VOL.

116, SEPTEMBER 9, 1982 451

Dioquino vs. Cruz, Jr.
*

No. L-38579. September 9, 1982.

JULIET T. DIOQUINO, assisted by mother, NATIVIDAD

TULLAO, petitioner, vs. THE HON. NICANOR J. CRUZ,
JR. and MARIO VERGEL DE DIOS, respondents.
*

No. L-39951. September 9, 1982.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON.

VICTORINO A. SAVELLANO Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, Branch XIX, and EDUARDO
OLIVERIS Y INOCENCIO, respondents.

Criminal Procedure; Jurisdiction of court, how determined.—

In criminal prosecutions, the jurisdiction of the court is not
determined by what may be meted out to the offender after trial
(People v. Cuello, 1 SCRA 814), or even by the result of the
evidence that would be presented during the trial (People v. Co
Hiok, 62 Phil. 503), but by the extent of the penalty which the law
imposes, together with other legal obligations, on the basis of the
facts as recited in the complaint or information (People v.
Purisima, 69 SCRA 341, 347) constitutive of the offense charged,
for once jurisdiction is acquired by the court in which the
information is filed, it is there retained regardless of whether the
evidence proves a lesser offense than that charged in the
information (People v. Mission, 48 O.G. 1330), or the subsequent
happening of events, although of a character which would have
prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance (Ramos
v. Central Bank, 41 SCRA 565, 583).

Same; Same; Simple seduction case; Jurisdiction over

criminal prosecution for a simple seduction case lies with the
Court of First Instance, not with the inferior court.—The above
rulings were reiterated in the fairly recent case of People v.
Buissan (105 SCRA 547) where this Court stated that jurisdiction
over a simple seduction case lies with the Court of First Instance
and not with the inferior court, notwithstanding the fact alleged
in the private respondent’s answer that the complainant gave
birth to a child some eighteen months after the alleged
commission of sexual intercourse in the simple seduction case.
_______________

* FIRST DIVISION.

452

452 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Dioquino vs. Cruz, Jr.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Indemnification, acknowledgment

and support under Art. 345 of the Revised Penal Code, nature of
civil liabilities of; Effect of bringing acknowledgment and
seduction cases in two different courts; JDRC, without jurisdiction
to determine acknowledgment suit, but must be determined in the
main case.—The indemnification, acknowledgment, and support
provided by Article 345 of the Revised Penal Code are civil
liabilities inherent and accessory to the finding of guilt in rape,
seduction, or abduction. It would be needless multiplication of
suits to bring to another court a liability already beyond dispute
because of a judgment of conviction in another court.
Furthermore, the charter of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court of Manila, Republic Act No. 1401 clearly provides in Sec.
38-A which states the exclusive original jurisdiction of said court
that “if any question involving any of the above matters (falling
under the court’s jurisdiction) should arise as an incident in any
case pending in the ordinary courts, said incident shall be
determined in the main case.”

Same; Same; Same; Same; Purpose of divesting the municipal

courts of jurisdiction over simple seduction cases.—Considerations
of consistency and orderliness have led this Court to rule as early
as 1911 that a justice on the peace court is divested of jurisdiction
over a case for simple seduction. (U.S. v. Bernardo, 19 Phil. 265).
The law on criminal jurisdiction must be as certain and
predictable as possible. Judges, fiscals, and accused alike should
not be made to speculate on whether or not an offspring may still
arise from the crime, whether or not the complainant or the
accused may be sterile or incapable of procreation, whether or not
the complainant was already pregnant by another man when the
crime was committed, and various other factual considerations
before jurisdiction may be fixed.

Same; Judgments; Stare decisis, value of doctrine of.—The

value of the doctrine of stare decisis—to stand by decisions and
not disturb settled matters—is best exemplified when lower
courts believe that a doctrine should be re-examined but
nonetheless apply it.

