Kierkegaard on 'Truth Is Subjectivity' and 'The Leap of Faith'

Author(s): Richard Schacht

Source: Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Mar., 1973, Vol. 2, No. 3 (Mar., 1973), pp. 297-
313
Published by: Cambridge University Press

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/40230394

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CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
Volume II, Number 3, March 1973

Kierkegaard on 'Truth is Subjectivity'

and 'The Leap of Faith'
RICHARD SCHACHT, University of Illinois

One of the things for which Kierkegaard is both best known

to English and American philosophers and most criticized by them,
is his contention that "truth is subjectivity." His discussion of
"truth" and "subjectivity" occupies a considerable part of his
most important philosophical work, Concluding Unscientific Post-
script;'1 and his contention that "truth is subjectivity" is the
pivotal claim around which virtually the entire work revolves.
Yet few of Kierkegaard's claims have been more frequently mis-
understood; and a misunderstanding of this claim has led many
philosophers wrongly to dismiss him as unworthy of serious con-
sideration.
He is sometimes taken to be saying that "subjectivity" is the
criterion of "truth" in general, at least where human beings
are concerned:, in short, that propositions uttered by human beings
are true if and only if those who utter them passionately affirm
or believe them. He also is sometimes taken to be saying that
"subjectivity" is the criterion of a certain kind of "truth," and the
necessary and sufficient condition of the attainment of a certain^
kind of knowledge, often called "subjective knowledge" (to dis-
tinguish it from "objective knowledge"). As I read the supporting
discussion in which his assertion that "truth is subjectivity" occurs,
however, neither of these interpretations of his assertion is correct.
I would argue that his claim is a claim of a different sort, and
does not bear at all upon the issue of the conditions under which
"truth" in the sense of some sort of knowledge may be attained.
His question, at least for the purpose of understanding his point,
is: "What does it mean to exist as a human being?" And his
1 Translated by David F. Swenson and Walter Lowrie. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1941.

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 Richard Schacht Kierkegaard

contention that "truth is subjectivity" oc

attempt to answer this question. His con
quite other than knowledge - either in g
sort- and the conditions of its attainme
tendency to think of "knowledge" wh
"truth" leads those astray who do not res
interpreters of Kierkegaard have been a
consequence, few of them properly unde
means by "truth/' when he asserts that "tru
On the other hand, I would hasten to a
intention to deny that Kierkegaard anyw
of "subjective knowledge" or of the esse
knowledge. That he is committed to suc
not be the case; and whether sense can or cannot be made of
such a notion is yet another question. In this paper, however, I
address myself to neither issue. My claim - to repeat it once more
for the sake of clarity-is only that, in asserting and arguing that
"truth is subjectivity/' Kierkegaard is committing himself to no
such notion, but rather is addressing himself to a different sort
of issue altogether.
In this paper I shall attempt to indicate what he in fact
means when he makes this contention, and more generally, what
he means when he speaks of "truth" in this context. In the course
of my discussion, I shall refer extensively to Hegel; for however
greatly Kierkegaard may differ with Hegel on substantive issues,
his special uses of the term "truth" are basically Hegelian ones.
Then, in the second part of the paper, I shall briefly consider
his discussion of the related question: Why make "the leap of
faith"?
I should add, by way of concluding my introductory remarks,
that I am begging an important question in Kierkegaard scholar-
ship, by imputing views expressed in Concluding Unscientific
Postscript to Kierkegaard himself. He did publish the work under
a pseudonym ("Johannes Climacus"); and he does say (in A First
and Last Declaration), that "in the pseudonymous works there is
not a single word which is mine." ONe who feels that he should be
taken at his word here may feel that I should have entitled this
paper "Johannes Climacus on 'Truth and Subjectivity' and "The
Leap of Faith/" and that I should have spoken of "Climacus"
rather than of "Kierkegaard" throughout. Perhaps I should have.
I have not done so because the views with which I am concerned
are more commonly associated with the name "Kierkegaard"
than with the name "Johannes Climacus," because I would con-

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 Richard Schacht Kierkegaard

sider anyone who insisted on using the

because Kierkegaard did in fact develo
not they really are his own), and beca
clear precisely what they are and wh
rather than to determine whether or
actually committed to them. The boo
centrally is sufficiently important,
been so influential and are of such intrinsic interest, that an
examination of them requires no further justification. Even if Kier-
kegaard scholars should all conclude that they should not actually
be imputed to him, this would not render an examination of them
any less worthwhile.

