Philosophy of Ideology

Philosophy of Ideology
Gustavo E. Romero
Abstract The concept of ideology is central to the understanding of the many po-
litical, economic, social, and cultural processes that have occurred in the last two
centuries. And yet, what is the nature of the different ideologies remains a vague,
open, and much disputed question. Many political, sociological, and ideological
studies have been devoted to ideology. Very little, on the other hand, has been done
from the philosophical field. And this despite the fact that there are undoubtedly
many philosophical questions related to ideology and its role in modern industri-
alized societies. Just a few examples of ideology-related philosophical questions
suffice to prove the point: What objects do ideologies deal with? Are the ideologies
testable? Are there true ideologies? Do they evolve? How are ideologies related to
societies? Is the existence of ideologies inevitable in modern societies? What is the
relation of ideology to science? Is science just another kind of ideology? Are we, as
human beings, innately predisposed to believe in ideologies? Or, instead, ideologies
proliferate through indoctrination and propaganda? Are ideologies necessarily harm-
ful?... and much more. In this article I try to answer some of these questions from a
philosophical point of view, taking a materialist approach. I begin by characterizing
ideology as a complex, multi-layered concept. Then, I briefly discuss the material
systems on which ideological movements operate, that is, societies and concrete hu-
man groups. I identify at least 11 different elements that seem to be present in most
ideologies, and I compare these characteristics with those of contemporary science
and technology. Although some superficial similarities can be identified, there are
deep differences that make ideology completely different from science. The simi-
larities, however, are stronger with technology. Ideologies continually evolve with
technological advances, social changes, and even with mere fashion. The current
Gustavo E. Romero
Instituto Argentino de Radioastronomía (CONICET; CICPBA), C.C. No. 5, 1894 Villa Elisa,
Argentina.
Facultad de Ciencias Astronómicas y Geofísicas, Universidad Nacional de La Plata, Paseo del
Bosque s/n, 1900, La Plata, Argentina.
e-mail: [email protected]
1
2 Gustavo E. Romero
fragmentation of ideologies caused by the widespread use of new technologies and

social networks has given rise to new phenomena of ideological propagation which,
in my opinion, are very dangerous, particularly for open societies. I discuss these
processes, within the context of the nature vs nurture debate, along with the question
of whether we can get rid of ideologies.
1 Introduction
Ideology has been ubiquitous throughout the 20th century and it still is today. Millions
of people have been killed in the name of ideologies. Millions have been imprisoned,
persecuted, displaced, or tortured for ideological conflicts. The lifestyle of most
people on this planet is determined, or at least influenced, by ideologies. Within the
same society, families and friends are often separated by ideological differences. It
seems almost impossible to understand today’s world without some understanding
of the many conflicting ideologies. And yet the very concept of ideology remains
distressingly vague.
Entire libraries have been written on ideology and related topics. Most of these
books explore particular ideologies, their history, characteristics, and their impact
on specific societies. Others compare different ideologies, conflicts between ideolo-
gies (or, rather, conflicts between people and governments inspired by competing
ideologies). Other books deal with the political, economic, and social aspects of
ideologies. Some works chart the world of contemporary ideologies and others rank
them by appealing to different criteria. Some of these books are written from a polit-
ical perspective and others from an ideological point of view. Almost none discuss
ideology from a philosophical outlook.
And yet ideology is full of aspects that call for philosophical inspection. A
philosophical analysis of ideology is particularly pertinent because many ideologies
are inspired by philosophical ideas. Others, in scientific theories, and still others, in
pseudo-scientific concepts.
The philosophy of ideology is more than just a branch of political philosophy,
because ideologies are not only political. They can also be biological, economic, or
cultural. Among the many philosophical questions that we can ask ourselves about
ideologies, I mention the following:
• What is an ideology?
• What objects do ideologies deal with?
• How many kinds of ideology are there?
• Are ideologies testable?
• Do they evolve?
• What is the relationship between ideologies and society?
• Are there true ideologies?
• Is science some kind of ideology?
• Are we conditioned from our social environment to believe in some ideologies?
Or are we, on the contrary, innately willing to accept some ideological attitudes?
Philosophy of Ideology 3
• Do we need ideologies?
The variety of seemingly contradictory opinions that exist in the field of ideology
studies makes a philosophical assessment desirable, one that can shed some new
light on controversial issues and helps to dispel some of the vagueness that plagues
the subject.
Let us consider, just as an example, the first question of our preliminary list
above, the very basic issue of “what is an ideology?” Terry Eagleton (2007), for
instance, offers a list of 16 competing meanings of the term ‘ideology’, collected
from a wide variety of authors. Such a list, ranging from “a process of production of
meanings, signs and values in social life” to “a socially necessary illusion” and “an
action-oriented sets of beliefs”, is far from exhaustive.
Certainly, not all definitions found in the literature are mutually compatible. Some
point out just a specific aspect of ideologies. Others have a definitively negative
character. And yet others are compatible with things that are certainly not ideologies
(for instance, we can imagine many sets of beliefs that are action-oriented but not
ideological, as those that guide a cook in the preparation of a given menu).
Perhaps a better clue to the correct meaning of “ideology” can be obtained from
the historical use of the word. The term seems to have been introduced by Antoine
Destutt de Tracy (1754–1836). Following the spirit of the Enlightenment, soon after
the French Revolution, he sought to found a general science of ideas. He tried to
determine the process of forming ideas from observation and experience. But soon
Napoleon and others began to use the word in a pejorative sense to describe a
simplistic and idealized analysis of reality, totally divorced from facts, which tries
to regulate people’s lives with the excuse of improving them.
Marx introduced the word in social and political contexts with a different meaning
in his classic work, written with Engels, The German Ideology (1976, originally
written in 1846). Marx and Engels considered as ideological any set of political
illusions produced by the social experiences of a class (briefly, according to him, a
class in this context is a social group defined by its economic role, such as proprietors
or workers). These illusions are used by the rulers, through the state, as an instrument
of control and domination of the working class. Ideology, for Marx, was made up
by the legal, political, religious, and philosophical principles proposed by the ruling
classes with the aim of reinforcing the capitalist society. In other contexts, however,
Marx also seems to conceive of ideology as a set of mental attitudes determined
by the social environment. Thus, members of different classes are both directly and
indirectly taught to think and behave in ways appropriate to their own class. With
revolution and the suppression of classes, the ideology should disappear.
Lenin (1973, first published 1902), on the contrary, thought that a socialist ide-
ology proper to the working classes was not only possible, but desirable. Such an
ideology would help develop a working class consciousness and prevent this class
from falling into trade unions. On the contrary, reglion is an intensional creation
of the ruling class for Lenin, a kind social tool whose purpose is to ensure the
domination of the workers.
The Italian communist Antonio Gramsci (1891-1937) thought that ideology is
consciously produced by intellectuals. Different ideologies conflict within the same
4 Gustavo E. Romero
society until one of them prevails. Engaging in the cultural war to achieve hegemony
is the main task of the organic intellectual, that is, one closely connected with the
class structure through some organization such as the communist party.
Karl Mannheim (1893-1947) realized that any social environment influences
human thought, so a society with many different social groups and class environments
will produce a multiplicity of ideologies. His "total" concept of ideology refers to
the modes of thought and experience, the Weltanschauung or “worldview" of an age
or group originating in a collective life situation.
Many social scientists and political analysts today use the term “ideology" in
a purely descriptive way to refer to any discrete and relatively coherent system of
beliefs that inform the social and political actions of a human group in a given society.
Contrary to the Marxist conception, this view is essentially neutral with respect to the
value of ideologies (see, for example, Seliger 1976). Others adopt a more normative
sense of the word, referring to ideas or beliefs that are in some way misleading,
illusory, or one-sided, and that serve the interests of specific groups. There is a
negative connotation associated with saying that something is ‘ideological’ in this
sense. The critical conception of ideology typically holds that ideology is a way of
using meaning to establish and sustain relations of domination (Thompson 1990).
Before trying to refine these first approximations to the concept of ideology, it
should be noted that ideologies, whether in their neutral or negative meaning, are
always linked to groups and social classes. Perhaps, then, a good way to begin our
inquiry into the nature of ideologies is to clarify the concepts of society, social group,
class, social stability, and the like. That is what the next section is devoted to.
2 Some concepts of sociology
I maintain that social systems are material objects, composed of organisms and the
artifacts they produce (Bunge 1979, Romero 2018). Being material, social systems
can change. They can grow, evolve, collapse, disappear, etc. They also interact with
other social systems and with other concrete objects. Let us be more specific about
these terms.
A general material system is a composed entity, i.e. a thing that is formed by
other things. It is is characterized by its composition, environment, structure, and
mechanism (Bunge 1979, 2003).
The composition of the system is the set of its parts. The environment is the
collection of things that interact with the system. The structure is the set of relation-
ships (bonds or links) between the different components or parts, as well as with
external objects. The first set of relations forms the endostructure, the second the
exostructure. The total structure is the union of the two. Finally, the mechanism of
the system is the collection of all its internal processes (a process is a series of lawful
changes).
A social system is a concrete system composed of animals that 1) share an
environment, 2) interact, 3) cooperate in some aspects and compete in others.
If the predominant animals in the group are humans, the social system is called
the human social system. There are many types of human social systems, ranging
from families to armies and societies. They can be natural and spontaneous, like a
tribe or nation, or artificial, like a multinational company or a cooperative enterprise.
A human society (HS) is a human social system composed of four large subsys-
tems: 1) biological, 2) economic, 3) political, and 4) cultural (Bunge 2003).
The biological subsystem of a human society is composed by human beings (the
dominant group) and the animals that depend on them; the structure is given by
the biological relationships among all these individuals. The environment is formed
by the territory and the ecosystem these people inhabit. The mechanisms are the
biological processes experienced by the population.
The economic subsystem is composed by the working individuals of the society
and the different means at their disposal. The corresponding structure is given by
the relations of production, exchange, and distribution of goods of all kinds among
them. The environment comprises the available material conditions, both internal and
external. The mechanisms that operate in the subsystem are the economic processes
of all kinds that occur in the society.
The political subsystem is made up of those individuals who are devoted to the
administration and control of the common goods and to activities related to the
government and the legislation of social actions. The corresponding structure is
made up of power, legal, and administrative relations. The environment consists of
the forces and conditions of power, both internal and external to the society. The
mechanisms are the actions of government and administration that take place, along
with the reactions that these actions provoke from the rest of the society.
The cultural subsystem, finally, is composed of individuals who are devoted to
inventing, researching, teaching, discovering, planning, creating, representing, etc.
as well as by the different means at their disposal together with the results of their
work. The structure consists of the relationships among the various cultural actors
and between them with the rest of the members of the society. The environment
is formed by the available material conditions and the operating mechanisms are
cultural processes of all kinds.
We can make now some postulates about social systems that seem plausible. For
instance,
• Changes in a social system originate from 1) changes in its components, 2)
changes in the links of its components, 3) interactions with the environment.
• Members of a social system cooperate in some respects and compete in others.
• A social system emerges if and only if its existence contributes to satisfying some
needs or desires of at least one of its members.
• A social system disappears when the links among its components are dissolved.
• Changes in one subsystem of a society have impact on the other subsystems.
Regarding the latter postulate, I notice that cultural changes, for instance those
initiated by new ideas, can affect the political and economic subsystems. These
changes can be moderate or radical. Ideologies seem to operate in this sense, starting
with certain groups of intellectuals and then extending to other parts of the society.
6 Gustavo E. Romero
A social group is a set of members of a society who have some common prop-
erties. For example, the group of the unemployed, or that of university students. We
must bear in mind that groups are not social systems. A population is separated into
groups to study it or implement action plans. For example, the group of all those over
65 years of age will be the first to be vaccinated in the event of a pandemic. Although
the individuals that make up the groups are material, the groups themselves are not.
You can vaccinate human beings, not groups. Groups are said to be vaccinated only
when most or all members belonging to the group are vaccinated.
Human groups are concepts abstracted from real people and used to think about
various types of social systems. This does not mean that the groups are not objective,
because objectivity is granted by the specification of a clear and explicit criterion
for the formation of groups. The group, being a concept, can be well constructed, if
the criteria are justified in a given context, or poorly defined, if the formation rule is
not clear (for example, the “group of young people”, or the “group of poor people”,
if the terms ‘young’ and ‘poor’ are not carefully defined).
There can also be arbitrary and subjective groups. For instance, the group of my
friends at any given moment depends on my subjective evaluation of friendship at
that moment.
A concrete social group is not a set but a collection of interacting individuals.
Contrary to the social group, it is not a theoretical construction, but a material
system. Specific social groups can achieve goals that are beyond the reach of their
individuals. Some examples are work crews, police squads, gangs, sports teams,
research teams, armies, musical bands, and mobs.
A social class is a social group whose members are supposed to dominate or to
be dominated in some way by members of another human group.
Dominance relationship: An individual x dominates an individual y in the as-

