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Wireless Internet Security
Architecture and Protocols
Starting from a foundation in the tools of network architecture development and crypto-
graphic algorithms, this text approaches wireless Internet security from the position of
system architecture. The focus is on understanding the system architecture of existing
Internet security protocols used widely in wireless Internet systems, and on developing
architectural changes to counter new threats.
The book begins with an introduction to the topics of security threats in wireless
networks, security services for countering those threats, and the process of defining
functional architecture for network systems. Examples of cryptographic algorithms are
included, and the author goes on to discuss examples of wireless Internet security
systems such as wireless network access control, local IP subnet configuration and
address resolution, IP mobility, and location privacy. Each chapter describes the basic
network architecture and protocols for the system under consideration, the security
threats faced, a functional architecture for the security system mitigating the threats,
and the important Internet protocols that implement the architecture. The text is an ideal
resource for graduate students of electrical engineering and computer science, as well
as for engineers and system architects in the wireless network industry.
James Kempf is a Research Fellow at DoCoMo Labs USA and has been active in
systems and software research since he was awarded his Ph.D. in Systems Engineering
from the University of Arizona in 1983. Prior to his current position, Dr. Kempf worked
at Sun Microsystems for 13 years, where he was involved in a variety of research
projects, including, in 1994, a prototype of a SPARC-based tablet computer with early
802.11 supports. His research interests include wireless Internet security, new Internet
architectures, and immersive user interfaces for wireless terminals.
Wireless Internet Security
Architecture and Protocols
JAMES KEMPF
DoCoMo Labs USA
CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS
Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, São Paulo
www.cambridge.org
Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9780521887830
© Cambridge University Press 2008
1 Security basics 1
1.1 Importance of a threat analysis 2
1.2 Classes of threats 5
1.3 Classes of security services 8
1.4 Supporting security systems 10
1.5 Summary 19
References 199
Index 202
Preface
to emphasize the use of protocols from the Internet protocol suite on noncellular radio
links. These types of systems tend to have cleaner architectures and are therefore easier
to understand and draw lessons from that can then be applied to more complex systems,
such as cellular. Merging the Internet and cellular networks has been a more complex
and challenging task than anyone thought it would be when the effort started ten years
ago, but the next generation of cellular systems, the All-IP Network or AIPN currently
under standardization, should eliminate most of the legacy telephony protocols and come
much closer to the goal of having cellular networks fully support the Internet protocol
suite.
In this book, Chapter 1 discusses some fundamental issues in security for any net-
work system: security threats, how to assess threats, and basic solutions and services
to mitigate threats. Chapter 2 presents the functional architecture approach as a tool
for developing an architecture for wireless security systems. In Chapter 3, the cryp-
tographic and other security algorithms important for Internet protocol standards are
reviewed. Chapters 1 through 3 present introductory material and can be skipped by
those knowledgeable about the topics discussed. Chapter 4 develops an architecture for
wireless network access authentication systems and describes two standardized system
designs in widespread deployment – AAA server based and hotspot – and the proto-
cols associated with the designs. The material in Chapter 4 illustrates how a security
architecture can be instantiated into different system designs depending on the specific
implementation and deployment needs. Chapter 5 discusses the security architecture
and protocols involved in local IP subnet configuration systems that allow wireless hosts
to securely configure an IP address and other information necessary to begin obtaining
Internet routing service when they move to a new geographic area. Chapter 6 presents
the security architecture and protocols for global IP mobility. Chapter 6 also shows the
limits of the architectural approach. Like other information systems technology areas,
a good architecture and system design do not help if the implementation introduces
bugs. Security flaws can crop up at any point in the design, implementation, and deploy-
ment process. Finally, in Chapter 7, a security threat very specific to wireless networks,
namely compromise of location privacy, is discussed. Chapter 7 illustrates how a basic
architectural change can solve a security problem in a cleaner way, at the expense of
deep and possibly expensive changes in implementation and deployment.
Throughout the book, I have attempted to maintain a level of detail for algorithms
and protocols sufficient to provide good understanding of how the respective algorithm
or protocol works, without overwhelming the reader. Certainly, any implementation
effort should consult more comprehensive sources. While an introductory undergrad-
uate course in network security is helpful to provide more depth, consultation of the
references for additional information should be sufficient to provide background on the
security algorithms. Knowledge of the basic Internet protocol suite, such as TCP and
DHCP, and some familiarity with mobility protocols, such as Mobile IP, is assumed.
Chapters 4 through 6 review the background on the architecture of the underlying
protocols and systems prior to discussing the security architecture and protocols for
wireless systems. In Chapter 7, some knowledge of IP routing is required in order to
Preface ix
understand how the location privacy architectural enhancements work. Most of these
topics are covered in introductory undergraduate networking courses.