(1) Kierkegaard's great lament in the Postscript (and elsewhere)

is that his contemporaries have "forgotten what it means to
exist/'2 He feels that they- or at least the intellectuals among
them- have come to think that man is to be viewed primarily
as a knower, and that his most important capacity is that of
attaining knowledge. For the attainment of knowledge, an attitude
of objectivity is required; and the cultivation of an attitude of
objectivity involves the suppression of personality and the tran-
scendence of individuality. And in the attempt to rise above and
leave behind one's individuality and personality, which can be
partly if not completely successful, Kierkegaard sees a kind of
self-annihilation to which he objects in the strongest possible
terms.

Against the tendency to applaud and encourage this develop-

ment, he argues that men are essentially finite, subjective, partic-
ular individuals, rather than unlimited, objective, impersonal know-
ing spirits. He asks:

Is [one] a human being? ... If he is a human being then he is also an

existing individual. Two ways, in general, are open for an existing individual:
Either he can do his utmost to forget he is an existing individual, by which
he becomes a comic figure. ... Or he can concentrate his entire energy
upon the fact that he is an existing individual. It is from this side . . . that
objection must be made to modern philosophy; not that it has a mistaken
presupposition, but that it has a comical presupposition, occasioned by its
having forgotten, in a sort of world-historical absent-mindedness, what it
means to be a human being. Not, indeed, what it means to be a human being

2 E.g., Postscript, p. 223.

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 Richard Schacht Kierkegaard

in general . . .; but what it means that you and I and he are human
beings, each one for himself.3

(2) Kierkegaard is determined to remind us "what it means

to be a human being." Of course, he grants that we can be
knowers; but "the knower is an existing individual, and . . . the
task of existing is his essential task."4 Existing - in inwardness, as
finite, particular individuals - is what he holds to be our "essen-
tial task" as human beings. And so, using the term "truth" in
one of the ways Hegel does, he says that for a human being,
"existing, the process of transformation to inwardness in and by
existing, is the truth."5
In other words, a man is in a state of truth with reference to
his essential nature qua human being (cf.: he is "truly human")
when he is living in such a way that his actual condition cor-
responds to his essential nature- when he is in actuality as he
ought (essentially) to be. Man's essential nature is conceived by
Kierkegaard in terms of "existing" in the above sense. "Every
man," he says, "is a spiritual being, for whom the truth consists
in nothing else than the self-activity of personal appropriation."6
Perhaps to stress the extent of his substantive departure from
Hegel, for whom objectivity and universality are of paramount
importance, Kierkegaard commonly characterizes man's nature in
terms of "subjectivity." "The task of becoming subjective," he says,
"may be presumed to be the highest task, and one that is pro-
posed to every human being."7 A man is thus in a state of truth
when he is fully subjective. Subjectivity is his "truth" - the state
he must attain to be true to his essential nature. In a word, for
a human being, "subjectivity is truth"- a phrase actually employed
much more frequently by Kierkegaard than "truth is subjectivity."
Stated either way however, the point is exactly the same.
And it is essential to observe that the point is one Kierkegaard
is making solely about human beings, and about their essential

3 Postscript, p. 100. Hegel, it should be noted, would not accept the "either-or" proposed by Kierkegaard
in this passage. For him, man's nature is to be conceived both in terms of universality and in terms of
individuality, neither of which (he holds) completely excludes the other. He writes: "Spirit is the nature
of human beings generally, and their nature is therefore twofold: on the one hand, explicit individuality
of consciousness and will; and on the other, universality which knows and wills what is substantive."
{Philosophy of Right, tr. T. M. Knox. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1942. s. 264. I have slightly modified
Knox's translation.)
Again: "The will's activity consists in annulling the contradiction between subjectivity and objectivity
and giving its aims an objective instead of a subjective character, while at the same time remaining
by itself (i.e., subjective] even in its objectivity." (Philosophy of Right, s. 28.)
4 Kierkegaard, Postscript, p. 185.
5 Postscript, p. 184.
6 Postscript, p. 217.
7 Postscript, p. 146.

