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PALGRAVE STUDIES IN POLITICAL LEADERSHIP

Prime Ministers
in Europe
Changing Career
Experiences and Profiles
Ferdinand Müller-Rommel
Michelangelo Vercesi
Jan Berz
 Palgrave Studies in Political Leadership

Series Editors
Ludger Helms
University of Innsbruck
Innsbruck, Austria

Gillian Peele
Department of Politics and International Relations
University of Oxford
Oxford, UK

Bert A. Rockman
Department of Political Science
Purdue University
West Lafayette, IN, USA
Palgrave Studies in Political Leadership seeks to gather some of the best
work on political leadership broadly defined, stretching from classical areas
such as executive, legislative and party leadership to understudied manifes-
tations of political leadership beyond the state. Edited by an international
board of distinguished leadership scholars from the United States, Europe
and Asia, the series publishes cutting-edge research that reaches out to a
global readership. The editors are gratefully supported by an advisory
board comprising of: Takashi Inoguchi (University of Tokyo, Japan),
R.A.W Rhodes (University of Southampton, UK) and Ferdinand Müller-­
Rommel (University of Luneburg, Germany).

More information about this series at

https://link.springer.com/bookseries/14602
 Ferdinand Müller-­Rommel
Michelangelo Vercesi • Jan Berz

Prime Ministers
in Europe
Changing Career Experiences and Profiles
Ferdinand Müller-Rommel Michelangelo Vercesi
Center for the Study of Democracy Center for the Study of Democracy
Leuphana University Lüneburg Leuphana University Lüneburg
Lüneburg, Germany Lüneburg, Germany

Jan Berz
Department of Political Science
Trinity College Dublin
Dublin, Ireland

ISSN 2947-5821     ISSN 2947-583X (electronic)

Palgrave Studies in Political Leadership
ISBN 978-3-030-90890-4    ISBN 978-3-030-90891-1 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-90891-1

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer
Nature Switzerland AG 2022
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the
Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of
translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on
microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval,
electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now
known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this
publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are
exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information
in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the
publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to
the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The
publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and
institutional affiliations.

Cover image: © Dutchy / Getty Images

This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature
Switzerland AG.
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
 To Jean Blondel
a highly respected scholar, mentor, and friend
 Foreword

Every professional or non-professional observer of political life has little

doubt about the importance of prime ministers in the parliamentary or
semi-presidential regimes typical of Europe (but not only). Prime minis-
ters, their actions and declarations, their tweets are almost daily at the
center of media attention. Who they are, where they come from, and how
successful their conduct of government affairs is are the objects of con-
stant discussion. It is a bit surprising therefore that political scientists have
devoted much less systematic attention to these figures. Is it the fear to be
not sufficiently scientific by taking a personalistic view of politics instead of
adopting a more structural vision? Is it because prevailing research frame-
works do not have a well-defined place for these political figures? Whatever
the reason for this, there is obviously a disturbing gap in our knowledge.
It is therefore good news that a book devoted entirely to the analysis of
these political figures should be published. And it is also good news that
the book should be based on solid and systematic empirical evidence and
on a well-articulated theoretical perspective.
Ferdinand Müller-Rommel, with a long scholarly experience in the
study of governments, and the two younger coauthors, Michelangelo
Vercesi and Jan Berz, put straightforwardly at the center of this book the
question: who are the European prime ministers? And this question, to
make it even more relevant, is nested in the wider perspective of party
government, the dominant although today somewhat more uncertain
variant of democracy in the European context. What is then the relation-
ship between prime ministers and parties and what prime ministers’ pro-
files can tell us about the role of the latter in a central democratic institution

vii
viii FOREWORD

as the government? By raising these questions, the three authors make this
book as an important contribution not only to our knowledge about cru-
cial policy-makers as prime ministers are but also to the ongoing scholarly
debate about the decline (or transformation) of party government.
Exploiting the first systematic collection of biographical data for 350
prime ministers in 26 European countries the book cannot only provide
an average profile of these political figures but also document variations
across groups of countries and over time of this profile.
Throughout the chapters of the book, we come to know who the prime
ministers of Europe are in terms of their gender, age when coming into
office, education, occupational background, and political positions occu-
pied in parliament, cabinet, or party office. We are led to appreciate the
differences in background patterns between three main groups of
European countries, those with a democratic experience dating to the first
years after the Second World War, the Southern European countries who
democratized in the mid-1970s, and the large Central and Eastern
European set of countries who became democratic between the end of the
1980s and the beginning of the 1990s. This articulation of the analysis
already provides important hints about the impact of historical periods on
the shaping of prime ministerial careers; but in a following step the book,
further pursuing this theme, explores variations by decades of all the main
features of prime ministers.
This rich and systematic descriptive analysis provides an interesting
starting point for a more theoretically articulate discussion of some impor-
tant trends of political change: populism, technocracy, and presidentializa-
tion of executive office. Although the book does not directly produce a
causal analysis of the relationship between these trends and the profile of
prime ministers, it provides a very important starting point for developing
further research along these lines.
It is fair to conclude that for all those who are convinced that prime
ministers are among the most important political players in today’s world
this book is a must.

Florence, Italy Maurizio Cotta

 Preface

Insofar as party governments matter, prime ministers do too. They are

among the best-known politicians in parliamentary and semi-presidential
democracies. Their political and private lives are under constant media
scrutiny. They are featured almost daily in the print and online media.
Their hours worked, their regular participation in events, as well as the
speeches and interviews they give seem innumerable. As a result, the large
majority of voters view prime ministers as the politically most powerful
government officials. This public opinion corresponds impressively with
the scholarly debate about the empowerment of prime ministers in parlia-
mentary democracies, which has come to be associated with the ‘person-
alization’ and ‘presidentialization’ of politics. Both concepts imply directly
or indirectly that prime ministers with a technical background—rather
than traditional ‘partisan prime ministers’—are more likely to hold the
highest executive position in parliamentary and semi-presidential govern-
ments of the twenty-first century. It therefore seems reasonable to argue
that in contemporary governments, the career profiles of chief executives
are slowly changing.
This book assesses how the career experiences and the career profiles of
the 350 prime ministers who governed more than 400 million citizens in
26 European liberal democracies between the years 1945 and 2020 have
changed over time and across countries. We want to know who these
prime ministers are, what their individual background characteristics were
prior to entering office, as well as when and where their career profiles
shifted from partisan to technical types over the past seven decades.

ix
x PREFACE

This volume is a product of a close academic collaboration between

three political scientists who are at different stages in their academic career.
Together, they have a common interest in the study of prime ministers.
The origin of this book goes back to many discussions we had with Jean
Blondel who made us aware that there is—most surprisingly—very little
scholarly interest in studying prime ministers from liberal democracies
outside of Westminster systems. Consequently, he proposed to bring
prime ministers ‘back in’ to the study of comparative government.
Following his advice, we decided to examine the changing role of European
prime ministers in times of declining party government. This book there-
fore provides rigorous descriptive findings about the consequences, and
the implications, of declining party governments on the career patterns of
prime ministers in Western, Southern, and Central-Eastern Europe.
Parts of this book have benefited greatly from the critical and construc-
tive reflections of participants at the ‘Tuesday Seminar’ of the Center for
the Study of Democracy at Leuphana University Lüneburg, as well as from
attendees at the 2020 General Conference of the European Consortium
of Political Research (ECPR) and the 2021 World Congress of the
International Political Science Association (IPSA). In particular, we are
most grateful to Annarita Criscitiello, Sebastian Jäckle, Eoin O’Malley,
Elena Semenova, Ilana Shpaizman, and Gregor Zons for their stimulating
intellectual feedback on our paper which covered the content from three
of the chapters found in this book. We would also like to express our grati-
tude to Corinna Kroeber, Florian Grotz, and Thomas Poguntke for hav-
ing commented on single chapters of the manuscript. Many thanks also to
the two anonymous reviewers of the book proposal. Whoever you are, you
provided substantive comments and valuable suggestions! Last but cer-
tainly not least, we would like to thank Aaron Martin for his thorough
copyediting.
A project such as this could not have materialized without significant
financial support and continuous administrative help. The data collection
on prime ministers’ personal background and their political careers has
been financed by the German Research Foundation (Deutsche
Forschungsgemeinschaft) within the framework of a larger project on career
profiles and political performance of prime ministers (GR3311/3-1 and
MU618/18-1). We are also most grateful to the Center for the Study of
Democracy at Leuphana University Lüneburg for having supported us
with the necessary technical and administrative infrastructure over the
course of the development of this book.
 PREFACE xi

At Palgrave Macmillan we had the pleasure of working with Ambra

Finotello and her colleagues, who provided guidance and continuous sup-
port throughout the entire project. We are also indebted to Ludger Helms,
and the editors of the Palgrave Studies in Political Leadership, for having
included this book in their series.
Our greatest appreciation, however, goes to Jean Blondel whose books,
including World Leaders, Government Ministers in the Contemporary
World, and The Profession of Government Ministers in Western Europe, as
well as his personal scholarly support over many years, have greatly inspired
this comparative analysis of prime ministers in the ‘new’ Europe. The
book is therefore dedicated to him.

