G.R. No. 202124 - People vs. Jugueta

Title
People vs. Jugueta
Case Decision Date

G.R. No. 202124 Apr 5, 2016
Accused-appellant Ireneo Jugueta appealed his conviction for Double Murder

and Multiple Attempted Murder. The Supreme Court upheld his conviction,
stating that the trial court's factual !ndings and assessment of witness
credibility are entitled to great respect. The court found that Jugueta acted in
concert with his co-accused, all of them carrying !rearms and !ring at the
victims. Conspiracy was established, and it was not necessary to identify
which bullet speci!cally killed the children. The court also found treachery to
be present. Jugueta's conviction for Double Murder and Multiple Attempted
Murder was a"rmed, and he was sentenced accordingly.
783 Phil. 806
EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 202124, April 05, 2016 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. IRENEO JUGUETA, ACCUSED-

APPELLANT.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This resolves the appeal from the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated January 30,
2012 in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 03252. The CA a"rmed the judgments of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 61, Gumaca, Quezon, !nding accused-appellant Ireneo Jugueta y Flores guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of Double Murder in Criminal Case No. 7698-G and Multiple
Attempted Murder in Criminal Case No. 7702-G.
In Criminal Case No. 7698-G, appellant was charged with Double Murder, de!ned and
:
penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 6th day of June 2002, at about 9:00 o'clock in the evening, at Barangay
Caridad Ilaya, Municipality of Atimonan, Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a caliber .22
!rearm, with intent to kill, quali!ed by treachery and evident premeditation, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot with said !rearm Mary
Grace Divina, a minor, 13 years old, who su#ered the following:
"Gunshot wound -
Point of Entry - lower abdomen, right, 2 cm. from the midline and 6 cm. from the level of the
umbilicus, directed upward toward the left upper abdomen."
and Claudine Divina, a minor, 3 V% years of age, who su#ered the following:
"Gunshot wound -
Point of Entry - 9th ICS along the mid-axillary line, right, 1 cm. diameter
Point of Exit - 7th ICS mid-axillary line, left;"
which directly caused their instant death.

That the crime committed in the dwelling of the o#ended party who had not given
provocation for the attack and the accused took advantage of nighttime to facilitate the
commission of the o#ense.
Contrary to law.[2]
In Criminal Case No. 7702-G, appellant, together with Gilbert Estores and Roger San Miguel,
was charged with Multiple Attempted Murder, allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about 9:00 o'clock in the evening of 6th day of June, 2002, at Barangay Caridad
Ilaya, Municipality of Atimonan, Province of Quezon, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court,the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together
:
and mutually helping one another, armed with short !rearms of undetermined calibres,
with intent to kill, quali!ed by treachery, with evident premeditation and abuse of superior
strength, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, and shoot
with the said !rearms the house occupied by the family of Norberto Divina, thereby
commencing the commission of the crime of Murder, directly by overt acts, but did not
perform all the acts of execution which would have produced it by reason of some cause or
accident other than the spontaneous desistance of the accused, that is, the occupants
Norberto Divina, his wife Maricel Divina and children Elizabeth Divina and Judy Ann
Divina, both elementary pupils and who are minors, were not hit.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
Roger San Miguel, however, moved for reinvestigation of the case against them. At said
proceedings, one Danilo Fajarillo submitted his sworn statement stating that on June 6,
2002, he saw appellant with a certain "Hapon" and Gilbert Estores at the crime scene, but it
was only appellant who was carrying a !rearm while the other two had no participation in
the shooting incident. Fajarillo further stated that Roger San Miguel was not present at the
crime scene. Based on the sworn statement of Fajarillo, the Provincial Prosecutor found no
prima facie case against Gilbert Estores and Roger San Miguel.[4] Thus, upon motion of the
prosecution, the case for Attempted Murder against Gilbert Estores and Roger San Miguel
was dismissed, and trial proceeded only as to appellant.[5]
At the trial, the prosecution presented the testimonies of Norberto Divina, the victim, and
Dr. Lourdes Taguinod who executed the Medico-Legal Certi!cate and con!rmed that the
children of Norberto, namely, Mary Grace and Claudine, died from gunshot wounds. Dr.
Taguinod noted that the trajectory of the bullet wounds showed that the victims were at a
higher location than the shooter, but she could not tell what kind of ammunitions were used.
[6]
Norberto testi!ed that the appellant is his brother-in-law. He recounted that in the evening
of June 6, 2002, as his entire family lay down on the $oor of their one-room nipa hut to
sleep, the "sack" walling of their hut was suddenly stripped o#, and only the supporting
bamboo (fences) remained. With the covering of the wall gone, the three (3) men
responsible for the deed came into view. Norberto clearly saw their faces which were
:
illuminated by the light of a gas lamp hanging in their small hut. Norberto identi!ed the 3
men as appellant, Gilbert Estores and Roger San Miguel.
The 3 men ordered Norberto to come down from his house, but he refused to do so. The
men then uttered, "Magdasal ka na at katapusan mo na ngayon" Norberto pleaded with
them, saying, "Maawa kayo sa amin, matanda na ako at marami akong anak. Anong
kasalanan ko sa inyo?" Despite such plea for mercy, a gunshot was !red, and Norberto
immediately threw his body over his children and wife in an attempt to protect them from
being hit. Thereafter, he heard successive gunshots being !red in the direction where his
family huddled together in their hut.[7]
When the volley of shots ceased and the three (3) men left, Norberto saw that his two (2)
young daughters were wounded. His wife went out of their house to ask for help from
neighbors, while he and his older daughter carried the two (2) wounded children out to the
street. His daughter Mary Grace died on the way to the hospital, while Claudine expired at
the hospital despite the doctors' attempts to revive her.[8]
In answer to questions of what could have prompted such an attack from appellant,
Norberto replied that he had a previous altercation with appellant who was angered by the
fact that he (Norberto) !led a case against appellant's two other brothers for molesting his
daughter.[9]
On the other hand, appellant was only able to pro#er denial and alibi as his defense.
Appellant's testimony, along with those of Gilbert Estores, Roger San Miguel, Isidro San
Miguel and Ruben Alegre, was that he (appellant) was just watching TV at the house of Isidro
San Miguel, where he had been living for several years, at the time the shooting incident
occurred. However, he and the other witnesses admitted that said house was a mere !ve-
minute walk away from the crime scene.[10]
Finding appellant's defense to be weak, and ascribing more credence to the testimony of
Norberto, the trial court ruled that the evidence clearly established that appellant, together
with two other assailants, conspired to shoot and kill the family of Norberto. Appellant was
then convicted of Double Murder in Criminal Case No. 7698-G and Multiple Attempted
:
Murder in Criminal Case No. 7702-G.
The dispositive portion of the trial court's judgment in Criminal Case No. 7698-G reads:
WHEREFORE and in view of all the foregoing, the Court !nds accused Ireneo Jugueta guilty
beyond reasonable doubt for Double Murder de!ned and punished under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code and is hereby sentenced to su#er Reclusion Perpetua for the death of
Mary Grace Divina and to indemnify her heirs in the amount of Php50,000.00 and another
to su#er Reclusion Perpetua for the death of Claudine Divina and accused is further ordered
to indemnify the heirs of Claudine Divina in the sum of Php50,000.00. In addition, he is
hereby ordered to pay the heirs of the victims actual damages in the amount of Php16,150.00
and to pay for the costs,
SO ORDERED.[11]
On the other hand, the dispositive portion of the trial court's judgment in Criminal Case No.
7702-G, reads:
WHEREFORE and in view of all the foregoing, the Court !nds accused Ireneo Jugueta guilty
beyond reasonable doubt for Multiple Attempted Murder de!ned and penalized under
Article 248 in relation to Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code and is hereby sentenced to
su#er the penalty of FOUR (4) YEARS and TWO (2) MONTHS of Prision Correctional as
minimum to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of Prision Mayor as maximum for each of
the o#ended parties; Norberto Divina, Maricel Divina, Elizabeth Divina and Judy Ann
Divina. Further, accused is ordered to pay for the costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED.[12]
Aggrieved by the trial court's judgments, appellant appealed to the CA. On January 30, 2012,
the CA rendered a Decision a"rming appellant's conviction for the crimes charged.[13]
Dissatis!ed with the CA Decision, appellant elevated the case to this Court. On July 30, 2012,
the Court issued a Resolution[14] notifying the parties that they may submit their respective
Supplemental Briefs. Both parties manifested that they will no longer submit supplemental
:
briefs since they had exhaustively discussed their positions before the CA.[15]
The main issue advanced in the Appellant's Brief deals with the inconsistencies in
Norberto's testimony, such as his failure to state from the beginning that all three assailants
had guns, and to categorically identify appellant as the one holding the gun used to kill
Norberto's children.
The appeal is unmeritorious.
At the outset, it must be stressed that factual !ndings of the trial court, its assessment of the
credibility of witnesses and the probative weight of their testimonies, and the conclusions
based on these factual !ndings are to be given the highest respect. Thus, generally, the Court
will not recalibrate and re-examine evidence that had been analyzed and ruled upon by the
trial court and a"rmed by the CA.[16]
The evidence on record fully supports the trial court's factual !nding, as a"rmed by the CA,
that appellant acted in concert with two other individuals, all three of them carrying
!rearms and simultaneously !ring at Norberto and his family, killing his two young
daughters. Norberto clearly saw all of the three assailants with their !rearms as there is
illumination coming from a lamp inside their house that had been laid bare after its walling
was stripped o#, to wit:
Q: When the wall of your house was stripped o# by these three persons at the same time, do
you have light in your house?
A: Yes., sir.
Q: What kind of light was there?

A: A gas lamp.
Q: Where was the gas lamp placed at that time?