Each chapter after the introductory material in Chapters 1 through 3 follows a similar
pattern. A particular subsystem important to the functioning of wireless networks is
introduced with a review of the architecture and protocols that have been standardized
to implement the subsystem. This is followed by a threat analysis and the develop-
ment of a functional architecture independent of the specific standardized protocols but
modeling their functionality. Interfaces are then defined between functional elements,
and an overview of the standardized security protocols on those interfaces is presented.
Chapter 7 is slightly different, due to the lack of any comprehensive standardized archi-
tecture or protocols for location privacy. Instead, the results of a research study in how
to modify the IP routing and forwarding architecture are expanded into a functional
architecture for location private addressing. The goal of the book is to provide an under-
standing of the underlying design principles for wireless Internet security systems to
students and others seeking to know more about how current systems are designed, as
well as a useful guide for designers and system architects modifying existing systems
or developing new ones.
Acknowledgements
This book grew out of a tutorial I presented at the Croucher Foundation Advanced
Study Institute on Cryptography, December 2004, in Hong Kong, on the current state
of wireless Internet security protocols. The meeting gave me an opportunity to meet
with other researchers in wireless security and compare notes on the state of the art and
where the field was going. I would like to thank the Croucher Foundation organizers,
in particular Dr. Frances Yao of City University, Hong Kong, for the opportunity to
participate in the meeting. Minoru Etoh, Eisuke Miki and Kazuo Imai, CEOs of Docomo
Labs USA and my managers over the three years of intermittent effort required to write
this book, were incredibly supportive in what turned out to be a very difficult and
demanding task, much more difficult than I envisioned when I started writing. I would
like to thank them for that support. I’d like to thank Marcelo Bagnulo and the University
Carlos III of Madrid for the opportunity to give a one week seminar in June 2007 on
Chapters 1 through 4. The interaction with the seminar attendees helped me refine the
material in these chapters. I would also like to thank my dedicated reviewers, Erik
Guttman, Cedric Westphal, and Renate Kempf, for their efforts in reviewing the book
before it was submitted for publication. Any errors are of course my own but their
work has helped immensely to improve presentation, understandability, and technical
accuracy. Finally, I would like to thank my colleagues at the Internet Engineering Task
Force and the Internet Architecture Board for many years of stimulating and informative
discussion on the technical topics surrounding wireless Internet security and Internet
standards in wireless and mobile networks.
1 Security basics
Network security protocols are necessary on the Internet because some people are
motivated to exploit or disrupt communications for financial gain or simply to prove
their technical ability to do so. In addition, communications between two parties might
sometimes be sensitive or involve money changing hands, in which case both parties to
the communication have an interest in security. While these points might seem obvious
now, they certainly were not obvious to the original designers of the Internet, since no
security was incorporated into the original Internet architecture. Until the Internet was
commercialized in the mid 1990s, nobody took security seriously in protocol design,
with the exception of government agencies that used the Internet protocol for defense
and intelligence purposes and researchers interested specifically in cryptography and
other security topics.
Security problems usually result from network protocols or systems that contain
opportunities for unauthorized or disruptive activity in their design. An opportunity
presented by a particular network protocol or system for an unauthorized party to disrupt,
harm, or exploit the network communications of two legitimately communicating parties
constitutes a threat against the protocol or system. A particular sequence of protocol
messages and computations which successfully exploits such an opportunity is an attack.
Much of network security involves identifying threats, figuring out how attacks can be
mounted, and then designing fixes to protocols – or, even better, incorporating security
into protocol designs before they are finalized – to thwart attacks.
For network systems in general, two important steps in developing an architecture
and designing the protocols are to define the problem and to list the characteristics of
an acceptable solution. Without a clear and concise problem statement, it is hard to
develop an architecture or design a protocol, because a network system, like any other
work of engineering, is a designed object that is meant to address a specific problem.
For example, the original design of the Internet architecture solved the problem of how
to interconnect many different kinds of incompatible network link types, like Ethernet,
ATM, etc. Once the problem is defined, a list of characteristics for an acceptable solution,
often called requirements, serves to limit the solution space in order to direct design
energy toward the most promising architectural solution. Without requirements, much
time and energy can be wasted on adding features to the architecture that are marginally
useful, or critical features can even be overlooked. Requirements also serve to highlight
engineering tradeoffs – where sets of features are in conflict – and therefore where
compromises must be made in the design in order to come up with something that really
can be implemented and deployed. The equivalent activity for security – identifying the
threats and figuring how attacks can be mounted – is called a threat analysis.
architecture is complete but before protocol design has started. Starting prior to that
is difficult, because it is hard to spot opportunities for attacks if the basic functions of
the underlying system are still unknown. A threat analysis may result in changes to the
underlying network system architecture, but changes in the network system architecture
prior to protocol design are typically not difficult. Waiting until the protocol design is
complete – which was all too often the case for older protocols that were not designed
based on a good security architecture – runs the risk of having to go back and make
major changes in the system architecture to enable a more secure protocol design or
accepting compromises in the security imposed by existing implementations.
