New Multilateral Development Banks: Opportunities and Challenges For Global Governance

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Global Policy Volume 8 . Issue 1 .

February 2017
113

New Multilateral Development Banks:


Opportunities and Challenges for Global
Governance

Special Section Article


Hongying Wang
University of Waterloo

Abstract
Is the creation of the New Development Bank (NDB) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) a challenge for the
World Bank and other traditional multilateral development banks (MDBs)? This paper provides an initial assessment of the
potential benefits and risks of NDB and AIIB by examining their motivations, scale, structures, rules and first projects. It identi-
fies areas in which the new MDBs can complement the World Bank and other traditional MDBs and discusses ways in which
they can undermine the latter. It suggests ways in which the two types of MDBs can further their cooperation in development
financing.

The relationships between regional and global institutions interacted with other actors in international development
and among regional institutions are important and contro- financing. These early signs provide the basis of a
versial in global governance. In the 1990s, with the deepen- preliminary assessment of the likely impact of these new
ing of European integration, the creation of the North institutions.
American Free Trade Area, and various regional cooperation
initiatives in the Asia-Pacific region, scholars and policymak-
The new regional landscape of multilateral
ers wondered if these regional blocs would fragment the
development banks
global governance framework. Today, regional and other
types of sub-global schemes are on the rise again. At the end of World War II, the International Bank of Recon-
In development cooperation, there is one global institu- struction and Development (IBRD) was created to help Eur-
tion – the World Bank Group (WBG), consisting of several ope rebuild after the war. Later, IBRD shifted its focus to
lending arms – and many regional institutions, including developing countries, providing financial support and pro-
more than 20 multilateral development banks (MDBs) (Hum- fessional advice for economic and social development. Since
phrey, 2015a). In the past, the relationship among different the creation of IBRD, more MDBs have emerged, roughly in
MDBs was discussed by various groups from time to time, three waves.
but this issue has grown much more salient in the last two The first wave happened during the era of decolonization
years following the creation of the New Development Bank from the mid-1950s to the mid-1970s, which saw the cre-
(NDB) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). ation of the International Finance Corporation and the Inter-
The NDB is a joint venture among the BRICS countries (Bra- national Development Association, both as members in the
zil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), which seeks to WBG. Outside the WBG, a number of regional development
support infrastructure and sustainable development in the banks were established in this era, including the Inter-
developing countries. The AIIB, initiated by China and jointly American Development Bank (IDB), the African Development
founded by fifty-seven member countries from Asia and Bank (AfDB), the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the
elsewhere, focuses on mobilizing resources to invest in Andean Development Corporation (CAF), and the Islamic
infrastructure in Asia. While some observers see the new Development Bank (IsDB). Most of them, such as IDB, AfDB,
MDBs as new sources of financing and potentially better and ADB, are quite similar to IBRD in their governance and
models of development cooperation, others are worried that operations. However, CAF and IsDB have some unconven-
they may undermine the WBG and traditional regional tional characteristics. They are primarily owned and con-
MDBs. trolled by borrower countries.
It is too early to know how the NDB and the AIIB affect A second wave of MDBs took place from the early 1990s
the existing global framework of multilateral development to the early 2000s in response to developments in Europe,
financing because both are new institutions. However, the including the creation of the European Bank of Reconstruc-
two banks have created their basic structures and rules, pre- tion and Development (EBRD) to help promote market-
pared the ground for their first investment projects, and oriented economies in post-communist countries and the

Global Policy (2017) 8:1 doi: 10.1111/1758-5899.12396 © 2017 University of Durham and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Hongying Wang
114

