Religion a Threat to Morality: An Attempt to Throw Some

New Light on Hume’s Philosophy of Religion

Gerhard Streminger
Hume Studies Volume XV Number 2(November 1989) 277-294.

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Religion a Threat to Morality: An
Attempt to Throw Some New
Light on Hume’s Philosophy of
Religion*
Gerhard Streminger

At the beginning of his Natural History of Religion Hume writes that

two questions in particular ... challenge our attention, to wit, that
concerning its foundation in reason, and that concerning its origin in
human nature.’ The first challenge is taken up by Hume in the
Dialogues ConcerningNatural Religion, and the second i n his Natural
History of Religion.
In this paper I will try to show that there is a third fundamental
problem discussed by Hume with regard to religion, namely its
relationship to and influence on morality. Although he never wrote on
this topic in as systematic a way as on the above-mentioned two
questions inparticular, I am convinced that his thoughts about it were
not just casual. The passages in Hume relevant to this third central
question about religion are to be found in “Of Superstition and En-
thusiasm,”in Essays Moral, Political, and Literary; in section 11ofAn
Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding; in Appendix 4 and “A
Dialogue,” in An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals; in the
History of England; in Part XI1 of the Dialogues Concerning Natural
Religion2; and, in particular, in the Natural History of Religion. Why
Hume never wrote about the relationship between religion and
morality in a more systematic way is not entirely clear. He may have
decided not to provoke the orthodox any further than h e already had.
That Hume changed the title of section 11 of his first Enquiry from the
original “Of the Practical Consequences of Natural Religion” to the
rather noncommittal “Of a Particular Providence and of a Future
State”may support this conjecture.
Before going into more detail as to Hume’s view on the relationship
between religion and morality, I want to make a few remarks about
Hume’s opinion of religion in general. Hume made a distinction be-
tween one ‘true’ and two forms of ‘false’ religion. His most explicit
description of true religion is to be found in a preface t o the second
volume of his Histo? ofEngland:

Volume XV Number 2 277

 GERHARD STREMINGER

Theproper OficeofReligion, Hume wrote in terms which have

a Quakerish flavour, is to reform Men’s Lives, to purify their
Hearts, to inforce all mom1 Duties, & to secure Obedience to the
Laws & civil Magistrate. While it pursues these useful Pur-
poses, its Operations, tho’ infinitely valuable, are secret &
si1ent;and seldom come under the Cognizance ofHistory ... The
Idea of a n Znfinite Mind, the Author of the Universe seems ...
to require a Worship absolutely pure, simple, unadorned;
without Rites, Institutions, Ceremonies;even without Temples,
Priests, or verbal Prayer & ~ u p p lic a tio n . ~

This preface, however, was not printed in the words quoted above.
Instead i t was reduced by Hume to a footnote at the end of the second
volume of his History of England in a shortened and toned-down
version. Even this footnote was removed in later editions of the History
of England. But in the Dialogues Hume repeated his idea of the effect
of true religion on morality almost verbatim:

The proper office of religion is to regulate the heart of men,

humanize their conduct, infuse the spirit of temperance, order,
and obedience; and as its operation is silent, and only enforces
the motives of mortality and jutice, it is in danger of being
overlooked, and confounded with these other motives.‘

This form of religion, however, although without any pernicious conse-

quences with regard to society (D223), is extremely rare. Religion, as it
has commonly been fbund in the world (D223), is a threat to morality.
The corru tions of true religion, namely superstition a n d en-
F
thusicrsm, are the popular forms of religious worship. Whenever
Hume talks about religion without qualifications, he has this false
religion in mind.
Coming back tomy original thesis, Hume, I think, sees three main
negative influences of false religion: (1)The clergy has a n interest in
setting bounds to human knowledge; (2)The God of false religion is no
moral authority; (3) False religion corrupts the natural moral senti-
ments and promotes an ‘artificial, affected’ life.

I. False Religion and Human Knowledge

To see the force of Hume’s argument concerning the threat of false
religion to morality, one has to take into account some general assump-
tions of Hume’s philosophy, in particular, of his ethics. In the ”Letter
to a Physician,” written in 1734, Hume gives a clear account of the
origin of his philosophy. As a very serious and earnest young man, he
went through long periods of depression. After his health was already

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RELIGION A THREAT TO MORALITY

