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Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations

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Ahl al‐dhimma in an Islamic state: The teaching of Abū

al‐Hasan al‐Mawardi's Al‐ahkam al‐sultaniyya
a
Wadi Zatoan Haddad
a
Hartford Seminary , 77 Sherman Street, Conn, 06015, USA
Published online: 18 Apr 2007.

To cite this article: Wadi Zatoan Haddad (1996) Ahl al‐dhimma in an Islamic state: The teaching of Abū al‐Hasan al‐Mawardi's
Al‐ahkam al‐sultaniyya , Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations, 7:2, 169-180, DOI: 10.1080/09596419608721078

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09596419608721078

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 Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations, Vol. 7, No. 2, 1996 169

Ahl al-dhimma in an Islamic State: the teaching of

Abū al-Hasan al-Mawardī's Al-ahkām al-sultāniyya1

WADI ZATOAN HADDAD

ABSTRACT The much-quoted Al-ahkām al-sultaniyya of the prominent Shafi'ī jurisconsult,

Abu l-Hasan al-Mawardī (364-450 AH/974-1058 AD), was written primarily to buttress
the 'Abbādsid caliphate which was facing, at the time, challenges to its authority by the
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competing caliphates of the Fātimids and Umayyads, in Cairo and al-Andalus respectively,
and, at home by the actual usurpation of its power by the Twelver Shī'ite Buwayhids
(945-1055 CE).
Al-Mawardī recapitulates Sunnī political thought to lend credence to the primacy of the
c
Abbāsid caliphate in Baghdad and its legitimacy. His discussion of the various functions,
rights and duties of the caliph included discussion of the rights and obligations of ahl
al-dhimma (Christians and Jews) in the Muslim state which includedfreedomof worship and
protection by the state, in lieu of the obligation of male adults to pay a poll tax (jizya) and land
tax (kharäj) by farmers. Al-Mawardī affirms the obtaining practice that allowed Christians
and Jews to attain high ranks in the government, serving as executive ministers, and
participating in certain military campaigns.

Almost 140 years ago, in 1856, the Sultan-cum-Caliph cAbd al-Majid brought to an
end the status of dhimmi in the Ottoman Empire in a proclamation known as Hatt-i
Humayun, which declared all inhabitants of the Ottoman empire equal citizens under
the law. Until recently, the issue of dhimmts and their status disappeared from the area
of public policy in the nation state and was relegated to the historical documents for
historians to ponder. Now the debate between Muslims and non-Muslims concerning
the role and status of minorities in an Islamic state has once again been joined under
a variety of rubrics and different circumstances. It appears to have gathered momentum
in the 1970s, aggravated by the Lebanese civil war in which political conflict turned into
sectarian warfare, casting doubt on the allegiance of Arab Christians to the nation state.
The rise of political Islam across the Muslim world and its advocacy of the reinsu'tution
of the SharTa has raised the spectre for Christians of being relegated to their former
status. It also has instigated a great deal of literature on the subject of minority
populations.
During the last three decades, a number of authors have re-examined the historical
documents in an effort to buttress their respective positions and views. Keen interest in
this topic has been shown for example on the part of some Israeli writers, sparked by
the Zionist rejection of the PLO project for the formation of a democratic state in
Palestine where Muslim, Christian and Jew could live together as equal citizens with
equal rights and responsibilities. A negative assessment of the dhimmi system was
published in 1985 by the Jewish writer Bat Ye'or, in which she compared the dhimmts
to European serfs of the Middle Ages2 in an effort to justify the Zionist insistence on