A: In the middle of our house.
...
:
Q: when did they !re a shot?
A: On the same night, when they had stripped o# the wallings.
Q: How many gunshots did you hear?

A: Only one.
Q: Do you know the sound of a gunshot? A !rearm? A: Yes, sir, it is loud? (sic)
...
Q: After the !rst shot, was there any second shot?

A: After that, successive !re shot (sic) followed and my youngest and eldest daughters were
hit.
...
Q: How many of the three were holding guns at that time?

A: All of them.
Q: You mean to tell the honorable court that these three persons were having one !rearm
each?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And they !red shots at the same time?

A: Yes, sir.
Q: To what direction these three persons !red (sic) their !rearms during that night?
A: To the place where we were.
Q: When those three persons were !ring their respective !rearms, what was your position
then?
A: I ordered my children to lie down.
:
Q: How about you, what was your position when you were ordering your children to lie
down?
A: (witness demonstrated his position as if covering his children with his body and ordering
them to line (sic) down face down)
Q: Mr. Witness, for how long did these three persons !re shots at your house?
A: Less than !ve minutes, sir.
Q: After they !red their shots, they left your house?

A: Yes, sir.
Q: And when these persons left your house, you inspected your children to see what
happened to them?
A: Yes, sir, they were hit.
x x x[17]
Appellant and the two other malefactors are equally responsible for the death of Norberto's
daughters because, as ruled by the trial court, they clearly conspired to kill Norberto's
family. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement regarding the
commission of a crime and decide to commit it. Proof of a prior meeting between the
perpetrators to discuss the commission of the crime is not necessary as long as their
concerted acts reveal a common design and unity of purpose. In such case, the act of one is
the act of all.[18] Here, the three men undoubtedly acted in concert as they went to the house
of Norberto together, each with his own !rearm. It is, therefore, no longer necessary to
identify and prove that it is the bullet particularly !red from appellant's !rearm that killed
the children.
Murder is de!ned under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as the unlawful killing of a
person, which is not parricide or infanticide, attended by circumstances such as treachery
or evident premeditation.[19] The presence of any one of the circumstances enumerated in
Article 248 of the Code is su"cient to qualify a killing as murder.[20] The trial court correctly
ruled that appellant is liable for murder because treachery attended the killing of Norberto's
:
two children, thus:
... Evidence adduced show that the family of Norberto Divina, were all lying down side by
side about to sleep on June 6, 2002 at around 9:00 o'clock in the evening, when suddenly
their wall made of sack was stripped o# by [appellant] Ireneo Jugueta, Roger San Miguel and
Gilbcrto Alegre (sic) [Gilbert Estores]. They ordered him to go out of their house and when
he refused despite his plea for mercy, they !red at them having hit and killed his two (2)
daughters. The family of Norberto Divina were unarmed and his children were at very
tender ages. Mary Grace Divina and Claudine who were shot and killed were 13 years old
and 3 lA years old respectively. In this case, the victims were defenseless and manifestly
overpowered by armed assailants when they were gunned down. There was clear showing
that the attack was made suddenly and unexpectedly as to render the victims helpless and
unable to defend themselves. Norberto and his wife and his children could have already
been asleep at that time of the night, ...[21]
Verily, the presence of treachery quali!ed the killing of the hapless children to murder. As
held in People v. Fallorina,[22] the essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack
on an unsuspecting victim without the slightest provocation on his part. Minor children,
who by reason of their tender years, cannot be expected to put up a defense. When an adult
person illegally attacks a child, treachery exists.
As to the charge of multiple attempted murder, the last paragraph of Article 6 of the Revised
Penal Code states that a felony is attempted when the o#ender commences the commission
of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which
should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own
spontaneous desistance. In Esqueda v. People,[23] the Court held:
If one in$icts physical injuries on another but the latter survives, the crime committed is
either consummated physical injuries, if the o#ender had no intention to kill the victim, or
frustrated or attempted homicide or frustrated murder or attempted murder if the o#ender
intends to kill the victim. Intent to kill may be proved by evidence of: (a) motive; (b) the
nature or number of weapons used in the commission of the crime; (c) the nature and
number of wounds in$icted on the victim; (d) the manner the crime was committed; and (e)
the words uttered by the o#ender at the time the injuries are in$icted by him on the victim.
:
In this case, the prosecution has clearly established the intent to kill on the part of appellant
as shown by the use of !rearms, the words uttered[24] during, as well as the manner of, the
commission of the crime. The Court thus quotes with approval the trial court's !nding that
appellant is liable for attempted murder, viz.:
In the case at bar, the perpetrators who acted in concert commenced the felony of murder
!rst by suddenly stripping o# the wall of their house, followed by successive !ring at the
intended victims when Norberto Divina refused to go out of the house as ordered by them. If
only there were good in aiming their target, not only Mary Grace and Claudine had been
killed but surely all the rest of the family would surely have died. Hence, perpetrators were
liable for Murder of Mary Grace Divina and Claudine Divina but for Multiple Attempted
Murder for Norberto Divina, Maricel Divina, Elizabeth Divina and Judy Ann Divina. But as
[appellant] Ireneo Jugueta was the only one charged in this case, he alone is liable for the
crime committed.[25]
Meanwhile, the supposed inconsistencies in Norberto's testimony, i.e., that he failed to state
from the very beginning that all three assailants were carrying !rearms, and that it was the
shots from appellant's !rearm that killed the children, are too trivial and inconsequential to
put a dent on said witness's credibility. An examination of Norberto's testimony would show
that there are no real inconsistencies to speak of. As ruled in People v. Cabtalan,[26] "[m]inor
inconsistencies and discrepancies pertaining to trivial matters do not a#ect the credibility of
witnesses, as well as their positive identi!cation of the accused as the perpetrators of the
crime."[27] Both the trial court and the CA found Norberto's candid and straightforward
testimony to be worthy of belief and this Court sees no reason why it should not conform to
the principle reiterated in Medina, Jr. v. People[28] that:
Time and again, this Court has deferred to the trial court's factual !ndings and evaluation of
the credibility of witnesses, especially when a"rmed by the CA, in the absence of any clear
showing that the trial court overlooked or misconstrued cogent facts and circumstances that
would justify altering or revising such !ndings and evaluation. This is because the trial
court's determination proceeds from its !rst-hand opportunity to observe the demeanor of
the witnesses, their conduct and attitude under grilling examination, thereby placing the
trial court in unique position to assess the witnesses' credibility and to appreciate their
truthfulness, honesty and candor x x x.[29]
:
The records of this case, particularly the testimonies of the witnesses, reveal no outstanding
or exceptional circumstance to justify a deviation from such long-standing principle. There
is no cogent reason to overturn the trial court's ruling that the prosecution evidence,
particularly the testimony of Norberto Divina identifying appellant as one of the assailants,
is worthy of belief. Thus, the prosecution evidence established beyond any reasonable doubt
that appellant is one of the perpetrators of the crime.
However, the Court must make a clari!cation as to the nomenclature used by the trial court
to identify the crimes for which appellant was penalized. There is some confusion caused by
the trial court's use of the terms "Double Murder" and "Multiple Attempted Murder" in
convicting appellant, and yet imposing penalties which nevertheless show that the trial
court meant to penalize appellant for two (2) separate counts of Murder and four (4) counts
of Attempted Murder.
The facts, as alleged in the Information in Criminal Case No. 7698-G, and as proven during
trial, show that appellant is guilty of 2 counts of the crime of Murder and not Double Murder,
as the killing of the victims was not the result of a single act but of several acts of appellant
and his cohorts. In the same vein, appellant is also guilty of 4 counts of the crime of
Attempted Murder and not Multiple Attempted Murder in Criminal Case No. 7702-G. It bears
stressing that the Informations in this case failed to comply with the requirement in Section
13, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court that an information must charge only one o#ense.
As a general rule, a complaint or information must charge only one o#ense, otherwise, the
same is defective. The reason for the rule is stated in People of the Philippines and AAA v.
Court of Appeals, 21st Division, Mindanao Station, et al.,[30] thus:
The rationale behind this rule prohibiting duplicitous complaints or informations is to give
the accused the necessary knowledge of the charge against him and enable him to
su"ciently prepare for his defense. The State should not heap upon the accused two or
more charges which might confuse him in his defense. Non-compliance with this rule is a
ground for quashing the duplicitous complaint or information under Rule 117 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure and the accused may raise the same in a motion to quash before he
enters his plea, otherwise, the defect is deemed waived.
:
However, since appellant entered a plea of not guilty during arraignment and failed to move
for the quashal of the Informations, he is deemed to have waived his right to question the
same. Section 9 of Rule 117 provides that "[t]he failure of the accused to assert any ground of
a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or information, either because he did
not !le a motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed a
waiver of any objections except those based on the grounds provided for in paragraphs (a),
(b), (g), and (i) of Section 3 of this Rule."
It is also well-settled that when two or more o#enses are charged in a single complaint or
information but the accused fails to object to it before trial, the court may convict him of as
many o#enses as are charged and proved, and impose upon him the proper penalty for each
o#ense.[31] Appellant can therefore be held liable for all the crimes alleged in the
Informations in Criminal Case Nos. 7698-G and 7702-G, i.e., 2 counts of murder and 4 counts
of attempted murder, respectively, and proven during trial.
Meanwhile, in People v. Nelmida,[32] the Court explained the concept of a complex crime as
de!ned in Article 48[33] of the Revised Penal Code, thus:
In a complex crime, two or more crimes are actually committed, however, in the eyes of the
law and in the conscience of the o#ender they constitute only one crime, thus, only one
penalty is imposed. There are two kinds of complex crime. The !rst is known as a
compound crime, or when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies
while the other is known as a complex crime proper, or when an o#ense is a necessary
means for committing the other. The classic example of the !rst kind is when a single bullet
results in the death of two or more persons. A di#erent rule governs where separate and
distinct acts result in a number killed. Deeply rooted is the doctrine that when various
victims expire from separate shot, such acts constitute separate and distinct crimes.[34]
Here, the facts surrounding the shooting incident clearly show that appellant and the two
others, in !ring successive and indiscriminate shots at the family of Norberto from their
respective !rearms, intended to kill not only Norberto, but his entire family. When several
gunmen, as in this case, indiscriminately !re a series of shots at a group of people, it shows
their intention to kill several individuals. Hence, they are committing not only one crime.
What appellant and his cohorts committed cannot be classi!ed as a complex crime because
:
as held in People v. Nelmida,[35] "each act by each gunman pulling the trigger of their
respective !rearms, aiming each particular moment at di#erent persons constitute distinct
and individual acts which cannot give rise to a complex crime."[36]
Furthermore, the Court notes that both the trial court and the CA failed to take into account
dwelling as an ordinary, aggravating circumstance, despite the fact that the Informations in
Criminal Case Nos. 7698-G and 7702-G contain su"cient allegations to that e#ect, to wit:
Criminal Case No. 7698-G for Double Murder:
That the crime was committed in the dwelling of the o#ended party who had not given
provocation for the attack and the accused took advantage of nighttime to facilitate the
commission of the o#ense.[37]
Criminal Case No. 7702-G for Multiple Attempted Murder:
... the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping
one another, armed with short !rearms of undetermined calibres, with intent to kill,
quali!ed by treachery, with evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, and shoot with the said
!rearms the house occupied by the family of Norberto Divina, thereby commencing the
commission of the crime of Murder, directly by overt acts, but did not perform all the acts of
execution which would have produced it by reason of some cause or accident other than the
spontaneous desistance of the accused x x x[38]
In People v. Agcanas,[39] the Court stressed that "[i]t has been held in a long line of cases that
dwelling is aggravating because of the sanctity of privacy which the law accords to human
abode. He who goes to another's house to hurt him or do him wrong is more guilty than he
who o#ends him elsewhere." Dwelling aggravates a felony where the crime is committed in
the dwelling of the o#ended party provided that the latter has not given provocation
therefor.[40] The testimony of Norberto established the fact that the group of appellant
violated the victims' home by destroying the same and attacking his entire family therein,
without provocation on the part of the latter. Hence, the trial court should have appreciated
:
dwelling as an ordinary aggravating circumstance.
In view of the attendant ordinary aggravating circumstance, the Court must modify the
penalties imposed on appellant. Murder is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, thus,
with an ordinary aggravating circumstance of dwelling, the imposable penalty is death for
each of two (2) counts of murder.[41] However, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) No. 9346,
proscribing the imposition of the death penalty, the penalty to be imposed on appellant
should be reclusion perpetua for each of the two (2) counts of murder without eligibility for
parole. With regard to the four (4) counts of attempted murder, the penalty prescribed for
each count is prision mayor. With one ordinary aggravating circumstance, the penalty
should be imposed in its maximum period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
maximum penalty should be from ten (10) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years of
prision mayor, while the minimum shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, i.e.,
prision correccional, in any of its periods, or anywhere from six (6) months and one (1) day
to six (6) years. This Court !nds it apt to impose on appellant the indeterminate penalty of
four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten
(10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, for each of the four (4) counts of
attempted murder.
Anent the award of damages, the Court deems it proper to address the matter in detail as
regards criminal cases where the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua to death.
Generally, in these types of criminal cases, there are three kinds of damages awarded by the
Court; namely: civil indemnity, moral, and exemplary damages. Likewise, actual damages
may be awarded or temperate damages in some instances.
First, civil indemnity ex delicto is the indemnity authorized in our criminal law for the
o#ended party, in the amount authorized by the prevailing judicial policy and apart from
other proven actual damages, which itself is equivalent to actual or compensatory damages
in civil law.[42]
This award stems from Article 100 of the RPC which states, "Every person criminally liable
for a felony is also civilly liable."
:
It is to be noted that civil indemnity is, technically, not a penalty or a !ne; hence, it can be
increased by the Court when appropriate.[43] Article 2206 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall be at
least three thousand pesos, even though there may have been mitigating circumstances. In
addition:
(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased, and the
indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter; such indemnity shall in every case be
assessed and awarded by the court, unless the deceased on account of permanent physical
disability not caused by the defendant, had no earning capacity at the time of his death;
(2) If the deceased was obliged to give support according to the provisions of Article 291, the
recipient who is not an heir called to the decedent's inheritance by the law of testate or
intestate succession, may demand support from the person causing the death, for a period
not exceeding !ve years, the exact duration to be !xed by the court;
(3) The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased may
demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased.
In our jurisdiction, civil indemnity is awarded to the o#ended party as a kind of monetary
restitution or compensation to the victim for the damage or infraction that was done to the
