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CAM219_Cover.qxd:Layout 1 31/3/10 09:23 Page 1
Campaign • 219
DUNKIRK 1940
DUNKIRK 1940 operation Dynamo
operation Dynamo
DUNKIRK 1940
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in the face of ferocious attack, the valiant efforts of the royal navy
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F R A N C E
and civilian cruisers saved the expeditionary force from annihilation
0 5 10 miles
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and preserved for great britain the means to carry on the fight
against Hitler’s germany. this comprehensive account of operation
Dynamo is brought to life by archive photography, new maps and
original artwork.
douglas C dildy
OSPREY
PUBLISHING
OSPREY
CAMPAIGN • 219
DUNKIRK 1940
Operation Dynamo
CONTENTS
ORIGINS OF THE CAMPAIGN 5
CHRONOLOGY 8
OPPOSING COMMANDERS 11
Allied commanders German commanders
OPPOSING FORCES 15
Allied forces German forces Orders of battle
OPPOSING PLANS 27
Operation Dynamo The German plan to deal with the Dunkirk pocket
THE CAMPAIGN 32
The race is on, Sunday 26 May The Panzers roll, Monday 27 May
The Belgians surrender, Tuesday 28 May The Luftwaffe strikes, Wednesday 29 May
The Panzers turn away, Thursday 30 May The biggest day, Friday 31 May
The Luftwaffe’s last chance, Saturday 1 June The French fight on, Sunday 2 June
The British are gone, 3 and 4 June
AFTERMATH 86
FURTHER READING 92
INDEX 95
CAM219_2311.qxd:Layout 1 11/12/09 18:36 Page 4
CAM219_2311.qxd:Layout 1 11/12/09 18:36 Page 5
Only four days after Heinz Guderian’s Panzers crossed the German frontier and
descended into the dark forests of the Ardennes they emerged at Sedan, broke
through French defences, and – surprisingly – turned towards the Channel coast.
Never in the history of warfare had a campaign between such great and
apparently equal forces been decided so swiftly and conclusively as the German
conquest of France and the Low Countries in May and June of 1940.
In the Netherlands General der Artillerie Georg von Küchler’s
Armeeoberkommando (AOK) 18 subdued the Dutch Army and occupied
‘Fortress Holland’ in five days of hard fighting. Against Belgium and the cream
of the Allies’ mobile armies – the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) and the
French 1ère and 7e Armées – the two Panzer, one motorized and 16 infantry
divisions of Generaloberst Walter von Reichenau’s AOK 6 crossed the Maas
and clashed with French light mechanized divisions in the Gembloux Gap.
Meanwhile, moving stealthily through the dark hills of the Ardennes in
southern Belgium were three Panzer corps spearheaded by General der
Panzertruppen Heinz W. Guderian’s XIX Armeekorps (motorisiert) (AK (mot.)).
Practically undetected these appeared on the banks of the Meuse River at Sedan,
RIGHT
A 4-ton lightly armoured British
Universal Carrier, towing an
Ordnance QF 2-pdr Mk IX anti-
tank gun, being welcomed by
Belgian civilians as they drive
through Herseaux on their way
to positions on the Dyle Line.
(IWM F4345)
LEFT
Meanwhile, through the
Ardennes Forest seven German
armoured divisions moved
steadily and stealthily towards
the Meuse River. Two of these
were equipped with
confiscated Czech-built Skoda
tanks, such as the PzKpfw 35(t)
light tank, seen here waiting in
a wood near Mayen before the
opening of the offensive.
(Courtesy of the Tom Laemlein
Collection)
5
CAM219_2311.qxd:Layout 1 11/12/09 18:36 Page 6
6
CAM219_2311.qxd:Layout 1 11/12/09 18:36 Page 7
on three sides and west of the city Rommel’s 7. Panzer-Division had crossed
the Scarpe, pushing the 3e Division légère mécanique off the heights behind it.
On the eastern side ten infantry divisions of Generaloberst Fedor von Bock’s
Heeresgruppe B assaulted the Belgians and pushed them back all along the
21km (13-mile) line between Menin and Desselghem, threatening to open a
gap on the BEF’s left flank near Courtrai. Lieutenant-General Alan F. Brooke,
commanding II Corps, was alarmed and demanded reinforcements. As an extra
precaution Lt. Col. Bridgeman was ordered to revise the draft evacuation plan,
especially now that Boulogne and Calais were unavailable for embarkation.
Bridgeman’s ‘second edition’ foresaw the BEF retreating along three parallel
routes to the coast and being lifted from the 43km (27 miles) of beaches
between Dunkirk and Ostend.
On 25 May the strategic situation for the BEF went from grave to
desperate. This was occasioned first by the news that at least two divisions
would be needed to plug the 13km-wide (8-mile) hole currently being blasted
in the end of the Belgian line. Later Gort learned that the planned attacks
from the south had been cancelled and the French were instead establishing
a linear defence along the Somme, abandoning the prospect of re-linking the
two halves of the Allied armies. At 1730hrs he was informed that the French
commitment to the northern forces’ southwards attack was reduced to merely
one division, dooming it to failure.
Confronted by all these factors, Lord Gort made the most momentous
decision of his long and illustrious military career, and one – flying in the face
of guidance from his civilian masters and military superiors – that was most
fateful for the future of the British Army and his nation. After an hour of
personal deliberations, he ordered the next day’s attack to the south cancelled
and the 5th and 50th Divisions moved north to close the breach on the north
end of his eastern front, thus denying the Germans an unchallenged advance
to Dunkirk and thereby protecting the BEF’s avenue of retreat.
7
CAM219_2311.qxd:Layout 1 11/12/09 18:36 Page 8
CHRONOLOGY
13/14 May Battle of Sedan – Guderian breaks 23 May Rear GHQ is evacuated through
through French defences. French Boulogne. BEF placed on half rations.
forces withdraw precipitously, and
three Panzer corps head for the coast. 23–26 May The 10. Panzer-Division invests Calais:
the 30th Brigade is ordered to hold to
14 May The Netherlands capitulates. the last. The garrison (3,500 British
and 16,500 French troops) surrenders
17–19 May Général de brigade de Gaulle’s on the 26th.
feeble armoured counterattacks
have no effect on the German 24 May The OKH orders Heeresgruppe A
‘drive to the sea’. to halt along the Canal Line.
18 May BEF GHQ orders non-essential 25 May Belgian line is pierced near Courtrai,
personnel evacuated. threatening BEF left flank, and Gort
orders two divisions to plug the gap.
19 May BEF, French 1ère Armée and Belgians French Général d’armée Antoine
establish a new defensive line on Besson (Groupe d’armées 3) cancels
the Scheldt/Escaut River. Reynaud counterattack from the south.
dismisses Gamelin, appoints Gén. Dunkirk is devastated by heavy
Weygand as the Supreme Commander Luftwaffe attacks.
of Allied Forces. First discussion
between BEF GHQ and War Office 26 May Général d’armée Blanchard orders
regarding possibility of retreat retirement to a large perimeter around
to Dunkirk. Dunkirk. At 1857hrs Operation
Dynamo ordered to commence. The
20 May Guderian destroys most of British Oberkommando des Heeres (OKH)
12th and 23rd Divisions (ill-equipped orders Heeresgruppe A to resume
LOC troops) at Albert, Amiens and the offensive
Abbeville. Reaching English Channel
at Noyelles, Panzers cut off all Allied 27 May Operation Dynamo begins; 7,669
forces in the north. Dover Command troops saved. Luftwaffe completely
planning for evacuation of British destroys Dunkirk harbour.
forces from Channel ports begins.
28 May Belgian Army surrenders. At Dunkirk
21 May BEF armoured spoiling attack at 17,804 troops rescued. Hitler signs
Arras. BEF air component evacuates deployment directive for Fall Rot. In
to England. Norway, Allied forces retake Narvik.
22 May Churchill meets with Reynaud and 29 May Luftwaffe launches ‘maximum effort’
endorses Weygand Plan for closing sinks 25 vessels. Kriegsmarine sinks
breach between Arras and Péronne. two RN destroyers. French Army
Panzergruppe Kleist is transferred joins in the evacuation: 47,310 troops
to Kluge’s AOK 4; Guderian’s saved. Deployment directive Fall Rot
Panzers advance on Boulogne is distributed, realignment of
and Calais. Wehrmacht commands begins
and Panzers are withdrawn
22–25 May The 2. Panzer-Division invests from operations against Dunkirk.
Boulogne; the 20th Guards Brigade
is evacuated by sea on the 23/24th; 30 May Bad weather prevents Luftwaffe
4,368 men saved. The remnant interference; 53,823 troops evacuated.
of French 21e Division d’infanterie Kriegsmarine sinks one French destroyer
holds out until the 25th. and severely damages a second.
9
CAM219_2311.qxd:Layout 1 11/12/09 18:36 Page 10
31 May French 1ère Armée surrenders at Lille, 4 June Last night of Dynamo; 26,175 French
35,000 troops captured. Biggest day troops saved; later that day 40,000
for Dynamo; 68,014 troops rescued. French troops surrender.
1 June Weather clear; Luftwaffe’s biggest day; 4–7 June Evacuation of Allied forces
one French and three RN destroyers from Narvik.
and 27 other vessels sunk. 64,429
troops evacuated. 5 June Fall Rot – final conquest of
France – begins.
2 June 26,256 troops saved. Evacuation of
BEF complete. 22 June France signs Armistice with Germany,
the battle of France is over, the Battle
3 June 26,746 French troops evacuated. of Britain is about to begin.
Luftwaffe launches Operation Paula,
a maximum offensive against French
air forces around Paris.