pect A, (x > Ay), if and only if x determines the behavior of y in the aspect A.
Note that according to the nature of A we can differentiate political, economic,

religious classes, etc. All these classes are conceptual constructs and not concrete
social groups.
Some remarks:
• Classes, like groups, are not material.
• If the classes are not material, there can be no “class struggle”. The struggles are
always between material systems.
• Classes can’t be self-aware because they don’t have brains, and hence they do not
think.
• The concept of class is useful for analyzing the structures of a society, but classes
cannot cause anything because they have no causal power. All real change in a
society must occur because the behaviors of real individuals change.
• Although classes are not systems, some members of a class can group together
and form a system, and their action can have an impact on society. For example,
unions or churches can bring together many members of a class and cause social
events.
Some of the considerations on sociological concepts offered above give us clues
about what ideology is. If social systems are real, concrete entities, then they are
capable of change. They can be changed by external forces, such as conflicts with
other social systems, or by changes in the environment, such as climate change or
sudden catastrophes. Or they can change due to epidemics or other health problems
that affect at least part of the biological subsystem. But social systems and, in
particular, societies, can also be changed by the action of some of the intentional
agents that belong to the population. These actions can take different forms: voting,
labor, legislation, even violent revolution. And the actions of individuals originate
from their mental configuration, their values and ideals, so any cultural framework
capable of promoting some actions and inhibiting others can be used to induce
changes in a society in a certain direction. Ideologies appear to do that: they seem
to be instruments to generate or prevent social changes.
3 Some neutral concepts of ideology
Several authors have proposed definitions of ideology in line with what was outlined
above. Let us review a few of them.
Hamilton (1987) made an extensive examination of the literature on the concept
of ideology, which led him to identify at least 27 definitional attributes to the term.
He pondered these alleged attributes to ascertain their utility and coherence as
definitional criteria for ideology finally proposing the following tentative definition:
An ideology is a system of collectively held normative and reputedly factual ideas and beliefs
and attitudes advocating a particular pattern of social relationships and arrangements, and/or
aimed at justifying a particular pattern of conduct, which its proponents seek to promote,
realize, pursue or maintain.
He notes that “This definition is coherent and sufficiently broad, yet sufficiently
circumscribed, to meet the requirements of empirical application and research. It
indicates the kind of ideas and beliefs that comprise ideologies rather than making
claims about their causes, functions, or anything else that may or may not be em-
pirically true about such ideas and beliefs.” (Hamilton 1987, p.38). We see that in a
broad sense this definition is in the line we have suggested.
Another author that offers a very neat definition is Lyman Tower Sargent (2009)
in his classic book Contemporary Political Ideologies: A Comparative Analysis.
An ideology is a system of values and beliefs regarding the various institutions and processes
of society that is accepted as fact or truth by a group of people. An ideology provides the
believer with a picture of the world both as it is and as it should be, and, in doing so,
it organizes the tremendous complexity of the world into something fairly simple and
understandable.
8 Gustavo E. Romero
Here the values are explicitly mentioned, as well as the fact that the set of beliefs
adopted is considered true. People who have an ideology are believers, according
to Tower Sargent. And they have an image of what kind of society they want to
implement. They also have, as a starting point, a picture of the world as it is now.
This image, however, may be too simplistic, inaccurate, or just plain wrong. It is
the difference between these two images, what is thought to be and what is thought
should be, that pushes the believer into action, probably guided by the value system
proposed by the ideology. Here we can glimpse a grave danger: if the images of the
world, current and future, held by the believer are false, or the values adopted are
misleading, the result of his or her actions can clash with the facts, with catastrophic
consequences.
Roger Eatwell definition takes note that ideologies not only can be used to promote
or enforce changes in a society, but also can serve to stabilize it (Eatwell 1993):
A political ideology is a relatively coherent set of empirical and normative beliefs and
thoughts, focusing on the problems of human nature, the process of history, and socio-
political arrangements. It is usually related to a program of more specific immediate and
short-run concerns. Depending on its relationship to the dominant value structure, an ideol-
ogy can act as either a stabilizing or a radical force.
Finally, I mention the influential definition offered by Michael Freeden (2003),