latter by the accused, which in a sense only covers the civil aspect. Precisely, it is civil
indemnity. Thus, in a crime where a person dies, in addition to the penalty of imprisonment
imposed to the o#ender, the accused is also ordered to pay the victim a sum of money as
restitution. Also, it is apparent from Article 2206 that the law only imposes a minimum
amount for awards of civil indemnity, which is P3,000.00. The law did not provide for a
ceiling. Thus, although the minimum amount for the award cannot be changed, increasing
the amount awarded as civil indemnity can be validly modi!ed and increased when the
present circumstance warrants it.[44]
The second type of damages the Court awards are moral damages, which are also
compensatory in nature. Del Mundo v. Court of Appeals[45] expounded on the nature and
purpose of moral damages, viz.:
:
Moral damages, upon the other hand, may be awarded to compensate one for manifold
injuries such as physical su#ering, mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings and social humiliation. These damages must be understood to be in the
concept of grants, not punitive or corrective in nature, calculated to compensate the
claimant for the injury su#ered. Although incapable of exactness and no proof of pecuniary
loss is necessary in order that moral damages may be awarded, the amount of indemnity
being left to the discretion of the court, it is imperative, nevertheless, that (1) injury must
have been su#ered by the claimant, and (2) such injury must have sprung from any of the
cases expressed in Article 2219[46] and Article 2220[47] of the Civil Code, x x x.
Similarly, in American jurisprudence, moral damages are treated as "compensatory
damages awarded for mental pain and su#ering or mental anguish resulting from a wrong."
[48]
They may also be considered and allowed "for resulting pain and su#ering, and for
humiliation, indignity, and vexation su#ered by the plainti# as result of his or her assailant's
conduct, as well as the factors of provocation, the reasonableness of the force used, the
attendant humiliating circumstances, the sex of the victim, [and] mental distress."[49]
The rationale for awarding moral damages has been explained in Lambert v. Heirs ofRey
Castillon: "[T]he award of moral damages is aimed at a restoration, within the limits
possible, of the spiritual status quo ante; and therefore, it must be proportionate to the
su#ering in$icted."[50]
Corollarily, moral damages under Article 2220[51] of the Civil Code also does not !x the
amount of damages that can be awarded. It is discretionary upon the court, depending on
the mental anguish or the su#ering of the private o#ended party. The amount of moral
damages can, in relation to civil indemnity, be adjusted so long as it does not exceed the
award of civil indemnity.[52]
Finally, the Civil Code of the Philippines provides, in respect to exemplary damages, thus:
ART. 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example or correction
for the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory
damages.
:
ART. 2230. In criminal o#enses, exemplary damages as a part of the civil liability may be
imposed when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. Such
damages are separate and distinct from !nes and shall be paid to the o#ended party.
Also known as "punitive" or "vindictive" damages, exemplary or corrective damages are
intended to serve as a deterrent to serious wrong doings, and as a vindication of undue
su#erings and wanton invasion of the rights of an injured or a punishment for those guilty
of outrageous conduct. These terms are generally, but not always, used interchangeably. In
common law, there is preference in the use of exemplary damages when the award is to
account for injury to feelings and for the sense of indignity and humiliation su#ered by a
person as a result of an injury that has been maliciously and wantonly in$icted,[53] the
theory being that there should be compensation for the hurt caused by the highly
reprehensible conduct of the defendant a associated with such circumstances as
willfulness, wantonness, malice, gross negligence or recklessness, oppression, insult or
fraud or gross fraud[54] - that intensi!es the injury. The terms punitive or vindictive
damages are often used to refer to those species of damages that may be awarded against a
person to punish him for his outrageous conduct. In either case, these damages are
intended in good measure to deter the wrongdoer and others like him from similar conduct
in the future.[55]
The term aggravating circumstances used by the Civil Code, the law not having speci!ed
otherwise, is to be understood in its broad or generic sense. The commission of an o#ense
has a two-pronged e#ect, one on the public as it breaches the social order and the other
upon the private victim as it causes personal su#erings, each of which is addressed by,
respectively, the prescription of heavier punishment for the accused and by an award of
additional damages to the victim. The increase of the penalty or a shift to a graver felony
underscores the exacerbation of the o#ense by the attendance of aggravating
circumstances, whether ordinary or qualifying, in its commission. Unlike the criminal
liability which is basically a State concern, the award of damages, however, is likewise, if not
primarily, intended for the o#ended party who su#ers thereby. It would make little sense for
an award of exemplary damages to be due the private o#ended party when the aggravating
circumstance is ordinary but to be withheld when it is qualifying. Withal, the ordinary or
qualifying nature of an aggravating circumstance is a distinction that should only be of
:
consequence to the criminal, rather than to the civil, liability of the o#ender. In !ne, relative
to the civil aspect of the case, an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying,
should entitle the o#ended party to an award of exemplary damages within the unbridled
meaning of Article 2230 of the Civil Code.[56]
The reason is fairly obvious as to why the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure[57] requires
aggravating circumstances, whether ordinary or qualifying, to be stated in the complaint or
information. It is in order not to trample on the constitutional right of an accused to be
informed of the nature of the alleged o#ense that he or she has committed. A criminal
complaint or information should basically contain the elements of the crime, as well as its
qualifying and ordinary aggravating circumstances, for the court to e#ectively determine
the proper penalty it should impose. This, however, is not similar in the recovery of civil
liability. In the civil aspect, the presence of an aggravating circumstance, even if not alleged
in the information but proven during trial would entitle the victim to an award of exemplary
damages.
Being corrective in nature, exemplary damages, therefore, can be awarded, not only due to
the presence of an aggravating circumstance, but also where the circumstances of the case
show the highly reprehensible or outrageous conduct of the o#ender. In much the same way
as Article 2230 prescribes an instance when exemplary damages may be awarded, Article
2229, the main provision, lays down the very basis of the award. Thus, in People v,
Matrimonio,[58] the Court imposed exemplary damages to deter other fathers with perverse
tendencies or aberrant sexual behavior from sexually abusing their own daughters. Also, in
People v. Cristobal,[59] the Court awarded exemplary damages on account of the moral
corruption, perversity and wickedness of the accused in sexually assaulting a pregnant
married woman. In People v. CaAada,[60] People v. Neverio[61] and People v. Layco, Sr. ,[62]
the Court awarded exemplary damages to set a public example, to serve as deterrent to
elders who abuse and corrupt the youth, and to protect the latter from sexual abuse.
Existing jurisprudence pegs the award of exemplary damages at P30,000.00,[63] despite the
lack of any aggravating circumstance. The Court !nds it proper to increase the amount to
P50,000.00 in order to deter similar conduct.
:
If, however, the penalty for the crime committed is death, which cannot be imposed because
of the provisions of R.A. No. 9346, prevailing jurisprudence[64] sets the amount of
P100,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Before awarding any of the above mentioned damages, the Court, however, must !rst
consider the penalty imposed by law. Under RA 7659 or An Act to Impose the Death Penalty
on Certain Heinous Crimes, Amending for that Purpose the Revised Penal Laws, and for
Other Purposes, certain crimes under the RPC and special penal laws were amended to
impose the death penalty under certain circumstances.[65] Under the same law, the
following crimes are punishable by reclusion perpetua: piracy in general,[66] mutiny on the
high seas,[67] and simple rape.[68] For the following crimes, RA 7659 has imposed the penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death: quali!ed piracy;[69] quali!ed bribery under certain
circumstances;[70] parricide;[71] murder;[72] infanticide, except when committed by the
mother of the child for the purpose of concealing her dishonor or either of the maternal
grandparents for the same purpose;[73] kidnapping and serious illegal detention under
certain circumstances;[74] robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons under
certain circumstances;[75] destructive arson, except when death results as a consequence of
the commission of any of the acts penalized under the article;[76] attempted or frustrated
rape, when a homicide is committed by reason or on occasion thereof; plunder; and
carnapping, when the driver or occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is killed or raped
in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof.[78] Finally, RA
7659 imposes the death penalty on the following crimes:
(a) In quali!ed bribery, when it is the public o"cer who asks or demands the gift or present.
b) In kidnapping and serious illegal detention: (i) when the kidnapping or detention was
committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person; (ii)
when the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention; (iii) when the victim is
raped, subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts.
(c) In destructive arson, when as a consequence of the commission of any of the acts
penalized under Article 320, death results.
:
(d) In rape: (i) when by reason or on occasion of the rape, the victim becomes insane or
homicide is committed; (ii) when committed with any of the following attendant
circumstances: (1) when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the o#ender is a
parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or a"nity within the
third civil degree, or the common-law-spouse of the parent of the victim; (2) when the
victim is under the custody of the police or military authorities; (3) when the rape is
committed in full view of the husband, parent, any of the children or other relatives within
the third degree of consanguinity; (4) when the victim is a religious or a child below seven
years old; (5) when the o#ender knows that he is a%icted with Acquired Immune De!ciency
Syndrome (AIDS) disease; (6) when committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines or the Philippine National Police or any law enforcement agency; and (7) when
by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has su#ered permanent physical
mutilation.
From these heinous crimes, where the imposable penalties consist of two (2) indivisible
penalties or single indivisible penalty, all of them must be taken in relation to Article 63 of
the RPC, which provides:
Article 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties. - In all cases in which the law
prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the courts regardless of any
mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have attended the commission of the
deed.
In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the
following rules shall be observed in the application thereof:
1. when in the commission of the deed there is present only one aggravating circumstance,
the greater penalty shall be applied.
2. when there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the commission of
the deed, the lesser penalty shall be applied.
3. when the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating circumstance and there is
no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied.
:
4. when both mitigating and aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the act,
the courts shall reasonably allow them to o#set one another in consideration of their
number and importance, for the purpose of applying the penalty in accordance with the
preceding rules, according to the result of such compensation. (Revised Penal Code, Art. 63)
Thus, in order to impose the proper penalty, especially in cases of indivisible penalties, the
court has the duty to ascertain the presence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances.
Accordingly, in crimes where the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua to death, the court
can impose either reclusion perpetua or death, depending on the mitigating or aggravating
circumstances present.
But with the enactment of RA 9346 or An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in
the Philippines, the imposition of death penalty is now prohibited. It provides that in lieu of
the death penalty, the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed when the law violated
makes use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the RPC.[79]
As a result, the death penalty can no longer be imposed. Instead, they have to impose
reclusion perpetua. Despite this, the principal consideration for the award of damages,
following the ruling in People v. Salome[80] and People v. Quiachon[81] is "the penalty
provided by law or imposable for the o#ense because of its heinousness, not the public
penalty actually imposed on the o#ender."[82]
When the circumstances surrounding the crime would justify the imposition of the death
penalty were it not for RA 9346, the Court has ruled, as early as July 9, 1998 in People v.
Victor[83] that the award of civil indemnity for the crime of rape -when punishable by death
should be P75,000.00 We reasoned that "[t]his is not only a reaction to the apathetic societal
perception of the penal law and the !nancial $uctuations over time, but also an expression
of the displeasure of the Court over the incidence of heinous crimes against chastity."[84]
Such reasoning also applies to all heinous crimes found in RA 7659. The amount was later
increased to P100,000.00.[85]
In addition to this, the Court likewise awards moral damages. In People v. Arizapa[86]
P50,000.00 was awarded as moral damages without need of pleading or proving them, for
:
in rape cases, it is recognized that the victim's injury is concomitant with and necessarily
results from the odious crime of rape to warrant per se the award of moral damages.[87]
Subsequently, the amount was increased to P75,000.00 in People v. Soriano[88] and
P100,000.00 in People v. Gambao[89]
Essentially, despite the fact that the death penalty cannot be imposed because of RA 9346,
the imposable penalty as provided by the law for the crime, such as those found in RA 7569,
must be used as the basis for awarding damages and not the actual penalty imposed.
Again, for crimes where the imposable penalty is death in view of the attendance of an
ordinary aggravating circumstance but due to the prohibition to impose the death penalty,
the actual penalty imposed is reclusion perpetna, the latest jurisprudence[90] pegs the
amount of P100,000.00 as civil indemnity and P100,0000.00 as moral damages. For the
qualifying aggravating circumstance and/or the ordinary aggravating circumstances
present, the amount of P100,000.00 is awarded as exemplary damages aside from civil
indemnity and moral damages. Regardless of the attendance of qualifying aggravating
circumstance, the exemplary damages shall be !xed at P100,000.00. "[T]his is not only a
reaction to the apathetic societal perception of the penal law and the !nancial $uctuation
over time, but also an expression of the displeasure of the Court over the incidence of
heinous crimes x x x."[91]
When the circumstances surrounding the crime call for the imposition of reclusion
perpetua only, there being no ordinary aggravating circumstance, the Court rules that the
proper amounts should be P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages and
P75,000.00 exemplary damages, regardless of the number of qualifying aggravating
circumstances present.
When it comes to compound and complex crimes, although the single act done by the
o#ender caused several crimes, the fact that those were the result of a single design, the
amount of civil indemnity and moral damages will depend on the penalty and the number of
victims. For each of the victims, the heirs should be properly compensated. If it is multiple
murder without any ordinary aggravating circumstance but merely a qualifying aggravating
circumstance, but the penalty imposed is death because of Art. 48 of the RPC wherein the
:
maximum penalty shall be imposed,[92] then, for every victim who dies, the heirs shall be
indemni!ed with P100,000.00 as civil indemnity, P100,000.00 as moral damages and
P100,000.00 as exemplary damages.
In case of a special complex crime, which is di#erent from a complex crime under Article 48
of the RPC, the following doctrines are noteworthy:
In People of the Philippines v. Conrado Laog,[93] this Court ruled that special complex crime,
or more properly, a composite crime, has its own de!nition and special penalty in the
Revised Penal Code, as amended. Justice Regalado, in his Separate Opinion in the case of
People v. Barros,[94] explained that composite crimes are "neither of the same legal basis as
nor subject to the rules on complex crimes in Article 48 [of the Revised Penal Code], since
they do not consist of a single act giving rise to two or more grave or less grave felonies
[compound crimes] nor do they involve an o#ense being a necessary means to commit
another [complex crime proper]. However, just like the regular complex crimes and the
present case of aggravated illegal possession of !rearms, only a single penalty is imposed
for each of such composite crimes although composed of two or more o#enses."[95]
In People v. De Leon,[96] we expounded on the special complex crime of robbery with