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 Richard Schacht Kierkegaard

nature as human beings, rather than a

mathematical or scientific or historical
"The reader will observe/' he says, "th
about essential truth, or about the truth which is related to
existence. . . ."8 Unfortunately, this is something too few readers
have observed, in spite of his explicit statement to this effect.
Further: there is, as one might expect, another side to the
coin. To the extent that one exists in some other way, he is not
being true to his essential nature; he is "untrue" to it. One not
only may be in a state of truth, but also may be in a state of
"untruth." So Kierkegaard says that one is in "untruth, if one
refuses to understand that subjectivity is truth, but, for example,
desires to become objective."9
"The truth" as Kierkegaard conceives it here - that is, man's
true, essential nature - is treated primarily as something to be
actualized. What is important for Kierkegaard is not that one
simply come to know what one's essential nature qua human
being is, but rather, that one actualize it, by achieving the appro-
priate inner state. And while thought plays a very considerable
role in this process, what is called for is not objective, ratio-
cinative, impersonal cognition, but rather what Kierkegaard calls
"subjective reflection." "The subjective reflection turns its atten-
tion inwardly to the subject, and desires in this intensification to
realize [i.e., actualize] the truth."10
(3) It is important to recognize that Kierkegaard does not
conceive of "subjectivity" in terms of "the accidental, the angular,
the selfish, the eccentric, and so forth."11 He realizes that it can
be and often is conceived in these terms - and that it was in part
because Hegel so conceived it that he depreciated its importance.
Indeed, far from endorsing this sort of subjectivity, he agrees
with Hegel that it is to be superseded: "Nor does Christianity
deny that such things should be gotten rid of. ... But the dif-
ference is, that philosophy [i.e., Hegel] teaches that the way is
to becorr|£ objective, while Christianity teaches that the way is
to become subjective . . . in truth'"12 - i.e., to become genuinely
subjective.
In short, Kierkegaard holds that an existing human being in
point of fact can never become a completely rational, objective,

8 Postscript, p. 178n.
9 Postscript, p. 185.
10 Postscript, p. 175.
11 Postscript, p. 117.
12 Postscript, p. 117.

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 Richard Schacht Kierkegaard

impersonal knower. But he holds tha

a variety of ways, one of which is th
mentioned; and that it is only if one
subjectivity that one is true to one's e
gaard conceives this sort of subjectivity
or eccentricity, but rather in terms
ness/' passionate personal commitme
and responsibility for what one is and do
(4) This, then, is one sense of "tru
the term, and one meaning of his ass
truth," or "truth is subjectivity." Thi
once again, is a basically Hegelian o
interesting way from the traditional
truth.
On this theory of truth, a thought is true if it corresponds to
an actual state of affairs - or, as Hegel puts it, "Truth is sup-
posed to be the agreement of Thought with its object, and in
order to bring about this agreement . . . thinking must accom-
modate and adapt itself to its object."13 While Hegel finds this
view of the matter unsatisfactory, he does speak of knowledge
as a "harmonious unity" of thought with "its substance," and
says that "this identity, when arrived at, is truth."14 But he con-
tends that in point of fact that which genuine knowledge is knowl-
edge of is not anything radically distinct from thought, but rather
is identical with the essential structure of thought or reason
itself. "In the philosophical sense of the word," he therefore says,
"truth may be described, in general abstract terms, as the agree-
ment of a thought-content with itself."15
Hegel further holds, however, that it is not really appropriate
to speak of "truth" in connection with particular "thought-con-
tents" considered piecemeal, but rather only in connection with
"objectivity" as a whole; and that "thought" here should properly
be construed, not in terms of what some particular person is
thinking, but rather in terms of the essential structure of reason,
or the "notion" or "concept" (Begriff). So he says that "Truth
in the deeper sense consists in the identity between objectivity
and the Begriff/' or in "the correspondence of objectivity with

13 C. W. F. Hegel, Science of Logic, tr. W. H. Johnston and L. G. Struthers. New York: Macmillan, 1929.
Vol. I, p. 55.
14 Hegel, Phenomenology of Mind, tr. J. B. Baillie. Second edition (revised). New York: Macmillan, 1949,
pp. 98-99.
15 Hegel, The Logic of Hegel, tr. William Wallace. Second edition (revised). Oxford: Oxford University
Press, pp. 51-52.

