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Research Article

Journal of Current Chinese Affairs


2022, Vol. 51(3) 456–475
The Chinese Communist © The Author(s) 2022
Article reuse guidelines:
Party as a Global Force sagepub.com/journals-permissions
DOI: 10.1177/18681026221129294
journals.sagepub.com/home/cca

Frank N. Pieke1,2

Abstract
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is currently in the throes of redefining itself as not
just China’s ruling party, but also as the dominant political force of global China.
Following the path of Chinese globalisation, this project overlaps with – but is different
from – China’s much maligned strategy of influencing and interfering in the society and
politics of other countries. The principal aim of the CCP’s global extension is not to
meddle in the affairs of other countries, but tying Chinese people, goods, money,
business, and institutions that have ventured abroad back into the strategy and domestic
system of China and the CCP. The article shows that China’s emerging superpower is
informed both by China’s unique pattern of globalisation and the CCP’s own under-
standing of the nature, aims, and modalities of its rule, which can only partially be com-
pared to those of earlier superpowers.

Manuscript received 04 December 2021; accepted 01 September 2022

Keywords
Chinese Communist Party, globalisation, political influence, party building

Introduction: Beyond Soft, Hard and Sharp Power


Interest and concerns about Chinese influence abroad have grown almost explosively in
recent years, first in Australia and the United States, but increasingly also in Europe,
Southeast Asia, and other parts of the world. The greater significance of China is a
matter of much more than the growth of its economy alone. Under President Xi

1
Leiden Asia Centre, Leiden University, Leiden, The Netherlands
2
East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore, Singapore, Singapore

Corresponding Author:
Frank N. Pieke, Leiden Asia Centre, Leiden University, Leiden, The Netherlands.
Email: f.n.pieke@hum.leidenuniv.nl

Creative Commons Non Commercial CC BY-NC: This article is distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/
by-nc/4.0/) which permits non-commercial use, reproduction and distribution of the work without
further permission provided the original work is attributed as specified on the SAGE and Open Access page (https://us.
sagepub.com/en-us/nam/open-access-at-sage).
Pieke 457

Jinping, the country is emerging as a superpower with global ambitions and a rapidly
escalating rivalry with the United States. In this new geopolitical climate, facts or suspi-
cions of Chinese influence or even interference abroad feature very prominently (for
instance Joske, 2020; Sahlins, 2015). In these discussions, the whole gamut of influence,
interference, and even sabotage is often lumped together. Chinese “soft power,” “public
diplomacy” (e.g., Confucius institutes, Chinese cultural centres, support for
Chinese-language media), and the activities and expressions of Chinese embassies and
diplomats are certainly not always innocent. However, they are of a different order
than the genuinely disruptive activities that China also engages in, such as disinformation
(“fake news”) campaigns, cyberattacks, bribery or threats against politicians, and espion-
age and theft of civil, military, or “dual use” technology.
The concept of soft power in international relations was developed as the opposite and
counterpart of hard power (Nye, 2004). The latter involves methods to coerce foreign
actors to submit to a country’s wishes, even against their will if necessary. The original
thrust of the concept of soft power focused on the influence of culture, values, and contact
in positively shaping opinions and attitudes towards the US autonomously from the activ-
ities of the state. However, when the Chinese authorities discovered this American
concept of soft power early in the first decade of the twenty-first century, they made it
an instrument of statecraft and public diplomacy: the party-state develops the narratives,
dominates, and directs the actors involved, and attempts to control the content and flow of
information. This approach is intended to enable China to develop and transmit long-
term, well-coordinated and comprehensive public diplomacy policies and unified mes-
sages (Cao and Zhao, 2013; d’Hooghe, 2014; Repnikova, 2022).
More recently in the context of alarmist analyses of Chinese influence, the concept of
“sharp power” has come into vogue. Sharp power occupies the space between soft and
hard power, referring to activities aimed at “piercing, penetrating or perforating the pol-
itical and information environments in targeted countries” (Walker and Ludwig, 2017:
13). Even more than soft power, Chinese sharp power is state-driven, seeking to
exploit the openness and free flow of information in democratic countries to abuse and
even undermine the target country’s values and policies.
This largely sums up our conceptual tools to understand China’s influence, influencing
and interference abroad. I argue that this misses a hugely important aspect of China’s
global impact that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) calls its “organisational capacity”
(组织力, zuzhili), and what I will call organising power. I will show that the CCP itself as
the principal agent of organising power does not simply impinge on foreign countries as
external entities, but creates enclaves abroad that are drawn back into China’s own
system. The party extends, builds, and uses its own organisation abroad in ways that
are very similar to party building and party work in China itself, turning the CCP into
a global presence and force that is interwoven with the globalisation of Chinese firms,
organisations, and individuals. Rather than being a part of the CCP’s foreign influencing
strategy, the CCP’s overseas organisational power is driven principally to counter the
dangers of what Ruben Gonzalez has termed the “decentred internationalisation of the
Chinese state,” that is, processes of localisation of Chinese state agents under the
458 Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 51(3)