homicide, as follows:
In robbery with homicide, the original criminal design of the malefactor is to commit
robbery, with homicide perpetrated on the occasion or by reason of the robbery. The intent
to commit robbery must precede the taking of human life. The homicide may take place
before, during or after the robbery. It is only the result obtained, without reference or
distinction as to the circumstances, causes or modes or persons intervening in the
commission of the crime that has to be taken into consideration. There is no such felony of
robbery with homicide through reckless imprudence or simple negligence. The constitutive
elements of the crime, namely, robbery with homicide, must be consummated.
It is immaterial that the death would supervene by mere accident; or that the victim of
homicide is other than the victim of robbery, or that two or more persons are killed, or that
aside from the homicide, rape, intentional mutilation, or usurpation of authority, is
:
committed by reason or on the occasion of the crime. Likewise immaterial is the fact that
the victim of homicide is one of the robbers; the felony would still be robbery with
homicide. Once a homicide is committed by or on the occasion of the robbery, the felony
committed is robbery with homicide. All the felonies committed by reason of or on the
occasion of the robbery are integrated into one and indivisible felony of robbery with
homicide. The word "homicide" is used in its generic sense. Homicide, thus, includes
murder, parricide, and infanticide.[97]
In the special complex crime of rape with homicide, the term "homicide" is to be understood
in its generic sense, and includes murder and slight physical injuries committed by reason
or on occasion of the rape.[98] Hence, even if any or all of the circumstances (treachery,
abuse of superior strength and evident premeditation) alleged in the information have been
duly established by the prosecution, the same would not qualify the killing to murder and
the crime committed by appellant is still rape with homicide. As in the case of robbery with
homicide, the aggravating circumstance of treachery is to be considered as a generic
aggravating circumstance only. Thus we ruled in People v. Macabales:[99]
Finally, appellants contend that the trial court erred in concluding that the aggravating
circumstance of treachery is present. They aver that treachery applies to crimes against
persons and not to crimes against property. However, we !nd that the trial court in this case
correctly characterized treachery as a generic aggravating, rather than qualifying,
circumstance. Miguel was rendered helpless by appellants in defending himself when his
arms were held by two of the attackers before he was stabbed with a knife by appellant
Macabales, as their other companions surrounded them. In People v. Salvatierra, we ruled
that when alevosia (treachery) obtains in the special complex crime of robbery with
homicide, such treachery is to be regarded as a generic aggravating circumstance. Robbery
with homicide is a composite crime with its own de!nition and special penalty in the
Revised Penal Code. There is no special complex crime of robbery with murder under the
Revised Penal Code. Here, treachery forms part of the circumstances proven concerning the
actual commission of the complex crime. Logically it could not qualify the homicide to
murder but, as generic aggravating circumstance, it helps determine the penalty to be
imposed.[100]
Applying the above discussion on special complex crimes, if the penalty is death but it
:
cannot be imposed due to RA 9346 and what is actually imposed is the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, the civil indemnity and moral damages will be P100,000.00 each, and another
P100,000.00 as exemplary damages in view of the heinousness of the crime and to set an
example. If there is another composite crime included in a special complex crime and the
penalty imposed is death, an additional P100,000.00 as civil indemnity, P100,000.00 moral
damages and P100,000.00 exemplary damages shall be awarded for each composite crime
committed.
For example, in case of Robbery with Homicide[101] wherein three (3) people died as a
consequence of the crime, the heirs of the victims shall be entitled to the award of damages
as discussed earlier. This is true, however, only if those who were killed were the victims of
the robbery or mere bystanders and not when those who died were the perpetrators or
robbers themselves because the crime of robbery with homicide may still be committed
even if one of the robbers dies.[102] This is also applicable in robbery with rape where there
is more than one victim of rape.
In awarding civil indemnity and moral damages, it is also important to determine the stage
in which the crime was committed and proven during the trial. Article 6 of the RPC
provides:
Art. 6. Consummated, frustrated, and attempted felonies. -Consummated felonies, as well as

