Francisco vs. House of Representatives G.R. No.

160261

FACTS: Within a period of 1 year, 2 impeachment proceedings were filed against

Supreme Court Chief Justice Hilario Davide. The justiceable controversy in this case was
the constitutionality of the subsequent filing of a second complaint to controvert the
rules of impeachment provided for by law.

ISSUE: Whether or not the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives is constitutional, and
whether the resolution thereof is a political question h; as resulted in a political crisis.

HELD: Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment

Proceedings which were approved by the House of Representatives are
unconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachment complaint against Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the
Constitution.

REASONING: In passing over the complex issues arising from the controversy, this Court
is ever mindful of the essential truth that the inviolate doctrine of separation of powers
among the legislative, executive or judicial branches of government by no means
prescribes for absolute autonomy in the discharge by each of that part of the
governmental power assigned to it by the sovereign people. At the same time, the
corollary doctrine of checks and balances which has been carefully calibrated by the
Constitution to temper the official acts of each of these three branches must be given
effect without destroying their indispensable co-equality. There exists no constitutional
basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment
proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is
to be interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be allowed to defeat another."
Both are integral components
 Francisco vs. House of Representatives G.R. No. 160261

Summary: Francisco vs. House of Representatives (GR 160261, 10 November 2003

Francisco vs. House of Representatives(GR 160261, 10 November 2003)En Banc, Carpio
Morales (J): 1 concurs, 3 wrote separate concurring opinions to which 4 concur, 2 wrote
concurring and dissenting separate opinions to which 2 concur.

Facts: On 28 November 2001, the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives

adopted and approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Pr0ceedings,
superceding the previous House Impeachment Rules approved by the 11thCongress. On
22 July 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, which directed the
Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner
of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the
Judiciary Development Fund (JDF). On 2 June 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada
filed an impeachment complaint (first impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of the Supreme Court for "culpable
violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes." The
complaint was endorsed by House Representatives, and was referred to the House
Committee on Justice on 5 August 2003 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of
the Constitution. The House Committee on Justice ruled on 13 October 2003 that the
first impeachment complaint was "sufficient inform," but voted to dismiss the same on
22 October 2003 for being insufficient in substance. Four months and three weeks since
the filing of the first complaint or on 23 October 2003, a day after the House Committee
on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint was filed with the
Secretary General of the House by House Representatives against Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-
mentioned House Resolution. The second impeachment complaint was accompanied by
a “Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least 1/3 of all the Members
of the House of Representatives. Various petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus were filed with the Supreme Court against the House of Representatives, et.
al., most of which petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment
complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the
Constitution that "[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same
official more than once within a period of one year."

Issue: Whether the power of judicial review extends to those arising from impeachment
proceedings.

Held: The Court's power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch of the
government in Section 1, Article VIII of our present 1987 Constitution. The "moderating
power" to "determine the proper allocation of powers" of the different branches of
government and "to direct the course of government along constitutional channels" is
inherent in all courts as a necessary consequence of the judicial power itself, which is
"the power of the court to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable." As indicated in Angara v. Electoral Commission, judicial
review is indeed an integral component of the delicate system of checks and balances
which, together with the corollary principle of separation of powers, forms the bedrock
of our republican form of government and insures that its vast powers are utilized only
for the benefit of the people for which it serves. The separation of powers is a
fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not through express
provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government
has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own
sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept
separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained
and independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system
of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various
departments of the government. And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as
the final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to
determine the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of
the Constitution. The major difference between the judicial power of the Philippine
Supreme Court and that of the U.S. Supreme Court is that while the power of judicial
review is only impliedly granted to the U.S. Supreme Court and is discretionary in
nature, that granted to the Philippine Supreme Court and lower courts, as expressly
provided for in the Constitution, is not just a power but also a duty, and it was given an
expanded definition to include the power to correct any grave abuse of discretion on
the part of any government branch or instrumentality. There are also glaring distinctions
between the U.S.

Constitution and the Philippine Constitution with respect to the power of the House of
Representatives over impeachment proceedings. While the U.S. Constitution bestows
sole power of impeachment to the House of Representatives without limitation, our
Constitution, though vesting in the House of Representatives the exclusive power to
initiate impeachment cases, provides for several limitations to the exercise of such
power as embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XI thereof. These limitations
include the manner of filing, required vote to impeach, and the one year bar on the
impeachment of one and the same official. The people expressed their will when they
instituted the above-mentioned safeguards in the Constitution. This shows that the
Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the sole discretion of
Congress. Instead, it provided for certain well-defined limits, or "judicially discoverable
standards" for determining the validity of the exercise of such discretion, through the
power of judicial review. There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court
exercised the power of judicial review over congressional action. Finally, there exists no
constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review over
impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the
Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be allowed to
defeat another." Both are integral components of the calibrated system of
independence and interdependence that insures that no branch of government act
beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution.
 Francisco vs. House of Representatives G.R. No. 160261

FACTS: Within a period of 1 year, 2 impeachment proceedings were filed against

Supreme Court Chief Justice Hilario Davide. The justiciable controversy in this case was
the constitutionality of the subsequent filing of a second complaint to controvert the
rules of impeachment provided for by law.

ISSUE: Whether or not the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives is constitutional, and
whether the resolution thereof is a political question — h; as resulted in a political crisis.

HELD: Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment

Proceedings which were approved by the House of Representativesare unconstitutional.
Consequently, the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.

REASONING: In passing over the complex issues arising from the controversy, this Court
is ever mindful of the essential truth that the inviolate doctrine of separation of powers
among the legislative, executive or judicial branches of government by no means
prescribes for absolute autonomy in the discharge by each of that part of the
governmental power assigned to it by the sovereign people.

At the same time, the corollary doctrine of checks and balances which has been
carefully calibrated by the Constitution to temper the official acts of each of these three
branches must be given effect without destroying their indispensable co-equality. There
exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review over
impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the
Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and “one section is not to be allowed to
defeat another.” Both are integral components of the calibrated system of
independence and interdependence that insures that no branch of government act
beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution.

The framers of the Constitution also understood initiation in its ordinary meaning. Thus
when a proposal reached the floor proposing that “A vote of at least one-third of all the
Members of the House shall be necessary… to initiate impeachment proceedings,” this
was met by a proposal to delete the line on the ground that the vote of the House does
not initiate impeachment proceeding but rather the filing of a complaint does.

Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral or
endorsement of the impeachment complaint to the House Committee on Justice or, by
the filing by at least one-third of the members of the House of Representatives with the
Secretary General of the House, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear.
Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated, another impeachment complaint
may not be filed against the same official within a one year period.

The Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial scrutiny and resolved on the
merits only the main issue of whether the impeachment proceedings initiated against
the Chief Justice transgressed the constitutionally imposed one-year time bar rule.
Beyond this, it did not go about assuming jurisdiction where it had none, nor
indiscriminately turn justiciable issues out of decidedly political questions. Because it is
not at all the business of this Court to assert judicial dominance over the other two
great branches of the government.