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Kuntoro Mangkusubroto
Utomo Sarjono Putro
Santi Novani
Kyoichi Kijima Editors
Systems
Science for
Complex Policy
Making
A Study of Indonesia
Translational Systems Sciences
Volume 3
Editors in Chief
Kyoichi Kijima, Tokyo, Japan
Hiroshi Deguchi, Yokohama, Japan
Editorial Board
Shingo Takahashi, Tokyo, Japan
Hajime Kita, Kyoto, Japan
Toshiyuki Kaneda, Nagoya, Japan
Akira Tokuyasu, Tokyo, Japan
Koichiro Hioki, Tottori, Japan
Yuji Aruka, Tokyo, Japan
Kenneth Bausch, Riverdale, GA, USA
Jim Spohrer, San Jose, CA, USA
Wolfgang Hofkirchner, Vienna, Austria
John Pourdehnad, Philadelphia, PA, USA
Mike C. Jackson, Hull, UK
Gary S. Metcalf, GA, USA
In 1956, Kenneth Boulding explained the concept of General Systems Theory as a skeleton of
science. He describes that it hopes to develop something like a “spectrum” of theories—a
system of systems which may perform the function of a “gestalt” in theoretical construction.
Such “gestalts” in special fields have been of great value in directing research towards the
gaps which they reveal.
There were, at that time, other important conceptual frameworks and theories, such as
cybernetics. Additional theories and applications developed later, including synergetics,
cognitive science, complex adaptive systems, and many others. Some focused on principles
within specific domains of knowledge and others crossed areas of knowledge and practice,
along the spectrum described by Boulding.
Also in 1956, the Society for General Systems Research (now the International Society
for the Systems Sciences) was founded. One of the concerns of the founders, even then, was
the state of the human condition, and what science could do about it.
The present Translational Systems Sciences book series aims at cultivating a new frontier
of systems sciences for contributing to the need for practical applications that benefit people.
The concept of translational research originally comes from medical science for enhancing
human health and well-being. Translational medical research is often labeled as “Bench to
Bedside.” It places emphasis on translating the findings in basic research (at bench) more
quickly and efficiently into medical practice (at bedside). At the same time, needs and demands
from practice drive the development of new and innovative ideas and concepts. In this tightly
coupled process it is essential to remove barriers to multi-disciplinary collaboration.
The present series attempts to bridge and integrate basic research founded in systems
concepts, logic, theories and models with systems practices and methodologies, into a
process of systems research. Since both bench and bedside involve diverse stakeholder
groups, including researchers, practitioners and users, translational systems science works
to create common platforms for language to activate the “bench to bedside” cycle.
In order to create a resilient and sustainable society in the twenty-first century, we
unquestionably need open social innovation through which we create new social values,
and realize them in society by connecting diverse ideas and developing new solutions. We
assume three types of social values, namely: (1) values relevant to social infrastructure such
as safety, security, and amenity; (2) values created by innovation in business, economics, and
management practices; and, (3) values necessary for community sustainability brought about
by conflict resolution and consensus building.
The series will first approach these social values from a systems science perspective by
drawing on a range of disciplines in trans-disciplinary and cross-cultural ways. They may
include social systems theory, sociology, business administration, management information
science, organization science, computational mathematical organization theory, economics,
evolutionary economics, international political science, jurisprudence, policy science, socio-
information studies, cognitive science, artificial intelligence, complex adaptive systems
theory, philosophy of science, and other related disciplines. In addition, this series will
promote translational systems science as a means of scientific research that facilitates the
translation of findings from basic science to practical applications, and vice versa.
We believe that this book series should advance a new frontier in systems sciences by
presenting theoretical and conceptual frameworks, as well as theories for design and appli-
cation, for twenty-first-century socioeconomic systems in a translational and trans-
disciplinary context.
v
ThiS is a FM Blank Page
Contents
vii
Supporting Decision Making for a Republic
Under a Complex System
Introduction
Indonesia stretches from Aceh to Papua (one-eighth of the globe circle), consisting
of more than 13.400 islands and territorial waters extending up to 3.257.483 km2.1
The archipelago contains more than 400 ethnics who speak different languages. The
country’s population has reached 245 million in 2014. Economically, the country
has been developing briskly. The GDP was USD 870 billion in 2013, making it one
of the 20 largest economies around the world. The GDP per capita (in constant 2005
USD) rose significantly from only USD 840 in the early 1990s to USD 1810 in
2013.2 Indonesia may well be considered a giant compared to its neighbouring
countries in Southeast Asia.
