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Page 371

Why did Nietzsche challenge the pursuit of the origin [Ursprung], at


least on those occasions when he is truly a genealogist? First, because
it is an attempt to capture the exact essence of things, their purest
possibilities, and their carefully protected identities; because this
search assumes the existence of immobile forms that precede the external world of accident and
succession. This search is directed to
"that which was already there," the "very same" of an image of a
primordial truth fully adequate to its nature, and it necessitates the
removal of every mask to ultimately disclose an original identity.
However, if the genealogist refuses to extend his faith in metaphysics,
if he listens to history, he finds that there is "something altogether
different" behind things: not a timeless and essential secret but the
secret that they have no essence, or that their essence was fabricated
in a piecemeal fashion from alien forms. Examining the history of
reason, he learns that it was born in an altogether "reasonable"
fashion-from chance;10 devotion to truth and the precision of scientific methods arose from the
passion of scholars, their reciprocal hatred, their fanatical and unending discussions, and their
spirit of
competition-the personal conflicts that slowly forged the weapons of
reason. 11 Further, genealogical analysis shows that the concept of liberty is an "invention of the
ruling classes,,12 and not fundamental to
man's nature or at the root of his attachment to being and truth. What
is found at the historical beginning of things is not the inviolable identity of their origin; it is the
dissension of other things. It is disparity.

Page 373
The genealogist needs history to dispel
the chimeras of the origin, somewhat in the manner of the pious philosopher who needs a
doctor to exorcise the shadow of his soul. He
must be able to recognize the events of history, its jolts, its surprises,
its unsteady victories and unpalatable defeats-the basis of all beginnings, atavisms, and
heredities. Similarly, he must be able to diagnose
the illnesses of the body, its conditions of weakness and strength, its
breakdowns and resistances, to be in a position to judge philosophical
discourse. History is the concrete body of becoming; with its moments
of intensity, its lapses, its extended periods of feverish agitation, its
fainting spells; and only a metaphysician would seek its soul in the
distant ideality of the origin.

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