Lüneburg, Germany Ferdinand Müller-Rommel

Lüneburg, Germany  Michelangelo Vercesi
Dublin, Ireland  Jan Berz
February 2022
 Contents

1 Studying Prime Ministers’ Careers: An Introduction  1

2 The Background of Prime Ministers: Who They Are 29

3 Change
 of Prime Ministers’ Careers: Theoretical
Considerations 65

4 Changing Career Experiences: Less Political, More Technical101

5 Changing
 Career Profiles: From Party-Agents to Party-­
Principals135

6 Conclusion:
 What Have We Learned and What Needs to
Be Done?181

Appendix197

Index225

xiii
 List of Figures

Fig. 3.1 From party government to prime ministers’ career changes 67

Fig. 4.1 Political experiences of prime ministers by decades (aggregated
share, in percent) 107
Fig. 4.2 ‘Insider experience’ of prime ministers by region and decade
(in percent) 108
Fig. 4.3 Duration of prime ministers’ parliamentary experience by
region and decade 112
Fig. 4.4 Duration of prime ministers’ ministerial experience by region
and decade 114
Fig. 4.5 Duration of prime ministers’ experience as party leader by
region and decade 115
Fig. 4.6 Prime ministers’ subnational political experience by region and
decade. (Note: The label ‘local assembly’ comprises all levels
of government and both legislative and executive institutions) 117
Fig. 4.7 Prime ministers’ experience in the European Parliament by
region and decade. (Note: Thick black bars represent the
quartiles and median; hollow circles represent outliers) 119
Fig. 4.8 Levels of prime ministers’ technical and political experience
by decade 126
Fig. 4.9 Levels of prime ministers’ technical and political experience by
decade and region 127
Fig. 4.10 Relationship between prime ministers’ technical and political
experience by decade. (Note: Dashed horizontal and vertical
lines represent the average value of political and technical
experiences)130

xv
xvi List of Figures

Fig. 5.1 Party-agent and party-principal factor scores of individual

prime ministers across Europe. (Note: Prime ministers with
the highest and lowest score for each career profile type are
named for each region) 143
Fig. 5.2 Distribution of factor score coefficients in the three regions.
(Note: Boxplots show the median (white line) and the lower
(25th) and upper (75th) quartiles. Whiskers represent 1.5
times IQR (interquartile range) and individual dots indicate
outliers)146
Fig. 5.3 Longitudinal developments of prime ministers’ career profiles
on European level. (Note: The upper panel shows the raw
party-principal and party-­agent values. The lower panel shows
the difference between party-principal and party-agent scores
as a direct test of our hypothesis (p < 0.001). Removing the
outlier case of Prime Minister Winston Churchill leaves the
results and the p-value level unchanged) 148
Fig. 5.4 Linear longitudinal change of prime ministers’ career profiles
by region. (Note: Linear fit between career profile scores and
time in the three regions. Western Europe (WE); Central-
Eastern Europe (CEE); Southern Europe (SE)) 149
Fig. 5.5 Longitudinal development of prime ministers’ career profiles
in Western Europe by country 151
Fig. 5.6 Longitudinal development of prime ministers’ career profiles
in Southern Europe by country 151
Fig. 5.7 Longitudinal development of prime ministers’ career profiles
in Central-­Eastern Europe by country 152
Fig. 5.8 Electoral volatility and prime ministers’ career profiles. (Note:
The left-­hand panel shows the raw party-principal and
party-agent scores by electoral volatility. The right-hand panel
shows the difference between party-principal and party-agent
scores by electoral volatility as a direct test of our hypothesis
(p < 0.01))155
Fig. 5.9 Prime ministers’ career profiles in parliamentary and semi-
presidential systems. (Note: Boxplots show the median (white
line) and the lower (25th) and upper (75th) quartiles.
Whiskers represent 1.5 times IQR and individual dots reveal
outliers)158
Fig. 5.10 Longitudinal development of prime ministers’ career profiles
by form of government 159
Fig. 5.11 The relationship between prime ministerial powers and prime
ministers’ career profiles 162
 List of Figures  xvii

Fig. 5.12 Longitudinal development of prime ministers’ career profiles

by power of cabinet agenda control 163
Fig. 5.13 Relationship between presidential powers and prime ministers’
career profiles 165
Fig. 5.14 Presidential powers and prime ministers’ career profiles by
prime ministerial agenda control 166
Fig. 5.15 Longitudinal developments of prime ministers’ career profiles
by party family 169
Fig. 5.16 Party-agents and party-principals in different party families.
(Note: Boxplots show the median (white line) and the lower
(25th) and upper (75th) quartiles. Whiskers represent 1.5
times IQR and individual dots reveal outliers) 170
Fig. 5.17 Distribution of party-agent and party-principal factor score
coefficients between women and men. (Note: Boxplots show
the median (white line) and the lower (25th) and upper (75th)
quartiles. Whiskers represent 1.5 times IQR and individual
dots reveal outliers) 172
Fig. 5.18 Development of party-agent and party-principal factor score
coefficients among women and men. (Note: The linear
development of party-principal and party-agent profile scores
among women prime ministers is visually indistinguishable) 173
Fig. A1 Eigenvalues of the correlation matrix show only two factors
with values above one 223
Fig. A2 Electoral volatility at the time of prime ministers’ first
investiture into office 223
 List of Tables

Table 1.1 Parliamentary and semi-presidential democracies under study

(N=26)17
Table 2.1 Female and male prime ministers by country 33
Table 2.2 Age and seniority of prime ministers by country 35
Table 2.3 Educational background of prime ministers by country 39
Table 2.4 Occupational background of prime ministers by country N (%) 42
Table 2.5 Prime ministers by political positions in the European regions
prior to entering office, N (%) 45
Table 2.6 Prime ministers by held political positions in the European
countries prior to entering office, N (%) 46
Table 2.7 Prime ministers’ former cabinet portfolios and opposition
parliamentary party leader, N (%) 48
Table 2.8 Partisan background of prime ministers by country (when
entering office for the first time), N (%) 52
Table 2.9 Prime ministers’ duration and interruptions in office 57
Table 4.1 Insider and outsider experience of prime ministers 106
Table 4.2 Experience of prime ministers by political post, region, and
decade (in percent) 110
Table 4.3 Prime ministers with experience in enterprises by region and
decade (in percent) 121
Table 4.4 Prime ministers’ technical experience in interest groups by
region and decade (in percent) 122
Table 4.5 Prime ministers’ technical experience as senior civil servant,
diplomat, and member of international organizations by
region and decade (in percent) 123
Table 4.6 Ordinal measure of technical experience and prime ministers’
distribution125

xix
xx List of Tables

Table 4.7 Prime ministers’ technical and political experiences: a typology 128
Table 5.1 Expected relationship between individual career attributes and
career profiles 140
Table 5.2 Correlation of career profile factors with career attributes
(principal factor method) 141
Table 5.3 Prime ministerial powers within the cabinet in Europe,
1945–2020161
 CHAPTER 1

Studying Prime Ministers’ Careers:

An Introduction

On May 17, 2016, the Social Democratic Party of Austria (SPÖ) appointed
Christian Kern as chancellor. Kern, who remained in office until December
2017, was an unusual figure in the history of Austrian party government.
After graduating with a degree in journalism and communication, Kern
worked for three years as a business journalist and for another three years
as assistant to the Federal Chancellery’s secretary of state, Peter Kostelka.
In 1994 he became the spokesman for the SPÖ’s parliamentary leader.
After another three years, Kern began a successful career in business for
the Verbund AG, the largest electricity supplier in Austria. In 2009, he
became a board member of the football club Austria Vienna; in 2010, he
took over as CEO of the public Austrian Federal Railways (ÖBB); and, in
2014, he was appointed chairman of the Community of European Railway
and Infrastructure Companies (CER). When Chancellor Faymann (SPÖ)
resigned due to his party’s poor performance in the 2016 Austrian presi-
dential election, the Social Democratic Party selected Kern to be the new
head of government and its party leader.
Although Christian Kern did have a party affiliation and spent part of
his career in close contact with politics, his professional profile tended
toward that of a business manager at the time of his investiture. Kern nei-
ther fit the ideal-type of a technocratic prime minister, devoid of political
experience, nor did he match the career model of a typical, partisan prime
minister, who gained extensive experience in parliament, in cabinet, or as

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 1

Switzerland AG 2022
F. Müller-Rommel et al., Prime Ministers in Europe, Palgrave
Studies in Political Leadership,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-90891-1_1
2 F. MÜLLER-ROMMEL ET AL.

party head, prior to entering office. In fact, Kern was an atypical, but
appealing, party member whose main professional experiences were gath-
ered outside of politics.
What explains the nomination of Christian Kern as prime minister? We
argue in this book that something new is happening in the selection of
prime ministers in European liberal democracies. In the ‘golden age’ of
party government between the 1950s and 1970s, political parties were the
most influential political organizations for mobilizing and representing
citizens. For about 30 years, they held a firm grasp on all aspects of the
democratic process. During these years, prime ministers were mainly
Berufspolitiker (Weber, 1919), a term later adopted in political science by
King (1981) as ‘career politicians’, who learned the craft of politics by
acquiring expertise as professional government practitioners. These politi-
cians bring with them experiences gained from political apprenticeships
and politically adjacent occupations, such as journalism, public relations,
and academia. They understand the intra-party, legislative, and cabinet
rules and procedures. Most of them are disposed toward compromise and
are able to make convincing political judgments (Allen et al., 2020).
Political parties select these career politicians as prime ministers because of
their reliability as party-agents. Thereby, their previous career positions in
parliament, in government, and in the political party were seen as proxies
for loyalty and competence that are valuable characteristics for being
selected for the prime ministerial job.
Yet, as we will see below, between the 1970s and the 1980s, things
started to change: social cleavages lost relevance as sources of political divi-
sion and constituencies became less cohesive and more individualized.
Furthermore, party identification and membership decreased while vola-
tility and party system fragmentation increased (Casal Bértoa & Enyedi,
2021). As a result, the conditions for a well-functioning, party govern-
ment declined (Mair, 2013, p. 65). Along with the eroding model of party
government, new populist and technocratic demands for representation
emerged in several European countries1 (Bertsou & Pastorella, 2017).
At the same time, the pressure from an increasing internationalization
of politics, defined by global governance through intergovernmental
negotiations, shifted power away from parliament and single cabinet min-
isters toward government and prime ministers. The increasing demand for
domestic and international policy coordination, as well as the growing
complexity and sectoral specialization within the center of government,
has led to a substantial empowerment of prime ministers with managerial
 1 STUDYING PRIME MINISTERS’ CAREERS: AN INTRODUCTION 3