1
Data from Badan Informasi Geospasial, Republik Indonesia. Accessed from http://tanahair.
indonesia.go.id/home/ on 9th April 2015
2
GDP is in constant 2005 US dollars. Source: World Development Indicators database, World
Bank. Accessed from http://data.worldbank.org/indicator on 9th April 2015
K. Mangkusubroto (*) • D.S. Utomo
School of Business and Management, Institut Teknologi Bandung, West Java, Indonesia
e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected]
D. Ramadhani
Harvard Kennedy School, Cambridge, MA, USA
e-mail: [email protected]
Yet the immense growth does not translate into any distinction on how the
government of Indonesia works compared to its peers. Government bureaucracy
approach is sectoral in nature. Ministries are designed to fulfil only a single sector
or purpose such as the Ministry of Infrastructure, Ministry of Health or Ministry of
Energy. In reality, challenges are becoming more cross-sectoral and
multidimensional. One cannot separate the issue of health from poverty nor solve
an environmental issue without hinging on energy and education. Simply creating
solutions for one sole purpose will deem to beat its own goal. The Indonesian
government like most governments is still struggling to adapt to the complexity of
problems where factors are intertwined more than ever.
As the fourth largest democracy, Indonesia is faced with definite coalition in the
government and constant compromise in the cabinet. It is even more severe in a
divergent political condition reflected by the multiparty system adopted by Indo-
nesia. With fifteen (15) parties recognised in the 2014 election, the multiparty
system requires the need to develop a coalition in the government, which led to
compromise in day-to-day cabinet decision-making. One ruling government is
usually consisted of four to five party coalitions with one to two major parties as
opposition. Despite the 2009–2014 administration that has managed to have six
supporting parties within the cabinet, the government coalition is only supported by
four parties. Moreover, the winning party of 2014 controls only less than 30 % of
the parliament. Thus, more compromise in both the executive body and legislative
body is given. Following the reform in 1998, Indonesia has chosen to embark on
democratisation and decentralisation at the same time. This is a momentous change
in the country’s political reform from a centralised and top-down system to a
decentralised and bottom-up mechanism.
The people directly elect the president, governors, and heads of districts. Indo-
nesia, now comprising 34 provinces and 506 municipalities and districts, conducts
more elections for each of the governance levels from national to district leaders
including their legislative counterparts.
This situation is complicated by the implementation of the decentralisation
system whereby the local government has been given certain power and authority
and the central government has no direct control over it. Starting with Regulation
No. 22 of 1999 and subsequently with Regulation No. 32 of 2004, the central
government’s authority has shrunk into foreign affairs; defence; security; judicial,
religious, and national monetary; and fiscal affairs. The sectoral approach is also
mimicked by local governments as government budget and disbursement is struc-
tured and based on the existing ministries. Silo mindset and work process coupled
with lack of understanding to intricacy of challenges led to poor delivery of public
services and slow debottlenecking of obstacles, if any. Indonesia has potentially
delegated more authority to local leaders than what they are now capable to
manage.
One observed conclusion is for a policy to be made, whether in the local or
national government; it needs more than just data and analysis. Policy is a product
of rigorous interplay between actors, subject to their compromise and coalition.
Supporting Decision Making for a Republic Under a Complex System 3
This section discusses the definition of the policy development process that is used
in this chapter, its scope, and the stages in this process. The terms strategy and
policy are often used interchangeably. In the strategic management literatures, for
example, Rao et al. (2004) have stated that a strategy is defined as a comprehensive
plan of action that is designed to meet specific objectives, in a certain time limit. On
the other hand, a policy is defined as guidance for an organisation to make
appropriate decisions in the long run. Although both terms imply a decision-
making process, the term policy is often considered to have a broader meaning
and also used in more fields. For simplicity, this paper uses the term policy in
referring to the decision-making activities that are carried out to achieve the desired
objectives.
At the national level, authors observed that there are at least three types of
triggers for the policy development process, i.e.:
1. The need to improve the administration performance. For example, to improve
the performance of the bureaucracy in Indonesia, the President established a
working unit known as the President’s Delivery Unit for Development Monitor-
ing and Oversight (UKP4). The objectives of this unit are to oversee the progress
of ministry and agency programmes, to synergise the working process across
ministries and to solve the occurring bottleneck. The authors are actively
involved in this unit.
