Existence and Self-Understanding in Being and Time

Author(s): William D. Blattner

Source: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research , Mar., 1996, Vol. 56, No. 1 (Mar.,
1996), pp. 97-110
Published by: International Phenomenological Society

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/2108467

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide
range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and
facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
https://about.jstor.org/terms

is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research

This content downloaded from

132.174.252.28 on Wed, 18 Sep 2024 19:42:44 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
Vol. LVI, No. 1, March 1996

Existence and Self-Understanding in

Being and Time

WILLIAM D. BLATTNER

Georgetown University

Early in Being and Time' Heidegger announces that the primary concept by
means of which he aims to understand Dasein (us humans) is- the concept to
which he gives the name 'existence.' But what is existence? Existence is,
roughly, that feature of Dasein that its self-understanding is constitutive of its
being what or who it is. In an important sense, this concept embodies
Heidegger's existentialism. At the center of existentialism lies the claim that
humans are given their content neither by an ahistorical, transcultural
essence, nor by nature. Rather, Dasein itself determines this content in its act
of self-understanding. Kierkegaard expressed this in his famous (if murky)
formulation that "The self is that which relates itself to itself;" Ortega in his
catchy phrase, "Man has no nature;" and Sartre in his notorious proposition,
"Existence comes before essence."2 All of these dicta articulate the same idea.
But how are we to understand this claim, and what must we presuppose to
render it plausible? I shall argue for two hypotheses. First, we cannot render
this existentialist idea plausible in its Heideggerian context without paying
special attention to how it is linked in Being and Time to the concept of an
ability. Heidegger interprets Dasein's characteristics primarily as ability-char-
acteristics, that is, characteristics that are not states, but rather capacities.
Second, the existentialist claim is subject to immediate and fatal counter-ex-
amples, unless we accept that Heidegger is operating with a subterranean
form of dualism. It is not a Cartesian dualism of consciousness and matter; it
is, rather, a dualism of natural and self-interpretive characteristics. We shall

All references to Being and Time are to the 15th German edition: Heidegger, Sein und
Zeit (henceforth, S&Z). (Citations to all other sources will be in short title form, with
complete bibliographic entries at the end of the paper.) All translations of S&Z are my
own, although of course I have relied heavily on Macquarrie and Robinson's English
translation: Heidegger, Being and Time (B&T). I have tried to indicate most of my di-
vergences from Macquarrie and Robinson's (M&R) translations of technical terminol-
ogy, usually by giving the German in parentheses along with M&R's translation.
Kierkegaard, Sickness Unto Death, p. 13; Ortega y Gasset, "History as a System," p.
185; Sartre, Existentialism and Humanism, p. 26.

EXISTENCE AND SELF-UNDERSTANDING IN BEING AND TIME 97

This content downloaded from

132.174.252.28 on Wed, 18 Sep 2024 19:42:44 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
see, moreover, that these hypotheses, if true, and if linked with Heidegger's
analysis of self-understanding, entail further unusual, ontological conclusions
about Dasein.

Existentiality, Self- Understanding, and Ability

In ?9 of Being and Time, whose aim is the preliminary presentation of "The

Theme of the Analytic of Dasein" (the title of the section), Heidegger ex-
plains 'existence' thus: "The 'essence' of Dasein lies in its existence. ... All
of this entity's being-so is primarily being," (S&Z, p. 42). Or as he puts it
in a slightly different way, "this entity, in its being, comports itself to its be-
ing. ... It is being that is in each case at issue for this entity," (S&Z, pp.
41-42). He enlarges on this definition later, this time introducing the lan-
guage of understanding: "Dasein is the entity that in its being comports itself
understandingly to this being. The formal concept of existence is herewith in-
dicated," (S&Z, pp. 52-53). Dasein is the entity whose being is always at is-
sue in what it does, that is, the entity who always has an understanding of it-
self, and whose self-understanding is constitutive of its "being-so," its being
what or who it is.
This central, existentialist thesis lies at the heart of Heidegger's concep-
tion of human being. Let us formulate it thus:

the Existentiality Thesis: If Dasein is A, then it is A because it under-

stands itself as A.