A threat analysis is conducted by finding opportunities for disruption or compromise
of communication. The following factors in a network architecture, system, or protocol
contribute to generating threats:
r An unprotected function in the architecture, protocol, or system design, implementa-
tion or deployment that offers a dedicated and knowledgeable opponent an opportunity
to attack. An example of such a weakness is a sensitive communication between two
parties that is conducted in the clear, so that it can be interpreted by an eavesdropper.
r A weakness in the protocol or system design, implementation, or deployment that
allows inadvertent disruption of communications, where the disrupting party is actu-
ally not intending to attack. Inadvertent disruption factors are typically not architec-
tural in nature, since they usually arise from unanticipated bugs in a protocol or system
design. An example is using a transport protocol without built-in congestion control
that does unrestricted retransmission without any backoff. Such a protocol could result
in severe congestion if many terminals started transmitting at once, denying service
to other applications and terminals on the network.
r Some basic parts of the network infrastructure can be attacked in crude and simple
ways that cannot realistically be defended against. For example, an attacker could
open the door of a microwave oven in an 802.11b wireless LAN cell, disabling any
wireless LAN communications for some radius around the microwave oven because
both 802.11b and microwave ovens use approximately the same radio frequency.
Architectural solutions are not always the best way to handle a threat. For example, in
the case of an 802.11 microwave oven attack, the defense is to find the microwave oven
and close the door. The alternative solution of locking up all the microwave ovens in the
building and requiring some kind of credentials check to use them is unrealistic and not
really commensurate with the threat. This is an example of how a threat can be handled
as part of the network system deployment. If the threat is not architectural in nature,
then architectural solutions are obviously not the right way to address it. For example,
if an application protocol uses a transport protocol without backoff for retransmission,
the solution is to modify the protocol design to include proper backoff.
After threats have been identified, the next step is to generate some realistic assump-
tions about the nature of the attacker. If the assumptions are too lax, serious threats may
be overlooked leading to attacks when the protocol or system is deployed. On the other
hand, if the assumptions are too strict, the security solution may be overengineered for
the actual threat. Most publicly visible mistakes in assumptions about the attacker tend
4 Security basics
to be on the lax side, since these tend to result in spectacular and widely published
security failures when products are deployed and someone manages to crack the secu-
rity. Assumptions on the too strict side usually delay a product’s deployment, cause cost
overruns, or require users to jump through so many unnecessary security hoops that the
product fails from a usability standpoint. These failures tend to look less like security
failures and more like failures in engineering management and product design.
A standard assumption about the attacker when conducting a threat analysis is that
the attacker is able to see all traffic between legitimate parties to the protocol. While
this assumption may not be true for most wired networks, it is almost always true for
wireless networks. Given that, the next assumption is that the attacker can alter, forge,
or replay any message they have intercepted. This allows the attacker to impersonate
one of the legitimate parties or otherwise attempt to get the legitimate parties to do what
they want. The attacker is also assumed to be able to reroute messages to another party,
so that the attacker can team up with others to increase the computational and network
power available. Finally, the attacker is assumed to have the ability to compromise cryp-
tographic material used to secure traffic if the cryptographic material is sufficiently old.
The safe age depends on the type and strength of the cryptographic material. Assump-
tions about the identity of the attacker are also important. Many attacks are perpetrated
by insiders who are known and authorized users, but who misbehave unintentionally due
to compromise of their terminals by viruses or malware or perhaps intentionally due to
some unknown motivation. A threat analysis cannot assume that known users will never
be a threat.
The amount of knowledge and resources available to the attacker typically determine
whether the attacker can exploit a particular opportunity for attack, and therefore which
threats should have priority for mitigation. It is never wise to assume that an attack
can be deterred by keeping the attacker in ignorance about how a protocol works. Most
attackers, if they are motivated to attack at all, are willing to expend the time and energy
necessary to understand how to make their attack successful. Such security by obscurity
is an invitation to attackers to crack the protocol or system, and thereby gain an enhanced
reputation in “black hat” (bad guy) circles for their cleverness. On the other hand, increas-
ing the amount of resources necessary to mount an attack – so that a successful attack
becomes difficult or impossible to mount with a commonly available set of resources –
is a legitimate and often-used method of deterring an attack. As we will see in the next
chapter, it is actually the basis of mathematical cryptography. However, since computing
power is constantly increasing and new mathematical understanding occasionally causes
old cryptographic algorithms to become easily breakable, any defense based on increas-
ing the amount of resources by a finite amount must consider where the boundary for
a successful attack lies. Architectures and protocol designs that incorporate flexibility
for strengthening cryptographic parameters and algorithms, or increasing the computa-
tional power necessary to compromise a system should the boundary be reached are an
important way of ensuring that designs keep current.
