Role of Law
Role of Law
INTRODUCTION
Before the Code of Hammurabi in ancient Mesopotamia, people followed rules to
organize social and economic activities, either through mutual agreement or force.
As societies grew larger and more complex, the need for formal rules became
essential.
In modern states, law plays three critical governance roles:
1. It regulates the behavior of individuals and organizations to turn economic
and social policies into outcomes.
2. It defines the structure of government by distributing authority and power
among government actors and between the state and citizens.
3. It provides mechanisms for accountability, peaceful dispute resolution,
and rule changes.
The rule of law, which requires that both government officials and citizens act in
accordance with the law, is fundamental to good governance and the realization of
social and economic potential. Empirical studies show that law and legal institutions
are crucial for improving institutional functioning, enhancing growth, securing
property rights, improving access to credit, and delivering justice. However, merely
having formal laws does not guarantee their effectiveness. In many developing
countries, laws may remain unimplemented, selectively enforced, or impossible to
enforce. "Good laws" might lead to bad outcomes, and laws can be used to
perpetuate insecurity, stagnation, and inequality. Examples include South Africa's
apartheid system and the use of constitutional amendments by authoritarian
leaders to legitimize undemocratic rule. Additionally, laws intended to secure property
rights can sometimes privilege powerful actors at the expense of the vulnerable, such
as rural farmers or marginalized groups.
Law is a double-edged sword: while it can reinforce existing social and economic
relations, it can also be a powerful tool for those seeking to resist, challenge, and
transform those relations. At all levels—local, national, and global—states, elites, and
citizens increasingly use law to negotiate, establish, and challenge norms, policies,
and their implementation. Law provides a structured and formal language for defining
and ordering things, which gives it the potential to evolve beyond its original purposes
and become an independent force. As a product of social and power relations, law can
also be a tool for reshaping them by changing incentives, coordinating beliefs, and
making the policy arena more contestable.
The question "What is law?" has been addressed by many theorists, whose definitions
generally fall into three categories, originally outlined in Plato's Minos:
Customary legal systems reflect the dominant, yet evolving, values and power
structures of their societies, but they may fall short of modern standards of non-
discrimination, rights, and due process. The legitimacy and effectiveness of these
systems are relative and depend on the available alternatives.
Another source of normative pluralism is social norms, which are widely accepted
rules of behavior within social groups. Although less visible than codified laws, social
norms greatly influence behavior by coordinating expectations and using social
sanctions to enforce cooperation and prevent anti-social behavior.
Additionally, in today's interconnected world, many global actors create and spread
rules that affect local experiences of law. These rules, covering areas like trade, labor,
environment, and human rights, can be binding international treaties (hard law) or
voluntary standards (soft law). They may reinforce, complement, or compete with
state law in governing public and private spaces.
This section explains how law acts as a tool for governments to establish rules
that guide behavior in areas such as criminal, civil, and regulatory domains to achieve
economic and social outcomes. However, whether these laws lead to expected results
depends on how they interact with power, social norms, and the state's capacity to
enforce them.
The text explores three mechanisms through which law influences behavior:
1. Coercive Power of Law: Using sanctions or punishment to enforce
compliance.
2. Coordinating Power of Law: Acting as a focal point to align individual actions
toward a common goal.
3. Legitimizing Power of Law: Gaining voluntary compliance by fostering a
sense of legitimacy.
These mechanisms rarely work in isolation but together, interacting with social and
political dynamics, to generate commitment and encourage collective action.
For example, anti-bribery laws require not just a credible threat of enforcement but
also support from private enforcement mechanisms like whistle-blowing. However, too
weak or too strong sanctions can either be absorbed as part of doing business or
discourage whistle-blowing altogether.
Studies by Oto-Peralías and Romero-Ávila argue that common law does not always
result in better legal outcomes than French civil law, especially in regions with high
precolonial population density or settler mortality. Additionally, the form of colonial
rule—such as whether British colonial law was deeply embedded in local contexts or
remained superficial—plays a bigger role in shaping postcolonial legal outcomes than
the mere origin of the legal system. For example, the impact of British colonial law
varied based on how it was adapted to local conditions, highlighting that governance
dynamics and historical context are more important for economic performance than
the specific type of legal system.
