 Upwards social mobility allowing individual members of the mass to
1 The declining elite becomes softer, milder, more humane and less enter. the lower ranks of the elite (via entrepreneurship, job promotion,
apt to defend its own power. / marnage, etc.).
2. On the other hand it does not lose its rapacity and greed for the
goods of others, but rather tends as much as possible to increase
---------
68 Theories of the Democratic State
Elite Theory 69

" d ' d 1 in major usurpations 'machine politics' in the big Cltles integrated millions of new immi-
its unlawful appropnatlOns an to m u ge . . grants with the vote into American society. In Europe the trade unions
of the nationalhPatrdir~lOnYi the yoke heavier and on the other moved into politics, creating an organized labour movement active in
Thus on the one an lt ma (es . , elections in support of socialist parties. Conservative and liberal parties
it ha~ less strength to maintain it. (Pareto 1991: 58) created their own mass organizations in response.
Parties broadened their activities in many ways. 'The political parties
' 'threats to its position weaken, a ruling
As subtler ways 0 f d lsruptmg , (fl 5) Mosca and created democracy and modern democracy is unthinkable save in terms
, ' ' rt to crude represslO n ow . of the political parties' (Schattschneider 1942: 1). Elections became
elite m cnS1S must reso, ' h ' t Niccolo Machievelli,
f 11 d the Itahan renalssance t eons , mass mobilizing events, involving canvassing for votes, posters,
Pareto .0 owe 1 d did not and should not hesitate to ~se
who argued that sta~e ea el's, reserve their position, irrespectlve leafleting, large rallies and speeches. These labour-intensive activities
violence, te~ror, deceltl~nd ~u~e, to liberal democratic conditions, and required large numbers of volunteer workers and activists to sustain
of conventlOnal mora lty. e m , osition are them, and bureaucratic knowledge about how to organize them effec-
under media scrutiny, the costs of overtly repressmg opp tively. In large countries party memberships spiralled into the millions,
greatly increased. d 1h ' on the relative importance of three and parties set up conferences, committees, newspapers, youth wings,
This leaves a great ea. angmg women's organizations, social organizations, reading clubs, bookshops,
processes: cultural organizations, trade unions and professional associations.
Local and regional governments, long run in non-partisan or disguised-
• As some children of elite members, prove ,to be hopeles~~:~~e~:~:~ partisan ways, became more explicitly party-politicized. Policy also
(flow 6), the elites must look outslde thelr own ranks p ceased to be defined by legislators freely debating in parliaments.
ment p,ersonnel. I' 1 d must be absorbed into established Instead carefully constructed pledges were collated and integrated
.. Potentlal counter-e lte ea el'S together into policy platforms. 'The parties have their experts on every
elite structures (flow 2). b 'ted into the bottom question, just as the bureaucracy has its officials with particular respon-
1 f h of the mass must e recrUl sibilities' (Weber 1994: 171). Especially in European cities, socialist
• ~~~p seo;~: :l~:~~hrough upward social m~bi1i~y, inter-marriage, parties tried to convince voters that their policies could deliver real
anlpromotions within firms and state orgamzatlOnS (flow 7). improvements in living standards.
The rise of mass parties required some re-thinking about elite compo-
In liberal democracies electoral co.u:petition ,and party systems were sition. 'Throughout history', Weber (1994: 21) noted, 'it has been the
seen by the early elite theorists as cntlCal for ehte renewal. attainment of economic power which has led any given class to believe it
is a candidate for political leadership'. But now 'the only persons with
the training needed for political leadership are those who have been
The central role of political parties
selected in political struggle' (Weber 1994: 219). Party politics seemed a
, h d ainly operated as small
Until the late nineteenth century partle~ a m ' d by a network relatively closed process, shutting off the vast majority of citizens from
cadres of national political elites in ?arh~ment, sust~~~:n aristocrats or influence: 'The ordinary voter, courted by the parties but not a member
of established regional and, 10ca~I:I;;e~eil~e;:~01h: votes of people in of their organisation, has no active role at all, and notice is only taken of
the local wealthy). These nota , t' nal elites and an opportu- his person during elections or in public advertisements formulated for
their areas, in return for influence wlth na 10 e (controlling titles, gov- his benefit at other times' (Weber 1994: 211). Power accumulated in the
g hands of professional politicians, a new class of actors whose rise to
nity to create c1ientelist networks ?f pat.rdona 'concessions). This
, br 1 f d d serVlCes an economlC ' prominence sparked many resentments from those they displaced.
ernment Jobs, p~ lC Y un e 'd tt n of political mobilization
traditional and mformally orgamze p~ er 'h ' both the US and One of the earliest studies of parties was by the Russian historian
could not survive t?e growth ,O~te~~c:~t~e:-~sge~~endedmore widely. Moisy Ostrogorski, whose Democracy and the Party System in the
European democraCles, as the ng b' d' laced by new United States (1910) highlighted the enormous discretionary power
'd d' t mpletely ut lt was lSP exercised by party officials in American party machines. Until just prior
Patronage dl not, l,e, ou ,co .r' 1 tasks In the United States,
bureaucracies speClahzmg m po ltlCa . to the general election:
 Elite Theory 71
70 Theories of the Democratic State