which is restricted to political ideologies:
A political ideology is a set of ideas, beliefs, opinions, and values that
1. exhibits a recurring pattern,
2. are held by significant groups,
3. compete over providing and controlling plans for public policy,
4. do so with the aim of justifying, contesting, or changing the social and political arrange-
ments and processes of a political community.
Contrary to the classical Marxist vision, Freeden emphasizes that there can be
several ideologies in the same society and that they compete to control public policies.
It could be argued that total ideologies compete to impose the general worldview of
the society that hosts them. Freeden also stresses the importance of language control
in that fight:
Ideologies compete over the control of political language as well as competing over plans for
public policy; indeed, their competition over plans for public policy is primarily conducted
through their competition over the control of political language.
We can extend Freeden’s definition beyond the realm of politics in line with our
previous characterization of a society as follows:
Definition. An ideology is a body of ideas, beliefs, opinions, and values such that
1. exhibit a recurring pattern,
2. is held by one or more social groups,
3. individuals in each group collaborate with each other and compete with other
groups in order to gain control of public policy plans,
4. they do so with the aim of justifying, contesting, or changing the state and
direction of the biological, economic, socio-political, and cultural processes of a
community.
In short, in a broad sense, an ideology is more or less a collection of beliefs and
values, not necessarily true or coherent, held by a group of individuals in a human
society, which is used as a tool to gain control over that society.
4 Essential features of any specific ideology
Although the definitions given above offer a broad characterization of the concept
of ideology, we can still ask ourselves ‘what characteristics are essential to call a
certain body of beliefs ideology?’ In order to clarify this, I propose to consider any
specific ideology, political or not, as a multidimensional field of beliefs. We can
represent such a field as 11 tuples of the following elements (see Bunge 1985 for a
similar approach):
I =< C, S, D, G, B, A, P,V, I, O, M > (1)
where,
C is the community of believers (a subset of which are militants) in I.
S is the society that hosts C, and on which the members of C act to modify it in
some aspect.
D is the domain of objects, real or imagined, that are studied, revered, or manip-
ulated by members of C.
G is the general worldview adopted by the members of C.
B is the background knowledge that members of C take for granted regarding the
objects of their interest (for example, historical or economic facts).
A is the total set of statements about objects in D that members of C hold true. A
subset Acore of this set A forms the central core of beliefs of the ideological field to
which believers are unwilling to change without renouncing their ideology.
P is the problem or set of problems, conceptual or empirical, that the members
of C face.
V is the value system shared by the members of C.
I is the set of ideals to which the members of C aspire.
O is the set of concrete objectives of the members of C with which they hope to
realize the ideals I.
M are the methods that members of C adopt to achieve their objectives O.
I will now make a few remarks about this minimal characterization of ideology
as a field of belief. First of all, I must say that it is a tentative scheme and certainly
perfectible. There may be other essential features of ideology that escape our analysis.
However, new elements can easily be incorporated into our definition as additional
dimensions, once they have been identified through comparative research of actual
ideologies. The different components of the expression (1) can be interpreted as
10 Gustavo E. Romero
discrete sets, whose elements will depend on the specific ideology. The first set, C,
has as elements the members of a community of believers in the ideology. I use the
word ‘community’ and not just ‘group’, because some interaction between people
who have the same ideology is expected, especially between those who are militants,
that is, those who care about the spread of the ideology.
People who have an ideology will exist only in a society, upon which they try to act.
Hence the dimension S. Different types of societies will have different ideologies.
The action of the individuals of C on S is possible because, as we have seen, a
society is a material entity existing in space and time and capable of evolving. It is
that evolution that the members of C want to control or at least influence.
The scope of an ideology will be given by the domain D of objects that concern
the believers. If these objects are social or political items, the ideology will be
sociopolitical. But it could be the case, as we will discuss in the next section, of
broader or narrower domains.
People who hold an ideology will share some worldview or at least elements that
are common to several worldviews, no matter how simple. This will give their beliefs
the minimum coherence necessary for argumentation or at least for propaganda. For
example, followers of an ideology may view the world as a material system where
human beings are free to act, or they may think that God created the world and
we must act according to his designs, or that human beings are inherently evil and
therefore they must be controlled and regulated down to the minutest detail if they
are going to live in society without killing each other, etc. Of course, the worldview
could also be much more elaborate, informed by science and technology.
If the proponents of an ideology want to change some aspect of a society then
they must have some knowledge, or pretend to have some knowledge, of the relevant
aspects in order to devise some course of action. For example, some economist, ide-
ologically identified with some left-wing ideology, might think that he or she knows
that inflation is always caused by speculative behavior on the part of manufacturers,
merchants, and goods distributors. Then, he or she, given the right power, could try
to implement and enforce price controls at supermarkets and other shops. Another
liberal economist might think that his or her colleague’s actions are nonsense because
the government’s practice of having the central bank printing money to finance pub-
lic spending is the main driver of inflation. So, for the second economist, reducing
the deficit and stop printing money are the first steps to suppress inflation. Without
some knowledge or presumed knowledge of the causes of inflation there is nothing to
do in either case. If the position of the economists is ideologically oriented and their
decisions and choices are based on ideas belonging to the hard core Acore of beliefs
of their respective ideologies, it will be very difficult, if not impossible, for them to
change their minds in front of the evidence of a failure and take a different course of
action. If there were not, in each case, a hard and irreducible core of ideas that are
not negotiable, we would not be talking about ideology, but economic science. It is
easy to find examples that extend the existence of a core of canonical truths to all
kinds of ideologies.
Every ideology faces problems that it claims to solve. Problems of power, job
opportunities, gender issues, freedom, etc. The extent of this set of problems will
depend on the type of ideology and the characteristics of the society. To solve them,
the members of C rely on their background knowledge B and a set of methods M
deemed as acceptable and effective. They are also guided by their values V and ideals
I. Values can be part of an elaborate axiology or simply a set of morals, depending
on the degree of sophistication of the ideological field. Ideals are conceptual models
where different values are exemplified. The purpose of ideals is to facilitate the
visualization of objectives and to motivate actions. The ideal in itself is not a goal
we can hope to achieve, but it serves to thrust our struggle in a direction that can lead
us to our goals. Therefore, all ideologies include problems, methods, values, and
ideals. They are the driving forces and self-imposed constraints necessary to achieve
goals. The latter are also essential: people guided by ideologies are goal-oriented.
Everything else is a means to achieve the changes they want to implement. Perhaps
the shortest way to characterize any specific ideology is to list its core beliefs and
goals.
5 Types of ideologies
From the characterization of ideology offered in the previous section, we see that what
makes an ideological field different from other fields of activity in human societies
is that ideology is based on beliefs and adopts specific arrangements of values and
methods with the ultimate goal of achieving some influence on the evolution of a
society or a social group. Depending on the scope of the ideology, that is, according
to its domain D, we can differentiate different types of ideologies (see also Bunge
1985 and Freeden 2003).
• Macro-ideologies: they are concerned with all or several of the subsystems of

the society.
• Micro-ideologies: they refer only to a limited class of issues within the society.
• Super-ideologies: they refer to all areas of human existence, not only social ones.
If an ideology of any kind does not change in the face of evidence adverse to it,
we say that this ideology is a fundamentalism. Many religious, political, and cultural
ideologies fall into this class.
Let us see some examples of the different types of ideologies, to illustrate the
classification.
6 Some examples
Macro-ideologies focus on the political, economic, and cultural subsystems of soci-

