TRIBAL REBELLIONS IN NORTH ORISSA: A STUDY ON KOL UPRISING OF MAYURBHANJ

STATE (1821-1836)
Author(s): Ashok Priyadarshi
Source: Proceedings of the Indian History Congress , 2010-2011, Vol. 71 (2010-2011), pp.
696-705
Published by: Indian History Congress
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/44147538

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TRIBAL REBELLIONS IN NORTH ORISSA:
A STUDY ON KOL UPRISING OF
MAYURBHANJ STATE (1821-1836)
Ashok Priyadarshi

Mayurbhanj situated between 21°17' and 22°34' north latitude and

between 85°40' and 87°10' east longitude was a Garjat or Princely
State and became a Tributary Mahal of British Orissa in 1804.1 It was
surrounded by Singhbhum, Sareikala and Midnapur in the north,
Keonjhar, Nilgiri and Balasore in the south, Midnapur and Balasore in
the east, and Singhbhum and Keonjhar in the west during Garjat period.2
IOt was the biggest Garjat State of Orissa covering an area of 4243
square miles. According to the census of 1872 its population was
2, 58, 680. 3 At present it is the largest, northern most and predominantly
tribal district of Orissa province. It also occupies the top list in the
tribal map of Orissa. Out of 62 types of tribes found in Orissa, 53 live
in Mayurbhanj, chief of them are Kols, Santals, Bhumijas, Bathudis,
Birhors, Kharias and Lodhas.4
In the 19th century Orissa witnessed a series of anti-colonial revolts
of which the Kondh rebellions in Ghunsur, Kalahandi and Chinakimedi;
Bhuyan rebellions in Keonjhar; Kol-Santhal uprisings in Mayurbhanj,
etc, are the most important. Since no detailed study has yet been done
on tribal rebellions of north Orissa, this paper examines the uprising in
this area especially in Mayurbhanj during the first half of the 19th
century. In this period the State of Mayurbhanj experienced two notable
movements, namely, the Kol Rebellion of 1821 and the Kol Rebellion
of 1831-36.5

Kol Rebellion of 1821

Soon after the occupation of Orissa in 1803 the British found that
Bamanghaty was a place of strategic importance, since the Calcutta-
Nagpur-Bombay mail route popularly known as Jackson Road or the
famous Jagannath Sadak passed through this territory.6 The British were
much concerned about the safety of the dak- route because the
depredations committed by the Kols often caused great inconvenience
and insecurity.7 This British wanted to suppress the tribal people through
the Raja of Mayurbhanj. Free movement of these people along Jackson
Road was restricted. Sometimes innocents were punished by the British
Therefore they rebelled against the authorities.

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 Modem India 697

The Kols and other tribes could no

in their traditional exclusive soci
log ' meaning sons of the soil. Th
' hatuď as they generally live in
plainland.8 Santals and Kols loved
serene tribal atmosphere was disg
elements and their exploitative n
when there was outside interferen
and privileges.
The intervention of non-tribal peo
to appropriate the lands of the tribal people created a hostile
environment. The non-tribals such as zamindars , merchants and money-
lenders harassed the tribais. During the colonial period there was large
scale immigration of non-tribals to the areas because of the new land
settlements and introduction of new market economy.9 As a result, large
number of ' hatua ' businessmen frequented these tribal areas and earned
profit in dealing with various forest products like turmeric, sandalwood,
palo , jhuna, honey, lac, etc. In this new market economy the tribais
were exploited by these merchants. The economic exploitation made
them restive.

The prolonged dispute between the raja of Mayurbhanj and his

vassal Sarbarakar of Bamanghaty added fuel to fire. Niranjan Das
Mohapatra was the Sarvarakar (. zamindar ) during the reign of Raja
Trivikram Bhanjadeo (18 13- 1829). 10 He was given charge of collecting
the revenue and protecting the safe passage of British dak service in
Bamanghaty region.11 But he was exploiting the people there on the
other hand he complained to the Collector of Midnapur that the Raja
of Mayurbhanj was creating terror at Bamanghaty with the help of local
tribes.12 However, the Raja replied to the Collector depicting Niranjan
Mohapatra as a man of indispline, disloyalty and characterlessness.13
The Sarvarakar did not want to submit the collected revenues and other
dues to the Raja and wanted to become free. This was the situation
which disturbed the discipline and systematic political and economic
administration of the Kol pirs of Bamanghaty.14
The Kol rebellion of Singhbhum in 1821 greatly influenced the
Kols of Bamanghaty. The Kol tribes of Singhbhum first started
resistance movement against their king.
In 1821 the Kols started the predatory activities in Singhbhum and
then in Mayurbhanj, attacked British troops, did not pay any tax, and
showed indisciplined behaviour along Jackson Road. An expedition
under Major E. Roughsedge was sent to subdue the tribais of
Mayurbhanj at Bamanghaty to pay revenues to their overland.15 As a