ruin'd, he realized that Christian and Stoic ethics do h a r m to human

nature. Their moral codes are entirely Hypothetical and depend more
upon Invention thun Experience. Every one consulted h i s Fancy in
erecting Schemes of Virtue & of Happiness, without regarding Human
Nature, upon which every moral Conclusion must depend. This there-
fore Z resolved to make my principal Study, & the Source from which Z
wou'd derive every Truth in Criticism as well as MoraZity6 Taking
seriously his own depressing experience in struggling to fulfil Christian
and Stoic morality, Hume drew the conclusion that the knowledge of
human nature is necessary in ethics. Before setting up rules, we must
know what we are able to do, what our nature is! Some of the passages
in the "Letter to a Physician* reappear in the Introduction to the
Ilteatise of Human Nature, published five years later. The science of
man, Hume summarizes, is the only solid foundation for the other
sciences [Logic,Morals, Criticism, and PoZitics].'
Knowledge of human nature is necessary in setting up rules and
moral systems; knowledge is also essential in the process of moral
evaluation. Hume makes this latter point particularly clear in the
second Enquiry. In Appendix 1, "Concerning Moral Sentiments A he
determines the role of reason in all decisions ofpraise or censure.B His
starting point is the situation of conflict. Supposedly, a person con-
siders the problem of whether hdshe had better, in a particular case of
emergency, assist a brother or a benefactor. Hume gives no answer to
this problem, but he indicates the direction in which an answer to a
problem like this is to be found We must consider these separate
relations, with all the circumstances and situations o f t h e persons, in
order to determine the superior duty and obligation (E 289). This idea,
that moral judgement has to consider everything, reappears in the
Appendix:

In moral deliberations we must be acquainted beforehand with

all the objects, and all their relations to each other; a n d f i o m a
comparison of the whole, f.c our choice or approbation. No new
fact to be ascertained; m new relation to be discovered. All the
circumstances ofthe case are supposed to be laid before us, ere
we can f i x any sentence ofblame or a p p r ~ b a tio n(E
. ~ 290)

I do not want to discuss here the problem of whether, or to what

extent, it may be possible to take literally everything into account. For
the following discussion i t is necessary only to keep i n mind that,
according to Hume, a possibly comprehensive knowledge about human
nature and the world is essential in at least two areas ofmoral thought:
in setting up moral rules, and in the process of moral evaluation.
Against this background, the meaning of some passages i n the Natural

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 7
GERHARD WREMINGER

History becomes apparent: Hume argues that the clergy has a genuine
interest in setting bounds to human knowledge. He comes to this
conclusion by way of the following steps:
1. Human beings experience the contrariety of life: The sun
destroys what is fostered by the moisture of dews and rains. War may
be favourable to a nation, whom the inclemency of the seasons afflicts
with famine. Sickness and pestilence may depopulate a kingdom,
amidst the most profbe plenty ...Zn short, the conduct of events ... is ...
full of variety and uncertainty (NHR 4:314). Human beings hang in
perpetual suspense between life and death, health and sickness, plenty
and want (NHR 4:316).
2. In order to deal with this situation, human beings, unless they
are enlightened, treat the hidden, unknown causes of these events as
persons, and try to influence them in the same way as is common among
themselves. We represent them to be sensible, intelligent beings, like
mankind; actuated by love and hatred, and flexible by gifrs and
entreaties, by prayers and sacrifwes (NHR 4:335).
3. Although any of the human affections may lead us into the notion
ofinvisible, intelligentpower [hope,fear, but also gratitude] ...men are
much oftener thrown on their knees by melancholy than by theagreeable
passions. Prosperity i s easily received as our due, and few questions are
asked concerning its cause or author. Zt begets cheerfulness andactivity
and alacrity and a lively enjoyment of every social andsensual pleasure:
And during this state of mind, men have little leisure or inclination to
think of the unknown invisible regions. On the other hand, every dis-
astrous accident alarms us, and sets us on enquiries concerning the
principles whence it arose (NHR 4:318-19). Human intentions are
...
usually carried beyond the present course of things by the anxious
concern for happiness, the dread of future misery, the t e r m of death,
the thirst of revenge, the appetite for food and other necessaries (NHR
4:315-16).
4.Theclergy-atleastalarge partofit-isawareofthe fact that
the fear of the unknown is the origin of religion. In order to keep their
flock religious, no topic is more usual with all popular devines than to
display the advantages of aflictwn, in bringing men to a due sense of
religion; by subduing their confidence and sensuality, which, in times
ofprosprity, make them forgetful of a divine providence (NHR 4:319).
In the Dialogues the philosopher repeats this argument: It is allowed,
that men never have recourse to devotion so readily as when dejected
with grief or depressed with sickness. Is not this a proofi that the
religious spirit is not so nearly allied to joy as to sorrow? (D225).
Accordingly, we find the tremendous images to predominate in all
religions ... terror is the primary principle of religion, it is the passion

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RELIGION A THREAT TO M O W I T Y

which always predominates i n it, and admits but of short intervals of

pleasure (D225-6).
I summarize this point: According to Hume, comprehensive
knowledge (of human nature and the world) is essential in setting up
norms and in moral judgement, but in order to keep people religious,
it is in the interest of the clergy to limit human knowledge, that is, to
let them forget the positive side of common life. What is even worse:
Since the conditions under which people are unhappy are the very
conditions that give rise to religion and in which i t thrives, the clergy
has a n interest to keep people unhappy. Limited knowledge and
subdured] confidence and sensuality are, however, untrustworthy
guidestomorality. The consequencesofclerical interests are, therefore,
dangerous to society. Hume’s critique is even more disturbing in that
he holds many clergymen to be hypocrites. In his essay “OfNational
Characters” Hume writes:

Though all mankind have a strong prupensity to religion at

certain times and i n certain dispositions;yet are there few or
none, who have it to that degree, and with that constancy,
which is requisite to support the character of this profession. It
...
must, therefore, happen, that clergymen will find it neces-
sary, on particular occasions, to feign more devotion t h a n they
are, at that time, possessed ofi and to maintain the appeamnce
offervor and seriousness, even when jaded with the exercises of
their religion, or when they have their minds engaged in the
common occupations of life They must not, like the rest of the
world, give scope to their natural movements and sentiments:
They must set a guard over their looks and words and actions:
And in order to support the veneration paid them by the
multitude, they must not only keep a remarkable reserve, but
must promote the spirit ofsuperstition, by a continuedgrimace
and hypocrisy. (Works 3:245-6 n. 3)”

In the second Enquiry Hume gives a brilliant summary of his argument

that religion tends to set bounds to human knowledge and does harm
to human emotions:

In later, philosophy of all kinds, especially ethics, have been

moreclosely united with theology than ever they wereobserved
to be among the heathens; and as this latter science admits of
no terms of composition, but bends every branch of knowledge
to its own purpose, without much regard to the phenomena O f
nature, or to the unbiassed sentiments of the mind, hence

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 GERHARD STREMINGER

reasoning, and even language, have been warped from their

naturalcourse. (E 322)

II. The God of False Religion is No Moral Authority

In popular religion God is considered to be the source of moral com-
mands without whose grace or assistance human beings are unable to
fulfil his will. Hume contradicts this. According to him, the God of
common religion is no moral authority. Hume argues as follows:
1. Polytheism is the primary religion of mankind. Human beings
personify the unknown causes of events. Painful events are taken as
being caused by malevolent spirits or gods, whereas pleasurable ones
are Seen as being caused by benevolent spirits.
2. Polytheism is usually overtaken by monotheism. Hume gives
two reasons for this: The one is that a particular God among the many
is marked out by the people as a national tutelary God (like Jahwe for
the Jews)." The second source of monotheism is the projection of social
relationships into the pantheon. One God is represented as the prince
or supreme magistrate of the rest, who, though of the same nature, rules
them with an authority, like that which a n earthly sovereign exercises
over his subjects and vassals (NHR 4:330).
3. If one God is marked out as the highest, a new psychological
mechanism sets in: his votaries will endeavor, by every art, to insinuate
themselves into his favour; and supposing him to be pleased, like
themselves, with praise and flattery, there is no eulogy or exaggeration,
which will be spared in their addresses to him. In proportion as men's
fears or distresses become more urgent, they still invent new strains of
adulation; and even he who outdoes his predecessors in swelling up the
titles ofhis divinity, is sure to be outdone by his successors in newer and
more pompous epithets of praise. Thus they proceed; till at last they
arrive at infinity itself beyond which there is no farther progress (NHR
4:330).
4. Upon closer consideration, the one God in popular religion
combines the projections of different human responses to the wn-
trariety of life. Our fears suggest the existence of a malevolent, reven-
geful God. We transfer, as is too usual, human passions and infirmities
to the deity, represent him as jealous and revengeful, capricious and
partial, and, i n short, a wicked and foolish man, in every respect but his
superior power and authority (NHR 4:317). On the other hand, our
hopes and inclination to flatter cast over the one God all possible
positive properties. Here therefore is a kind of contradiction between the
different principles of human nature, which enter into religion. Our
natural terrorspresent the notion o fa devilish and malicious deity: Our
propensity to adulation leads us to acknowledge a n excellent and divine
(NHR 4:353).The God of the orthodox is not only the creator of all

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things, and the God of mercy, but also the God who countenances the
everlasting torments of hell.
5. Theologians and philosophers realised that a God t h a t embodies
discordant elements is no moral authority since moral authorities
behave, at least, consistently. They, therefore, tried to puriify the
popular image ofGod: (a)by deducing the existence of an all-benevolent
God from the world as i t is. Hume discusses this attempt i n Parts X
and XI of his Dialogues. The result is a negative one: EPICURUS'S old
questions areyet unanswered Is he willing toprevent evil, but not able?
then is he impotent. Is he able, but not willing? then he is malevolent. Is
he both able and willing? whence then is evil? (D198);(b) b y enlarging
and emphasizing God's positive properties. According to Hume, how-
ever, this attempt fails, since the extension of God's power and the
extension of God's benevolence conflict with each other. The reason i s
that human fear increases with the extension of God's power and
knowledge, because no secrecy is to be kept out of his reach. An
omnipotent and omniscient God is not an all-benevolent one, but rather
a new source of fear. Thus it may safely be afirmed, that popular
religions are really, in the conceptwn of their more vulgar votaries, a
species of &monism; and the higher the deity is exalted i n power and
knowledge, the lower of course is he depressed in goodness and
benevolence;whatever epithets ofpraise may be bestowed on him by his
amazed adorers (NHR 4:354). Human beings have tried to overcome
their fears by feigning a saviour God; but this God turned out to be a
demon. According to Humean standards, such a creature is no moral
authority.
I summarize this point: The God of false religion is thought to be
the source of commands and of our moral actions, According to Hume,
this God is the product of human projections. The imagination,
motivated by weakness, fear, melancholy, together with ignorance is the
truesourc[el OfSUPERSTITION, the human imagination set in motion
by Hope, pride, presumption ... together with ignomnce is the true
sourc[e] of ENTHUSLASM (Works 3:145).'* The God of false religion is
no moral authority: He either embodies discordant elements, due to the
different motivesin human nature that activate theimagination, or he
is a demon, insofar as the extension of the so-called positive properties
(knowledge, power, benevolence, presence) turn God into a new source
of fear. Nothing can be hidden from this demon's all-seeing eyes. The
God of popular religion contradicts our natural ideas of generosity,
lenity, impartiality, and justice (NHR 4:355). LUCLAN observes that a
young man, who reads the history of thegods i n HOMER or HESIOD,
and finds their factions, wars, injustice, incest, adultery, and other
immoralities so highly celebrated, is much surprised afierwards, when
hecomes into the world, toobserve thatpunishments are by law inflicted