PETITION to review the order of the Court of First

Instance of Rizal.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

453

VOL. 116, SEPTEMBER 9, 1982 453

Dioquino vs. Cruz, Jr.

No. L-38579.

Amando K. Gaitos for petitioner.

Teofilo Leonin for respondents.

No. L-39951.

Amando K. Gaitos & Associates for petitioner.

Teofilo Leonin for respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

These two cases were elevated to this Tribunal on the issue

of what court has jurisdiction over criminal prosecutions
for simple seduction.
In G.R. No. L-38579, Judge Pedro A. Revilla of the Court
of First Instance of Rizal ruled that the crime of simple
seduction is within the original jurisdiction of the
municipal court. He, therefore, dismissed the petition for
certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with preliminary
injunction which sought to enjoin the Municipal Court of
Parañaque from proceeding with the trial of Criminal Case
No. 35936.
In G.R. No. L-39951, respondent Victorino A. Savellano
then Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
dismissed Criminal Case No. 17765 for seduction and
ordered the Fiscal to file the case with the “proper” court.
Article 338 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

“ART. 338. Simple seduction.—The seduction of a woman who is

single or a widow of good reputation, over twelve but under
eighteen years of age, committed by means of deceit, shall be
punished by arresto mayor.’’

while Section 87(c) of the Judiciary Act, as amended

provides:

“SEC. 87. Original jurisdiction to try criminal cases.—Municipal

judges and judges of city courts of chartered cities shall have
original jurisdiction over:

xxx xxx xxx

454

454 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

 Dioquino vs. Cruz, Jr.

“(c) Except violations of election laws all other offenses in which

the penalty provided by law is imprisonment for not more than
three years, or a fine of not more than three thousand pesos, or
both such fine and imprisonment.”

xxx xxx xxx

In Luansing v. Court of Appeals (27 SCRA 305), We ruled:

“x x x The penalty imposed by Article 338 of the Revised Penal

Code for the crime of simple seduction is arresto mayor, the
duration of which is from one month and one day to six months.
Apparently, the crime of simple seduction falls under the original
jurisdiction of the Justice of the Peace or Municipal Courts.
However, it should not be overlooked that persons guilty of
seduction shall also be sentenced to indemnify the offended
woman, to acknowledge the offspring unless the law should
prevent him from so doing, and to give support to such offspring
(Article 345, Revised Penal Code). These are inherent accessory
civil liabilities when a child is born as a result of the crime. The
acknowledgment of, and the giving of support to, the offspring are
matters beyond the jurisdiction of the Justice of the Peace or
Municipal Courts. They pertain to the Courts of First Instance
(Section 44 [a] and [e], Republic Act No. 296).
“It has been held that laws conferring jurisdiction on the
inferior courts over demands below certain amounts do not
preclude a determination of said demands in the superior court,
where they are connected with larger claims or with a type of
demand solely within the jurisdiction of the superior court. Thus
for instance, where an action is within the jurisdiction of the
Court of First Instance because it involves an issue of admiralty,
the said court must be held likewise to have jurisdiction over
other causes of action joined thereto even if the amount sought to
be collected is less than the jurisdictional limit (Fireman’s Fund
Insurance Co. vs. Cia. General de Tabacos de Filipinas, G.R. No.
L-22625, April 27, 1867). In like manner, since the crime of
seduction carries with it a liability, under Article 345 of the
Revised Penal Code, to acknowledge and give support to the
offspring resulting from the crime—matters beyond jurisdiction of
the Justice of the Peace or Municipal Courts—it follows that the
instant case falls within the jurisdiction of the Court of First
Instance (U.S. vs. Bernardo, 19 Phil. 265). It would be absurd to
have the principal case of seduction tried and decided by the
Municipal Court and the resulting acknowledgment and support
of the offspring by the Court

455

VOL. 116, SEPTEMBER 9, 1982 455

Dioquino vs. Cruz, Jr.
of First Instance. The duplication would entail unnecessary waste
of time and effort for the parties and for the courts, to the
detriment of an orderly administration of justice.”

