Brief background Natural justice is a legal philosophy used in some jurisdictions in the determination of

just, or fair, processes in legal proceedings. It is sometimes taken as a process of rational logical
deduction. The concept is very closely related to the principle of natural law (Latin expression of jus
naturale) which has been applied as a philosophical and practical principle in the law in several common
law jurisdictions, particularly the UK and Australia.
Natural justice operates on the principles that man is basically good, that a person of good
intent should not be harmed, and one should treat others as one would like to be treated.
Natural justice may be simply defined as the natural sense of what is right and wrong. It has
also been referred to as fair plays in action.
It can also be a procedural safeguard against improper exercise of power by a public authority

In Local Government Board Vs Arlidge [1915] AC 120, House of Lords held that the common
law rules of natural justice required little more from a department than the carrying out in
good faith of its usual procedures. . The brief facts of this case were that a Hampstead council
had made a closing order in respect of a house, which appeared unfit for human habitation.
The owner appealed to the local government board as prescribed by the housing and town
planning Act. A public inquiry was held which confirmed the closing order. Arlidge applied to
court contending that the decision was invalid because the board did not disclose which official
actually decided the appeal. That Arlidge had not been heard orally by that official and had not
seen a report of the inspector who conducted the inquiry. While rejecting the contention, the
House of Lord held that parliament having entrusted judicial duties to the executive body, must
be taken to have intended to follow the procedure, which was its own and was necessary if it
was capable of doing its work efficiently. So long as the officials dealt with the question
referred to them without bias and gave parties adequate opportunity of presenting the case,
the board could follow its own established procedures even though there not of court of law.

The right to a hearing in accordance with the rules of natural justice may be expressly provided
for or the courts may imply such an obligation exists under common law. There are essentially
two sections to the rules of natural justice; the first being derived from the Latin maximum
"audi alteram partem" (let the other side be heard). This is the duty to allow persons affected
by a decision to have a reasonable opportunity of presenting their case. The essence of this
principle is that in certain contexts, prior to a decision being taken in the exercise of statutory
power which may adversely affect the interests of individuals, those individuals should be
alerted to the fact of, and the reasons for, the impending decision or action, and be permitted
reasonable opportunity to make representations.

The second part of the rules of natural justice is derived from the Latin maxim "nemo judex in
causa sua" (no one can be the judge in his own cause). The essence of this principle is to
disqualify persons having an interest in a matter over which they are presiding, or in respect of
which there may be an appearance of bias, from taking certain types of decisions, thus
rendering void such any decision taken in breach of the principle of natural justice. This gives
rise to a duty to act fairly, to listen to arguments, and to reach a decision in a manner that is
untainted by bias.

Art. 42 of the 1995 Constitution provides that any person appearing before any as
administrative official or body has a right to be treated justly and fairly and shall have a right to
apply to a court of law in respect of any administrative decision taken against him / her. This is
fortified by Art 28 of the 1995 constitution, which provides for a right to a fair hearing. It
provides that in the determination of civil rights and any obligation, or in criminal matter a
person shall be given a fair, speedy and fair hearing before an independent tribunal established
by law. Accordingly, Article 44 of the Constitution provides inter alia that notwithstanding
anything in the Constitution, there shall be no derogation from the enjoyment of the right to
fair hearing.

Judicial review refers to the power of the High court to exercise control and supervision over
the legislative, executive and judicial powers of administrative bodies, by review it is means the
re-consideration of the action or decision of the authority with a view to determining whether
it acted in accordance with the law and whether it acted in accordance with the people's
natural justice. The court will be concerned with whether the authority acted in accordance
with provisions of the law under which it purported to have acted or whether or not it was
biased or whether the authority gave the aggrieved party the opportunity to present its side of
the case. In this regard, the remedies the court can grant are; a) Certiorari b) Mandamus c)
Prohibitions
Certiorari issues to quash the decision of the authority. Mandamus issues to command the
authority reconsider the matter all over again in accordance with the law. Prohibition issues to
command the authority not to proceed further in acting illegally. The court can also make
orders declaratory of the rights of the parties and whether the authority has acted illegally.
In Chief Constable of the North Wales Police V Evans [1982] 1 WLR 1155 HL, Lord Hailsham
stated that the remedy of judicial review is intended to protect the individual against the abuse
of power by a wide range of authorities, judicial, quasi-judicial, and administrative powers. That
it is not intended to take away from those authorities the powers properly vested in them by
law and to substitute the courts as the bodies making the decisions. It is intended to see that
the relevant authorities use their powers in a proper manner. That the purpose of the remedies
is to ensure that the individual is given fair treatment by the authority to which he has been
subjected. That the function of court is to see the lawful authority is not abused by unfair
treatment and not to attempt itself the task entrusted to that authority by law.

Furthermore the right to a fair hearing can be further well analyzed in the case of Ridge Vs
Baldwin (1964) AC 40 the plaintiff had (chief constable of Brithom)
had been prosecuted and acquitted on charges of conspiracy to obstruct the course of
justice. The Brithom watch committee which was responsible for enforcing discipline in
the police force purported to dismissed the plaintiff from his post, without giving him any
prior notice or hearing and applied to court contending that his dismissal was invalid.
Court held that the decision was void due to breach of the principles of natural justice.
Lord Reid stated that „…the principle of audi alteram partem goes back many centuries
in our law…an officer cannot lawfully be dismissed without first telling him what is
alleged against him and hearing his defense or explanation.‟
importance of the above case
1.it helped to free both the substantive rules of natural justice from strict limitations which had
been imposed in earlier decisions, in particular from the requirement that the
decision-making body must be under a duty to act judicially and also the
remedy of certiorari.
2.The application of the rules of natural justice to cases involving dismissal from
employment has been extended since Ridge V Baldwin and has now become a
rule of general application.
3.The requirements of a fair hearing depend on all circumstances. They include;
a right to notice, but restrictions may be placed where public interest so
requires, the right to legal representation or make representations, whether in
writing or orally and where an oral hearing is held, the right to comment on
any evidence presented, where evidence is given orally by witnesses, the right
to put questions to those witnesses.

Contents of a right to a fair hearing

1. Notice must be given in adequate terms so that the prospective victim knows the essence of
the case he has to meet and can prepare his answer properly. In Desouza Vs Tanga Town
council, court held that notice should include the substance of the allegations of the charge
and it must specify the time and place where the hearing is to take place. A similar issue arose
in Patel Vs Plateau Licensing
2. The parties must be given the opportunity to adequately present their case. This includes
the right to have the matter adjourned if injustice would otherwise. In Kanda Vs Government
of Malaysia, Lord Denning stated, “If the right to be heard is to be real, it must carry with it a
right in the accused man to know the case which is made against him. He must know what
evidence has been given and what statements have been made affecting him and then he must
be given a fair opportunity to correct or contradict them."
3. The administrative authority has a duty to afford an oral hearing but in some cases,
representations may be made in writing. In Chief Constable of the North Wales Police V
Evans [1982] 1 WLR 1155 HL, the Chief constable of North Wales decided that Evans, a
probationer constable in the force, should be required to resign or, if he refused, be discharged
from the force. Evans resigned but subsequently challenged the decision on the ground that it
was taken in breach of natural justice because he was not given an opportunity to offer any
explanation. The House of Lords agreed with the decision of Court of Appeal that there had
been a breach of natural justice, but in the light of comments made in the Court of Appeal, felt
it necessary to make some comments on the scope of judicial review.
4. It also includes allowing all witnesses to be called to their respective parties and giving
each party to cross-examine each party's witness. In Ceylon University Vs Fernando (1960) I
WLR 223, Supreme Court held that failure to afford audience or allow witnesses to be
questioned / cross examined breached the principles of natural justice and therefore the report
of the chancellor was null and void.
In Dent V Kiambu Liquor licensing Court [1968] EA 80, while noting that licensing courts were
not mere executive bodies buts courts from which an appeal would lie to the High Court and
must be conducted in a manner appropriate to judicial tribunals, held that this requires that
there is a requirement of production of proof of any matter referred to in evidence on oath or
affirmation upon which the opposing party may put questions in cross-examination.

5. Means that all relevant information from whatever source it may come should be disclosed
to a person who may be prejudiced by its concealment. However, does the kind of evidence
admissible have any limits? In R Vs Deputy industrial injuries commissioner Exparte Moore
(1965) I QB 456, at 488 Diplock LJ stated that, „technical rules of evidence, however, form no
part of the rules of natural justice. The requirement that a person exercising quasi-judicial
functions must base his decision on evidence means no more than it must be based upon
material which tends logically to show the likelihood or unlikelihood of the occurrence of some
future event the occurrence of which would be relevant. It means that he must not spin a coin
or consult an astrologer, but he may take into account any material which, as a matter of
reason, has some probative value in the sense mentioned above, the weight to be attached to
it is a matter for the person to whom parliament has entrusted responsibility of deciding the
issue
6. Right to legal representation -In Enderby Town Football Club Ltd Vs The Football
Association Ltd (1970) 3 WLR 1021, Court held that denial of legal representation is not
necessarily breach of natural justice. Lord Denning MR. at 607 stated thus, „Seeing that courts
can inquire into the validity of the rule, the question is; is it lawful for the body to stipulate in
its rules that its domestic tribunal shall not permit legal representation? Such a stipulation is, I
think, clearly valid so long as it is construed as directory and not imperative: for that leaves it
open to the tribunal to permit legal representation in an exceptional case when the justice of
the case so requires. But I have some doubt whether it is legitimate to make a rule which is so
imperative in its terms as to exclude legal representation altogether, without giving the tribunal
discretion to admit it, even when the justice of the case so requires.‟ Regarding the legal
representation the reviewing court will normally establish procedure, the practice adopted by
the tribunal or authority whose decision is reviewed. Thus, where it has been allowing legal
representation, it should do so for everybody but where it has not been doing so, the denial
will not amount to breach of natural justice

7. Although not established by any legal authority, it has been recommended that a right to a
fair hearing include disclosure of the relevant information to the party that would be affected
by the decision. In Ridge Vs Baldwin, Lord Reid stated that before attempting to reach any
decision, they should inform the person of the grounds upon which they propose to act and
give him an opportunity of being heard in his own defense.

The right to a fair hearing is not absolute in administrative proceedings and may be excluded
in the following cases;
1. Where factors such as agency come into play e.g. agent action may be needed to safeguard
public health/ safety in the case of White Vs Redfern (1879) 5 QB 15. The right to a fair hearing
was excluded where there was agent need to protect public health and destroy bad food that
was exposed for sale.

2. It may be excluded where considerations of national security must be taken into account.
This should be considered in light of Article 43 of the Constitution. It provides inter that, in the
enjoyment of the rights and freedoms prescribed in the constitution, „no person shall prejudice
the fundamental or other human rights and freedoms of others or the public interest. It states
further that public interest under this article shall not permit political persecution; detention
without trial and that any limitation of the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms prescribed by
this Chapter beyond what is acceptable and demonstrably justifiable in a free and democratic
society, or what is provided in this Constitution

3. Where an employer summarily dismisses an employee the right of a fair hearing is excluded
unless contractual or statutory procedural duties are cast on the employer, the court can only
grant an employee damages for breach of contract if the dismissal is wrongful but cannot
declare the decision to dismiss null and void.

THE RULE AGAINST BIAS The second part of the principle of natural justice is derived from the
Latin maxim "nemo judex in causa sua" meaning no one can be the judge in his own cause.
This gives rise to a duty to act fairly, to listen to arguments, and to reach a decision in a manner
that is untainted by bias. There can never be a fair trial where the adjudicator has an interest in
a case or matter. There are 2 aspects to the rule against bias;
1. That the adjudicator must not have any direct financial or proprietary interest in the
outcome of the proceedings.
2. An adjudicator must not be reasonably suspected or show a real likelihood of bias.

Financial or pecuniary interest. No matter how small the adjudicator's pecuniary interest may
be or no matter how unlikely it is to affect his judgement, he is disqualified from taking part in
making a decision. Any decision made in such circumstances will be set aside. In Leeson V
General Council of Medical Education (1889) 43 Ch.D 336, court stated thus, „…a person who
has judicial duty to perform disqualifies himself from performing it if he has a pecuniary
interest in the decision which he is about to give or a bias which renders him otherwise than an
impartial judge. If he has a pecuniary interest in the success of the accusation, he must not be a
judge.‟

In Dimes Vs Proprietors of Grand Junction Canal proprietors (1852) 3 HLC 759, a decree made
by the Lord Chancellor was set aside because he was holder of shares in the company, which
was a party to the proceedings. The brief facts were as follows. Lord Cottenham was Lord
Chancellor of England and held 92 shares in a company called G,.J. Canal worth thousands of
pounds. There was a dispute between a man called Davies and the company. The company
applied for an injunction restraining Mr. Davies‟ conduct in putting a bar across the canal,
which he claimed to be his property. The application was granted and there was an appeal to
Lord Cottenham as Lord Chancellor, the decision was affirmed, Mr. Davies losing his appeal.
Lord Cottenham had not disclosed that he was a shareholder of the company. T was held by
the House of Lords that the Lord Chancellor was disqualified from acting as a judge in the cause
on ground of interest and the decree was set aside. L.C.J., Lord Campell said, „„No one can
support that Lord Cottenham could be, in the remotest degree influenced by the interest that
he had in this concern; but it is of the last importance that the maxim that no man is to be a
judge in his own cause in which his own cause should be heard is sacred. And that is not to be
confined to a cause in which he is a party, but applies to a cause in which he or she has an
interest. ….We have again and again set aside proceedings in inferior tribunals because an
individual, who had an interest in a cause, took part in the decision. And it will have a most
salutary influence on these tribunals when it is known that this high court of last resort, in a
case in which the lord chancellor of England had an interest, considered that this decree was on
that account a decree not according to law, and was set aside. This will be a lesson to all
inferior tribunals to take care not only that in their decrees they are not influenced by their
personal interest but to avoid the appearance of laboring under such an influence.‟‟

Non-pecuniary interests in some cases there may exist some kind of relationships between the
adjudicator and one of the parties that might lead to a biased decision. The test to be applied
are; 1. Is there a real likelihood of bias? 2. Is there a reasonable suspicion of bias? NB. There is
no need to prove actual bias. Examples of cases where a likelihood of bias led to the decision
being set aside are hereunder discussed. The locus cluscus on the subject of bias is the case of
Libyan Arab (U) Bank & another V Adani Vassilads CACA No. 9 of 1985, Odoki JA (as he then
was quoted article 126 of the Constitution, then 15 (9) )and stated that the provision lays down
the requirements for a fair trial, that
court must be independent and impartial. He held that bias may be established against a
person sitting in a judicial capacity on one of the two grounds; (a) direct pecuniary interest in
the subject matter, (b) bias in favor of one side against the other. That bias means a real
likelihood of an operative prejudice whether conscious or not. That in considering the
possibility of bias it is not the mind of the judge, which is considered, but the impression given
to reasonable persons. Justice Odoki, JA (as he then was), stated that, „there must be
reasonable evidence to satisfy the court that there was a real likelihood of bias. Objection
cannot be taken at everything that might raise a suspicion in somebody’s mind or anything,
which could make fools suspect. There must be something in the nature of real bias, for
instance evidence of proprietary interest in the subject matter before court or a likelihood of
bias based on close association with one of the parties as was the case in Tuman V R.‟ His
lordship held that in this case „there is no reasonable evidence to satisfy me that there was a
real likelihood of bias on the part of the learned trial judge. There was no evidence or even
suspicion that he had a direct pecuniary interest in the subject matter of the suit. There was no
evidence that he was likely to favor the respondent against the appellant; and even if the trial
judge may have been thought to form some opinion beforehand on the case, it is not enough
to establish bias. The allegation of bias was a mere conjecture.‟ That the appellants should
have raised a preliminary objection the trial and even if it were overruled, he should as the trial
judge remarked in his judgement have continued with the hearing and made it a ground of
appeal. The appellants abandoned the hearing because they suspected that the trial judge had
prejudged the case against them before hand. That the burden of proof lies on the party
refusing to continue trial to satisfy court of appeal that he was justified in his apprehension
that it would be futile for him to continue and that had he done so he would not have had a fair
hearing.

In Brassington V Brassington [194] 3 ALLER 988 at 990, Holroyd Pearson L.J stated thus,
„Before considering the effect of the remarks of which a complaint is made, we must observe
that only a very strong case indeed could justify a refusal by a party to continue to take part in
the trial. If a party though aggrieved, continues to present his evidence and arguments he can
always reserve his complaint and appeal against the unfair decision when it has been given.
And any remarks which show that the tribunal prejudged the case against him before he had
called his evidence will always in this court add very great weight to the substance of the
appeal and may in themselves constitute a sufficient ground of appeal. The aggrieved party will
then at least have shown that he has a genuine case on which he either ought to have or could
have succeeded.

Which he either ought to have or could have succeeded.

In Metropolitan Properties Co. F.G.C Ltd V Lannon (199)1Q.B 41, Lord Denning stated that, „in
considering whether their was a real likelihood of bias, the court does not look at the mind of
the justice himself or at the mind of the chairman of a tribunal or whoever it may be who sits in
a judicial capacity. It does not look to see if there was a real likelihood that he would or did, in
fact favour one side at the expense of the other. The court looks at the impression, which
would be given to other people. Even if he was impartial as could be, nevertheless if right
minded persons would think that in the circumstances there was a real likelihood of bias on his
part, then he should not sit and if he does sit, his decision cannot stand. Nevertheless, there
must appear to be a real likelihood of bias. There must be circumstances from which a
reasonable man would think it likely or probable that the justice or chairman as the case may
be would or did favor one side unfairly. The court will not inquire whether he did in fact favor
one side unfairly. Suffice it that reasonable people might think he did. The reason is plain
enough. Justice must be rooted in the confidence and confidence is destroyed when right-
minded people go away thinking the judge was biased.‟

In Patel V Joshi [1952]19 EACA 42, Court of Appeal held that a judge should not descend into
the area where his vision may be clouded by dust of conflict, but an appellate court will refuse
a retrial unless it is convinced that the vision of the judge had become so clouded-excessive
intervention.

In conclusion, therefore natural justice is paramount in a way that it ensures that a proper
decision is made the mare fact that both parties are given chance to be heard as per the
maxims Audi atteram partem and Nemo judex in causa sua as thoroughly explained above.