2. The need to respond to state emergencies, for example, the reconstruction
process in Indonesia (Aceh and Nias region) after the 2004 tsunami. Some of
the authors were directly involved in the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction
Agency for Aceh and Nias. This agency was responsible for managing interna-
tional aid in the reconstruction effort. Some policies, such as the geographic
information system to show how the aim is used, are made in an effort to
transparently manage the received aid.
3. The need to respond to global challenges, for example, the policies that are made
as efforts to address the climate change. Some of the authors are actively
involved in the REDD+ task force which is responsible for designing and
implementing policies of sustainable forest use.
Although the policy development process may have different triggers, the
activities that are carried out and the requirements in each activity are generally
the same. Summarising the information from several literatures, the policy devel-
opment process can be depicted as a cycle as shown in Fig. 1.
Setting Direction This stage aims to decide the future that will be pursued, as well
as issues and problems that can arise in achieving this desired future. In the public
policy field, this activity is often known as agenda setting (Jann and Wegrich 2007).
There are many reasons that may trigger this activity. In the public sector, this
activity could be triggered when there are stakeholders who feel that the current
4 K. Mangkusubroto et al.
conditions do not meet their expectations or if there are several stakeholders whose
interests are conflicting with each other (Jann and Wegrich 2007). In an organisa-
tion, this activity might be triggered when there are gaps between their vision,
mission or goals and their performance (Dyson et al. 2007). These two reasons
imply that the stakeholders already know the desired future or the conditions that
may happen in the future. However, this activity may also be performed by
stakeholders to design the future conditions that may be good and more desirable
to them. The latter pattern is also known as interactive planning (Ackoff 1974;
Ackoff 2001).
Creating Alternatives This stage aims to identify various alternatives that may
help in achieving the desired future. In public policy, this stage is often called as the
policy formulation stage (Jann and Wegrich 2007). At this stage the stakeholders
require information that may help them to understand the features and the uncer-
tainties of the problem they are facing. This information gathering effort is often is
known as shaping (Friend and Hickling 2005) or exploring internal and external
environments (Dyson et al. 2007).
Evaluating Alternatives In their book Friend and Hickling (2005) call this stage a
comparing stage. In this stage, stakeholders construct and agree on the criteria that
will be used (Friend and Hickling 2005) and then compare the performance of each
alternative based on these criteria. This performance can be evaluated based on the
social, environmental or economic impacts (Milano et al. 2014) of each of the
alternatives, costs and benefits, the necessary coordination and conflict resolution if
there are any (Jann and Wegrich 2007). This performance can also be measured by
Supporting Decision Making for a Republic Under a Complex System 5
Pidd (2004) mentioned that there are two types of human rationality that play a
role during a policy development process, namely, substantive rationality and
procedural rationality. Simon (1986) described the substantive rationality as a
decision-maker’s effort to choose behaviours (alternatives) that are suitable to
achieve a certain goal. In substantive rationality, the objectives and all possible
alternatives are assumed to be known; the problem is how to select the best
alternative. In contrast, the problem in procedural rationality is how to process
limited information so that the decision-maker can make a choice (Simon 1986;
Jones 2002). Much disjointed and episodic interaction in the policy development
process could not be adequately explained without considering a behavioural model
of human choice (Jones 2002).
Pidd (2004) suggested that in a policy development process, procedural ratio-
nality has a more dominant role when the stakeholders try to define their vision and
to find out what can be done to achieve this vision. In this effort, the stakeholders
need to make their worldview and values explicit and filter available information
from the environment. In policy development stages discussed previously, these
efforts were performed on the setting direction stage and creating alternatives stage.
For example, the setting direction stage can become an enigma if the stakeholders
do not appreciate what each other’s roles, selective attention (stakeholder’s ability
to filter information) and emotional arousal play (Jones 2002).
Though its role is less dominant, the substantive rationality also contributes in
suggesting how the data from the real world can be interpreted. After the possible
alternatives are identified, substantive rationality is more suitable to be used,
because it can objectively compare these alternatives based on the agreed criteria
(Pidd 2004). These efforts are performed in evaluating and choosing alternatives
stages that have been discussed previously. However, it also has been discussed
previously that in the choosing alternatives stage the consensus among stakeholders
needs to be established. Building this consensus involves negotiation that also
requires the stakeholders to express their values and worldview. Therefore, proce-
dural rationality can also play its role again at this stage.
According to Pidd (2004), approaches that may help the stakeholders in
conducting information gathering, expressing their values and priorities and facil-
itating debate are required to support procedural rationality. These kinds of
approaches enable the stakeholders to identify alternatives that can resolve the
conflict. Meanwhile, to support the substantive rationality, approaches that can rank
the alternatives objectively based on all the available information are required. This
characteristic is usually owned by quantitative approaches.
Figure 2 describes how each type of rationality contributes in a policy develop-
ment process.
In reality, it is very difficult to implement the structured process described in this
section. The next section discusses the authors’ efforts to carry out the process of
policy development in a national context.
Supporting Decision Making for a Republic Under a Complex System 7
Fig. 2 Types of rationality mainly used by the stakeholders at each stage in policy development
process
This section discusses the REDD+ case to describe the complexity of policy
development in order to support the international agenda to tackle climate change.
The first part discusses the underlying political conditions of REDD+ implementa-
tion in Indonesia. The second part discusses the actors involved in REDD
+ implementation. The remaining parts discuss the efforts that have been made to
orchestrate the interaction between actors at the international level, national level
and local level.
REDD+ was formally launched in Indonesia since the signing of the letter of intent
(LoI) between the Indonesian government and Norwegian government in Oslo in
May 2010. In this LoI, Norway hopes that the REDD+ fund should be managed
credibly and transparently as was done by the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction
Agency for Aceh and Nias (BRR) after the 2004 tsunami.
The LoI consists of three phases with USD 1 billion of total funding from
Norway until 2020. The first phase is the preparation phase in which Indonesia
should establish institutions that will manage REDD+. The second phase is the
8 K. Mangkusubroto et al.
The Norwegian government is the pivotal actor that promotes REDD+ to the global
stage and to Indonesia. At the 2007 COP in Bali, they launched a global initiative
for forests and climate change and promised to contribute USD 500 million per year
to the REDD+ initiative (this initiative is known as Norway’s International Climate
and Forest Initiative (NICFI)). With these efforts, they hope that they can play an
important role internationally. Hence, they urged the REDD+ to become the key
element of the COP in Bali.
During the G-20 Summit in September 2009, the Indonesian government launched
the ambitious emission reduction commitments. The Indonesian government men-
tioned that in 2020, Indonesia will be able to reduce emissions by 26% against the
business-as-usual scenario by its own power and 41% with international support.
The Norwegian government then stepped in and offered collaboration under the
Supporting Decision Making for a Republic Under a Complex System 9
REDD+ initiatives. Norway became the first country that signs a formal agreement
with Indonesia.
The President’s Delivery Unit for Development Monitoring and Oversight
(UKP4) is then asked to coordinate with the REDD+ implementation in Indonesia.
Some officials at this institution have been involved in the Aceh and Nias recon-
struction after the tsunami in 2004. This institution also has the authority to
coordinate with the ministries and agencies related to REDD+. Hence, the UKP4
is expected to be able to help in initiating the REDD+ implementation efforts in
Indonesia.
The REDD+ agency (BP REDD+) is finally established in August 2013, after
almost 3 years of preparations. The preparations of the presidential decree on the
BP REDD+ itself require 1 year of discussion by involving various ministries and
agencies. The operationalisation of the BP REDD+ itself is in fact very difficult.
The head of BP REDD+ was chosen in December 2013, and its deputies are
appointed in May 2014. This has suggested that developing a consensus to establish
BP REDD+ was very difficult.
to convey the conception of REDD+ as ‘beyond carbon and more than forest’ in
various world events. In various international conversations, the world began to see
REDD+ not only as a climate change agenda but also as a sustainable development
agenda.
The UNFCCC is the official forum for the global REDD+ since the 13th COP in
Bali in 2007. However, the negotiations in this forum somehow do not represent
interests of the developing countries, and this has made the REDD+ agenda pro-
gress very slowly. The deforestation and land use problems are more than just
climate change issues. The main questions to these problems are how to manage
forests and lands (governance issue) and how it may benefit the people (welfare
issue). In addition to the climate change, the governance and welfare dimensions
are very important for the developing countries including Indonesia. These two
issues are often not considered in the UNFCCC.
At that time UNFCCC still cannot adopt Indonesia’s innovations in REDD+.
However, the collaboration between BP REDD+, Norway and UNORCID/UNDP
was eventually able to disseminate REDD+’s innovation globally, e.g. the World
Bank, Germany and the UK. Germany, for example, is interested in talking about
REDD+ in the jurisdiction context. They created the REDD Early Movers
programme. This is another innovation that involves development aspects in
REDD+.