ety. Some well-known ideologies of this kind are (for a comprehensive examination
see Freeden, Tower Sargent and Stears 2013, and Wetherly 2017):
• Liberalism. Liberalism has a core of central beliefs where we find the assumption
that human beings are, at least partially, rational agents, whose freedom of thought
and, within certain limits, of action, must be protected. Freedom is considered
the supreme value. Liberalism views the individual as the primary social unit.
Therefore, the main means of achieving well-being is individual initiative. The
state must guarantee equality before the law, but its power must be controlled
and restricted by other independent counterpowers. The plurality of ideas and
opinions is highly valued in liberalism because it arises from the variety of
human beings, from their different characters, dispositions, and choices. Merit
and equal opportunities are values and must also be promoted. A self-made free
human being is one of the ideals of liberalism.
• Socialism. Socialism has a hard core of beliefs that includes the idea that human
beings are essentially defined by their relationships with other human beings,
especially through work. Among its ideals we find equality, well-being, universal
education, and social assistance. Among its goals we have the elimination of
poverty and extreme economic differences. The main tool to achieve these objec-
tives are economic regulations and state intervention in the different subsystems
of society. Freeden (2003) points out that socialism is a future-oriented ideology,
also very critical of the past and the present.
• Conservatism. The hard core of conservatism’s beliefs include the idea that
change in a society, whether political, economic, or cultural, should be gradual
and never sudden or revolutionary. Change is the natural result of continuous
human evolution and should not be abrupt. Conservatism seeks to strengthen
existing institutions so that they are not susceptible to sudden collapse. Change,
understood as growth and improvement of the existing bases of society, however,
is valued and welcomed.
Among the means used in conservatism is the observance of public order, under-
stood as strict enforcement of the law, and the education of the population in the
original values of society. The conservatives are not necessarily explicit in terms
of economic and cultural issues, which is why they can appear in either liberal
or socialist societies. That syncretic ability is perhaps the most powerful tool
they have to achieve the goal of stability. Thus, throughout history, conservatism
has fought both liberalism and socialism at different times and places, borrowing
numerous elements from one and the other.
• Progressivism . Progressivism is a type of ideological movement that is essen-
tially opposed to conservatism. It values and seeks change as a way to improve
living conditions in a society. Even a radical change can be deemed valuable
and desirable if conditions and circumstances are considered to demand it. The
progressive values creativity, curiosity, science, tolerance, diversity, and open-
mindedness. As with conservatism, this ideology is not necessarily tied to a
particular form of political, economic, or cultural model. Both liberals and so-
cialists can also be progressives. Even people who live in semi-totalitarian states
can come to consider themselves progressives. Great revolutions, such as the
French revolution or the Bolshevik revolution, had the banners of progressivism
in their beginnings.
• Totalitarianism. Totalitarianism nullifies the separation between the public and

private spheres of social life, insisting that the state has the right to regulate all
areas of human existence. The main belief of the totalitarian creed is that human
beings are not capable of handling the responsibility associated with individual
freedom, so such a role must be assumed by the state. Freedom means only
emancipation from the falsehoods of other ideologies.
The primary means to achieve a totalitarian state is the elimination of any coun-
terpower. Justice and legislative activities must be controlled by the executive
branch, which in practice is the only one that exists. Some totalitarian tools are
propaganda, press control, the repression of any dissent, internal espionage, and
sheer terror. Among other techniques adopted by totalitarian governments we can
mention the creation of both internal and external enemies who are accused of be-
ing responsible for all problems, the cult of a leader’s personality, the destruction
of the free press and its substitution by an addict one, the restriction of people’s
movements, the use of fraud in mock elections, and the modification of language
as a form of thought control.
Among the totalitarianisms we can mention most versions of absolutism, fascism,
communism, Nazism, and various hybrid ideologies found in several developing
countries. Totalitarian ideologies are rarely found in their pure form in the con-
temporary world.
• Anarchism. Anarchism is the generic name for a set of macro-ideologies that
seek the reduction or even the abolition of the state, understood as a monopoly
of force, and by extension also the rejection of political government or authority
imposed by force on the individual, considering them unnecessary or harmful. It
arose, in its modern form, in the 19th century, as a reaction to the authoritarian
consequences derived from the French Revolution1.
There is a huge variety of versions of anarchism, both individualist and social-
ist. Some anarchist theorists: Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, Josiah Warren, Mikhail
Bakunin, Max Stirner, Piotr Kropotkin, Robert Nozick, David Friedman, and
Murray Rothbard, among many others. A partial list of movements self-defined
as anarchism in some sense includes: individualist anarchism, mutualism, col-
lectivist anarchism, anarch-communism, anarch-capitalism, anarch-syndicalism,
anarch-feminism, etc.
The essential problem of almost all forms of anarchism has always been how to
combine complete unrestricted individual freedom with some form of effective
social cooperation.
Let us now move to micro-ideologies.
A micro-ideology is one that, like the dominant ideologies, has an identifiable
structure but is restricted to a limited domain. It does not cover the full range of
issues that pertain to macro-ideologies, and it is limited in its objectives and scope.
1 Of course, anarchist attitudes are ancient and can be found in the most varied historical periods.
Most notably, perhaps, in the third and fourth centuries, when thousands of people fled the cities
and moved to the desert where they lived as hermits and eventually formed primitive monastic
societies (see Lacarrière 1961).
Let us take nationalism as an example, an ideology that assigns exceptional value

to the concept of nation as a shaper of social and human identity. In general, national-
ism is silent on freedom and individual rights and on the relations between the public
and private spheres, among many other issues. It can occur within macro-ideologies
of any kind. Some additional examples of micro-ideologies are neoliberalism, femi-
nism, veganism, supremacism, ecologism, pacifism, and gender ideology.
Finally, we have the super-ideologies. Super-ideologies try to encompass all as-
pects of reality, and in the case of religious super-ideologies, of a supposed supra-
reality. Super-ideologies offer a vision and interpretation of the world and all realms
of experience, along with a system of valuation or axiology to inform human behav-
ior. In general, super-ideologies incorporate the concept of ‘salvation’, be it individual
or collective. By ‘salvation’ is understood some kind of overcoming of the natural
limits of the human condition or, in the collective case, the achievement of a state
where the social dynamic disappears because ideal equilibrium conditions have been
reached.
Most super-ideologies are religious, but some are secular. Examples of super-
ideologies are Catholicism, Islam, and some philosophical worldviews such as
Marxism, which includes not only beliefs about nature, history, ethics, society,
and metaphysics, but also about the future of humanity.
7 Are populism and terrorism ideologies?
It may be striking that the brief list of macro-ideologies presented in the previous
section does not include democracy or capitalism, something that many authors do.
The reason they are not included is that I don’t think they are ideologies at all,
because they do not meet the criteria given in Section 4. Democracy is not a set
of beliefs, values, and objectives, but a system of government. It can be adopted
by societies with very different dominant ideologies, from liberalism to socialism.
Supporting a democratic system of government does not imply a commitment to any
particular vision of economic or political affairs, the evolution of society, or human
nature. Even totalitarian societies can adopt some style of democratic practice. For
example, most of the communist systems of the period before 1989 called themselves
“democratic republics”. Of course, many ideologies can adopt or even try usufruct
the term because of the positive connotations it have today, but this does not mean
that ‘democracy’ denotes by itself any kind of ideology. Ideologies are prone to
appropriate any concept they deem useful or profitable.
Similarly, capitalism is not an ideology. It fails to fulfil many of the dimensions
displayed by ideologies. Capitalism is an economic system that can be applied in a
variety of ideological contexts. Many dictatorships have or had capitalist systems, as
well as self-proclaimed communist states like China.
Something similar occurs with two other terms frequently associated with ide-
ologies: populism and terrorism. Populism is a methodology for obtaining, keeping,
and increasing power in a society; it is a form of political construction where rhetoric
prevails over any doctrine (Vallespín and Bascuñán 2017). Some of the basic char-
acteristics of the populist methodology are: 1) the existence of a charismatic leader
who claims to ‘connect’ directly with the people; 2) a permanent appeal to the ‘peo-
ple’, which can only be interpreted in their desires and needs by the leader; 3) the
construction of an enemy who is blamed for all problems; 4) a manifest hostility
to any plurality with the consequent creation of a strong polarization; the populist
discourse is essentially articulated as a fight of ‘them’ against ‘us’; 5) permanent
appeal to emotional language, extreme simplifications, and rejection of reason and
hard data; 6) rejection of the free press and disqualification of those who think
differently, rejection of dissent; 7) manipulation of history to create a mythical or
idyllic past, revisionism to adapt the facts to the narrative adopted in the present;
8) contempt for minorities and victimhood; 9) permanent attempts to dismantle the
counterpowers and control mechanisms of democracy; 10) adoption of a very vague
vocabulary that facilitates all kinds of ideological hodgepodge.
The 21st century has witnessed an unexpected resurgence of populisms around
the world. These movements have proliferated in Europe, America, and Asia as
a reaction to a series of rapid and complex changes associated with globalization
and the universalization of the capitalist economic system. They take an astonishing
variety of forms, borrowing concepts from multiple ideologies. All of them are
nationalists, many are isolationists, some present themselves as left-wing and others
are openly right-wing. They all fight the very foundations of the liberal society:
the separation of powers, the independence of justice, the existence of plurality and
tolerance towards those who think differently. Wherever these movements reach the
power, the result is similar: populists appropriate the state and dispose of it at will,
impose patronage policies, persecute the press, and harass the opposition. When
possible, they modify the constitution to limit controls and extend their term in
power. Occasionally such methods evolve into dictatorships, as in Venezuela, or
autocratic rules, as in Russia.
Terrorism, like populism, is a method, not an ideology. It is the method that con-
sists of killing innocent people for political purposes. Terrorism is often ideologically
motivated: most terrorists believe in an ideology that they want to protect or impose.
The practice of terror is not exclusive to a specific ideological group. It has been
used by anarchists, radical religious groups, Nazis, communists, and dictators of all
stripes. Terror can also be used by individuals, such as the so-called Unabomber, by
insurgent, nationalist or fundamentalist groups, or by entire states. Although closely
related to the ideologies, it should not be confused with one of them, although some
ideologies are more prone to using terror than others, depending on their axiological
systems.
8 Science vs ideology
Is science just another ideology? Many people seem to think so. I strongly disagree.
But before discussing the relationship between science and ideology, it is convenient
to characterize science. I will adopt an approach similar to the one I applied earlier to
the concept of ideology. I will first offer a general outline and then a multidimensional
analysis. Science is the result of highly complex human activity, and any simple
attempt to define it through a single salient feature tends to degenerate into mere
caricature.
Science is the result of a systematic human effort that aims to acquire true
knowledge about the world. It is not the only way to obtain human knowledge; we
can learn many things just observing, practicing, reading, etc. Science differs from
these and other knowledge acquisition operations in that it is systematic and its
results are subject to a variety of controls. Furthermore, it is a progressive activity
in the sense that scientific knowledge increases with research. There are several
indicators of scientific progress, including the improvement in the ability to predict
events and the increase in human capacity to manipulate the environment (through
science-based technology).
Unlike other forms of knowledge acquisition, science produces conceptual repre-
sentations of the world that are articulated in theories and models (Romero 2018).
A theory is a logically organized set of statements, endowed with a specific interpre-
tation, that refer to objects of the same class. If we introduce a set of statements P,
a set of semantic instructions to interpret them S, and a domain (reference class) R,
then a theory is represented by the quadruple (Bunge 1967, Romero 2018):
T =< P, S, R, `>, (2)
where ` is the logical entailment operation. So a theory is a context that is closed under
deduction: every statement in a theory is either a premise or a deductive consequence
of a set of premises. The premises are called axioms and the consequences are
theorems.
Certainly, theories in the making are seldom presented in this way. It is the task
of the philosophers of science to render them into such a format to investigate their
structure, ontology, and deep meaning. The working scientists usually do not care
about this.
Contrary to a popular belief, the theorems of a theory never can be directly tested
(except for coherence). Any evaluation of a theory against empirical evidence must
be implemented through individual statements produced through a model. Models
are obtained from a number of theories (T1,T2, ...,Tn ) and sets of specific assumptions
(A1, A2, ..., Am ) that describe concrete situations. Symbolically,
(T1 ∧ T2 ∧ ... ∧ Tn ) ∪ (A1 ∧ A2 ∧ ... ∧ Am ) ` M. (3)
The model represents a collection of processes occurring in a specific circumstance.