An important consideration when performing a threat analysis is to clearly identify
the value of the threatened activity or the severity of the disruption. If the value of the
activity is low or the severity of the disruption is slight, measures to counteract the threat
1.2 Classes of threats 5
should be similarly lightweight. However, care should be taken when making value
judgments in this manner, since sometimes threats that are considered unlikely or minor
become more important as a protocol or system is more widely deployed. Sometimes,
threat mitigation measures are not intended to remove the possibility of attack entirely,
but just to reduce the threat to a level that existed before the protocol or system was
developed. Of course, this doesn’t help solve the underlying problem in the deployed
protocols or systems, but sometimes such mitigation to existing threat levels is the only
realistic choice, given implementation and deployment constraints.
The process of conducting a threat analysis is unfortunately very heuristic and not
very quantitative. A successful threat analysis is best conducted by donning the mindset
of the attacker. The person conducting the analysis needs to ask in what clever and
creative ways the particular functioning of the protocol or system can be disrupted. In
the rest of the chapter, we will discuss some generic classes of threats and the security
services that have evolved to counter them. Looking for these classes of threats is a good
starting point when conducting a threat analysis. In Chapter 2, we discuss in more detail
how a threat analysis is incorporated into the process of developing a security system
architecture.
While every network protocol or system has particular characteristics that render it more
or less susceptible to attack, a few basic classes of attacks are repeated with various per-
mutations in different circumstances. The basic threat classes apply to wireless networks
as well. The basic threat classes are:
r replay threat
r eavesdropping and spoofing
r man-in-the middle (MitM) threat
r denial-of-service (DoS) threat.
Network security architectures, protocols, and systems have evolved to counter attacks
based on these threats using various kinds of cryptographic and other security algorithms.
In this section, we briefly examine each class of threat.
attack, and therefore can presumably be quickly found. Other types of DoS attacks listed
in the following subsections, are harder to detect because the attacker can be remote.
Bombing attacks
A more serious but still crude attack is when the attacker bombards a network or server
with packets designed to increase network utilization and thereby decrease throughput.
Such an attack is especially effective if the attacker controls a network of machines,
called zombies, throughout the Internet that have been compromised using viruses or
spyware. The attacker can then instruct the machines to target a specific website or other
service in order to blackmail the owner or otherwise extract some illegitimate benefit.
The zombies allow the attacker to perpetrate the attack without exposing its identity,
making the attacker difficult to track down. The only currently known way to handle
such distributed denial-of-service attacks (DDoS attacks) is to provision the server or
network with enough spare capacity so that some legitimate users can always get service,
perhaps at a reduced level, or leave some capacity in reserve to be switched on for such
situations.
Redirection attacks
A particular kind of DoS attack, called a redirection attack, is a consideration in the
design of wireless protocols. A redirection attack occurs when the attacker sets up a
session with a server for a large bandwidth data flow, such as streaming video, then
redirects the attack at a victim whose network connection or device does not have the
bandwidth to handle the flow volume. The victim’s network connection is overwhelmed
by the traffic and legitimate service grinds to a halt.
Address spoofing
Finally, another attack that is not specific to wireless networks but easier to perpetrate
there and therefore more common on wireless networks is address spoofing. The protocol
used by IP networks on the last hop for routing has traditionally not been secure, because
wired networks have in the past typically operated in situations where physical security
or difficulty of access (as for example in dial-in networks) have made attacks unlikely.
This protocol allows a router to map an IP address to a link layer address, so that the
8 Security basics
router can deliver the packet directly to the terminal’s interface card through the link
layer. However, because the protocol is not secure, it is possible for an attacker on the
same link to claim to own the IP address. The router then ends up sending packets to the
attacker instead of to the legitimate owner of the address.
With the exception of DoS attacks, security services have been developed to counter the
threats discussed in the previous section. Security services have many uses in general
network security, and are an important part of wireless network security too. For example,
unlike wired networks, in a wireless network, any properly configured device within
the broadcast radius of a wireless access point can hear the communication between a
wireless device and the wireless access point. Depending on the wireless link protocol, an
eavesdropping attacker may be able to easily decode the communication and respond as
the victim. If a sender on a wireless link wants to prevent eavesdropping, the messages
sent and received over the link must include proof of origin to provide data origin
authentication, must be encrypted to provide confidentiality protection, and must be
protected against replay to avoid use of a previous message by an adversary. These are
the basic security service classes. For DoS attacks, most mitigation measures focus on
deployment or network management, with the exception of protocol design measures that
limit opportunities for DoS. Since DoS attacks exploit some very deep and fundamental
properties of the Internet architecture, they are hard to mitigate with specific system
architectural measures. Most DoS attacks are also not specific to wireless networks, so
they are not discussed further in the book unless they are related to specific protocol
design issues.