Besides these countries, there are many other international NGOs. For example,
the Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR), World Agroforestry Cen-
tre (ICRAF), World Resources Institute (WRI), Climate Advisers, etc. are research
institutions who disseminate the REDD+ agenda globally. In the UN Climate
Summit in September 2014, REDD+ managed to become a main issue in forest
agenda discussion. This shows the importance of forest and climate agenda in the
global development discourse.
One important milestone in the integration of REDD+ into the global develop-
ment agenda is the involvement of the President of Indonesia as a co-chair at the
High-Level Panel of Eminent Persons (HLPEP) on the Post-2015 Development
Agenda. It’s a long story, starting from a trip to attend the Rio+ 20 in Brazil in May
2012, in which the President expressed his readiness to the UN Secretary-General to
lead HLPEP. The President then appointed the head of UKP4 as the chairman of the
National Committee for HLPEP to help him in formulating the agenda and
Indonesia’s position in leading HLPEP. The REDD+ task force at that time
becomes the think tank in drafting the HLPEP final report, which was then
submitted to the UN Secretary-General in September 2013 in New York. This
effort is very important to attach the REDD+ agenda to the sustainable development
agenda.
There is also an initiative of the New Climate Economy consisting of seven
countries, which was initiated by Norway, Sweden, and the UK. There is also the
Tropical Forest Alliance 2020, which is an initiative from the US government and
Consumer Goods Forum (3000 companies whose business lines are related to
forest).
Supporting Decision Making for a Republic Under a Complex System 11
The Norwegian government also actively urged the commodity producers and
consumers in various countries to commit to zero deforestation at the Climate
Summit in September 2014 to the companies such as Asia Pulp and Paper,
APRIL Group (logging company) and Wilmar International (palm oil plantation).
However, significant impacts of this commitment have yet to be realised until now.
The REDD+ concept that was proposed by Indonesia is now able to influence the
concept used at the international level. However, the REDD+ implementation in
Indonesia itself is very difficult. Hence, only part of the international commitment
and support can be realised. Until the end of 2014, Indonesia has only utilised USD
40 million of the total commitment of USD 1 billion from Norway (4%).
Some of the authors participated to direct the REDD+ task force in 2010. Our effort
has successfully created some innovation in forest and land management in Indo-
nesia. Improving forest and land governance is a prerequisite to implement beyond
carbon and more than forest REDD+. Most of the REDD+ task force members are
new players who suddenly have to deal with other actors such as the Ministry of
Forestry (MoF), Ministry of Environment (MoE) and National Council on Climate
Change (DNPI), which have grappled with this issue for a long time. Some of the
old actors are in doubt with the REDD+ task force members’ experience because
the REDD+ task force’s new members have no bad experience in the past; they act
freely, fast and flexibly. These major changes were not anticipated by the former
actors and cause a lot of resistance.
The constellation of national actors in the REDD+ issue is very interesting. At
that time, one of the authors was entrusted to manage and to create innovation in
REDD+. Unfortunately, forestry and other land sector issues, which are very related
to REDD+, are still entrusted to the existing ministries and agencies. The climate
change issues that are related to REDD+ are also controlled by the DNPI. In
addition the land use issues are also related to the interest of palm oil and paper
industries. Since all of these related issues are managed independently by various
entities, the implementation of REDD+ was hampered.
The President actually hoped that the REDD+ task force will be able to solve the
current forest and land governance problems. In one of the cabinet meetings, one of
the authors was asked to present the difference between forest area calculations
based on different maps produced by the MoF and the MoE. This meeting con-
cluded that one reference map is very important. The President then asks for an
immediate moratorium instruction that led to the One Map movement. Unfortu-
nately, this instruction was not fully supported at the implementation phase.
In addition to the moratorium and the one map problems, there is another
problem between the government and the indigenous peoples. The Indonesian
constitution recognises the rights of indigenous people. Unfortunately, the forestry
law considers the indigenous forests as state forests. Forest utilisation licences
12 K. Mangkusubroto et al.
granted by the MoF sometimes do not take into account the forest area that belongs
to the indigenous peoples. However, the situation changed after the Constitutional
Court Decision No. 35 in 2013. This decision excludes the indigenous forests from
the state forest and therefore entitles the indigenous peoples to control and manage
their forests. The REDD+ task force that wanted the recognition of indigenous
rights so that a sustainable forest and prosperous society can be achieved then
supports this decision. The REDD+ task force then facilitates the indigenous peo-
ples to gain state recognition. On the other hand, the MoF avoided dealing with this
matter, handing it over to the local governments. The uncertainties about the
recognition and protection of indigenous peoples continue to occur. The REDD
+ task force and later the BP REDD+ tried to take over this responsibility. This has
made the REDD+ task force and BP REDD+ seen as a channel between indigenous
peoples and the government.