not much has been seen of the people, although it has been talked (less so in the United States). Leaders constructed their own campaign
of a good deal; everybody quoted its authority, acted in its name, teams of s~eech.writers and policy experts, press, TV and advertising
took pledges on its behalf, but this everybody was made up almost g,urus :- paymg httle heed to the views of their legislators or party func-
exclusively of the class of professional politicians. Hitherto the con- tIO~anes .. p~~ty bureaucracies withered, memberships declined, and party
tact between the party organization and the electorate has been very SOCIal actlVltles became ever less relevant. Only periodic political embar-
rassments created by mishandled party conferences or conventions or
slight. (Ostrogorski 1910: Ch. 9)
occasional rebellions by disillusioned party factions, punctuated 'this
t~ansition to a mode of operation focused exclusively on winning elec-
Ostrogorski disliked both the oligarchical ten~encies. in US m~chine
parties in the late nineteenth century, and the anstoc~atlC predommance tIOns through media activities. In the US the spread of primary elections
in British parties, so much so that he called for partle~ to be outlaw~d. a.s the main way to choose candidates further weakened party organiza-
Yet Ostrogorski's work founded the more democratlC strand of ehte tIOns. The press and television were more important than party caucuses
theory. Unlike Mosca and Pareto, he refused to s~~ the proble~s of in d~termining who parties ended up with as presidential or legislative
party politics as fundamental to the whole poht~cal system: The candidates, and media-savvy politicians played to this audience.
Mich~ls' 'iron law of oligarchy' could be applied to both mass parties
mishaps and failures which we have only too often wltnes.sed cannot b.e
attributed to democratic government as such. Through thiS very expen- and their catch-all successors. Democratic elite theorists argued that the
ence , so full of sadness, democracy has vindicated itself again and ~arginalization of internal party democracy and consultation processes
did not matter much, so long as competition between parties still gave
again' (Ostrogorski 1910: Ch.17). .
The threats posed by organized parties to democracy cfoYstalhz,ed v~ters the d.ecisive hand. They agreed with pluralists that internal party
across Europe in the 1920s and 1930s. Fascist and Commulllst parties ohgarchy did not actually demonstrate that the state itself was domi-
developed propaganda machines and battalions of uniformed, stree~­ nate~ by a single elite - only that each political party in a two-party or
fighting thugs, intended to intimidate opponents and bre~k up their multi-party system would be dominated by an elite.
meetings. In post-World War I Germany both left and nght staged Catch-all parties are expensive to operate, especially in the US where
attempted putsches against the Weimar republic" an~ in Italy and c.ampaign costs have mushroomed, increasing the influence of corpora-
Germany fanatical, leader-worshipping party orgalllzatlons eventua~ly tIOns and other wealthy donors. In the eyes of elite theorists, this
took over and integrated themselves into state structures. In the Soviet wealth buys political power by recruiting capable individuals to serve
Union the Communist Party became a vehicle for a massive personality the. i.n~erests of the ruling class, and by financing the campaigns of
cult focusing on Stalin. As a revolutionary organization that allowed no pohtlClans and the operations of political parties. In the United States
competitors, the Communist Party did not have to bother with com~et­ and elsewhere, many large corporate donors give to both or all main
itive elections (though it did allow elections in which only Commulllsts political parties. Corruption of politics by money can sometimes be
curbed by campaign finance legislation, but the wealthy always find a
could stand). .
After 1945 political parties became progressively smaller and less mc~u- way around restrictions. So in the United States, the response to limits
sive. The highly drilled massed battalions of the Nazi Nuremburg ralhes on individual contributions was the creation of political action commit-
or the Red Square parades in Moscow were now a potent imag~ of wh~t tees (PACs), often associated with corporations or unions.
democracy was not. Communication technologies changed. FI.r~t radIO . Financial elites can hire the best lobbyists to make sure that legisla-
and then TV became critical in elections campaigns. As advertlsmg and tIOn and regulation are to their liking, and they control privately-owned
use of the media increased in sophistication, the importance of rallies and media. Elite theorists (for example, Domhoff, 1978a) described addi-
the activities of party workers declined. And the development of opinion tional aspects of the social system that help to secure the power of elites
polls into reasonably accurate guides to voting intentions meant, that a?~ to undermine the importance of the party barriers that supposedly
advisors to political leaders could study and understand :~e dynamlC~ of diVide them. These include the common social background of business
public opinion and calculate the chances of diffe~ent pohCles succeedmg, and political leaders; the social clubs and networks to which they all
belonged; the consequently easy access to political power enjoyed by
without relying on their party organizations. .
Mass mobilized parties gave way to 'catch-all' parties. These were stili corporate leaders and their lobbyists; and the revolving door between
run in top-down manner by national political elites, especially in Europe top business and governmental positions.
72 Theories of the Democratic State Elite Theory 73