impact of China’s global footprint and interests (Gonzalez-Vicente, 2011; see also
Hameiri and Jones, 2015).
As Chinese actors are increasingly present abroad and as China constitutes a growing
slice of the world economy, the CCP is confronted with challenges compelling it to
extend the reach of its system abroad. The global reach of the CCP’s own organisation
is not a devious plan to rule the world or make the world socialist, Chinese, or both,
but an evolving response to and aspect of the requirements of the specific pattern of
“Chinese globalisation” (Pieke et al. 2004) and China’s emerging superpower role.
The CCP’s foreign organisational reach is a response to the challenges and opportun-
ities of Chinese globalisation that quite literally and naturally makes the world more
Chinese, just as in the twentieth century US hegemony made the world more
American. For the CCP, China’s role in the world no longer provides incentives for con-
vergence on liberal norms and institutions. Instead, the impact of its globalisation and
superpower pulls China away from them, strengthening its own, “neo-socialist” order
(Pieke, 2016) not only domestically but also, as we will see in this article, abroad.
The extension of the CCP organisational power is very different from earlier efforts to
export Maoist ideology and revolution. This most obviously was the case during the
Korean War in the early 1950s, in Vietnam in the 1960s and 1970s, and in Cambodia
after the Vietnamese invasion in 1978. The CCP also materially supported communist
movements in Malaysia, Burma, and Indonesia. Maoist China was a source of inspiration
and ideological and strategic guidance for revolutionary movements across the world.
Leaders of India’s Naxalites and Peru’s Shining Path, for instance, visited China and
often stayed for extended periods of training (Lovell, 2019).
Overseas party building is also different from the established foreign practices of the
CCP’s United Front Department (统战部, tongzhan bu) and International Liaison
Department (对外联络部, duiwai lianluo bu) that seek to gain influence among overseas
Chinese or foreign elites. The United Front Department’s responsibility for overseas
Chinese makes it a vital plank for China’s access to the capital, knowhow, and markets
of foreign countries (Groot, 2004; Sapio, 2019). More recently, united front work has
become more pervasive both in China itself and amongst overseas Chinese communities,
emphasising not just alliance and support, but also insisting on the unity of the Chinese
nation, loyalty to China, and support for China’s system, model, and politics (Pieke, 2021).
The party’s International Department focuses on relations with foreign political parties
and elites across the political spectrum. Under Xi Jinping, the department has further
stepped up its work, for instance by organising major events in Beijing where members
of the Politburo or even Xi Jinping himself meet with foreign delegates, some of which I
attended myself between 2014 and 2017. The department is particularly active in Belt
and Road countries, for instance by organising training courses for cadres of foreign political
parties like the South African ANC (Brady, 2003; Eisenman and Heginbotham, 2020: 302–
303; Hackenesch and Bader, 2020; Lovell, 2019; Shambaugh, 2007).
Recently, the United Front Department has taken on increasingly direct responsibility
for China’s foreign influencing strategy as part of its overseas Chinese work (Joske,
2020). In speeches given in 2015 and 2016, Party General Secretary Xi Jinping explicitly
Pieke 459

connected the overseas Chinese work of the united front with his Belt & Road Initiative.
Moreover, Xi imagines the overseas role of the United Front Department to be comple-
mentary to the work of the International Department.
Overseas party building work, however, takes place quite separately from the United
Front and International departments, and is best seen as an open-ended process rooted in
the domestic organisational practices of the party. Overseas party building is led and
coordinated by the party’s Central Organization Department in conjunction with the
party committee of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration
Commission of the State Council (SASAC), the party committee of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, and the party group of the Ministry of Commerce. Together, these
central party organisations issued the 2016 “Guiding Opinions on Strengthening the
Party Building Work in Overseas Units of Central Enterprises” that will be discussed
more fully below. The logic behind this process is pretty consistent and driven by a com-
bination of established Leninist principles and the CCP’s view of its leading role in
Chinese politics and society (Koss, 2021).
The research for this article consists of a systematic search of Chinese-language aca-
demic literature and other Chinese written sources (CNKI Chinese-language publications
database, Chinese media databases, policy documents, blogs, reports, and other docu-
ments on WeChat [微信, weixin] official accounts).
WeChat official accounts have a unique added value. Managed by media outlets, aca-
demic institutions, governmental bodies, or companies, their contents are specifically tar-
geted at subscribers rather than the general public. We have found many sources on party
building overseas on such accounts maintained by Chinese state-owned enterprises
intended for the use of party members among their employees or as a reference for
career party members from their or other companies or organisations. WeChat official
accounts provide information on party building considered inappropriate for the
general public, which turned out to be invaluable for this research. Because of the fun-
gible nature of the content of WeChat accounts, we have refrained from providing a
URL to postings that we refer to in this article, but we have kept an offline archive of
all postings drawn on for our research.
Our research used the Sogou WeChat (搜狗, sougou) search engine to perform sys-
tematic searches of WeChat official accounts. We started our search with general
terms such as “国外党建” (guowai dangjian, party building abroad) and “海外党建”
(haiwai dangjian, party building overseas). Then, narrowing down further, we continued
with more specific searches of two categories: (1) specific means and ways of party build-
ing overseas “互联网+” (hulianwang jia, internet+), “海外党建6 + 1” (haiwai dangjian
6 + 1, overseas party building 6 + 1), “企业文化” (qiye wenhua, corporate culture), (2)
large state-owned enterprises that emerged as advanced examples of party building over-
seas, such as Sinopec and the China State Construction Engineering Corporation.
For practical reasons, we had to focus on just a few small countries from different parts
of the world with different degrees of Chinese presence and party building activities
(Cambodia, Angola, Serbia, Kazakhstan, and the Netherlands). However, this was
done to keep the amount of material manageable rather than attempt a systematic
460 Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 51(3)