As the head of the UKP4, one of the authors plays an active role in coordinating
related ministries and agencies to overcome these problems. This effort was done
by establishing a national inter-sectoral coordination mechanism. Through these
efforts, a common understanding with various institutions can be established such
as the Ministry of Welfare, Ministry for Political, Legal and Security Affairs, MoE
and various NGOs such as Indigenous Peoples Alliance (AMAN), Greenpeace,
Indonesian Environmental Forum (WALHI), etc.
The author only asks decision from the President for really critical matters, for
example, when two presidential decrees are needed, i.e. a decree to establish BP
REDD+ and a decree about a national REDD+ strategy. It is important to maintain
the focus on the resulting decisions. Because the establishment of BP REDD+ is one
part of the agreements in the LoI, the author prioritises this objective. To pursue this
objective was not easy, especially because the author demands that these agencies
should be at the same level with other ministries, as mentioned in the LoI.
The national REDD+ strategy is a picture of how the REDD+ task force con-
siders REDD+ not only as the climate change agenda but also as reformation
agenda, land-based management of natural resources, and sustainable development
agenda that focuses on improving the welfare of local and indigenous communities.
This document was prepared by involving various experts and stakeholders, making
it a complete document and in accordance with the needs in the future development.
The national strategy document has become the core of BP REDD+ preparation and
future actions. Unfortunately, this document still cannot convince the ministries to
be used in their implementation agenda.
The dynamics that gave birth to BP REDD+ clearly illustrates the competition
between actors. Although the President has agreed that BP REDD+ will become an
institution at ministry level in 2001, the realisation of this agreement takes 1 year
(August 2012–August 2013). This was caused by a lot of disagreements on the BP
REDD+ draft. These disagreements occurred because many of the proposed BP
REDD+ authorities (especially fund management and supervision) clashed with the
existing authorities of other ministries and agencies. As a result, the discussion of
the draft, led by the Coordinating Minister for Politics and Law, was prolonged
until the end of 2012. Nevertheless, the Minister for Politics at that time could
Supporting Decision Making for a Republic Under a Complex System 13
facilitate this discussion and maintain the atmosphere of the debate. The most
contentious points include (i) ministry-level status, (ii) roles and functions that
were allegedly overlapped with many ministries, (iii) nonstructural entity status,
(iv) the financial authority and (v) the monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV)
authority. With the help of one of the authors in facilitating communication
between the heads of relevant institutions, the final draft to be submitted to the
President was finally agreed upon. The decree on BP REDD+ was finally signed by
the President on August 31, 2013.
REDD+ is a global initiative that was boldly adopted as a national agenda and then
was operationalised in an innovative way into the local context. The Central
Kalimantan province was defined by the President as a pilot province and became
the first living laboratory for the REDD+ task force. The REDD+ operationalisation
in Central Kalimantan was not an easy task. This was the first time the REDD+ was
tested on a provincial scale that has a different political context. At that time the
Governor and many of the mayors in this province came from the opposition
parties. Nevertheless, the Governor has a good communication with the President,
so the REDD+ concept was easily accepted. This is because the Governor saw a lot
of potential benefits that can be obtained from the REDD+ implementation.
However, many difficulties arose in implementing the REDD+ concept in Cen-
tral Kalimantan. The problems faced by the REDD+ task force were (i) high
deforestation rates (100,000 ha/year), (ii) a lot of unproductive and wastelands,
(iii) poor spatial planning, (iv) the threat of forest clearance for mining, (v) the local
governments having only limited manpower and (vi) natural resource corruption
cases. The good leadership from the Governor was not supported with adequate
human resources in Central Kalimantan. To overcome this, the REDD+ task force
then established a support office in the Governor’s office. This support office serves
as the secretariat for the Regional REDD+ Commission that runs REDD+ activities
in Central Kalimantan.
Various programmes had been tested in Central Kalimantan. Among others, the
Governor offered to test the REDD+ programme through a rehabilitation project of
an abandoned one million hectares of peatland project area (a failed project in
1996). A number of innovations are attempted such as green villages, green schools,
indigenous peoples mapping, the prevention of forest fires and land use licensing
improvements. The involvement of local stakeholders is very essential in deter-
mining the success of such programmes. A lesson learned from this pilot province is
that the operationalisation of REDD+ should be done in an innovative way through
real programmes that can be directly linked to the local needs.