expansion of the European Investment Bank to further facili- Another motivation behind the creation of the NDB and
tate European integration. the AIIB is the desire of emerging economies to reform the
The creation of the NDB and the AIIB represents the third existing system of financial governance, especially to
and latest wave of MDBs. These new banks have arisen at a increase their voice at international financial institutions. In
time of power shift in the international system from industri- 2010, agreements were reached at both the IMF and the
alized countries to emerging economies. Since 2000, the World Bank to shift votes from the developed to the devel-
BRICS countries’ share of world gross domestic product has oping countries, especially to emerging economies. How-
grown from 8 per cent to 22 per cent, while the Group of ever, the so-called voice reform was not implemented in a
Seven’s share has declined from 65 per cent to 45 per cent. timely fashion. The World Bank recognizes that, despite pre-
Unlike most traditional MDBs, the NDB and the AIIB are led vious rounds of reform, many countries are still significantly
by the emerging economies, with China playing a particu- underweighted with respect to their economic size, includ-
larly prominent role. ing three BRICS countries – China, Brazil, and India (Develop-
To assess the benefits and risks posed by the NDB and ment Committee, 2015). At the IMF, the reallocation of votes
the AIIB for the existing institutions and framework of multi- was held up by the United States until the end of 2015.
lateral development financing, it is important to understand In the years leading up to the creation of the NDB and
what has brought them into being and how much financing the AIIB, the emerging economies grew increasingly impa-
they are likely to provide. tient with the slow pace of reform at international financial
institutions. Take China for example: on the one hand, Chi-
The NDB and the AIIB: motivations and scale nese officials continued to call for these institutions to carry
out their promise of greater inclusiveness and better repre-
The official rationale for creating the NDB and the AIIB is to sentation of developing countries (e.g. Zhou, 2014). On the
meet the urgent need of infrastructure investment in the other, they began to see alternative institutions as a way to
developing world. There is a strong consensus among inter- pressure these institutions to act. A central theme in the
national development institutions that infrastructure is vital official and popular Chinese discourse about the new MDBs
for developing countries to realize their growth potential. A is their function in increasing the ‘right to speak’ (huayu
commonly cited study estimates the gap between the cur- quan) for China and other developing countries at the glo-
rent spending and the necessary investment to range from bal level. (e.g. Ding, 2014; Li, 2015).
nearly $1 trillion to $1.5 trillion a year in developing coun- Besides filling the infrastructure gap and stimulating
tries (Bhattacharya et al., 2012). reform of the global financial system, the new MDBs have
Compared with other types of infrastructure investors, also been driven by the national interests of the emerging
such as private investors and national development banks, economies. Again, China provides the most obvious illustra-
MDBs have several advantages. First, because these banks – tion. In recent years, China has made infrastructure develop-
backed by sovereign governments – have high credit ment a priority of its investment overseas, pouring large
ratings, they can raise capital relatively cheaply in the sums of money into building power plants, railways, high-
marketplace. Therefore, they are able to extend loans on ways, ports, and airports in Africa, Asia, and Latin America
attractive terms. Second, unlike many private investors, (Br€autigam and Gallagher, 2014). In 2013, the Chinese gov-
these banks can afford to make long-term investments. ernment unveiled its One Belt, One Road (OBOR) initiative,
Third, MDBs tend to be equipped with strong technical aimed at building networks of connectivity to expand Chi-
capacities, years of experience, significant regional presence, nese trade and investment overseas. As a leader in the NDB
and local knowledge, which enable them to better deal with and the AIIB, China can direct some of these institutions’
the risks of infrastructure projects in different areas of the financial resources to its favorite projects. In fact, in June
world, especially in developing countries. 2016, the AIIB board of directors approved the bank’s first
In the early years, traditional MDBs prioritized infrastruc- four projects, all of which are power, transportation, and
ture investment, but they moved away from this priority in urban development projects along the OBOR route.
the 1980s and 1990s. There were many reasons behind this The NDB and the AIIB can also be instruments for emerg-
shift, including MDBs’ evolving view on the importance of ing economies to reduce their dependence on the US cur-
social and governance lending, the difficulty of meeting rency. Although both banks have used the US dollar for
new safeguards demanded by civil society, and the neolib- their initial capitalization and their first loans, they plan to
eral belief on the part of powerful donors in the virtue of increase the use of local currencies over time. China, in par-
private sector investment in infrastructure. The World Bank ticular, hopes to use both banks to expand and promote
used to direct 70 per cent of its lending to infrastructure in the internationalization of the renminbi. In July 2016, the
the 1950s and 1960s, but by 1999, infrastructure financing NDB issued 3 billion yuan ($448.37 million) bond denomi-
had dwindled to 19 per cent of its lending. The IDB made nated in RMB to fund green investment projects. Officials at
70 per cent of its lending to infrastructure projects in 1981, the bank indicated that more bonds will be issued in mem-
but that figure fell to 10 per cent in 2003. The ADB’s infras- ber-country currencies to minimize exchange risks (Tham
tructure investment declined less dramatically, but until the and Taplin, 2016).
early 2000s, the trend was downward as well (Humphrey, The NDB and the AIIB are entering an already crowded
2015a). area of global governance; their potential influence depends

© 2017 University of Durham and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Global Policy (2017) 8:1
Global Governance in Multinational Development Banks
115