And without giving Cissy time to invite him to come to her house,
for the purpose of criticising her guest’s singing, he exclaimed
hurriedly, “I really must not keep you standing. Good morning, Mrs.
Archer, I am sorry I have forfeited your good opinion.” And so left
them.
“Well, Marion,” said Cissy, “though I thought him so nice the other
day, I cannot say that I think so now. He is very rough and ill-
tempered.”
“But Cissy, you teazed him on purpose. I think you deserved what
you got.”
“You are an impertinent little cats Miss Freer,” replied her cousin.
After which relief to her feelings, Mrs. Archer recovered her good
humour, and they spent an amicable evening. This was the day
before Sybil’s birthday. There had been some slight discussion,
consultation rather, between Lady Severn and her niece, as to the
advisability of inviting the daily governess to make one of the party
to Berlet. But as Lady Severn wished to pay some attention to Mrs.
Archer, and it would have been awkward to invite that lady without
the young girl whom she evidently looked upon as a valued friend
and guest, it was decided that the invitation should include Miss
Freer. The children would have rebelled had their dear Miss Freer
been left out; indeed they would naturally enough have looked upon
such an omission as a gross breach of promise, as their governess
had been asked to make one of the previous expedition, which the
weather had put a stop to.
“Of course not, my dear,” replied Lady Severn; “but how can I
draw the distinction? I quite agree with you about it but I don’t see
how it is to be done.”
“Yes,” said Lady Severn, “that will do very well. Knowing that
Charlotte and Sybil are with their governess, I shall feel comfortable
about them. I must consult with Ralph about the carriages. There
are our own two, and Mr. Chepstow has offered any of his we like.”
For Mr. Chepstow had called at the Rue des Lauriers, and been
graciously received by the dowager and her fascinating niece.
“By-the-by, May,” she said, “what are you going to wear to-
morrow?”
“Well and why shouldn’t you wear it?” asked Cissy; “it is a
perfectly suitable dress.”
“Suitable, certainly, for Marion Vere, but I am by no means sure
that it is equally so for Miss Freer,” replied Marion.
“Just what I say. As long as I have to act, what you call my farce,
I think I should do so as consistently as possible. And from some
little things Lofty Severn has told me, I am afraid I have been
careless. Miss Vyse, it appears, has remarked, in the children’s
hearing, that my dress is unbecoming to my station; and, of all
people in the world, I should least like her to begin making remarks
about me.”
“I don’t know,” replied Marion. “I don’t like her, and I don’t trust
her, and that’s about all I can say. No doubt if she were finding out
about who I really am, she might do me great mischief.”
“Of course she might,” said Cissy. “But one thing I must say,
Marion: were it found out that you are not really Miss Freer, I should
feel myself bound, in your defence, to tell the whole story from
beginning to end. I could not consent to screen Harry’s part in it any
longer.”
“Harry has had no part in it,” said Marion, eagerly. “You know this
governessing scheme was most entirely my own. No one could be
blamed for it but myself.”
But the conversation was not without its result. With a girlish sigh
of regret, she put away the pretty rosebud dress, and laid out for the
morning’s wear an unexceptionably quiet and inexpensive costume
of simply braided brown-holland.
Friday morning was cloudlessly fine. The sky was of that same
even, intense blue, which had so impressed Marion on her first
arrival in the south; and as she walked to the Rue des Lauriers, the
girl felt joyous and light-hearted. She found Lotty and Sybil watching
for her. In their different ways the two children were full of delight at
the prospect of the day’s treat, and Marion felt glad that lessons had
formed no part of the morning’s programme, as such a thing as
sitting still would have been quite beyond the power of her excited
little pupils.
“She’s only two years older than I am, Miss Freer,” said Lotty,
virtuously, “and yet she goes to all sorts of parties. I’m sure I don’t
know how she ever learns any lessons.”
“Now Lotty, now Sybil old woman, the carriage is coming round,
for you. Ah! Miss Freer, too!” Ralph added, as he saw her. “I beg
your pardon; I thought you were to have been picked up on the
road with Mrs. Archer. But, never mind, we shall pack in.”
As they passed through the court-yard there stood Mr. Price,
looking somewhat disconsolate, not quite sure that he had done
right in quitting his seat by the side of his pupil, which, yet, his
shrinking modesty would not have allowed him to retain, unless all
the rest of the company had been already provided for.
“You, too, still here, Price!” exclaimed Sir Ralph. “I thought you
had been whisked off in the waggonette. However, it’s all the better!
If Miss Freer does not mind a little crowding, that’s to say?”
What a merry drive they had! Marion hardly recognized the silent,
melancholy Mr. Price in the agreeable, humourous man beside her.