10
CAM219_2311.qxd:Layout 1 11/12/09 18:36 Page 11
OPPOSING COMMANDERS
I have no confidence in his leadership. When it came to handling a large force, he seemed incapable of seeing the
wood for the trees.
Lieutenant-General Alan F. Brooke commenting on his commander,
General Lord Gort, BEF Commander-in-Chief
ALLIED COMMANDERS
Born John Standish Surtees Prendergast Vereker in Ireland in 1886, the leader
of the British forces in France succeeded his father to peerage as the
6th Viscount Gort of Limerick in 1902 and entered the British army as
Lord Gort. Three years later, after completing his education at Harrow,
he was commissioned in the Grenadier Guards. During World War I he served
as an operations officer on the GHQ staff before returning to the front lines
where he commanded the 4th, then the 1st Battalions of the Grenadier
General Lord Gort, on the
Guards. Wounded four times he was awarded the Victoria Cross and two
occasion of being awarded the Distinguished Service Orders.
French grand croix de la Légion A large burly man, Lord Gort had the well-earned reputation of being
d’honneur by Général d’armée indestructible and had the inspiring visage of a born fighter. For these reasons,
Alphonse-Joseph Georges,
Commander of Allied Forces
in 1937 when theatrical Secretary of State for War Isaac Leslie Hore-Belisha –
North-western France, on 8 the ‘new broom in the War Office’ – wanted renewed interest in the British
January 1940. (IWM F2088) military, Gort was selected ahead of more senior officers to become the new
Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS). The position came with a
promotion to full general and since Gort had been a lieutenant-general
for only two months, the more senior men he was ‘jumped’ over were
quite naturally piqued. These included General Sir William Edmund
Ironside, Lieutenant-General Alan Brooke and Lieutenant-General John
G. Dill. Adding insult to injury, Ironside was originally slated to
command the BEF, but at the last minute Hore-Belisha appointed Gort
instead, and the Viscount’s two subordinate corps commanders were
Brooke and Dill! Consequently Lord Gort’s image suffered grievously
from these disaffected officers (even though Ironside and Dill were
soon properly placed as CIGS and Vice-CIGS), particularly through
the disingenuous characterizations by the ambitious, arrogant and
contemptuous Lt. Gen. Brooke, who was joined by others once things
began going bad for the BEF.
Subsequently, in large part owing to the disparaging references
by these officers, Lord Gort is described by many historians as
unimaginative, preoccupied with minutiae and not particularly inspiring.
Nevertheless, Gort proved to be a decisive leader with a keen eye for
discerning – amidst the chaos and confusion of combat – the critical
element and ultimate aim, and had the tireless determination needed to
see things through, even if his methods were entirely conventional.
11
CAM219_2311.qxd:Layout 1 11/12/09 18:36 Page 12
LEFT While it was Lord Gort’s forthright decision and dogged determination
Vice Admiral Bertram Home that saved the BEF from destruction, its actual deliverance came through the
Ramsay. (Associated Press
masterful organizational skills and exemplary leadership of Flag Officer
via IWM HU57271)
Dover: Vice Admiral Bertram Home Ramsay. Son of a Hussars officer,
CENTRE Ramsay joined the Royal Navy in 1898, becoming a midshipman aboard
French Vice-amiral Jean Abrial. HMS Cresent on the North American and West Indies Station. Vigorous,
(ECPA Photo Marine 269-
3765/Gattegrio)
athletic and an ardent sportsman, Ramsay easily overcame his rather slight
build with energy, intelligence and self-confidence. During World War I
RIGHT he held successful commands of the monitor M-25 and destroyer HMS Broke
Général de corps d’armée in the crack Dover Patrol and participated in the Second Ostend Raid,
M. B. Alfred Fagalde, with
Major-General Sir Victor
being mentioned in dispatches. After the war he was promoted rapidly,
Morven Fortune, inspecting becoming King George V’s naval aide de camp (ADC) and finally the Home
the 51st (Highland) Division’s Fleet Chief of Staff.
8th Bn. The Gordon Retiring as a rear admiral in December 1938 over a dispute with his boss,
Highlanders at Béthune
Home Fleet Commander Admiral Sir Roger Backhouse, nine months later
on 25 February 1940.
(IWM F2743) Ramsay was recalled as ‘Flag Officer in Charge, Dover’ because of his extensive
knowledge of Channel operations. When that subordinate echelon of the Nore
Command was elevated to coequal status, Ramsay was promoted to vice
admiral, reporting directly to the Board of Admiralty. At the age of 57, Ramsay
still possessed boundless energy, was a cool, deliberate, innovative and
implacable leader with considerable administrative acumen and vast experience
in his area of responsibility.
Commanding all French units – army as well as naval – along the French
coast was 61-year-old Vice-amiral Jean-Charles Abrial, commonly known by
his position: Amiral Nord. Born in Realmont, near Toulouse, Abrial entered
the French Navy as a cadet in 1896. Noted for his successes hunting U-boats
during World War I, afterwards he rose rather rapidly through the ranks,
being promoted to vice-amiral in 1936 and commanding the 3e Région
Maritime (the coastal defence area along France’s Mediterranean shore)
at Toulon through 1938. In December the next year he was appointed to
the Forces Maritimes du Nord, which was headquartered at Dunkirk and
responsible for the defence of the French Channel coast. While not as
dynamic and far-sighted as Ramsay, Abrial was confident, aggressive and
determined to ‘hold on to Dunkirk till the last man and the last round’.
12
CAM219_2311.qxd:Layout 1 14/12/09 09:44 Page 13
In the end, the fate of the BEF, the French 1ère Armée and the Belgians would
lie in the hands of two German officers: General der Artillerie Georg von
Küchler and Generalmajor Wolfram von Richthofen. Küchler eventually was
given command of the German ground forces attempting to eliminate the
Allies ensconced in the Dunkirk Perimeter and Richthofen was charged with
destroying them from the air.
Scion of a Junker family, Küchler was a Prussian Army officer through
and through. Commissioned in 1901 as a Leutnant in the artillery, he had an
excellent combat record throughout World War I and by 1918 was a member
of the elite Großer Generalstab (Greater German General Staff – dissolved in
the Treaty of Versailles). Continuing a steady rise under the Weimar Republic,
by 1934 he commanded the 1. Infanterie-Division in East Prussia. Two years
later, as a Generalleutnant and Inspector General of the service academies, he
caught Hitler’s eye and in turn became an ardent supporter. Against Poland,
he led AOK 3 – advancing out of East Prussia as part of Bock’s Heeresgruppe
Nord (see Campaign 107: Poland 1939 by Steven J. Zaloga, Osprey Generalmajor Wolfram
Publishing Ltd: Oxford, 2002) and was awarded the Ritterkreuz (Knight’s von Richthofen.
Generalfeldmarschall
Cross) for his successes. A highly professional officer – if somewhat unkempt
Erich von Manstein said
– he was an effective leader and efficient administrator who, especially with Richthofen was ‘the most
his combat experience and thorough knowledge in the employment of outstanding air force leader
artillery supporting infantry, was the best choice for finally smashing the we had in World War II’.
(IWM HU55040)
fortified perimeter of the Dunkirk beachhead.
According to Göring’s boasts it would never come to that, for the insolent
and impudent British and French forces ‘trapped’ at Dunkirk were to be
obliterated by the fearsome Stuka dive-bombers of Wolfram von Richthofen’s
VIII Fliegerkorps. Cousin of the famous ‘Red Baron’ ace of World War I,
Richthofen began his military career as a cavalry officer, seeing action on both
fronts before transferring to the Imperial German air service. Becoming a
fighter pilot in March 1918, he served in Jasta 11 (his cousin’s unit) under
Göring, scoring eight aerial victories. After the war he earned a degree in
aeronautical engineering from the Technical University of Hanover and a PhD
13
CAM219_2311.qxd:Layout 1 11/12/09 18:36 Page 14
from the University of Berlin. By the time Göring brought the embryonic
Luftwaffe into the open, von Richthofen was an Oberst in the Technical
Bureau and in 1936 he went to Spain with the Condor Legion rising from
chief of staff to commander in two years. Returning to Germany in May 1939
as a Generalmajor he had perfected the use of air power in coordinated, close
support of ground troops in the attack.
Given command of a ‘special-purpose air division’ in which most of the
Luftwaffe’s Stuka Gruppen were concentrated, Richthofen supported the
Panzers overrunning Poland in September and, towards the end of that
month, was responsible for the near destruction of Warsaw from the air. Later
designated VIII Fliegerkorps, his was a mobile and flexible command and in
Fall Gelb (Case Yellow, the plan for the invasion of France and the Low
Countries) Richthofen used it handily in first supporting Reichenau’s AOK 6
penetration into Belgium before shifting south to support Guderian’s crossing
of the Meuse at Sedan and then providing ‘flying artillery’ for the Panzer
columns charging across Picardy. Awarded the Ritterkreuz on 23 May,
he returned to his HQ to begin planning strikes against the Allied defenders
at Boulogne and Calais, French forces at Lille and their counterattacks at
Amiens, and – eventually – against Dunkirk itself.
14
CAM219_2311.qxd:Layout 1 11/12/09 18:36 Page 15
OPPOSING FORCES
I must not conceal from you that a great part of the BEF and its equipment will inevitably be lost.