skills and a knowledge of special policy fields. Moreover, the emergence of

new forms of mass communication and political participation, as well as
the convergence of all major parties toward the ‘ideological center’ of
politics, strengthened leadership-oriented party organizations, and as a
result, led to a more personalized style of political representation among
executives. Prime ministers not only received more political power but
also became more prominent political figures within and outside of party
politics, a development which scholars refer to as the ‘presidentialization
of politics’ (Foley, 2000; Heffernan, 2005; Poguntke & Webb, 2005).
Thus, the decline of party government as well as the new challenges pre-
sented by the presidentialization of politics made individual leaders more
important relative to their party organizations. These new leaders transi-
tioned from being dependent on their own party to taking over and
becoming principals of their parties, exhibiting stronger leadership styles,
a more prominent public image, and expertise in major policy areas.
Against this background, we argue that party demand for prime minis-
ters’ background characteristics have changed (Chap. 3) and that, over
time, prime ministers have accumulated less political experience within
national, party-based, political institutions and more technical experience
outside of politics (Chap. 4). In addition, we claim that prime ministers’
career profiles have moved from a ‘party-agent’ ideal-type to a ‘party-­
principal’ ideal-type (Chap. 5). These processes have affected older
European democracies as well as countries in Southern and Central-­
Eastern Europe which democratized in the 1970s and 1990s. We wrote
this book to provide empirical evidence for these conjectures.