The Governor cannot act by himself in managing REDD+, and the involvement
of district mayors is also necessary. The decentralisation policy has given many
implementation authorities to the district mayors. At that time, the Governor faced
14 K. Mangkusubroto et al.
many difficulties in controlling all of the 15 district mayors. Only seven district
mayors, who have the same political alignment with the Governor, declared their
readiness to support REDD+. Therefore, the BP REDD+ tried to convince the other
mayors to support this concept. The strategy chosen by the BP REDD+ was to
appoint the Governor as the regional leader of REDD+ to coordinate the REDD+
implementation at the district level. The new Regional Government Law No. 23 of
2014, which gives greater powers to the Governor, is used as the basis in bargaining
the position of the Governor.
The synergy between the Governor’s and the mayors’ leadership is very detri-
mental to the success of the REDD+ operationalisation. The REDD+ strategies at
the local level should match with the vision/mission and strategy at the provincial
and district levels. Our experience has shown that without it, the political support
from the local government could not be obtained. The various facilities built by the
REDD+ task force eventually had to be maintained and operationalised by the local
government. That is why the coordination is very important from the outset.
After BP REDD+ was established, the REDD+ activities were expanded to ten
other provinces, i.e. Aceh, West Sumatra, Riau, Jambi, South Sumatra, West
Kalimantan, East Kalimantan, Southeast Sulawesi, Papua and West Papua. The
dynamics in each province is different, making the BP REDD+ operationalisation
context of REDD+ vary in each province. The leader’s character also determines
the structure of REDD+ in each province. The Governor in Central Kalimantan
wanted to lead this process directly (top-down), while the Governor in Jambi saw a
great need to involve all mayors (bottom-up). The BP REDD+ operationalisation
also appears to be more difficult in Papua than in Sumatra and Kalimantan. In
Papua, the human resource capacity issues became the main constraint in REDD+
operationalisation. The strategy and approaches are determined depending on the
needs of the given province and as a result of communication and coordination with
local stakeholders.
The BP REDD+ introduced ten imperative programmes to be implemented at the
provincial level: (1) prevention of forest fires, (2) identification and protection of
indigenous peoples, (3) structuring land use licensing, (4) land conflict resolution,
(5) moratorium monitoring, (6) green villages, (7) green schools, (8) law enforce-
ment improvement, (9) spatial planning improvement and (10) national park devel-
opment. None of these programmes directly related to the emission reduction.
These programmes are designed to overcome the causes of deforestation and land
degradation and more relevantly to improve forest and land use governance as well
as to empower local communities. These REDD+ implementation activities at the
local level were designed to be concrete and in accordance with the local needs.
Emission reduction programmes can only be carried out if the previous
programmes could be well received by the local communities.
A needs-oriented approach became the focus of BP REDD+ at the end of 2014.
The Riau province, for example, was hit by forest and land fires throughout 2014.
Hence, BP REDD+ came up with forest and land fire prevention programme. The
BP REDD+ acted in collaboration with the Riau province government to (i) develop
a forest and land fire monitoring system, (ii) conduct an audit of compliance with
Supporting Decision Making for a Republic Under a Complex System 15
17 companies and (iii) develop local government capacity. The last action was
taken seriously by the provincial government which then leads to a major action
plan to improve forest and land governance in the Riau province. The needs of the
West Sumatra province are different. The governors and the local government
wanted to develop forest-based villages. There were 500,000 hectares of forest to
be proposed to get a village’s forest status from the government. By empowering
village communities in protecting the forests (green village), the BP REDD
+ approach was in line with the needs of the local governments in obtaining a
village’s forest status. While in Jambi, according to the needs of the province, BP
REDD+ focused on the empowerment of indigenous peoples. The needs-based
approach was successful to ensure that the BP REDD+ agenda can be implemented
at the local level.
The role of NGOs is also very detrimental in REDD+ operationalisation. In
Jambi and West Sumatra provinces, for example, the collaboration of BP REDD+
and the Conservation Information Centre (WARSI, an NGO that is based in those
provinces since 1992) has made it easily accepted by the local communities. In
Papua, the BP REDD+ activities are supported by the World Wide Fund for Nature
(WWF) and the Samdhana Institute, while in other provinces, where the NGOs do
not actively participate, the operationalisation of REDD+ becomes much more
difficult. Therefore, it can be concluded that to support a national agenda such as
REDD+, the active participation of the NGOs is very important.