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 GERHARD STREMINGER

on the same actions, which he had been taught to ascribe to superior

beings. The contradiction is still perhaps stronger between the repre-
sentations given us by some later religions (NHR 4353,that is, chris-
tianity. In the essay “Of the Immortality of the Soul,” Hume discusses
the Christian concept of justice and comes to the conclusion that it
contains “a moral scandal”?

Heaven and hell suppose two distinct species of men, the good
and the bad. But thegreatestpartof mankindfloat betwixt vice
and virtue ...Punishment, according to our conception, should
bear some proportion to the offence. Why then eternal punish-
ment for the temporary offences of so fmil a creature as man?
Can any one approve of Akxander’e mge, who intended to
exterminate a whole nation because they had seized his
famurite horse. Bucephahs? (Works 4402)

III. False Religion and ‘Natural’Life

“he third point is, probably, the most important one. In order to see
the force of Hume’s argument, it is necessary again to make some
general remarks first.
Although the Dialogues Concerning Natuml Religion are a fun-
damental critique of the central doctrine of deism, namely of the design
argument, we must not forget that the author shared one important
assumption with deistic thinkers: the positive view of human nature.
Although Hume thought that nature does not reveal the existence of
an omniscient and all-benevolent God, he was as convinced as the deists
that the orthodox view of human nature is wrong. Hume shared their
belief that Human nature is not depraved; that we are able, without
God’s grace and assistance, to act morally; and that religion is not
necessary to morality. Although he nowhere criticized the doctrine of
original sin directly, i t is clear from a passage in the first Enquiry, that
he had no high opinion of the Book upon whose report the doctrine of
original sin is founded. Hume writes:

Here then we are first to consider a book, presented to us by a

barbarous and ignorant people, written in a n age when they
were still more barbarous, and i n all probubility long afier the
facts which it relates, corroborated by no concurring testimony,
and resembling those fabulous accounts. which every nation
gives of its origin. Upon reading this book, we find it f i l l of
prodigies and miracles. It gives a n account of a state of the
world and of human nature entirely different from the present:
Of our fall fiom that state: Of the age of man, extended to near
a thousand years: Of the destruction of the world by a deluge:

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RELIGION A THREAT TO MORALITY

Ofthe arbitrary choiceofonepeople, as thefavourites of heaven;

and that people the countrymen of the author: Of their
deliverance from bondage by prodigies the most astonishing
imaginable: Z &sire any one to lay his hand upon his heart,
and after a serious consideration declare, whether h e thinks
that the falsehood of such a book, supported by such a tes-
timony, would be moreextraordinary and miraculous than all
the miracles i f relates; which is, however, necessary to make it
be received. (E 130)

Thus, Hume did not accept the doctrine of original sin and he did
not think that human nature is depraved. In the essay “Of the Dignity
and Meanness of Human Nature” and, in particular, i n the second
Enquiry, Hume defends a very positive, almost Hutchesonian view of
human nature. He believed that he had proven that there is in human
nature a tendency to increase the happiness ... o f m u n k i n d that there
is ageneral concernfw society; that we are compelled by ... instances ...
[to] renounce the theory, which accounts for every moral sentiment by
the principle of self-love. We must adopt a more public affection, and
allow, that the interests of society are not, even on their o w n account,
entirely indifferent to w (E 218-19). Hume thought that there is a
spontaneous sympathy with the unhappy that the very aspect ofhappi-
ness, joy, prosperity, gives pleasure; that of pain, suffering, sorrow,
communicates uneasiness (E 220).A11 mankind sofar resemble thegood
principle, that, where interest or revenge or envy perverts not our
disposition, we are always inclined, from our natural philanthropy, to
give thepreference to the happiness ofsociety, and consequently to virtue
above its opposite (E227). The most impressive illustration of Hume’s
positive view of human nature is, I think, to be found in the Treatise of
Human Nature. According to orthodox Calvinisticthinking, not to help
the crew of a ship that hadruninto danger on the Sabbath was a special
sign of piety. Now, Hume writes:

Suppose I saw a ship at a distance, tost by a tempest, and i n

danger every moment ofperishing on a rock or sand-bank ...
Suppose the ship to be driven so near me, that Z can perceive
distinctly the horror, painted on the countenance ofthe seamen
and passengers, hear their lamentable cries, see the dearest
friends give their last adieu, or embrace with a resolution to
perish i n each others arms: No man has so savage a heart as
to reap any pleasure from such a spectacle, or withstand the
motions ofthe tenderest compassion and sympathy. (T594)
 GERHARD STREMINGER

No one had so savage a heart? The orthodox obviously had, and in

the very last sentences on the second Enquiry Hume explicitly links
the morality ofhuman beings to special conditions: When people depart
from the maxims ofcommon reason, and affect these artificial lives ...
no one can answer for what will please or displease them. They are in a
different element from the rest of mankind; and the natural principles
of their mind play not with the same regularity, as if lefi to themselves,
free from the illusions of religious superstition or philosophical en-
thusiasm (E 343).False religion creates a n artificial,affectred] life, a
life in which, for example, Sabbath-rules play a dominant role, or in
which human flattery is activated without bounds. Another example is
this: Since all privacy is lost in view of a n omnipotent and omniscient
God, believers are not allowed to accept their doubts: They must then
be careful not to form expressly any sentiment of blame and disapproba-
tion. All must be applause, ravishment, extacy (NHR 4:354).Why false
religion has a tendency to create an artificial life and therefore is a
serious threat to our natural moral sentiments is the subject of probab-
ly the most fascinating passages in the Natural History of Religwn.
Here is the gist of Hume's very complex argument:
1. The popular image of God in monotheism is contradictory: The
beliefin an infinitely superior deity isjoined with superstitious terrors.
The human mind is then sunk into the lowest submission and abase-
ment and the monkish virtues of mortification, penance, humility, and
pcrssive suffring are represented as the only qualities which are accept-
able to him (NHR 4:339). Not moral, but useless or even baneful
behaviour towards society is demanded by the clergy."
2. Polytheistic religions have a different impact on morality. Since
the powers and functions of their deities are limited, the believers may
even, without profaneness, aspire sometimes to a rivalship and emula-
tion of them. Hence activity, spirit, courage, magnanimity, love of
liberty, and all the virtues which aggrandize a people (NHR 4339).The
heroes in paganism correspond exactly to the saints in popery and holy
dervises i n MAHOMETANISM. The place of HERCULES, THESEUS,
ROMULUS, is now supplied by DOMINIC, FRANCIS, ANTHONY,
and BENEDICT. Instead of the destruction of monsters, the subduing
of tyrants, the defence of our native country; whippings and fastings,
cowardice and humility, abject submission and slavish obedience, are
become the means of obtainingcelestial honours among mankind (NHR
4:339-40). The fact that monotheistic religions often suppress our moral
sentiments, whereas polytheistic religions promote them gave rise to
the observation of MACHUVEL, that the doctrines of the CHRISTLAN
religion ... which recommend only passive couwge and suffering, had
subdued the spirit of mankind, and had fitted them for slavery and
subjection (NHR 4:340).

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3.Polytheistic religions are attended by another advantage: "hey

are often far more tolerant. If the powers and functions of the deities
are limited, the gods of other sects and nations are admitted to have a
share of divinity as well. The intolerance of almost all religions, which
have maintained the unity of God, is as remarkable as the contrary
principle of polytheists. The implacable narrow spirit of the JEWS is
well known. MAHOMETANISM set out with still more bloody prin-
ciples; and even to this day, deals out damnation, though not fire and
faggot, to all other sects. And ifi among CHRISTIANS, the ENGLISH
and DUTCH have embraced theprinciples of toleration, this singularity
has proceeded /?om the steady resolution of the civil magistrate, i n
opposition to the continued efforts ofpriests and bigots (NHR 4:337-8).
In monotheism the worship of other deities is usually regarded as
absurd and impious; adversaries are represented as profane, and the
most furious and implacable of all human passions are activated (NHR
4337). One of the results is human sacrifice and religious wars.
Certainly, there had been human sacrifice among polytheists as well,
but besides, that the effusionof blood may not be sogreat i n the former
case as in the latter; besides this, Zsay, the human victims, being chosen
by lot, or by some exterior signs, affect not, i n so considerable a degree,
the rest of the society. Whereas virtue, knowledge, love of liberty, are the
qualities, which call down the fatal vengeance of inquisitors; and when
expelled, leave the society i n the most shameful ignorance, corruption
and bondage (NHR 4:338-9).
4.All institutionalized monotheistic religions are connected with
absurdities and contradictions. Hume gives here the example of the
Catholics, a very learned sect, who, nevertheless, believe the most
absurd and nonsensical: the votaries eat, after having created, their
deity (NHR 4:343).Why is this so?
a) Hume's first explanation is this: If that theology went not beyond
reason and common sense, her doctrines would appear too easy and
familiar. Amazement must of necessity be raised: Mystery affected:
Darkness and obscurity sought af?er:And a foundation of merit afforded
to the devout votaries, who desire an opportunity of subduing their
rebellious reason, by the beliefofthe most unintelligible sophisms (NHR
4:341-2).In the first Enquiry Hume explains this phenomenon, citing
a strongpropensity of mankind to theextraordinary and the marvellous
(E118): The passion of surprise and wonder,arising from miracles,
being a n agreeable emotion, gives a sensible tendency towards the belief
of those events, fiom which it is derived (E 117).Moreover, there is a
pride and delight in exciting the admiration of others (E 117).
b) In the Natural History ofReligion Humegives a different, I think
deeper, explanation of this phenomenon (that people believe the most
absurd) by linking i t finally to morality. According to Hume, believers

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 GERHARD STREMINGER

have a tendency to accept the most absurd and nonsensical for two
reasons:
The first is that to believe in absurdities, improbabilities and
incredibilities opens an opportunity to triumph in one's belief. Since
those who believe in absurdities will be confronted with opposition,
even abuse; and because of this opposition they can value highly their
service to the deity. Nay, the baser the materials are, of which the
divinity is composed, the greater devotion is he likely to excite in the
breasts of his deluded votaries. They exult in their shame, and make a
merit with their deity, i n braving, for his sake, all the ridicule and
contumely of his enemies. Ten thousand Crusaders inlist themselves
under the holy banners; and even openly triumph in thoseparts of their
religion, which their adversaries regard as the most reproachful (NHR
4:346). The effect of this mechanism on the moral sentiments is fatal:
The believers become obstinate and dogmatical. Men dare not avow,
even to their own hearts, the doubts which they entertain on s w h
subjects: They make a merit of implicit faith;and disguise to themselves
their real infidelity, by the strongest asseverations and most positive
bigotry (NHR 4:348). Is it strange, when mistakes are so common, to find
every one positive and dogmatical? And that the zeal ofren rises in
proportion to the error? (NHR 4347).
The second reason why the faithful believe in absurdities i s that
they feel that ordinary moralityis just somethingnatural. Humecomes
to this conclusion by way of the following steps:
(i) It is afact that manyofthe votaries,perhapsthegreatest number,
will still seek the divine favour, not by virtue and good momls, which
alone can be acceptable to a perfect being, but either by frivolous
observances, by intemperate zeal, by mpturous extasies, or by the belief
...
of mysterious and absurd opinions. The least part ofthe Pentateuch,
consists i n precepts of morality; and we may also be assured, that that
part was always the least observed and regarded (NHR 4:357). Even if
a popular religion were found, i n which it was expressly declared, that
nothing but morality could gain the divine favour; i f an order ofpriests
were instituted to inculcate this opinion, in daily sermons, and with all
the arts ofpersuusion;yet so inveterate are the people's prejudices, that,
for want ofsomeother superstition, they would make the very attendance
on these sermons the essentials of religion, rather than place them in
virtue and good morals (NHR 4:357-8).
(ii) This phenomenon, Hume goes one, is very odd for two reasons:
(1)Nobody is so stupid, as that,judging by his natuml reason, he would
not esteem virtue and honesty the most valuable qualities, which any
person could possess. Why not ascribe the same sentiment to his deity?
(NHR 4:358); and, (2) To practice superstition is very often far more
difficult than to practice morality. It is certain, that the Rhamadan of

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the TURKS, during which the poor wretches, for many &ys, often i n
the hottest months of theyear, and i n some of the hottest climates of the
world, remain without eating or drinkingfrom the rising to the setting
sun; this Rhamadan, I say. must be more severe than the practice of any
moral duty, even to the most vicious and depraved of mankind ... The
austerities of some Roman Catholics, appear more disagreeable than
meekness and benevolence. I n short, a11 virtue, when men are reconciled
to it by ever so little practice, is agreeable: All superstition is for ever
odious and burthensome (NHR 4358).
(iii)Moralityisnot amatter ofcourse, butitis anatural behaviour.
This Humean (and classical) idea is very nicely summed u p by J. C. A.
Gaskin: Moral behaviour "is not difficult or disagreeable or in any way
contrary to our nature as normal people. It is an 'interested obligation'
and we are inclined to observe it by a combination of many factors: our
participation in the feelings of others through sympathy or fellow
feeling, our concern to be well thought of in society and live at peace
with ourselves and others, our aversion to criminal punishment and
disgrace, our calculation of our own greatest happiness etc. In brief,
happiness for people and usefulness for society, are the criteria for the
morality of an action, and action in accordance with these criteria is
both in a man's best interest and in harmony with his normal per-
sonality. Morality is social, utilitarian and secular. The will of god and
the rewards and punishment of an afterlife play no part in Hume's
scheme of morals.""
(iv) Believers feel this. They know that moral behaviour is nothing,
which they have properly performed for the sake of God, or which can
peculiarly recommend [them] to the divine favour andprotection (NHR
4:359). They get into conflicts, and the consequence is that they turn to
absurdities, rites, ceremonies, etc. - not although these are absurd
and unnatural, but because they are. Since they are absurd the
believer has the certainty that they are done for God's sake.