To clarify this thesis, we must specify what Heidegger means by 'understand-

ing.' To see the dangers of not doing so, consider a rather straightforward, or
perhaps untutored, interpretation of the Existentiality Thesis, one based on
the assumption that by 'understanding' Heidegger has in mind something like
knowledge. In this case, the Existentiality Thesis would entail that Dasein
knows about everything that it is (Cartesian transparency taken to an
extreme!). This would render it impossible that Dasein have any features it
does not know about and would probably make self-deception impossible
(depending on one's analysis of that phenomenon).
Fortunately, we need not defend this claim, since Heidegger makes clear
that by 'understanding' he does not have in mind some form of awareness or
cognition:

If we Interpret [understanding] as a fundamental existential, we thereby indicate that this

phenomenon is conceived as a fundamental mode of the being of Dasein. In contrast,
'understanding' in the sense of one possible sort of cognition among others, perhaps dis-
tinguished from 'explaining,' must thereby be Interpreted as an existential derivative of
primary understanding, which co-constitutes the being of the There. (S&Z, p. 143).

98 WILLIAM D. BLAITNER

This content downloaded from

132.174.252.28 on Wed, 18 Sep 2024 19:42:44 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Rather, he uses the term to pick out competence, capability:3

In ontical discourse we often use the expression 'to understand something' to mean 'to be
able to manage a thing' [x'einer Sache vorstehen konneno], 'to be equal to it' [>>ihr gewach-
sen sein<o, 'to be capable of something' [oetwas konnen<<]. In understanding, as an exis-
tentiale, that of which one is capable is not a What, but rather being as existing. (S&Z, p.
143)

In fact, the word 'understanding' has a number of closely related meanings.

Principally, we use it in two ways: to describe a cognitive stance or proposi-
tional attitude towards a content, such as when we say, "I understand the Ex-
istentiality Thesis;" and to describe a sort of ability we have, as when we say,
"I understand the Germans."4 In the latter statement we express the idea not
that we grasp some content (though understanding the Germans will likely
involve that), but rather that we are competent with certain sorts of people,
that we are capable of handling ourselves amongst them. (We can use the
world 'know' this way too: "Bo knows baseball.")
Thus, in Heidegger's vocabulary, to say that Jones understands something
is to say that she is capable of it. To say, therefore, that Jones understands
herself as being (or, to be) A, is to say that she is capable of being A. And
indeed, Heidegger endorses this consequence, when he writes, "Understanding
is the existential being of Dasein's own ability-to-be [Seinkonnen, M&R:
potentiality-for-being]," (S&Z, p. 144).5 Thus, if we wed the Existentiality
Thesis to Heidegger's account of understanding, we see that the former claims
not that Dasein is aware of whatever it is, but rather that it is capable of
whatever it is.
Now, this is a surprising claim. Suppose that Jones is six feet tall. The
Existentiality Thesis then seems to claim that Jones is capable of being six
feet tall. But what could that mean? Jones may be six feet tall, but is she able
to be, or capable6 of being, or competent at being six feet tall? Jones's height
is one of her properties, not capabilitiese. Jones is six feet tall, and is able to

This interpretive thesis is prominent in the literature. See for example, Dreyfus, Being-
in-the-World; Guignon, Heidegger and Knowledge; Schmitt, Heidegger on Being Hu-
man.
4 It may be that the first use is actually dependent on the second, if understanding a con
tent is a sort of ability, perhaps an ability to use (a linguistic expression of) the con-
tent. It is not necessary to take a position on that question.
5 Richard Schmitt is the first to see that this line should be read this way. See Schmitt,
Heidegger on Being Human, p. 179.
6 One must bear in mind that the words 'capable' and 'able' have at least two uses. On the
one hand, we say that Jones is able to be hungry, by which we mean that she can be
hungry, that it is possible that she be hungry. On the other hand, we often use 'able'
and 'capable' in the sense in which they refer to an ability or competence. 'Jones is
able to drive' almost always has this meaning. It states that she has a certain skill or
competence. For the sake of clarity, I will use 'ability' and 'capability' only in the lat-
ter sense.

EXISTENCE AND SELF-UNDERSTANDING IN BEING AND TIME 99

This content downloaded from

132.174.252.28 on Wed, 18 Sep 2024 19:42:44 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
run ten miles per hour. Let us call these two sorts of item, respectively,
'state-characteristics' and 'ability-characteristics.' Heidegger claims, then, that
all of Dasein's characteristics are ability-characteristics.

the Ability Thesis: All of Dasein's characteristics are ability-char-

acteristics.