BEF Commander Lord Gort to Secretary of State for War Anthony Eden, 26 May 1940
ALLIED FORCES
The British
By 10 May 1940, the British had deployed 13 infantry divisions (three of them
for line-of-communications (LOC) duties and half the rest reservist Territorial
Army units) and a tank brigade to France as the BEF. On that date nine of
these had advanced in a front three divisions wide to take up positions along
27km (17 miles) of the Dyle River from Louvain to Wavre. After rebuffing
the German IV and XI AK of Reichenau’s AOK 6, the British were shocked to
learn of the German breakthroughs at Sedan and Dinant and the need to fall
back to the Escaut and later the Lys River.
After over two weeks of fighting and retreating, on 26 May, the once-mighty
Allied armies in Flanders had been hammered into a rough boot-shaped pocket.
The back of the boot conformed to the coastline from Zeebrugge to Gravelines
and the front was formed by the Lys River as far as Menin. Except for the
A convoy of lorries loaded with top end of this line held by part of Fagalde’s 16e Corps d’armée, this 90km
troops make their way through (56-mile) front was manned by the beleaguered Belgian Army. The 67km-long
a Belgian town during their
(42-mile) instep was held by a portion of the BEF – four divisions (1st, 3rd, 4th
retreat from the Dyle Line.
Unlike most French formations, and 42nd) with two more (5th and 50th) being sent to backstop the flagging
the units of the BEF were Belgian right flank – as far south as Bourghelles (on the French–Belgian border).
largely motorized allowing for The French 1ère Armée manned the swollen toe of the boot, their lines looping
battlefield movements that
south along the river Sensée to end on the Haute Deule Canal north of Douai.
were faster than both their
German adversaries and their The sole of the boot followed the chain of canals from Douai to Gravelines,
French allies. (IWM F4396) ostensibly covered by four British divisions (2nd, 44th, 46th and 48th) with
the northern end – from Gravelines through Watten – being held by the rest of
Fagalde’s 16e Corps d’armée.
Thus the BEF found itself – instead of being a homogeneous whole as it had
been on the Dyle – split into two parts on opposite sides of the 25–40km-wide
Dunkirk–Lille Pocket that extended some 112km (70 miles) from the coast.
While the east side of the pocket seemed most threatened because of the rent
being torn in the Belgian line around Courtrai, on the west side six Panzer
divisions had driven to the sea and wheeled in echelon to rumble noisily up to
all points along the Canal Line. Because III Corps could not hope to cover the
front’s 72km length, its four divisions were broken up into their individual
battalions and scattered to hold bridges and small villages as strongpoints – or
‘stops’ as Lord Gort called them – thus forming a dotted line from La Bassée
to Bergues. Consequently the western side of the pocket was open to
exploitation by mobile armoured forces.
15
CAM219_2311.qxd:Layout 1 11/12/09 18:37 Page 16
The French
Meanwhile at the ‘bottom of the pocket’ were the three corps of the French 1ère
Armée. Having fought continuously for almost two weeks, Gén. Blanchard’s
12 divisions (including three badly depleted armoured units) were on the brink
of exhaustion. Because of the dislocation caused by the withdrawal from
Belgium and punishing Luftwaffe air attacks on the French railway network,
no supplies had reached them since 20 May. Quartermasters had been forced
to forage food from the surrounding towns to feed the troops and supplies of
artillery ammunition were virtually exhausted.
While the 1ère Armée was attempting a fighting withdrawal to the north
along with the BEF, the primary French contribution to the defence of the
Dunkirk beachhead was Gén. Fagalde’s 16e Corps d’armée. Having lost half
of one division (21e Division d’infanterie) on a tragic deployment towards
Boulogne, this corps consisted of two intact infantry divisions and a horse-
mounted reconnaissance battalion (18e Groupe de reconnaissance de corps
d’armée, GRCA). On 23 May Fagalde was ordered to move his HQ and
one division (68e Division d’infanterie) to the west between Gravelines
and Saint-Omer, leaving the other (60e Division d’infanterie) with the
Belgians to protect the Bruges (now Brugge) area.
Informed he was to command all French ground forces along the Channel
coast, Fagalde immediately went to Dunkirk to confer with Vice-amiral Abrial
and assess what other units he had to work with. Manning the area’s fixed
defences were the three reserve battalions of the 272e Demi-brigade d’infanterie
assigned to the 11,000-man Secteur fortifié de Flandres under Général de
brigade Eugène Barthélemy, headquartered in the ancient walled and moated
city of Bergues, 8.5km (5 miles) south of Dunkirk. Additionally there were two
training battalions, three labour battalions and five battalions from his
decimated 21e Division d’infanterie (mainly the 137e RI) holding Gravelines
and Bourbourg. For artillery Fagalde had six battalions of 75mm guns, five of
155mm guns and two of 25mm anti-tank guns.
16
CAM219_2311.qxd:Layout 1 11/12/09 18:37 Page 17
TOP
HMS Wakeful steaming off
Bray-Dunes. Commissioned in
1917, Wakeful was one of 37
old V and W-class boats on
strength at the beginning of
the war. They were equipped
with four single 4in. guns and
two triple torpedo tubes. (IWM
HU1141)
BOTTOM
HMS Grafton was one of the
Royal Navy’s newer, larger
(1,350-ton) class of destroyers,
eight of which were
commissioned in 1936. They
mounted four quick-firing
4.7in. guns and eight torpedo
tubes and had two quad-MG
(.50-cal. Browning) anti-aircraft
mounts. (IWM FL22287)
17
CAM219_2311.qxd:Layout 1 11/12/09 18:37 Page 18
18
CAM219_2311.qxd:Layout 1 11/12/09 18:37 Page 19
A 10.5cm le FH 18 moves up
during the advance across
Belgium. Contrary to British
propaganda at the time,
subsequent histories and
popular belief, most of the
forces facing the BEF were not
modern mechanized units but
1918-style infantry formations
with horse-drawn artillery.
(IWM HU3894)
GERMAN FORCES
After the BEF’s small, but stinging, spoiling attack at Arras on the 21st,
all of Guderian’s superiors began worrying that the hard-charging Panzers
had outstripped their infantry consorts to the point where they were now
dreadfully exposed. His immediate superior – General der Kavallerie Ewald
von Kleist – was worried about what the British counterattack portended
and the rising tank losses being experienced in the last few days. About
the same time (1640hrs on 23 May) Kleist’s new boss – AOK 4 commander
Generaloberst Günther Hans von Kluge – telephoned Heeresgruppe A
commander, Generaloberst Gerd von Rundstedt, advising that ‘the troops
would welcome an opportunity to close up tomorrow’. Rundstedt, who had
his own reservations about continuing the unbridled offensive and wanted a
period of rest and regrouping before attacking south of the Somme, consented
readily and at 2000hrs Kluge telephoned both Panzergruppen HQs stating
that AOK 4 would not advance during the 24th in order to allow the infantry
to close up with the Panzers.
That day Hitler visited Rundstedt’s Heeresgruppe A HQ (a vine-encrusted
townhouse in Charleville, France) and a discussion on the means to subsequently
eliminate the Allied pocket ensued. Influenced by Generaloberst Wilhelm Keitel,
the Chief of the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW), Hitler had become
worried that the Panzers would be bogged down in Flanders and wanted
to preserve them for the coup de grâce to be delivered against the French.
Additionally, for political reasons he wanted Heeresgruppe B to push the Allied
forces out of Belgium so that their final defeat would take place on French soil
and not in neutral territory. Thus Hitler became even more adamant about
stopping the Panzers than his generals.
Returning to Felsennest (his battle HQ, a hunting lodge in the forests at
Münstereifel, south of Bonn) Hitler directed the OKH to issue a Haltbefehl,
‘halt order’. As passed to Kluge’s AOK 4 it read ‘By the Führer’s orders…
hold [along] the favourable defensive line Lens–Béthune–Aire–Saint-Omer–
Gravelines, and allow the enemy to attack it.… The principal thing now is to
husband the armoured formations for later and more important tasks.’
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LEFT Thus the Allied forces trapped in the Dunkirk–Lille Pocket were caught
Supplementing Richthofen’s between what the Germans called ‘the hammer and the anvil’. To the east were
Stukas were new dive-
the German infantry divisions of Bock’s Heeresgruppe B, which consisted of
bombing-capable Junkers 88As
of Keller’s Amsterdam-based I. two armies: Küchler’s AOK 18, which had completed the conquest of Holland
Gruppe/Kampfgeschwader 30. and deployed across the Scheldt to become Bock’s right wing, and Reichenau’s
This unit’s crews were trained AOK 6. These were entirely slow-moving 1918-style infantry formations –
in the highly specialized anti-
21 divisions in six corps – composed of foot soldiers and horse-drawn artillery.
shipping role and had
accounted for several Royal All of Bock’s motorized and mechanized units – as well as all OKH reserves –
Navy warships during the had been sent around the Allied pocket to join Rundstedt’s drive to the sea.
Norwegian campaign. (IWM Halting along the Canal Line to the west were the Panzer units hot from
MH6115) their headlong dash to the Channel. Facing the Allied pocket, Kluge’s AOK 4
RIGHT controlled Panzergruppe Kleist (minus XIV AK (mot.) protecting the south
German S-boat at speed. flank) and the newly created Panzergruppe Hoth, formerly XV AK (mot.) now
Armed with two tubes for G7a joined by the XVI and XXXIX AK (mot.) from Heeresgruppe B. Three infantry
21in. torpedoes and capable of
corps supported them. All told, Heeresgruppe A had swelled to 71 divisions in
35 knots, these fast attack craft
were masters at nocturnal hit- 22 corps, but most of these were in AOK 12 and 16, which had been left behind
and-run tactics. (IWM U7) to control the flow of infantry marching into the extended German salient and
protect the south flank along the Somme.