In essence, while legal origin influences legal systems, the success of those systems
in supporting economic growth depends more on local governance, power
dynamics, and how laws are implemented, rather than the type of legal system
itself.
For example, the global success of smoking bans demonstrates how laws can
empower non-smokers to pressure smokers, leading to a shift in societal norms where
smoking in public became socially disapproved without much enforcement. This
reflects a norm bandwagon effect, where growing support for a new norm causes
the old one to lose legitimacy.
Gradual norm shifts require a critical mass of supporters who engage in collective
action. Formal laws can strengthen those aligned with legal rules during local norm
contests. For instance, Ghana's inheritance law was introduced despite conflicting
with customary systems but gradually led to social change. Similarly, Senegal's ban
on female genital mutilation helped shift societal views, though it also had
unintended negative consequences by pushing the practice underground.
The power of law to shift norms depends on the incentives it provides and supportive
programs like education and awareness campaigns. In India, the introduction of
gender quotas in village councils initially met resistance, but over time, exposure
to female leaders improved perceptions and increased women's participation in
leadership and entrepreneurship.
Laws can shift norms over time, but they need development and income levels to
effectively support the change. For instance, child labor regulations became more
effective as household incomes increased. In contrast, religious or philosophical
norms tend to be more resistant to change.
The legitimizing power of law refers to the idea that for laws to be truly effective,
they must be seen as legitimate, encouraging voluntary compliance rather
than relying solely on sanctions or enforcement.
Process legitimacy is crucial for legal systems to be respected. Max Weber's concept
of rational legal authority highlights how compliance depends on people's belief in
the fairness of the legal system. Tyler's research supports this, showing that people
are more likely to obey laws they perceive as fair and procedurally just, beyond fear of
punishment. Studies in Africa confirmed that people’s compliance with laws is tied to
their judgment of the government's legitimacy, based on competence and procedural
justice.
However, transplanting laws from one country to another often fails when not
adapted to local conditions. Countries that adapted foreign laws to their specific socio-
economic contexts, or already had populations familiar with the principles, saw
greater success. For instance, legal transplants during EU integration were more
effective when accompanied by efforts to empower domestic actors through
assistance and monitoring. In contrast, attempts to transplant judicial reforms and
anti-corruption laws in southeastern Europe, which bypassed local legislative
processes, did not yield the desired outcomes.
Ordering power: The constitutive role of law
Constitutions serve as the rules for making rules, setting the framework for how
laws are created and enforced. However, the effectiveness of these formal rules
depends on whether they truly limit power or serve as mere "parchment barriers"—
that is, symbolic without real enforcement. Informal and practical power dynamics
also influence how these formal rules shape governance. This section explores the
conditions under which these rules genuinely define power distribution and influence
governance dynamics.
Constitutions, serving as the rules for making rules, have been proliferating,
especially with the rise of new independent states and political transitions in regions
like Central and Eastern Europe post-Soviet era. Despite this growth, constitutions are
typically short-lived, with an average lifespan of 19 years globally, and only 8 years
in Latin America and Eastern Europe. Constitutions are crucial political tools, but their
effectiveness in limiting power through formal rules varies.
The excerpt discusses the role of constitutions as tools for commitment and
coordination among rulers and interest groups. Unlike regular laws,
constitutions need to be self-enforcing, as there is often no clear guardian of the
rules. Effective constitutions function as bargains that allocate power, maintaining
stability as long as interest groups find them beneficial. They help reduce
renegotiation costs and conflicts by clearly defining institutional roles, and
entrenchment makes these rules "sticky," limiting the ability of groups to exit the
agreement when dissatisfied.
The passage explores the divergence between legal frameworks and actual political
practices, particularly in how institutional designs affect elite interests. While
political institutions like presidential versus parliamentary systems create
different incentives, outcomes depend on whether political actors actively
engage with these formal rules.