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 Richard Schacht Kierkegaard

the Begriff," rather than merely in "the

nal things with my conceptions."16
Having modified the concept of "trut
refers to the correspondence of "objectiv
proceeds to refer to objects as "true" o
whether they do or do not adequately r
"essence." He says: "It is in this deeper
speak of a true state, or of a true w
are true, if they are as they ought to
corresponds to their Begriff. "^ So, for e
of Right, speaking of the will, he says
to nothing except itself," it "is then t
determination consists in a correspond
in its existence . . . and its Begriff. "™
On the other hand, he says, "in this
be said to consist in the contradiction
function or Begriff and the existence
example, he suggests that a man "is an untrue man" if he
"does not behave as his Begriff or his vocation requires."20 In
short, for Hegel, if and only if one's actual spiritual state cor-
responds to his essential nature, one is in a state of "truth." And
with this, Kierkegaard - following Hegel's usage - agrees.
This is an abstract formula, however, which Hegel and Kierke-
gaard fill in quite differently. Hegel construes man's essential
nature above all in terms of "universality" - and, consequently,
in terms of objectivity. For him, therefore, "truth" - the truth of
human existence- is objectivity and universality. Subjectivity, on
his view, is important; but it is not the "truth" of man's nature.
It refers, he says, to "the absolute unity of self-consciousness
with itself . . ., the pure certainty, as distinguished from the
truth, of individuality."21 He rejects "that way of looking at the
matter . . . according to which what is fundamental, substantive,
and primary is supposed to be the will of a single person in
his own private self-will, not the absolute or rational will, and
spirit [Geist] as a particular individual, not spirit as it is in its
truth."22

16 Logic of Hegel, pp. 354, 352.

17 Logic of Hegel, p. 354.
18 Philosophy of Right, s. 23.
19 Logic of Hegel, p. 52.
20 Logic of Hegel, p. 354.
21 Philosophy of Right, s. 25.
22 Philosophy of Right, s. 29. It is of some interest to observe that this passage continues as follows:
"Once this principle (of the supremacy of subjectivity] is adopted, of course, the rational can come on

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 Richard Schacht Kierkegaard

For Kierkegaard, on the other hand

existence is to be conceived precisely
subjectivity and inwardness. To att
universality and objectivity is, on his
sight. For it is both to attempt the imp
that "to be a particular individual
highest significance of a human being
thus differ radically with regard to w
existence is. But they both use the
basic sense in speaking of it.
(5) This is not, however, the only sp
both use the term. Each also uses it i
Here too, Kierkegaard's uses of the
stood in relation to Hegel's. First: He
to "the Absolute." In the famous pass
Phenomenology of Spirit in which he
must be conceived both as Substanc
actually says is that "everything dep
pressing the Truth not [merely] as S
well."24 When, in place of "the Absolute
what more explicit expression "the
"The Idea is the Truth."25 The conten
tem of reason" or Begriff proper, in
essential structure of reality generally;
or knowledge of this "system of reason,
of "the Truth," which is absolute, ult
he says, is "to be understood as the
as the Realm of Pure Thought. This r
without husk in and for itself."26 In
used by Hegel to refer to that which
reality (hence: "the Absolute").
Kierkegaard also refers to the ultim
Only that which he takes to be the
Hegel's "system of reason" (in connec
"truth" has an obvious application).
context too, therefore, while the term

the scene only as a restriction of the type of freedom wh

is devoid of any speculative thinking, and is repudiated by the
which it has produced in men's heads and in the world are of a
ficiality of the thoughts on which they are based."
23 Kierkegaard, Postscript, p. 134.
24 Hegel, Phenomenology of Mind, p. 80.
» Logic oi Hegel, p. 352.
26 Science of Logic, p. 60, Hegel's emphasis.

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 Richard Schacht Kierkegaard