country-by-country comparison, which is something that we will have to leave for future
research.
Many of the sources that we have used were written by party cadres from state-owned
enterprises abroad, and almost certainly overstate the extent and successes of foreign
party work. Their authors have an obvious incentive to boast their successes and hide
their failures. However, we have also found some publications based on Chinese publicly
funded academic research projects on foreign party building. These are indeed much less
bullish and have served as an important corrective (Feng, 2021; Guo and Sun, 2011a,
2011b; Ma, 2017).
In addition, this research also reviews recent versions of the party constitution, and
general party regulations, directives, and guiding opinions related to party building, espe-
cially from the Central Organization Department, in order to uncover the development
and current trends of party building, both domestically and abroad.

Organising Power: Regulating CCP Party Building at Home and


Abroad
In 2017, western media exposed the presence of a number of CCP “cells” (branches) at
universities abroad (Allen-Ebrahemian, 2018). Surprisingly, some Chinese newspapers
also openly reported on this (Zhang, 2017a, 2017b). The immediate consequence of
these “revelations” was simply that the CCP itself stopped giving publicity to foreign
party work without any intention of actually putting an end to it. Nevertheless, in the
Chinese literature, it is still not difficult to find ample evidence of the existence of
active party branches at foreign universities. In particular, Chinese universities with
many student exchanges abroad set up temporary party branches among their students
at foreign universities (Tongji daxue, 2018).
According to Guo and Sun (2011b), party building work among Chinese students
abroad goes back to at least 2006 when Beijing Union University (北京联合大学,
beijing lianhe daxue) established a party branch for twelve of its party members who
went to study at the University of Paisley (now the Paisley Campus of the University
of West Scotland). At the time of their writing in 2011, already more than ten further col-
leges and universities had established “basic party organisations” among their students
overseas.
Foreign party branches among Chinese students function to a large extent using what
is called the “internet+” method, which includes the use of social media, online meetings,
and online teaching materials and courses. It remains an open question whether this kind
of party work among students actually has much substance. Guo and Sun’s 2011 research
of a (small) sample of party members among returned students in the Nanjing area
showed that even where overseas party branches existed, daily party organisational
work almost never took place. Only 22 per cent of their respondents reported that their
party branch had relatively strong “cohesion and charisma” (凝聚力和感召力,
ningjüli he ganzhaoli; Guo and Sun, 2011a, 2011b; see also Feng, 2021). On the other
Pieke 461

hand, it must be said that for an institution such as the University of Defence Technology
(国防科技大学, guofang keji daxue) party branches among the students abroad are of
genuine importance to ensure that they return to China, of course with the knowledge
they have acquired (Joske, 2018; Wang, 2013).
The concept of party building (党的建设, dang de jianshe, 党建, dangjian) is inher-
ently political and strategic. In his 1939 essay “Introducing The Communist” Mao
Zedong called for building a “bolshevized Chinese Communist Party, a party which is
national in scale and has a broad mass character, a party which is fully consolidated ideo-
logically, politically and organizationally” (Mao, 1967 [1939]: 285). In Mao’s reinter-
pretation, bolshevisation was equated with ideological and political conformity to the
centre and strict Leninist organisational principles, which ultimately translated into the
Yan’an rectification campaign of 1942–1944 (Benton, 1996). As one of the CCP’s
three “magic weapons” (三大法宝, san da fabao) for defeating the enemy in the
Chinese revolution, party building is the process by which the mass of party members
and cadres is transformed into what Philip Selznick calls an “organisational weapon”
of the revolution (Selznick, 1952).
In 1988, a Central Party Building Work Leading Group (中央党的建设工作领导小
组, zhongyang dang de jianshe gongzuo lingdao xiaozu) of the Politburo was established.
Two of the deputy leaders of the leading group were the heads of the Central Discipline
Inspection Commission (中央纪律检查委员会, zhongyang jilü jiancha weiyuanhui) and
the Central Organization Department. The importance of this work is evidenced by the
fact that both Hu Jintao and later Xi Jinping acted as leaders of the leading group in
the years immediately preceding their elevation to the highest office in the land (Xi,
2018).
Party building refers to self-improvement activities undertaken to maintain what the
party considers to be its own unique nature. Party building includes the full range of
propaganda, education and training, organisational work, discipline inspection, mass
organisations, and united front work, which is laid down in the general section of the
party constitution itself (Zhongguo gongchandang zhangcheng, 2017). Party building
also involves teaching, research, and theory building, and is even a discipline at party
schools throughout the country (Pieke, 2009).
Party building specifically deals with the presence of the party at the grassroots
of society. Most importantly, party building lifts the “party spirit” (党性, dangxing)
and strengthens “party discipline” (党纪, dangji), thus aligning the party’s
members and cadres with the methods, work style, vision, goals, and ideology of
the centre. Party building operates at the nexus of the party’s external role and func-
tions (“the work of the party,” 党的工作, dang de gongzuo) on the one hand and
routine internal “party affairs” (党务工作, dangwu gongzuo) on the other hand.
Party building is how “the party must manage the party” (党要管党, dang yao
guan dang), bringing together ideology, organisation, and political practice
(N.A., 2018). Party building is thus where the party becomes an instrument not
just of governance, but of political transformation in the pursuit of its own ultimate
goals and mission.
462 Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 51(3)