Just as worrisome as the lack of infantry support was the fact that the
Panzer units had become badly depleted in their combats with Allied defenders
and in their drive across northern France. Out of 2,428 tanks with which Kleist
had begun the campaign (see Battle Orders 32: Panzer Divisions: The Blitzkrieg
Years 1939–40 by Pier Paolo Battistelli, Osprey Publishing Ltd: Oxford, 2007),
he estimated 30 per cent had been lost in combat or were irreparably damaged.
Another 20 per cent had been left behind because of mechanical breakdowns
or were in need of repair before continuing across the Aa. This left him with
only 1,220 operational tanks but with the respite provided by the ‘stop order’,
it was estimated that the 730 reparable vehicles could be back in their units in
three days or less.
The Luftwaffe
The Luftwaffe too had suffered heavy losses during the opening stages of Fall
Gelb. While they had driven the BEF’s air component from the Continent
and reduced the Armée de l’Air to impotence, heavy attrition had eroded the
German air force’s strength; 641 combat aircraft (as of 25 May) were lost
(23 per cent of its starting inventory) and serviceability was down to 50 per
cent. Even with timely replacements General der Flieger Albrecht Kesselring,
commanding Luftflotte 2, reported that many bomber Gruppen (groups)
were reduced to 15 serviceable aircraft (against a statutory strength of 36).
20
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The Kriegsmarine
With the German Navy’s heavy surface units crippled in the ongoing
Norwegian campaign and the Channel too narrow, shallow and heavily mined
for large-scale U-boat operations, the Kriegsmarine was limited to using its
high-speed torpedo boats or Schnellboote (or S-boote, called ‘E-boats’, short
for ‘enemy boats’, by the British) for hit-and-run attacks, normally at night.
Marinegruppe Kommando West, Admiral Alfred Saalwächter, had two
flotillas (totalling nine) of these fast light attack craft and they moved to the
main Dutch naval base at Den Helder soon after its capture. Supported by two
tenders and staging from the Dutch naval base at Vlissingen (Flushing), they
soon proved their worth, S.21 and S.23 sinking the large French destroyer
Jaguar as it approached Dunkirk on 22/23 May, and S.34 sinking the 694-ton
coastal freighter Aboukir near the North Hinder buoy six nights later.
Supplementing the S-boats was a single flotilla of seven small 291-ton
(341-ton submerged) Type IIC and two smaller Type IIB coastal/training
U-boats. Having lost three U-boats in October 1939 to mines in the Channel,
the Kriegsmarine was quite naturally reluctant to send their submarines into
the shallow, shoal-ridden waters but they did station four of these small boats
in what the Germans called the ‘Hoofen’, the south-eastern corner of the
North Sea between the Kent coastline and the Scheldt Estuary.
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Attached Fleet Air Arm squadrons Formerly of 7e Armée – Reassigned to Forces Maritimes du Nord
NAS 801, Skuas, Detling on 24 May 1940
NAS 806, Skuas, Manston 16e Corps d’armée – Gén. de corps M. B. Alfred Fagalde
NAS 815, Swordfish, Detling 21e Division d’infanterie – Gén. de brig. Félix Lanquetot
NAS 825, Swordfish, Detling 48e RI – largely destroyed near Boulogne on 22 May
NAS 826, Albacores, Ford 65e RI – largely destroyed near Calais on 22 May
137e RI
35e RAD
FRENCH ARMY 255e RAD
27e GRDI
Groupe d’armées 1 – Gén. d’armée Jean Georges Maurice 60e Division d’infanterie – Gén. de brig. Deslaurens
Blanchard 241e RI
1ère Armée – Gén. de corps René Jacques Adolphe Prioux 270e RI – largely destroyed during retreat between
3e Corps d’armée – Gén. de corps Fournelle de la Laurencie Zeebrugge and Nieuport on 29 May
1ère Division d’infanterie motorisée – surrendered at Lille, 271e RI
31 May 1940 50e RA – attached to Belgian Army, lost on 28 May
7e GRDI II/307e RAD
2e Division d’infanterie Nord-Africaine – surrendered at 68e GRDI
Lille, 31 May 1940 68e Division d’infanterie – Gén. de div. Beaufrère
92e GRDI 224e RI
12e Division d’infanterie motorisée – Gén. de brig. 225e RI
Louis Janssen 341e RI
8e RZ 89e RAD
150e RI 289e RAD
25e RAD I/307e RAD
225e RAD 59e GRDI
3e GRDI 115e RALH
Remnant of 32e Division d’infanterie – Gén. Maurice Lucas 407e RP (from 7e Armée)
III/122e RI 616e RP
III/143e RI 18e GRCA
4e Corps d’armée – Gén. de corps Aymer – surrendered at Lille, Secteur fortifié de Flandres – Gén. de brig. Eugène Barthélemy
31 May 1940 272e Demi-brigade d’infanterie – Lt. Col. Lemistre
15e Division d’infanterie motorisée 14e RRT (one battalion only)
1ère Division d’infanterie Marocaine 15e RRT (one battalion only)
4e Division d’infanterie 221e RRT (one battalion only)
7e GRCA 161e RAP
106e RALH Groupe des Secteurs Nord (autonomous coastal defence
fortress units)
604e RP
IV/310e RI – Dunkirk
5e Corps d’armée (motorisée) – Gén. de corps René Altmayer –
V/310e RI – Calais
surrendered at Lille, 31 May 1940
VI/310e RI – Boulogne
25e Division d’infanterie motorisée
VII/310e RI – Gravelines
5e Division d’infanterie Nord-Africaine
21e Centre d’instruction divisionnaire
104e RALT
21e Bn./110e RI
605e RP
21e Bn./129e RI
Corps de cavalerie – badly depleted in continuous combat
147e Bataillon de Sapeurs-Mineurs
1ère Division légère mécanique – Gén. de brig. Picard
4e RC
FRENCH NAVY
6e RC
18e RD Forces Maritimes du Nord – Vice-amiral Jean-Charles Abrial
4e RDP ‘Pas de Calais’ Flotilla – Contre-amiral Marcel Landriau
74e RATTT Two large torpedo boat destroyers
2e Division légère mécanique – Gén. de brig. Bougrain Six torpedo boat destroyers
8e RC Six torpedo boats
13e RD Five dispatch boats (sloops)
29e RD Two minesweepers
1re RDP Six submarine chasers
71e RATTT Three personnel ships (detached to RN)
24
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OPPOSING PLANS
You are now authorized to operate towards the coast forthwith in conjunction with the French and Belgian armies.
Secretary of State for War Anthony Eden to BEF Commander Lord Gort, just before 1900hrs, 26 May 1940
OPERATION DYNAMO
The ability to rescue the BEF actually depended on two plans that met at the
water’s edge. The BEF had to organize a withdrawal into and defence of
the Dunkirk perimeter, as well as develop an embarkation programme; Dover
Command had to organize, control and protect the shipping, its routes and
the embarkation points. To prevent the Luftwaffe from interrupting the
desperate process, the RAF had to provide continuous, effective air cover.
To orchestrate the BEF’s part, Lord Gort chose III Corps commander
Lieutenant-General Sir Ronald Adam. His primary staff elements consisted of
the BEF’s quartermaster-general, chief engineer, and Lt. Col. Bridgeman.
Adam was charged with surveying the ground and making all necessary plans
for a defensive perimeter, organizing the means to sustain the 250,000 British
troops, and making the preparations for effective and timely embarkations.
To establish a defensible perimeter, Lord Gort sent the commander of the
48th (South Midland) Division, Major-General Andrew F. A. N. Thorne, his
staff and his 144th Brigade to Dunkirk on 25 May. Upon arrival, Thorne
found that Gén. Fagalde had already established a strong defence in depth,
with what remained of 21e Division d’infanterie deployed behind the line
Gravelines–Watten–Cassel and Général de division Beaufrère’s 68e Division
d’infanterie entrenched along a secondary line of canals connecting Mardyck–
Spycker–Bergues, heavily supported by artillery. Consequently Thorne placed
the 144th Brigade on the left flank of the secondary line at Wormhoudt.
Working together, Adam and Fagalde quickly mapped out a defensible
48km (30-mile) perimeter using as many contiguous water barriers as possible.
With Fagalde already holding the west side of the perimeter, it was naturally
agreed that arriving French troops would be placed west of the
Dunkirk–Bergues Canal. In the British portion Adam placed II Corps furthest
east, covering the two canals forming the corner at Nieuport and extending
almost to Furnes. I Corps would defend the centre around Furnes and III
Corps would fill in between there and Bergues.
Adam planned for the BEF to be evacuated in reverse order: III, II and
I Corps with the last providing the rearguard. Embarkation assembly areas
and control centres were established at three beaches: Malo-les-Bains, an
eastern suburb of Dunkirk (for III Corps); Bray-Dunes Plage, 10km (6 miles)
to the east (I Corps); and La Panne Bains (now De Panne), 6km (4 miles)
further east (II Corps).
