Defence Tech Notes

Defence Tech notes
Satyajit S Meti ae20b054

May 2024
1 Technology in Ukraine Russia War

• INTRO:When it comes to technology, the war in Ukraine is a
war of juxtapositions. On the one hand, this is the first major war in
which a variety of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) — or drones — have
played such a prominent role. On the other hand, this new technology has
played a major part in forcing infantry to dig lines of trenches reminiscent
of the First and Second World Wars.
Some of the technology in the war in Ukraine, such as the guided missiles
being used by both sides, isn’t fundamentally all that new. Modern guided
missiles trace their origin back to early developments during the latter part
of the Second World War.
Modern precision-guided weapons may be increasingly accurate in hitting
their targets, but there is all too often considerable human error in allo-
cating targets for them.
What is new in the war in Ukraine is that it isn’t like many of the
“small wars” of the late 20th and early 21st centuries, in which
one side had an almost overwhelming technological advantage.
The Taliban in Afghanistan didn’t have access to satellite imaging, large
drones and precision-guided munitions, or even weapons to counter these,
so they had to fight an “unconventional” or “asymmetrical” war.
In the war in Ukraine, both sides have access to and are devel-
oping new and not-so-new technologies, with neither side having
an overall technological edge.
• DRONE Tech:What is different in the war in Ukraine is the sheer num-
ber and range of drones being used. Large drones are still being used —
including Iranian-developed “suicide” or “kamikaze” drones like the Sha-
hed being used by Russia — that can strike targets deep inside enemy
territory. However, smaller drones are being used by both sides — of-
ten nearer to the frontline — for reconnaissance, artillery spotting and as
kamikaze drones.
At the beginning of the war, the Ukrainian side had an advantage
in drone warfare — that advantage has now arguably passed to
1
Russia. Russia has been able to produce and import huge num-
bers of drones and develop some effective local countermeasures
against Ukrainian drones.
Ukrainian naval drones have, however, been a particular problem
for the Russian navy.
Footage appearing to show the sinking of the Russian warship Sergei Ko-
tov. The recent sinking of the large patrol ship Sergei Kotov with naval
drones is a case in point. Modern warships are not bristling with the sort
of anti-aircraft guns that their Second World War counterparts had to
stop kamikaze pilots for example.
But quite possibly they will soon be bristling again, because such guns
are ideal for dealing with drones at close range. Even the humble torpedo
net from the late 19th century may make a return to try to stop drones
reaching ships at anchor.
• MISSILE Technology:While in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. and
other western powers made heavy use of guided missiles. What is dif-
ferent in Ukraine is that both sides have access to them.
For example, the Russian Iskander and Anglo-French Storm Shadow
missiles have proven highly effective at striking targets deep in
the enemy rear. Often targets for such missiles have been located using
drones.
Many tanks are being destroyed not only by or with the help of
drones, but with anti-tank missiles such as the Russian Kornet,
or much vaunted U.S.-supplied Javelin on the Ukrainian side.
Anti-tank missiles are not new — the Egyptian armed forces for example
made good use of recently developed Soviet anti-tank missiles during the
Yom Kippur War in 1973.
The anti-tank missiles being used in Ukraine today are however
much more sophisticated. Back in 1973, anti-tank missiles often
had to be connected to the operator through a fine wire that was
reeled out by the missile as it flew! Today’s missiles typically
have more sophisticated and reliable targeting.
• Conclusion:While new technology has transformed the fighting in Ukraine,