Over the past fifteen years, party building efforts have been made to increase and
strengthen the party’s presence across Chinese society (Li, 2019; McGregor, 2010;
Shambaugh, 2008; Thornton, 2012, and her article in this special issue). Xi Jinping
has further accelerated this process, increasing the direct political and administrative
role of the party, strengthening its presence and grip on government, the army, the judicial
system, civil society, and business (Economy, 2018; Grünberg and Drinhausen, 2019;
Koss, 2021b; Leutert and Eaton, 2021; Lin and Milhaupt, 2021; McGregor, 2019;
Mittelstaedt, 2021; Pieke, 2018; Yan and Huang, 2017).
A key aspect of this approach is the principle of “strictly governing the Party” (从严治
党, congyan zhidang) in order to enhance the party branches’ “organisational capacity”
(组织力, zuzhili, organising power), strengthen the political function of party branches,
and develop party branches’ role of a “battle fortress” ( 战斗堡垒, zhandou baolei) in the
consolidation of the party’s long-term governance (Zhongguo gongchandang zhibu
jiguan dangwei, 2018).
The same principle and approach apply overseas. China’s increasing globalisation pre-
sents the party’s ambition to strengthen its grip with a number of particular challenges.
This includes not only the presence and activation of party members within foreign orga-
nisations and companies present in China itself, an issue that recently has vexed a great
many commentators on China (Sky News Australia, 2020). Chinese globalisation also
necessitates the management of party members residing outside China. The number of
Chinese students abroad has increased rapidly. State-owned institutions and companies
increasingly have projects or investments outside China and send larger numbers of
their staff abroad. Recruitment agencies often send large groups of Chinese workers
abroad on temporary contracts. In all these cases, party members are among them.
Party building work explicitly concerns party members who in principle temporarily
go abroad, rather than those who have emigrated permanently. The latter have to give up
their party membership or at least de-activate the membership of their original party
branch in China, after which they become subject to the party’s overseas Chinese policies
run by the United Front.
Party work abroad focuses particularly on party members who work abroad for
state-owned enterprises or large projects, and Chinese students on government scholar-
ships and university programmes or exchanges. There is, at present, still little mention
of party work among those who have gone abroad under their own steam, that is, self-
funded students or private businesspeople.
However, private enterprises and their subsidiaries abroad have already been included
in the CCP’s party building drive. In my most recent research on party building in the
Netherlands and elsewhere in Europe, I have found evidence that since 2017 some of
China’s larger private enterprises are being compelled to commit to party building
abroad and to work together with the representatives of the Ministry of Commerce at
Chinese embassies and consulates to promote party building among other Chinese enter-
prises abroad as well (Pieke and de Graaff, 2022: chapter 6).
In the Chinese literature, the focus on party work abroad is presented as following
from the requirements of China’s “system.” State-owned enterprises and state-
Pieke 463

coordinated projects are seen as foreign extensions of China’s domestic economy and
society and therefore as “part of the system” (体制内, tizhinei) of the party and the
state. An article on building party branches posted on the CCP’s members’ website
(共产党员网, gongchandangyuan wang) formulated this as follows:

Although there are particularities in overseas party building work, it is not treated differently
(境外党建工作虽有特殊性、但无特殊化, jingwai dangjian gongzuo sui you teshuxing,
dan wu teshuhua). Strengthening party building in overseas institutions of Chinese-funded
enterprises is an inevitable requirement for promoting the institutionalization and standard-
ization of overseas party building work. (Liu, 2018)

Party members abroad will in principle remain members of the party committee to
which they belong in China. The party committees of universities and companies are
required to involve their members abroad as far as possible in their activities and, if pos-
sible, to organise activities abroad for them. In addition, party members abroad must also
remain locally involved in the party. In theory, the party committee of the local Chinese
embassy or consulate is responsible for the party members among the students and
employees of companies and institutions. For workers sent abroad by recruitment agen-
cies, the party committee of the agency’s foreign representation is responsible for the
party members among them (Zhonggong zhongyang zuzhibu, 1984).
In practice, these arrangements that date from 1984 do not appear to work properly.
The great distance from China makes it very difficult for party committees in China to
involve their members abroad in their activities taking place in China. The party
committees of embassies and consulates often lack the necessary staff and perhaps
also the incentives to keep in touch with party members dispersed throughout their
jurisdiction.
Party organisations often fail to adapt to the very different circumstances abroad and as
a result atrophy. Due to frequent cross-border rotation, it is difficult to systematically
carry out party member education or build party branches. In addition, party members
are affected by a “different social and cultural environment, resulting in different ways
of living, thinking and values” (Jiang, 2019).
From the party’s point of view, there are a number of major problems with this.
Without an active connection to a party branch, “only those party members with
strong ideals and beliefs can resist the temptation” of the “sugar-coated bullets” (糖衣
炮弹, tangyi paodan; an old Maoist term used during the Three-Anti Campaign in
1951) of a western lifestyle and “international hostile forces.” With the erosion of
party spirit and party discipline, the party is in danger of losing control of its own
members. This can also be a problem for the party members themselves. Party
members who have to reactivate membership of their party branch upon return to
China have been put behind by their time abroad. As a result, their careers and further
development as party members might suffer (Feng, 2021).
In order to ensure that the party does not lose control of its members abroad, other,
more recent regulations or opinions have appeared that also refer to foreign party
464 Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 51(3)