partly on their scale relative to the other MDBs. The NDB regional development banks did not provide adequate value
has $50 billion in initial capital subscription, with 20 per added. Proposals to optimize the MDB system ranged from
cent paid in and 80 per cent callable. In early 2016, the harmonization and coordination among different banks to
BRICS countries paid up the first installment of $750 million. letting different banks find niche functions to having the
The AIIB, with $100 billion in authorized capital, also speci- World Bank withdraw first from Asia and Latin America and
fies that 20 percent will be paid-in capital and the rest later from Africa (Kempffmeyer, 2000).
callable. In the last few years, regional development banks have
Over time, the shareholder equity will likely grow as gained more favorable attention. Their advocates argue that
banks add the returns of their investments to reserves, but they have advantages over the World Bank due to their
a more important source of lending for MDBs is borrowing local knowledge and networks, as well as their better repre-
from private capital markets. The three dominant credit rat- sentation of countries in the region and thus greater institu-
ing agencies – Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s, and Fitch – eval- tional legitimacy. But even these supporters for enhancing
uate the creditworthiness of borrowers in international regional MDBs are aware of the potential conflict among
capital markets. As a recent study points out, their method- the MDBs and between them and the World Bank, calling
ologies tend to underestimate MDBs’ financial strength and for ‘regulated competition’ and avoidance of too much
seem to be particularly unfavorable to MDBs not led by duplication of services (Griffith-Jones et al., 2008; Kempff-
Western industrialized countries (Humphrey, 2015b). For the meyer, 2000).
NDB, this could seriously limit its scale of operations in the The controversy surrounding the establishment of the
initial years. Among the member countries, only China has new MDBs, especially the AIIB, has been much more intense
an AA- rating, while all the others have ratings below or than any previous discussions about regional banks and
bordering investment grade. Compared with the NDB, the their relationship with the World Bank. Moreover, the anxi-
AIIB is in a more advantageous position in this regard ety about these new banks has gone well beyond the devel-
because its membership includes a large number of non- opment organizations, involving governments, pundits, and
borrower, developed countries. the public. Among the more memorable reactions was the
A recent study examines a variety of scenarios for the comment by former US Treasury Secretary Lawrence Sum-
growth of equity and potential loan portfolio of the two mers in early April 2015, following the avalanche of coun-
new banks. It predicts that the NDB’s loan portfolio will tries applying to join the AIIB despite US opposition: ‘This
grow slowly to about $45–$65 billion in the first ten years past month may be remembered as the moment the United
and that AIIB’s loan portfolio will reach $70–$90 billion in States lost its role as the underwriter of the global economic
that period. This would place the investment capacity of the system’ (Summers, 2015). Now that the NDB and the AIIB
NDB and the AIIB at a level similar to that of ADB, surpass- are officially established and have begun to operate, it is
ing CAF and AfDB but falling below the World Bank and time to take a closer look at what benefits and risks they
even the IDB (Humphrey, 2015a). might bring to international cooperation on development.

Potential benefits and risks of the new MDBs Potential benefits of the New MDBs
Compared with trade, where regional blocs can undermine The most obvious benefit that the NDB and the AIIB can
an open global system, and monetary cooperation, where bring is additional investment in infrastructure development
coordinated responses are required to deal with contagious in developing countries. As mentioned earlier, in recent
financial crises, in the area of development financing regio- decades, the World Bank has greatly reduced its investment
nal and even subregional compartmentalization was not a in infrastructure, instead devoting more attention to pov-
major threat. For decades, the World Bank and various erty reduction, good governance, refugees, climate change,
regional development institutions worked side by side and and other issues broadly defined as development. By mobi-
often collaborated on development strategies and projects. lizing finance and expertise for infrastructure development,
Cofinancing between the World Bank and other MDBs was the NDB and the AIIB can complement the World Bank in
an important part of their lending, serving as an instrument supporting different dimensions of development. Indeed,
of aid coordination rather than a simple way to pool this is the expressed intention of the two MDBs (Asian
resources (Kapur et al., 2011). There was no serious norma- Infrastructure Investment Bank, 2015; New Development
tive conflict among the different MDBs. In fact, most of the Bank, 2015).
regional development banks are organized and governed in So far, the new and traditional MDBs seem to be cooper-
similar ways as the World Bank and subscribe to similar val- ating well. Three of the four projects announced by the AIIB
ues and priorities of development assistance. They can be are jointly funded with the World Bank, ADB, the United
seen as ‘regional copies of the World Bank’ (Kempffmeyer, Kingdom’s Department for International Development, and
2000). EBRD. In May 2016, the AIIB and the ADB signed a memo-
This is not to say that there was no debate over the rela- randum of understanding regarding jointly financing sus-
tionship among different development banks: coordination tainable development projects (Asian Development Bank,
was a central concern. By the early 2000s, some critics 2016). Meanwhile, the AIIB and the World Bank signed their
argued that the juxtaposition of the World Bank and the first cofinancing framework agreement (World Bank, 2016).