When we go from general theories to models the reference class shrinks enormously.
General theories, unlike models, are not expected to make concrete predictions
unless they are considerably enriched with special assumptions and data. We test
the theories by consistency analysis (both internal and with the total network of
theories) and by empirical evaluation of models obtained from the theories with
specific assumptions and data on applications to individual cases. These evaluations
are made by comparing predictions (statements) of models with data. An empirical

datum is not a fact, but a proposition that informs about a fact and that is acquired with
the help of empirical operations (experiments or observations). We always compare
propositions with propositions, never propositions with facts. Since propositions are
conceptual objects, they are loaded with theory. The fact itself, on the other hand, is
independent of theory (Bunge 1983, Romero 2018).
Ruling out a theory through the predictions of a model is very difficult, because
many theories and assumptions about the specific situation to which the model is
applied are involved in each observation or experiment. Any of the theories or any of
the ancillary data could be the cause of the lack of confirmation. Similarly, positive
claims about the corroboration of a theory should be treated with caution for the
same reason: false positives can be triggered by a multitude of causes. Therefore,
multiple independent tests are necessary. We need to ponder on the validity of a
given theory in a specific area across many models in quite different situations and
with different experimental setups before drawing conclusions about the validity of
the theory in question.
We can apply a multidimensional approach to science, as we did with the concept
of ideology. The result is always tentative and perfectible, but I think it takes into
account most traits that are characteristic of scientific research. Science itself can be
defined as a set of research fields where each research field R comprise the following
items (Romero 2018):
• C: A community of researchers.
• S: A society that houses the activities of those individuals in C.
• D: A domain of material or conceptual objects to investigate and study.
• G: A general philosophy shared by the members of C.
• F: Set of formal languages used by researchers.
• B: A background of previous scientific knowledge.
• Q: A collection of problems of questions about the domain D.
• A: A collection of goals of the members of C with respect to D.
• M: A specific set of scientific methodologies that are used to solve the problems
in P.
• E: An ethic common to the members of C.
Then, a research field R is formally represented by:
R =< C, S, D, G, F, B, P, A, M, E > . (4)
The elements of each component change over time, hence these components are sets
only at a fixed moment, otherwise they are collections, not sets. The field of research
evolves according to the evolution of its components. At a given instant, science can
be defined as the set of all research fields at that instant:
Sci = {R1, R2, . . . , Rn }. (5)
This type of characterization is similar to that proposed by Bunge (1983), but I have
included an ethic component that in my opinion is essential for any research activity.
Now, a few remarks. Many of the components of (4) are similar to those of our
characterization of ideology. There are, however, important differences. Scientific
research, the activity of the members of C, consists of discovering, posing, examining,
and if possible solving problems. Not every problem is a scientific problem: scientific
problems, Q are those that are posed against a scientific background, B, and are
studied with scientific means, M, and with the primary objective of increasing our
knowledge about the world and the mechanisms that operate in it (A).
The result of research is articulated in theories and models that intend to represent
as correctly as possible some aspect of the world. Theories of basic sciences (a) are
made up of hypotheses, including regularities (trends or laws) about classes of
entities that are assumed to exist, (b) are capable of producing more or less accurate
predictions based on specific models, and (c) contain no value judgments about
reality or action programs aimed at changing it.
On the other hand, an ideology usually does not result from research (although
some may be inspired by it) nor does it change with its results: up to now, ideologies
have been fairly dogmatic beliefs and resistant to scientific innovations. An ideology
can change but only in details. If an ideological "ism" were to radically change, it
would cease to be that "ism."
Major changes in an ideology are usually introduced by some charismatic leader
and resisted by other charismatic leaders, rather than being the consequence of rig-
orous investigation and admission of mistakes. The result is that ideologies, instead
of progressing like the sciences, fragment. As an example, let us consider the many
divisions of communism: Marxism, Marxism-Leninism, Stalinism, Maoism, Trot-
skyism, etc. The methodological component and the verifiable element are mostly
absent from ideologies. The ideologues will apply, in many occasions, the ideolog-
ical package prescribed for each case regardless of the situation, to later blame the
failure on whatever is at hand at the time.
Several authors, in the last decades, have proposed that science is a form of
ideology, since it would actually deal with power and domination. The attitude of
considering science as ideology perhaps goes back to Heidegger’s obscure analysis
of technology (Heiddeger 1954, English translation 1977). According to Heiddeger
(1) technology "is not an instrument", it is a way of understanding the world; (2)
technology "is not a human activity" but develops beyond human control; and (3)
technology is “the greatest danger”, risking seeing the world only through techno-
logical thinking. There is a confusion here between science and technology on which
I will talk about later.
The view of science as a form of power and an ideology is more clearly stated by
Marcuse (1964). According to Marcuse, “domination perpetuates and extends itself
not only through technology, but as technology, and the latter provides the great
legitimation of the expanding political power which absorbs all spheres of culture."
He adds, “science, by virtue of its own methods and concepts, has projected and
promoted a universe in which the domination of nature has remained linked to the
domination of man – a link which tends to be fatal to this universe as a whole. Nature,
scientifically comprehended and mastered, reappears in the technical apparatus of
production and destruction which sustains and improves the life of individuals while
subordinating them to the masters of the apparatus. Thus, the rational hierarchy
merges with the social one.” The question for Marcuse is not whether technology has
played any role in the promised emancipation of humanity. The question for him is
simply whether technological advance leads to more repression and domination or
not. He fears that “the very concept of technological reason is perhaps ideological”.
Since industrial technology facilitates the exploitation of the working class by the
bourgeoisie, the instrumental manipulation of nature in the natural sciences is bound
to be guided by bourgeois ideology. Science has become ideology.
According to Habermas, the central error in Marcuse’s formulation of the problem
is that he has retained a concept of ideology appropriate to an era long past (Habermas
1970, see also 1971). For Marx, ideology was tied to a defined social class. Such
a view is now untenable. Habermas thinks that classes have not disappeared in
contemporary society, but have been irreversibly integrated. When Habermas calls
for the abandonment of the critique of technology and science as ideology, he is
not trying to imply that they are neutral; he recognizes that they have become forms
of domination as well as emancipation from deprivation and hard work, so he sees
them in an ambivalent light.
Other authors who challenge the neutrality of science and defend a science loaded
with ideology are Thomas Kuhn2, Paul Feyerabend, and Bruno Latour. These well-
known and widely debated views have many similarities with Foucault’s thesis that
the knowledge/power relationship becomes characteristic of modern society.
Proposals to identify science and ideology arise not only from the sociology of
science, but also from the camp of ideology itself, especially from environmentalism
and feminism.
Ecology’s critique of science and technology asserts that ethical neutrality with