The respondent courts took cognizance of the Luansing

ruling. However, the Court of First Instance of Rizal
observed that in Criminal Case No. 35396, the issue of
acknowledgment of offspring and support was already out
of the question.
The Court of First Instance of Rizal felt that it was not
obliged to follow the Luansing ruling because it was no
longer possible to have an offspring under the facts of the
case. The crime of seduction in People v. Mario Vergel de
Dios before the Municipal Court of Parañaque, Rizal was
allegedly committed between October 2 and 3, 1972. The
motion for discontinuance or termination of proceedings
was filed on September 10, 1973 when the prosecution was
about to terminate the presentation of its evidence before
the municipal court. The decision of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal in the certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus case was promulgated on February 11, 1974 or
more than sixteen months after the seduction was allegedly
committed. The court stated that the civil liability of
persons guilty of crimes against chastity provided under
Article 345 of the Revised Penal Code is imposable only in
those cases where there is a clear showing that the victim
has conceived within 120 days from the date of the offense
and that courts should not speculate on the possibility that
an issue may be born as a result of the crime committed by
the accused.
In L-39951, the Court of First Instance of Manila stated
that it had no jurisdiction over People v. Eduardo Liveros Y
Inocencio, Criminal Case No. 17765 for seduction because:

“1. The penalty provided for simple seduction under

Article 338 of the Revised Penal Code is arresto
mayor; this falls under the original jurisdiction of
the City Court-Section 87(c) of the Judiciary Act;
“2. The creation of the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court in the City of Manila (R.A. 1401)
gives the said court ‘exclusive original jurisdiction
to hear and decide . . . (b) cases involving custody,
guardianship, adoption, paternity and
acknowledgment’ (Article III, Section 38-A) and

456

456 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Dioquino vs. Cruz, Jr.
“ ‘If any question involving any of the above matters should arise in an
incident in any case pending in the ordinary courts, said incident shall be
determined in the main case.’

“These meet the contingencies under Article 345 of the Revised

Penal Code.
“This Court finds no occasion to consider the application of the
Luansing case and also U.S. Bernardo, 19 Phil. 265, both of which
are cases outside Manila and where there is no Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court.
“In fine, from the point of view of the penalty for the crime
(arresto mayor) or the acknowledgment of the offspring (Article
345), the Court of First Instance of Manila would have no
jurisdiction. Whichever way the Court looks at the case, this
Court has no jurisdiction.”

The Court of First Instance of Manila added that “the case

at bar may also provide a propitious occasion for our
Supreme Court to review and re-examine those rulings in
view of the enlargement of jurisdiction of the municipal
courts and city courts since those cases were decided.’’
We have carefully considered the arguments and
reasons given by the respondent judges in these cases but
find no reasons to warrant Our departing from the rule so
clearly enunciated in Luansing v. Court of Appeals.
In Criminal prosecutions, the jurisdiction of the court is
not determined by what may be meted out to the offender
after trial (People v. Cuello, 1 SCRA 814), or even by the
result of the evidence that would be presented during the
trial (People v. Co Hiok, 62 Phil. 503), but by the extent of
the penalty which the law imposes, together with other
legal obligations, on the basis of the facts as recited in the
complaint or information (People v. Purisima, 69 SCRA
341, 347) constitutive of the offense charged, for once
jurisdiction is acquired by the court in which the
information is filed, it is there retained regardless of
whether the evidence proves a lesser offense than that
charged in the information (People v. Mission, 48 O.G.
1330), or the subsequent happening of events, although of a
character which would have prevented jurisdiction from
attaching in the first

457

VOL. 116, SEPTEMBER 9, 1982 457

Dioquino vs. Cruz, Jr.