those which are frustrated and attempted, are punishable.
A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution and
accomplishment are present; and it is frustrated when an o#ender performs all the acts of
execution which would produce the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do
not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.
There is an attempt when the o#ender commences the commission of a felony directly by
overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony
by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.
As discussed earlier, when the crime proven is consummated and the penalty imposed is
death but reduced to reclusion perpetua because of R.A. 9346, the civil indemnity and moral
:
damages that should be awarded will each be P100,000.00 and another P100,000.00 for
exemplary damages or when the circumstances of the crime call for the imposition of
reclusion perpetua only, the civil indemnity and moral damages should be P75,000.00 each,
as well as exemplary damages in the amount of P75,000.00. If, however, the crime proven is
in its frustrated stage, the civil indemnity and moral damages that should be awarded will
each be P50,000.00, and an award of P25,000.00 civil indemnity and P25,000.00 moral
damages when the crime proven is in its attempted stage. The di#erence in the amounts
awarded for the stages is mainly due to the disparity in the outcome of the crime committed,
in the same way that the imposable penalty varies for each stage of the crime. The said
amounts of civil indemnity and moral damages awarded in cases of felonies in their
frustrated or attempted stages shall be the bases when the crimes committed constitute
complex crime under Article 48 of the RPC. For example, in a crime of murder with
attempted murder, the amount of civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages
is P100,000.00 each, while in the attempted murder, the civil indemnity, moral damages
and exemplary damages is P25,000.00 each.
In a special complex crime, like robbery with homicide, if, aside from homicide, several
victims (except the robbers) sustained injuries, they shall likewise be indemni!ed. It must
be remembered that in a special complex crime, unlike in a complex crime, the component
crimes have no attempted or frustrated stages because the intention of the o#ender/s is to
commit the principal crime which is to rob but in the process of committing the said crime,
another crime is committed. For example, if on the occasion of a robbery with homicide,
other victims sustained injuries, regardless of the severity, the crime committed is still
robbery with homicide as the injuries become part of the crime, "Homicide", in the special
complex crime of robbery with homicide, is understood in its generic sense and now forms
part of the essential element of robbery,[103] which is the use of violence or the use of force
upon anything. Hence, the nature and severity of the injuries sustained by the victims must
still be determined for the purpose of awarding civil indemnity and damages. If a victim
su#ered mortal wounds and could have died if not for a timely medical intervention, the
victim should be awarded civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages
equivalent to the damages awarded in a frustrated stage, and if a victim su#ered injuries
that are not fatal, an award of civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages
should likewise be awarded equivalent to the damages awarded in an attempted stage.
:
In other crimes that resulted in the death of a victim and the penalty consists of divisible
penalties, like homicide, death under tumultuous a#ray, reckless imprudence resulting to
homicide, the civil indemnity awarded to the heirs of the victim shall be P50,000.00 and
P50,000.00 moral damages without exemplary damages being awarded. However, an award
of P50,000.00 exemplary damages in a crime of homicide shall be added if there is an
aggravating circumstance present that has been proven but not alleged in the information.
Aside from those discussed earlier, the Court also awards temperate damages in certain
cases. The award of P25,000.00 as temperate damages in homicide or murder cases is
proper when no evidence of burial and funeral expenses is presented in the trial court.[104]
Under Article 2224 of the Civil Code, temperate damages may be recovered, as it cannot be
denied that the heirs of the victims su#ered pecuniary loss although the exact amount was
not proved.[105] In this case, the Court now increases the amount to be awarded as temperate
damages to P50,000.00.
In the case at bar, the crimes were aggravated by dwelling, and the murders committed
were further made atrocious by the fact that the victims are innocent, defenseless minors a
one is a mere 3 1/2-year-old toddler, and the other a 13-year-old girl. The increase in the
amount of awards for damages is be!tting to show not only the Court's, but all of society's
outrage over such crimes and wastage of lives.
In summary:
I. For those crimes[106] like, Murder,[107] Parricide,[108] Serious Intentional Mutilation,[109]

Infanticide,[110] and other crimes involving death of a victim where the penalty consists of
indivisible penalties:
1.1 Where the penalty imposed is death but reduced to reclusion perpetua because of RA
9346:
a. Civil indemnity-P100,000.00
b. Moral damages - P100,000.00
:
c. Exemplary damages -P100,000.00
1.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated:
a. Frustrated:
i. Civil indemnity - P75,000.00
ii. Moral damages - P75,000.00
iii. Exemplary damages a P75,000.00
b. Attempted:
i. Civil indemnity-P50,000.00
ii. Exemplary damages - P50,000.00
iii. Exemplary damages - P50,000.00
2.1 Where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, other than the above-mentioned:
a. Civil indemnity -P75,000.00
c. Exemplary damages - P75,000.00
2.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated:
a. Frustrated:
i. Civil indemnity - P50,000.00

:
b. Attempted:
II. For Simple Rape/Quali!ed Rape:
1.1 Where the penalty imposed is Death but reduced to reclusion perpetua because of RA
9346:
c. Exemplary damages"[111] -P100,000.00
1.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated but merely attempted:"[112]
a. Civil indemnity-P50.000.00
a. Civil indemnity - P75,000.00

:
2.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated, but merely attempted:
b. Moral damages-P25,000.00
III. For Complex crimes under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code where death, injuries, or
sexual abuse results, the civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages will
depend on the penalty, extent of violence and sexual abuse; and the number of victims
where the penalty consists of indivisible penalties:
9346:
The above Rules apply to every victim who dies as a result of the crime committed. In other
complex crimes where death does not result, like in Forcible Abduction with Rape, the civil
indemnity, moral and exemplary damages depend on the prescribed penalty and the penalty
imposed, as the case may be.
:
IV. For Special Complex Crimes like Robbery with Homicide,[113] Robbery with Rape,[114]
Robbery with Intentional Mutilation,[115] Robbery with Arson,[116] Rape with Flomicide,[117]
Kidnapping with Murder,[118] Carnapping with Homicide[119] or Carnapping with Rape,[120]
Highway Robbery with Homicide.[121] Quali!ed Piracy,[122] Arson with Homicide,[123] Hazing
with Death, Rape, Sodomy or Mutilation[124] and other crimes with death, injuries, and
sexual abuse as the composite crimes, where the penalty consists of indivisible penalties:
9346:
In Robbery with Intentional Mutilation, the amount of damages is the same as the above if
the penalty imposed is Death but reduced to reclusion perpetua although death did not
occur.
1.2 For the victims who su#ered mortal/fatal wounds[125] and could have died if not for a
timely medical intervention, the following shall be awarded:
1.3 For the victims who su#ered non-mortal/non-fatal injuries:

:
a. a. Civil indemnity - P75,000.00
In Robbery with Intentional Mutilation, the amount of damages is the same as the above if
the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua.
2.2 For the victims who su#ered mortal/fatal wounds and could have died if not for a timely
medical intervention, the following shall be awarded:
c. Exemplary damages -P50,000.00
2.3 For the victims who su#ered non-mortal/non-fatal injuries:
c. Exemplary damages a P25,000.00
In Robbery with Physical Injuries,[126] the amount of damages shall likewise be dependent
on the nature/severity of the wounds sustained, whether fatal or non-fatal.
The: above Rules do not apply if in the crime of Robbery with Homicide, the robber/s or
perpetrator/s are themselves killed or injured in the incident.
Where the component crime is rape, the above Rules shall likewise apply, and that for every
additional rape committed, whether against the same victim or other victims, the victims
:
shall be entitled to the same damages unless the other crimes of rape are treated as separate
crimes, in which case, the damages awarded to simple rape/quali!ed rape shall apply.
V. In other crimes that result in the death of a victim and the penalty consists of divisible
penalties, i.e., Homicide, Death under Tumultuous A#ray, Infanticide to conceal the
dishonour of the o#ender,[127] Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide, Duel, Intentional
Abortion and Unintentional Abortion, etc.:
1.1 Where the crime was consummated:

1.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated, except those crimes where there are
no stages, i.e., Reckless Imprudence and Death under tumultuous a#ray:
a. Frustrated:
i. Civil indemnity -P30,000.00
ii. Moral damages-P30,000.00
b. Attempted:
If an aggravating circumstance was proven during the trial, even if not alleged in the
Information,[128] in addition to the above mentioned amounts as civil indemnity and moral
damages, the amount of P50,000.00 exemplary damages for consummated; P30,000.00 for
frustrated; and P20,000.00 for attempted, shall be awarded.
VI. A. In the crime of Rebellion where the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua and death
occurs in the course of the rebellion, the heirs of those who died are entitled to the
following:[129]
c. Exemplary damages - P100,000.00[l30]
:
B. For the victims who su#ered mortal/fatal wounds in the course of the rebellion and could
have died if not for a timely medical intervention, the following shall be awarded:
C. For the victims who su#ered non-mortal/non-fatal injuries:
VII. In all of the above instances, when no documentary evidence of burial or funeral
expenses is presented in court, the amount of P50,000.00 as temperate damages shall be
awarded.
To reiterate, Article 2206 of the Civil Code provides that the minimum amount for awards of
civil indemnity is P3,000.00, but does not provide for a ceiling. Thus, although the
minimum amount cannot be changed, increasing the amount awarded as civil indemnity
can be validly modi!ed and increased when the present circumstance warrants it.[131]
Prescinding from the foregoing, for the two (2) counts of murder, attended by the ordinary
aggravating circumstance of dwelling, appellant should be ordered to pay the heirs of the
victims the following damages: (1) P100,000.00 as civil indemnity for each of the two
children who died; (2) P100,000.00 as moral damages for each of the two victims; (3)
another PI00,000.00 as exemplary damages for each of the two victims; and (4) temperate
damages in the amount of P50,000.00 for each of the two deceased. For the four (4) counts
of Attempted Murder, appellant should pay P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as
moral damages and P50,000.00 as exemplary damages for each of the four victims. In
addition, the civil indemnity, moral damages, exemplary damages and temperate damages
payable by the appellant are subject to interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum
from the !nality of this decision until fully paid.[132]
Lastly, this Court echoes the concern of the trial court regarding the dismissal of the charges
against Gilberto Estores and Roger San Miguel who had been identi!ed by Norberto Divina
:
as the companions of appellant on the night the shooting occurred. Norberto had been very
straightforward and unwavering in his identi!cation of Estores and San Miguel as the two
other people who !red the gunshots at his family. More signi!cantly, as noted by the
prosecutor, the testimonies of Estores and San Miguel, who insisted they were not at the
crime scene, tended to con$ict with the sworn statement of Danilo Fajarillo, which was the
basis for the Provincial Prosecutor's ruling that he !nds no probable cause against the two.
Danilo Fajarillo's sworn statement said that on June 6, 2002, he saw appellant with a certain
"Hapon" and Gilbert Estores at the crime scene, but it was only appellant who was carrying a
!rearm and the two other people with him had no participation in the shooting incident.
Said circumstances bolster the credibility of Norberto Divina's testimony that Estores and
San Miguel may have been involved in the killing of his two young daughters.
After all, such reinvestigation would not subject Estores and San Miguel to double jeopardy
because the same only attaches if the following requisites are present: (1) a !rst jeopardy has
attached before the second; (2) the !rst jeopardy has been validly terminated; and (3) a
second jeopardy is for the same o#ense as in the !rst. In turn, a !rst jeopardy attaches only
(a) after a valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) when a
valid plea has been entered; and (e) when the accused has been acquitted or convicted, or
the case dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.[133] In this case,
the case against Estores and San Miguel was dismissed before they were arraigned. Thus,
there can be no double jeopardy to speak of. Let true justice be served by reinvestigating the
real participation, if any, of Estores and San Miguel in the killing of Mary Grace and Claudine
Divina.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
January 30, 2012 in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 03252 is AFFIRMED with the following
MODIFICATIONS:
(1) In Criminal Case No. 7698-G, the Court !nds accused-appellant Ireneo Jugueta GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of the crime of murder de!ned under Article 248
of the Revised Penal Code, attended by the aggravating circumstance of dwelling, and
hereby sentences him to su#er two (2) terms of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for
parole under R.A. 9346. He is ORDERED to PAY the heirs of Mary Grace Divina and Claudine
:
Divina the following amounts for each of the two victims: (a) P100,000.00 as civil
indemnity; (b) P100,000.00 as moral damages; (c) P100,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
(d) P50,000.00 as temperate damages.
(2) In Criminal Case No. 7702-G, the Court !nds accused-appellant Ireneo Jugueta GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of four (4) counts of the crime of attempted murder de!ned and
penalized under Article 248 in relation to Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code, attended by
the aggravating circumstance of dwelling, and sentences him to su#er the indeterminate
penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correctional, as
minimum, to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, for each of the
four (4) counts of attempted murder. He is ORDERED to PAY moral damages in the amount
of P50,000.00, civil indemnity of P50,000.00 and exemplary damages of P50,000.00 to
each of the four victims, namely, Norberto Divina, Maricel Divina, Elizabeth Divina and Judv
Ann Divina.
(3) Accused-appellant Ireneo Jugueta is also ORDERED to PAY interest at the rate of six
percent (6%) per annum from the time of !nality of this decision until fully paid, to be
imposed on the civil indemnity, moral damages, exemplary damages and temperate
damages.
(4) Let the O"ce of the Prosecutor General, through the Department of Justice, be
FURNISHED a copy of this Decision. The Prosecutor General is DIRECTED to immediately
conduct a REINVESTIGATION on the possible criminal liability of Gilbert Estores and Roger
San Miguel regarding this case. Likewise, let a copy of this Decision be furnished the
Secretary of Justice for his information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Brion, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Perez,
Mendoza, Reyes, Leonen, and Caguioa, JJ., concur.
Perlas-Bernabe, J., on leave.
Jardeleza, J., no part.
:
NOTICE OF JUDGMENT
Sirs/Mesdames:
Please take notice that on April 5, 2016 a Decision/Resolution, copy attached herewith, was
rendered by the Supreme Court in the above-entitled case, the original of which was
received by this O"ce on May 3, 2016 at 1:44 p.m.
Very truly yours,
(SGD)
FELIPA G. BORLONGAN-ANAMA
Clerk of Court
[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Jane Aurora T. Lantion, with Associate Justices Isaias P.
Dicdican and Rodil V. Zalameda, concurring; rollo, pp. 2-21.
[2]
Record, Vol. 1, pp. 2-3.
[3]
Record, Vol. II., p. 2.
[4]
Order of the Provincial Prosecutor, Record, Vol. I, pp. 12-14.
[5]
RTC Order, Record, Vol. II, pp. 66-67.
:
[6]
TSN, February 5, 2004, Folder of TSN's.
[7]
TSN, March 3, 2004, Folder of TSN's
[8]
Id.
[9]
TSN, June 28, 2004, Folder of TSN's.
[10]
TSN's, February 10, 2005, April 7, 2005, February 15, 2006, August 3, 2006, September 6
2006 and June 7, 2006.
[11]
Record, Vol, I, pp. 293-294.
[12]
Record, Vol. II, p. 131.
[13]
Supra note 1.
[14]
Rollo, p. 27.
[15]
Rollo, pp. 33-34.
[16]
People of the Philippines v. Renandang Mamaruncas, 680 Phil. 192, 211 (2012).
[17]
TSN, July 14, 2004, pp. 6-8.
[18]
People v. Nazareno, 698 Phil. 187, 193 (2012).
[19]
People v. Advienlo, et al., 684 Phil. 507, 519 (2012)
[20]
Art. 248. 2 a Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246 shall kill
another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to death, if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or
employing moans to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or a#ord
impunity.
2. In consideration of a price, reward, or promise.
3. By means of inundation, !re, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel,

derailment or assault upon a street car or locomotive, fall of an airship, by means of motor
vehicles, or with the use of any other means involving great waste and ruin.
4. On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or of an

earthquake, eruption of a volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic or other public calamity.
5. With evident premeditation.
6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the su#ering of the victim, or
outraging or sco"ng at his person or corpse.
[21]
Supra note 11, at 287.
[22]
468 Phil. 816, 840 (2004), citing People v. Bustamante; 445 Phil. 345, 363-364 (2003);
People v. Magno, 379 Phil, 531, 554 (2000).
[23]
607 Phil. 480, 505 (2009).
[24]
"Magdasal ka na at katapusan mo na ngayon."
[25]
Supra note 12, at 128-129.
[26]
682 Phil. 164 (2012).
[27]
People v. Cabtalan, supra, at 168.
:
[28]
G.R. No. 161308, January 15, 2014, 713 SCRA 311.
[29]
Medina, Jr. v. People, supra, at 320.
[30]
G.R. No. 183652, February 25, 2015.
[31]
People of the Philippines and AAA v. Court of Appeals, 21st Division, Mindanao Station, et
al, supra.
[32]
694 Phil. 529, 581 (2012).
Art. 48. Penalty for Complex Crimes - When a single act constitutes two or more grave or
less grave felonies, or when an o#ense is a necessary means for committing the other, the
penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum
period.
[34]
People v. Nelmida, supra note 32, at 569-570. (Emphasis omitted)
[35]
Supra note 32.
[36]
People v. Nelmida, supra, at 570.
[37]
Supra note 2.
[38]
Supra note 3.
[39]
674 Phil. 626, 635 (2011).1
[40]
People v. Evangelic, 672 Phil. 229, 248-249 (2011).
[41]
Revised Penal Code, Art. 63, par. (1), provides, in part, that when the penalty consists of
two (2) indivisible penalties and is attended by one or more aggravating circumstances, the
:
greater penalty shall be applied, and in this case, the death penalty shall be imposed.
[42]
People v. Combate, 653 Phil. 487, 504 (2010), citing People v. Victor, 354 Phil. 195, 209
(1998)
[43]
Corpuz v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 180016, April 29, 2014 724 SCRA 1, 57.
[44]
Id. at 58-59.
[45]
G.R. No. 104576, January 20, 1995, 240 SCRA 348, 356-357.
[46]
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:
(1)A criminal o#ense resulting in physical injuries;

(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape or other lascivious acts;
(4) Adultery or concubinage;
(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
(6) Illegal search;
(7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;
(8) Malicious prosecution;
(9) Acts mentioned in Article 309;
(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26,27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.
The parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped or abused, referred to in No. 3 of this
article, may also recover moral damages.
The s,pouse, descendants, ascendants, and brother and sisters may bring the action
mentioned in No. 9 of this article, in the order named.
[47]
Art. 2220. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if
the court should !nd that, under the circumstances, such damages are justly due. The same
rule applies to breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.
:
[48]
Bagumbayan Corp. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, No. L-66274, September 30 1984 132
SCRA 441,446.
[49]
6A C.J.S. Assault A68.
[50]
G.R. No. 160709, February 23, 2005, 452 SCRA 285, 296.
[51]
Art. 2220. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if
the court should !nd that, under the circumstances, such damages are justly due. The same
rule applies to breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.
[52]
Lilo Corpuz v. People of the Philippines, supra note 43, at 59.
[53]
People v. Dalisay, 620 Phil. 831, 844 (2009), citing People v. Catubig, 416 Phil. 102, 119
(2001), citing American Cent. Corp. v. Stevens Van Lines, Inc., 103 Mich App 507, 303 NW2d
234; Morris v. Duncan, 126 Ga 467, 54 SE 1045; Faircloth v. Greiner, 174 Ga app 845, 332 SE 2d
905; A731, 22 Am Jur 2d, p. 784; American Surety Co. v. Gold, 375 F 2d 523, 20 ALR 3d 335;
Erwin v. Michigan, 188 Ark 658, 67SW2d592.
[54]
A762, 22 Am Jur 2d pp. 817-818.
[55]
A733. 22 Am Jur 2d, p. 785; Symposium: Punitive Damages, 56 So Cal LR 1, November
1982.
[56]
People v. Catubig, supra note 53, at 119-120.
[57]
Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 8 Designation of the o#ense. - The complaint or information shall state the designation
of the o#ense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the o#ense, and
specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of the
o#ense, reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it.
:
(Emphasis supplied)
Sec. 9, Cause of the accusations. - The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
o#ense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and
concise language and not necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms
su"cient to enable a person of common understanding to know what o#ense is being
charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating circumstances and for the court to
pronounce judgment. (Emphasis supplied)
[58]
G.R. Nos. 82223-24, November 13, 1992, 215 SCRA613, 634.
[59]
322 Phil. 551 (1996).
[60]
617 Phil. 587(2009).
[61]
613 Phil. 507(2009).
[62]
605 Phil. 877 (2009).
[63]
People v. Abdlera, 553 Phil. 307 (2007).
[64]
People v. Gambao, G.R. No. 172707, October 1, 2013, 706 SCRA 508, 533-534. People v.
Combats, supra note 41, at 509.
Art. 122. Piracy in general and mutiny on the high seas or in Philippine waters. - The penalty
of reclusion perpetua shall be in$icted upon any person who, on the high seas, or in
Philippine waters, shall attack or seize a vessel or, not being a member of its complement
nor a passenger, shall seize the whole or part of the cargo of said vessel, its equipment or
passengers. The same penalty shall be in$icted in case of mutiny on the high seas or in
Philippine waters.
[67]
Id.
:
[68]
Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. - Rape is committed by having carnal
knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;

2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented. The crime of rape shall be
punished by reclusion temporal, x x x.
[69]
Art. 123. Quali!ed piracy. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed
upon those who commit any of the crimes referred to in the preceding article, under any of
the following circumstances:
1. Whenever they have seized a vessel by boarding or !ring upon the same;
2. Whenever the pirates have abandoned their victims without means of saving themselves
or;
3. Whenever the crime is accompanied by murder, homicide, physical injuries or rape.
[70]
Art. 211-A. Quali!ed Bribery. - If any public o"cer is entrusted with law enforcement and
he refrains from arresting or prosecuting an o#ender who has committed a crime
punishable by reclusion perpetua and/or death in consideration of any o#er, promise, gift or
present, he shall su#er the penalty for the o#ense which was not prosecuted, x x x
[71]
Art. 246. Parricide. - Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether
legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse, shall be
guilty of parricide and shall be punished by the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.
[72]
Art. 248. Murder. - Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246 shall
kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua, to death
if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or
:
employing means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or a#ord
impunity.
2. In consideration of a price, reward or promise.
3. By means of inundation, !re, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel,
derailment or assault upon a railroad, fall of an airship, or by means of motor vehicles, or
with the use of any other means involving great waste and ruin.
4. On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or of an
earthquake, eruption of a volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic or other public calamity.
5. With evident premeditation.
6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the su#ering of the victim, or
outraging or sco"ng at his person or corpse.
[73]
Art. 255. Infanticide. - The penalty provided for parricide in Article 246 and for murder in
Article 248 shall be imposed upon any person who shall kill any child less than three days of
age.
[74]
Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. - Any private individual who shall
kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall su#er the
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death:
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days.
2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been in$icted upon the person kidnapped or
detained; or if threats to kill him shall have been made.
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is any of
the parents, female or a public o"cer.
...
[76]
Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons - Penalties. - Any
person guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of any person shall
su#er:
:
1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of the robbery,
the crime of homicide shall have been committed, or when the robbery shall have been
accompanied by rape or intentional mutilation or arson.
....
[76]
Art. 320. Destructive Arson. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be
imposed upon any person who shall burn:
1. One (1) or more buildings or edi!ces, consequent to one single act of burning, or as a result
of simultaneous burnings, committed on several or di#erent occasions.
2. Any building of public or private ownership, devoted to the public in general or where
people usually gather or congregate for a de!nite purpose such as, but not limited to, o"cial
governmental function or business, private transaction, commerce, trade, workshop,
meetings and conferences, or merely incidental to a de!nite purpose such as but not limited
to hotels, motels, transient dwellings, public conveyances or stops or terminals, regardless
of whether the o#ender had knowledge that there are persons in said building or edi!ce at
the time it is set on !re and regardless also of whether the building is actually inhabited or
not.
3. Any train or locomotive, ship or vessel, airship or airplane, devoted to transportation or

conveyance, or for public use, entertainment or leisure.
4. Any building, factory, warehouse installation and any appurtenances thereto, which are
devoted to the service of public utilities.
5. Any building the burning of which is for the purpose of concealing or destroying evidence
of another violation of law, or for the purpose of concealing bankruptcy or defrauding
creditors or to collect from insurance.
Irrespective of the application of the above enumerated qualifying circumstances, the

penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall likewise be imposed when the arson is
perpetrated or committed by two (2) or more persons or by a group of persons, regardless of
:
whether their purpose is merely to burn or destroy the building or the burning merely
constitutes an overt act in the commission or another violation of law.
The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall also be imposed upon any person who shall
burn:
1. Any arsenal, shipyard, storehouse or military powder or !reworks factory, ordnance,

storehouse, archives or general museum of the Government.
2. In an inhabited place, any storehouse or factory of in$ammable or explosive materials.
...
[77]
Republic Act No. 7080 (1991), Sec. 2. De!nition of the Crime of Plunder; Penalties. - Any
public o"cer who, by himself or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by
a"nity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses,
accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt criminal
acts as described in Section 1 (d) hereof in the aggregate amount or total value of at least
Fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be
punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Any person who participated with the said public
o"cer in the commission of an o#ense contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be
punished for such o#ense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the
attendance of mitigating and extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal
Code, shall be considered by the court. The court shall declare any and all ill-gotten wealth
and their interests and other incomes and assets including the properties and shares of
stocks derived from the deposit or investment thereof forfeited in favor of the State.
[78]
Republic Act No. 6539 (1972), Sec. 14. Penalty for Carnapping. - Any person who is found
guilty of carnapping, as this term is de!ned in Section Two of this Act, shall, irrespective of
the value of motor vehicle taken, be punished by x x x the penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death shall be imposed when the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle
is killed or raped in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion
thereof.
:
[79]
RA 9346, Sec. 2.
[80]
532 Phil. 368, 385 (2006).
[81]
532 Phil. 414, 428(2006).
[82]
See People v. Sarcia, 615 Phil. 97 (2009). Supra note 41.
[83]
People v. Victor, supra, at 210.
[84]
People v. Gambao, supra note 64, at 533.
[86]
384 Phil. 766 (2000).
[87]
People v. Anzapa, supra.
[88]
436 Phil. 719(2002).
[89]
Supra note 64.
[90]
People v. Gambao, supra note 64.
[91]
People v. Victor, supra note 42, at 210.
[92]
ARTICLE 48. Penalty for complex crimes. a When a single act constitutes two or more
grave or less grave felonies, or when an o#ense is a necessary means for committing the
other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its
maximum period.
[93]
674 Phil. 444 (2011).
[94]
315 Phil. 314(1995).
:
[95]
Id. at 338.
[96]
608 Phil. 701 (2009).
[97]
People v. De Leon, supra, at 716-717, citing People v. Salazar, 342 Phil. 745, 765 (1997)-
People v. Abuyen, G.R. No. 77285, September 4, 1992, 213 SCRA 569, 582; People v. Ponciano,
G.R. No. 86453 December 5, 1991, 204 SCRA 627, 639 and People v. Mangulabnan, et al., 99
Phil. 992 999 (1956)
[98]
People v. Nonas, 415 Phil. 683 (2001), citing People v. Penillos, G.R. No. 65673, January 30,
1992, 205 SCRA 546, 564 and People v. Sequino, 332 Phil. 90 (1996).
[99]
400 Phil. 1221 (2000).
[100]
People v. Macabales, supra, at 1236-1237, citing People v. Vivas, G.R. No, 100914, May 6,
1994, 232 SCRA 238, 242.
[101]
Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons; Penalties. a Any
person guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of any person shall
su#er:
1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of the robbery,
the crime of homicide shall have been committed.
2. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua when the
robbery shall have been accompanied by rape or intentional mutilation, or if by reason or on
occasion of such robbery, any of the physical injuries penalized in subdivision 1 of Article
263 shall have been in$icted; Provided, however, that when the robbery accompanied with
rape is committed with a use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty
shall be reclusion perpetua to death (As amended by PD No. 767).
3. The penalty of reclusion temporal, when by reason or on occasion of the robbery, any of
:
the physical injuries penalized in subdivision 2 of the article mentioned in the next
preceding paragraph, shall have been in$icted.
4. The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its medium
period, if the violence or intimidation employed in the commission of the robbery shall have
been carried to a degree clearly unnecessary for the commission of the crime, or when the
course of its execution, the o#ender shall have in$icted upon any person not responsible for
its commission any of the physical injuries covered by sub-divisions 3 and 4 of said Article
263. (As amended by R.A. 18)
5. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium
period in other cases. (As amended by R, A. 18).
[102]
People v. De Leon, supra note 96; People v. Ebet, 649 Phil. 181 (2010).
[103]
Revised Penal Code, Art. 293. Who are guilty of robbery. - Any person who, with intent
to gain, shall take any personal property belonging to another, by means of violence against
or intimidation of any person, or using force upon anything, shall be guilty of robbery.
[104]
People v. Tagudar; 600 Phil. 565, 590 (2009), citing People v. Dacillo, 471 Phil. 497, 5 10
(2004).
[105]
Id, citing People v. Surongon, 554 Phil. 448, 458 (2007).
[106]
Article 255, RTC.
[107]
Article 248, RTC.
[108]
Article 246, RTC.
[109]
Article 262, RTC.
Note that if the crime penalized in Article 255 [Infanticide] was committed by the mother of
:
the child for the purpose of concealing her dishonor, she shall su#er the penalty of prision
mayor in its medium and maximum periods, and if said crime was committed for the same
purpose by the maternal grandparents or either of them, the penalty shall be reclusion
temporal. (As amended by R.A. 7659). Hence, the damages to be awarded should be the same
as in Roman Numeral Number Five (V) of the summary, i.e., In other crimes that result in
the death of the victim and the penalty consists of divisible, because the prescribed
penalties arc divisible.
[111]
Exemplary damages in rape cases are awarded for the inherent bestiality of the act
committed even if no aggravating circumstance attended the commission of the crime.
[112]
There is no frustrated stage in the crime of rape.
[113]
Art. 294(1), RPC.
[114]
Id.
[115]
Id.
[116]
Id.
[117]
Art. 266-A, RPC as amended by RA 8353.
[118]
Art. 267, RPC.
[119]
RA No. 6539.
[220]
Id.
[221]
P.D. 532.
[122]
Art. 123, RPC.
:
[123]
Art. 320, RPC.
[124]
RA No. 8049.
This is so because there are no stages of the component crime in special complex crimes
but the victims must be compensated as if the component crimes were separately
committed.
[126]
Art. 294 (3), RPC.
[127]
If the crime of infanticide in Art. 255 of the RPC was committed by the mother of the
child or by the maternal grandparent/s in order to conceal her dishonor, the penalties
against them are divisible, i.e., prision mayor in its medium and maximum periods, and
reclusion temporal, respectively.
[128]
See People v. Catubig, supra note 53.
[129]
Although the penalty prescribed by law is reclusion perpetua, the damages awarded
should be the same as those where the penalty is death due to the gravity of the o#ense and
the manner of committing the same.
[130]
In order to deter the commission of the crime of rebellion and serve as an example,
exemplary damages should be awarded.
[131]
Supra note 38.
[132]
See Dario Nacar v. Gallery Frames and/or Felipe Bordey, Jr., G.R. No 189871, August 13
2013 703 SCRA 439, 459.
[133]
Quiambao v. People, G.R. No. 185267, September 17, 2014, 735 SCRA 345, 356-357.
:

G.R. No. 202124 - People vs. Jugueta

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G.R. No. 202124 - People vs. Jugueta

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Title

People vs. Jugueta

Case Decision Date

Accused-appellant Ireneo Jugueta appealed his conviction for Double Murder

783 Phil. 806

[ G.R. No. 202124, April 05, 2016 ]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. IRENEO JUGUETA, ACCUSED-

Point of Exit - 7th ICS mid-axillary line, left;"

which directly caused their instant death.

The appeal is unmeritorious.

Q: What kind of light was there?

Q: Where was the gas lamp placed at that time?

Q: How many gunshots did you hear?

Q: After the !rst shot, was there any second shot?

Q: How many of the three were holding guns at that time?

Q: And they !red shots at the same time?

Q: After they !red their shots, they left your house?

Criminal Case No. 7698-G for Double Murder:

Criminal Case No. 7702-G for Multiple Attempted Murder:

In People v. De Leon,[96] we expounded on the special complex crime of robbery with

Art. 6. Consummated, frustrated, and attempted felonies. -Consummated felonies, as well as

I. For those crimes[106] like, Murder,[107] Parricide,[108] Serious Intentional Mutilation,[109]

1.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated:

i. Civil indemnity - P75,000.00

ii. Moral damages - P75,000.00

iii. Exemplary damages a P75,000.00

ii. Exemplary damages - P50,000.00

iii. Exemplary damages - P50,000.00

a. Civil indemnity -P75,000.00

b. Moral damages - P75,000.00

c. Exemplary damages - P75,000.00

2.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated:

i. Civil indemnity - P50,000.00

ii. Moral damages - P50,000.00

ii. Moral damages - P25,000.00

iii. Exemplary damages - P25,000.00

II. For Simple Rape/Quali!ed Rape:

b. Moral damages - P100,000.00

c. Exemplary damages"[111] -P100,000.00

b. Moral damages - P50,000.00

c. Exemplary damages - P50,000.00

a. Civil indemnity - P75,000.00

b. Moral damages - P75,000.00

c. Exemplary damages - P25,000.00

b. Moral damages - P100,000.00

c. Exemplary damages - P100,000.00

b. Moral damages - P75,000.00

c. Exemplary damages - P75,000.00

b. Moral damages - P100,000.00

c. Exemplary damages - P100,000.00

a. Civil indemnity - P75,000.00

b. Moral damages - P75,000.00

c. Exemplary damages - P75,000.00

1.3 For the victims who su#ered non-mortal/non-fatal injuries:

a. Civil indemnity - P50,000.00

b. Moral damages - P50,000.00

c. Exemplary damages - P50,000.00

a. a. Civil indemnity - P75,000.00

b. Moral damages - P75,000.00

c. Exemplary damages - P75,000.00