respect to the results of scientific research is not justified. Green ideologues chal-
lenge the idea that any form of knowledge can be separated from its consequences.
If science has made an alliance with the prevailing forces that contribute to the
destruction of the environment, then its neutral character is not such, and science
must be combated. Science, we are told, has become an ideological tool of those
who exploit the planet for their own short-term benefit.
Radical feminism sees science as way of knowing burdened with presuppositions
permeated with the interest of male domination of women. Modern science would
not be objective but a vehicle of Western men’s values (Mies and Shiva 1993). The
privilege of determining what is considered scientific knowledge and its usage has
been controlled by men, and for the most part of history restricted to men, being
science a kind of male ideology.
Some of these observations miss the mark, confusing science with the ideology
or with the attitude of individual scientists who have ideological stances, or con-
fusing science and technology. If we compare our characterizations of science and
ideology, we can appreciate, beyond the superficial similarities, deep differences. It
is correct, however, to say that basic science includes values. As we have seen, each
field of research is made up of individuals who share some ethic, and the ethic is
2 At least in his classic book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, University of Chicago Press,
1962. In later works he moderated his original views.
based on a common axiology, a set of values that are accepted by researchers. These
values, however, are not universal; refer to the research methods that are used to gain
knowledge about the objects in the domain under investigation. They imply things
like rejection and condemnation of plagiarism and fraud, working conditions in lab-
oratories, proper citation behavior, among many other things. Of course, researchers
themselves may hold ideological positions on many issues, but such ideology should
not pervade their work. Ideological content, when it infiltrates scientific results, is
often detected and purged through the multiple control mechanisms available to
modern science.
The confusion of science and technology, so common in Heiddeger, Marcuse,
and many postmodern critics can be avoided through an adequate characterization
both activities. Technology is related to our ability to manipulate our environment.
Not all technology is necessarily based on science. Technology is older than sci-
ence. Science-based technology can be characterized as a human activity that aims
to design, develop, build, and control artifacts using knowledge obtained through
science (Romero 2018). An artifact is something artificial that can be controlled
and used for specific purposes. Artifacts are not just mechanical. They can be elec-
tronic, thermodynamic, biological or cultural depending on the proposed goals3.
Science-based technology includes not only the many engineering fields, but also
medicine, didactics, normative epidemiology, economics, law, and all disciplines of
social planning.
As we did with ideology and science, we can distinguish several components in
a technological field Ti (Romero 2018):
• Ci : A community of technologists.
• S: A society that welcomes those individuals in Ci .
• Di : A set of material or conceptual things that Ti deals with.
• Fi : A set of formal theories used by the members of Ci .
• Ei : Set of scientific theories and data used by the members of Ci .
• Pi : A set of specific practical problems.
• A: The total technological knowledge available to those in Ci .
• Oi : A set of final technological goals.
• Mi : A specific set of norms and methodological instructions.
• V: A value system adopted by the members of Ci .
Each scientific technology is a science-informed activity aimed at solving prac-
tical problems. Although closely related to science through Fi and Ei , it differs
radically from science in its methods and goals. There is, however, a strong virtuous
link between basic science and scientific technology: scientific results motivate ques-
tions whose answers demand new technologies, and then the results and empirical
explorations obtained with these new technologies make it possible to formulate new
questions and problems. that cause a mutually reinforcing progress.
Technology is not free of values. The technologists in each field have values
regarding their rules of action in certain activities, such as animal experimentation,
3 For ‘conceptual artifacts’ see Romero 2018, pp. 94–96, and Romero 2022b.
environmental contamination, or the production of weapons. Contrary to the case of

basic science, where general ethical neutrality is clearer, in technology discussions
of values and ethical implications are possible and desirable. Ideally, such a debate
should be rational and informed by science, but it is often ideologically motivated.
The moral responsibility of technologists in their endeavor to produce technolog-
ical artifacts and solutions to the problems entrusted to them should not obscure the
more important responsibility of politicians, bureaucrats, or executives who demand,
finance, and decide on the use of the products obtained, through scientific technol-
ogy, from vaccines to weapons (see Doorn and van de Poel 2013 and references
therein).
I conclude that, more than science being like a kind of ideology, ideology is a
kind of social pseudo technology.
9 Ideological fashions and packages
Why do we believe in ideologies? Ideologies offer a kind of chart or map of our social
and political environment (Freeden 2003). Ideologies give us mental representations
that seem to guide us by means of identifiable patterns in the midst of what otherwise
appears to be a mere chaos of events beyond our control. Ideologies offer us ways
to make sense of what we experience in society. They promise security, a sense of
belonging, a goal, and changes for the future. More importantly, they help us order
our values and give us a motivation to act.
Ideologies, however, do not represent external reality in an objective way. Varied
and sometimes conflicting ideologies compete for our attention, offering radically
different versions of the social world. Many times they are not even internally
coherent or consistent with the scientific worldview. It is not surprising, then, that
many people end up adopting ideological positions in various combinations and
with no other justification than that these positions are popular at a certain time and
place. Or maybe they simply follow some charismatic person who holds those views
and expresses them in a way that they can relate to. Or maybe it is simply because
there is no other option at hand, and otherwise the world seems too strange, chaotic,
threatening to them.
The proliferation and diffusion of certain ideologies, as well as the setback of oth-
ers, on the other hand, is a complex phenomenon that obeys a combination of causes
and circumstances of economic, social, and historical nature. Think, for example, of
the decline of liberalism and the concomitant expansion of totalitarianisms in Eu-
rope and Asia during the first half of the 20th century, and especially after the Great
Depression. Or in the spread of leftist ideologies in South America at the beginning
of this century, coinciding with the rise in the international price of commodities
caused by the growth of China. The complex combination of external, internal, en-
vironmental, and psychological events necessary to bring about such sociopolitical
changes has not yet been fully understood. Fashion may not even be oblivious to
some of these processes.
The universalization of the use of social networks at the beginning of this cen-
tury facilitated the dissemination of simple ideas and combinations of ideological
positions, forming ideological kits ready to be adopted by social groups with simi-
lar backgrounds. As mentioned by Pérez-Jara and Camprubí (2022): “These packs
structure collective identities by gathering themes and narratives which lack inter-
nal logical connections between them. Moreover, what comes in each pack varies
with the cultural landscapes.” These ready-to-use ideological kits assembled for
immediate gratification need not even be coherent. Pérez-Jara and Camprubí add:
The specific contents of ideological packs thus depend on the historical and cultural condi-
tions behind their construction and maintenance. And yet, once they are functioning, these
menus provide a significant degree of predictability of a person’s ideological nebula just by
attending to one or a couple of isolated ideological items.
In Argentina, for example, most people who identify themselves nowadays as