Government and Policy Maldng expansion of US forces in wartime and its maintenance afterwards cre-
ated what Lasswell (1941) had foreseen as 'a garrison state'.
Elite theory's view of government and policy making emphasizes three These changes forged an alliance between the US's largest corpora-
defining features of contemporary societies that go almost unmentioned tions (Mills's 'corporate rich') and the military ('the warlords'), drama-
in traditional pluralism: bureaucracy; technology; and large scale. C. tized in President Eisenhower's farewell address to the American people
Wright Mills in particular analyzed the changed circumstances of the in 1960 warning of the dangers of a powerful 'military-industrial com-
top state elite, as well as more prosaic public policy-making operating plex'. Defence spending sustained the research and development efforts
at the 'middle levels of power'. of growing numbers of scientists and technologists. And although post-
war consumer spending quickly rebalanced the US economy from its
The power elite military orientation in the war years, significant defence programmes
remained. Foreign policy prioritized a national interest defined in eco-
Bureaucracy (literally 'rule by bureaus') was first identified and named nomic as well as security terms, especially when it came to securing raw
in Germany in the early nineteenth century, when the formalization of material supplies (Krasner 1978).
decision-making and reliance on written records was first seen as Mills deplored the lack of an impartial civil service and the domi-
breeding a new concentration of power. At the turn of the twentieth cen- nance of Washington policy-making (then as now) by political
tury Max Weber offered a thorough account of bureaucracy's routiniza- appointees of the President. These nominees were either law, media or
tion of tasks, codification of easily-retrievable records, impersonal political professionals involved in the winning candidate's campaigns.
allocation of offices on merit, and close structuring of social life by rules After their period of government service many of these people would
and regulations - all of which we now associate with the organizations resume their business careers, able to take further advantage of their
of modern society. Bureaucratization affects business and state organiza- contacts in government.
tions alike, concentrating control in hierarchies with established stan- This power elite of political executives, the corporate rich and the
dard operating procedures, to which their staff adhere. In the economic military hierarchy operated across all the 'history-making' major issues
sphere Weber argued that only innovative and assertive entrepreneurs of economic and foreign policy-making. In Mills's view they did not
can resist the extreme stabilization of organizational processes that bother to resolve or even consider lower-level issues:
results, periodically shaking up markets with new inventions. Within the
liberal democratic state, only effective value guidance from the class of What was Caesar's power at its peak compared with power of the
professional politicians could ever hope to counteract the inertia of changing inner circle of Soviet Russia or of America's temporary
bureaucracy. However, as we noted earlier, Weber also thought that administrations? The men of either circle can cause great cities to be
charismatic leaders can sometimes shake up government bureaucracies. wiped out in a single night, and in a few weeks turn continents into
C. Wright Mills saw the transformation of the scale, bureaucratic thermonuclear wastelands. That the facilities of power are enor-
character and technologies of government in the post-1945 United mously enlarged and decisively centralized means that decisions of
States as the critical issues of his day: 'The political directorate, the cor- small groups are now more consequential. (Mills 1956: 23)
porate rich, and the ascendant military have come together as the
power elite, and the expanded and centralized hierarchies which they The power elite concept also pointed to the enormous ideological effort
head have encroached upon the old balances and have now relegated deployed to justify the transformation of American society that post-
them to the middle levels of power' (Mills 1956: 296 ) war militarization entailed:
The massive Manhattan project that developed the atomic bomb trig-
gered what Mills called 'the militarization of science'. The subsequent In the last thirty years, there have been signs of a status merger
H-bomb and missile programmes established a 'military ascendancy in among the economic, political and military elite. [T]hey have begun
the world of science' (Mills 1956: 217). By the yarly 1950s the United to seek, as powerful men [and women] have always sought, to but-
States had renounced its historical isolationism and besttode the tress their power with the mantle of authoritative status. (Mills
Western world as a military colossus, locked in an apparent death- 1956: 91)
match with the Soviet Union's authoritarian Communism. The huge
74 Theories of the Democratic State Elite Theory 75