The Political Role of Prime Ministers

The political role of prime ministers in liberal democracies has changed
markedly over the past decades. In parliamentary democracies, prime min-
isters exercise public leadership and represent the government to citizens.
Together with their cabinet ministers they are collectively responsible to
the parliament, which has the power to execute a vote of no confidence
between elections. Put differently, prime ministers are delegated by the
assembly to lead the cabinet and its decision-making and, at the same
time, they are held accountable to voters through both the parliament and
the party that has nominated them. As pointed out by Strøm (2000), the
prime minister lies at the crossroads of a complex institutional twine,
which can be depicted like a chain of delegation with the shape of an
Another random document with
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safety of life at sea, it has been suggested that the Board of Trade
shall superintend the construction, the periodical inspection, the
repair, and the loading of all British Merchant Ships.” Considering the
extent of our mercantile marine and the mode in which business
must, necessarily, be conducted if we desire to maintain our present
high position as a maritime nation, any such suggestion is simply
absurd and, if carried into effect, would be most ruinous. That we
have already too much legislation in matters of detail the
Commissioners themselves admit. Referring to the pernicious effects
of inquiry into such matters by Government surveyors on Emigrant
ships, they say, and from the evidence before them they would have
been justified in expressing their opinion in still stronger terms, “We
consider it to be a question worthy of serious consideration, whether,
in the case of passenger ships, the certificate of the Board of Trade,
so far as regards specific approval, should not be expressly confined
to the number of passengers to be allowed, and to the
accommodation for their health, comfort, and general security; all
questions of unseaworthiness of hull, machinery, and equipment
being left to the owners, subject only to a general power of
interference in case of danger, sufficiently apparent to justify special
intervention.”
I have been unable to ascertain who made the
How this can be extraordinary proposal, that every ship from the
accomplished. time her keel was laid until she was loaded and
ready for sea should be under the superintendence
of officers appointed by the Board of Trade. In justice to Mr. Plimsoll
I must state that, though I have read his book, and nearly all his
speeches, I cannot trace any recommendation that the merchant
ships of this country should be placed, either as regards
construction, inspection, or repair, altogether, under the control of
the Board of Trade or of any other Government department.[299]
What Mr. Plimsoll mentions seems to me, to be a matter to which I
have often referred in the course of this work, that we do not utilise
to anything like the extent we might the vast private resources
within ourselves, and that we might do so to advantage, so far as
regards the survey of our merchant ships, not one of which he
suggests should be allowed to go to sea unless she is seaworthy.
Now this is a suggestion which few men would be bold enough to
decline to consider, and Mr. Plimsoll points out how this may be
secured by means already at our disposal. Perhaps in the way he
puts it, the difficulties with which it is surrounded could not be
overcome; but the maxim cannot be ignored, as it is sound in
principle.
To leave the survey of our ships to any one private institution, not on
a sufficiently broad basis, such as Lloyd’s Register, might create as
many evils as a general Government survey, and, besides creating
jealousy on the part of other somewhat similar institutions or
associations, might be considered contrary to the rules of sound
government. But these institutions could be enrolled and licensed, as
various other associations now are, and empowered to grant
certificates of seaworthiness, which every ship above a certain
tonnage would require to produce before she was cleared at the
Custom House. Or they might be welded into one great national
institution directly controlled by all the various branches of the
shipping community in harmony with their sentiments, and alive to
the wants and necessities always arising through the growth and
development of trade and commerce.
Individuals may do wrong, and, though it may be for their interests
to have a good sound ship, there is no denying the fact that ships
are sent to sea which are not seaworthy; but corporations and
associations cannot do wrong with the same impunity. If they did,
they would be deprived of their licence, and there would be a check,
one against the other, which is not the case with individuals. Or, on
the other hand, a great representative institution would be efficiently
checked and influenced by public opinion, and the voice of those
immediately concerned. Were Government to require these
associations to classify ships, then I agree with the Commissioners,
that it is not its province “to ascertain whether a ship is fit for the
conveyance of dry and perishable goods,” but, from the debates in
Parliament, and numerous articles in the public press, it is clear that
many persons are of opinion, that it is the duty of Government to be
reasonably satisfied that a ship is seaworthy before she proceeds to
sea. We exercise this duty in the case of railways, mines, and
manufactures of various kinds, and events have shown, however
much we may have already done to save life and property at sea,
that the exercise of a similar duty, if practicable, is at least worthy of
consideration in the case of ships.
As the great bulk of the vessels belonging to the United Kingdom are
already classed, the certificate of classification they now hold would
suffice as a certificate of seaworthiness. Those which are not now
classed in Lloyd’s Register, or in any other association, but which
belong to the great steam companies, or to very large shipowners,
are so well known for their good qualities as not to require
classification, and for this reason classification, or, at least, survey for
seaworthiness, even if compulsory, could not be a serious hardship
to them.
Practically the number of vessels now unclassed is confined to the
very good or to the very bad ships. With the owners of the former I
should think there would be no difficulty in dealing; they do not class
their ships either because they do not care to incur the expense
(underwriters being ready to insure them at the lowest current
premiums), or because they think they can construct ships, in their
own way, superior to those which are built to rules for classification.
But such men, while they might protest, and justly so, against being
interfered with in a business they more thoroughly understand than
any government or private surveyor, and in which they take a
laudable pride (for such men are the pillars of our maritime
greatness), would, I doubt not, have no objection to an authorised
surveyor inspecting their ships, and would readily pay the moderate
fee required to cover the cost of a certificate of seaworthiness.[300]
For the information of the general public I may state that there is a
very great difference between the highest grades of vessels and
those which any surveyor who knew anything about his business
would pronounce to be unseaworthy. In the case of classed ships,
the certificate of classification would suffice; but, from the owners of
ships who do not class, many intelligent persons are of opinion that
a certificate of seaworthiness should be required. They argue, and
with great force, that those persons who do not class their ships,
because they will not bear inspection, have no right to imperil the
lives of others for their own gain. Life is not a thing of price; if it
were, the rich would live, and the poor would die. And when a
Shipowner declines to bear the expense of making his vessel
seaworthy, he places in jeopardy the life of the sailor to benefit
himself.
There are very easy means of ascertaining the
Registration seaworthiness of a ship, when first sent afloat,
Associations. already at our disposal, as those of my readers,
who are not conversant with this subject, will find
Lloyd’s Register, by referring to the Appendix,[301] where a history
its great of Lloyd’s Register of British and Foreign Shipping
importance.
will be found. That association has a well-
organised and extensive staff of surveyors, through whom, at a very
small cost, this fact could be ascertained. My readers will also there
see the immense advantage that association has afforded in the
improvement of our ships and the power it possesses of rendering
still greater public service. But while rivalry amongst associations for
classification is unquestionably injurious,[302] it may not be
considered advisable that Lloyd’s Register alone should issue
certificates of seaworthiness. There are other similar associations
whose certificates would answer the object in view equally well, and
it is for Government to decide (should an attempt be made to carry
this principle into practice) what associations shall be empowered to
issue the requisite certificates.
But while I cannot ignore the principle that no unseaworthy vessel
should be allowed to leave our ports, I cannot hide from myself the
fact that there would be numerous difficulties (but far from
insurmountable) in the way of carrying it fully into practice. It might
be argued that if the Board of Trade enrolled the associations
named, and, more especially, if it took them under its immediate
control, they would in a few years, instead of being private
Institutions, be mere servants of the Board, and, through the Board,
of a sensational House of Commons. But that argument may be met
by the Shipowners saying to the Board of Trade, “We do not wish to
be under your immediate control at all. Why should we not be
allowed to manage our own affairs, as all other branches of the
community now do,—subject, in our case, as in that of all others, to
such enactments only as may be necessary for the public safety? We
ought to know our own business a great deal better than any of your
surveyors can teach us; and, if we think proper to form ourselves
into an association, or associations, to manage our own affairs, and
if we do what the country requires, why should we be interfered with
by the Government as to the manner in which we think proper to
build, equip, and navigate our ships, any more than other traders in
the management of their affairs? Enrol us, if we think proper to
associate, as you do joint-stock concerns or other associations; let us
form a board with members elected by the persons interested, such,
for instance, as the Metropolitan Board of Works, to manage our
own concerns, with specific rules for the protection of the public,
which, if we violate, you will punish us as you would do any other
class of the community.”
Now, arguments such as these are really unanswerable. Statesmen
and others, who have to encounter the harassing difficulties of
official life, and who know that all executive power must be
exercised by a minister, or by individuals responsible to him, and,
through him, to the public, might say, “How are we, unless all ships
are under our immediate control, to meet questions put to us in the
House of Commons, such as, ‘Whether such and such a society
licensed by Government had the folly and audacity to allow of spring
safety-valves, or of boats not fitted with Clifford’s Patent?’ or how
could we justify a licence granted to an association which showed
such flagrant disregard of modern inventions and of seamen’s lives?”
But the reply to all this is that it is not the province of Government to
legislate on such details as these, any more than it would be to
dictate by Act of Parliament, how the details of any other branch of
trade or manufacture are to be carried out. The duties of
Government have long since been defined, and it is because
Government, of recent years, has gone far beyond its duties in the
case of Shipowners, that Shipowners complain, and justly complain,
against Government for a “meddling and muddling” in matters alike
beyond its province and its knowledge.
Reverting to the principle which so many persons now say should be
enforced by legislative enactment, the seaworthiness of every ship,
there would be great difficulty in carrying that out by Government,
as seaworthiness is not definable. That is to say, though a vessel
may be seaworthy, when launched, (even then it would depend upon
the trade in which she was to be employed), she might not be so at
the end of her first voyage, or she might be so for one trade in
summer, but not in winter, or with one description of cargo, but not
with another; or, in fact, with the same cargo if properly stowed,[303]
but not otherwise, and so forth. The details are so numerous that it
would be impossible to enter upon them within my limits, and for the
same reasons, if the principle is to be carried out, it can only be by
the association of competent individuals with the necessary staff
under their control, possessing that knowledge which long
experience alone can give. I mention these points in case the
Legislature consider it necessary to enforce this principle; for, if it is
to be carried out, it should be in such a manner as will satisfy the
public with the least possible interference with the duties of the
Shipowner.[304]
In the meantime I must direct the attention of my
Improvement of readers to the unseaworthiness of too many of our
seamen by seamen, which is of really greater national
better
importance than the unseaworthiness of our ships.
education.
However desirable it may be to make certain, if we
can, that no unseaworthy ships shall leave our ports, the
incompetency, carelessness, and drunkenness of seamen demand
much more seriously our attention; and, as all legislative enactments
have hitherto failed to raise them to the requisite standard, we ought
to direct our attention more earnestly than we have yet done to their
education. If education is necessary on shore, it is still more so with
seamen, and yet we have done, practically, nothing, as a Nation, to
assist them in gaining knowledge, and, especially, that description of
knowledge required in their calling. Indeed, we have not seriously
attempted any great practical scheme for their education or for the
amalgamation of the services of the Royal Navy and those of the
mercantile marine, which, while invaluable to us as a nation, would
tend so much to elevate the social position of that neglected portion
of their class, who, not having the good fortune to be enrolled in the
Navy or on the lists of the large Shipowners, must seek their daily
bread at sea in any ship where employment can be found.
On the contrary, we have, in some respects,
Evil effects of pandered to their pernicious habits. For instance,
advance notes when a clause in the first Government Bill of last
Session (1875) was introduced to render advance
notes illegal, the House of Commons rejected it. From my own
experience I can have no hesitation in stating that the system of
advance notes (I do not include the allotment notes, which are most
useful) tends to lower the character of seamen, promotes
intemperance and insubordination, and has been the indirect means
of far more disasters at sea than either overladen or otherwise
unseaworthy vessels.
Besides, any such system is unknown to any other class of the
community. What should we think of a mechanic or house servant
who could not enter our service unless we paid him a month’s wages
in advance? We should have nothing to say to him—1st, because we
should not care to trust our money to a person who, on some
frivolous excuse, might decline to repay us by his faithful service;
and (2ndly) because we should, naturally, consider anyone requiring
such an advance an improvident if not a worthless person. These
advances must, necessarily, discourage frugality and prudence;
while, in the case of seamen, they most assuredly lead, directly, to
intemperance and vice. Nor is there any real occasion for making
advances in their case. The mechanic or the house servant may have
been for some time out of employment, and, as his wages are paid
weekly or monthly, he may not have laid by anything; but, in the
case of seamen, their wages are paid at the end of the voyage, often
in large sums, and by means of savings-banks and money-order
offices, specially established for their use, they have every facility
afforded them for retaining their earnings. But they do not. Why?
Because the Legislature has encouraged their natural and
proverbially improvident habits, by acknowledging a system of
advance of wages unknown to any other class of workmen, on which
advance they depend for an outfit, after too frequently squandering
the wages they had earned on a previous voyage.
But I should prefer my readers considering carefully the Report of
the Commissioners on this subject instead of my own views, and
therefore I do not hesitate to give these conclusions at length,[305]
as a large mass of evidence was brought before them. They, as
statesmen and philanthropists, had no object in view beyond the
national good, and, more especially, the welfare of the seafaring
population.
“The evidence before us leads to the conclusion
confirmed by that the system of advance notes is one great
the opinion of obstacle to the amelioration of the condition of
the
merchant seamen. All the witnesses whom we
Commissioners.
have examined admit that the system is most
pernicious, but it is defended on the ground that, without this
advance, the sailor could not pay for his lodging on shore, or procure
the clothes requisite for him when he joins a ship.
“In practice it seems that the advance note is handed over to the
lodging-house keeper, not usually in exchange for cash, but in
discharge of debts which the sailor has been induced to incur. The
lodging-house keeper charges a heavy discount, and the sailor is
frequently brought on board half-clad and intoxicated.
“Shipowners and captains of merchant ships concur in stating that a
large portion of the ship’s crew is very often brought or even lifted
on board in a condition of helpless drunkenness, that the vessel
must often be detained for twenty-four hours in order that the men
may be so far recovered as to be able to get her under weigh, and
that there is great risk of life and property at the commencement of
the voyage from the consequent inefficiency of the seamen.
“The advance note is not payable until some days after the sailing of
the ship; but if the ship then puts back or touches at another port,
the seaman often takes the opportunity of making some complaint,
in order to get free from his engagement, and will even incur a
month’s imprisonment with this object, whilst the Shipowner or the
person who has cashed the note loses the money which has been
paid in advance.
“It is said that if there were no advance note, the crimp in a foreign
or colonial port would not have the same inducement to entice the
sailor to desert.
“After careful consideration of the numerous evils attending this
mode of prepayment, we recommend that advance notes should be
declared illegal, that no payment or order for payment made in
advance for wages shall be a discharge for the payment of any
portion of a seaman’s wages when due, and that no money paid by a
Shipowner to or for a seaman shall be debited to the seaman, except
wages already earned, the allotment notes, and the cost of such
supplies as the seamen may receive after joining the ship.
“There will be some inconvenience felt at first from the abolition of
the existing system of advance notes, and there will be perhaps
considerable opposition to the change in the ports, and amongst the
lodging-house keepers, who profit by these notes. We feel, however,
convinced that unless this mischievous mode of payment be
discontinued, the seamen will never be raised from their servile
dependence on crimps, and taught to rely on their own industry and
intelligence.”[306]
But there is a question of quite as great
Over-insurance. importance to which I shall again have occasion to
refer when I review the history of our steam companies, and show
the remarkably small amount of loss that some of them have
sustained through the system and order prevailing on board their
vessels. There we shall see how losses are prevented. In the
meantime, we should do well to inquire how losses are encouraged
by allowing policies of insurance to be effected for a greater amount
than the value of the ship or the cargo she contains.
A contract of marine insurance is in its essence a
Views of Mr. T. contract of indemnity, and the spirit of the contract
H. Farrer. is violated if the assured can make the occurrence
of a loss the means of gain. But the law has
allowed a very considerable deviation from this fundamental
principle. Mr. T. H. Farrer, in his evidence, happily illustrates this in
the case of a ship with a chartered freight, bound from London to
Calcutta and back.[307] He supposes her to be lost on her outward