And any practice, recommended to him, which either serves to

nopurpose in life, or offers the strongest violence to his natural
inclinations; that practice he will the more readily embrace, on
account of those very circumstances, which should make him
absolutely reject it. It seems the more purely religious, because
it proceedsfion no mixture ofany other motiveor consideration
... I n restoring a loan, or paying a debt, his divinity is nowise
beholden to him; because these acts ofjustice are what he was
bound toperform, and what many haue performed, were there
no god in the universe. But if he fast a day, or give himself a
sound whipping; this has a direct reference, in his opinion, to
the service of God. No other motive could engage him t o such

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 CERHARD STREMINGER

austerities. By these distinguished marks of devotion, he has

now acquired thedivinefavour;and may expect, i n recompence,
protection and safety in this world, and eternal happiness in
the next. (NHR 4359)

(v) There i s an even more disastrous consequence for human

society if the pious actually choose explicitly immoral acts in order to
show their belief in God Hence the greatest crimes have been found, in
many instances, compatible with a superstitious piety and devotion:
Hence, it is justly regarded as unsafe to draw any certain inference in
favour o f a man’s morals, from the fervour or strictness ofhis religious
exercises, even though he himseZf believe them sincere. Nay, it has been
observed, that enormities of the blackest dye have been rather apt to
produce superstitious terrors, and encrease the religious passion (NHR
4359-60).In the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion Hume repeats
this point: And when we have to do with a man, who makes a great
profession of religion and devotion; has this any other effect upon
several, whopass forprudent, than toput them on theirguard, lest they
...
be cheated and deceived by him? The steady alone to so important an
interest as that ofeternal salvation is apt to extinguish the benevolent
affections, and beget a narrow, contracted selfishness. And when such
a temper is encouraged, it easily eludes all thegeneral precepts of charity
and benevolence (D221-2). Besides other things, Hume i n his History
ofEngland is eager to show that i n history we find a preponderance of
bloody warfare and civil strife whenever religion and politics are linked.
The love of God does not imply the love of human kind.
I come to the conclusion of this paper by repeating its main idea:
Hume makes a distinction between true and false religion. The popular
form of religious worship is false. False religion is a threat to morality
since the clergy has a n interest in setting bounds to human knowledge;
since they keep believers miserable; since the God of false religion is
no moral authority, for his properties are either contradictory or even
immoral; and, in particular, since the believers have to live in conflicts:
Because they feel that their moral acts are plainly natural, they have
to find something that is done for God’s sake: rites, ceremonies, and,
sometimes, oppression and annihilation of other people. After the
commission ofcrimes, there arise remrses and secret horrors, which
give no rest to the mind, but make it have recourse to religious rites and
ceremonies, as expiations of its offences (NHR 4:360).To have recourse
to religious rites and ceremonies is, of course, in the interests of the
established churches.
According to Hume, i t is simply untrue, as is maintained again and
again, that religion supports morality; the opposite is true: it weakens
it. And as religion weakens morality, morality weakens religion:

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RELIGION A THREAT TO MORALITY

Whatever disorders the internal frame promotes the interests of super-

stition: And nothing is more destructive to them than a manly, steady
virtue, which eitherpreserves us fiom disastrous, melancholy accidents,
orteaches us tobear them. Duringsuchcalmsunshineofthe mind, these
spectres offalse divinity never make their appearance (NHR 4:360).
The usual defence of established churches if confronted with their
bloody history is that 'the message is good, but human nature is bad.'
According to Hume, it is the other way round There is nothing in-
herently wrong with human nature - what is wrong is t h e message.
It makes people greedy and activates their lowest instincts. The
Natural History of Religion ends without reconciliation: Examine the
religious principles, which have, in fact, prevailed in the world. You will
scarcely be persuaded, that they are any thing but sick men's dreams:
Or perhaps will regard them more a8 theplaysome whimsies of monkies
in human shape, thun the serious, positive, dogmatical asseverations of
a being, who dignifies himself with the name of rational ...Ignorance
is the mother ofDevotion:A maxim that is proverbial, and confirmed
by general experience (NHR 4:362-3). Already in the Treatise ofHuman
Nature Hume has called the errors in philosophy only ridiculous, but
those in religion dangerous (T272).And on his deathbed h e told James
Boswell that "the Morality of every Religion was bad" and that "when
he heard a man was religious, he concluded he was a rascal, though he
had known some instances of very good men being religio~s."'~

University of Graz, Austria

* Read at the Hume Conference in Marburg, August, 1988.

1. David Hume, "The Natural History OfReligion,"in The Philosophi-
cal Works, ed. T. H. Green and T. H. Grose, 4 vols. (1882;
Darmstadt, 1964),4:309.Further references ("NHR") will be given
in parentheses within the body of the text.
2. It is interesting, and typical for secondary literature on Hume, that
the problem of the relationship between religion and morality is
almost entirely neglected. This is true even of the most thorough
interpretation of Hume's Dialogues: St. Tweyman, Scepticism and
Belief i n Hume's Dialogues Concerning N a tu r a l Religion
(Dortrecht, 1986).
3. This preface is printed in E. C.Mossner, The LifeofDavid Hume
(1954;Oxford, 19801,306-7.
4. David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, ed. Norman
Kemp Smith (Indianapolis, 1947),220.Further references CD")
will be given in parentheses within the body of the text.