"But surely," one might object, "this Ability Thesis is indefensible: Jones
has lots of state-characteristics, e.g., being six feet tall." To defend the Abil-
ity Thesis I shall argue, first, that the state-characteristic of being six feet tall
is closely associated with a self-interpretive ability-characteristic, and second,
that Dasein is only to be identified with the related ability-characteristic, not
with the state-characteristic. Jones is six feet tall. She also, however, under-
stands that physical state-characteristic in some definite way: she understands
herself to be tall. This latter characteristic is not purely physical, is not the
sort of characteristic a tree of the same physical height can have. At least, it
can be seen to be so, when we recognize that being tall is a way of comport-
ing oneself in the world. Being tall has in this way to do with one's stature,
not just one's physical height. A person who understands herself as unusually
tall might talk down to people, use her height to lord it over them; on the
other hand, she might be embarrassed by her height, more shy about physical
encounters. Similarly, although being a female is a biological fact about
Jones, being feminine is her way of interpreting that biological fact. (Think
of the way in which we speak of degrees of femininity and masculinity, and
the way in which baby name books sometimes categorize baby names by
how feminine or masculine they are.7) Thus, closely related to the state-char-
acteristics of being six feet tall and female are the self-interpretive characteris-
tics of being tall and feminine.
Self-interpretive characteristics are, furthermore, abilities. One must know
how to be them. Being six feet tall or biologically female is a state, not an
ability; it involves no know-how. But being tall (in the stature sense) or fem-
inine is an ability. It is a way of handling oneself and relating to others.
Abilities are easiest to notice when they break down. Imagine someone bad at
being tall, say, someone who tries to lord it over others physically, but fails.
He would seem rather foolish trying. He sets his shoulders back, cocks his
head downward, and says ..., "Um, excuse me, please." Being tall is learned,
sometimes mastered, and can be done better and worse. We are socialized into
or are taught our self-interpretive stature-characteristics, just as with many
other, more obviously self-interpretive characteristics (being American, being
middle class, etc.). These characteristics are one and all abilities. Hence, each

For an amusing version of this, look at the chapters "From Madonna to Meryl" and
"From Rambo to Sylvester" in Linda Rosenkrantz and Pamela Redmond Satran, Beyond
Jennifer and Jason, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990).

100 WILLIAM D. BLATTNER

This content downloaded from

132.174.252.28 on Wed, 18 Sep 2024 19:42:44 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
of the state-characteristics we have considered (being six feet tall, female) is
closely associated with a self-interpretive ability-characteristic (being tall,
feminine).
One might think that the force of the argument above depends on contrast-
ing a physical state-characteristic with a self-interpretive ability-characteristic.
But this is not so. Jones is not only six feet tall, but also, say, the leader of
her weekly book discussion group. That is clearly self-interpretive: one is not
the leader of a group naturally, but rather only by being socially and interpre-
tively situated in a certain way. But is it a state-characteristic? Heidegger
would argue not. Jones must know how to be a group leader; she must be ca-
pable of it. Being a group leader is having and exercising a set of abilities:
the ability to organize a group's meeting, the ability to control a discussion,
even the ability to use a phone. So, what appear to be interpretive state-char-
acteristics turn out, in the final analysis, also to be ability-characteristics.
Consequently, none of Dasein's interpretive characteristics are state-character-
istics, and thus, the argument does not trade on narrowing our focus on state-
characteristics to physical ones.
The second leg of the defense of the Ability Thesis is the more difficult
one: the claim that Dasein is only to be identified with these self-interpretive
characteristics, not with its factual state-characteristics. Since I have already
argued that what appear to be self-interpretive state-characteristics are really
ability-characteristics, I can now argue that Dasein is only its ability-charac-
teristics by arguing that Dasein is only is its self-interpretive characteristics.
In the passage in which Heidegger draws the distinction between the facti-
cal (i.e., interpretive) and the factual (i.e., non-interpretive), we can see that
Dasein's putative factual characteristics are not really proper to it .

... entities that are not wordless, e.g., Dasein itself, are also occurrent "in" the world, or
more precisely stated, can, with a certain legitimacy and within certain limits, be conceived
as merely occurrent. To do this, it is necessary to look completely away from, or better, not
to see the existential make-up of being-in [Dasein's way of being in the world]. This possi-
ble conception of "Dasein" as something occurrent and only occurrent should not be con-
fused with Dasein's own manner of "occurrentness." (S&Z, p. 55, note the scare-quotes)

Heidegger makes three significant claims here. (1) One can "with a certain le-
gitimacy" conceive Dasein as something occurrent. In this context, the term
'occurrent' (vorhanden, M&R: present-at-hand) appears simply to pick out
things unlike Dasein, that is, non-existential entities, including I think, what
Heidegger calls the 'available' (zuhanden, M&R: ready-to-hand), that is, the
paraphernalia of the social world.8 So, one can "with a certain legitimacy"