27
28
N
Léop
XX
XX
Lys
Ostend
C
1 (-)
anal
60
old C an
Nieuport-Bains al BE Terneuzen
FR de
Bray- XXXX D
Malo-les- Nieuport
CAM219_2311.qxd:Layout 1
érivat Léopold Ca
Calais XX Dunes La Panne BE Bruges XX i on XX nal
II
Mardyck Bains
l
10 Dunkirk XX en XXX
Gravelines FR 68 16 XXX t BE Maldegem XX Balgerhoeck
nC
13 Res.
Loo
(-) -Br
Bourbourg FR 16 ug 12
uze
II Eecloo XXVI
n al
BE
e
III a es
Can
III Spycker FR C XX Ca XX BE
al
ern
137 21 II lme XX
X XX
Aa Canal
GD
na 11 II
XXX
FR 6GH B a s s e Co Dixmude 16 Res. (-) l
nt-T
III XX BE XX BE
XIX (+) ser XX
X
X XX
Ghe
XXX
LAH 144 48 Noordschote XX 2 CA (-)
XX 4 VI XXX
XXX
2 (-) XX
Bollezeele 6 IV XX BE
Wormhoudt XX 2 I XX
Nevele IX
18:37
Watten Thielt5 VI BE
Boulogne Watou (-) BE 9 VII XX Ghent
Arneke 2 BE XX 10 IV XX XX BE
Saint-Momelin X Poperinghe BE 225
Lian II
FR 15 I BE Roulers 3 VII 8 VII
e 145 48 Steenvoorde Vinckt XX
XXX Saint-Omer 12 Ypres BE Iseghem BE BE
XX
XX 56
XX XX XX Scheldt
Fo rê t de Cassel X Godewaersvelde X Zonnebeke XX
XX X 18 19
XX C l a i rm a ra i s XX 14 30 255
XXX
XX 31 X Desselghem
20 Hazebrouck Mont
X
des Cats 13 5 XX XXX XI
XXX 8 X Lys
X 131
44 XX 61 Menin IV
XLI (+) 143 48 Courtrai
Blaringhem
XXXX
132 1 44 (-)
XXXX X
Warneton Halluin XXX
Aa Fo rê t de Ni e ppe FR Comines XX XXX
Étaples Lys Aire 69 25 Audenarde (Oudenaarde)
X
Air
Kleist XX X 4 XX X
XXXX
eC
6 2 25 50 XXX
Verfügungs Armentières 7
an
Estaires XX
al
XXXX II aut 6
XX Saint-Venant 3 (-) Esc
Montreuil X Roubaix XXX
XXX BEF XX
3 XX
B o i s de 2 (-) FR XXXXX
Pa que a ut X XX
III
3 re
Totenkopf X
Ca FRANCE
nc XXX
150 50 Lille XXX 35 nd
he 4 2 1 (-) XX XX XX De
XVI (+) X FR
1 4 1 254
Béthune 5 2 XXX XX
XX La La Bassée Canal FR XX XX
I 269
4 XX
Ba s ule X e151 42 253
sé e C
anal 50 Seclin XX
eD
7 XXXX Tournai XXX
X
XXX 2NA 3 Bourghelles
X
139 46 XXVII
Haut
XX BELGIUM
XX
Hoth
Au
Attiches FR
Saint-Pol 12 3
thi
XX Carvin XX XXXX
e
12 5NA 5 1 FR XX
XX Lens 32 3
XXX Maulde
Opposing forces around the Dunkirk–Lille Pocket, 1800hrs 26 May
FR XX FR/Prioux
XXXXX
5 25 5 FR XX
II Orchies XX
XXXX XX Raches XX B
XX Frévent 1 3
FR XX 217
Allied retreat 4 32 15 4
13 4 4 FR
German advance FR XXXX
FR Douai
XXX XX Marchiennes Condé
Inundated area Scar
pe
XIV XX
27
XX XXXXX
Arras
9 11
XX XX XX XX A
XXX
Gort’s next task was to organize the orderly withdrawal into the perimeter
by forces spread about both sides of the Dunkirk–Lille Pocket. On the eastern
front, on the morning of 26 May Gort directed Major-General Harold E.
Franklyn to move his 5th Division northwards to man positions along the
Comines–Ypres Canal, filling the gap between the Belgians and II Corps.
Required to shield the retirement routes of I Corps and rear echelon
formations withdrawing from the bottom of the pocket northwards to
Dunkirk, this movement was largely carried out by the GHQ motor transport
companies. Franklyn’s troops would be followed by Major-General Giffard
Martel’s 50th Division once the GHQ transport returned to pick them up.
On the western side, command of III Corps was passed to Major-General
S. R. Wason RA, Gort’s chief of artillery. Wason could exercise only limited
control over his four divisions since their brigades were scattered in small
detachments and communication was problematic. Consequently, he spent
most of the next two days attempting to coordinate the withdrawal effort
with the French 1ère Armée.
Realizing that there was no option open to him but to follow the British
lead, at 2230hrs on 25 May Gén. Blanchard issued the order: ‘The 1ère
Armée, the BEF and the Belgian Army will regroup progressively behind
the water-line demarcated by the Aa Canal, the Lys and the “Canal de
Dérivation” so as to form a bridgehead covering Dunkirk in breadth.’
The French plan for the withdrawal was to pull the divisions of 1ère
Armée back successively to the Scarpe, Deule Canal and Lys concurrent with
the BEF retirements. Separate retreat routes were established for French and
British units but because of their relative locations in the pocket and the
situation each faced, often these were not used.
In any event Blanchard considered the movement as simply a retreat into a
more defensible pocket, a supersized fortress. As his Operational Order No. 30
(26 May) emphasized, ‘This bridgehead will be held with no thought of retreat.’
But the British thought only in terms of evacuating their defeated army.
Assigned the task of planning for just this contingency, V. Adm. Ramsay had
already organized the evacuation of 4,368 troops from Boulogne, 440 from
Calais and had returned 23,128 non-combat personnel to England.
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THE CAMPAIGN
Operation Dynamo is to commence… with the greatest vigour
Signal from the Admiralty to Flag Officer Commanding Dover, 1857hrs, 26 May 1940
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At the southern end of the BEF’s western battle line the battalions of
the 2nd Division, widely scattered along La Bassée Canal, were faced by
two motorized SS divisions (the SS-Verfügungs Division, later renamed the
2. SS-Panzer-Division ‘Das Reich’, and the new SS-Division ‘Totenkopf’)
who limited their attacks to establishing bridgeheads at several points.
The real crisis was on the eastern side of the Allied pocket where Bock’s
Heeresgruppe B had no interruptions in its continued attacks. King Léopold’s
IVe Corps attempted to hold the line from Ypres to Roulers by placing some
2,000 railway carriages end to end on the 18km (11-mile) railway connecting
the two cities as an anti-tank barrier. While this held (Bock had no tanks),
the rest of the Belgian line no longer had any barriers, natural or man made,
and to the east of Roulers the Germans soon penetrated at Iseghem, Nevele and
Ronsele. The last Belgian reserve, the 1ère Division de chasseurs Ardennais,
was thrown into the breach and stopped the 225. Infanterie-Division at Vynckt
but a new hole soon appeared near Ecloo when the 256. Infanterie-Division
fought their way across the Lys Canal de Dérivation at Balgerhoeck. With no
reserves remaining, three tired regiments from depleted divisions were rushed
into the gaps while in the rear auxiliary troops formed a new line using ancient
World War I 75mm guns taken from training centres.
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LEFT By noon it was apparent that they could no longer hold back the Germans
Major-General Harold and Léopold reported to the French that ‘the Belgian Army is in a serious
E. Franklyn outside his
situation and… has nearly reached the limits of its endurance’. This was
winter ‘Phoney War’ HQ
at Wambrechies on repeated and emphasized at 1800hrs when Gén. Blanchard arrived at the
22 January 1940. Belgian GHQ and at the same time a message was sent to the BEF GHQ
(IWM O1188) saying ‘In the absence of Belgian reserves we cannot extend the boundary
RIGHT
notified yesterday any further to the right. We are compelled regretfully to say
Luftwaffe medium bomber that we have no longer any forces available to bar the way from Ypres.’
units flying from Germany While the spent Belgian Army holding the east flank of the pocket was
were escorted by twin-engine crumbling under the weight of massive and incessant ground and air assaults, the
Messerschmitt Bf 110C heavy
fact that they had held north-east of Ypres – plus inundations prepared east of
fighters, such as these from
II./ZG 26 flying over their the Yser Canal – provided enough time for Gort to move Maj. Gen. Franklyn’s
base at Neuss. Demonstrating 5th Division north to man the 8km (5-mile) length of the disused, and completely
their inexperience, RAF pilots dry, Comines–Ypres Canal. Taking operational control of the 143rd Brigade
flying 11 Hurricanes and two
on his right, Franklyn stationed his own 13th Brigade in the centre and the
Spitfires were shot down
by poorly manoeuvring 17th Brigade on the left. Franklyn was backed by two regiments of artillery and
Zerstörer, who lost only six all of I Corps’ heavy guns. The 50th Division’s lead unit, the 150th Brigade,
in return. (Courtesy of the followed the 5th Division, passing behind Franklyn’s forces to occupy and defend
Vasco/Cornwell Collection) Ypres, but would not arrive until the next evening.
In London, convinced by an ‘Ultra’ intercept (exploitation of the German
‘Enigma’ encrypted signals) of the OKW’s ‘go order’ the night before,
Churchill had now arrived at the same conclusion as Gort. Meeting with
Reynaud he encouraged continued fighting but also urged a withdrawal to the
coast for the BEF and French 1ère Armée. Reluctantly the French Premier
consented to the general withdrawal to the coast; however, he wasn’t told
that the British were considering evacuating the BEF.