work. The general regulations on party organisation in state-owned enterprises of 2004,


for instance, include the observation that

Enterprises stationed abroad must establish party organizations and carry out party work in
accordance with the number of party members, the local environment and the actual situation
of the enterprise, and the requirements of flexibility, simplicity, safety and confidentiality
(emphasis added). (Zhongyang zuzhibu, 2004: article 22)

A genuine increase in the emphasis on foreign party work happened in 2016 with the
issuance of a “leading opinion” (指导意见, zhidao yijian) specifically on party work
abroad. Reportedly, these regulations are called “Guiding Opinions of the Central
Organization Department, the Party Committee of the SASAC, the Party Committee of
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Party Group of the Ministry of Commerce on
Strengthening the Party Building Work in Overseas Units of Central Enterprises” (中
央组织部、国务院国资委党委、外交部党委、商务部党组关于加强中央企业境外
单位党建工作的指导意, Zhongyang zuzhibu, guowuyuan guoziwei dangwei, waijiaobu
dangwei, shangwubu dangzu guanyu jiaqiang Zhongyang qiye jingwai danwei dangjian
gongzuo de zhidao yijian) Although this opinion has remained confidential, I have been
able to piece together its gist from some of the articles that I have read.
According to this recent Chinese literature, the opinion was issued to incorporate new
models and methods of party building abroad that were already being experimented with.
For example, the opinion authorises setting up a network of regional party branches, for
which the party committee of the local establishment of a large Chinese state-owned
enterprise is then responsible and takes on the coordination. This reduces the pressure
on the staff of the local embassy and makes it possible to organise party members in insti-
tutions that do not themselves have a party organisation (Qiang, 2018).
According to the 2016 regulations, party work abroad should be based on five princi-
ples. The first is “upholding the general principle of the unwavering leadership of the
party” (坚持党的领导不动摇原则, jianchi dang de lingdao bu dongyao yuanze). This
principle provides the ideological motivation and political guarantee that the achieve-
ments of the overseas development of state-owned enterprises and institutions serve
the construction and development of the cause of socialism with Chinese characteristics
(Liang, 2019).
Overt party activities are often not possible, especially in situations where, for
example, employees of a Chinese company frequently work with non-Chinese collea-
gues. Moreover, many countries do not allow CCP activities. Covert party activities
are therefore often necessary and methods based on the internet or social media must
be used more than in China. Such activities take place on the basis of the second principle
of overseas party work, the “principle of the ‘five non-disclosures’ (“五不公开”原则,
“wu bu gongkai” yuanze): the non-disclosure of party organisation, internal party posi-
tions, party member status, internal party documents, and internal party activities in over-
seas party building activities. The five non-disclosures help overseas party building
activities avoid “local political, economic, cultural and religious risks,” and “provide
Pieke 465

protection for the long-term and stable development of overseas party building” (Jiang,
2019; Liang, 2019; Zhongguo taiping baoxian jituan dangwei, 2018).
In practice, the five non-disclosures mean that party activities and discussion of party
work must never be held in the presence of foreign employees or visitors, nor should
party activities take place in public places outside the company premises and work
sites. Facebook, Twitter, and other foreign social media should be avoided. Instead,
the company’s intranet and WeChat official account should be used. For the consumption
of foreign employees and visitors, party activities should be presented as a part of the
company’s “corporate culture and team building” (企业文化和团队建设, qiye wenhua
he tuandui jianshe; Liang, 2019).
Covert practices are by no means limited to the operations of Chinese state-owned
enterprises abroad. Among Chinese students, too, party activities are carried out under
other guises in order to avoid arousing suspicion or even censure. A recent academic
article on foreign party building among students abroad observes that “due to the
special political environment overseas, some party members have kept ‘invisible’ for a
long time.” They “rely on international student organizations to integrate the training
of party members into [other] activities, such as Chinese cultural promotion and
exchanges, international volunteer work, speech contests, debate contests, etc.” (Feng,
2021). This confirms earlier research of Guo and Sun, who write that

Grass-roots student party organizations (party branches or party groups) in foreign countries
take into account the special and complex international environment of foreign countries
when conducting activities. Most of them publicize, organize, apply for venues and funds
in the name of ordinary student associations. (Guo and Sun, 2011a)