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698 IHC-ģ Proceedings, 71st Session, 2010-11

result the tribais agreed to pay revenue and keep the road safe.
Roughsedge suggested to the government that the four Kol pirs of
Mayurbhanj should be controlled from Midnapur because these places
were too distant from Cuttack and the Commissioner of Cuttack could
neither get information quickly nor reach there promptly to deal with
an emergency.16 He also pointed out, "... for some years a vigilant
superintendence of the conduct of Bamanghatee Zumindar towards the
Coles of these Pergunnahs and frequent enquiry into habits of the Coles
themselves, to ascertain whether they have actually discontinued their
predatory practices, will be essential to the security and usefulness of
the Dawk, which is established on Jackson's road, and can only be
ascertained with convenience and efficiency, I submit from
Midnapore."17
The heads of villages of Thai and Bharbharia pirs were anxious to
make their personal appearance in the camp of Roughsedge for
submission to the British government while those of Lalganj and Aula
pirs submitted to Captain Mcleod at Jayantigarh.18
After the Larka Kols surrendred to the British, an agreement was
concluded between them and Roughsedge. The main features of the
agreement were as follows'.19
(i) The Kols agreed to be loyal and obedient to the British.
(ii) They agreed to pay their dues to their king through Sarvarakar.
(iii) They agreed to keep the road communication safe and open to
ensure safety of daks .
(iv) They were to encourage their children to read either che Oriya or
the Hindi language.
(v) They agreed not take up arms against their chief under any
circumstances but were to complain to the officer commanding
British troops or to other competent authority.
(vi) They were not to allow persons of all castes to settle in their
villages.
Roughsedge transferred the four Kol pirs from Raja of Mayurbhanj
to the administration of the Political Agent of Hazaribagh. In fact the
Sarvarakar of Bamanghaty was placed under Hazaribagh in relation to
Kol pirs and his lord the Raja of Mayurbhanj continued to have political
relation with the Commissioner of Cuttack, the Superintendent of Orissa
Tributary Mahals.20

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 Modem India 699

Kol Rebellion of 1831-36

After ten years the dissatisfied again revolted for a long period from
1831 to 1836 in Bamanghaty Zamindari. The introduction of
Roughsedge's new system of dual control of administration encouraged
the Sarvarakar of Bamanghaty to proclaim his independence from the
control of Maharaja of Mayurbhanj.21 The British interference in Kol
pir affairs not only placed the Raja of Mayurbhanj in an embarrassing
situation, but also gave scope to further disagreements between the
Raja and the Sarvarakar.22 Roughedge's arrangement, without consulting
either the Superintendent of Tributary Mahals or the Raja of
Mayurbhanj, was highly unjust and illegal. Anticipating such
complications, major W. Blunt, the Superintendent wrote to the Political
Departmet.23
The Zamindaree of Mohurbunge being one of the Tributary States
which by section 37, Ragulation XIII and Section 13, Regulation
XIII of 1805 are executed from the operation of the general
Regulations of Government and which have been placed under the
exclusive charge of a Superintendent of those Mahals. I am of the
opinion that the arrangement suggested by Major Roughsedge might
upon this ground alone be liable to objection as it would become
necessary to enact a new Regulation or to appoint a separate
Superintendent of Midnapore for the charge of that portion of
Mohurbunge estate.
This action actually a violation of the 1 805 Regulation. In consequence
an unhealthy rivalry developed between the Political Agent of
Hazaribagh and the Commissioner of Cuttack in matters relating to
control over Bamanghaty and the rivalry at once became so acute that
it led to the resignation of G. Stockwell, the Commissioner of Cuttack.24
Taking advantage of the support of the Hazaribagh Agency the
sarvarakar of Bamanghaty adopted a defiant attitude towards his chief,
the Raja of Mayurbhanj, for which the relationship between the two
was bound to deteriorate further.25 The Commissioner of Cuttack wanted
to help the Raja but the Hazaribagh Agent supported the Sarvarakar.26
On 3rd March 1827 the new Sarvarakar, Madhav Das Mohapatra, son
of Niranjan Mohapatra (Dharua tribal), complained that the Raja of
Mayurbhanj, Trivikram Bhanja, had extracted a Kabuliyat for Rs.701,
by deceitful means , from his father and was coercing the Kols to pay
him the dues through two of his agents named Ram Singh and Dina
Singh.27 Madhav Das sought British help to stop the alleged oppression
of the Raja and expressed his willingness to pay Rs.121 Annually to
the Raja of Mayurbhanj. Apprehending the outbreak of disturbances in
Bamanghaty, the Political Agent of Hazaribagh, Colonel Gilbert,
requested the Cuttack Commissioner, Thomas Pokenham, to ask the