In fact the only notification given to the French leadership was at 0500hrs
the next day through the British Military Mission to the French GQG
(Grand Quartier Général). At this time, on direction of Secretary of State
for War Anthony Eden, Major-General Sir Richard Howard-Vyse ‘consulted’
with Gén. Weygand regarding the Supreme Allied Commander’s desired
‘destination of the [BEF] and any French units that it might prove possible to
evacuate’. Weygand had his naval chief, Amiral Jean-François Darlan, ‘study
[the possibility of] re-embarkation’, but the only direct outcome was to
establish a liaison with Dover Command and grant permission to evacuate
wounded, ‘superfluous Staff elements’ and ‘certain categories of specialists’,
primarily technically trained troops such as artillerists and tank crews who
could be better employed south of the Somme.
34
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CAM219_2311.qxd:Layout 1
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Kwinte Bank
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Page 35
a Ba r
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l t T
South g e t e es
Foreland t i n R a W
South Goodwin Light y n 2E Trapageer
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Varne Dunkirk BELGIUM
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Va
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Shoreline at high tide
dg
Low tide
Ri
Cap
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5m depth line
Gris-Nez
Th
10m depth line
Evacuation routes X, Y and Z across the English Channel, 26 May to 4 June
F R A N C E
Evacuation routes
0 5 10 miles
Buoy or light vessel
0 5 10 15km Mine fields
35
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Nevertheless, a little over two and a half hours after the Panzers were once
again unleashed, the Admiralty signalled ‘Operation Dynamo is to commence’.
Throughout the day Ramsay’s ongoing shuttle service continued; during
the morning two hospital carriers brought home 646 wounded. In the late
afternoon six personnel ships arrived, delivering 250 service and signals troops
and 12,000 gallons of water, and rescued 3,748 men with the 1,182-ton French
steamer Rouen taking 420 wounded poilus to Cherbourg.
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the armour and by the end of the day were overrun, one battalion (I/48e RI)
and some artillery (II/35e RAD and I/115e RALH) surviving and withdrawing
to Drincham. Similarly, north of Bourbourg the 1. Panzer-Division pulverized
II/137e RI, breaking through in the afternoon to close a steel ring around
Gravelines (II/310e RI) and Fort Philippe (VII/310e RI).
Further south Major-General Noel Irwin’s 2nd Division attempted to hold
a 32km (20-mile) length of canal from Aire to La Bassée. Along this front
the full fury of three Panzer and two SS divisions was unleashed. Following
a devastating artillery bombardment, in the pre-dawn darkness tanks rolled
through the bridgeheads and violently assaulted the scattered British
battalions. Without anti-tank guns (all sent to the Dunkirk perimeter) and
with very limited artillery (reassigned to II Corps) the defenders were overrun
at almost every point.
In the centre of the line, the battalions of the 4th Brigade were battered,
surrounded and systematically destroyed by the 4. Panzer-Division and
SS-Division ‘Totenkopf’. On the right flank the 6th Brigade was overrun by
the 3. Panzer-Division and virtually wiped out by noon, the survivors seeking
shelter in the Forest of Nieppe. On the left the 5th Brigade was beaten back by
Rommel’s 7. Panzer-Division. A small futile counterattack briefly spoiled his
success, but shortly after noon Rommel launched a powerful coordinated
assault that drove an armoured wedge deep towards Armentières, the first step
in the encirclement and eventual destruction of the French 1ère Armée at Lille.
Meanwhile on the more desperately threatened east side of the pocket, at
the Comines–Ypres Canal, Franklyn’s three brigades were hit by the full
strength of three infantry divisions. Enemy assaults were powerful and the
fighting vicious. In a dramatic see-saw battle the British gave ground and
counterattacked repeatedly. Finally, the fighting died down at last about
midnight, giving the exhausted British troops some respite before the new
day brought renewed German attacks.
With the 5th Division holding throughout the day, I Corps began pulling
out of line about 2200hrs with the 1st Division beginning its two-day 95km
(60-mile) trek north, all the way to the Dunkirk perimeter, leaving behind
three battalions as an emergency reserve for II Corps. The 42nd Division
38
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followed, one brigade, the 125th, stopping to set up a rearguard on the Deule
Canal between Lille and Wambrechies while the others, the 126th and 127th,
formed the new line on the Lys east of Armentières.
Behind them Major-General Bernard L. Montgomery’s 3rd Division began
its 40km (25-mile) move to take position on Franklyn’s left. Transported by
2,000 troop carriers, lorries, vans and staff cars Montgomery’s 13,600 men
passed behind the 4th and 5th Divisions and arrived at their new positions
at 1000hrs, extending the British line north to near Noordschote. Once
Montgomery had passed behind them, the 4th Division retired directly to the
west, redeploying behind the Lys west of Warneton. One of its brigades,
the 12th, covered the right flank of the neighbouring 5th Division and while
the two others, the 10th and 11th, became Franklyn’s reserves.
Attempting to close the gap created by the departure of the British
divisions, the French 1ère Armèe also began its retirement to the north, but
things did not work out so well. Marching on foot, hungry, exhausted, low
on ammunition and harried by incessant Luftwaffe attacks, their three corps
had to cross the Deule Canal between Provin and Lille in order to reach the
new defensive line on the Lys. Unfortunately Général de corps d’armée
Aymer’s 4e Corps d’armée was only able to withdraw to around Seclin, south
of the canal, regrouping the next day. Général de corps d’armée René
Altmayer’s 5e Corps d’armée came under heavy artillery fire and almost
continual air attacks and soon became lost, frustrated and confused. More
fortunate was Général de corps d’armée de la Laurencie’s 3e Corps d’armée,
which had the advantage of following the British divisions north of Lille.
By this time the Belgian Army was being forced into a pocket of its own.
Their right flank was pushed back to the north-east near Passchendaele, some
13km (8 miles) from the end of the BEF line at Ypres. Closing in from the east
the German XXVI AK penetrated Belgian lines at Maldegem and Ursel. In
their centre, two German divisions opened a 7km (4-mile) gap between Thielt
and Iseghem, counterattacks were repulsed and the Germans’ route to Bruges
and Ostend lay open. Communications and transport were in chaos and the
throng of refugees – an estimated 3 million people in an area of 1,700km2
(650 square miles) – made any meaningful manoeuvres impossible.
39
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40
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Fortunately the spiked anti-aircraft guns would not be needed – at least not
this day. The weather deteriorated throughout the day with piles of cloud
mingling with the pall of oily smoke soon to obscure the harbour and beaches.
Only 75 bombing sorties were flown against Dunkirk, the largest raid arriving
at 1000hrs – KG 77 Dorniers heavily protected by Bf 109Es. The RAF’s 11
Group had learned a lesson the previous day and paired its squadrons to create
larger formations, though only by flying half the number of patrols (321 sorties
in 11 missions). The Messerschmitt escorts (JG 3, JG 26, JG 51 and JG 54)
were numerous and effective, only one Do 17Z was lost to RAF fighters but in
this and other sporadic clashes during the day three Spitfires, three Defiants
and eight Hurricanes were shot down for the loss of only two Bf 109Es.
While heavy cloud and continuous rain cloaked the Dunkirk perimeter for
the rest of the day, clear skies over Lille funnelled heavy Luftwaffe attacks
against the French 4e and 5e Corps d’armée. Paralyzed by repeated air raids,
Géns. Aymer and Altmayer gave up retreating and elected to fight it out where
they stood. Général de la Laurencie, knowing the only hope lay at Dunkirk,
continued to lead his 3e Corps d’armée northwards, losing his rearguard (1ère
Division d’infanterie motorisée) and one other division (2e Division d’infanterie
Nord-Africaine) to the closing pincers formed by 7. Panzer-Division from the
west and 7. Infanterie-Division from the east.
At Dunkirk, beneath the blanket of smoke and clouds, the pace of the
evacuation began to increase dramatically. Captain Tennant was dissatisfied
with the slow, tedious process of plucking small batches of troops from
the beaches. The shallow shelving and numerous sandbars prevented larger
ships from approaching closer than 800m (2,625ft) and the slow back-
breaking rowing of ship’s lifeboats required 6–12 hours to fill the ships to
capacity. Consequently during the first full day of Dynamo only 7,669 troops1
were evacuated.
At 2200hrs the night before, Capt. Tennant directed one of the personnel
ships, the modern 1,162-ton Queen of the Channel, to try docking against the
harbour side of the Jetée de l’est (known as the ‘east mole’ to the British).
This was a rocky 1,280-metre long (4,200ft) breakwater extending from the
base of old fortifications to the harbour’s mouth. Atop tall pilings set in the
tumbled stone boulders was a wooden gangway about two metres wide.
While not designed as a docking or embarkation pier, in the darkness Captain
1. There are five sources for the numbers of personnel evacuated during Operation Dynamo, none of which agrees. Used here are
the numbers from The Admiralty’s Historical Section, which are perhaps not the most accurate but are the highest and therefore
the most often quoted. They represent the approximate numbers arriving in England from midnight one day to midnight the next.