The term 'occurrent' has two senses in S&Z. In its narrow and more frequent sense, it
means "to exist independently of human practices and interpretation," as opposed to
"to be or to be dependent upon human practices." In this sense it contrasts with
'available,' which picks out those non-human things that play a role in our practices,

EXISTENCE AND SELF-UNDERSTANDING IN BEING AND TIME 101

This content downloaded from

132.174.252.28 on Wed, 18 Sep 2024 19:42:44 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
conceive Dasein as non-human, non-existential. (2) In doing this one must
prescind from Dasein's "existential make-up." That is, one can conceive
Jones factually, if one abstracts away from Jones's properly Daseinish, or ex-
istential features. This abstraction thus grasps a non-existential element or
aspect of Jones, in the first instance, one would think, her biology. (3) This
non-existential abstraction is not the same as Dasein's "proper occurrence,"
i.e., its facticity. 'Facticity' is the name that Heidegger gives to Dasein's de-
terminacy as an existential entity.9 Despite Heidegger's referring to it as
"Dasein's own manner of 'occurrentness,"' or even, precisely by using
'occurrentness' here in scare-quotes, he wants to contrast it with whatever
might be natural in Dasein. Let me formulate the overall claim of this para-
graph in another thesis:

the Duality Thesis: Dasein can be considered both in its proper

ontological make-up, as essentially self-un-
derstanding, and in an abstracted, factual way,
as something that merely occurs (esp., natu-
rally).

I want to suggest that this Duality Thesis is central to Heidegger's ontology.

Of immediate relevance is this: only with the help of the Ability and Duality
Theses can Heidegger maintain the Existentiality Thesis. The general strategy
for responding to potential counter-examples to the Existentiality Thesis is to
distinguish factual characteristics from the existential ability-characteristics
that are interpretations of them. The three theses come together as a package
deal in Being and Time.
We can clarify the Ability Thesis further by approaching it again from a
slightly different angle. Let us begin with a deceptively direct comment by
Heidegger early in Being and Time:

The characteristics that can be exhibited by [Dasein] are thus not occurrent "properties" of
an occurrent entity that "looks" such and so, but rather possible ways for [Dasein] in each
case to be and only that. (S&Z, p. 42)

One might think this passage simply says that whatever Dasein is (its charac-
teristics) are possible for it. But in fact, it has the Ability Thesis buried in it.
If Heidegger intended here only to say that Dasein's characteristics are possi-
bilities for it, then he would assert nothing so dramatic as the Ability Thesis.

paradigmatically, equipment. In its broad sense, 'occurrent' picks out non-human enti-
ties, i.e., both the occurrent in the narrow sense and the available. See S&Z, p. 45 for
an example of a broad use of the term.
9 I do not have the space here to develop in detail an account of facticity. I aim in subse-
quent publications to clarify the conceptual relations between existentiality and factic-
ity.

102 WILLIAM D. BLATINER

This content downloaded from

132.174.252.28 on Wed, 18 Sep 2024 19:42:44 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Of course, the weaker claim is a triviality dressed up as a thesis, since it just
states that all of Dasein's (actual) characteristics are possible (characteristics).
In order to see the passage as more than merely trivial, we must figure out
what special content is carried by Heidegger's phrase, "possible ways for Da-
sein to be."
Heidegger suggests that there is a special notion of possibility that applies
to Dasein, one quite unlike that which applies to, say, a tree.

Possibility, which Dasein in each case is existentially, is distinguished just as much from
empty, logical possibility as from the contingency of something occurrent, in so far as with
the latter this and that can "happen." As a modal category of being-occurrent, possibility
means the not yet actual and the not ever necessary. It characterizes the merely possible. ...
Possibility as an existential, on the other hand, is the most originary and last, positive,
ontological determination of Dasein .... (S&Z, pp. 143-44)