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700 IHC.Ě Proceedings , 71st Session, 2010-11

Raja of Mayurbhanj not to collect tax and exploit the tribal Kols.28 He
also stated that the Raja would not extract revenue from the Kols
because they had already made payment to Madhav Das and considered
such actions highly improper.29 Again Madhav Das appealed to Gilbert
claiming Bamanghaty as ' Khasdes ' (rent free land) and holding up the
threat of breach of peace by the ignorant tribesmen.30
In the meantime Maharaja Jadunath Bhanjadeo succeeded to the
throne of Mayurbhanj in 1829. Trouble broke out afresh between him
and Madhav Das. Madhav Das gave a petition before Major Mackenjie,
the Political Agent of Hazaribagh, on 8th May, 1 829, against the Raja.31
The above references indicate that the rivalry between the Raja of
Mayurbhanj and the Sarvarakar of Bamanghaty became the major cause
of Kol disturbance of 1831. They also instigated the Kols by giving
tall promises from both sides.32
Contemporary British officials such as J. Master, Russel and Dent,
reported that the involvement of the local chiefs resulted in the Kol
rebellion. The. Kunwar (king) of Sareikala supported the cause of
Madhav Das Mohapatra.33 The Kols were not happy with the agreement
of 1821 . They could not tolerate the restriction of their freedom. The
opening up of the pirs to outsiders resulted in great socio-economic
exploitation, which they opposed. However, the immediate cause of
the revolt, according to Captain Wilkinson, was the Raja's effort to
capture Bamanghaty.34 Broadly speaking, after an analysis of the above
discussed facts and events, we came to know that the rivalry between
the Raja and Sarvarakar, the attitude of Commissioner of Cuttack and
Political Agent of Hazaribagh, the confusion of tribais about the two
authorities became the causes of the rebellion of 1 83 1 .

The movement from 1831 to 1836 was a continuous course of

repeated disturbances. In December 1 83 1 the four Kol pirs were placed
under Cuttack and decided to remove the Binjhua guards.35 Thereafter
a widespread unrest started. The Mamanghaty Kols were apparently
instigated by the Sarvarakar against the Raja.36 The two brothers of the
Raja (Routray and Chootray) were present in Bamanghaty to protect
strategic places against likely Kol raiders. Madhav Das too roused his
own castemen, the Dharuas and the Kols of Lalganj and Aula pris, and
advanced with a view to wrecki vengeance.37 The Kols, between them,
plundered and laid waste the entire countryside.38 The ryots or farmers
began to run away and by April 1832 the security of government dak
was in serious jeopardy.39 An eye witness account of the lawlessness
prevailing in Bamanghaty is available from a report of Mudeelal, the
'Dawk Moonshee' of Bamanghaty which states.40

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 Modem India 701

Raja Jadu Nath Bheej, Zumeend

Bhumun Ghatee and established himself there and behaved
tyrannically and oppressively towards Mado Dass Mahapatur the
Zumeendar of Bhumun Ghatee: on this account the last named
Zumeendar taking his followers with him and quitting that part of
the country has gone elsewhere ... The Coles plunder every village
and carry away rice, paddy and cow. The whole country is desolate.
It is only in the dak chowkies that the servants of Government and
the runners remain.