Sir Ralph and he amused her with reminiscences of their younger
days, from time to time saddened by a passing allusion to the
brother she had already heard of. The “John” so affectionately
mentioned by Sir Ralph when speaking to Mrs. Archer.
The second or third time this happened, Sir Ralph glanced at her
with a slight smile of surprise and amusement.
“Nonsense, my dear boy,” said Mr. Price. “You will really make me
blush, and that would look very funny on an old man like me. Would
it not, Miss Sybil?”
Oh! how grateful Marion was to the all-unconscious Mr. Price, for
thus opportunely turning the conversation!
Marion turned round, her cheeks pale with the paleness that tells
of deeper indignation than quick mantling crimson.
The words were taken out of her mouth by Mr. Price, who
standing beside her had, unawares, heard the little conversation.
“Oh. Mr. Price,” she said, “I hope you don’t think me so silly as to
be cross about a trifle; but you don’t know how particular Lady
Severn is in all arrangements about the children, and I was so afraid
of her thinking either Miss Freer or I had neglected her wishes.”
So Ralph left them. On the whole, I don’t think Frank would have
regretted if Mr. Price had done the same. But this did not appear to
be that worthy gentleman’s intention. So Captain Berwick consoled
himself by engaging Marion steadily in conversation, and thus
obliging her to walk at the other side of the donkey’s head; for she
could not have been cold or inattentive to one who was showing
such good nature to her little pupil.
At last they got to the top. Most of the party were there before
them, for the donkey’s tardiness had delayed them. There was a sort
of terrace round the cottage, or châlet rather, from which the view
was supposed to be seen in perfection. It was indeed beautiful! If
only there had not been such a crowd of people talking about it!
How the young ladies cluttered and admired, how the gentlemen
thought it their duty to agree with their observations, however
inane! All but Ralph. When Marion first caught sight of him he was
standing perfectly silent beside Florence, who was speaking to him
in a low voice, from time to time raising her beautiful, lustrous eyes
to his face, with a look half of questioning, half of appeal. It was
some mere trifle she was asking him about, but, as she watched
them, Marion thought to herself that Sir Ralph must indeed be
strangely almost unnaturally callous, to resist the fascination of such
loveliness.
Marion found herself seated near Cissy, who looked rather tired.
She whispered to Marion: “How nice it would be if all these people
were away!”
But everybody talked and laughed, and eat cold chicken and
drank champagne, as if they had been in England. So I suppose they
all enjoyed themselves.
“I said the Beast. We have been talking about Beauty and the
Beast, and I thought when you came growling so, you were just like
him.”
“Thank you, Lotty,” he said; “or, rather, I think I should thank Miss
Freer for the compliment, should I not? That’s what Miss Freer
teaches you, eh, Sybil? To call your poor old uncle a beast.”
“Oh no, dear Uncle,” she said, “Miss Freer didn’t ever say you
were a beast. Lotty only said it because you growled. But, besides,
Uncle Ralph, didn’t you know that the Beast was very nice, really he
was, a beautiful prince at the end.”
“Really, was he? And how did he come to be so improved?” asked
Ralph, with an air of the profoundest interest.
“But who was Beauty, in the first place?” interrupted heir uncle.
“No, oh no. Not a little girl. A young lady, Uncle. A big young lady,
like——like——oh, yes! Just like Miss Freer. A pretty, sweet young
lady, just like Miss Freer.”
“And she turned the Beast into a beautiful prince, you say? I
wonder how ever she could do that,” he said, thoughtfully.
“Can’t you guess? Well, I will tell you,” said Sybil, full of
importance. “You see, the Beast was very good and kind, though he
was ugly. And the fairy fixed that whenever any pretty young lady
would love him for being good and kind, and not mind his being
ugly, then that minute he was to turn into a beautiful prince. So the
very minute Beauty said, ‘I do love you, my dear good Beast,’ he
turned into the prince. Isn’t it a pretty story, Uncle, and don’t you
think Beauty must have been just like Miss Freer?”
Sir Ralph stayed beside them till they were close to the edge of
the wood, helping them to climb up the steep, rough paths. Then he
hastened on before them, saying they had better follow at their
leisure. Soon after they had reached the châlet it became time to
think of rejoining the carriages.
Mrs. Archer was in great spirits at this news, and chattered away
about returning to India, as if it were the most easily managed little
journey in the world. But Marion, as she looked at her, felt certain
vague misgivings. She was not satisfied that her cousin was gaining
strength from her sojourn at Altes, for at times she looked sadly
fragile. The slightest extra exertion utterly prostrated her, and yet so
buoyant and high-spirited was she, that Marion found it impossible
to persuade her to take more care of herself. Poor little Cissy! What
a baby she was after all! And yet a difficult baby to manage, with all
her genuine sweet temper and pretty playfulness.