leftists and progressives will also be nationalists, something that was unimaginable
before the advent of Peronism, when socialists were internationalists (Sebreli 2003).
It is also very likely that the self-proclaimed progressive supports dictatorships
such as those in Venezuela and Nicaragua, and sympathizes with the regimes in
China and Iran, while strongly advocating the use of inclusive language and special
legislation in favor of transgender people and other sexual minorities. Minorities
that would be outlawed and persecuted in most of the countries with which these
‘progressives’ ideologically identify. The lack of logical connection between these
and other positions seems to go unnoticed or unimportant to whoever adopts the
corresponding ideological package. Surprisingly, many of these people will claim
the importance of science in society. Similarly, many self-identified liberals may
support anti-abortion laws, be nationalist, support the death penalty, or be against
gun control or vaccination. Similar ideological kits are popular in Brazil and other
countries of the region. It seems clear that reason plays little or no role in the
adoption of these ideological packs. It is that same lack of rational support that
probably makes it possible for the believer to undergo a sudden ‘conversion’ and
change sides, something occasionally observed. Pérez-Jara and Camprubí (2022)
remark:
At a cultural level, social groups usually change opinion not because they are really convinced
by the logical force of the arguments of their opposite enemies. Rather, there are other cultural
factors at work, such as the changes of position of the public charismatic figures that those
social groups have already bestowed legitimacy. But sacred cows can also be sacrificed and
canceled if they step too far into fields which their audiences are convinced to be inherently
evil or polluted.
One of the results of these attitudes is a marked polarization where each side
considers the other the source of all evil. Another result is to facilitate the sudden
emergence of new charismatic leaders who can embody with effective dramaturgy
the basic ideological kit of preference in a specific social group (Alexander and
Pérez-Jara 2021).
10 Why people believe in ideology? Nature vs. nurture
In the previous section we have mentioned how the cultural environment influences
people’s ideological choices. This, however, seems to be only part of the story.
The source of ideological differences can also be partly attributed to physiological,
genetic, cognitive, and neural patterns.
Twin studies consistently find that political orientation has a heritable compo-
nent (Martin et al. 1986, Alford et al. 2005). More recent genetic studies show a
statistically significant association between self-reported political ideology and the
7R variant of the dopamine D4 receptor (DRD4) gene (see Settle et al. 2010). The
gene creates a disposition, resulting in personality traits that lead an individual to
seek cultural environments that, in turn, incline some people toward innovation and
liberal ideologies and others toward conservatism.
Physiological responses also seem to trace the ideological dichotomy between
liberals and conservatives (or left and right). When exposed to negative images,
for example, people with a leftist ideological orientation report a smaller increase
in sympathetic nervous system activation, indicated by changes in electrodermal
activity (Oxley et al. 2008). A strong relationship has also been observed between
physiological responses to unpleasant images and conservatism (Dodd et al. 2012),
in the sense that people of this orientation are more sensitive to crude and repulsive
visual stimuli.
Many of the correlations of physiological responses with ideological identifica-
tions have been corroborated at a deeper neurological level by functional analysis of
brain activity using MRI (fMRI). Recently, Ahn et al. (2021) applied machine learn-
ing techniques to fMRI data to test the hypothesis that brain responses to emotionally
evocative images predict broad ideological orientation. Disgusting images (for ex-
ample, a mutilated body) generate neural responses that are highly predictive of the
ideological group they belong to. Specifically, machine learning analysis enabled the
identification of the subject’s ideological orientation from whole-brain blood oxy-
gen level distribution (BOLD) patterns during imaging exposure. The hemodynamic
response of the conservative group had a steeper slope and a higher peak than that
of the liberal group.
These results are independently supported by analysis of the correlations found
in brain-injured patients (Nam et al. 2021). People with frontal lesions show a
preponderance of more conservative (or less liberal) beliefs than those with or
without anterior temporal lobe lesions. Additional studies predict ideology by extent
of damage, yielding evidence that greater damage to the dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex, but not to the amygdala, is associated with a higher incidence of conservatism.
These last results suggest that emotional reactions are stronger in conservative people,
reinforcing what was found by Ahn et al. (2021).
The general picture is also consistent with the neurophysiological studies carried
out by Nam et al. (2018), who found that a larger bilateral amygdala volume is
positively correlated with the tendency to believe that the existing social order is
legitimate and desirable, that is, with a conservative position (see also Kanai et al.
2011, and Kim et al. 2020 for a functional connectivity analysis).
All these findings and others reported in the current literature (see Jost et al.
2014 and Krastev et al. 2016 for reviews) invite us to revise the traditional view that
ideological positions are the product of rational, conscious, and socialized thought.
The adoption of ideological stances seems to be, instead, more related to an emotional
process intimately linked to complex neural dispositions. Neither a unique product
of nature nor of nurture, ideology seems to emerge rather when our dispositions find
the appropriate cultural and material conditions for their development.
11 Are ideologies necessary?
Our time, from the early 19th century onward, has been considered "an age of
ideology" given the ubiquity, proliferation, and importance of these belief systems
(Watkins 1964). The death or decline of ideologies, however, has been often claimed
since the very concept of ideology appeared at the end of the 18th century. After
World War II, Aron (1955), and later Bell (1960) and Lipset (1960) formulated the
"end of ideology" thesis. According to it, as a consequence of the gigantic struggle
of ideologies that occurred in the middle of the 20th century, a struggle that cost
millions of lives and destroyed entire nations, causing indescribable suffering, both
right and left ideologies would have been equally discredited. As a result, the power
of ideologies to motivate and mobilize people would have been exhausted, at least
in the West.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the thesis was further developed and
modified by Fukuyama (1992), who stated that liberalism was the final winner of
the ideological wars of the 20th century. Even in those countries where a liberal
society would not yet have been fully realized, liberalism would be seen as the only
acceptable ideological view.
Not surprisingly, the end of ideology thesis has been widely contested (see, for a
review of the discussions in this controversy, Brick 2013). Articles titled ‘the end of
the end of ideology’ soon began to proliferate. Hodges (1967) and later Jost (2006)
examined the evidence against the claim that ideologies are waning and concluded
that ideology is very much alive. Palmer (1994) suggests that ideologies are changing
their tone and way of functioning rather than ending.
As we have seen in Section 9, current ideological opinion frequently emerges,
at least among vast groups of people defined by common interests, similar cultural
backgrounds, and connected by media and social networks, in the form of a variety
of "ready-to-eat" menus or ideological packages. Since each package groups a series
of positions that may not be logically related or can even be contradictory, their
acceptance depends more on social interactions than on cognitive evaluation. The
result is an atomization of the great conflicts of the past and an extension of the
ideological battlefield to subjects hitherto unsuspected. The refusal to wear a mask
for sanitary purposes, for example, becomes an ideological statement because that
act is perceived as part of an ideological package that defines a certain group. These
associations can lead many people to make completely unreasonable decisions,
decisions that will affect their lives and the society in which they live, sometimes
with catastrophic effects.
Given that ideology can so easily evolve and change, driven by unprecedented
technological change, fostered by our innate neural dispositions, can we hope to get
rid of it in the future, at least its most damaging effects? Should ideology disappear,
if possible, from our cultural landscape?
Ideologies undoubtedly are powerful forces that shape our societies. As Palmer
(1994) says: “They are instrumental in recruiting the early enthusiasms of the more
schooled and aware citizens, the intellectuals. They give rise to simplified slogans
that encapsulate in a popularly attractive fashion the main concerns and thus recruit
the greater numbers needed for effective political action. They catalyse the adoption
of policies either to conserve or to change social, economic and political institutions.”
These are important social functions, instrumental in the mobilization of the different
political, social, economic and cultural agents. Ideology has the power to motivate
people to act, something that in the past could only be achieved through religion,
force, or more rarely, reason. The problem is when the ideological body of beliefs
is in disagreement with well-known facts, includes meaningless or incompatible
propositions, or the value system is outdated or inconsistent with the proposed goals.
Ideological fanaticism can be mitigated through scientific and technical knowl-
edge, which help us expose the inconsistencies of thought and the incompatibility
of belief with evidence (Lane 1966). Education in the habits of critical thinking, on
the other hand, makes it difficult to adopt ideological packages that are incoherent or
lacking in clear meaning. Cognitive activity and learning can activate neural circuits
that serve to inhibit dispositions that originate in less plastic subcortical architec-
tures. I don’t know of more powerful tools to destroy fanaticism and unreason than
science and the cognitive habits it propagates.
Ideology is not inevitable, although it is highly functional in gaining and maintain-
ing power in modern technical societies. When it becomes dysfunctional is precisely
when we must combat it. The basis of our very existence could depend on it. In the
past, and still many times in the present, this has often been done through violence.
In open societies, at least, the fight should start much earlier, trying not to get to the
point where violence seems inevitable.
Is a scientific ideology possible, that is, an ideology with a body of beliefs
informed by science and free from inconsistencies? Bunge (1985) thinks so. I doubt
it. True science is not related to beliefs. It is a matter of research, conjecture, evidence,
and testing. Science lacks the degree of conviction necessary to move masses. And
the values of science refer only to researchers, how they relate to their methods
and protocols, as well as how they interact with the society that hosts them. It is
in philosophy where I think we should look for help in this case. In a philosophy
informed by the best science of the day. In political philosophy, in philosophy of
sociology, in axiology, and in ethics.
Perhaps the best thing is to finally put ideologies aside, if we can educate ourselves
enough and simply agree on our objectives as society and then look for the opti-
mal means to achieve them within each subsystem of society: political, economic,
biological, and cultural.
A scientific and philosophically informed politics will always be better than an