passage in the Bay of Biscay. Presuming that the owner only insured
her prudently and not exorbitantly, he would recover in this case not
merely the value of the ship at the commencement of the voyage,
but also the freight of the outward and homeward voyages, while he
would be exempted from paying the seamen’s wages from the date
of the disaster, the expenses necessary to carry his ship to Calcutta,
to remain there, and to return on her homeward passage, so that he
would be, actually, a very considerable gainer by the loss.[308] Nor is
the matter less flagrant in the case of valued policies, when the
value of the property is fixed by agreement beforehand between the
assured and the underwriter. The effect of this, as the
Commissioners justly remark,[309] is, “that unless the policy is
altogether void, on account of fraud, or the concealment of a
material fact, the assured can, in the case of a total loss, receive the
value which has been stated in the policy, however much it may
exceed the actual worth of his property.” In confirmation of their
opinion, they add “that, in certain decided cases, the Shipowner has
been allowed to recover 50 and even 100 per cent. more than the
actual value of his vessel.”
 Various witnesses recommended that, in case of a
Evidence of total loss, the underwriter should be allowed to
other witnesses. question a valued policy, when he considered that
the value had been overstated; but many
Shipowners and underwriters objected to this proposal, contending
that, where a value had been agreed on between the Shipowners
and underwriter, subsequent interference would be mischievous or
futile, as it might induce Shipowners to insure abroad. It was
contended that the value of a ship might depend on a variety of
circumstances; for instance, the loss of a steamer to a Shipowner,
about to start a new line of steam communication, would be
inadequately replaced by the cost of the vessel, though estimated
values of this sort are very problematical.
As regards insurance of freight, it was further suggested that the
Shipowner should not, in case of total loss, be entitled to recover his
freight, without deducting the expense saved to him by reason of the
loss of the vessel. On the other hand, it was alleged that the
necessity of estimating these uninsured expenses would give rise to
doubt, difficulty, and litigation, and that, if the suggestion were
adopted, the Shipowner would be to a great extent deprived of the
legitimate advantage he now enjoys of being able to obtain with
facility an advance on his freight.
After carefully considering all these matters, the
Opinion of the Commissioners arrived at the conclusion that they
Commissioners. ought not to recommend any alteration of the law
with regard to valued policies in cases of total loss,
as there were weighty reasons against any interference on the part
of the Legislature with contracts made by persons capable of taking
care of their own interests, without carefully ascertaining the effect
this interference was likely to produce on the entire system of law
relating to such contracts. But they were of opinion that the “whole
system of insurance law requires complete revision, for not only does
it allow the assured, in some cases, to recover more than the
amount of the loss actually sustained by him, but it also, on the
other hand, deprives him of an indemnity in cases in which he ought
to be protected by his insurance.”
The Commissioners, however, with great force, remark, that “a
complete and thorough revision of our laws relating to marine
insurance is a task of equal importance, difficulty, and delicacy,
requiring evidence of an extensive character, and necessitating a
very lengthy and careful investigation, and it touches directly on so
many subjects unconnected with the security of life at sea, on which
it has only an indirect and somewhat remote bearing, that we do not
think it properly falls within the scope of our commission. We should
also have been reluctant to undertake the complete revision of our
system of marine insurance law, because, for many reasons, it
appears to us to be important that, before such a task is undertaken,
an attempt should be made to induce foreign nations to concur with
us in framing and adopting a general code of insurance law. To alter
the English law of marine insurance to any considerable extent,
might have the effect of throwing the business of insurance into the
hands of foreigners, and there is so much insurance of foreign
property in England, as well as of English property abroad, that it is
most desirable that the law of insurance should, as far as possible,
be the same among all commercial nations. An examination of the
foreign codes leads us to hope that there would be found no
insuperable difficulty in the way of attaining this important object.”
Although the Commissioners do not at present recommend any
alteration to be made in the law relating to valued policies, they
think that the Shipowner should not be able to recover his insurance,
whether under a time or voyage policy, in cases where it is shown
that he or his agent had not done everything reasonably within their
power to make and maintain the ship in a seaworthy condition,
where that unseaworthiness occasioned the loss. They further
consider that the Shipowner’s liability for damage to property or
person should be unlimited in cases involving the death of the
seaman or the damage to person or property. They are also of
opinion that the present system by which insurance cases are tried
before a judge and jury is altogether unsatisfactory, as a single judge
and two assessors would constitute a far better tribunal. In
conclusion, they recommend that the Marine Department of the
Board should be revised and strengthened by having a legal adviser
exclusively attached to it (a recommendation which has been since
carried out). “It will,” they remark, “be the duty of the Board of
Trade to check the negligent and to punish the culpable shipowner,
but it is desirable that these functions should be performed without
harassing the great body of Shipowners, who, by their ability and
indefatigable energy, have contributed to the prosperity of the
empire.”
I have now endeavoured to give as succinct an account of the whole
course of the maritime legislation of the British Empire and its effects
upon ships, seamen, and commerce as my space will permit, from
the earliest period up to the close of the year 1875. Although it is not
the province of an historian to enter upon controversial questions,
much less to dive into the future, yet history is of little value unless
we can gain knowledge from the past which can be made useful
hereafter. I may therefore be permitted to close this volume with a
few remarks on the subject of further maritime legislation, especially
as the subject is one to which an unusual amount of public attention
has been devoted during the last two or three years, and as it has
been, officially, announced that it will be again dealt with by
Government in the ensuing Session of Parliament.
Shipowners say that there is far too much
Too much legislation already, and I certainly agree with them;
legislation but when they charge the Government as they do,
already.
and especially the Board of Trade, or rather Mr. T.
H. Farrer, as its permanent Secretary, with forcing all this over-
legislation upon them, I must remind them of the facts. What
Government did, and did wisely and well, as I have endeavoured to
show, was to frame such mercantile marine laws as had become
essential after the repeal of the Navigation Laws. The laws then
passed have, unquestionably, been of great service, not merely to
the nation, but to Shipowners themselves. Having completed all that
was considered necessary, Government directed its attention to the
amendment, as cases for its necessity arose, and to the
consolidation of existing laws; and I can, of my own knowledge,
state that Mr. Farrer has, since then, opposed all further legislation
which had for its object the interference with the details of a
Shipowner’s duty. But the House of Commons would not allow
Government to rest with its good work. “Independent members” of
that House, actuated by various motives, some of them not very
clearly defined, commenced to “amend” (?) in their own way, these
laws (see Hansard’s ‘Reports of Parliamentary Proceedings’), by
proposing numerous fresh clauses and fresh Bills which, if
Government had not resisted, would most likely have doubled the
existing number of the mercantile marine statutes. They next
commenced to introduce Bills of their own, to teach Shipowners how
to construct and equip their vessels. Among the first of these
measures was the Act to test chains and anchors, introduced by Sir
J. D. H. Elphinstone and the late Mr. John Laird. So far from that Bill
receiving the approval of Government, when I moved its rejection,
[310] was strongly supported by Mr. Milner Gibson, the then President
of the Board of Trade. We were, however, defeated, and the Bill
passed and became law.
Encouraged by this success, other independent members followed,
and, since then, most of the measures connected with the mercantile
marine of this country have been forced upon Government either by
Bills introduced by individual members, or by questions asked, or by
deputations from interested constituencies, or “philanthropists,” who,
however good in their intentions, are, too frequently, mischievously
ignorant of the subjects they force upon the attention of Parliament.
No one of my readers conversant with these matters can say that
the Bills of the last three or four years, except so far as necessary
amendments, were Government measures. They were nearly all
forced upon the executive, while the only real and valuable measure
of Government, the consolidation and codification of existing laws,
has been, Session after Session, rejected, or, at least, “shunted”
aside by the House of Commons.
For more than two centuries we attempted to regulate our maritime
commerce by means of the Navigation Laws and their innumerable
additions and amendments, the fallacy of which I have endeavoured
in these volumes to expose; yet we are now following the same
course our forefathers adopted by attempting, by means of a library
of Mercantile Marine Laws, to regulate the details of the business of
our Shipowners. Commerce, in all its branches, flourishes most when
left alone. Leave our Shipowners alone, except when they do wrong.
Leave them to manage their own affairs in such a manner as they
consider most conducive to their own interests, and we may rest
assured that, if they have a fair and free field and no special favours,
they will maintain, against all nations, the maritime supremacy of
England.
My advice, therefore, to the House of Commons, if
Necessity of a an old member may venture to give it, would be to
Mercantile do nothing next Session in the way of fresh
Marine Code,
legislation, but to confine itself to necessary
amendments, and to the codification of existing laws, so that
Shipowners may have one law for their guidance; at present they are
bewildered by the numerous fragmentary laws now in force. But, in
addition to whatever reorganisation and changes may be found
necessary, increased facilities would still seem requisite for the
immediate payment of seamen’s wages on their discharge; and,
though the mode of inquiry into the causes of the loss of life and
property at sea has already been altered, greater rigour is still
demanded for such inquiries, and more prompt means of detecting
and punishing persons who ignorantly or negligently lose the vessels
in which they serve. In cases of wilful loss, which I hope and believe
are of rare occurrence, the law cannot be too prompt, too stringent,
nor too severe. A man who wilfully loses his ship, I rank without
hesitation with the “villain and the murderer.”
Nor should I have much more mercy on the
and of more Shipowner who recklessly loses his ship, or who is
prompt accessory to her loss; and I should subject to
punishment, though in a different and more
 punishment in modified form, any Shipowner who, either
criminal cases. ignorantly or negligently, sends his ship to sea in
an unseaworthy state. In these matters, the law is
still open to improvement, both as regards greater facilities for the
discovery of crime and its prompt punishment, arising, as this does,
in no small degree, from its too complex character.
Although the Shipowner is now made liable for criminal neglect, and
cannot, by contract, relieve himself from this liability, such neglect is
difficult of proof, and a jury deciding against a Shipowner on a
question of damages, may, often, hesitate to make him criminally
responsible. If it were possible to enforce this liability in all cases
where guilty; if every Shipowner were made to feel that the proper
construction, equipment, loading, manning, and navigation of his
ship were matters to which it was his duty to attend, and if these
duties were enforced, it would produce much more salutary effects
in the way of saving life and property at sea than any Government
surveys with a legion of inspectors at their back: each one of these
relieves the Shipowner from a duty which belongs to him alone, and
relieves, or, at the least, might relieve, him from a part of his
responsibility; for if, as in the case of compulsory pilotage, a
Shipowner is relieved from responsibility in case of accident, he
cannot, in common justice, be held criminally liable when he has
acted in conformity with such laws as have been passed for his
guidance and control.
Whether it would be possible, as has been recommended, to
establish by positive enactment an absolute and indefeasible
obligation on the part of every Shipowner to his shippers,
passengers, and underwriters, that he and the agents to whom he
trusts his ships, shall do all in their power to make and keep his ship
seaworthy, is a problem I am not, at present, prepared to solve;
moreover, it raises numerous questions of great difficulty and
delicacy.
Some amendments may be, also, required in the tonnage and
measurement law, which, though, as I have already explained, now
a vast improvement on any previous law, still presents features of
hardship alike on Shipowners and seamen, as, in the case of the
latter, frequent instances occur where the law is evaded by the
stowage of cargo or stores in spaces appointed by the present Act
for the accommodation of the crew.
Such are the leading measures which may still require the attention
of the Legislature; but, before closing my remarks, I desire my
readers to recollect the existence of a Merchant Shipping Code,
which has not yet become law. It embraces all the laws relating to
Merchant Shipping, and if the First Minister would take up this Bill
and amend it in detail, he would not merely confer a boon on the
largest shipping community the world has ever seen, but one by
which his name would be long remembered.
If the Legislature did nothing else during the ensuing Session, it
would be a Session well spent: ten clear sittings[311] would,
however, suffice, if there was a determination on both sides of the
House to allow no party spirit to interfere. Nor should any such
feeling be displayed, for the questions now to be considered are
almost wholly of an executive and not of a political character; while
all the materials are now ready, the lengthened inquiries and
discussions to which almost every point except insurance (and on
this there must be further inquiry before there is any legislation) has
been already subjected, render further discussion, in a great
measure, unnecessary.
I have endeavoured to show how much progress
Concluding has been made during the last quarter of a century
remarks on the —a progress eminently due to the repeal of our
extraordinary
Navigation Laws and to many of the earlier
progress of
British shipping. measures of the Board of Trade, in confirmation of
which I may point to the magnificent ships now
produced, to the enormous extent of our mercantile fleets,[312] as
compared with those of all other nations, and to the superiority of
our officers to what they were before the repeal of the Navigation
Laws.
There is, nevertheless, a wide and noble field in which the statesman
might employ his power and genius to great advantage, and earn for
himself an imperishable name. The means are now in a great
measure at his disposal. But he must decide between two principles.
He must not, on the one hand, give way to the question of sentiment
or to the popular cry that merchant ships and their cargoes shall be
under Government survey, and, at the same time, hold Shipowners
responsible for acts which legislation has placed beyond their control.
If he adopts the former course, he must double or treble the existing
staff of officials; but I venture to warn him that, in so doing, he will
place a canker-worm at the root of our maritime greatness, which
will as surely destroy the mighty fabric we have raised by individual
genius, energy, and skill, as ever did the “dry rot” in our wooden
ships of war and commerce.
Seeing what our Shipowners have already accomplished, he might to
advantage afford them facilities for self-government. The means, as I
have shown, are already at his disposal. We have Lloyd’s Register,
with its large staff of competent surveyors ready to aid, at our
disposal, as also a similar association in Liverpool. We have
mercantile marine boards, elected by popular constituencies, at all
the leading seaports in the kingdom, under whose supervision the
shipping officers are now placed, as well as the examination of all
masters and mates. Leave them as they are; but, as I understand
that these boards are not overburdened by the duties now devolving
on them, could not their duties in relation to the crews be extended
and some arrangement be made whereby these different institutions,
formed into one, two, or more central and district boards, might
perform all the work of detail now required by Parliament? By some
such amalgamation everything the country requires could be done
more economically and efficiently than at present.
Lloyd’s Registry now tests all anchors and chains as required by
Parliament, without any disturbance of their functions or the work for
which they were originally constituted, the voluntary classification of
ships. Why should we not place in their hands such duties connected
with the ship herself as the regulation of load-lines, certification of
seaworthiness, if found expedient, and the supervision of all matters
of detail which Parliament may consider necessary, in the
construction, equipment, loading, and navigation of our ships? All
these matters would be much better done by a popularly elected
board chosen from merchant Shipowners and underwriters than by
any Department of the Government. In their hands might be safely
placed the appointment of surveyors: one Department of this new
Board attending to the hull of the ship, the other to her navigation,
as at present; all these matters being subject, of course, to such
regulations as Parliament might consider it expedient to impose, and
represented in Parliament by the President of the Board of Trade, or,
in lieu thereof, by a Secretary of State for Commerce, should that be
desirable.
I merely throw out these remarks for consideration, being aware that
many obstacles, though few real difficulties, would require to be
overcome in carrying out some such re-organisation as I venture to
suggest. But whatever changes Ministers may consider most
expedient to adopt, they must not lightly tamper with the merchant
fleets which the skill and genius of our people have created, or with
the position they have achieved since relieved from those legislative
enactments, by which they were bound for more than two centuries.
These fleets are now the largest, and unquestionably the finest, in
the world, and instead of foreigners overstocking our own ports as
was prophesied, we now conduct the greater portion of the maritime
commerce of foreign nations.[313] It is, therefore, no idle boast to
say, that while the sun never sets on the dominions of our Queen,
there is no ocean, no sea, and, I might add, were it not for the
exclusive policy of the United States and of France, with a few other
insignificant exceptions, no lake, no river, where the British flag is
not unfurled, and where it does not shed its civilising and beneficial
influence, over many peoples of varied tongues, who might
otherwise still be living in darkness, if not in barbarism.
It behoves, therefore, our Statesmen to take care how they deal with
this great interest—made great by the freedom of our laws and by
the energy of our people; and, whatever further legislation may be
necessary, it is seriously to be hoped that Government will confine its
measures to their legitimate object; viz. the clear definition of the
legal duties and responsibilities of Shipowners, the maintenance of
lighthouses, buoys and beacons on our coasts, the general
regulations necessary for the proper conduct of maritime commerce,
the investigation into the true cause of all accidents at sea, and the
prompt punishment of all persons who wrongfully and wilfully violate
the law.