The party organisation of state-owned enterprises abroad is subject to the joint lead-
ership of the party committee of the headquarters of the company back in China and
the party committee of the Chinese embassy of the host country. This third “dual-
leadership principle” (共同领导原则, gongtong lingdao yuanze) stipulated in the 2016
confidential regulations goes back to the regulations of 1984 (see above). The party orga-
nisations of the headquarters back in China are responsible for the education, manage-
ment, and supervision of party members and cadres abroad, and bear the costs of these
and other party building work abroad. The party committee of the embassy or consulate
provides “political guidance in view of China’s foreign policies.” The embassy also
carries out ideological and political work in case of “special situations or emergencies,”
and facilitates exchanges on party building work with other, locally present Chinese com-
panies and units (Liang, 2019).
The fourth principle of foreign party work is “the principle of focusing on the centre
and serving the overall situation” (围绕中心, 服务大局原则, weirao zhongxin, fuwu
daju yuanze). This principle follows from Article 33 of Chapter V of the party constitu-
tion which stipulates that the primary party organisations in state-owned enterprises and
collective enterprises shall carry out their work around the production and operation of
enterprises. State-owned enterprises abroad face heavy responsibilities and high pressures
466 Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 51(3)

in an even more complex market operation environment with a higher risk than in China
itself. Improving corporate efficiency, enhancing corporate competitiveness, and main-
taining and increasing the value of state-owned assets are “the starting point and the
end point” of party organisation work in enterprises abroad (Liang, 2019).
The fifth and final principle of the 2016 regulations is the “principle of adapting mea-
sures to local conditions and being pragmatic and efficient” (因地制宜, 务实高效原则,
yin di zhi yi, wushi gaoxiao yuanze). When party organisations carry out party building
work abroad, they should fully consider the actual situation and innovate party organisa-
tion, party member education and management methods, and where needed simplify
operating procedures (Liang, 2019).
The party is concerned that the appeal of living abroad will alienate some of its
members, who might no longer prove reliable after their return to China. Moreover,
foreign operations should fit the overall plan and aims of the party. The party is well
aware that Chinese companies and projects abroad have their own strategic objectives.
If left unchecked, the party believes, foreign operations will make Chinese companies
increasingly global and less Chinese. Party building and party work in these companies
and projects are intended to ensure that they do not stray too far from the plans of the CCP
and its vision for the Chinese nation (Ma, 2017).
Very interestingly, the final two principles of party work abroad outlined above seem
at least partially to negate such a heavy-handed emphasis on politics and submission to
the party authorities back in China. They emphasise operational work, profitability, and
flexible adaptation to local conditions. These two principles present party work as a
means of combating corruption and coordinating the activities of the Chinese embassy
and other Chinese companies and institutions in a particular region. This is considered
particularly important in less developed countries. Yet even here party work is not
intended as an instrument of interference in the affairs of other countries, but as a way
to make Chinese companies and projects abroad more competitive, better run, operating
according to the law, and more in tune with local circumstances (Ma, 2017).

Overseas Party Building in Practice


Party members abroad working together in a party branch are often drawn from several
different departments of a company or even from different companies. They moreover
tend to travel frequently. Members of such a joint overseas party branch participate in
its study and education activities, but do not need to transfer their party relationship to
the overseas party branch. Instead, the party branch in their original unit conducts the
management and evaluation of these party members and collects their party membership
fee. This helps to organise party members scattered over many projects and sites abroad
without jeopardising the integrity of the CCP’s party organisation and its grip over its
members.
Online party work plays an essential role abroad. Some party committees distribute
e-readers to their members with updates of the party constitution and party building clas-
sics. Through the use of party building information apps and WeChat official accounts,
Pieke 467

foreign grassroots party branches get access to the latest developments in the party
and national policies. The CCP is aware of the security issues that come with the inter-
net, particularly in times of increased geopolitical rivalry. The party therefore urges
the exclusive use of Chinese tools and social media (Gao, 2019). This has several
advantages, most importantly that their paperless nature facilitates compliance with
the “five non-disclosures” in party work overseas (N.A., 2017). Furthermore,
foreign party building apps, such as 海外党建6 + 1 (Haiwai dangjian 6 + 1, overseas
party building app 6 + 1) also help the party to monitor whether individual party
members complete their daily party work tasks, such as reading recent party
documents (Li, 2020).
In addition to these explicitly political and organisational goals, foreign party building
work has three operational goals: (1) keeping Chinese and foreign employees happy and
in line; (2) enhancing the competitiveness and management of foreign operations and
projects; and (3) presenting a positive image of the company and China to the outside
world. The ways that these goals play out in practice are often highly diverse and the con-
nection with party work is not necessarily always instinctively obvious. Indeed, party
building often seems to serve as an index that points to all that is good and reassuring
about China, its system and – increasingly – its culture.
Enterprise party organisations enforce party discipline and rules, in the process also
reducing the financial risks of enterprises’ external operations and the possible loss of
state-owned assets. Party branches also conduct education and the promotion of “clean
government” to fight corruption and excessive lifestyles.
The party is involved in labour relations and management as well. This includes
disease and safety management in high-risk countries. One article even reports on
mundane facilities for workers and staff as the party’s work: “in order to enrich the
lives of employees, the regional company’s party committee has set up a staff’s food
committee, life service station, fitness equipment room, leisure viewing room, shared
book room, and a secretary’s chat room” (Liang, 2019). Party work also caters to the
emotional needs of homesick employees, providing them with more opportunities to
be involved with China, their hometown and relatives.
The relevance of party building work extends far beyond the company or project and is
presented as a magic wand to strengthen China’s presence and impact abroad. Party work
aims to ensure that Chinese actors do not alienate foreign partners, governments or the
public. Like in domestic party building, party branch work abroad is a “grassroots fight-
ing fortress,” and is supposed to create a positive impression of China and Chinese enter-
prises among the local population (Gao, 2020).
The composition of workers and staff on overseas projects is often very complex with
different cultures, beliefs, and languages among local employees, high crime rates, and
conflicts between Chinese and local workers. In order to deal with these problems,
party work and party building must focus on external relations, labour management,
and more generally a “good external environment.” By establishing effective leadership
and organisation, the party ensures the “smooth flow of internal government orders and
orderly organization,” and promotes “the unity and vitality” of overseas employees
468 Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 51(3)