instance (Ramos v. Central Bank, 41 SCRA 565, 583). The

above rulings were reiterated in the fairly recent case of
People v. Buissan (105 SCRA 547) where this Court stated
that jurisdiction over a simple seduction case lies with the
Court of First Instance and not with the inferior court,
notwithstanding the fact alleged in the private
respondent’s answer that the complainant gave birth to a
child some eighteen months after the alleged commission of
sexual intercourse in the simple seduction case.
The jurisdiction of a court depends upon the state of
facts existing at the time it is invoked, and if the
jurisdiction once attaches to the person and subject matter
of the litigation, the subsequent happening of events,
although they are of such a character as would have
prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance,
will not operate to oust jurisdiction already attached.
(Tinitigan v. Tinitigan, Sr., 100 SCRA 619, 634.)
The court in G.R. No. L-39951 contended that a separate
case for acknowledgment must be filed with the Juvenile
and Domestic Relations Court even as the seduction case
should be tried by the City Court of Manila. There is no
merit in this contention. The indemnification,
acknowledgment, and support provided by Article 345 of
the Revised Penal Code are civil liabilities inherent and
accessory to the finding of guilt in rape, seduction, or
abduction. It would be needless multiplication of suits to
bring to another court a liability already beyond dispute
because of a judgment of conviction in another court.
Furthermore, the charter of the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court of Manila, Republic Act No. 1401 clearly
provides in Sec. 38-A which states the exclusive original
jurisdiction of said court that “if any question involving any
of the above matters (falling under the court’s jurisdiction)
should arise as an incident in any case pending in the
ordinary courts, said incident shall be determined in the
main case.’’
Considerations of consistency and orderliness have led
this Court to rule as early as 1911 that a justice of the
peace court is divested of jurisdiction over a case for simple
seduction. (U.S. v. Bernardo, 19 Phil. 265). The law on
criminal jurisdiction must be as certain and predictable as
possible. Judges,

458

458 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Dioquino vs. Cruz, Jr.

fiscals, and accused alike should not be made to speculate

on whether or not an offspring may still arise from the
crime, whether or not the complainant or the accused may
be sterile or incapable of procreation, whether or not the
complainant was already pregnant by another man when
the crime was committed, and various other factual
consideration before jurisdiction may be fixed.
 The value of the doctrine of stare decisis—to stand by
decisions and not disturb settled matters—is best
exemplified when lower courts believe that a doctrine
should be reexamined but nonetheless apply it.
The Manila court apologized for provoking discussion on
the Luansing decision. The better procedure would have
been for the court to have applied Luansing and have left
the agitation for a re-examination of settled doctrine to one
of the parties.
WHEREFORE, the petitions in the instant cases are
hereby granted. The orders dated October 14, 1974 and
November 22, 1974 in G.R. No. L-39951 are set aside and
the respondent Court of First Instance of Manila is directed
to try Criminal Case No. 17765 and to render judgment
accordingly. The order dated February 11, 1974 in G.R. No.
L-38579 is set aside. The municipal judge of Parañaque,
Metro Manila is directed to forward the records of Criminal
Case No. 35936 to the Court of First Instance of Rizal for
proper proceedings.
SO ORDERED.

Teehankee (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Plana,

Vasquez, and Relova, JJ., concur.
Makasiar, J., is on official leave.

Petition granted.

Notes.—Deceit, though an essential element of simple

seduction, need not be proved in a charge of qualified
seduction. It is replaced by abuse of confidence. The law
assumes the existence of deceit as an integral element of
said crime. (People vs. Fontanilla, 23 SCRA 1227).

459

VOL. 116, SEPTEMBER 9, 1982 459

Litex Employees Association vs. CIR

Lewd design is inherent in the very act of having sexual

intercourse with a chaste woman over 12 and under 18
years under a false promise of marriage, which act
constitutes the crime of seduction. (People vs. Luansing, 27
SCRA 305.)

——o0o——
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