41
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German and Allied forces engaged around Dunkirk and Lille, 2200hrs 28 May
N
E n g l i s h Cha nne l
Ostend
Nieuport-Bains Westende
Malo- 12
II
les- Bray- XX
La Panne Nieuport
Bains Dunes 256 XXVI
II
X
Mardyck III
Gravelines II 310
272 (-)
Furnes 271 60
III
XX Dunkirk FR XX
1 1 Pz
FR 68 XVI Uxem 208 XXVI
III
FR III
Loo
225 68 341 XXX
II
68 Bulscamp
FR XXVI 18
Can
Bourbourg 4 1 Pz FR al
Spycker Bergues Can III
Dixmude
a
III Basse 241 60
l
Brouckerque IR XIX 6 II
Colme
GD (+) Loo FR XXXX
Saint-Pierre al X GH
Can Socx XXX 18 B
Aa Canal
Broucke XX 4 10 X
e
XX
lm
X 2 XX
11 XIV Wylder Yser
ute
III X BambecqueXX
144 48 Noordschote 216 IX
LAH 1 I XX
Bollezeele Wormhoute Proven
XXX
Watten 3 II
9
XX
XIV
Bo i s d e
Ha m
Ledringhem
Arneke
X
Houtkerque
69
X
23
BELGIUM Roulers
IX 18
XX
XX
6 6 X
Watou XXX 30 XI
X
XX X 139 46 19 XI
Saint-Momelin XXX 145 48 Steenvoorde 151 50
XX
XXX
20 XIV X Poperinghe 14 XI Passchendaele
5 2 XI 6
Fo rê t de XX Cassel X Ypres
Saint-Omer Cl a i rma ra i s 11 6 Godewaersvelde 150 50 XX Zonnebeke
XX
X X 18 IV XXX
XX from
Aa 133 44 Mont des Cats 11 4 XX 254
6. Armee
3 XLI Reserve
XX
Caestre X 31 IV
XXX
8 XLI X
10 4 X XX
XXX 131 44 IV 6
Hazebrouck X 13 5 61 IV Menin
XLI (+) XX
X
X
Blaringhem 132 44 12 4 Lys
29 XLI Steenwerk 143 48 XXX
XX X
Verfügungs XLI XX
XX
127 42 Comines Halluin XXX
12 3 XX
XX X 6
Fo rê t de 1 (-) X
7 X
Aire Ni e p pe Caudescure XX FR FR XX 126 42 35
XX
32 (-) De
X
3 1 3
ule
XX FR XXXX
Saint-Venant Merville XX
XX Armentières
FR 4 3
X
Wambrechies 6 B
Estaires DLM (-) 125 42
Robecq Lestrem XX Escaut
XX XX XXX
Totenkopf XVI
7 XVI 25 Roubaix XXX
Lille
Air
XXX
XX
XXVII 6
eC
XX
XVI (+) XX
1 4 FR Annappes 269
an
Maroc. XX XXVII
XX Höpner 5
al
XXX XX FR XX
251 2 4 4
Béthune Hoth 4 NA
3 FR
253 XXVII
L aB XX
FRANCE 4
XXXX
A Ca
nal
ass
é e XX
FR
NA
5
XX 15
5 FR
4
XX
La Bassée 267 II FR Seclin 217 XXVII
X XX XX
XX
12 II Provin 11 II
XX
B
X
Lens XX
X
X
X
1 VII
XX Orchies
XXX 8 VIII
VIII 4 XXXXX
XXX Raches A
XX
II 4
28 VII
Allied retreat
XX
XX
Marchiennes
46 II Douai
German advance 83 VII
Arras e
Inundated area Scarp XXX
VII 4
0 5 10 miles ée
Sens Denain
0 5 10 25km
42
CAM219_2311.qxd:Layout 1 11/12/09 18:38 Page 43
W. J. Odell eased the cross-Channel steamer to the jetty, the crew made fast
a head rope and he warped alongside, secured with lines fore and aft. As
Tennant watched, 600 troops shuffled down the makeshift dock and boarded
Queen of the Channel via ladders and gangplanks.
With this success, Tennant and his staff quickly organized berthing parties
to secure the ships, set up a control system to manage the flow of men and
signalled destroyers to enter the harbour, dock and load. In pairs, six of the
nimble warships came alongside, embarked troops and then backed out,
turned and headed for Dover at 22 knots. Followed by two others lifting
men from the beaches, these were replaced by the four destroyers called in
from their patrol stations, four more arriving from the Western Approaches
and two others from Portsmouth, beginning a steady continuous cycle of
embarkations and departures.
The day’s only major loss was the plucky Queen of the Channel. Just after
dawn and just past halfway to Kwinte Buoy, she was spotted by a lone Ju 88A
(from I./KG 30) on an armed reconnaissance sortie and was sent to the
bottom, her crew and 904 troops being rescued by the 1,039-ton stores ship
Dorrien Rose.
With embarkations from the east mole shifting into high gear, at 1100hrs
Gén. Blanchard arrived at Gort’s CP at Houtkerque to discuss the
adjustments needed to compensate for the Belgian capitulation. He was
shocked and dismayed to learn that the BEF had orders to evacuate from
Dunkirk. Also learning that most French troops were too tired to continue
retreating, he directed Général de corps d’armée Prioux to continue fighting
where they were and, if nothing else, save the honour of the French Army.
Meanwhile at the Comines–Ypres Canal Franklyn’s three tired brigades
were again hit by the full strength of three German infantry divisions and
another day-long, see-saw battle ensued. Eventually the 17th Brigade was
overwhelmed and two of the unit’s three battalions were virtually annihilated.
A late counterattack by the 4th Division’s 10th Brigade prevented the same
thing from happening to the 13th Brigade, and a late afternoon rainstorm
brought the fighting to a close. Once the fighting had died down at 2100hrs
the 4th Division – whose artillery had exhausted all their ammunition in the
battle – packed up and continued northwards, marching all night to take its
positions on the Dunkirk perimeter.
43
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A heavily loaded drifter makes North of Ypres, the 3rd Division held the line along the Yser River to
its best speed for England as Noordschote. They were shelled but not seriously challenged by German
Dunkirk continues to burn in
infantry who were still making their way through the throng of disarmed
the background. These ‘little
ships’ brought home only Belgian troops and masses of frightened refugees. At 2200hrs Montgomery
28,708 men, but they provided was ordered to pull back and form a new defensive line between Noordschote
the crucial link in ferrying wet and Poperinghe with Martel’s 50th Division on his right.
and weary troops from the
On the western side of the retreat corridor, the 2,500-man remnant of the
beaches out to the larger
vessels waiting offshore. 2nd Division straggled northwards behind the widely spaced brigades of Major-
(IWM HU2108) General Edmund Osborne’s 44th Division. It had rained heavily during the
night, making the retreat miserable for the Allied troops, but also making the
ground very soggy, forcing the 8. Panzer-Division’s heavy mechanized vehicles
to stay on the roads, limiting their mobility. Nevertheless, German attacks
began at dawn, mostly against the 132nd Brigade ensconced in the Forest of
Nieppe. They were hammered by heavy shellfire and as SS stormtroopers
attacked the outlying units, Panzers drove across the Hazebrouck Canal,
forcing the defenders into a series of fighting withdrawals.
The spaces between Osborne’s other units allowed German mechanized
units to penetrate the line in several places, attacking the battalions from
multiple sides simultaneously, eventually forcing them to seek the high ground
called Mont des Cats near Godewaersvelde. This dominating position, 10km
(6 miles) behind Caestre, was already occupied by two RA field regiments –
one each from the 42nd and 44th Divisions – who had provided Osborne’s
scattered battalions with excellent fire support. The 44th Division rallied to
this high ground to dig in and defend it the following day while behind them
the 2nd Division’s survivors rested at Watou.
Meanwhile, north of Osborne’s units Major-General Thorne’s 48th Division
had a tough time. Defending Wormhoudt, the 144th Brigade was subjected to
heavy bombardment before the German attacks – by the 6. Panzer-Division’s
SR 4 and IR (mot.) ‘Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler’ – commenced at 1000hrs.
Relentless assaults overwhelmed one battalion and forced the others to fight
their way out with rifle, grenade and bayonet. The battered Tommies regrouped
at Bambecque that evening.
At the walled hilltop town of Cassel, 145th Brigade was attacked heavily
by PR 11’s Skoda 35(t) 10.5-ton light tanks throughout the day. The Czech-
made tanks went in without infantry support and suffered grievous losses from
the brigade’s 24 anti-tank guns and four 18-pdrs (K Battery, 5th Regiment
RHA) firing through loopholes in the town’s thick medieval walls. Though
victorious, by the end of the day the Tommies were surrounded.
44
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At the northern end of the line, the rifle brigade (1. Schützenbrigade) and
engineers (Pion. Bat. (mot.) 37) of Guderian’s 1. Panzer-Division besieged the
French fortress troops (II and VII/310e RI) at Gravelines and Fort Philippe.
However, anticipating the 300km (186-mile) movement south-east to join
Generaloberst von List’s AOK 12 for Fall Rot, Guderian withdrew the
division’s two Panzer regiments to laager along the Samer-Montreuil road
near Boulogne.
On the front line Guderian’s Panzers were replaced by General der Infanterie
Gustav von Wietersheim’s XIV AK (mot.). Wietersheim left his three original
motorized infantry divisions along the Somme and was given three fresh
formations to use against the Dunkirk perimeter – the small 9. Panzer-Division
(from Heeresgruppe B’s XXXIX AK), the 20. Infanterie-Division (mot.) (from
Heeresgruppe B’s XVI AK), and the light 11. Schützenbrigade (mot.) fresh from
its one-day conquest of Jutland the month before (see Campaign 183: Denmark
and Norway 1940 by the same author, Osprey Publishing Ltd: Oxford, 2007).
Wietersheim was also given IR (mot.) ‘Grossdeutschland’ and IR (mot.)
‘Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler’, two battalions of Guderian’s heavy artillery and
his observation aircraft squadrons.