In many countries, both developing and developed, power is often exercised through
"alternative political technologies" or "informal institutions," which operate
outside the formal legal system. These may include clientelism, bribery, and
traditional authority structures. Such informal mechanisms often arise not merely
from deviance but as practical solutions to commitment and collective action
problems, aligning elite incentives with the real distribution of power.
Thus, the gap between law and practice often reflects a replacement of formal rules
with more contextually suitable arrangements that help maintain stability through
elite bargains. The conditions under which these informal agreements evolve into
formal, rule-based governance are discussed in further detail in a subsequent chapter.
The passage discusses the dual role of law in shaping both elite behavior and
citizen contestation of power. While elites use law to implement policies and
exercise authority, citizens can leverage law to challenge these exercises of power.
Law is seen as both a product of social and power dynamics and a tool for reshaping
them.
In India, the Supreme Court has been instrumental in public interest litigation,
promoting the rights of disadvantaged groups and enhancing government
accountability on issues like child labor and public health. Similarly, South African
courts have held the government accountable for housing and healthcare.
The effectiveness of legal action in promoting social justice does not always rely on
favorable judgments; even losses can mobilize activists and foster rights
consciousness. The concept of “vernacularization” emphasizes the importance of
grounding rights discourse in local contexts, and successful mobilization often requires
building strategic coalitions alongside legal awareness.
The passage discusses how countries with weak legal institutions have sought
international support to enhance their capacity for credible commitment,
particularly in combating corruption. An example is Guatemala, which enlisted
the United Nations to establish the International Commission against Impunity in
Guatemala (CICIG), successfully prosecuting numerous officials, including a sitting
president.
Other countries, such as Bosnia and Herzegovina and Cambodia, have also
employed international judges and prosecutors to address sensitive cases. While
these initiatives have led to successful prosecutions, they face criticism for lacking
sustainability as they often circumvent domestic political processes.
In instances where local courts are viewed as inadequate, citizens have pursued
legal action in foreign jurisdictions, leveraging the concept of universal jurisdiction for
severe crimes. For instance, affected communities in Papua New Guinea sought
redress in Australia against a mining company for environmental damage. Although
the case was not fully successful, it prompted changes in local negotiations, ensuring
community representatives were included in discussions about development
agreements with the company and the government.
The passage discusses the concept of the rule of law, highlighting its essential role in
achieving stable and equitable development. While the rule of law is widely endorsed
as a governance ideal, its precise meaning varies. At a minimum, it entails that both
government officials and citizens are bound by the law, which must be clear, certain,
public, and applied equally through effective legal institutions.
The discussion has shifted from "thin" versions of the rule of law, which focus mainly
on procedures, to "thicker" versions that emphasize substantive adherence to
rights, fairness, and equity. The United Nations defines the rule of law as a
governance principle where all entities, including the state, are accountable to laws
that are publicly promulgated, enforced equally, and aligned with international human
rights norms.
There is a strong correlation between indicators of the rule of law and income levels,
although the causality and underlying mechanisms are less understood. Recognizing
the micro-foundations of laws’ effectiveness can assist policymakers and citizens
in crafting strategies that promote successful legal frameworks. Ultimately, societies
shape their transitions to the rule of law through the dynamic interplay of power
and contestation, focusing not just on the rule of law itself but also on how law is used
by groups and individuals to promote and enforce their interests.
The passage discusses transitions to the rule of law, noting that while there is
extensive literature on democratization, less focus has been placed on legal
transitions.
Three key types of transitions are identified:
i. From Customary to Modern Law: This shift often occurs when actors believe
that a unified legal system will better serve their economic interests,
particularly in facilitating trade and investment. However, transition costs are
high, and existing stakeholders may prefer customary rules, making political
power crucial for implementing change.
The passage emphasizes the need for more research into legal transitions, indicating
that a fully modern legal system is not a prerequisite for economic growth. Legal
systems often evolve alongside economies, and the transition from customary to
formal law may occur later than Western observers expect. A deeper understanding of
these historical dynamics is necessary to guide developing countries in implementing
the rule of law effectively.