Heidegger is here clearly trying to argue for a third sort of possibility othe
than logical possibility and the "contingency of something occurrent" (which
I shall call 'occurrent possibility'). But what sort of possibility is that? To
answer this question, it is helpful to examine his characterization of occurrent
possibility.
Richard Schmitt is the only interpreter, so far as I know, who has ad-
dressed this passage directly.' Much of what he says is illuminating and
helpful. Unfortunately, one aspect of his reading is clearly wrong. He inter-
prets occurrent possibility as "physical possibility." But this is not right for
two reasons. First, occurrent possibility is supposed to apply not only to the
naturally and physically occurrent, but to any sort of occurrent item, whether
it be physical, mental, mathematical, or whatever. Second, since Heidegger
does not carve out any special notion for the available, I suggest that he is
here using the term 'occurrent' in its broad sense to apply to anything unlike
Dasein."1 If so, "physical possibility" is yet more inappropriate, because not
only is the available far from exclusively physical, but the possibilities that
govern even the physically available are not primarily physical possibilities
(e.g., how a hammer can be used).
Heidegger's explanation of the concept of occurrent possibility makes no
mention of "physical possibility." He says simply, and unfortunately darkly,
that occurrent possibility is the "contingency of the occurrent," and that "with
the latter, this and that can happen." The idea seems to be this. Let me regi-
ment the phraseology, 'with the latter, this and that can happen,' as 'with re-
spect to something, some event can take place.' Consider the tree: with re-
spect to the tree, a burning down can take place. Put somewhat more perspic-
uously, the tree can be the subject of a burning down. If this parsing of Hei-

10 Schmitt, Heidegger on Being Human, pp. 178ff.

l See note #8 above.

EXISTENCE AND SELF-UNDERSTANDING IN BEING AND TIME 103

This content downloaded from

132.174.252.28 on Wed, 18 Sep 2024 19:42:44 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
degger's language is correct, then occurrent possibility is simply the contin-
gent taking place of an event.
Now, Dasein's possibilities are, according to this passage, supposed to be
different in kind. How? The rest of the paragraph in which this passage occurs
focuses on Dasein's ability-to-be. This leads naturally to the suggestion-
this is Schmitt's significant contribution-that Dasein's possibilities are
abilities. We can say, "The tree can burn down," but we should not thereby
mean, "The tree has the ability to burn down," at least not in the precise
sense that the tree has some competence. But this is what it is to say of
Jones that she can be a translator; it is to say that she is able to translate, that
she has that competence.
Schmitt's reading of Heidegger's concept of existential possibility fits in
neatly with the overall interpretation I am offering. Dasein's possibilities are
abilities, and as Heidegger says on p. 42, all Dasein's characteristics are exis-
tential possibilities, i.e., abilities. Furthermore, the very idea of distinguish-
ing two different sorts of possibility, occurrent and existential, reflects the
Duality Thesis. We ought not, in a careful, ontological analysis, conflate the
two different ways in which we can consider Dasein: abstractly as occurrent
and properly as existential. This distinction runs so deep that we must even
introduce distinct notions of possibility to do it justice. To reiterate: the Hei-
deggerian defense of the Existentiality Thesis is carried out by way of the
Ability and Duality Theses. We end up with a dualistic picture of Dasein,
who when conceived properly is characterized only as having self-interpretive
abilities, but when conceived improperly (abstractly) is also characterized as
having state-characteristics.

Understanding and Projection

We have seen that for Dasein (properly) to be A, it must understand itself as

A. Now, what is involved in understanding oneself as A? Heidegger answers
this question by introducing his notion of projection (Entwurf). The German
word 'Entwurf does not have all the meanings that the English word
'projection' has. Its central sense is that of a plan, sketch, or blueprint. How-
ever, Heidegger goes out of his way to indicate that by 'projection' he does
not have in mind anything so explicit and thought out as a blueprint:
"Projecting has nothing to do with comporting oneself towards a thought out
plan, in accordance with which Dasein arranges its being," (S&Z, p. 145).
So, what is Heidegger after with the language of 'projection?' He also plays
upon the construction of the German word 'projection:' ent-werfen is to
throw or cast forth.12 He seems rather to want to emphasize this metaphor.
Thus, at the beginning of the paragraph in which he introduces projection, he
writes,

12 See Caputo, "Hermeneutic Phenomenology."

104 WILLIAM D. BLAYTNER

This content downloaded from

132.174.252.28 on Wed, 18 Sep 2024 19:42:44 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Why does understanding, in accordance with all essential dimensions of what can be dis-
closed in it, always press ahead into [dringt ... in ...] possibilities? Because understanding
has in itself the existential structure that we call projection. (S&Z, p. 145)