While the German commanders nearest Dunkirk reorganized their forces,
the evacuations continued unabated. The loss of Queen of the Channel
prompted V. Adm. Ramsay to discontinue the use of large steamers during
‘hours of full daylight’ and dispatched a dozen more minesweepers and
18 schuyts, some of them delivering ammunition, food, medical supplies
and 10,000 gallons of water before picking up waiting troops. These, plus a
total of 16 destroyers, returned with more of the 11,874 British troops
embarked from the harbour and 5,930 from the beaches. Of the total at
least 461 were wounded. Additionally, a small convoy of French supply
ships evacuated 2,500 ‘specialist’ troops and 480 wounded. Although one
ship, the 2,954-ton Douaisien, was lost to a magnetic mine, almost all of the
1,000 aboard were rescued.
During the day, however, arrivals outpaced embarkations as another 50,000
men trudged into the perimeter. Most of these were rear echelon and combat
support troops. They lacked the unit cohesion and individual discipline of
fighting units and soon overwhelmed Tennant’s slim staff, one of whom
referred to them as ‘the odds and ends of an army, not the fighting soldiers’.
Added to these were a throng of individual soldiers and small units separated
from their larger formations and, in the absence of orders or leadership, simply
headed for the funeral pyre of Dunkirk.
To rescue as many as possible as soon as possible, that night Ramsay
ordered a maximum effort. To the harbour he sent seven personnel ships,
three hospital carriers and two additional destroyers. To the beaches he sent
20 destroyers, 19 minesweepers, 20 schuyts, 17 drifters, five coasters and two
tugs towing 18 motorboats and 26 lifeboats.
While weather and darkness precluded further Luftwaffe intervention,
it encouraged the Kriegsmarine to attempt interdicting this large flow of
shipping between Dunkirk and Dover. The north-east corner of Route Y was
only 60km (37 miles) from the S-boats’ forward base at Flushing and late
that afternoon, under a mantle of dark grey skies, three of the fast attack
craft departed, cruising stealthily through the scattered rain squalls to take
station off Kwinte Buoy hoping to locate and sink some of the many ships
passing the well-lit turning point. Their success would be the first of two
major disasters to befall the Royal Navy the following day.
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2
3
Cassel is strategically located atop a 176m-high (577ft) The battle soon became a contest between British anti-tank
‘sugarloaf’-shaped hill 30km (19 miles) south of Dunkirk and is guns and the tanks’ main gun and machine guns. British 25mm
the junction of five major roads through the area. This medieval and 2-pdr anti-tank rounds ricocheted off the PzKpfw 35(t)s’
walled city was defended by two of the 145th Brigade’s infantry 25mm front armour until the gunners switched their aim to
battalions, its company of nine 25mm Hotchkiss anti-tank guns, the tank tracks, or waited until the tanks passed and hit the
the 209th Battery (reinforced), the Worcestershire Yeomanry 16mm side/15mm rear armour.
(53rd Anti-tank Regt.) with 15 2-pdrs and a battery of four Bombardier Harry Munn described the battle:
18-pdrs from 5th Regiment, Royal Horse Artillery.
We fired, they moved, halted and fired. After some 15 shells had
In the previous two days the defenders had transformed Cassel been fired, [the gun loader asked] ‘When are you going to hit the
into a fortress by ‘loopholing’ the outer walls for the artillery and bloody thing?’… so I shouted to [the gun layer] ‘Hit [it] in the tracks,
anti-tank guns and building barricades in the narrow streets. Frank!’ Just as the tank moved we fired, hitting the track propulsion
The infantry, 2nd Bn., the Gloucestershire Regt (2nd Glosters) wheels.… The tank halted abruptly, swinging to one side. Our next
and the 4th Bn., the Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Regt shell must have disabled the turret, as they opened the escape
(4th Ox and Bucks) – established a defence in depth. hatch and ran for their lives towards their lines…
Once the Panzer offensive resumed Kampfgruppe Koll, built By the end of the day the 209th Battery had claimed 40 tanks
around Oberstleutnant Richard Koll’s PR 11, drove directly destroyed. Finally, at midnight Koll abandoned the fruitless
towards Cassel. Panzer-Regiment 11 consisted of three tank assault and the surviving Panzers were withdrawn. The
battalions, each with an authorized strength of 15 PzKpfw IIs, following day PR 11 moved off to the north-east, laagering
17 PzKpfw IVs and 34 Skoda PzKpfw 35(t)s. In March 1935, around Droogland to lick its wounds.
the Wehrmacht confiscated 219 of the 10.5-ton Czech tanks,
Depicted here are the crew of disabled PzKpfw 35(t) 713 (1)
delivering 130 to PR 11. Only one ton heavier than the PzKpfw II,
captured by a squad of 2nd Glosters (2), while an abandoned
the 35(t) had a much heavier armament: one 3.7cm cannon
18-pdr (3) still points through a loophole in the city wall.
and two 7.92mm machine guns. By the time PR 11 approached
Cassel it had an estimated 20 PzKpfw IIs, 25 PzKpfw IVs and For additional details on this and several other valiant stands
70 PzKpfw 35(t)s operational. fought by units of the BEF, Hugh Sebag-Montefiore’s well-
researched and evocative Dunkirk: Fight to the Last Man is
Koll began his assault at 1000hrs. While battalions on both
highly recommended.
flanks were held up by outposts, some two-dozen tanks
advanced from the south.
48
CAM219_2311.qxd:Layout 1 11/12/09 18:39 Page 49
TOP
The RAF’s image suffered badly
from the gross exaggerations
of its inexperienced fighter
crews. Known as the Defiant’s
‘incredible victory’, on 29 May
No. 264 Sqn. gunners claimed
to have downed 19 Stukas, 15
Bf 110s, two Bf 109s and a Ju
88A. Actually only one Ju 88A
(1./LG 1) and one Stuka (2./StG
2) are known to have fallen to
Defiants this day. (IWM CH884)
BOTTOM
One of the five NAS 825
Swordfish lost on the Bollezeele
raid, resting in a field south of
Bergues, ravaged by souvenir-
hunters. The RAF completely
lacked a dedicated ground
attack aircraft for close air
support of the troops
prompting the Fleet Air
Arm to fill this gap with its
anachronistic Wolrd War I
-type biplanes. (IWM HU58737)
49
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12
11
10
ROUTE Y
5 MIDDLEKERKEBANK BUOY
3
NOORD PASS 4
3 2
50
Another random document with
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"Nellie," said Christina after tea, when they were all
assembled in the drawing room, "I have lost one of my
children!"
"She does not look very sad," said Arthur, "so I suppose
it is all right."
"'And now,' he said, 'tell me, what was your reason for
abstaining, may I ask?'
"'Certainly,' I answered; 'it was just this. I was reading
in my Bible one day, and this verse seemed to haunt me
after I closed the book:
"I saw him put his arm round them both with a
smothered, 'My dear, I am only too glad,' and then I slipped
away.
"When I went back again after half-an-hour, they were
sitting side by side, holding each other's hands, and
looking, oh, so happy! Charlie had fallen asleep in his
father's arms, and his mother had lifted his feet into her
lap, and was holding them in her disengaged hand.
"I cannot tell you, dears, all they said and did, nor
repeat their gratitude. How little had I done, and what an
abundant blessing had my gracious Father given me!
* * * * * *
She pressed his hand, and then said very low, so that
only he heard it, "It is a strange day, Tom, and I do not
know how to rejoice; but I shall feel better perhaps when
once he is here."
Netta and Isabel sat near Nellie with their work, but
they did not do much; for every cab made them look up,
and sometimes go to the window to peep out.
Nellie sat very quiet too. Would Walter ask her this time
if she had any secrets? She hoped not; but perhaps he
would be too taken up to think of her. Then a pang of
jealousy shot across her heart; a pang instantly rebuked
and confessed; but the thought filled her eyes with tears.
Not the thought that she was no longer first with her
beloved brother, but of grief that she could have even
regretted it for a moment.
"Yes, she looks very thin and tired; but Christina thinks
she will recover gradually. I must try to cheer her if I can."
CHAPTER XXV.
HASTY.
BUT Wilmot did not come back. As Nellie had told her
father, it was all over; there would be no change.
"Your affectionate
little Tom."
Isabel said, "It did; we were having a talk, and did not
want to be interrupted."
"All right," said Ada, "I'll make myself scarce." With
which sharp words, she hastened from the room.
"Isabel, dear!" said Nellie. "I wish you would not vex
Ada."
"From Christina."
CHAPTER XXVI.
CONCLUSION.
FOUR years after the events recorded in the last
chapter, two young ladies were sitting in a sunny room at
Shanklin, looking out on to the sea.
"Yes; but she thinks nothing about it, but just goes on
her sensible way as nicely as possible."
"I am sure she has. There was one time that I was
rather afraid, but your love and patience tided over the
difficulty."
"It was very hard for her to have to yield to me, if there
was a difference of opinion; and yet sometimes you know I
was forced to carry out what I thought right. It was about
the children generally that we had trouble; but, after all,
she acted so beautifully."
"Only a little."
"Your back?"
"Is it bad?" she asked, as she rapidly got out rag and
calendula, which she always kept handy.
"From home."
"Your obedient
servant,
"Mrs.
Fenton."
"Does she like having the three little boys to live with
her?" asked Arthur.
"Clementin
a Wood."
"You do?"
"I don't pretend to deny it," she answered.
"I will ring; but you know the water doesn't boil till
five."
"I'll see 'm; I'll tell misses, 'm. The kettle do nearly boil,
'm."
Nellie said she was rather tired, and would sit in the
garden instead, and bear Tom company.
But the gate swung to, and Dolly's little feet ran lightly
up the path, then through the house and into the garden,
and paused by her side.
Nellie bent her head lower, but knew not what to say.
"I am sure you did not. Come, Nellie, it has been such a
long weary time; can you not make me happy at last?"
LONDON: