Not in MY name!

A collection of quotes on the past, present, and future of the practice of torture
/ Selected and arranged by Ella Mazel

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Detailed Table of Contents

5. The techniques of interrogation
Introduction The Geneva Conventions protecting POWs and
civilians in times of occupation broadly prohibit
1. What is torture? torture and other inhumane treatment, but also
specifically bar coercive interrogations -- the use
2. The more things change ... of inhumane treatment in an attempt to extract
information. Published U.S. Army intelligence
3. The purpose of torture doctrine and detainee regulations acknowledge
those requirements, as they must.
4. The "rules" of torture
Steven C. Welsh, "Iraq Prisoner Abuse and
5. The techniques of the Geneva Conventions," The Defense
interrogation Monitor, Newsletter of the Center for
Defense Information, May/June 2004
6. Can torture ever be justified?
From the U.S. Army Training Manual
7. What about terrorism?

8. Secrecy and public relations No physical or mental torture, nor any other form of coercion, may be
inflicted on prisoners of war to secure from them information of any kind
9. Does torture get results? whatever. Prisoners of war who refuse to answer may not be threatened,
insulted, or exposed to unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of any
10. The torturers kind . . . The questioning of prisoners of war shall be carried out in a
language which they understand.
11. The victims
Department of the Army, FM 34-52, Appendix J, Geneva Convention
12. Human rights Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 12 August 1949, Article 17,
QUESTIONING OF PRISONERS, May 8, 1987
Index of sources

The use of force, mental torture, threats, insults, or exposure to

unpleasant and inhumane treatment of any kind is prohibited by law and is
This work is licensed under a neither authorized nor condoned by the US Government. Experience
Creative Commons License. indicates that the use of force is not necessary to gain the cooperation of
sources for interrogation. Therefore, the use of force is a poor technique,
as it yields unreliable results, may damage subsequent collection efforts,
and can induce the source to say whatever he thinks the interrogator wants
to hear. However, the use of force is not to be confused with psychological
ploys, verbal trickery, or other nonviolent and noncoercive ruses used by
the interrogator in questioning hesitant or uncooperative sources. . . . The
psychological techniques and principles outlined should neither be
confused with, nor construed to be synonymous with, unauthorized
techniques such as brainwashing, mental torture, or any other form of
mental coercion to include drugs. These techniques and principles are
intended to serve as guides in obtaining the willing cooperation of a
source.
Department of the Army, FM 34-52, Chapter 1. INTERROGATION AND
 THE INTERROGATOR. Principles of Interrogation: Prohibition against
use of force, May 8, 1987

Some interrogation techniques, now . . . and then

From: U.S. Army Field Manual, From: Henry Charles Lea, A

FM 34-52, Appendix H: History of the Inquisition of the
Approaches, May 8, 1987 Middle Ages, 1887

The FUTILITY TECHNIQUE The prisoner was shown the

APPROACH is used to make the implements of torment and urged
source believe that it is useless to to confess. On his refusal he was
resist and to persuade him to stripped and bound . . . and again
cooperate with the interrogator. entreated to speak. . . . This
The futility approach is most frequently produced the desired
effective when the interrogator can result . . . the efficacy of torture
play on doubts that already exist in lay not so much in what was
the source's mind. . . . There is the extracted by its use as in the
futility of . . . "you are not finished innumerable cases in which its
here until you answer the dread, near or remote, paralyzed
questions," futility in that the resolution with agonizing
"everyone talks sooner or later." expectations.

The "WE KNOW ALL" The inquisitor was to pretend

APPROACH convinces the source that he had conclusive evidence,
that we already know everything. . and that if the accused would
. . When the source begins to give confess and point out those who
accurate and complete information had led him astray, he should be
to the questions to which the allowed to go home forthwith.
interrogator has the answers, the
interrogator begins interjecting
questions for which he does not
have the answers.

The FILE AND DOSSIER The inquisitor is advised during

APPROACH is when the the examination to turn over the
interrogator prepares a dossier pages of evidence as though
containing all available referring to it, and then boldly
information . . . . Careful inform the prisoner that he is not
arrangement of the material . . . telling the truth, for it is thus and
may give the illusion that it thus; or to pick up a paper and
contains more data than what is pretend to read from it whatever
actually there. . . . The interrogator is necessary to deceive him.
may read a few selected bits of
known data to further impress the
source. . . . The success of this
technique is largely dependent on
the naivete of the source, the
volume of data . . . and the skill of
 the interrogator in convincing the
source.

The DECREASED FEAR DOWN To render these devices more

APPROACH . . . is really nothing effective, the jailer was
more than calming the source and instructed to worm himself into
convincing him that he will be the confidence of the prisoners,
properly and humanely treated. . . . with feigned interest and
When used with a soothing, calm compassion, and urge them to
tone of voice, this often creates confess at once, because the
rapport and usually nothing else is inquisitor is a merciful man who
needed to get the source to will take pity on them.
cooperate. . . . as the source will
readily respond to kindness.

The "MUTT AND JEFF" A more elaborate trap was that of

("FRIEND AND FOE") [the jailer] treating the prisoner
APPROACH involves a with kindness in place of rigor . .
psychological ploy . . . [in which] . to gain his confidence, and then
two experienced interrogators who urge him to confess, with
are convincing actors . . . display promises of mercy. . . . When
opposing personalities and everything was ripe, the
attitudes toward the source. . . . inquisitor himself would appear
The first interrogator . . . displays and confirm these promises, with
an unsympathetic attitude. . . . At the mental reservation that all
the time the source acts hopeless . . which is done for the conversion
. the second interrogator appears . . of heretics is merciful . . . so that
. to show a sympathetic attitude . . when the unlucky wretch was
. in an effort to increase the rapport prevailed upon to ask for mercy
and control the questioning. . . . in return for his revelations, he
When used against the proper was to be led on with the general
source, this trick will normally expression that more would be
gain . . complete cooperation. done for him than he asked.

In practice

Even the existence of a series of international conventions and a

substantial literature and diplomatic agreement about the rights of
prisoners, seems not to have prevented an autonomous military from
developing its own rules.
Edward Peters, Torture, 1985

Intelligence . . . is a vital commodity and the attempt to get it or

withhold it explains much of the terror and torture inflicted by both sides.

William Tuohy, "A Big 'Dirty Little War'," NY Times Magazine,

11/28/1965
 Pentagon officials said the rules for interrogation in Iraq had been
drastically tightened -- while still insisting the now banned techniques had
never been approved for use. . . . Human rights groups have predicted that
the Administration might come to rue the extremes to which it pushed the
envelope on interrogation.

Johanna McGeary et al., "Pointing Fingers," Time Magazine, 5/24/2004

The ever-shifting rules, in which lists of accepted interrogation tactics

were widened drastically before being reined in over 17 crucial months,
helped foster a climate in which abuse could flourish. . . . Some of the
procedures authorized in Iraq had been banned as too harsh months earlier
at Guantánamo.

Douglas Jehl et al., "U.S. Rules on Prisoners Seen as a Back and Forth of
Mixed Messages to G.I.'s," NY Times, 6/22/2004

American policies in Abu Ghraib prison . . . were sanctioned . . . by

Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, the overall commander in Iraq, who .
. . signed a classified memorandum calling for interrogators at Abu Ghraib
to work with military police guards to "manipulate an internee's emotions
and weaknesses" and to assume control over the "lighting, heating . . .
food, clothing, and shelter" of those they were questioning.

Mark Danner, "The Logic of Torture," The New York Review of Books,
6/24/2004

In a just-revealed notation on a 2002 memo . . . Defense Secretary

Donald Rumsfeld indicated that making terrorism detainees stand for up to
four hours was no biggie in the physical stress department. "I stand for 8-
10 hours a day," Rummy scrawled. "Why is standing limited to four
hours?"

Richard Leiby, "Donald Rumsfeld, A Real Stand-Up Guy," Washington

Post, 6/24/2004

Military intelligence soldiers who were recruited for the special

projects team shortly after Mr. Hussein's capture said they were no longer
required to get . . . approval to use harsh tactics. . . . like . . . using military
dogs during interrogations.. . . "Just having the dog in the room worked
pretty effectively," said one intelligence analyst.
Andrea Elliott, "Capture of Hussein Aides Spurred U.S. Interrogators," NY
Times, 7/3/2004

Lacking clear guidance, soldiers at various jails were apparently

confused about the rules. In Iraq, some guards were such sticklers that they
demanded paperwork to take away detainees' blankets, while others did
not understand that they needed written authorization to intimidate
prisoners with dogs.
Douglas Jehl et al., "U.S. Rules on Prisoners Seen as a Back and Forth of
Mixed Messages to G.I.'s," NY Times, 6/22/2004
 While the Administration maintained that its rules and practices of
interrogation adhered to international standards, a broad spectrum of
critics argue that the Pentagon adopted harsh methods that played fast and
loose with the law. Even if no one ordered these particular incidents [at
Abu Ghraib], critics argue that the abuses can be read as Administration
policy carried to extreme.

Johanna McGeary, "Pointing Fingers," Time Magazine, 5/24/2004

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