Global Policy (2017) 8:1 © 2017 University of Durham and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Hongying Wang
116

Another potential benefit of the new MDBs is that by practices, the NDB will aim, in a modest way, to build what
offering credible alternatives in development finance, they is described in our founding principles as “next practices”’.
bring a strong impetus for reform of the traditional MDBs. Commenting on the AIIB, China’s Minister of Finance Lou
At the World Bank and major regional MDBs, wealthier Jiwei argued that, ‘The multilateral development organiza-
members often have more decision power because they tions such as the World Bank and the Asian Development
make greater financial contribution to the banks. In contrast, Bank are under constant reform, a proof that there is only
the NDB (though not the AIIB) allocates its shares and votes the “good practice” instead of the so-called “best practice”’
equally among the five member countries. For the World (Lou, 2014). The NDB and the AIIB seem to diverge from
Bank, this new model of governance serves as a reminder the World Bank and other traditional MDBs on several
that to maintain its legitimacy in a rapidly changing world, issues.
where emerging economies are increasingly demanding First, the NDB and the AIIB reject the use of development
to be heard and respected, business as usual could be financing as leverage to promote social and political change
unsustainable. in borrowing countries. Commenting on the NDB, Lou said,
In addition, both the NDB and the AIIB aspire to be leaner ‘This bank will place greater emphasis on the needs of
and more efficient than the World Bank. Each has a nonresi- developing countries, have greater respect for developing
dent board of directors that meets periodically to make the countries’ national situation, and more fully embody the val-
necessary decisions. In comparison, the World Bank main- ues of developing countries’ (Wildau, 2015). According to
tains a resident board of directors, which is said to cost $70 AIIB President Jin, the bank will choose its investment pro-
million annually (Magnier, 2015). The NDB and the AIIB pro- jects on the basis of financial costs and returns and risk
mise to keep their staffs small, in sharp contrast with the assessments (Jin, 2016).
WBG, which has more than 10,000 employees in more than Second, with regard to safeguards in September 2015, the
120 offices around the world. The NDB and the AIIB can AIIB publicized its first draft Environmental and Social
potentially offer a more efficient model of operation than Framework. Many nongovernmental organizations inside
the World Bank, including faster approval of projects and and outside China are highly critical of its lack of details and
less tension between the professional staff and the board of enforcement mechanisms and the notably short and superfi-
directors. This could push the World Bank to cut costs and cial consultation process (Liu, 2016). The NDB has received
improve efficiency. even harsher criticism in this regard: it has neither published
Finally, emerging economies’ plan to establish their own the details of its environmental and social safeguards nor
MDBs to support infrastructure development may well consulted various groups in the process of making these
have played a role in reviving the World Bank’s interest in safeguards (Santos, 2016). The leniency of the new MDBs
this area. In 2014, the World Bank launched a Global toward infrastructure projects that may have negative social
Infrastructure Facility (GIF). With an initial fund of $100 and environmental consequences could make them more
million, the GIF seeks to coordinate the efforts of MDBs, attractive to some borrowers, who prioritize faster and
private sector investors and financiers, and governments lower-cost financing. This could undermine the ability of
in infrastructure investment. It suggests that competition other MDBs, including the World Bank, to uphold their
from the NDB and the AIIB can be beneficial to the devel- standards.
oping countries by making the World Bank more respon- Another potential risk of the new MDBs relates to China’s
sive to their needs. outsize role in them. The NDB has an egalitarian governance
structure, but the reality is that, with its economy and its
Potential risks of the new MDBs foreign reserves larger than that of the other BRICS coun-
tries combined, China exerts enormous influence over the
The main concern about the new MDBs expressed by inter- other members. In the AIIB, where voting rights are largely
national development organizations and the US government determined by economic power and financial contribution,
is that these new institutions will play by rules different than China has 26.06 per cent of the votes, much greater than
those of the World Bank and other regional MDBs. If that is the 16.65 percent share of the United States in the World
the case, these new banks may undermine the existing Bank. With both banks headquartered in China and issuing
standards, goals, and values that traditional MDBs seek to their first bonds in that country, Chinese supremacy in these
promote. institutions is inevitable.
Officials at the NDB and the AIIB have repeatedly pro- With such dominance in the NDB and the AIIB, China is in
claimed that they will follow commonly accepted rules of a position to use these two MDBs to pursue its own foreign
multilateral development financing. Indeed, the NDB and policy goals. As noted earlier, all four projects recently
the AIIB have acted in this spirit in their initial institution- approved by the AIIB are along the route of China’s ambi-
building. Most of the senior management staff have years tious OBOR initiative. If the selection of future projects fol-
of experience working in traditional international financial lows this pattern, the new MDBs may end up serving
institutions. On the other hand, officials at the new MDBs China’s ambitions more than the needs of other developing
have carefully pointed out that they will not abide by all countries. As China expands its economic ties with neigh-
the existing rules. For instance, NDB’s Vice President, Leslie boring countries and beyond, it is likely to gain greater
Maasdorp (2015), stated that, ‘Beyond drawing on best political influence as a result.

© 2017 University of Durham and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Global Policy (2017) 8:1
Global Governance in Multinational Development Banks
117

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© 2017 University of Durham and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Global Policy (2017) 8:1

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