0959-6410/96/020169-12©1996 CSIC and CMCU

 170 Wadi Zaidan Haddad

establishing a Jewish state. The motive becomes clear in the preface to the book written
by Jacques Ellul:
For the conquering Islam of today, those who do not claim to be Muslims do
not have any human rights recognized as such. In an Islamic society, the
non-Muslims would return to their former dhitntm status, which is why the
idea of solving the Middle East conflict by the creation of a federation
including Israel within a group of Muslim peoples or states, or in a 'Judeo-Is-
lamic' state, is a fantasy and an illusion. From the Muslim point of view, such
a thing would be unthinkable.3
One group of authors has examined the record in the context of contemporary
discussions on issues of minority rights and human rights as declared by the United
Nations. These studies provide a comparative view of Islamic perspectives on minorities
in comparison to European systems, in order to identify the Islamic position regarding
majority-minority relations in the context of Muslim minorities living in Europe and
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America, as well as the role of religious minorities in Muslim states. Observers have
pointed to the fact that the historical situation has altered dramatically, in fact reversed.
Whereas at the beginning of the Islamic state it was the Muslims who were the minority
and the People of the Book were the. whole people of the conquered territory, now
Muslims are the great majority and the People of the Book are in a minority situation.
In these circumstances, many are asking, do the same rules obtain? In the early Islamic
state, the taxes collected from the People of the Book ,jizya, supported the new state,
a system which worked because of relative numbers. Because it is obvious that the small
minority of remnant Christians in Muslim countries cannot provide the tax base to
support an Islamic state, questions are being raised about the essential purpose oijizya.
Another set of writers has been re-assessing the Islamic teachings about dhimmts in the
context of the current Egyptian debate concerning the implementation of the Sharica.
They are questioning whether the Sharica is divinely decreed in every detail, and
therefore must be recreated in a social, political and legal system identical to that which
obtained at the time the Islamic state was established.
The classical Islamic source most frequently cited by contemporary authors writing
on Islamic political thought is Abu-al-Hasan CAB b. Muhammad b. Habib al-Mawardl's
Al-ahkam al-sultdniyya.* Al-MawardI was born in Basra in 364/974, and died in
Baghdad in 450/1058 at the age of 86. Famous for his work in the Islamic sciences5 and
recognized by the caliph as a prominent statesman, he was entrusted with various
embassies. He distinguished himself as a Shaficl jurisconsult, and in 429/974 he was
awarded the honorific title of aqdd al-qudah—a superlative tide which, however, as we
are informed by Yaqut,6 did not rank him above the functioning qadi al-qudah.
The significance of Al-ahkam al-sultdniyya is the fact that it was written at a time of
political crisis in Islam. This crisis manifested itself in dynastic squabbles between the
c
Abbasid caliphate in Baghdad and the competing Fatimid caliphate in Cairo, and with
the caliphate of the Umayyads in al-Andalus. There was also a crisis of conflict between
Sunni and ShTa, since the Sunnl caliphate was dominated by the ShTite Buwayhids
who were exercising power through the office of the sultan. It was clear to Muslims that
the caliph had become a puppet in the hands of the Buwayhids. The area under the
c
Abbasid caliphate at this time had not only lost power over the expansion of Islam to
the West, which led to an internal economic crisis, but was beginning to experience
population pressures from tribal settlers (Turkish and other) moving West.
The 'ulama' at the time were looking for a way out of this morass in order to revitalize
 A hi al-dhimma in an Islamic State 171

the umma of Islam. Hence they called for the restoration of the power and authority of
the caliph. In a similar fashion, some of today's intellectuals and Islamic authors,
cognizant of the disarray of the Islamic umma and its subdivision into nation states, its
economic dependency and its loss of power to determine its own future, are beginning
to offer similar solutions as a means of empowering the umma in order to re-invent a
viable Islamic civilization capable of leading the Muslims into the future.
Al-ahkdm al-sultdniyya, clearly the effort of one individual to address some of the
complicated issues presented by the political situation current at the time of its writing,
may actually have been commissioned by the caliph Al-Qadir bi Allah (d. 422/1031) or
his son and successor Al-Qa'm bi Amr Allah, as the introduction of the work intimates.7
Its twenty chapters are devoted to the discussion of the various functions, rights and
duties of the caliphate. In it al-Maward! advocates the restoration of the caliphate/
imamate to its original authority and power as manifested during the era of the first four,
rightly-guided caliphs. The primary interest of the text is not the dhimmis. They only
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appear as a secondary concern in discussions on the form of administration the Islamic

state should have and the kind of fiscal and military policy it should undertake. Three
of the chapters deal with matters that are related to the dhimmis. The second chapter
discusses the caliph's right to appoint ministers and provincial governors as his
deputees to administer and execute the affairs of state. Chapter thirteen is devoted to
the discussion of the jizya, or poll tax, and the kharaj, or land tax. These taxes were
imposed by God on the mushrikun, literally the associators, sometimes referring to the
People of the Book, for the benefit of the Muslims.8 The levies have three things in
common: (1) both presuppose servility on the part of the associators, which serves to
emphasize their inferiority and subservience and also shows that die jizya is a covenant
of protection (sagharan lahu wa-dhimma); (2) both are considered as booty money (Jay")
to support those entitled to such funds; (3) both are due at the end of the year, and
cannot be demanded earlier.

These two taxes differ, however, in that whereas the poll-tax is prescribed by a Qur'anic
text (Q. 9:29), and thus is understood to be divinely initiated, the kharaj is instituted
on the basis of the personal opinion (ijtihad) of the 'ulamd'. The second difference is
that while die minimum amount oi jizya to be levied is estimated on the basis of shar",
the maximum is determined by ijtihad; in die case of kharaj, however, both the
minimum and maximum amounts are to be determined by ijtihad. Thirdly, the jizya is
levied as long as die unbeliever persists in his unbelief, but is dropped when he converts
to Islam. On the odier hand, die kharaj is collected whether a person converts to Islam
or persists in his unbelief (kufr).
As for die jizya, al-Mawardi confirms diat it is levied on adult, sane males, and
cannot be levied on boys, women, slaves, hermaphrodites, or madmen. Al-Mawardi
omits Christian monks from die list of diose to be exempted from paying jizya, diough
this practice was sanctioned by the Prophet and institutionalized by die caliph cUmars
and continued to be recognized as the proper practice for many centuries after
al-Mawardi.9
Al-MawardTs text at first glance appears to be contradictory or at least paradoxical.
He offers two alternative interpretations for every policy diat concerns matters of jizya.
Seldom does he come down in favour of one position or another. It is clear, however,
diat two different interpretations of what die policy should be and what it means existed
in die juridical literature he was reporting. This equivocation may be due to die fact
diat over die centuries various interpretations had been given and policies executed.
 172 Wadi Zaidan Haddad

That there is no consistency may also be because the initial treaties with the conquered
territories had a somewhat ad hoc character, with each military leader signing a treaty
depending on the prevailing circumstances.
According to al-Mawardi, the term jizya is derived from jaza, which means recom-
pense. Non-Muslim subjects who lived in the abode of Islam were required to pay it
either as dues or as punishment for their so-called unbelief. It was exacted of them
either as an act of humiliation (sagharari), or as a remuneration to the Muslim
community, a guarantee that security would be provided to the subject people, in which
case it would be collected in kindness.10
The amount of jizya to be paid by the dhimrms was discussed by the various jurists.
Al-Mawardi reports that Abu Haiufa had opted for a three-tier rate: 12 dirhams for the
poor, 24 for the person with medium income, and 48 for the affluent. On the other
hand he himself opted to follow the school of al-ShaficI, who had set up 12 dirhams per
head as a minimum. This is based on the precedent set by the caliph cUmar, who made
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this rate uniform. However, both al-Shafi0! and al-Mawardi empowered the ruler with
the right of ijtihdd to determine whether the amount of jizya levied would be uniform
for all, or whether it should be graded according to a person's financial status.11
The change in the amount of jizya levied was considered by al-Mawardi as a possible
break of an earlier legitimate contract. However, new circumstances often require
amendments to the contract. cUmar's precedent set a fixed rate of 12 dirhams (= one
dinar); al-Mawardi gave the dhimrms the possibility of negotiating the matter. Change
must be contingent on acceptance on the part of the dhimrms. 'If those in authority in
the dhimmi community accept the ruling of the government [in this matter of jizya], it
becomes obligatory on them and their progeny century after century.'12 Governors
cannot increase or decrease the amount at their own whim without the consent of the
dhimmts.
Al-Mawardi shows great respect for contracts, and therefore emphasizes the necessity
of abiding by their terms. In the early campaigns, Muslim generals concluded contracts
with various towns, communities or peoples that varied in tone and stipulations
depending on whether the people surrendered peacefully or engaged the Muslims in
battle. Thus we find al-Mawardi approving of a peace treaty concluded on the basis of
paying a double sadaqa instead of jizya. This he accepts on cUmar's precedent in his
treaty with the Christian tribes of Tanukh and Banu Taghlib in Syria. On the other
hand, he theorizes, if an agreement stipulated that a certain group should pay both the
jizya and a double sadaqa, then it must be collected from them.
If a condition in the treaty stipulates that hospitality be provided for Muslim
sojourners, then they are to host them for three days (again, the precedent having been
set by cUmar in his treaty with the Christians in Syria). The terms of hospitality are also
set by the Syrian precedent: to provide of their own daily food, without requiring that
they kill sheep or chicken for their meal; and to supply shelter, but not fodder, for their
beasts of burden. These terms are applicable to people living in rural areas, not cities.
However, if the terms of the treaty did not include the requirement of hospitality or a
double sadaqa then they are not responsible for the payment of any sadaqa on their crop
or fruits, nor the offering of hospitality to sojourners.13 Furthermore, if not explicitly
stated in the treaty, the 'recommended conditions' for dhimmi behaviour in Muslim
society are not obligatory on them. Even when prescribed, the infringement of these
conditions does not constitute a breach of contract. Nevertheless, they are to be forced
to comply and are to be reprimanded.
 AM al-dhimma in an Islamic State 173

In citing the qur c anic authority for jizya, al-Mawarcft quotes Q. 9:29, a verse which
has caused consternation among Muslims as well as dhimmis:
Fight against such of those who have been given the Scripture as believe not
in God or the Last Day, and forbid not that which God has forbidden by His
messenger, and follow not the religion of truth, until they pay the tribute
readily, being brought low fanyadin wa-hum saghiruri).
In the phrase that points to those who 'believe not in God or the Last Day', he argues
that while ahl al-kitab, Christians and Jews, do acknowledge that God is one, their faith
in God may be rejected or denied on the basis of two interpretations: that they do not
believe in God's Scripture, the Qur c an, or that they do not believe in Muhammad,
God's messenger; for acknowledging the veracity of God's messengers is paramount to
believing in them.14 Likewise, not believing in the Last Day may mean either that, while
they acknowledge the reality of reward and punishment after death, they do not fear the
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threat of the Last Day, or that they may not accept as true God's description of the
various kinds of torment revealed in the Qur c an. 15
As to the phrase: 'and they forbid not that which God has forbidden', al-Marawdl
says that it also has two interpretations: either it refers to the laws of their religion which
have been abrogated by God in the Qur'an, or it refers to what God has made
permissible or prohibited to them in their Scripture.
The phrase, 'and [they] follow not the religion of truth,' may mean one of two things:
either that they do not accept the admonition in their Scripture to follow Muhammad,
the messenger of God, or simply that they do not embrace Islam. The latter interpret-
ation is the one held by the generality of religious scholars (al-jumhur). Those who have
been given the Scripture' refers either to those who have the Scripture now, and thus
by following it are its children, or to the progeny of those to whom the scripture was
given.16 'Until they pay the tribute' means either until they deliver it, or until they give
assurances of payment; and if they pledge to pay the jizya at its due time Muslims must
abstain from causing them any harm.
As to the enigmatic words at the end of the verse, uan yadin', al-Mawardi again
provides two possibilities for interpretation. The first is to pay the jizya 'out of
sufficiency and ability [to pay]'; the other is that they will become subservient and
humbled by the conviction that Muslims have dominance and power over them.
Finally, the phrase 'wa-kum saghirun', is interpreted to mean either that they will be
servile and submissive, or that the laws of Islam are applicable to them.17 Al-Mawardi
makes it incumbent upon the ruler to exact the jizya from Jews and Christians so that
they will be entitled to dwell in dar al-islam. Furthermore, by paying, or agreeing to pay,
Hit jizya in its due time, two rights are owed them: (a) no harm will come to them, and
(b) protection will be provided for them so that they may be secure and well-guarded.18
In this al-Mawardi seems to be advocating the more conciliatory interpretation as a
standard for the caliph to follow, perhaps out of his desire to recapture die ideals of
early Islam, since he goes on to quote the hadith reported by Nafic on the authority of
TJmar that the last words the Prophet spoke were: 'Protect me in regard to my
covenant (.dhimmati).'19
On the other hand, while al-Mawardi quotes Abu Hanifa's saying: 'I will not take it
(the jizya) from the [Christian] Arabs lest they be exposed to humiliation',20 and alludes
to the caliph TJmar's acceptance of a double zakah from the Arab Christians in lieu of
jizya,21he goes out of his way to affirm that 'the Arabs (i.e Arab Christians) are liable
to pay the jizya as do others.'22
 174 Wadi Zaidan Haddad

Having granted, earlier, the jurya-payers' two rights, he returns to lay down two
conditions for the acceptance of the 'jizya contract', as he calls it. Al-MawardI here
seems to draw on the so-called 'covenant of cUmar' popularized by historians, and
issued and re-issued by some caliphs, governors, or sultans, usually to appease the
populace, who, for socio-economic reasons, resented the dhimmis for what they con-
sidered to be their ostentation, arrogance, affluence and misuse of their government
positions by overtaxing or oppressing the Muslim common people.
Again, typically, al-Mawardl classifies the two conditions as (a) requisite (mnsta-
haqqd) and (b) desirable or recommended (mustahabba), listing six items under each
category.23 The requisite conditions for the dhimmis deal with issues of respect for the
religion of Islam and for the women of Islam, and commitment not to betray their
Muslim protectors. These conditions stipulate that they:
1. not criticize the Book of God, exalted is He, nor alter it;
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2. not attribute lies to the Apostle of God, nor show disdain toward him;
3. not speak of the religion of Islam in a censorious or derogatory manner;
4. not commit adultery with a Muslim woman, even in the name of marriage;
5. not lure a Muslim away from his religion, and not meddle in his financial affairs or
with his religion.
6. not aid the people of war, nor befriend (yawuddu) the rich among them.24
The six recommended conditions deal more with the comportment and dress of the
dhimmis, designed specifically to underscore their subservient status. These conditions
recommend that they:
1. identify their appearance by wearing the distinguishing badge, and a tightened belt;
2. not build structures that are higher than the Muslims', but at the same level or
lower;
3. not allow their bell-ringing, the chanting of their scriptures, or their sayings
(doctrines) concerning eUzayr or Christ, to reach Muslim ears;
4. not display in public their wine-drinking, crosses, and swine;
5. conceal the burying of their dead, and not publicly voice their wailing or mourning;
6. be prohibited from riding horses, whether thoroughbred or crossbred, but not from
riding mules and donkeys.25
However, al-Mawardl clearly indicates that these 'desirable conditions' are not necessi-
tated by the dhimma contract per se, unless they are insisted upon initially at the time
of the contract (pact or covenant). He appears to have in mind an alleged agreement
made with a certain Syrian town in which some historians reported that Muslims made
the people of the town ask for a long list of humiliating conditions for the Christians.
According to some modern Muslim critiques of historiography, it is highly unlikely that
such an event ever took place.
The other matter related to ahl al-kitdb to which al-Mawardl gives some significant
attention is the kharaj or land tax. He classifies all lands within the realm of the Islamic
empire into four categories:
(1) dead land that Muslims have revived and cultivated; this is tithe (fushr) land, and
no kharaj tax will ever be imposed on it;
(2) land owned by people who have embraced Islam: they have more right to it than
anyone else; it too is cushr land;
 Ahl al-dhimma in an Islamic State 175

(3) land that has been conquered by force; al-Mawardl espouses al-ShafiTs ruling in
this case, that the land must be divided among the victors;
(4) land whose people concluded a peace treaty with the Muslims. In the last case, the
land is theirs and the owners must pay khardj on it.
Unclaimed land occupied without fighting becomes waqf land, dedicated for the
benefit of all Muslims. It is to be considered khardj land and the tax is equivalent to rent
by whoever cultivates it. It is theirs permanently, whether the cultivator be a Muslim or
a dhimmi. This type of land cannot be sold. The other type is land on which people
dwell and which they cultivate. Their ownership of it is valued because of the peace
accord. The owners of this land must pay a khardj tax.. They are allowed to sell the land
whenever and to whomever they will.26
While matters of taxation, both jizya and khardj, occupy most of al-Mawardl's
attention regarding non-Muslim peoples, two other concerns deserve brief mention.
One is the matter of conversion. Primarily a political rather than a religious reality,
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conversion to any faith but Islam was seen as undermining the balance of power in the
respective communities. Al-Mawardl permits the Sabians (al-sabfa) and the Samaritans
to convert to Christianity and Judaism respectively because of their natural affinity.
However, he does not consider it acceptable for Jews to convert to Christianity based
on what he finds to be the sounder of two judgements offered by earlier jurists. If the
Jew chooses to convert, it must be to Islam. But what if he wants to revert to his former
religion of Judaism? Al-Mawardl, without declaring his preference, simply states that
there are two opinions on the matter, that he should, or that he should not, be so
allowed.
In the second chapter of Al-ahkdm al-stdtaniyya, al-Mawardl addresses the matter of
the ahl al-dhimma in leadership positions and their appointment as civil servants in an
Islamic state. Recognizing that the Imam cannot himself directly administer the entire
Islamic realm, al-Mawardl allows for the appointment of qualified persons, those who
are experienced, trustworthy, and of good character, to be ministers who represent him
in administering the various provinces or special departments of state. With his
penchant for categorization, he outlines two types of ministry: (a) the delegative
ministry (vrizdrat al-tajwid), and (b) the executive ministry (jmzarat al-tanfidh). The first
type of ministry can be assumed by one who has all the qualifications for the Imamate,
except the genealogical requirement. Neither freedom nor knowledge is required for the
executive position, however, since it involves only conveying the caliph's orders and
reporting back to the caliph on the matters he has been commissioned to execute. The
executive thus functions more as a mediator or an ambassador. If, however, the caliph
includes the executive in his deliberations and solicits bis opinion, then he deserves the
tide of wazir, and in this case should be knowledgeable in the matter or matters about
which he is consulted.
This ministry (tvizdrat al-tanjtdh) is open to members of ahl al-dhimma, al-Mawardl
declares, but he cautions that if the dhimmii minister arrogates to himself a higher rank,
he should be stopped. Thus while confirming the permissibility of a dhimmi becoming
an executive minister, he is clear to send a warning for the aggressive among them who
may aspire to higher office. In permitting a Jew or Christian to become such a minister
al-Mawardl is confirming a long-standing practice of caliphs and governors. On the
other hand, informed by history that men in power tend to exceed their mandate, he
makes it clear that the dhimmi officer should be closely watched. Nonetheless, al-
Mawardl considers this position as significant enough for him to set down six
qualifications for candidacy: honesty, truthfulness, absence of avarice, lack of enmity or
 176 Wadi Zaidan Haddad

conflict with other people, good memory (to remember well the message of the caliph),
and finally intelligence and sagacity.27
The other matter relevant to non-Muslims in al-MawardTs writings is a chapter
following that on jihad.28 He discusses 'the selection and appointment of generals for
wars that are waged for the welfare of Islam'. Then he outlines three possible areas
where war should be waged: war against apostates {ahl al-ridda); war against rebels (ahl
al-baghy) who, while not abandoning Islam, cease obeying the Imam/caliph and
become independent; and finally war against highwaymen and marauders who disturb
the peace and become a threat to society. Al-Mawardl allows for dhimmis and associa-
tors who have a treaty with Muslims to participate in redressing two of the three types
of threat. They cannot be allowed to participate in wars of the second kind, those
against the rebels, for though such persons no longer acknowledge central authority
they still retain their status as Muslims. Therefore non-Muslims are not permitted to
join a Muslim army trying to bring them back to political submission. They are,
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however, in al-MawardTs opinion free to participate in wars of the other two kinds.
Al-MawardTs commentary on the role of People of the Book in Islamic society
must be seen in the context of his acute awareness of their contribution to Islamic
civilization. Christians in the Muslim empire were not only payers ofjizya and khardj.
They were farmers, artisans, craftsmen, traders and merchants. Among them were
accomplished physicians, pharmacologists, philosophers, logicians, astronomers, musi-
cians, linguists, and theologians. Above all they constituted the great majority of the
inhabitants of Syria, Iraq, and North Africa—an area that developed into the core land
of the Muslim empire for at least two and a half centuries after the Muslim conquest.
The subjects provided essential expertise in the conquered territories in the fields of
fiscal administration, tax collection, engineering and civil service. The governors of the
newly occupied provinces needed to take control and organize departments of adminis-
tration (dfwan) for safeguarding the welfare of Muslims, the regulation and collection
of taxes, and the attainment of normalcy and stability for the inhabitants. There being
no prohibition in either the Qur c an or the Sunna, the governors did not hesitate to call
on qualified Christians or Jews, and to a lesser extent Sabians who were relatively small
in number.
When Sultan cAbd al-MajId ended the system of jizya and made citizens of the
Ottoman empire equal in status, it was met with criticism and resentment by the
'ulama', who earlier in 1839 had also criticized and resented the codification of Islamic
Law based on the Hanafi school of law. Objections raised in both instances were the
same, namely that the respective actions represented a serious departure from the
SharTa. Furthermore, both actions were understood to be taken as a concession to
foreign powers that were Christian. Once these steps were taken, however, both became
official state policy, in effect setting out a new direction for closer Muslim-Christian
respect and co-operation. The emergence of nationalism gave impetus to a new kind of
thinking about the place of the Christian in a predominantly Muslim society, as did the
collaborative efforts between Christians and Muslims in their joint struggle against
Western colonial aggression. It was as part of the legacy of these events and currents
that Muslim writers in the twentieth century began to rethink the role of Christians and
Jews in Islamic societies, especially in light of renewed efforts to institute the Sharica as
the constitution of the state.
Among the most influential of the modern Islamist thinkers to return to the classical
sources of Muslim political theory to find answers to this problem was Abu al-Acla
al-Mawdudi, one of the advocates and founders of the state of Pakistan in 1947.
 Ahl al-dhimma in an Islamic State 177

MawdudI envisaged the kind of polity that an Islamic state should follow, keeping in
mind the reality of the existence of a non-Muslim minority. He articulated this vision
in a monograph which was almost immediately translated into Arabic, and came to be
widely read (as his other works on religion have been) by Islamists across the Muslim
world and particularly in Egypt.
Writing from within the Hanafl tradition, but cognizant of the modern world and the
need to be relevant, he envisages the Islamic state as having a President, an elected
shura council (consisting of Muslims only and elected by Muslims exclusively), an
independent judiciary, and a cabinet that is formed by a Prime Minister. The last is
commissioned by the President to form the cabinet, which continues to serve as long
as it enjoys the confidence of the Shura Council and the President.
On the matter of ahl al-dhimma, MawdudI retains the traditional classification of
non-Muslims. They have the right to vote and be elected to serve on city councils and
other local bodies, because such administrative units do not deal with matters related
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to what MawdudI calls the system of life (nizdm al-haydh). Rather their function
pertains to the administration of local affairs.29 Moreover, MawdudI says that in
accordance with Islamic principles, the contemporary Muslim state is permitted to
allow (tukhazvzoiluha) the non-Muslim denominations additional rights such as that of
establishing their own House of Representatives. The right to vote and to be elected to
serve in this House is exclusively theirs and can be achieved with complete freedom.
Through this body they can address their social needs and express their views regarding
the administrative affairs of the state. They can freely present their grievances, objec-
tions, counsel, and suggestions in matters relating to the system of government and the
decisions of the Shura Council. The government will examine these with an attitude of
fairness and justice.30 Members of the denominational House may direct questions to
the government about matters that are of concern to them or about the government in
general, and a representative of the government will be present to respond to their
questions.31 The denominational House may suggest new laws, or amendments to
existing laws, that are relevant to their affairs and personal status laws, and these
suggestions will have the force of law immediately as soon as the Prime Minister ratines
them.32
On the other hand, MawdudI insists, non-Muslim citizens may not occupy the
position of Prime Minister, nor can they participate in the election of the Shur5 Council
or be members of it. Otherwise they may serve in all departments of state except certain
major sensitive positions that are related to basic principles of the Islamic system.
MawdudI refrains from naming these positions, but recommends that a committee of
experienced persons set down a list of those positions that need to be reserved for a
qualified Muslim. Dhimmis, he insists, according to their qualification may occupy the
highest ranks; for an example, a dhimmi could become general accountant, chief
engineer, postmaster general or any of the highest positions in the administration of
state affairs.33
But in another substantial work, Nazariyyat al-isldm wa-hadyihi (The theory of Islam
and its guidance), MawdudI expresses his profound sentiment that

Islam has saddled the Muslim inhabitants with the responsibility of bearing
the burden of the whole system [of government], for they are the ones
who uphold the validity of this system. All of its laws are applied to them, and
they are obligated to obey all its ordinances: the religious, moral, civil,
and political.
 178 Wadi Zaidan Haddad

... It requires them to offer all kinds of sacrifices in defence of their state. Then
it grants them alone the right of choosing the authoritative leaders in this state.
They participate in this parliament, the consultative body (majlis al-shura), the
major positions of the government which direct the policy of this ideological
state and in accordance with its basic principles, are entrusted to them [the
Muslims].34
Egyptian debate during the last two decades over the reinstitution of the SharTa as
the constitution of the state has once again raised the issue of the role oidhimmis. Some
authors have opted for the negative interpretation of saghar, namely that the dhimml
must maintain a status of humiliation and subservience. As a response to these
demands and in an effort to set out new thinking on the issue, the Egyptian intellectual
Fahml Huwaydtt published his Muwdtinun Id dhimmiyyun (Citizens not dhimmis) in
1985 with the subtitle 'the position of non-Muslims in society1. like many other
Muslim 'laymen', he has taken up a religious theme usually treated by the 'ulama' in
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books of jurisprudence. He sets out by admitting that the Muslims today find them-
selves in a 'crisis situation'.
No one can deny that there is a crisis of trust which vitiates the relationships
between Muslims and non-Muslims. This crisis is the outcome of the accu-
mulation of many grudges, historical and contemporary, some of which
occurred by accident or due to error, and others of which were committed
purposely and with ill-intent.35
He then reviews the history of Muslim relations with non-Muslims in light of Islamic
jurisprudence on the subject. He painstakingly proceeds to critique and correct the
juristic rulings, on the basis of a distinction he makes between the fundamental
principles of Islam as exemplified in the Qur'an and the authentic hadtth, on the one
hand, and jurisprudence on the other. The latter he considers to be a creation of history
and determined by political and economic factors which are never absolute or everlast-
ing. He concludes, therefore, that this period we live in is different and has its own
needs and frame of reference. Hence new policies should be operational in the
treatment of non-Muslims in a predominantly Muslim society.
Huwaydl sounds serious in his intent to move his readers to action. He warns that
there is 'no way of surpassing this crisis of trust except by dealing with the causes, with
utmost candour, courage, and decisiveness'. Any silence or dodging of these root causes
at .stake is tantamount to ignoring mines implanted in the Arab and Islamic body which
might explode as happened in Lebanon and Egypt.36
Huwaydl's thesis is that non-Muslims and Muslims together form a single com-
munity (umma). He finds proof for that in many references in the Qur'5n, in the
prophetic hadith, and in the Constitution of Medina (al-sahtfa) which the Prophet and
the immigrant Muslims signed with the Ansar and the various Jewish groups of
Medina.37
Since the late 1970s, a number of Muslim thinkers have treated the question of the
role and status of religious minorities or ahl al-dhimma in an Islamic state. All writers
legitimize their propositions by drawing on certain renowned authorities of the past in
order to be Islamically grounded and thus more widely accepted by the reading public,
and to protect themselves from being accused of innovation and secularism. On the far
right, the radical traditionalists accept the writings of Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, especially
his Ahkdm ahl al-dhimma, while the centrists restrict their ideas to the SharTa, which
provides for the toleration of the People of the Book in exercising their religion under
 Ahl al-dhimma in an Islamic State 179

Muslim protection of life and possessions in lieu of paying the jizya. The liberals have
found in al-Mawardl's Kitab al-ahkam al-sultaniyya an authoritative source which,
through their speculative ijtihdd, they have tried to develop in ways that they deem
proper for the present conditions and valid for the future civilizational project.

NOTES
1. Muhammad Fahml al-Sarjanl (Ed.) (Cairo. Dar al-Tawfiqiyya li'l-Tibaca, 1978).
2. I n many ways the dhimmi was comparable to the European serf of the Middle Ages. The condition
of serfdom, however, was the result of certain historical changes such as the transformation of
slavery, the end of the State, the emergence of the feudal system, and the like, and thus, when these
historical conditions altered, the situation of the serf also evolved until his status finally disap-
peared. The same, however, does not apply to the dhimml- his status was not the product of
historical accident but was that which ought to be from the religious point of view and according
to the Muslim conception of the world. In other words, it was the expression of the absolute,
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unchanging, theologically grounded Muslim conception of the relationship between Islam and
non-Islam. It is not a historical accident of retrospective interest, but a necessary condition of '
existence.' Bat Ye'or, The Dhimmi- Jews and Christians under Islam (Rutherford, NJ, Farleigh
Dickinson University Press, 1985), 28-29.
3. Jaques Ellul in Preface to Ye'or, The Dhimmi, 31.
4. In a recent survey conducted for a doctoral dissertation for the University of Cairo, Nasr
Muhammad cArif found that of 74 authors he had surveyed, 55 have quoted Al-ahkam al-
suUtaniyya as the authority of note.
5. Of his numerous works, nine have survived, four of which remain in manuscript form. His
surviving works are: Tafsir al-qur'an (ms.), Kitab al-hawi al-kabir fi; 'l-furu', Kitab al-iqnac, Kitab
a'ldrn al-nubuwtva, Kitab adab al-dunya wal-din, Qawdnin al-toizara via-siydsat al-mulk (ms. in
Vienna), Tashil al-nazar toa-ta'dS al-zafar (ms. in Gotha), Nasihat al-muluk (ms. in Paris), and
Al-ahkam al-sultaniyya. (See: £7-2, W, 869).
6. Yaqut, Irshdd al-arib, V, 407, as quoted by Hamilton A. R Gibb in his Studies on the Civilization
of Islam, Stanford J. Shaw & William R. Polk (Eds) (Boston, Beacon Press, 1962), 164, n. 6.
7. Al-MawardI, Al-ahkam al-sultaniyya, p. 3. See translation in Gibb, Studies, p. 152.
8. Ibid., 161.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid., 164.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid., 165.
14. Ibid., 161.
15. Ibid., 162.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid., 163.
21. Ibid., 164.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid., 164-165.
24. Ibid., 164.
25. Ibid., 164-165.
26. Ibid., 167.
27. Ibid., 27-29.
28. Ibid., chapters four and five, pp. 37-58, 59-71, respectively.
29. Aba al-Acl3 al-Mawdudl, Huquq ahlal-dhimma fi"l-dawla al-islamiyya (Cairo, Dar al-Fikr, [1948]?),
31-32.
30. Ibid., 32.
31. Ibid., 33.
32. Ibid., 32.
 180 Wadi Zaidan Haddad

33. Ibid., 31-37; also MawdudTs Nazariyyat al-islam wa-hadyihi fi'l-siyasa tea 'l-qanun (Damascus,
Dar al-Fikr, 1964), 359-360.
34. MawdudI, Nazariyyat al-islam, 301.
35. Fahml Huwaydt, Mutcdtinun la dhimrrnyyun: maivqic ghayr al-muslimtn fi mujtama 'l-rmtslimn
(Cairo, Dar al-Shuruz, 1885), 7.
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid., 124-125.
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