FOOTNOTES:
[267] This term had its origin in the early part of the present century, when so
many of H.M.’s 10-gun brigs, employed in carrying the mails, or on other short
services, were lost, especially on their Atlantic voyages, that they got the name of
“coffins.”
[268] See Appendix, No. 13, p. 634, where a list will be found of the different Acts
of Parliament which have been passed relating to merchant shipping since 1849.
[269] See ‘History of Lloyd’s Register of British and Foreign Shipping,’ Appendix,
No. 12, p. 624.
[270] See ante, vol. iii. pp. 48 and 50.
[271] See Parl. Paper C. 630, 1872.
[272]

Wrecks, &c., other than Collisions in the United Kingdom.

Year. Total Loss. Partial Damage. Total.
1856 368 469 837
1857 384 482 866
1858 354 515 869
1859 527 540 1,067
1860 476 605 1,081
1861 513 658 1,171
1862 455 695 1,150
1863 503 830 1,333
 1864 386 653 1,039
1865 470 832 1,302
1866 562 876 1,438
1867 656 1,020 1,676
1868 527 841 1,368
1869 606 1,047 1,653
1870 411 730 1,141
1871 398 826 1,224
1872 439 1,110 1,549
1873
212 522 734
Jan. to June
Total 8,247 13,251 21,498

Annual average of 17 years, 472-11/17 total wrecks, and 748-13/17 casualties

resulting in partial damage.
Note.—In the above statistical statement no earlier date than 1856 is taken, as the
machinery had not in 1855 being sufficiently organised to ensure that nearly all the
wrecks, &c., in that year were reported; and there is reason to believe that some
may not have been reported in the years 1856, 7, and 8.
[273]
The following table shows the number of lives saved, and the
Return of lives number of lives lost on and near the coasts of the United
lost and saved Kingdom, 1855-1873.
between 1855
and 1873.
Lives Saved.
By
By Rocket, By Lives
Luggers, By
Year. By and Ships By By Total Lost.
and Ships’
Life Mortar and Individual other Lives [274]
Coastguard own
Boats. Apparatus, Steam Exertion. means. Saved.
and other Boats.
Lines, &c. Boats.
Boats.
1855-
336 499 1351 489 .. 22 .. 2,697 485
6
1856-
634 383 606 587 .. 21 .. 2,231 521
7
1857-
120 149 683 244 .. 17 .. 1,213 539
8
1858-
220 154 878 622 .. 16 .. 1,890 353
9
1859-
367 407 681 769 951[275] 9 .. 3,184 1,647
60
1860-
771 415 467 858 1,499 14 362[275] 4,386 537
1
1861-
322 415 371 919 1,425 27 396 3,875 884
2
1862-
291 252 414 1,319 1,289 9 531 4,105 690
3
1863-
472 256 424 1,533 1,465 10 439 4,599 620
4
1864-
293 347 338 1,003 1,459 22 232 3,694 516
5
1865-
480 490 462 1,000 2,195 7 374 5,008 698
6
1866-
378 527 385 986 2,728 13 765 5,782 896
7
1867-
377 310 843 1,060 1,902 6 660 5,158 1,333
8
1868-
504 333 317 719 2,062 .. 561 4,496 824
9
1869-
532 354 383 714 2,067 8 443 4,501 933
70
1870-
473 203 500 1,062 2,795 2 459 5,495 774
1
1871-
403 293 265 990 1,737 .. 245 3,933 626
2
1872-
548 715 582 647 1,888 6 388 4,774 590
3
Total 7521 6502 9950 15,522 25,462 209 5855 71,021 13,466

