IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE

DR. DANIEL C. SHELTON, :

:
Plaintiff, :
:
v. : C.A. No. ________
:
: Jury Trial Demanded
DONALD PATTON, NAVEED BAQIR, :
YUN FEI LOU, and ALETHEA SMITH- :
TUCKER, all individually and in their official :
capacities; and BOARD OF EDUCATION OF :
THE CHRISTINA SCHOOL DISTRICT, :
:
Defendants. :

COMPLAINT

1. This is a Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process and state law breach of

contract action on behalf of Plaintiff Dr. Daniel C. Shelton, an experienced and decorated

Superintendent of the public school Board Defendant. Plaintiff’s mistreatment and termination

have been widely followed by taxpayers and legislators as well as extensively covered by the

local news media. For reasons unknown, the Board waived attorney-client privilege and allowed

the news media subsequently and independently to publish numerous written warnings from the

Board’s own attorney that its treatment of the dedicated Dr. Shelton was blatantly

unconstitutional, illegal and would result in an award of compensatory and punitive damages

against both the Board and certain individual Board members. But these Defendants chose to

disregard those warnings and fired Plaintiff anyway.

2. Dr. Shelton was terminated:

(a) without any notice or meaningful opportunity to be heard;

(b) without being given a pre or post termination hearing;

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 (c) without disinterested decision makers deciding his fate in the 4-3
termination vote, with the Board’s own lawyer repeatedly concluding it
was “impossible” for certain Board members to be impartial “[g]iven
the[ir] public record of animus” against him which amounted to a “witch
hunt;” and

(d) in violation of the requirement of receiving a “written statement of the

reasons for termination” amounting to “good and just cause” and only
following the “fair hearing” protections of his five year employment
contract and a one year extension of the same.

I. JURISDICTION

3. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343(a)(3)

and (4), §§ 2201 and 2202, and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

The cause of action arises under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment. The claims

arose in this judicial district.

4. This Court has supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims under 28 U.S.C. §

1367.

5. Venue is proper in this judicial district because it is the where Plaintiff was employed

and the claims arose.

II. THE PARTIES

A. Plaintiff

6. Plaintiff Dr. Daniel C. Shelton (“Shelton” or “Plaintiff” ) is a 52 year old White male

veteran Delaware public school administrator, with an impeccable employment record, no prior

workplace disciplinary record, the recipient of commendations for his outstanding job

performance, and a resident of New Castle County, Delaware where he was employed for five

years beginning July 1, 2020 as the superintendent of the Christiana School District.

1. Professional Reputation and Recognition.

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 7. In April 2022 Plaintiff was voted by his peers Delaware’s superintendent of the year

receiving the award from the Delaware Association of School Administrators, the state-level

affiliate of the American Association of School Administrators (“AASA”). The award is based

on leadership for learning, communication, professionalism and community involvement. Dr.

Matthew Burrows, superintendent of the Appoquinimink School District and a member of the

national governing board of the AASA, in a prepared statement at that time stated: “he’s shown

passion and commitment to the students, staff and families of his district and has made deep and

lasting contributions to education here in Delaware.”

8. For the 2020-21 school year Plaintiff was president of the Chief School Officers

Association of Delaware, while that group navigated the pandemic.

9. In 2012 he was selected by his peers to be the National Association of Elementary

School Principals (“NAESP”) “National Distinguished Principal,” and he also received the Paul

Carlson Award in 2014 which is the highest honor given in the Delaware Association of School

Leaders.

10. During his time as Superintendent Plaintiff served on the Governor's Council of the

Arts (the “DDOA” or Delaware Division of the Arts) (2017-present), as Honorary Commander of

the Dover Air Force Base (2018), as member of the Dover & Caesar Rodney Rotary Clubs, and

as a member of the legislative committee for the Central Delaware Chamber of Commerce. He

also was recognized by the Delaware General Assembly by proclamation for his support of

Delaware schools.

2. Education and Employment History.

11. Plaintiff has several degrees from the University of Delaware including his doctorate

in Educational Leadership and Public Policy in 2007, a Masters of Education in Curriculum and

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Instruction in 2001, and a Bachelors of Science in Health, Physical Education, with a minor in

Computer Science, in 1995.

12. Plaintiff also has at least 26 years of professional education experience.

13. After receiving his B.A., in 1998 he started his career in the Christina School

District, first as a teacher and then as an administrator, before spending five years as the

Superintendent of the Capital School District in Dover and then he finally returned to Christina

School District as Superintendent in 2020.

14. Plaintiff has been employed by the Defendant for over 21 years. In 1998 he began

working for the Christina School District as a Technology teacher at Drew-Pyle Intermediate

School. His later positions include Assistant Principal at Jones Elementary, Principal of Maclary

Elementary and Smith Elementary School where he served 12 years during which time there

were dramatic increases in test scores, fully functioning professional learning communities and a

schedule to maximize the effectiveness and staff efficiency in small group instructional time.

Kirk Middle School followed as its principal.

15. In 2015, Plaintiff was selected as the Superintendent of the Capital School District

which had a long history of racial tensions and poor performance that had over time eroded the

trust of the community. During five years in Capital, he saw significant gains in test scores and

perhaps just as important increases in survey data in trust and appreciation of the work he was

doing.

16. When the pandemic hit he developed immediately a solid plan that got through the

remainder of the 2019-2020 school year including solid delivery of instruction, handing out

computers, instructional supplies and food for students and ensuring teachers had the training

they needed to be successful.

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 17. In 2020 Plaintiff was asked to apply for the open position as the Christina School

District Superintendent and was the chosen candidate. Christina had not had success in

preparing for a COVID return and he and his team spent the summer preparing, purchasing

computers and hot spots and preparing the teachers for a hybrid opening to the school year.

18. The pandemic was a difficult time but it was successfully navigated with the

collective bargaining units, with employees and parents.

19. A comprehensive strategic plan was adopted and the student body was engaged in an

effective way by organizing a Superintendent's Student Advisory Council which independently

voted a member to represent students on the Board of Education.

20. Coming out of the pandemic, the District saw a steady increase in Smarter Balance,

SAT and graduation rates with four schools coming out of improvement status. The District also

had the highest growth in 10th grade scores and the Christiana Honors Academy had the best

Middle School Smarter scores in the State.

B. Defendants.

21. Defendant Board of Education of the Christina School District (the “Board”) is a

reorganized school board operating under 14 Del.C. § 1043. It does business as the Christina

School District (the “District”), 1899 South College Avenue, Newark, DE 19702.

22. Under Delaware law, the Board is the final decisionmaker and policymaker for all

employment, personnel and contractual decisions involving the Superintendent of the District.

23. For example, it has “the authority to administer and to supervise” and “the authority

to determine policy ... for the general administration” of the District. 14 Del.C. § 1043.

24. It also is empowered to “appoint personnel,” 14 Del.C. § 1049(a)(9), and

“[d]etermine the educational policies of ... and prescribe rules and regulations for the conduct and

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management of the” District. Id. at § 1049(a)(2).

25. All of its decisions in the employment arena are final.

26. The employment context is not one of the few areas where the broad authority of a

school board is limited by statute. Compare 14 Del.C. § 1058 (creating a limited power to appeal

certain “controversies involving the rules and regulations of [a] school board” to the State Board

of Education).

27. Instead, and specific to the context of due process and contract rights of even lower

level district employees, for nearly 50 years the District of Delaware has held that Delaware

school boards “possess[ ] considerable autonomy of operation and power of initiative,” all

“without the necessity of action by the State Board of Education or the General Assembly.”

Morris v. Bd. of Ed. of Laurel Sch. Dist., 401 F.Supp. 188, 205 (D. Del. 1975); see id. at 204.

28. Such employment matters fall squarely within the purview of “the local school board

... and not [ ] the State Board of Education or the State of Delaware.” King v. Caesar Rodney

Sch. Dist., 396 F.Supp. 423, 426 (D. Del. 1975).

29. Defendant Donald Patton (“Patton”) was elected to the Board in July 2021, reelected

in July 2022 and has served as its current President since July of 2023. He is sued individually

and in his official capacity.

30. His professional history as an educator employed by the District was not

distinguished and certain incidents which occurred provide various motives for him to dislike

and retaliate against Plaintiff.

31. Defendant Naveed Baqir (“Baqir”) is currently a member of the Board who first took

office in July 2021. He is sued individually and in his official capacity.

32. Defendant Yun Fei Lou (“Lou”) is currently a member of the Board who first took

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office in July 2023. He is sued individually and in his official capacity.

33. Defendant Althea Smith-Tucker (“Smith-Tucker”) is currently a member of the

Board who first took office in July 2020. She is sued individually and in her official capacity.

II. FACTS

A. The Two Employment Contracts Creating Protected Property Interests.

1. The Original Contract.

34. Attached as Exhibit A is Plaintiff’s four page written State of Delaware School

Superintendent Contract dated June 4, 2020, with a term from July 1, 2020 through June 30,

2025, five years, and signed by all seven then current members of the Defendant Board. The vote

to hire Plaintiff was unanimous.

35. Thereafter on July 1, 2020, during the unprecedented Covid-19 educational

lockdowns in Delaware and nationally, under paragraphs 4 and 6, Plaintiff, on the direction of the

Defendant Board began exercising duties overseeing nearly 14,000 students, 3,000 teachers,

administrators and other employees in a professional manner and in accord with Delaware law.

36. His duties included: management of all District affairs; responsibility for general

administration, instruction, human resources, communications, government relations, facilities

and business affairs; recommendations regarding personnel matters; and Executive Secretary to

the Board.

37. Aside from benefits, the annual salary under this contract began at $199,000 per year

and with negotiated raises is currently $210,043.

38. Paragraph 9 of the written contract provides that it cannot be terminated during its

term “except for good and just cause,” following a previous “fair hearing,” and prior to such

hearing “a written statement of the reasons for termination” must have been provided.

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 2. The One Year Contract Extension.

39. On or about December 12, 2023, the Board approved a one year extension of

Plaintiff’s contract through June 30, 2026. For the 2025-2026 school year the contractual wage

total here is $219,898.

40. Plaintiff agreed to and accepted this extension.

41. On January 9, 2024, the Board approved the minutes of their prior Board meeting

which included the extension of Plaintiff’s contract.

42. The Board’s longtime attorney admitted in writing on March 13, 2024 that this

“extension” of Plaintiff’s contract “was approved December 12, 2023.”

43. On March 12, 2024, Defendant Lou also publicly admitted that the Board had

approved a one year extension of Plaintiff’s contract.

B. Breach of Contract, Adverse Actions and

Deprivation of Property Interests.

1. Breach.

44. Defendants thereafter materially breached both of Plaintiff’s contracts in numerous

ways.

45. On numerous occasions, by repeated 4-3 Board votes, Defendants took numerous

adverse actions (including suspension and termination) against Plaintiff without: (1) any prior

“written statement of the reasons;” (2) a prior “fair hearing” to allow Plaintiff to respond and

defend himself;’ and (3) “good and just cause.”

46. In so doing, Defendants materially breached both of Plaintiff’s employment

contracts.

47. For example, by a 4-3 vote at a Board meeting on March 12, 2024, Plaintiff was

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suspended and reprimanded without pay effective for three days from April 1, to April 3, 2024.

He lost three days of his negotiated wages by this action.

48. Non-Defendant Board members Douglas Manley, Monica Moriak and Dr. Clair

O’Neal strongly opposed the action.

49. In the public session that day Defendant Patton during debate and in response to

Board member Moriak did not deny and in fact admitted that there had been: no discussion with

Plaintiff of the alleged reasons for the suspension; no prior notice had been given to him in

writing; and no “fair hearing” had been held at which he had any opportunity to respond or rebut

the charges against him.

50. By a 4-3 vote at the same Board meeting on March 12, 2024 the earlier one year

extension of Plaintiff’s employment contract also was recinded.

51. Again, no written notice of the reasons was given to Plaintiff; no “fair hearing” was

held before doing so; and no “good and just cause” existed to justify this material breach of

contract .

52. Then by a 4-3 vote at a Board meeting on May 24, 2024, as a total surprise and with

no prior warning, the Board voted “no confidence” in Plaintiff.

53. An agenda item to provide a written evaluation of Plaintiff was removed from the

agenda for that day.

54. Again, no written notice of the reasons was given to Plaintiff; no “fair hearing” was

held before doing so; and no “good and just cause” existed to justify this.

55. Because it was May and graduation was upon the Board, Plaintiff was not suspended

from his duties after this vote.

56. On June 26, 2024 the Delaware Department of Justice issued a Finding that the

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Board had violated the Freedom of Information Act with this “vote of no confidence.” (Ruling at

7, see 3). The Board through its attorney on June 7, 2024 had “conceded” that a violation had

occurred by “the Board’s failure to notice its vote of no confidence in the superintendent in the

May meeting agenda.” (Ruling at 2). The DOJ agreed with this admission.

57. By a 4-3 vote at the following Board meeting on July 9, 2024, Plaintiff was

suspended, he was reprimanded, and he was placed on administrative leave. Thereafter he was

denied access to his offices and all systems of the District and he was denied supervision of any

of its activities or personnel and not allowed to perform any of his prior job duties and

responsibilities identified above. His email was turned off, and his office keys were demanded.

58. Again, no written notice of the reasons for these actions was given to Plaintiff; no

“fair hearing” was held before doing so; and no “good and just cause” existed to justify any of

this.

59. By a 4-3 vote at a Board meeting on August 13, 2024 the Board hired a replacement

Superintendent and gave him a one year term of office.

60. As a result, Plaintiff was out of a job.

61. Again, no written notice of the reasons was given to Plaintiff; no “fair hearing” was

held before doing so; and no “good and just cause” existed to justify any of this.

2. The Board’s Own Lawyer’s Admission of the Board’s

“Wholesale Disregard of the Law” as it Engaged in a “Witch Hunt”

62. For more than four decades, the Board has been represented by its distinguished,

longtime legal counsel at Morris James LLP.

63. For many years, that distinguished lead counsel has been attorney James H.

McMackin, III, Esquire, who has regularly given legal advice to the Board.

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 64. But for unknown reasons, during the summer of 2024 the Board waived attorney-

client privilege over its communications with its longtime legal counsel.

65. One of the ways the Board did this was by providing confidential attorney-client e-

mails and communications to members of the Delaware media and to the general public.

66. Numerous news stories were thereafter widely published addressing the contents of

these no longer protected communications.

67. Members of the general public also widely circulated these communications.

68. These communications contained many evidentiary admissions directly relevant to

Plaintiff’s lawsuit.

69. For example, on July 17, 2024 attorney McMackin admitted in writing that

Defendant Board members were engaging in a “witch hunt” towards Plaintiff.

70. He admitted that there was a “mountain” of evidence that the four Board member

Defendants were not impartial towards Plaintiff.

71. He admitted that these same four Defendants had displayed a “public record of

animus” towards Plaintiff.

72. He admitted that “[g]iven public statements and actions, one or more board members

... will have an ‘impossible’ hill to climb if they claim to be impartial.”

73. He admitted that this lack of impartiality would result in a constitutional “due

process” violation.

74. He explained to the four individual Defendants that their “lack of impartiality can not

only result in district liability, but it is one of the few issues that gives rise to personal liability –

even for elected volunteers.”

75. He also repeatedly warned the Board that its illegal actions towards Plaintiffs were

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going to, by necessity, lead to his resignation.

76. In accord with the finest traditions of the Delaware Bar, attorney McMackin

explained that he would not and could not be a party to the Board’s wholesale illegal behavior

towards Plaintiff and otherwise.

77. He explained that the Board’s “wholesale disregard of the law” was greatly troubling

and illegal.

78. He explained, “I am not sure what the Board’s goal is, but it is not adherence to the

law.”

79. Finally, on August 14, 2024, the Board’s longtime attorney McMackin and the

Board’s longtime law firm Morris James, resigned from representing the Board.

3. The DOJ’s Additional Concern for Board Lawlessness.

80. The Delaware Department of Justice, by an epilogue in the Delaware Budget statute,

in July 2024 also was required to monitor all Board meetings, including even executive sessions,

due to Delaware legislative concerns about the Board’s illegal meetings and many other public

concern problems.

81. In July 2024 attorney McMackin had reported to Defendants that the DOJ

“mentioned to me that they are considering ways to take action against the District considering

public turmoil but they disclosed nothing further.”

D. Damages.

1. Wages and Benefits

82. As a direct and proximate result of the actions of the Defendants as detailed herein,

Plaintiff has suffered and will suffer economic damages based on a wage and benefit package of

about $292,000 annually through the year 2026, including, but not limited to: loss of wages; loss

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of earnings; loss of benefits, including COBRA benefits; decreased earning capacity now and

upon retirement; decreased employment and earnings opportunities; decreased pension and

retirement benefits; and other pecuniary losses.

83. For the 2025-2026 year the base wage loss starts at $219,898 without factoring in

15% for lost benefits. For the next 10 years, up to Plaintiff’s retirement at age 62, with a 2%

expected annual raise factored in, Plaintiff’s wage and benefit loss totals $2,768,994.

2. Injury to Reputation.

84. As a direct and proximate result of the actions of the Defendants as detailed herein,

Plaintiff’s reputation has been destroyed in: (1) the local, regional and national educational

communities; and (2) the public at large.

85. Plaintiff is unemployable. After applications, he cannot even obtain an initial

interview as an administrator or educator either in Delaware, Pennsylvania or Maryland.

86. His professional reputation has been ruined by the public implication that he is guilty

of some type of grievous and immoral wrongdoing which caused the District and individual

Defendants to:

• March 12th - suspend and reprimand him and unilaterally cancel his next
year’s contract;

• May 24th - pass a “no confidence” vote about his professionalism;

• July 9th - permanently suspend, reprimand him and place him on leave; and

• August 13th - hire a replacement superintendent.

87. Defendants made numerous false, misleading and defamatory written and oral

statements about Plaintiff.

88. The statements referred to Plaintiff by name.

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 89. The gist of these statements is that Plaintiff is a racist, a liar, immoral and an inept

and incompetent educational administrator who engaged in workplace wrongdoing so severe that

it justified two mid-contract firings and the waiver of attorney-client privilege between the Board

and its own longtime attorney.

90. For example, on April 21, 2024 on Community Crossfire with Norman Oliver, on

DETV (see https://www.youtube.com/live/FPnhsUaJkAQ?si=xsbIS5AA35LwX5jT), during the

interview Defendant Patton accused Plaintiff of being a “racist.” (Recording at 4:46+). After

falsely stating that Plaintiff had orchestrated a Board effort to remove him as President of the

Board, Patton stated “he did it because I am Black.”

91. These statements are completely and categorically false.

92. Being called a racist injures a person’s reputation in the popular sense, diminishes the

esteem, goodwill or confidence in which a person is held, excites adverse, derogatory or

unpleasant feelings or opinions against him and exposes him to public hatred, contempt, scorn,

obloquy, and shame. In doing so, it also harms a person’s reputation, lowers him in the

estimation of the community and deters third persons from associating or dealing with him.

93. The defamatory nature of the statements is self-evident and would be understood as

such by any reasonable third party, by the plain words of these statements themselves and also by

referring to extrinsic evidence.

94. These statements and integrally related actions also maligned Plaintiff in his

profession, trade or business.

95. For example, the above noted actions and statements, in their totality convey the

message that Plaintiff engaged in grievous educational and or other wrongdoing at work.

96. They falsely accused Plaintiff of being an inept and incompetent educational

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administrator.

3. Non-Pecuniary Losses.

97. As a direct and proximate result of the actions of the Defendants as detailed herein,

Plaintiff has also suffered emotional pain, suffering, disappointment, anger, inconvenience,

mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, mental and physical pain, physical injury, anguish,

humiliation, embarrassment, and other non-pecuniary losses and injury. Psychological, emotional

or mental injuries include, but are not limited to: depression; anxiety; trouble sleeping; recurring

nightmares; decreased energy and motivation; as well as other psychological, emotional and

mental injuries.

E. ALLEGATIONS REGARDING THE DEFENDANTS' CONDUCT

98. All the actions of the Defendants described both above and below were taken

pursuant to policies, practices and/or customs of the Board and were authorized, sanctioned,

implemented, permitted and/or ratified by officials functioning as final decisionmakers at a

policymaking level.

99. By the policies, practices and/or customs of officials functioning as final

decisionmakers at a policymaking level, the Board has denied Plaintiff his constitutional rights

under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

100. The Defendants’ actions violated clearly established federal constitutional rights of

which any reasonable official would have known.

101. At all times material hereto the individual defendants participated in, authorized,

and sanctioned the federal constitutional deprivations described above.

102. At all times material hereto the individual defendants and their agents were acting

under color of law. The federal constitutional deprivations described herein are fairly attributable

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to the State.

103. The actions of the Defendants and their agents or employees were deliberately,

intentionally, willfully, purposefully, and knowingly done in violation of federal constitutional

rights and because of the exercise of those rights.

104. The individual Defendants either knew or showed a negligent or reckless disregard

for the matter of whether their conduct violated federal constitutional rights.

105. Their actions were outrageous and taken with evil motive, in bad faith, out of

personal animus and without any reasonable grounds to support them.

106. Their actions were wanton and malicious or taken with reckless indifference to

federal constitutional rights.

107. The exercise of rights under the U.S. Constitution made a difference in all actions

adverse to Plaintiff.

108. The exercise of these rights was a motivating, substantial or determinative factor in

all actions adverse to Plaintiff.

109. The Defendants’ actions were willful, reckless and oppressive.

110. The Defendants’ actions were motivated by bias, bad faith, and improper motive.

111. The Defendants’ actions constitutes an abuse of governmental power.

112. The individual Defendants did not reasonably believe that the actions they took were

necessary to accomplish any legitimate governmental purpose.

113. The Defendants’ actions do not further any narrowly drawn important, substantial

or compelling governmental interest.

114. The Defendants' actions are not so reasonable as to further any governmental

interest asserted and do not closely fit the goal of serving those governmental interests.

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 COUNT I (Fourteenth Amendment - Procedural Due Process
- No Process Whatsoever)

115. Plaintiff repeats and realleges paragraphs 1-114 set out above.

A. Property Interests Created by Written Contract.

116. Plaintiff possessed protected property interests in his employment based on his

written contracts, and from local government laws, policies, customs and practices, both written

and unwritten, and from mutually explicit understandings between his government employer and

its employee. Stana v. Sch. Dist of City of Pittsburgh, 775 F.2d 122, 126 (3d Cir. 1985).

B. The Process Due Was Pre and Post Termination Hearings.

117. Federal law determines what process is due to Plaintiff. Cleveland Bd. Of Educ. v.

Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985).

118. Plaintiff was denied the root requirement of the opportunity for a hearing before he

was deprived of his employment rights. Id. at 542.

119. Plaintiff was denied his right to “notice” of the charges against him. Id.

120. The significance of the private interest “in retaining employment cannot be

gainsaid” since Plaintiff’s livelihood was at stake as well as his reputation as an educator. Id. at

543.

121. Plaintiff also was denied some opportunity to present “his side of the case.” Factual

disputes were involved too. The need for a discharge was not clear and “the only meaningful

opportunity to invoke the discretion of the decisionmaker is likely to be before the termination

takes effect.” Id.

122. Allowing Plaintiff to present his full version of the events would have provided “a

meaningful hedge against erroneous action.” Id. at 543 n.8.

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 123. The governmental interest in an immediate termination of Plaintiff was non-

existent, presented no administrative burden nor intolerable delays. No significant hazard was

presented by keeping Plaintiff on the job. Id. at 544-45.

124. No “extraordinary situation,” “emergency situation” or “rare exception” to the

requirements of a pre-termination hearing exist. Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408

U.S. 564, 570 n.7 (1972). Nor is any “extremely narrow” exception justified. Stana, 775 F.2d at

127.

125. Plaintiff “received no hearing, either before or after his [termination], and hence ...

he was deprived of due process.” Bradley v. Pittsburgh Bd. of Educ., 913 F.2d 1064, 1078 (3d

Cir. 1990).

126. Because Plaintiff was given none of the long established and constitutionally

mandated procedural protections – neither a pre-termination nor a post-termination hearing – our

own District’s educational and other precedents have long mandated constitutional liability for

such procedural due process violations. See, e.g. Hawkins v. Bd. of Public Educ., 468 F.Supp

201, 208-14 (D.Del. 1973); Pitts v. Key, 511 F.Supp. 497, 501-05 (D.Del. 1981). The result is

the same under Third Circuit precedent. See, e.g. Bradley, 913 F.2d at 1078 (“Bradley received

no hearing, either before or after his suspension, and hence ... he was deprived of due process.”).

127. There is a direct causal relationship between Defendants’ actions and the harm

Plaintiff suffered.

128. Defendants’ actions were the “but for” cause of the termination of Plaintiff and

other actions taken against him.

129. As a direct and proximate result of defendants' actions, Plaintiff has been injured.

130. Plaintiff’s constitutional right to procedural due process has been denied under the

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Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

COUNT II (Fourteenth Amendment - Procedural Due Process

- Biased Decisionmaker)

131. Plaintiff repeats and realleges paragraphs 1-130 set out above.

132. Due process requires an impartial decisionmaker - one who is neutral, detached and

lacks bias - before a person may be deprived of a property interest by that decisionmaker.

133. Due process also requires that a decisionmaker must recuse themselves even in the

absence of actual bias, if that decisionmaker’s impartiality may be “reasonably” questioned.

134. The individual Defendants were actually biased against Plaintiff and were not

impartial decision makers in deciding all of the matters set forth above.

135. Defendants’ own longtime distinguished attorney, widely known for his wisdom,

ethics and zealous advocacy on behalf of his clients, nevertheless concluded that the individual

Defendants, his own clients: (1) actually were not impartial decision makers; and (2) also that

their impartiality could reasonably be questioned in light of their past words and actions.

136. All four of the individual Defendants lacked impartiality and had actual bias against

Plaintiff.

137. All of the votes to breach Plaintiff’s contracts, suspend him and the rest of the

actions set forth above passed by the narrowest of margins of four votes in favor and three

opposed.

138. All four of those votes in favor of taking actions against Plaintiff were tainted by

actual bias and impartiality in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.

139. All four of those votes were tainted by the appearance of actual bias and impartiality

that would be questioned by a reasonable person.

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 140. If only one of those four Defendants voting against Plaintiff had recused themselves

because of their impartiality, actual bias and the reasonable appearance of the same, none of the

actions challenged by Plaintiff in this lawsuit could have been taken against him and would not

have passed the vote by the Board.

141. Instead, the vote would have been tied 3-3, leaving the Board unable to change the

status quo by firing Plaintiff, breaching either of his employment contracts, and/or suspending

and later firing him.

142. If all of the individual Defendants who lacked impartiality and bias had recused

themselves, the votes would have failed 0-3 and no actions could have been taken against

Plaintiff.

143. There is a direct causal relationship between Defendants’ actions and the harm

Plaintiff suffered.

144. Defendants’ actions were the “but for” cause of the termination of Plaintiff and

other actions taken against him.

145. As a direct and proximate result of defendants' actions, Plaintiff has been injured.

146. Plaintiff’s constitutional right to procedural due process has been denied under the

Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

COUNT III (State Law - Breach of Original Contract)

147. Plaintiff repeats and realleges paragraphs 1-146 set out above.

148. Plaintiff had a five year employment contract with the Board. It is attached as

Exhibit A.

149. The Board breached multiple terms of that contract.

150. Plaintiff has suffered injury.

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 151. There is a direct causal relationship between Defendants’ actions and the harm

Plaintiff suffered.

152. Defendants’ actions were the “but for” cause of the breaches of the contract.

153. As a direct and proximate result of defendants' actions, Plaintiff has been injured.

154. Plaintiff’s right to be free of breach of contract has been denied under the common

law of the state of Delaware.

COUNT IV (State Law - Breach of Extended Contract)

155. Plaintiff repeats and realleges paragraphs 1-154 set out above.

156. Plaintiff had a single year extension of his employment contract with the Board.

157. The Board breached multiple terms of that contract.

158. Plaintiff has suffered injury.

159. There is a direct causal relationship between Defendants’ actions and the harm

Plaintiff suffered.

160. Defendants’ actions were the “but for” cause of the breaches of the contract.

161. As a direct and proximate result of defendants' actions, Plaintiff has been injured.

162. Plaintiff’s right to be free of breach of contract has been denied under the common

law of the state of Delaware.

Wherefore, Plaintiff prays that the Court:

A. Enter judgment against the Defendants, jointly and severally.

B. Enter a declaratory judgment declaring the acts of the Defendants to be a

violation of Plaintiffs’ constitutional and statutory rights under State and
federal law.

C. Enter a judgment against the Defendants for compensatory damages,

including lost wages, back pay, pension and other benefits, for future or
front pay, loss of earning capacity, emotional distress, humiliation,

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 embarrassment, and injury to reputation which has made Plaintiff
unemployable.

D. Enter separate judgment against the individual Defendants for punitive

damages.

E. Issue a permanent injunction requiring Defendants to expunge Plaintiff’s

personnel files of any derogatory, false, or misleading information relating
to this matter.

F. Award damages in an amount to be determined at trial for lost back pay

and front pay including all incremental pay increases that Plaintiff would
have received and his wage and benefit losses until his retirement at age
62.

G. Award damages for lost 401(k) matching funds.

H. Award damages for lost medical, dental, vision, and life insurance and
other lost benefits.

I. Award compensatory damages for out-of-pocket medical expenses.

J. Issue a reparative injunction directing that each of the individual capacity

defendants write a letter of apology to Plaintiff, apologizing for their
illegal violations of Plaintiff’s constitutional and common law rights.

K. Award Plaintiff attorneys’ fees, costs and pre and post judgment interest
for this action.

L. Require such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper
under the circumstances.

Respectfully Submitted,

THE NEUBERGER FIRM, P.A.

/s/ Thomas S. Neuberger
THOMAS S. NEUBERGER, ESQUIRE (#243)
STEPHEN J. NEUBERGER, ESQUIRE (#4440)
17 Harlech Drive
Wilmington, DE 19807
(302) 655-0582
TSN@NeubergerLaw.com
SJN@NeubergerLaw.com

Dated: December 9, 2024 Attorneys for Plaintiff

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Exhibit A