Now and then Miss Vyse favoured the schoolroom party with her
presence. These were the days the young governess dreaded. Not
that then, was anything in Florence’s manner actually to be
complained of. She refrained from the slightest appearance of
interfering, and indeed went further than this; for she paraded her
respect for the governess, in a way that to Marion was more
offensive than positive insult or contemptuous neglect. She it was
who always reproved the refractory Lotty for any sign of disrespect
or inattention.
She thought it better to say very little about the children to Sir
Ralph, when she met him in Mrs. Archer’s house. And, indeed, he by
no means encouraged her doing so. The mention of her morning’s
employment always appeared so to annoy him that at last it came to
be tacitly avoided, and really, for the time being, forgotten. For they
were at no loss for things to talk about, those three, in the
afternoons, generally one or two a week, that Sir Ralph spent in
Cissy’s drawing-room.
“And so,” said Cissy, “just like a man, you leave us poor weak
women to endure as best we may, what you confess would be
beyond your powers.”
“Now, Mrs. Archer,” he replied, “that’s not fair at all. ‘What’s one
man’s meat is another man’s poison.’ I can’t suppose your drawing-
room-full of friends is disagreeable to you, as, to speak plainly, you
have yourself to thank for it. If you don’t want to see all these
people, what do you ask them for?”
“Great use I should be!” he said, lightly, and then went on more
seriously, “Besides, do you know, Mrs. Archer, I am really busy just
now.”
“It has been set to music, and I think it very pretty,” he replied. “I
could show it to you, for I have both copied it and translated it. But I
can’t show it you just now. Indeed, I am not sure that it would not
please you more if I gave it to some one else to show you.”
“If you gave it to some one else to show me?” she repeated. “I
don’t understand what you mean, Sir Ralph. Really I don’t.”
“Sir Ralph,” she said, “I won’t say again I don’t know what you
are talking about; but, truly, I may say I don’t know whom you are
referring to. You wouldn’t wish to vex me, I know. If even there is
anything you wish to warn me about, I am sure you would do it
most gently and kindly. I am not very old, and I daresay not very
wise,” she added, with a smile; “but, truly, I don’t quite understand.
No knight, as you call it, is likely to pass this way on my account.”
She spoke so earnestly and simply that Ralph all but moved out of
his habitual self-control, looked up again with the sun-light look over
his face.
“Miss Freer,” he began, eagerly, and still more eager words were
on his lips; but— —the door opened, and in walked, with the air of
one thoroughly at home, and sure of a welcome, Frank Berwick!
It was not the first time Ralph’s pleasant afternoons had been
interrupted by this young gentleman. He rose, the bright look utterly
gone from his face, shook hands with Frank, and, Mrs. Archer shortly
after returning to the room, seized the first opportunity of taking
leave of the little party. As he bade good-bye to Marion he said, in a
low voice, heard by her only:
“Forgive me, Miss Freer, for what I said. I must have seemed very
impertinent, but, truly, I did not mean to be so. Remember how
many years older I am than you, and let that prevent your thinking
me unpardonably officious.”
Marion said nothing, but for one half instant raised her eyes to his
face, with a curious expression, part deprecating, part reproachful.
The sort of look one sees in the face of a child who has been
scolded for a fault which it does not feel conscious of or understand.
Then she said, or whispered—or, indeed, was it only his fancy; the
words were so faint and low?—
When Ralph left Mrs. Archer’s house he did not turn towards the
Rue des Lauriers, but walked briskly in the opposite direction. Like
many other men, he had a habit, when perplexed or annoyed, of
“taking it out of himself,” as he would have called it, by sharp,
physical exercise. Not till he was some way out of the town, in a
quiet country lane, did he slacken his pace, and begin steadily to
think—thus:
“What a weak fool I am, after all! Can it really be that after all
these years, I, now that I am middle-aged (for thirty-three is more
than middle-aged for men like me), have caught the strange
infection, hitherto so incomprehensible to me? What is there about
this girl, this grave-eyed Marion, that utterly changes me when in
her presence? Oh! Madness and Folly are no words for what I was
nearly doing just now, who of all men in the world am least fitted,
have indeed least right to marry! Lucky it was that that boy, Berwick,
came in when he did. Not, after all, that it would have mattered
much. She could not care, or ever learn to care, for me. But the
thing might have distressed her all the same, and increased the
discomfort of her position. How odious it is to think of her trudging
backwards and forwards every morning as a daily governess, and
that hateful Florence sneering at and insulting her in her cat-like
way!”