[274] The figures in this column show the number of lives lost between the 1st
January and 31st of December in each year. The number of lives lost during the
first six months of 1873 is 728.
[275] No record kept for former years.
[276] We expended between 1555 and 1873 143,660l. (see ‘Wreck Returns, 1874,’
p. 11) in providing apparatus for saving life, and in rewards to individuals as well
as awards of the National Lifeboat Institution (apart altogether from the efforts of
that noble Society, about which see ante, note, p. 315), and Her Majesty was
graciously pleased (12th April, 1867) to issue her warrant instituting two
decorations, the “Albert Medal of the first class,” and the “Albert Medal of the
second class,” to reward brave men, who have been conspicuous for saving life at
sea or on the coast.
[277] The total number of vessels and their tonnage, including their repeated
voyages, that entered and cleared at the ports in the United Kingdom with cargoes
and in ballast from and to foreign countries and British possessions for the year
1873 was 130,075, of 44,439,986 tons; the entrances and clearance coastwise
with cargoes only, 332,148 vessels, of 40,632,014 tons. If I add to these the
coasters in ballast and those with the description of cargo of which no note is
taken at the Customs, as also the vessels frequenting the Channel, and bound for
Hamburg, Bremen, and the Northern ports of Europe, which do not enter any of
the ports of the United Kingdom, of which no return is kept, it will be found that I
have not over-estimated the number which now annually pass along or frequent
our coasts.—‘Navigation and Shipping of the United Kingdom for the Year 1873.’
Presented to Parliament, 1874.
[278] This point involves many grave questions. Happily, men do not altogether
live for the purpose of making money—they have other and far nobler objects in
view. Some, indeed, but they are rare and grand characters, live altogether for the
benefit of mankind and the progress of the human race. There are others who
follow a business or profession, not altogether because it yields them profit, but
because it affords them pleasure. Such is the case to a large extent in this country.
We are a seafaring people, and we pursue occupations in connexion with it
frequently as much for pleasure as for profit. We enjoy the business of
Shipowners, because it is natural to us, and we take a delight in improving the
forms of our ships. I have seen a captain whose heart was in his ship, caress her!
—yes, caress her, by clapping the taffrail where he stood when she was performing
her work to his satisfaction, as if she had been a living thing, and heard him
exclaiming, “Go a-head, my beauty!” just as many persons may have been heard
extolling the performance of a favourite horse. Care must, therefore, be taken not
to interfere by unnecessary legislative enactments with what is not merely our
business but our pride and pleasure, or we may be driven, to the serious loss of
the nation, to seek other investments for our capital. We have now arrived at that
point where competition has become so close that if we tax our Shipowners to any
greater extent than they are now taxed, directly or indirectly (interference with
their affairs is the heaviest as well as the most obnoxious of all taxes), we shall
most assuredly drive their ships from the trades in which they are now engaged, or
compel them to submit to the humiliation of seeking a Foreign register, and
hoisting a Foreign flag.
[279] See ante, p. 465.
[280] The year previous to 1873-4 was a much more disastrous one than the year
before it, as there were 728 lives lost in the six months ending 30th June, 1873,
which is in some measure accounted for by the wreck of the ship Northfleet, when
293 lives were lost.
[281] See Parl. Paper, 214, 1875, pp. 4 and 11.
[282] As it has often been broadly stated that employment in British ships is much
more dangerous now than it was in 1836, when the first Committee sat to inquire
into the cause of shipwrecks, I may reply that the most careful analysis shows
that, while the losses were then on the average of the three previous years 3·72
percentage of the number of vessels (or rather of their tonnage) employed, they
were for the three years previous to 1873 only 2·95 per cent., although these
years were exceptionally fatal to ships laden with timber, grain, and coal (see
Appendix to ‘Commission on Unseaworthy Ships,’ pp. 780 and 791), arising from
the enormous increase in the oversea trade of these articles. For instance, while in
1861, 57,745,993 cwts. of corn were imported, the imports in 1872 amounted to
97,765,298 cwts. The imports of timber rose between the same periods from
3,358,589 to 4,949,786 loads; and the oversea exports of coals from 7,934,832 in
1861 to 13,198,494 tons in 1872.
[283] Lighthouses, 6 & 7 Wm. IV. cap. 79.
[284] Merchant Shipping Act Amendment Act, 16 & 17 Vict. cap. 131.
[285] Merchant Shipping Act, 36 & 37 Vict. cap. 85.
[286] Parl. Paper, C. 1152, 1875.
[287] However beneficial in its results, it may well be questioned if any body of
surveyors ought to be empowered at their pleasure, without complaint, to thus
retard trade and stop the ordinary course of commerce; and I am disposed to
question alike the policy and the wisdom, as well as the necessity, of this
regulation. There appear to be now employed in these questionable operations, no
less than 117 Government surveyors, “shipwrights,” and “engineers,” stationed at
different ports in the United Kingdom, twelve of whom are retired officers of the
Royal Navy, besides a good many so-called “shipwrights,” who can have very little
knowledge of the construction of merchant ships or of their requirements.[288] In
making these appointments, the fact seems to have been overlooked that, at all
our ports, there are the surveyors of Lloyd’s Register, or of other similar
associations, whose services might have been utilised with a great saving of public
expenditure, and with, perhaps, greater efficiency. Yet I read, to my astonishment,
in the public journals not long since a letter (6th August, 1875) from Mr. Plimsoll,
addressed to the President of the Board of Trade, in which, among much irrelevant
matter, he urgently recommends eighteen more surveyors to be appointed by
Government, at a salary of not less than 1000l. per annum. I sincerely trust no
such appointments will be made; but that Government will direct its attention to
other more economical and more efficient modes of removing the evils of which
Mr. Plimsoll complains, if indeed they exist at all to the extent alleged. There is no
use hiding the fact that all such appointments must be filled, in a great measure,
through patronage, and that it would be impossible to find men, even at the
tempting salary named, competent for the numerous technical and responsible
duties that would be required of them. But if such men could be found, are we to
hand over the whole of the vast maritime interests of this country, from the time
the keel is laid to the despatch of the ship to sea, to the supervision and control of
a certain number of Government officials, however competent? As it is, the duties
of the surveyors, already appointed, are too frequently as ludicrous as they are
questionable. I daresay Mr. Plimsoll must have felt this when he recommended in
his letter to Sir Charles Adderley, that “we ought not to have less than four
detaining officers in Ireland, four in Scotland, and ten in England, and that the
minimum average(?) salary should be 1000l. per annum.” Of course he meant
them to look after the officers already appointed as well as after the ships; and
that they should be “apart altogether from the Permanent Secretary, and the
Secretary of the Marine Department,” whom he charges, in the same letter,
without, by the way, one tittle or shadow of evidence, with the grossest dereliction
of duty.
[288] The staff of the Board of Trade, and its cost for salaries, in 1875 were as
follows:—