ideologized politics.
12 Summary and conclusions
Ideology is an ill-defined concept that is sometimes used very loosely. In general,

the term designates a set of beliefs, values, methods, and objectives that concrete
human groups consider necessary or at least desirable to achieve lasting changes in
different aspects of modern human societies. In this article I have identified at least
11 essential components or ‘dimensions’ present in any ideology, that is, elements
that must be manifested if any body of ideas is to be called an ideology.
To claim that there is an ideology, there must be a community of people who have
produced, believe, and are committed to the basic assumptions of the ideological
corpus. These people should have contact with a certain society that they are trying to
change in some aspects. Different ideologies deal with different objects or referents
of their discourse in each society. Certain human groups, mobilized by ideals, aspire
to change some aspect of a society. They can succeed because both the militants and
society are material entities, and material things are capable of change. The tools
they have at their disposal to achieve their goals and solve the problems that concern
them are a variety of methods, some background knowledge, a set of values, some
worldview, doesn’t matter how sketchy, and a core of ideas which they consider to
be inalienable. This core of ideas may or may not be informed by current science,
and may or may not form a coherent body.
Ideology is created by human beings to act on other human beings in a society.
Ideologies are not produced by social classes because social classes are not material
entities, but conceptual ones. Only human beings, concrete human groups, and
societies are material systems. And only material objects and systems can modify
their states and interact (see Romero 2022a for an updated review of systemic
materialism).
Ideologies can be divided according to the range of action they seek, into three
large groups: 1) macro-ideologies, 2) micro-ideologies, and 3) super-ideologies. The
first group includes sociopolitical ideologies that aspire to change or control societies
through their main subsystems: political, economic, and cultural. If an ideology
focuses only on a specific subsystem, it might be appropriate to label it a case of
"intermediate ideology". The second group deals with a more limited range of topics,
from nationalism to feminism. There are a large number of micro-ideologies in the
world today. Finally, super-ideologies are concerned with every aspect of human
life. They even offer an interpretation or intended insight into the entire universe. In
this group we find religions that act on human affairs such as Catholicism or Islam,
as well as philosophically motivated macro-ideologies that adopt a metaphysical
worldview, something that is observed in certain totalitarianisms.
In addition to these three main types of ideologies, we also find some ideologies
that appeal to syncretism. They adopt a groups of ideas from different ideologies
depending on the circumstances to defend their goals. These ideologies, like conser-
vatism and progressivism, are also very flexible with their methods and programs.
I have not considered capitalism and democracy as ideologies because they are
an economic system and a form of organizing governments. There are many ways
to implement both, and none of such ways reunite the multiple dimensions that
characterize ideologies. Similarly, populism and terrorism are neither ideologies.
They are methodologies for accessing and keeping power.
Science is not another kind of ideology either. Despite some superficial similari-
ties, there are profound differences. The goals of ideology are more similar to those
of technology than to those of science. And every ideological movement has at its
core of beliefs some affirmations and statements that are not negotiable. Science, by
contrast, is always in flux. All scientific assumptions and presuppositions are always
considered provisional and open to examination. Values in science, moreover, con-
cern only issues related to scientific practices and do not extend to the entire scope
of human activity. Ultimately, science seeks true representations of the world, while
ideologies attempt to command, control, and direct certain kinds of human actions
to achieve specific human goals.
Ideology is highly changeable with advances in technology. This is not surprising,
since ideology seems to have appeared as a way of coping with the complications of
modern industrialized societies, where technology plays a fundamental role in de-
termining the social structure. With the advance of radio and television, there was a
wide dissemination of the main ideologies in the 20th century, which resulted in great
conflicts, because the main contenders defended substantially opposite worldviews.
In the 21st century, social networks have played a determining role in the fragmen-
tation and simplification of ideologies, forming ideological packages or kits. These
packages are made up of combinations of slogans and simple maxims. Ideologies
are developed by intellectuals, but ideological packages are produced by politicians
and populists for quick use and consumption. The goal of these packs is to offer a
ready-to-use guide that encourages behavior and justifies the opinions of followers.
The inconsistencies that these ideological packages often contain are reflected in the
irrational behavior of those who adhere to them. One of the most alarming results
of the massive proliferation of these ideological menus is the extreme political po-
larization that is observed in many societies. Such polarization has become the most
powerful force against rational discussion and perhaps the greatest internal threat to
open societies in this century.
Ideology, since its irruption in the political, social, and cultural landscape of the
19th century, has been behind great confrontations and wars, social turmoil and riots,
terror and totalitarian control, destruction of goods and freedoms, division of families
and separation of friends. But it has also been a source of great progress by pushing
for civil reforms, improving working conditions, resisting tyranny and oppression,
vindicating the rights of minorities, promoting industrialization, and much more. His
ever-changing legacy remains controversial. Can we do better without ideologies?
Maybe. But in the meantime, we would do well to try to discourage the spread
of incoherent and scientifically uninformed ideological packages by encouraging
people to think by themselves, guide themselves through science and reason, and
leaving behind dogmas and prejudices.
Our brains are prone to believe. We have innate dispositions that favor attitudes
that are at the very base of the main ideological camps. And yet such provisions
only operate under certain conditions that can be controlled. And even under such
conditions, our brains are plastic enough to inhibit a wide spectrum of primitive
impulses. We must and we can do it, for the good of our civilization.
Acknowledgements I thank Javier Pérez Jara for useful suggestions and stimulating comments,
as well as for his invitation to contribute to this volume. I also thank Óscar Teixidó y Matt Suárez
Holze for helpful remarks.
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Philosophy of Ideology

fragmentation of ideologies caused by the widespread use of new technologies and

2 Some concepts of sociology

Dominance relationship: An individual x dominates an individual y in the as-

Note that according to the nature of A we can differentiate political, economic,

3 Some neutral concepts of ideology

Finally, I mention the influential definition offered by Michael Freeden (2003),

4 Essential features of any specific ideology

• Macro-ideologies: they are concerned with all or several of the subsystems of

Macro-ideologies focus on the political, economic, and cultural subsystems of soci-

• Totalitarianism. Totalitarianism nullifies the separation between the public and

Let us take nationalism as an example, an ideology that assigns exceptional value

7 Are populism and terrorism ideologies?

T =< P, S, R, `>, (2)

(T1 ∧ T2 ∧ ... ∧ Tn ) ∪ (A1 ∧ A2 ∧ ... ∧ Am ) ` M. (3)

The model represents a collection of processes occurring in a specific circumstance.

are made by comparing predictions (statements) of models with data. An empirical

R =< C, S, D, G, F, B, P, A, M, E > . (4)

Sci = {R1, R2, . . . , Rn }. (5)

environmental contamination, or the production of weapons. Contrary to the case of

9 Ideological fashions and packages

In Argentina, for example, most people who identify themselves nowadays as

10 Why people believe in ideology? Nature vs. nurture

11 Are ideologies necessary?

A scientific and philosophically informed politics will always be better than an

12 Summary and conclusions

Ideology is an ill-defined concept that is sometimes used very loosely. In general,

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