The innovations made by the BP REDD+ that have been mentioned previously
may improve the bargaining power of Indonesia at the international level. The
success stories of various REDD+ implementations may attract more support from
the international community. Unfortunately, the existence of BP REDD+ is still
vulnerable to the dynamics of the national politics, i.e. regime change. This
dynamics may also give negative influence to the existing REDD+ programmes.
Lesson Learned
This paper presents a case study of development policy at the national level using
the topic of REDD+ implementation. Although this case occurred in Indonesia, the
dynamics in this case involves local, national and international actors.
From this case, there are several lessons that can be learned. First, the process
undertaken by the REDD+ task force to develop BP REDD+ was started from
intellectual design to establish the desired condition (sustainable development
beyond carbon and more than forest). This process was done by involving various
stakeholders beyond the REDD+ task force. It was continued with a dynamic and
iterative process that involved information gathering from various sources, inten-
sive alternative design by the REDD+ task force, extensive stakeholder consulta-
tion at provincial and national levels and cross-ministry and agency debate. This
process produced various outputs, such as the REDD+ national strategy, a funding
instrument, and various programmes at provincial and district levels. This action
16 K. Mangkusubroto et al.
research showed that the policy development cycle, which has been discussed in
previous literature, can be applied at the national level.
These collaborative campaigns are expected to be able to create a paradigm shift
and establish a significant foundation to make these initiatives sustainable. The
10-year target (2010–2020) clearly indicates that this process will experience
regime change and transition. This is a challenge, because the structure and the
working process of the government often changes between regimes.
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Value Co-creation Platform as Part of an
Integrative Group Model-Building Process
in Policy Development in Indonesia
Introduction
Decision-makers design policies that are often difficult to implement, because the
design fails to take into account the key feedback that will generate undesired
consequences or limit the benefits of actions (Bérard 2010). This may be the case
more specifically in circumstances when the system under consideration has many
components that may not be easily taken into account by decision-makers’ mental
models. This fact leads to the need of using approaches such as system dynamics
Value Co-creation Platform as Part of an Integrative Group Model-Building. . . 19
modeling that helps to recognize the dynamic behavior that a system experiences
and, consequently, also to mitigate the cognitive limits of decision-makers.
The modeling process using system dynamics can be carried out through two
types of projects: modeling projects and group modeling projects. The first type is
managed by one or more modelers, who design the models themselves and gain the
expertise and required data from many sources and often from experts on the
modeled system (Bérard 2010). While the second type of project, group model
building, refers to a system dynamics model-building process in which a group is
deeply involved in the process of model construction (Vennix 1999).
In a group model building (GMB), the participants develop one or many models
during structured sessions with the help of a facilitator, who must favor the
clarification of knowledge within the group (Bérard 2010). These activities are
typically formed as workshops, work sessions, or conferences. The participants of
the workshops are the “clients” for whom the model is developed, and can be
researchers that are the expert in the problem being discussed, and/or practitioners
who are themselves actors of the system.
There are five components of the process in doing GMB, as mentioned by Bérard
(2010): problem articulation, dynamic hypothesis, simulation model formulation,
model testing, and formulation of strategies and evaluation. However, each step of
the group modeling process may include a succession of individual activities,
subgroup workshops, and plenary sessions. It depends on how suitable the activities
are to the actors that are involved in the GMB.
Although previous literature has clarified on how the GMB process could be
applied to some problems in policy making and policy development, some limita-
tions still should be noted. First, the context in which group modeling projects take
place may be important (Vennix 1999). Another suggestion is that factors such as
the type of organization, the organizational culture, and the history of participants
may affect the project implementation (Bérard 2010). In addition, the model is
limited to the methodological frameworks using system dynamics modeling. While
in the practice, other methods of modeling could be considered in the process.
To cope with the limitations, we propose a group model building where value
co-creation platform becomes a part in the GMB process to enhance the policy
making and policy development process. We implement the platform based on the
real ongoing case study in Indonesia, considering the fact that the type of factors
mentioned (organizational, historical, or cultural type) has a role in influencing the
project implementation of the GMB process. In the next session, a brief explanation
on value co-creation platform will be presented.
Fig. 1 Three management strategies included in the two-layered service system (Novani
et al. 2015; Galbrun and Kijima 2009)
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