Bamanghaty divided the allegiance of the Kols between the Raja and
the Sarvarakar. Thai and Bharbharia supported the Raja whereas Lai
and Aula Kols were with the Sarvarakar. The result was loot, burning,
depredation and other violent incidents.41
As the Raja of Mayurbhanj did not possess adequate troops, nor
courage, to resist the Commissioner of Cuttack, Stockwell decided to
help the Raja in enforcing his rightful authority over the Zamindar. He
was asked by the Government to explain measures taken so far for
restoring peace in the disturbed area. The Government also authorized
him to use military forces stationed at Midnapur under the command
of Colonel Doveton in case of insurrection spreading to British territory
or in the event of the communication between Midnapur and Sambalpur
being cut off or in case he found that the insurrection could not be
suppressed without exercise of military force.42
On 23 April 1832 Stockwell reached Joka, where under orders of
Madhav Das robbery of dak had been perpetuated on 10 April. He
received the report that his messengers carrying letters to Madhav Das
were intercepted and the guides had been kidnapped and subsequently
murdered.43 A group of 200 insurgents were ready at Cordjoore pass to
obstruct the advancing army. As Stockwell advanced through Sarinda,
more instances of plunder were brought to his notice. His attempts to
communicate with Mahav Das bore no fruit.44 Madhav Das secretly
increased the strength of his followers.45 The request of Stockwell for
more armed force for the control of the rebellion was responded to by
the government. The Hazaribagh agent, Wilkinson, in the meantime,
suggested that for restoring peace and tranquility it was necessary to
adjust the Zamindar's relationship with his chief. He invited the
Zamindar (Sarvarakar) on 11th May 1832, with the assurance of
restoration of peace and investigation of the dispute.46 He also proposed
a meeting of the leading Kols and the Sarvarakar with the Raja to effect
a reconciliation.47 But this policy of appeasement naturally shocked
Stockwell and on 1 June, 1832, he tendered resignation.48
After this, a joint enquiry was made by the authorities of Cuttack
and Hazaribagh which recommended to government that:49

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702 ĪHC: Proceedings, 71st Session, 2010-11

(a) The four Kol pirs would be restored to the Sarvarakar of

Bamanghaty;
(b) Sadrvarakar would be under the Mayurbhanj Raja; and
(c) Sarvarakar would pay Rs.101/- per annum as tribute to the Raja.
In their Despatch to the court of Directors dated 3 1st July 1 832 the
government stated:
This disturbance was suppressed in May and we have concluded an
agreement which we trust will have the effect of preventing the
animosities of the parties, from leading to further acts of violence.50

The Court of Directors approved restoration on 12th February 1834.

But actually peace was not established between the Raja and the
Sarvarakar. The tribal movement continued. Though a number of
petitions and counter-petitions were filed before the British Government
by both the parties asking for justice, the Government rigidly pursued
a policy of non-intervention. This policy of the Government resulted
anger and impatience, and provoked the Raja, Jadunath Bhanja, to
march with his troops into Bamanghaty in August 1834, to expel the
Sarvarakar Madhav Das along with his family and other leading
members.52 Madhav Das fled to Ghatsila.53 The Raja was even
determined to drive out the Kol insurgents from Bamanghaty where he
was established firmly.54
The involvement of Kunwar of Sareikala in Bamanghaty further
complicated the situation apprehending the Mayurbhanj Raja's entry
into Kuchang. Both the chiefs used the Larka Kols as mere pawns on
the chess-board of rebellion and the Kols allowed themselves to be so
used on account of their malleable nature. The Hazaribagh agent
Wilkinson, led to the Kol Pirs with a strong force in August 1836 to
restore law and order. In his dispatch of 22nd August, 1836, he wrote
that the Kols of Mayurbhanj were primarily responsible for the outrages.
Afterwards both Rickietts and Wilkinson agreed that the best
arrangement would be to place the Kol pirs under direct management
of the British Government.55

The notorious plunderers were arrested during the military

operations. The looted daks were recovered. The cattle stolen from
neighbouring areas were restored. All Moonda and Kol Saredars were
forced to enter into direct engagements with the British.56 As a
permanent solution the government placed the four Kol pirs of
Mayurbhanj under direct administration, and formed Kolhan. Lieutenant
Tickell was appointed Assistant Political Agent and was given charge
of the newly formed administrative unit.57