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 GERHARD STREMINGER

5. David Hume, The Philosophical Works, ed. T. H. Green and T. H.

Grose, 4 vols. (Darmstadt, 1964), 3:144. Further references will be
given in parentheses within the body of the text.
6. J. Y. T. Grieg, TheLettem ofDavid Hume, vol. 1(Oxford, 1931), 14,
16.
7. David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge,
2nd ed. (Oxford, 1987), xvi. Further references (“T’) will be given
in parentheses within the body of the text.
8. David Hume, Enquiries Concerning the Human Understanding
and Concerning the Principles ofMorals, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, 2nd
ed. (Oxford, 1975), 285. Further references (‘%‘I)will be given in
parentheses within the body of the text.
9. Hume continues: If any material circumstance be yet unknown or
doubtful, we must first employ our inquiry or intellectual faculties
to assure us of it; and must suspend for a time all moral decision
or sentiment ... I n moral decisions, all the circumstances and
relations must be previously known; and the mind, fiwm the con-
templation of the whole, feels some new impression of affection or
disgust, esteem or contempt, approbation or blame (E290).
10. Hume continues: This dissimulation ofien destroys the candor and
ingenuity oftheir temper, and makes an irreparable breach in their
character ... Few men can bear contradiction with patience; but the
clergy too open proceed even to a degree offuryonthis head: Because
all their credit and livelihood depend upon the belief; which their
opinions meet with; and they alone pretend to a divine and super-
natural authority, or h u e any colour fbr representing their an-
tagonists as impious and prophane. The Odium Theologicum, or
Theological Hatred, is noted even to a proverb, and means that
degreeofmncour, whichis themostfuriousandimplacable ... Thus
manyofthe vicesofhuman natureare ...inflamed in thatpossession
(Works 3245-7 n. 3).
11. But then this problem arises: What kind of moral authority is such
a God supposed to be who is only or primarily interested in one
people? In short, who does not fulfil the ‘cosmopolitanideal of the
enlightenment’?
12. In contrast to false religion, true worship is without recourse to the
aid of the senses & imagination (Mossner [above, n. 31,307). As to
the role of imagination in Hume’s philosophy, see Gerhard
Streminger, “Hume’s Theory of Imagination,” Hume Studies 6.2
(November 1980): 91-118; 7.1 (April 1981): 103.
13. J. C. A. Gaskin, Hume’s Philosophy ofReligwn (London, 1978), 100.
Gaskin recognizes that Hume discussed the problem of the
relationship between religion and morality (pp. 148-58). More on

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RELIGION A THREAT TO MORALITY

this topic is to be found in J. Buchegger,David Humes Argumente

gegen d a s Christentum (Frankfurt, 1987).
14. In the Enquiry Hume had already stressed this point: Celibacy,
fasting, penance, mortification, self-denial, humility, silence,
solitude, and the whole train o f monkish virtues; for what reason
are they everywhere rejected by men of sense, but because they serve
to no manner of purpose; neither advance a man’s fortune in the
world, nor render him a more valuable member of society; neither
qualifu him for the entertainment of company, nor increase his
power ofself-enjoyment?Weobserve, on the contrary, that they cross
all these desirable ends; stupifL the understanding and harden the
heart, obscure the fancy and sour the temper. Wejustly, therefore,
transfer them to the opposite column, and place them in the
catalogue of vices ... Agloomy, hair-brained enthusiast, after his
death may have a place in the calendar; but will scarcely ever be
admitted, whenalive, intointimacy and society, except by those who
are as delirious and dismal as himself (E 270).
15. Already in the Treatise Hume had written that in matters of
religion men take a pleasure in being terrify’d, and that no
preachers are so popular, as those who excite the most dismal and
gloomypassions (T 115).
16. Gaskin (above, n. 13), 152. In the Natural History Hume is eager
to show that moral behaviour is a source of pleasure: The duties,
which a man performs as a fiiend or parent, seem mereZy owing to
his benefactor or children; nor can he be wanting to these duties,
without breaking through all the ties of matter and morality. A
strong inclination may prompt him to theperformance:Asentiment
of order and mom1 obligation joins its force to these natural ties:
And the whole man, if truly virtuous, is d m w n to his duty, without
any effortor endeavour. Even with regard to the virtues ... such as
public spirit, filial duty, temperance, or integrity; the moral obliga-
tion, i n our apprehension, removes all pretention to religious merit;
and the virtuous conduct is deemed no more than what we owe to
society and to ourselves (NHR 4:358).
17. J. Boswell, “An Account of My Last Interview with David Hume,
Esq.,” in David Hume, Dialogues (above, n. 4), 76.

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