Central Philippine University Vs Court of Appeals 63 SCAD 72 - SUMMARY
Central Philippine University Vs Court of Appeals 63 SCAD 72 - SUMMARY
Central Philippine University Vs Court of Appeals 63 SCAD 72 - SUMMARY
Summary Cases:
Subject: Condition attached to the Land Donation that Donee shall build school is a Resolutory
Condition ; It is the legal possibility of bringing the action which determines the starting point for the
computation of the period when the cause of action accrued; When the obligation does not fix a period
but from its nature and circumstances it can be inferred that a period was intended, the general rule
provided in Art. 1197 of the Civil Code applies; Doubts referring to incidental circumstances of a
gratuitous contract should be resolved in favor of the least transmission of rights and interests
Facts:
In 1939, the late Don Ramon Lopez, Sr., former member of the Board of Trustees of the Central
Philippine University (CPU) executed a deed of donation of land in favor of the school (CPU). Title was
issued in the name of the donee CPU with the following annotations copied from the Deed of Donation:
1. The land described shall be utilized by the CPU exclusively for the establishment and use of a
medical college with all its buildings as part of the curriculum;
2. The said college shall not sell, transfer or convey to any third party nor in any way encumber
said land;
3. The said land shall be called "RAMON LOPEZ CAMPUS", and the said college shall be under
obligation to erect a cornerstone bearing that name. Any net income from the land or any of its
parks shall be put in a fund to be known as the "RAMON LOPEZ CAMPUS FUND" to be used for
improvements of said campus and erection of a building thereon.
Fifty years thereafter, Private Respondents, heirs of Don Ramon Lopez, Sr., filed an action for
annulment of donation, reconveyance and damages against CPU. Private Respondents alleged that
since 1939 CPU had not complied with the conditions of the donation.
The trial court held that CPU failed to comply with the conditions of the donation and declared it null and
void. It ordered CPU to execute a deed of reconveyance of the property in favor of the Private
Respondents.
On appeal, the CA remanded the case for the determination of the time within which CPU should comply
with the first condition annotated in the certificate of title. It ruled that the annotations at the back of
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petitioner's certificate of title were resolutory conditions, breach of which should terminate the rights of
the donee thus making the donation revocable. It found that in the first condition, the donor did not fix a
period within which the condition must be fulfilled. Hence, until a period was fixed for the fulfillment of the
condition, CPU could not be considered as having failed to comply with its obligation.
Petitioner now alleges that the appellate court erred in holding that: (a) the annotations in the title are
onerous obligations and resolutory conditions of the donation; and (b) the issue of prescription does not
deserve "disquisition;"
Held:
Condition attached to the Land Donation that Donee shall Build a School is a Resolutory
Condition
1. When a person donates land to another on the condition that the latter would build upon the
land a school, the condition imposed was not a condition precedent or a suspensive condition
but a resolutory one.
2. It is not correct to say that the schoolhouse had to be constructed before the donation became
effective, that is, before the donee could become the owner of the land, otherwise, it would be
invading the property rights of the donor. The donation had to be valid before the fulfillment of
the condition.
3. If there was no fulfillment or compliance with the condition, such as what obtains in the instant
case, the donation may now be revoked and all rights which the donee may have acquired under
it shall be deemed lost and extinguished.
It is the legal possibility of bringing the action which determines the starting point for the
computation of the period when the cause of action accrued.
4. The school claimed that prescription bars the instant action of private respondents. This claim
is unavailing. In this case, the cause of accrued upon expiration of a reasonable period and
opportunity for petitioner to fulfill what has been charged upon it by the donor.
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5. The condition imposed by the donor (the building of a medical school upon the land donated)
depended upon the exclusive will of the donee as to when this condition shall be fulfilled. When
petitioner accepted the donation, it bound itself to comply with the condition thereof. Since
fulfillment of the condition depended upon the exclusive will of the donee-petitioner, its absolute
acceptance and the acknowledgment of its obligation provided in the deed of donation were
sufficient to prevent the statute of limitations from barring the action of private respondents
upon the original contract which was the deed of donation.
6. Moreover, the time from which the cause of action accrued for the revocation of the donation
and recovery of the property donated cannot be specifically determined in the instant case. A
cause of action arises when that which should have been done is not done, or that which should
not have been done is done. In cases where there is no special provision for such computation,
recourse must be had to the rule that the period must be counted from the day on which the
corresponding action could have been instituted. It is the legal possibility of bringing the action
which determines the starting point for the computation of the period.
When the obligation does not fix a period but from its nature and circumstances it can be
inferred that a period was intended, the general rule provided in Art. 1197 of the Civil Code
applies
7. Art. 1197 provides that the courts may fix the duration for the fulfillment because the fulfillment
of the obligation itself cannot be demanded until after the court has fixed the period for
compliance therewith and such period has arrived.
8. This general rule however cannot be applied considering the different set of circumstances
existing in the instant case. More than a reasonable period of fifty (50) years has already been
allowed petitioner to avail of the opportunity to comply with the condition even if it be
burdensome, to make the donation in its favor forever valid. But, unfortunately, it failed to do so.
Hence, there is no more need to fix the duration of a term of the obligation when such procedure
would be a mere technicality and formality and would serve no purpose than to delay or lead to
an unnecessary and expensive multiplication of suits
9. Records are clear and facts are undisputed that since the execution of the deed of donation up
to the time of filing of the instant action, petitioner has failed to comply with its obligation as
donee. Petitioner has slept on its obligation for an unreasonable length of time. Hence, it is only
just and equitable now to declare the subject donation already ineffective and, for all purposes,
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revoked so that petitioner as donee should now return the donated property to the heirs of the
donor, private respondents herein, by means of reconveyance.
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