Aggregate
Employment. Number.
Salary.
£

In the Board of Trade and registry of seamen 237 48,760

Examinations 13 3,355

Mercantile marine offices 237 24,416

Surveyors, emigration officers, tonnage measurers, recorders of

154 30,078
draught of water

Nautical assessors .. 3,000

Total 641 109,609

[289] I feel no hesitation in giving, from the public journals, an account of this
most extraordinary and unusual scene, not merely as an episode in the history of
Merchant Shipping, but to explain the circumstances under which the temporary
Act now in force was passed at the close of the Session of 1875:—
“Mr. Charley asked the First Lord of the Treasury whether he could hold out any
hopes of being able to afford facilities for the third reading of the Infanticide Bill in
time to enable the House of Lords to consider it this Session.
“Mr. Disraeli said he thought he could hold out some hopes to the hon. member.
He felt some difficulty on Monday in stating the intentions of the Government, but
this arose from their desire to pass the Merchant Shipping Bill this Session; but,
finding it impossible to get through the committee on the Agricultural Holdings Bill
this week, they had come to the conclusion to abandon the Merchant Shipping Bill.
It had been submitted to the Government that they might pass the Bill in a
modified form, but he declined to deal with the subject in that fragmentary
manner. All he could say was that they would take the earliest opportunity of
bringing forward the measure next Session.
“Mr. Goschen, speaking on behalf of the shipping interest, expressed his extreme
regret that the Merchant Shipping Bill had been sacrificed for the Agricultural
Holdings Bill.
“Mr. Plimsoll earnestly entreated the Government not to consign thousands of their
fellow-creatures to an undeserved grave. There were, he said, shipowners of
murderous tendencies—(‘Order, order!’)—who had frustrated the passing of the Bill
by protracted debates. The secretary of Lloyd’s had assured a friend of his that he
did not know of a single ship which had been broken up during the past thirty
years because it was worn out. The result was that hundreds of brave fellows were
sent to unhallowed graves by these speculative scoundrels—(cries of ‘Order!’ and
uproar).
“The Speaker informed the hon. member that his remarks were out of order. When
the Merchant Shipping Bill, which was on the orders of the day, came up for
consideration he would have an opportunity of addressing the House.
“Mr. Plimsoll said he would give notice that on Tuesday next he would put a
question to the President of the Board of Trade with reference to certain vessels
which had been lost, entailing a great sacrifice of human life, and would ask
whether those vessels were not owned by Mr. Edward Bates, the member for
Plymouth, or a person bearing the same name. He should also have some
questions to put, with respect to members on the Liberal side of the House, for he
was determined to unmask the villains who sent these people to their death—
(cries of ‘Order!’ and tremendous uproar).
“The Speaker said: The hon. member has used the term ‘villains.’ I trust that he did
not apply it to any members of this House.
“Mr. Plimsoll: I did, sir, and I shall not withdraw it.
“The Speaker: The conduct of the hon. member is altogether unparliamentary, and
I call on him to withdraw the language—(cheers).
“Mr. Plimsoll (excitedly): And I must again decline to withdraw it.
“In reply to a third interrogation by the Speaker, the hon. member again declined
to withdraw. The Speaker: The hon. member declines to withdraw, and I must
submit his conduct to the judgment of the House.
“Mr. Plimsoll, standing in the centre of the House, said he would submit to the
judgment of the House. Once more approaching the table, holding a paper in his
hand, said, ‘This, sir, is my protest,’ and was proceeding to address the House, but
in obedience to loud cries of ‘Order!’ he took his seat on the front bench below the
gallery.
“Mr. Disraeli rose and said that the conduct of the hon. member was almost
unparalleled.
“Mr. Plimsoll, jumping up and interrupting: ‘And so is that of the Government’—
(tremendous uproar).
“Mr. Disraeli, continuing, said: I feel that it is my duty, as far as I can, to uphold
the dignity and honour of the House; for the conduct of the hon. member has
been not only violent, but so offensive, that it is impossible for the House to pass it
over. As the hon. member has declined to withdraw the word used, it is my duty to
move that he be reprimanded by the Speaker for his disorderly and violent conduct
—(loud cheers).
“The Speaker said that according to the practice of the House the hon. member for
Derby would answer in his place, and then withdraw.
“Mr. Plimsoll retired to the bar, and as he reached it, turned round apparently with
the intention of saying something, but the members there prevailed on him to pass
out, and as he did so, he exclaimed: ‘You do not know the men as well as I do.
This will cost the lives of thousands.’ The hon. member then left the House.
“The Marquis of Hartington rose and was about to address the House, but was
informed by the Speaker that the motion before the House was, that the hon.
member for Derby be reprimanded.
“The Marquis of Hartington said he need hardly state that he should support the
motion—(cheers). It was evident that the hon. member was labouring under great
excitement, but he was not justified in using the language he had employed. No
doubt, when he had a little time for reflection, he would see his conduct in a
different light—(cheers).
“Mr. Sullivan said the scene they had witnessed was without precedent in the
House, but he appealed to the House to be indulgent to the hon. member. He was
aware that the hon. member was extremely ill, and his state of mental excitement
arose from his overstrained feelings. Without seeking to justify the transgression of
the hon. member, he wished the House would allow him to have a week’s rest, by
which time he would be in a position to apologise for his misconduct. He (Mr.
Sullivan) held in his hands the documents which had wrought the hon. member up
to his present state of excitement, and for some time past his friends had been
caused the most serious uneasiness by the deplorable state of his mind. If the
House would afford him a few days’ rest, he would no doubt be able to set himself
right—(cheers).
“Mr. Disraeli then moved that the hon. member for Derby be requested to attend
in his place on this day week—(loud cheers).
“Mr. Fawcett said that Mr. Plimsoll was at present in an extremely painful state of
excitement. He had gone out to him in the lobby, and found him in the most
lamentable condition. By great effort he had persuaded him to take a walk in the
open air—(great laughter). At the end of a week there was little doubt that he
would withdraw the violent expressions he had used—(cheers).
“Mr. Bass, as the colleague of Mr. Plimsoll, offered his grateful acknowledgments to
the House for the course they had taken—(cheers).
“The matter then dropped.

“On the motion for discharging the Merchant Shipping Bill,

“Mr. Bates said that he wished, with the indulgence of the House, to make a
statement with respect to what had fallen from the hon. member for Derby earlier
in the sitting. All who had witnessed the extraordinary exhibition would agree with
him that the hon. member for Derby was not responsible for his actions. With
respect to himself it was unfortunately true that he had lost during the last two
years five ships; but ships better found in every respect were never sent to sea.
They were all of them iron ships, and classed A 1. To himself, personally,
pecuniarily the loss was very severe, as he never insured his ships for more than
one-half or two-thirds of their market value. That was not so much the matter; but
he did deplore the loss of his men, and his only consolation was that, as far as
human foresight could go, the ships were as good and as safe as man could make
them. He felt assured that the statement of the hon. member for Derby would be
looked upon by all, as he looked upon it, with pity—(cheers).
“The House shortly afterwards adjourned.”
Mr. Plimsoll subsequently apologised for his conduct to the House. But it is much to
be regretted, on his own account, that he neither attempted to substantiate the
charges he had brought against Mr. Bates, nor asked leave to withdraw them.
[290] When the Bill was withdrawn there stood upon the orders of the day of the
House of Commons no less than 178 amendments to it, many of them on subjects
of great importance and difficulty, as well as of great intricacy. See Times’ report of
Mr. Disraeli’s speech at the Mansion House, 4th August, 1875.
[291] ‘Unseaworthy Ships,’ 38 & 39 Vict. cap. 88.
[292] Already there seems to be a misapprehension. Mr. Plimsoll, as would appear
by the newspapers, has been spending his vacation on the shores of the Black Sea
and Danube, visiting the grain ports, and instructing the masters of all vessels
loading grain how to stow it in accordance with the conditions of the new Act. That
he is clearly of opinion that inspectors should be appointed is evident from the fact
that he appointed forty of them! and that the Foreign Office approves of what he
has done! What next and next? But the Board of Trade, by the correspondence
which has been published, is of an entirely different opinion, and maintains that
the Act of Parliament gives no such power. Nor does it! Nor should it! It is not the
duty of Government to appoint inspectors to see that its laws are carried into
effect. I say nothing as to the expense and impracticability of having surveyors at
every port in the world where a ship is to load grain; but, if such is the meaning of
the Act as applicable to grain ships, where is this sort of legislation to end? Are we
to have Government inspectors to see to the loading of all our ships at home and
abroad? And if so, why should this new system not be applied to every branch of
commerce? Nay, why should it not extend into our houses? Surely heavy penalties
would, in the case of grain ships, be a much more effectual mode of enforcing the
conditions of the Act. Is there to be no end to the folly of unauthorised individuals
appointing surveyors to inspect the loading of our ships abroad, or interfering with
duties alone within the power of the Executive Government? It is high time we put
a stop to these well-meaning, but Quixotic, proceedings.
[293] I cannot understand what is meant by the word “keep.” A ship sails in a
seaworthy condition, but an accident happens on the voyage which may render
her “unseaworthy”: is the master, under such circumstances, to put back to the
nearest port for repairs? and if he does not do so, and his ship is lost, it may be
from causes wholly different, is his policy of insurance to be invalid, and is he to be
responsible for any loss of life that may thus occur?
[294] In Mr. Plimsoll’s protest, which, as the rules of the House of Commons would
not allow him to present, he either threw upon the table, or had dropped into the
House from one of the galleries,[295] he says, “I charge the Government that they
are wittingly and unwittingly, for they are both, playing into the hands of the
maritime murderers inside the House and outside the House to secure a further
continuance of the present murderous system.”... “I desire to unmask the villains
who sit in the House, fit representatives of the more numerous, but not greater,
villains who are outside the House.” I offer no comment on this language. It tells
its own tale of the state of mind of its author.
[295] The disgraceful scenes in the House of Commons could not have arisen from
Mr. Plimsoll’s momentary excitement, when the Government announced the
withdrawal of its Bill, but must have been premeditated, as this carefully prepared
protest too clearly shows.
[296] Mr. John W. A. Harper, Secretary to the Salvage Association. See Question
8769, p. 311.
[297] See also evidence, W. J. Lamport, Question 5556, p. 192. With regard to the
question of overloading, Mr. Lamport made a remarkable statement, which I do
not hesitate to give at length, because it differs entirely from an opinion prevailing
at present in the public mind.
The Chairman asked (Question 556): “From your knowledge of the shipping in
Liverpool during forty years, Do you think that there has been a great deal of
overloading?”—“Since it was intimated to me that I was to be asked to give
evidence in this room, I have been trying to task my memory for cases in which
when vessels had foundered or had not been heard of, I myself had felt a
reasonable suspicion that the cause was overloading. I have not been able to bring
to my recollection a single instance of the kind. Now this result, I must confess,
was a little startling to myself, and in order to check it I spoke to the overlooker of
my firm, who is a man older than myself, who has had longer experience than I
have had, and who, from his outdoor business, would probably hear of such things
more frequently than I should. The overlooker told me that he himself did not
remember a single instance, in which he had suspected that any vessel which had
left the port of Liverpool had been lost because of being overloaded.”
I may add, from my intimate knowledge of Mr. Lamport, which extended over a
period of thirty years up to his untimely death, that these were no mere words of
course. Indeed, the statement agrees with my own experience; and, from the
inquiries I have made elsewhere, there are comparatively very few ships lost from
overloading, except in the coasting and short-voyage trades. In confirmation of
this opinion, the Commissioners, in their final report, state that “It is chiefly among
the small coasting vessels that any habitual overloading prevails,” and “that there
are a large number of ships in ballast annually lost, while the losses from collisions
show that the management and negligence of sailors are not less disastrous than
the carelessness of shipowners.”
[298] It appears to me to be a grave mistake to require the insertion in the ship’s
articles of the draught of water. These articles are an agreement between owner,
master, and crew, and are binding on all. How can a drowned sailor’s family claim
compensation for a vessel being loaded to a draught the sailor himself agreed to?