sense for him as it does for Hegel, he gi

tion. He refers, e.g., to the fact "that t
into being in time, that God has come
He speaks of the God-relationship as a r
eternal truth is related to an existing in
uses the expression "the eternal truth
"God" when he introduces the notion o
"By virtue of the relationship subsisting b
and the existing individual, the parad
The eternal truth has come into bein
paradox."2*
Of course, Hegel too identifies "the Truth" (which in this
sense he likewise considers "eternal") with "God." In both religion
and philosophy, he says, "the object is Truth, in that supreme
sense in which God and only God is the Truth."30 And, after
having asserted that the "system of reason" is "the Truth as
it is, without husk in and for itself," he says that one could also
put the matter thus: "that this content shows forth God as he
is in his eternal essence before the creation of Nature and of a
Finite Spirit."3** But Hegel can speak of "God" as well as of the
"system of reason" as "the Truth" only because he identifies
the two- an identification which involves a denial of something
Kierkegaard emphatically asserts: God's radical transcendence of
the world. Both speak of the ultimate reality as "the truth"; but
they differ about how the ultimate reality is to be conceived.
(6) Secondly: It has been observed that, while Hegel modifies
the traditional construal of "truth" as "the correspondence of
external things with my conceptions," he does speak of it as the
"harmonious unity" or "identity" of thought with "its substance."32
For him, therefore, the thinking subject may be said to be "in
the truth" to the extent that his thought is in a relation of
"unity" or "identity" with that which is the proper content
or "substance" of knowledge. On his view, however, the proper
content or "substance" of knowledge is the "system of reason,"
which comes to light through the discipline of Hegelian Logic.
"Now though when one begins to study it," he says, "Logic is
not present to the mind in all this recognized power, yet none

27 Kierkegaard, Postscript, p. 188.

28 Postscript, p. 180.
29 Postscript, p. 187.
30 Hegel, Logic of Hegel, p. 3.
31 Science of Logic, p. 60, Hegel's emphasis.
« Phenomenology of Mind, pp. 98-99.

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 Richard Schacht Kierkegaard

the less the mind of the student conceives from it a power

which will lead him into all truth."33 He rejects the view that
"truth exists merely in what ... is called at one time intuition,
at another immediate knowledge of the Absolute/' and contends
rather that "truth finds the medium of its existence in Begriffe
[or concepts] alone/'34
Here, therefore, Hegel speaks of "truth" in connection with a
relation of "unity" or "identity" with that which is at once the
proper content or "substance" of knowledge and also the ultimate
reality as he conceives it - namely, the "Idea" or "system of
reason." And this relation of "unity" or "identity" is Absolute
Knowledge, the attainment of which thus involves achieving the
highest degree of objectivity and rationality.
Kierkegaard too speaks of one who "exists in the truth."35
And, like Hegel, he considers it appropriate to say of someone
that he is "in the truth" just in the event that he exists in a
relation of unity with the ultimate reality, and precisely in virtue
of the fact that "a unity of the infinite and the finite" then
obtains.36 But for him, once again, the ultimate reality is not
Hegel's "system of reason," but rather is the God of Christianity.
And it is his contention that a human being cannot achieve a
relation of unity with God through becoming objective and
rational, but rather only through a "leap of faith" which is com-
pletely non-rational. For an existing human being, he maintains,
it is not Hegelian Logic which "will lead him into all truth";
and it is not through the attainment of Hegelian Absolute Knowl-
edge that an existing human being can achieve "unity with the
infinite." Rather, one can be "in the truth" only when one is in
the state of faith. So Kierkegaard regards "the venture which
chooses an objective uncertainty with the passion of the infinite"
not only as "faith," but also as "truth."37
In short, for Kierkegaard as for Hegel, one who achieves a
relation of unity with the ultimate reality may be said to be in a
relation of "truth" to it. But whereas for Hegel one may thus be
said to be "in the truth" only to the extent that one's thought
corresponds to the "system of reason," for Kierkegaard one is
"in the truth" only in the state of faith.
(7) If "truth" is construed in this sense, Kierkegaard may be
33 Science of Logic, p. 69.
34 Phenomenology of Mind, p. 74.
35 Kierkegaard, Postscript, p. 222.
36 Postscript, p. 176.
37 Postscript, p. 182.

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 Richard Schacht Kierkegaard