The day being chilly, none of Mrs. Archer’s friends ventured out
on the terrace, and the small drawing-room was therefore rather
crowded. There was the usual set; the Bailey girls, Mr. Chepstow,
and Monsieur De l’Orme, the Frasers and Sophy Berwick,
accompanied, of course, by her brother. Erbenfeld was there too,
amusing himself by trying to get up a flirtation with Mrs. Archer; by
no means an easy undertaking, as he found to his cost; for Cissy’s
self-possession, quick wit and unaffected, utter indifference to his
graceful compliments and sentimental allusions, baffled him far more
effectively than any affectation of matronly dignity, or the most
freezing airs of propriety. It was really rather amusing to watch, for
Erbenfeld was clever enough in his shallow way, and evidently quite
unaccustomed to have his flattering attentions thus smilingly
rejected. Ralph had not been there two minutes before he began to
wish himself away; but he had resolved to say half-an-hour or so, to
avoid the appearance of any marked change; and so he sat on
patiently, thinking to himself it was no bad discipline for his powers
of self-control to sit there trying to talk nonsense to Sophy Berwick,
all the time that he was intensely conscious or Marion’s near
presence at the piano, where she was eagerly examining sonic new
music which Frank had just brought her, the giver, of course,
standing close by, replying to her remarks with a bright smile on his
handsome face.
She looked up at, him with surprise, but when she saw the
perfect good faith in which he had asked the question, she began to
laugh in spite of herself.
“Yes,” said she, “I think I have told you before that I sing a little,
and if you had been listening you would have heard me singing just
now.”
“I was not singing alone, just now,” she said, more seriously, “I
only took a part in those glees.”
“Ah!” he replied, “then it was not bad of me after all. But I should
very much like to hear you sing alone. When Miss Bailey finishes this
affair she is playing, will you sing, Miss Freer?”
She seemed as if she hardly heard him, and at a sign from Cissy,
took Dora’s place at the piano.
Her voice was certainly not a very powerful one, but neither could
it be called weak. It was true and sweet, but its chief beauty was its
exceeding freshness. Clear and bright, and yet with an under-tone of
almost wild plaintiveness. The sort of voice one would be inclined to
describe as more like a young boy’s than a woman’s. It made one
think of a bunch of spring field flowers, freshly gathered and
sparkling with dew. So, at least, Ralph fancied as he listened, and
went on in his own mind to compare Florence Vyse’s rich contralto to
a perfectly arranged group of brilliantly coloured and heavily scented
exotics. The simile was not however a perfect one, for it did not
sufficiently express the tenderness and cultivated refinement of
Marion’s singing.
What her song was, Ralph did not know nor care. It was German,
so much he discovered, and some words reached him, which
sounded like these:
A sort of sorrowful refrain they seemed to him, and they set his
thoughts off again in the direction of wishing they were less true as
applied to himself. But he pulled himself up short, thanked Miss
Freer quietly, said good bye to Mrs. Archer and her guests, and was
just about to take his departure when the door opened, and “Lady
Severn and Miss Vyse” were announced by Mrs. Fraser’s man-
servant, whose mistress very goodnaturedly lent him to Mrs. Archer
on Fridays.
A few days after this, the second of the Altes balls took place.
Mrs. Archer and her cousin had not gone to the first, as on the day it
was held the former had not been well enough to risk the fatigue.
But having been, or fancied herself, stronger of late, she was bent
on attending the forthcoming one. Marion had no objection to
accompanying her, save her former fear of appearing inconsistent.
But this time Cissy was not to be moved. Marion was to go to the
ball, attired in the prettiest of dresses, and for this one evening to
enjoy herself thoroughly, and forget all about that “odious
governessing.”
“Of course you should come,” said Sophy. “I should think it bad
enough to have to be shut up all the morning with those brats,
without thinking it necessary on that account to forego a pleasant
way or spending an evening.”
“Oh, well,” replied Marion, “for once in a way I daresay there can
be no objection to it.”
Marion felt and looked rather annoyed at this not very delicately-
expressed inquiry; but, before she had time to reply, Cissy, who was
present at the time, came to the rescue.
“Of course not, Miss Berwick,” she exclaimed, rather indignantly,
but, on catching a beseeching look from Marion, she changed her
tone, and added, half laughingly, “Don’t you know, Miss Berwick,
that Marion is going out with me next spring, to marry a nabob
whom she has never seen? A real nabob, I assure you, as rich as—
as I should like to be, and that’s saying a good deal, I assure you. By
this time next year, imagine Miss Freer converted into Mrs. Nabob,
with more fine dresses and diamonds than she knows what to do
with. What a charming prospect! I hope you will remember, May, to
give me some of your cast-off grandeur.”
“How can you be so silly, Cissy!” said Marion, half laughing and
half annoyed.
Sophy looked curious and mystified. She could not make out how
much was fun and how much earliest of Mrs. Archer’s
announcement. Miss Freer’s “How silly,” very probably, only applied
to her friend’s exaggerated way of telling it. It was quite possible,
Sophy decided, that the young lady was in fact engaged to some
rich Indian, and was only a daily governess for a short time, perhaps
to make some money towards providing a trousseau, being of a
more independent spirit than some brides elect in similar
circumstances.