within the enterprise. Corporate party organisations can also build “social and environ-
mentally friendly corporate and community relationships” (Gao, 2020; see also Ma,
2017).
Overseas party work therefore explicitly concerns itself with China’s larger aims in
international politics, especially those that concern China’s public diplomacy and soft
power strategies. The key concept here is “corporate culture” (企业文化, qiye
wenhua). As “the carrier of party building work” (党建工作载体, dangjian gongzuo
zaiti), corporate culture is presented as having “the same effect as the Party’s role in sta-
bilizing the team and uniting people, and is an effective entry for party building work to
serve production and operation” (Liang, 2019).
Moreover, the label “corporate culture” enables a Chinese company to carry out party
work overseas under the “five non-disclosures” principle and avoid restrictions imposed
by foreign governments on overt party work (Zhang, 2017a, 2017b). Indeed, the term cor-
porate culture and its explicit connection with overseas party building occur so frequently
in our sources that this very likely represents the official approach to overseas party build-
ing (Liang, 2019; Zhang, 2017a, 2017b).
Party building as corporate culture is presented as an approach to tie Chinese and
foreign employees together and to the company. Party work enhances the company’s
“organising power,” and is used “as the core of team-building” of party members,
Chinese employees and foreign employees (Zhongguo dianzi jinchukou youxian
gongsi dangwei, 2019).
This use of party building as corporate culture is ostensibly apolitical, aiming to use
the party’s organisational power to boost productivity. Concrete examples given of
how foreign employees are involved in party work in Chinese companies are dumpling-
making competitions, cultural and sports competitions and other activities that enhance
the integration of Chinese and foreign employees, regularly praising outstanding
foreign employees, and selecting foreign employees to China for a visit or study
(N.A., 2019).
Another area where party work involves foreign employees is corporate social respon-
sibility (CSR). Foreign employees have a better understanding of the local situation and
can help with the CSR strategy of Chinese companies and projects overseas. CSR
involves the image of Chinese companies and their Chinese “brand.” Here, too, overseas
party work and party building serve as a “red engine” (红色引擎, hongse yinqing) that
“transforms the political advantage of party building into a development advantage of
participating in world market competition” and ensures that this remains in tune with
the objective of improving the image of Chinese companies abroad and the general
thrust of China’s soft power strategy (Wu, 2020).
However, the use of “corporate culture” is not as straightforwardly instrumental as it
might sound. One company (中建桥梁, zhongjian qiaoliang, China Construction
Bridge) openly argues that “the project’s party branch has infused the ‘China
Construction Bridge creed’ with traditional Chinese culture, while at the same time
taking into account the restricted and concealed nature of overseas party building activ-
ities” (Zhongjian qiaoliang, 2018).
Pieke 469

This example shows that the fusion of corporate culture and party building easily spills
over into the use of the much broader concept of Chinese culture. Corporate culture is a
vehicle “to tell the Chinese story well” (讲好中国故事, jiang hao zhongguo gushi) and
persuades foreign employees and others abroad that “the Chinese way” (中国道路,
zhongguo daolu) is why China achieved its economic success (Ma, 2017). The connec-
tion between party building and corporate culture thus also serves a more generally posi-
tive appraisal of Chinese culture and the fusion of the party’s legitimacy with Chinese
civilisation.

Conclusion
In this article, I have shown that the current focus on Chinese soft, sharp or hard power
overlooks a crucial aspect of the CCP’s development as a global force. The extension of
the party’s organisational power among its own members who are residing abroad is
turning the CCP into a global presence. However, this organisational power is not
intended to interfere with the affairs of other countries, but principally seeks to use the
party’s organisation to tie Chinese actors (firms, organisations, and individuals) back
into the system in China and the CCP’s vision of a global Chinese nation. Party building
ensures that Chinese actors do not stray too far from the interests, plans, and objectives of
the CCP and that their activities contribute to a positive image of China and the Party
abroad.
Where CCP work is discouraged or even forbidden, the party is happy to operate cov-
ertly or under the guise of team building and corporate culture. Old Leninist principles of
party building like a cell-based, hierarchical party organisation, party discipline, and
democratic centralism thus increasingly shape Chinese globalisation. The same can be
said of the covert nature of party building, which harks back to the party’s roots as the
secretive vanguard of a revolutionary movement. A century ago in the first few years
after the founding of the CCP in 1921, Leninism was only gradually adopted.
Leninism did not come ready-made, but had to be learned, adapted, and then imposed
upon an often intransigent, motley crowd of party members and party groups across
China (Van de Ven, 1991). Now that the party extends its reach across the globe,
some of the same processes are at work again, albeit on a much larger, vastly better
funded and much more professional basis.
However, it is important not to stretch the comparison with the CCP’s past too far. The
overseas extension of the party principally follows the globalisation of Chinese capital
and serves a national agenda that sees China become a superpower and equal to the
US by 2050. This is not the same as the military conquest and revolutionary takeover
of China in 1949. It is also not the same as spreading communist revolution across the
world, as Mao’s China periodically, selectively, and often half-heartedly attempted in
the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s.
Overseas party building has been born from finding solutions to a range of often
contradictory, practical problems arising from China’s globalisation. The party is learning
by doing. Its overseas work varies vastly between countries and contexts and is rife with
470 Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 51(3)

inconsistencies, chiefly because overseas party work must cater to three quite different
agendas. First, party building helps Chinese businesses in their local operations.
Second, party building ties Chinese actors abroad to the system back home and the stra-
tegic interests of the CCP. Third, party building also contributes to China’s foreign policy
strategy in promoting the “Chinese story,” the “Chinese way,” the “Belt and Road,” and
the “shared community of mankind.”
A key tactic to combine these agendas is connecting party building work with
“culture.” The specific characteristics of party work are presented as an expression of
what makes not just the party, but China as a whole different and competitive in the
global arena. Depending on the context, “culture” is read as either the “corporate
culture” of a Chinese company, the “national brand” of Chinese businesses, or more gen-
erally China’s modern culture and system and even China’s traditional civilisation.
Party building as “corporate culture” is also a method of neo-socialist corporatist
labour management, principally of Chinese employees, but spilling over among
foreign employees as well. As part of the neo-socialist symbiosis of capitalism and social-
ism in China itself, the party’s power monopoly keeps labour cheap, disciplined, and
abundant. Similarly, party building abroad serves global China’s version of corporatist
labour relations that overcomes class struggle and unifies management, Chinese employ-
ees, and foreign workers. The irony of Leninist principles being put to work to obscure
class differences, avoid class struggle, and facilitate the global expansion of Chinese
capital is so thick that it needs no further elaboration.
Party building or Chinese culture is deployed as an organic part of the foreign exten-
sion of the Chinese system: Chinese projects, Chinese enterprises, and Chinese state-
funded students. As we have seen at the start of this article, these are treated as being
“inside the system.” Despite the CCP’s profession of the principle that Chinese
state-owned enterprises and projects should abide by local laws and regulations, party
building organises Chinese enclaves along Chinese principles, serving Chinese interests,
and dealing with their foreign environment on (hybridised) Chinese terms.
The foreign extension of Chinese party building culture also has a certain similarity
with the global expansion of earlier great powers. The symbiosis of party work and
Chinese culture is an aspect, vector, and instrument of Chinese globalisation, extending
crucial aspects of China’s system, society, and economy across the world. Just like
European imperial powers in the nineteenth century and the US and Soviet Union hege-
mons of the twentieth century, global expansion presents its agents with a whole range of
practical and principled challenges. Institutions, beliefs, concepts, and strategies rooted in
their own culture and society had to be transplanted into a world that they not merely
wished to accommodate, but also wanted to make their own.
In contrast to the colonial or hegemonic practices of these earlier great powers, export-
ing communist ideology or the imposition of China’s system of party-led governance
beyond the foreign enclaves of China’s system are all conspicuously absent. This, I
believe, is neither an oversight of the sources used for this article nor an artifact of
Chinese censorship. China does not want to rule the world or make the world Chinese.
It wants to ensure that its interests are served, also against those of other great powers
Pieke 471

if need be, and does not hesitate to project its system, power, and influence abroad to do
so. This already might be enough of a threat to many countries caught up in Chinese glo-
balisation as it is. There is no need to imagine ulterior motives that are even worse.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests


The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or
publication of this article.

Funding
The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this
article.

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Author Biography
Frank N. Pieke, Professor of Modern China Studies, Leiden University and Visiting Research
Professor at the East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore. Frank N. Pieke studied
Cultural Anthropology and Chinese Studies at the University of Amsterdam and the University
of California, Berkeley, where he received his PhD in 1992. After lectureships in Leiden and
Oxford, he took up the Chair in Modern China studies at Leiden University in 2010. Between
2018 and 2020, he was the director of the Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS) in
Berlin. In the academic year 2021–2022, he iwas in Uppsala as a fellow at the Swedish
Collegium for Advanced Study.
Email: f.n.pieke@hum.leidenuniv.nl

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