These themes resonate in subsequent decades. Authors such as Noam Figure 3.3 Mills's picture of how modern US society differed from past
Chomsky describe US power in the twenty-first century in similar patterns
terms.

The middle levels of power

Mills condemned the pluralist theory of his day for its blinkered focus
on interest group process, its ideological celebration of an ineffectual
regional elites
diversity, its want of hard-edged empirical observations, and its middle levels power
unproven 'theory of balance':
local elites

You elaborate the number of groups involved, in a kind of bewil-

dering, Whitmanesque enthusiasm for variety ... You do not try to
mass
clarify this hodge-podge by classifying these groups, occupations,
strata, organizations according to their political relevance or even local 'mass'

whether they are organized politically at all. You do not try to see
how they may be connected with one another into a structure of
power, for by virtue of his [or her] perspective, the romantic conser-
vative [pluralist] focuses upon a scatter of milieux rather than upon
Later elite theorists by and large followed Mills's core components.
their connections. (Mills 1956: 244)
For Domhoff (1978a) the US power elite has pretty much the same
Mills did not deny the existence of a vigorous political process membership as it did for Mills. However, Domhoff also treats the
involving Congress, party politics and state and regional governments power elite as 'the leadership group or operating arm of the ruling
in post-war America. But he saw them as merely a political side show, class', arguing that members of this privileged class may choose not to
like Hollywood celebrities who create a constantly absorbing spectacle. become involved in public affairs (1978a: 13). Domhoff's power elite
This was not always so - in earlier epochs such as the civil war period, (like that of Mills) excludes 'labour leaders', 'middle America politi-
there were real political conflicts that had engaged regional and local cians' and 'leaders of minority group organizations' (1978a: 15). His
politicians and citizens in deciding history-making events (see Figure analysis stresses a broader range of elite influence, based on money's
role as a primary social good in many different spheres of social life. So
3.3(a)). But not any longer.
The key danger Mills saw in the separation of the elite from the wealthy individuals and corporations can hire the best lawyers and ini-
middle levels of power is the enormous scope for discretionary deci- tiate the most favourable cases to make sure that legal knowledge is
sions conferred on the power elite, to decide issues in its own interest skewed to serve their interests, such that the legal system works for
and to keep decisions secret, without having to account to elected rep- them. For Domhoff, the state is very much the instrument of the ruling
resentatives, let alone citizens at large. The middle levels of power are elite, and systematically serves its interests.
for Mills a cushioning layer that absorbs popular views and influence;
they do not transmit public opinion (Figure 3.3(b)). The power elite Community power studies
stands above criticism partly because it develops an insulating 'prestige'
and cultivates myths about where power really lies. Collusion by the Elite theorists did not confine their attention solely to US national poli-
elite ensures that its behaviour is hidden froJ,11 public view. For tics. Drawing on his own case work in Illinois, Mills saw the 'local
example, the elite can persuade media corporations that publicizing society' of American small cities and towns as a domain where small
embarrassing foreign policy or intelligence f~i1ures is against the businesses, local leaders and diverse community groups were politically
'national interest'. The more complex power structure of earlier active and processed the most tractable and immediately vital issues.
American history was now lost for good. Metropolitan politics (in New York or Los Angeles) had a different
76 Theories of the Democratic State Elite Theory 77

dynamic, driven by a social and economic elite of wealthy families of fascism with its stress on the mobilization of the masses in search of
(sometimes numbered as 'the 400'). Their periodic ambitions to define charismatic leadership.
the public society of the nation had actually failed repeatedly in Mills' The more empirical American elitist theory authors who followed in
view, disrupted by new elites, economic turbulence and populist resis- the middle of the twentieth century were subtle leftist critics of the dis-
tance. But local elite life was a marginal area of 'conspicuous consump- tribution of power in the US political system. Their implicit agenda
tion'. For all its economic significance in encouraging economiC involved the redistribution of wealth and power to make American
production, local American upper class affairs remained a sphere of society more equal and more truly democratic. Quite how this redistri-
social life without major political implications. bution ought to be achieved was generally left unstated. For European
Other elite theory sociologists, notably Floyd Hunter (1958), carried radicals, it is easy to look back at C. Wright Mills and Floyd Hunter
out a succession of 'community power studies' in American cities that and wonder why they did not advocate socialism - as their European
reached different conclusions. In city after city the sociologists argued contemporaries (and even some American successors) surely did. The
that the diverse political leadership structures anticipated by pluralists answer may have a lot to do with the character of US politics in the late
did not exist. They used a reputational method, systematically inter- 1940s and 1950s. This was the era of anti-communist witch-hunts led
viewing people across the community's main organizations about who by Senator ]oseph McCarthy, a time when social science was being re-
was influential. The lists thus drawn up were then pruned to identify a branded as 'behavioral science' so as not to be confused with socialism.
top 50 or top 20 of elite power-holders. Power at the city level seemed Speaking of the political science of that era (in which he was a major
to be concentrated in a mini-version of the national elite, usually com- figure), David Easton (1991: 209-10) recalls that the discipline's
posed of locally significant businesses (especially property developers), emphasis on basic science as opposed to social problems served the dis-
and politicians dependent on business for campaign contributions and cipline particularly well amid the dangers of McCarthyism. In this light,
investment in their cities. It was chiefly in this form that elite theory elite theorists such as Mills and Hunter were courageous in daring to
spread back from the US to post World War II Europe. In the 1980s raise critical questions about US politics.
analysts stressed the domination of city politics by 'growth coalitions' In the pluralism versus elite theory debates of the 1950s and 1960s,
bringing together property and investment interests with mayors elected neither side really had an explanatory theory as to why the state was
by working class and middle class, white and African-American con- pluralist, or why it was dominated by elites - in contrast to the earlier
stituencies (Logan and Molotch 1987). European elite theorists, who could ground their explanatory theories
It would be easy to portray the pluralism versus elitism debate about in the psychology of elites and masses, or accounts of how large organi-
American national politics as a disciplinary clash between pluralist zations worked. For all post-war elite theorists, it was easy to assume
political science (described in Chapter 2) and elite theory sociology that a ruling class or power elite exists, and interpret politics and the
(epitomized by Mills and Hunter). But this would not be quite right. state in this light, but much harder to demonstrate the existence of an
The top-selling introductory textbook on US politics in multiple edi- elite to pluralist sceptics. Pluralists argued that even very large inequali-
tions since the 1960s has been The Irony of Democracy by political sci- ties in society do not mean there exists a cohesive elite, for members of
entists Thomas Dye and Harmon Ziegler, which took a determinedly the alleged elite often seem preoccupied with their own internal rival-
elite theory perspective. However, for all their realist cynicism Dye and ries. Proving, or for that matter disproving, elite theory claims is actu-
Ziegler steered clear of any suggestions that the US political system ally very hard. Clearly public policies sometimes involve redistribution
merited radical reform. Another popular textbook on US politics, of resources to the poorer members of society. Elite theorists can
Michael Parenti's Democracy for the Few, had no such hesitation - but always say that any such redistribution does not represent any real
never sold in the same numbers. political influence on the part of ordinary people, merely a way of sta-
bilizing society in the interests of the elite.
American pluralists and elite theorists never claimed to be discussing
Conclusions any political system beyond the United States; they were concerned
with how power was distributed in the United States, but not why it
The early European elite theorists were anti-socialist, anti-communist, had to be that way. The legacies of this debate remain with us to this
anti-democratic, anti-egalitarian, and in the end they supported the rise day. We will see in subsequent chapters how both sides have been
78 Theories of the Democratic State

transformed in recent decades, and how both made themselves felt

beyond US borders. Conspicuously missing in American social science,
but very important everywhere else, was a third classical theory of the
state, Marxism, to which we now turn.