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 Modem India 703

The Kolhan was formed in 183

622 villages. The village-wise
follows:58

Raja of Singhbhum - 357

Kunwar of Sareikala - 5 1

Thakur of Kharswan - 03

Raja of Mayurbhanj - 181

Captain Wilkinson also drew up a directive for the smooth
of administration of the newly formed Kolhan free-state.
There is a need to identify the nature of the tribal uprisings.
the colonial administrators and historians have viewed the tribal
movements as unconscious, non-political disturbances without any
ideology, some scholars in the post-independence period consider tribal
movements as a prelude to the freedom movement. The subaltern school
of historians speaks about the history of the people and politics of the
people, where the main actors were no the dominant groups of
indigenous society but the subaltern classes, tribes, peasants, landless
labourers, etc.
To conclude, the history of society will not be complete without a
record of the activities of all sections of people living in it. Therefore
it is necessary to study and write history in the areas of tribal identity,
tribal revolts, socio-economic structure and cultural life of the tribais
in the backward regions of our nation. We have to understand these
people, make them understand us and thus create a bond of affection
and understanding, otherwise growing political awareness would lead
to a series of internal problems which would weaken national unity
and its composite culture.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1 . Sahu and Senapati (ed.), Or issa District Gazetteers (ODG)> Mayurbhanj

1967, p. 2.
2. Cobden-Ramsay, Feudatory States of Orissa (FSO), (Bengal Gaze tiers), Howrah,
1950, p. 47.
3. ODG , Mayurbhanj, p.92.
4. Ibid., p. 11 6.
5. Mishra, Prabodh Kumar, Mayurbhanj ar ltihas O ' Sanskrutir Mukhyadhara,
Cuttack, 2004, pp.76-78.
6. Hunter, W.W., A Statistical Account of Bengal, Vol. XIX, London, 1877, p.302.
7. The Kol Pirs of Mayurbhanj, (State Govt. Publication, year not mentioned), pp.4-
5.

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704 IHC: Proceedings , 71st Session, 2010-11
8. Praharaj, D.M., Tribal Movements and Political History in India , New Delhi,
1987, p. 104.
9. Patra, S.K., 'Mayurbhanj State 1912-49: A Study of Political Development and
Tribal Movements', published M.Phil thesis, Sambalpur University, 1981, p. 12.
10. ODG, Mayurbhanj, p. 89.
1 1 . Praharaj, op. cit., p. 1 04.
12. Ibid.

13. Ibid.

14. Mishra, op. cit., p. 48.

15. Chanda, R.P., Selections from Official Letters and Records (SOLR), Roughsedg
to Swaiton, Secy. To Govt, of Bengal, 16 May, 1821.
16. Ibid.

17. Ibid.

18. Sahu, M., Kolhan Under the British Rule, p. 36.

1 9. SOLR , Agreement, 7 May 1 82 1 .
20. Ibid.

21. Ibid.

22. Memorial of Mayurbhanj State to V. Mountbatten, Baripada, 29 July 1 947; Praha

op. cit., p. 106.
23. Ibid.

24. Ibid.

25. Praharaj, op. cit., Petition of Madhav Das, 3 March 1827, p. 107.
26. Ibid.

27. Ibid.

28. Memorial of Mayurbhanj State; Praharaj, op. cit., p. 107 corroborating the refer
made in the Kol Pirs of Mayurbhanj, p. 23.
29. Ibid.

30. Praharaj, op. cit., p. 107, corroborating the reference made in 'The Kol Pi
Mayurbhanj', p. 23.
31. Ibid.

32. Ibid.

33. Sahu, M. op. cit., p. 42.

34. Bihar District Gazetters ( BDG ), Singhbhum; Wilkinson to Ricketts, 14 June
35. FSO, Corroborating the reference by Praharaj, op. cit., p. 109.
36. Sahu, M. op. cit., p. 109.
37. Praharaj, op. cit., p. 108.
38. Ibid.

39. Ibid.

40. Ibid., p. 110, Translation of Report of Muddeelal to Deputy Post Master C.

Bamington, 24 March 1832.

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 Modem India 705

41. BDG, S inghbhum, p. 64.

42. Proceedings of Lieutenant Govern
Deputy Secy. To Government to G.
April 1832.
43. SOLR, pp. 104- 105, Stockwell to Thomason, 8 May, 1832.
44. Ibid., No.366, p. 85, Stockwell to Thomason, 28 April 1832.
45. Ibid.

46. Ibid.

47. Ibid., 386, p. 142.

48. Ibid., 404, p. 164.
49. Ibid., 408, p. 1 73; 445, p.246; 449, p.257.
50. Ibid., 410, p. 177.
51. Ibid., 449, p.257.
52. Ibid., 447, p.255.
53. Ibid., 476, p.298.
54. Ibid., 547, p.382; 551, p.413.
55. Ibid.

56. Ibid., 559 and 560, pp.427-429.

57. Ibid., 569, p. 446 and 572, p.451; ODG, Mayurbhanj, p. 74.
58.. BDG, S inghbhum.

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