seen to be making yet another point

subjectivity/' in addition to that ind
"truth" so conceived (as relation of unit
i.e., God) is not attainable* by adopti
cognitive orientation, but rather only
jective. Hegel had said: To attain unity
become objective! For it is only through the attainment of
Absolute Knowledge that this unity can be achieved; and Absolute
Knowledge can be attained only by becoming objective.
In reply, Kierkegaard says: No - to attain unity with the ultimate
reality, you must become subjective! Hegel, he holds, was mis-
taken both about the nature of the ultimate reality and about
the way in which a finite, existing individual can attain unity
with it. The ultimate reality is God; and a person can place
himself in a relation to this ultimate reality only by suspending
his reason and making a "leap of faith." Making a "leap of
faith" requires, not objectivity and rationality, but "passion."
And passion is something essentially non-rational and subjective.
Kierkegaard, as has been observed, accepts the Hegelian notion
of "truth" as the "unity of the infinite and the finite"; but he
holds that for an existing individual, "This unity is realized [only]
in the moment of passion,"38 because it can be achieved only
through a "leap of faith."
(8) In short, Kierkegaard uses the term "truth" in three special
senses, all of which derive from Hegel. They refer (1) to a person's
essential nature as a human being, (2) to the relation of unity a
person may achieve with the ultimate reality (God), and (3) to
this ultimate reality itself. Putting them all together, one might
say that for Kierkegaard, only a person who actualizes his essen-
tial "truth" (i.e., who is actually what he is essentially) can
achieve a relation of "truth" (i.e., a relation of unity) with the
eternal "truth" (i.e., the ultimate reality, God). And Kierkegaard
asserts that "truth is subjectivity," or "subjectivity is truth," be-
cause he holds that a person actualizes his essential "truth," and
can achieve a relation of "truth" to the eternal "truth," only if
he becomes genuinely subjective.

II

(9) Why make "the leap of faith"? To make this "leap," for
Kierkegaard, is to affirm "That God has existed in human form,
has been born, grown up, and so forth. . . ,"39 Kierkegaard's
J8 Postscript, p. 176.
39 Postscript, p. 194.

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 Richard Schacht Kierkegaard

advocacy of making "the leap of faith"

analysis of human existence. It has encountered even more
resistance among philosophers than has his contention that "truth
is subjectivity/' not because .It has been misunderstood, but rather
because - as he himself is at pains to point out - the "leap" in-
volves the affirmation of a proposition which not only is rationally
unjustifiable, but moreover is radically repellent to the rational
understanding. This proposition asserts what Kierkegaard takes
to be "the absolute paradox": namely, that an infinite and eternal
being existed as a particular and finite being. It is paradoxical
because of "the absolute difference between God and man,"
which, he holds, "consists precisely in this, that man is a par-
ticular existing being . . ., while God is infinite and eternal."40
Kierkegaard thus not only grants, but even insists upon the irra-
tional nature of this proposition, and the fact that its affirma-
tion is not possible without a suspension of rational thought.
Even for him, however, rational thought is not something to be
lightly abandoned; just as Abraham's "suspension of the ethical,"
in Fear and Trembling, is represented as being anything but
casual. Why then does Kierkegaard defend and advocate "the leap
of faith"?
Man, for Kierkegaard, is a being whose most profound desire
is for what he calls "an eternal happiness" - an extremely intense
("infinite") happiness, which is in no way dependent upon external
circumstances, and which therefore cannot be shaken by the loss
of anything finite. But man is also a being the "truth" of whose
nature, he contends, is "subjectivity." He further holds that it is
only through "the leap of faith" that a being whose "truth" is
"subjectivity" can attain "an eternal happiness." The question
therefore arises: What is the connection between "becoming
subjective," "the leap of faith," and "an eternal happiness"?
(10) It seems to me that two different answers to this ques-
tion may be distinguished in Kierkegaard's discussion in the
Postscript; although he himself would not appear to distinguish
between them. The first presupposes that "an eternal happiness"
is possible for a man only if it is possible for him to relate
himself to God. A man, however, is a being who exists in time;
and it would not be possible for such a being to enter into a
"God-relationship" if God had not also at some point existed in
time. Through "the leap of faith," in which one affirms the
proposition that God did exist in time, one is able to enter into
a "God-relationship," and thereby attains "an eternal happiness."
40 Postscript, p. 195.

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 Richard Schacht Kierkegaard

The proposition that Cod has existed

radically paradoxical. Indeed, to the ratio
"absurd." If it is to be affirmed, ther
affirmed through a "leap of faith." And
such a "leap" is not reason, but rather "
cause of the radical nature of the parado
passion." "Passion" is not something ratio
rather something intensely "subjective.
faith," therefore, one must "become sub
doing so that one can attain the degr
to enter into a God-relationship and t
eternal happiness."
Several points may be observed in con
of thought. First, the conclusion conform
expressed in the statement that, for Kie
who is in a state of "truth" can be in a relation of "truth"
with the eternal "truth." Secondly, while this line of thought
does constitute a break with the tradition of rational theology
it suggests that Kierkegaard occupies a position well within th
bounds of the Pauline-Augustinian-Lutheran tradition. Indeed, if
he had had nothing more to say than this, he could hardly be
credited with any significant degree of originality. And the fact
that he frequently asserts that he really is not saying anything
new about Christianity, but rather is simply attempting to restore
it in its true and original form, is an indication of the prom-
inence of this line of thought in his own mind.
Thirdly, it should be noted that if this line is taken, passion
and subjectivity have no intrinsic significance, and are not valued
for their own sake. Rather, they are means to the attainment of
something else- means dictated by man's nature, through which
alone a human being is capable of entering into a God-relationship
and thereby achieving the "eternal happiness" which, it is here
suggested, the God-relationship alone can make possible. If man
were a being of a different sort- a being, for example, which could
enter into a God-relationship through the intensive development
and employment of reason - then passion and subjectivity could
be dispensed with. And if man were a being which could enter
into this relation only through the use of reason, then it would
follow that passion and subjectivity must be eliminated, if the
goal of "an eternal happiness" is to be achieved.41 Kierkegaard,
of course, maintains that man is not a being of this sort, but
rather is a being which can enter into a God-relationship only
41 Cf. Spinoza, in the first pages of his On the Improvement of the Understanding.

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Richard Schacht Kierkegaard

through a passionate "leap of faith." T

on this line of reasoning, the fact th
jective only serves to indicate what a
into such a relationship.
(11) At other times, however, Kierk
reason along other lines. Here the i
faith" is suggested to lie, not in the
alone makes possible, but rather in th
which it requires, and in the intensif
thereby gives rise. Man, for Kierkega
of whose nature is "subjectivity." The
one is, therefore, the more profou
realization of one's essential nature. A
respondingly, the highest reward, an et
for those who are subjective; or rathe
individual who becomes subjective."42
the "eternal happiness" man seeks
realizes one's essential subjectivity com
of the attainment of a state of radical su
Here the content of "the absolute pa
in "the leap of faith" is a matter of r
for that matter, the attainment of a Go
is the fact that the paradox one affir
the greatest paradox imaginable. The
here is to stimulate the individual to
of passion; for, since Kierkegaard hold
tion of passion, and passion to be "
subjectivity,"43 he further holds that t
achieved precisely through the attainme
So he says: "passion is the culmination
ing [i.e., essentially subjective] individual
In this context, therefore, Kierkegaar
"the leap of faith" runs something
individual, determined by his essentia
is that of intensifying and purifying h
is to be accomplished, he must attain
passion." But, according to Kierkeg
passion in the sphere of human subje

42 Kierkegaard, Postscript, p. 146.

43 Postscript, p. 178.
44 Postscript, p. 176.
45 Postscript, p. 118.

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 Richard Schacht Kierkegaard

further holds that "Without risk there is no faith/'46 and that

indeed the possibility of faith is directly proportional to "objective
uncertainty/' it follows that the greater the objective uncertainty
of that which one believes, the greater the faith must be on the
part of the one who believes it. The greatest degree of objective
uncertainty, however, is that which is associated with the par-
adoxical. There is, therefore, no greater stimulus to passion than
paradox, since it is through passion alone that the paradoxical
can be deliberately affirmed. The greatest conceivable paradox
thus would provide the greatest possible stimulus to passion.
But, Kierkegaard contends, the greatest conceivable paradox
is the central thesis of Christianity - namely, that God became a
man. Nothing, therefore, is better suited to the intensification of
subjectivity than Christianity. If one can achieve the "infinite
passion" necessary to affirm this central thesis of Christianity,
thereby making "the leap of faith/' one will have effected the
greatest possible intensification of one's subjectivity, and so will
have accomplished one's essential task. So Kierkegaard says:
"Subjectivity culminates in passion, Christianity is the [absolute]
paradox, paradox and passion are a mutual fit."47 Hence "the
necessity of the paradox" for the intensification of subjectivity,48
and thereby for the attainment of "an eternal happiness."
(12) Kierkegaard regards this as a kind of argument for
Christianity deriving solely from considerations pertaining to man's
nature as an essentially subjective being, and to the connection
between subjectivity, passion and paradox. To argue in this manner,
however, is to depart quite radically from traditional Christian
theology; for as has been observed, it is to stress the form of
the central thesis of Christianity, rather than its content. Given
the way the argument is structured, it is only in virtue of the
fact- or what Kierkegaard takes to be the fact - that the central
thesis of Christianity constitutes the greatest possible paradox,
that "the leap of faith" and Christian belief are indicated.
If some greater paradox were to be conceivable, however, then
some greater stimulus to passion and to the intensification of sub-
jectivity would exist, and something other than Christian belief
would be indicated.
And in point of fact greater paradoxes would appear to be
conceivable, even within the context of Kierkegaard's own dis-
cussion. He says: "That God has existed in human form, has been
46 Postscript, p. 182.
47 Postscript, p. 206.
48 Postscript, p. 191.

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 Richard Schacht Kierkegaard

born, grown up, and so forth, is surely t

But it would seem even more "paradox
claim that this happened, and further
speculative philosopher, who forgot co
existing, essentially subjective individual
Jesus, was God. Or that God grew up
responsible for the deaths of millions of J
not Jesus, was God.50 Or, even more absu
not in human form, but rather, as a w
stone.

If all that counts is the paradoxicality of the claim, then any

of these claims surely would do better than the Christian one.
For if it is paradoxical to claim that a being which is a, b,
c, d, and e, has existed as a being which was -a and -b, it
surely would be still more paradoxical to claim that it has
existed as a being which was -a, -b, -c, -d, and -e. If God is
the being in question, the truly absolute paradox would be the
claim that God has existed as a being whose properties included
the opposites or negations of every one of God's purported prop-
erties. And, after all, God supposedly is not only infinite and
eternal (the attributes Kierkegaard mentions) but also omniscient
omnipotent, and supremely good. And surely there are (and have
been) numerous entities which fall at least as short of being
infinite and eternal as Jesus did, and which moreover are much
less powerful, knowing and good than he was; or which indeed
are utterly devoid of power, knowledge and goodness, as he
most certainly was not. In contending that the central thesis of
Christianity is "the absolute paradox," therefore, Kierkegaard
displays a rather uncharacteristic lack of imagination.
(13) Kierkegaard may be correct in suggesting that a certain
sort of subjectivity is possible only through the heightening of
passion, that "paradox and passion are a mutual fit," and that
therefore the greater the paradox one can muster the passion to
affirm, the more complete one's subjectivity of this sort will be
His contention that this sort of subjectivity is desirable, however,
and that it constitutes the fullest possible realization of man's
essential nature, is questionable, to say the least. Kierkegaard
may be right in claiming that the attainment of a state of com-
plete objectivity and rationality is neither possible nor desirable
for an existing human being; but one can accept this point without

49 Postscript, p. 194.
*° Walter Kaufmann offers a similar counter-example (Nero) in a similar criticism of Kierkegaard in hi
From Shakespeare to Existentialism (New York: Doubleday, 1959), p. 198.

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 Richard Schacht Kierkegaard

going as far as he does in the opposi

be true that it is not possible for an e
achieve "an eternal happiness" in this lif
ingly paradoxical is true, or at least is
a "leap of faith": namely, that God has
would indicate only the necessity of af
adoxical proposition if this end is to
desirability of affirming the greatest p
because it is the greatest paradox imagina
(14) This does not of itself constitute
stance of Kierkegaard's contention tha
"truth" is "subjectivity." It may be poss
of "subjectivity" more satisfactorily, in a
so prominent a position to "passion" and "paradox" in the
process of "becoming subjective." Yet the fact that they do come to
have such a position in the course of Kierkegaard's discussion
suggests that his conception of man's nature suffers from a one-
sidedness that is no less unfortunate - and indeed is a good deal
more dangerous- than Hegel's. His radical protest against Hegel's
overly objectivized and rationalized conception of man's nature
may have been necessary as a corrective; but a more balanced
view of man's nature than either of theirs may be required if it
is to constitute an adequate analysis of what it is to be human.
In his fascination with the paradoxical, Kierkegaard would seem
to have done, in a different way, the very thing he accuses Hegel
of doing: lost sight of what it means to exist, as a truly human
being.51

October 1971

51 I would like to thank my colleagues, Professors Hugh S. Chandler, Philip G. Hugly, and Louis Werner,
for their comments and suggestions.

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