there are still many elements that would be easily understood by soldiers
in the First World War.
Firstly, regardless of all the technology, ultimately the “poor bloody in-
fantry” has to move in and occupy territory — and fight for it at close
quarters. Soldiers still often have to kill other soldiers while in close prox-
imity to each other.
Typically, the technology of today may be new, but the function
isn’t. We could, for example, see drones playing a role like the observa-
2
tion balloons of the First World War. These were used in particular for
directing artillery fire.
Balloons stopped being used in war because of the development of weapons
that could easily shoot them down, from aircraft to high-powered anti-
aircraft guns. When a new technology comes along, the race begins
to counter it. The Russian armed forces have already had some
success in jamming the link between drone operators and their
drones.
• WHATS NXT: Autonomous drones using AI are in many ways
a nightmare idea, but they are being worked on.
Autonomous anti-drone drones would no doubt follow.
One thing is certain — new technologies will be developed, to
be followed by countermeasures. New hi-tech ways of killing or facil-
itating it will continue to serve alongside the old methods.
• SIDE EFFECTS OF AUTONOMY AND AI:. The use and even
the loss of autonomous systems, on the other hand, is less politically costly
than the loss of human lives. Scholars have therefore warned that with
this perception that deploying autonomous systems for military purposes
comes at a lower political cost, leaders may be more inclined to initiate
conflict.5 Others have suggested that this perception of lower political
costs may not only make conflicts easier to start but also more difficult to
end, especially in the context of urban warfare.6 The proliferation of these
technologies to more countries and nonstate actors will likely increase the
risk of conflict and spread instability across the international system.
Another set of arguments centers on how the use of AI and autonomous
technologies could increase the risk of intentional, inadvertent, or acci-
dental escalation—whether from a crisis to a conflict, or conventional to
nuclear confrontation—due to misperceptions, miscalculations, or acci-
dents.7 Some arguments have focused more specifically on the connection
between AI and nuclear weapons, examining how advances in AI could be
exploited across the nuclear deterrence architecture—from early warning
and intelligence, surveillance,
Today, AI technology remains too brittle and vulnerable to attacks for
nuclear-armed states to delegate nuclear command and control functions,
and specifically missile-launch decisions to AI. Yet, some scholars have
suggested that with improvements in technology, concerns about retain-
ing first strike advantage or ensuring retaliation could prompt countries,
perhaps particularly Russia, to activate fully automated nuclear command
and control systems (as the USSR has done during the Cold War).9 Aside
from command and control, researchers have posited that improvements
in autonomous systems, specifically in undersea vehicles that can locate
and shadow adversary submarines, increase the vulnerability of nuclear
delivery systems, which could in turn undermine strategic stability and
deterrence.10
3
2 Israel Hamas conflict
• Oct 7 Hamas attacked Israel on the borders of GAZA.
• Axis of resistance :supported by Iran;Hamas in Gaza,Houdis in Yemen;Hezbollah
in Lebanon.
Like many other modern conflicts, the war has been shaped by a prolif-
eration of inexpensive unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), also known as
drones, which have made attacks from the air easier and cheaper.
Hamas used them to drop explosives on October 7, while Israel has turned
to new tech to shoot them down.
In a first, the army has used an AI-enabled optic sight, made

by Israeli startup Smart Shooter, which is attached to weapons
such as rifles and machine guns.”It helps our soldiers to intercept
drones because Hamas uses a lot of drones,” said the senior
defence official. ”It makes every regular soldier – even a blind soldier –
a sniper
”It helps our soldiers to intercept drones because Hamas uses a lot of
drones,” said the senior defence official.
”It makes every regular soldier – even a blind soldier – a sniper
Another system to neutralise drones involves deploying a friendly
drone with a net that it can throw around the enemy craft to
neutralise it.
”It’s drone versus drone – we call it Angry Birds,” the official said.
Hamas tunnels To map the tunnels the army has turned to
drones that use AI to learn to detect humans and can operate
underground, including one made by Israel startup Robotican
that encases a drone inside a robotic case.
It is being used in Gaza ”to enter into tunnels and to see as far as the
communication lets you,” the senior Israeli defence official said.
Before the war the technology did not allow drones to operate underground
because of issues sending images to the surface, the official added.
IDF Israeli infantry divisions are using a third-generation targeting system
known as Dagger. Dagger was developed by the Israeli company Smart
Shooter based on the SMASH electro-optic, algorithm-based fire control
system. The system tracks the target and alerts the shooter to the optimal
firing moment
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Defence Tech notes

Satyajit S Meti ae20b054

1 Technology in Ukraine Russia War

• Conclusion:While new technology has transformed the fighting in Ukraine,

In a first, the army has used an AI-enabled optic sight, made

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