We can see why Heidegger makes these claims, if we bear the Ability Thesis
in mind.
Do we relate to our abilities as to thought out plans? Imagine that after
finishing her college degree in German, Jones decides to become a simultane-
ous interpreter. She sketches out a plan for becoming one: she will go to
Georgetown University's School of Languages and Linguistics to learn the
craft and then apply for an apprenticeship at the United Nations. That is a
plan for becoming a simultaneous interpreter, is it not? It is a plan for the
project of becoming a simultaneous interpreter. It is not a plan for or
blueprint of the ability to be a simultaneous interpreter. And note that being
a simultaneous interpreter is an ability: one has to know how to be one.
There is no sketch, plan, or blueprint for being this ability.'3 In understand-
ing herself as a simultaneous interpreter, Jones does not sketch out a plan of
the project of becoming one; rather, she works at and exercises the ability to
be one. And this is what Heidegger means by "pressing ahead into" a possi-
bility, an ability.
But there is a difficulty in developing the concept of projection.'4 When
Heidegger introduces the language of projection, he makes two claims about
its relation to Dasein's possibilities. First, he writes, "... in casting, projec-
tion casts the possibility as possibility before itself and lets it be as such,"
(S&Z, p. 145). So, projection constitutes possibility or "lets it be." Second,
"Understanding is, as projection, the sort of being of Dasein, in which it is
its possibilities as possibilities," (S&Z, p. 145). Thus, in virtue of projec-
tion, Dasein is its possibilities. It would seem that these two statements
stand in tension. On the one hand, projection seemingly has as its object all
the possible ways in which Dasein could be. If this were so, then Jones-
who now confronts a range of possible ways to be, including being a German
doctoral student, being a simultaneous interpreter, being a commercial trans-
lator-thus projects all of these possibilities. After all, one would think, they
are all possibilities for her, and it is projection that lets them be. On the
other hand, it would seem that projection has as its object that (those) definite
possibility(ies) for the sake of which Jones is now acting, her "for-the-
sake(s)-of-which." Heidegger says that Jones is her possibilities." She is the

13 This is one of the principal burdens of Chs. 4-6 of Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World.

14 I was first made aware of this difficulty by Ted Schatzki, who objected to my taking
projection in just the narrow sense explored below.
15 But why would Heidegger then use the plural 'possibilities' when describing this func-
tion of projection? Because Dasein is never just one for-the-sake-of-which, but rather
several or many of them at once. Jones is a simultaneous interpreter, a loyal sister, a
conscientious employee, etc.

EXISTENCE AND SELF-UNDERSTANDING IN BEING AND TIME 105

This content downloaded from

132.174.252.28 on Wed, 18 Sep 2024 19:42:44 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
possibility of being a simultaneous interpreter, because she is currently
pressing ahead into that possibility. She is not the possibility of being a
German doctoral student, because she is not currently pressing ahead into that
one. She is her for-the-sake-of-which, and not the other possibilities that she
forgoes. Thus, there are two functions here: opening up the range of possibil-
ities, and pressing ahead into one of them; Heidegger seems to subsume both
of them under the notion of projection.
There is good reason to believe, however, that 'projection' refers only to
the second phenomenon, namely, determining oneself as someone by
pressing ahead into a possible way to be. Recall that Heidegger explains why
understanding always presses ahead into possibilities by pointing to
projection:

Why does understanding, in accordance with all essential dimensions of what can be dis-
closed in it, always press ahead into possibilities? Because understanding has in itself the
existential structure that we call projection. (S&Z, p. 145)

Understanding presses ahead into possibilities, precisely because understand-

ing is constituted by projection and projection just is pressing ahead into
some possibility. Further support for this claim can be found in Chapter 2 of
Division Two. In his treatment of what he calls "guilt," Heidegger briefly
explores Dasein's inability to be two different possibilities at once. He
writes,

... as able-to-be [seinklnnend], it [Dasein] stands in each case in the one possibility or the
other; it is constantly not some other possibility and has given it up in its existentiell
projection. (S&Z, p. 285)

If projection were the opening up of possibilities as possible, simply as

such, then Dasein would not have to give up one possibility in virtue of pro-
jecting a different one. Since, however, in projecting the possibility of being
a simultaneous interpreter, Jones presses ahead into that possibility, she must
give up being a doctoral student. Though she could open up both possibili-
ties, she cannot press ahead into both of them. Therefore, to project oneself
upon some possibility is to press ahead into it.
But how is this conclusion consistent with Heidegger's claim that it is
projection that lets possibilities be? After all, if Jones can only project her-
self upon one of the possibilities under consideration, then it would seem-if
the preceding argument is correct-that the others are not possible for her.
But that is a strange conclusion at best! The solution to this worry lies in re-
calling that Heidegger uses the term 'possibility,' when applied to Dasein, to
refer to abilities, not simply to ways in which one could be. Although it is
possible for Jones to be a doctoral student in German-she could pursue that
way of life-she has not set out to do so, she has not developed any of the
requisite skills, and she is not in any way pressing ahead into that possibil-

106 WILLIAM D. BLATTNER

This content downloaded from

132.174.252.28 on Wed, 18 Sep 2024 19:42:44 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
ity. Though she has the potential to be a doctoral student, she is not
(currently) able to be one.'6

The Unattainability Thesis and Death

Let us see where the argument thus far has gotten us. Suppose that Jones has
some characteristic, A. We know (by the Ability Thesis) that A is an ability-
characteristic. We also know (by the Existentiality Thesis) that Jones under-
stands herself as A. Finally, because understanding is cashed out in terms of
projection, that is, in terms of pressing ahead into A, we can see that Jones
must be pressing ahead into A. This turns out to have a very surprising con-
sequence, however.
Consider the following scenario. Jones sets out to develop the ability to
ride a bike. She works at it for one year. At the end of this year, Jones is a
skillful bike rider; she has the ability to ride a bike. Now, I take it that she
would continue to be a skillful bike rider, at least for a year or so, even if she
stopped riding her bike, say, three months later. Her ability to ride a bike will
deteriorate slowly due to disuse. Nonetheless, it is correct to say that she still
has the ability for a while after she decides never to exercise it again. We can
conclude from this that there is some point at which it is true to say of Jones
that she has the ability in such a way that she need no longer press ahead into
it, although if she does not, she will gradually lose it. I shall henceforth use
the words 'attain' and 'attainable' in a technical sense:

attainable: An ability, A, is attainable just in case there can be some

point in time at which it is true to say of a person that she
has A, even if she never tries to exercise A thereafter.

Thus typically, abilities are attainable, because there is (or better, can be)
some point at which one is able to exercise them, even if one never tries to
do so again.
Nevertheless, Heidegger's account of Dasein's existentiality does not per-
mit attainability. Recall that to be some ability-characteristic existentially,
Dasein must press ahead into it. But attainability is precisely that feature of
abilities that one can (come to) be able without having further to press ahead
into them. In other words, Heidegger's account entails yet another thesis,

the Unattainability Thesis: Dasein's ability-characteristics are not attain-

able.

16 This contrast makes plain what is wrong with Macquarrie and Robinson's translation
of 'Seinkdnnen' as 'potentiality-for-Being,' rather than as 'ability-to-be.'

EXISTENCE AND SELF-UNDERSTANDING IN BEING AND TIME 107

This content downloaded from

132.174.252.28 on Wed, 18 Sep 2024 19:42:44 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
But as we have seen with the example of riding a bike above, abilities do
seem to be attainable. So, Heidegger's account appears to entail an unaccept-
able conclusion.
Here again the Duality Thesis underlies Heidegger's claim, for the
Unattainability Thesis applies only to Dasein's self-interpretive abilities.
That is to say, since it is self-interpretive abilities that belong properly to
Dasein, whereas factual abilities belong to Dasein only as conceived as occur-
rent, the analysis of Dasein's existentiality applies only to Dasein's self-in-
terpretive abilities. Jones can attain the ability to ride a bike, because she can
work on her riding skills, develop them to the point where she can ride with
ease, even after she decides never to ride again. This ability is occurrent, and
Jones possesses it only in so far as she can be conceived occurrently .17 But
the ability to be, say, a weekend bike enthusiast is a self-understanding.
(What we ordinarily call "the ability to ride a bike" is a mix of an occurrent
ability to stay balanced and move forward on a contraption of a certain sort
and a self-understanding.) Jones is characterized by the self-interpretive abil-
ity, Heidegger claims, only in so far as she is currently pressing ahead into it.
If she were to give up on her hobby, she would thenceforth no longer be a
weekend bike enthusiast.
We are, moreover, not dealing here simply with an inconsequential and
remote repercussion of the arcana of Heidegger's ontology. The many theses I
have drawn out of Being and Time do not constitute just the ontological in-
frastructure of Heidegger's existential analytic. They also make space for one
of his more concrete and salient concepts, death. I have argued elsewhere"8
that 'death,' as Heidegger uses it, does not pick out the event that happens at
the end of every human being's life. It denotes, rather, a certain condition in
which one can find oneself, the condition of not being able to be anyone in
particular. This inability, here characterized in terms of Dasein's existential-
ity, is the same phenomenon that Heidegger describes effectively in his dis-
cussion of anxiety. To be anxious is to find all ways to be Dasein equally ir-
relevant or uninteresting. Such an affective disposition would disable Dasein
from being anyone, because Dasein would not have the affective grounds for
exercising any particular ability-to-be.
What is relevant here is this: if one of Dasein's abilities-to-be were at-
tained, Dasein could not then, and for a while thereafter, die in Heidegger's
sense. Suppose that Jones could attain the ability-characteristic of being a
simultaneous interpreter. If she attained it in February, then it would simply
be false to describe her then as not able to be anyone: she would be able to be

17 Recall the distinction (drawn above on p. 7) between 'occurrent' in the narrow sense,
and 'occurrent' in the broad sense. The ability to ride a bike is occurrent in the broad
sense, but not in the narrow. (It surely does depend upon human practices.)
18 The interpretation of 'death' that I sketch here is unusual. I spell it out in greater detail
and justify it at length in my article, "Concept of Death."

108 WILLIAM D. BLAITNER

This content downloaded from

132.174.252.28 on Wed, 18 Sep 2024 19:42:44 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
a simultaneous interpreter. This ability would be like the factual ability to
ride a bike. Even if she renounced it, she would still be able to exercise it.
So, no matter what affective condition she fell into in March, it would still
be true that she is able to be a simultaneous interpreter. She could not die in
March, in Heidegger's sense. But it is central to Heidegger's conception of
Dasein's being that it can die, in this sense, at any time.
This last claim is foundational for much of what Heidegger says after
Chapter 1 of Division Two, where he introduces and develops his concept of
death. Without it, he cannot proceed to his distinction between authenticity
and inauthenticity, since they are ways of responding to the possibility of
death, and especially (in the case of authenticity) to its universal and constant
possibility. Without the concept of death, he also cannot get his discussion
of temporality off the ground.'9 In fact, the entirety of Division Two of Being
and Time is dependent upon the legitimacy of Heidegger's concept of death.
And I have been arguing that this concept would be idle without the
Unattainability Thesis. Looking at the extended argument of Being and Time
from the other end, we can see that Heidegger departs from the common exis-
tentialist pronouncement captured by the Existentiality Thesis, and this drives
him to the Ability, Duality, and Unattainability Theses. This last in turn,
then, leads him, via his concept of death, into his discussions of authenticity
and temporality. All of the theses here explored contribute to Heidegger' s on-
tology of the human, which we can now see to be a dualistic understanding of
an entity constituted by its unattainable, self-interpretive ability-characteris-
tics.2,,

References

Blattner, William D. "The Concept of Death in Being and Time." Man and
World 27 (1994): 49-70.
Blattner, William D. "Existential Temporality in Being and Time (Why Hei-
degger is not a Pragmatist)." In Heidegger: A Critical Reader, edited by
Hubert L. Dreyfus and Harrison Hall, pp. 99-129. Oxford: Basil Black-
well, 1992.
Caputo, John. "Husserl, Heidegger, and the Question of a 'Hermeneutic'
Phenomenology." In A Companion to Martin Heidegger's "Being and
Time, edited by Joseph J. Kockelmans, pp. 104-126. Washington, DC:
The University Press of America, 1986.

19 Again, my own views lie partly in the background here, though on the general asser-
tion many interpreters would agree. See Blattner, "Existential Temporality."
2() want to thank Terry Pinkard, Wayne Davis, and two anonymous referees for their
helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper, and the Georgetown University
Graduate School for a Summer Academic Research Grant for Summer, 1993, which I used
to write this paper.

EXISTENCE AND SELF-UNDERSTANDING IN BEING AND TIME 109

This content downloaded from

132.174.252.28 on Wed, 18 Sep 2024 19:42:44 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Dreyfus, Hubert L. Being-in-the- World. Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute
of Technology Press, 1991.
Guignon, Charles B. Heidegger and the Problem of Knowledge. Indianapolis:
Hackett Publishing, 1983.
Heidegger, Martin. Being and Time. Translated by John Macquarrie and Ed-
ward Robinson. New York: Harper and Row, 1962.
Heidegger, Martin. Sein und Zeit. 15th ed. Tubingen: Max Niemayer Verlag,
1979.
Kierkegaard, S0ren. The Sickness Unto Death. Translated by Howard V.
Hong and Edna H. Hong. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980.
Ortega y Gasset, Jose. "History as a System." Translated by Helene Weyl. In
History as a System and Other Essays Toward a Philosophy of History.
New York: W.W. Norton, 1961.
Sartre, Jean-Paul. Existentialism and Humanism. Translated by Philip
Mairet. London: Methuen, 1948.
Schmitt, Richard. Martin Heidegger on Being Human. New York: Random
House, 1969.

1 10 WILLIAM D. BLATTNER

This content downloaded from

132.174.252.28 on Wed, 18 Sep 2024 19:42:44 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms