Misc. Appl. No. 559 of 2016 National Bank of Commerce vs. Rabia Muro New

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF TANZANIA

LABOUR DIVISION

AT DAR ES SALAAM

MISCELLANEOUS APPLICATION NO. 559 OF 2016

NATIONAL BANK OF COMMERCE............APPLICANT


VERSUS
RABIA MURO.................. ................. RESPONDENT

RULING
Date of Last Order: 08/02/2018

Date o f Ruling 04/05/2018

L.L.Mashaka. J

This is a ruling in respect of preliminary objection raised by the

respondent Rabia Muro against the application for extension of time filed

by the applicant National Bank of Commerce based on 2 points of law that:

a) The application is Res Judicata after it was found out to be time


barred.

b) That the application is incompetent for lack o f improper citation


o f the law.

The hearing of the preliminary objection was by way of written

submissions and noting from the submissions, the respondents was drawn

and filed by Mr. Amani Abdallah, Advocate and those for the applicant was

drawn and filed by Mr. Godfrey Tesha, Advocate.

The respondent submitted on the second point of the preliminary

objection that the application for extension of time was under non-citation

of the provisions of the law to wit Rule 24(1 l)(b) of the Labour Court
Rules, GN 106/2007 which renders the application incompetent before the

Court. That it was undisputed that the application is for extension of time
which is not specifically provided under the law thus it is one amongst the

applications falling under Rule 24 (11) of the Rules. That failure to cite the

same renders the application incompetent before the Court and the

appropriate remedy is the same to be dismissed.

The respondent referred this Court to the case of Airtel Tanzania

Limited Vs. Earl Matthysen, Miscellaneous Application No. 220 of 2014,

HCLD at Dar es Salaam (unreported) where the Court held that:-

7/7 the circumstance, I find that the applicant failed to cite

Rule 24 (ll)(b) o f the Labour Court Rules GN 106/2007 and


this renders the application incompetent to move the Court
to entertain and determine the application for extension o f
tim e. The preliminary objection is found to have merit".

Also the respondent referred this Court to the case of Edna


Sylvester Ndile Vs. Standard Chartered Bank, Revision No. 166 of
2013, HCLD at Dar es Salaam (unreported) where Hon. Wambura, J held

that:-

"An application for extension o f time is among those


applications which fall under the category o f Rule 24(1 l)(b)
o f the Labour Court Rules as they are not specifically

provided under the rules. "

In making reference to the Court of Appeal on proper citation of the

enabling provisions of the law, the respondent cited the case of Project

Manager Es Ko International Inc. Kigoma Vs. Vicent 3. Ndugumbi,


Civil Appeal No. 22 of 2009, CAT at Tabora (unreported) His Lordship

Rutakangwa JA held that:-

"It is now settled law that wrong citation o f the law, sub
section and or paragraphs o f the law or non-citation will not
move the Court to do what it is asked to do and accordingly
renders the application incompetent."

That from their submissions the application was incompetent before


the Court and capable of being dismissed.

On the first point of preliminary objection, the respondent argued

that Revision application No. 498 of 2015 was struck out on 14th November

2016 by this Court after it was found to be time barred, and on 6th

December 2016 the applicant filed the present application which is res

judicata on the reason that the application has the same issue, same
parties and it has been determined with the Court of competent jurisdiction

hence this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain it.

The respondent in substantiating that made reference to Section 9 of

the Civil Procedure Act, Cap 33 R.E 2002 which provides that:-

"No Court shall try any suit or issue in which matter directly
and substantially in issue has been directly and substantially
in issue in a former suit between the same parties or
between parties under whom they or any o f claim litigating
under the same title in a court competent to try such
subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been
subsequently raised and has been heard and finally decided

by such court. "


That from the provisions above, bars the trial of the suit or an issue

in which the matter directly and substantially in issue has been adjudicated
upon in a previous suit.

Also the respondent, referred this Court to the case of Kamunye

and Others Vs. The Pioneer General Assurance Society Ltd

(1971)EA 263 where the principle of res judicata was enunciated that:-

"the test whether or not a suit is barred by res judicata


seems to me to be-is the plaintiff in the second suit trying to
bring before the court, in another way and in the form o f a
new cause o f actiona new cause o f action, a transaction
which he has already put before a court o f competent
jurisdiction in earlier proceedings and which has been
adjudicated upon. I f so the plea o f res judicata applies not
only to points upon which the first court was actually
required to adjudicate but to every point which properly
belonged to the subject o f litigation and which the parties,
exercising reasonable diligence, might have brought forward
at the time. "

From that the respondent concluded that the decision above was too
bar multiplicity of suits and guarantee finality of litigation. That it makes

conclusive a final judgment between the same parties or their privies on

the same issue by court of competent jurisdiction in the subject matter of

the suit. Therefore prayed that the application was res judicata and the

same be dismissed in its entirety.


In reply to second point of preliminary objection on non-citation of

the enabling provisions of the law, at the outset making reference to the

case cited by the respondent of Airtel Tanzania Limited Vs. Earl

Matthysen cited by the respondent, the applicant did concede with the

first point of preliminary objection and prayed that the application be

struck out and for purpose of protection of justice between parties. The

applicant prayed that the Court gives them leave to refile the application

within seven days. That prayer by the applicant was cemented by the

attached case laws by the respondent in the written submission in support

of the raised preliminary objection, that the same cases referred to by

respondent were struck out with leave of filing another proper application.

On the first point of preliminary objection, the applicant argued that

in order for the matter to be res judicata, such an application or case must

be the same, the parties must be the same and it has to be determined by

a Court with competent jurisdiction.

That the present case the application is not the same as Revision No.

498 of 2015 which was to call for records, revise and set aside the

Arbitrator's award dated 25th day of August 2015 while this current
application is for extension of time and cannot be treated to be an

application for revision.

The applicant concluded that the first point of preliminary objection

lacks merit but the second point has merit therefore the applicant prayed

for the matter to be struck out with leave to file competent application

within seven days.


In rejoinder, the respondent submitted that they pray the application

to be dismissed instead of being struck out and referred the Court to the
case of Chief Executive Faidika Limited Vs. Lydia Pius, Revision No

18 of 2013, HCLD at Dar es Salaam [unreported] Mipawa,J (as he then

was) where the Court dismissed the application for being incompetent

before the Court. That the applicant has concede the application to be

defective as it offends the provisions of Rule 24(ll)(b) of the Labour Court

Rule G.N. 106/2007. That giving leave to the applicant to file another

application will amount to abuse of Court processes and destroy the aim

that litigation should come to an end. The respondent further submitted

that on 18th December 2015, Revision No. 498 of 2015 was struck out for

being incompetent, and on 6th December 2016 the applicant filed this

current application for extension of time with the same mistakes. That the

application being the second one should be dismissed without giving them

leave to file another application.

Having read written submissions by both parties and gone through

Court records and since it is undisputed that the applicant has concede to

the second point of preliminary objection which suffices to bring this


application to an end, this Court will not therefore labour on the first point

of preliminary objection for it will not in any manner change the end result.

The respondent cited the decision of this Court which struck out an

application for extension of time in Misc. Application No. 220 of 2014

between Airtel Tanzania Ltd Vs. Earl Matthysen (supra) and for

certainty in decision making, this Court subscribes to the same and uphold

the second point of preliminary objection on failure of the applicant to cite


Rule 24(1 l)(b) of the Labour Court Rules, GN No. 106 of 2007 in this
application.

Since this is the first application for extension of time brought by the

applicant, this Court doth order the same to be struck out thereto instead

of being dismissed as prayed for by the respondent. This application for

extension is struck out from the Court register.

If the applicant still intends to pursue this matter, I grant leave to file

a competent application for extension of time within 7 days from today.

It is so ordered.

JUDGE

04/ 05/2018

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