VOL.

126, DECEMBER 19, 1983 233

Ruiz vs. Gordon

*
No. L-65695. December 19, 1983.

HECTOR S, RUIZ, as coordinator of the Olongapo Citizen's

Alliance for National Reconciliation, petitioner, us.
RICHARD GORDON, as City Mayor of Olongapo City,
respondent.

Constitutional Law; Local Government; A party applying for a

permit to stage a rally should be interested in finding out if his
application has been granted.·As shown both in the
manifestation and the answer, this action for mandamus could
have been obviated if only petitioner took the trouble of verifying
on November 23

_________________

* EN BANC.

234

234 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Ruiz vs. Gordon

whether or not a permit had been issued. A party desirous of

exercising the right to peaceable assembly should be the one most
interested in ascertaining the action taken on a request for a
permit. Necessarily, after a reasonable time or, if the day and time
was designated for the decision on the request, such party or his
representative should be at the office of the public official
concerned. If he fails to do so, a copy of the decision reached,
whether adverse or favorable, should be sent to the address of
petitioner. In that way, there need not be waste of time and effort
not only of the litigants but likewise of a court from which redress
is sought in case of a denial or modification of a request for a
permit.
Same; Same; Litigations involving permits to stage a rally are
better started at the trial court level.·Lately, several petitions of
this character have been filed with this Court. It could be due to
the lack of knowledge of the guidelines set forth in the extended
opinion. Steps have been taken to send the Regional Trial judges
copies thereof. In the future, therefore, without precluding the
filing of petitions directly with this Court, the interest of justice
and of public convenience would be better served if litigation
starts on the trial court level.

Teehankee, J., concurring:

Constitutional Law; Local Governments; Granting of permit to

stage rally practically a ministerial duty absent a clear and
present danger.·This Court has after all laid down the clear
guidelines in the J.B.L. Reyes case for the licensing authorities
and has taken steps to furnish copies thereof to all regional trial
courts for their information and guidance. It is to be hoped that
what has happened in Manila after the J.B.L. Reyes case, wherein
the Mayor as the licensing authority has in compliance with the
guidelines granted all subsequent applications for such permits,
seeing to it only that there be no conflict in the scheduling of such
assemblies and thereby eliminated the need for the applicant's
having to go to court, would be emulated by all other cities and
towns concerned. The granting of such permits for the exercise of
a fundamental right, absent any clear and present danger, is after
all practically a ministerial duty.
Same; Burden to show presence of danger is on the mayor.·
The burden to show the existence of such grave and imminent
danger that would justify an adverse action lies on the mayor as
the licensing authority. There must be objective and convincing,
not

235

VOL. 126, DECEMBER 19, 1983 235

Ruiz vs. Gordon

subjective or conjectural, proof of the existence of such clear and

present danger. As the Court stated in its Resolution of October
25, 1983 in the J.B.L. Reyes case, "It is essential for the validity of
a denial of a permit which amounts to a previous restraint or
censorship that the licensing authority does not rely solely on his
own appraisal of what public welfare, peace or safety may require.
To justify such a limitation, there must be proof of such weight
and sufficiency to satisfy the clear and present danger test. The
possibility that subversives may infiltrate the ranks of the
demonstrators is not enough."

Concepcion, Jr., J., separate opinion:

Constitutional Law; Local Government; Guidelines to be

followed by local officials in granting permits to stage a public
rally.·In order that public officials may not be charged, rightly or
wrongly, with dereliction of duty or abuse of powers in the
granting or denying of such permits, the following guidelines are
deemed necessary: (a) When a peaceful assembly is to be held in a
private lot, house, or edifice, only the consent of the owner of the
place is necessary. No permit from the government or any public
officer is required. (b) When an application to hold a rally, parade,
or peaceful assembly has to make use of public places like parks,
plazas, and streets, the public authority charged with the duty of
granting or denying the permit should also consider the
convenience and the right of the rest of the public to use and enjoy
these same facilities. (c) Conditions of peace and order in the
locality should be carefully considered and precautionary steps
taken to prevent vandals, hooligans, provocateurs, and other
criminals from turning into a violent one what otherwise should
be a peaceful demonstration.

PETITION for mandamus to review the order of the City

Mayor of Olongapo.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Teddy C. Macapagal and Engelberto de Castro for
petitioners.
Ma. Ellen M. Aguilar for respondent.

FERNANDO, C.J.:

The constitutional rights to free speech and free assembly

236

236 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Ruiz vs. Gordon

are invoked in this mandamus proceeding filed on

November 25, 1983 against respondent Richard Gordon,
City Mayor of Olongapo City. It was alleged: "On 21
November 1983, petitioner personally delivered to the
respondent a letterapplication dated 19 November 1983,
the full text of which reads as follows: 'November 19, 1983,
The Honorable City Mayor, Olongapo City, Sir: In behalf of
the Olongapo Citizen's Alliance for National Reconciliation,
Justice for Aquino Justice for All (JAJA), Concern (sic)
Citizen for Justice and Peace (CCJP), Damdamin Bayan na
Nagkakaisa (DAMBANA), United Nationalist Democratic
Organization (UNIDO), we are respectfully requesting for a
permit to hold a prayer-rally at the Rizal Triangle,
Olongapo City on December 4, 1983 from 1:00 P.M. until it
will be finished in the early evening. It is likewise
requested the above named organizations to be allowed to
hold a parade/march from Gordon Avenue to the Rizal
Triangle starting at 1:00 P.M. Your preferential attention
on this request will be highly appreciated. [It was signed by
petitioner Hector S. Ruiz, Coordinator of Olongapo1
Citizen's, Alliance for National Reconciliation.]' "
Reference was then made to the minute 2
resolution of this
Court in Jose B.L. Reyes v. Bagatsing. The prayer was for
"the immediate issuance of the writ of mandamus, without
prejudice to an extended decision; or that a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction be issued immediately
so as not to render moot and academic the purpose for
which the permit was applied for on 4 December 1983 3
from
1:00 to 6:00 (early evening) o'clock in the afternoon."
At the next session day, on November 29, 1983, the
Court issued the following resolution: "The Court, after
considering the pleadings filed and deliberating on the
issues raised in the petition for mandamus with prayer for
a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction filed on
November 25, 1983, Resolved to

_________________

1 Petition, III, par. 4,

2 G. R. No. 65366, October 25, 1983.
3 Petition, par. 8.

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VOL. 126, DECEMBER 19, 1983 237

Ruiz vs. Gordon

require the respondents to file an ANSWER, 4

not a motion
to dismiss, within two (2) days from notice. "
On the very afternoon of the same day, there was this
manifestation from respondent Mayor: "1. On November
22, 1983, the petitioner, allegedly the coordinator of the
Olongapo Citizen's Alliance for National Reconciliation,
had their request for a prayer rally and parade/march
received in the Office of the Mayor. 2. That even before the
request, the respondent had repeatedly announced in his
regular program on Sunday over the radio (D WGO) and at
the Monday morning flag ceremony before hundreds of
government employees that he would grant the request of
any group that would like to exercise their freedom of
speech and assembly. 3. That respondent when interviewed
on the matter by the Editor-in-Chief of the 'Guardian', a
newspaper of general circulation in Olongapo and
Zambales, mentioned the fact that he had granted the
permit of the petitioner, which interview appeared in the
November 22-28, 1983 issue of the said newspaper. A copy
of the newspaper is hereto attached and made an integral
part hereof as Annex 'A'. 4. On November 23, 1983, the
City Mayor approved the request of the petitioner to hold a
prayer rally and a parade/march on December 4, 1983. A
copy of the permit is hereto
5
attached and made an integral
part hereof as Annex 'B " The prayer was for the dismissal
of the petition. The permit reads as follows: "23 November
1983, Dr. Hector S. Ruiz, Coordinator, Olongapo Citizen's
Alliance for National Reconciliation, Olongapo City. Dear
Dr. Ruiz: Your request for a PERMIT to hold a prayer rally
at the Rizal Triangle, Olongapo City and a parade/march
from Gordon Avenue at 1:00 p.m. of 4 December 1983 as
stated in your letter dated 19 November 1983 received in
this office on 22 November is hereby GRANTED provided
that: 1. The parade/march and rally will be peaceful and
orderly; 2. Your organization will be responsible for any
loss or damage to government property and for the
cleanliness of the Rizal Triangle; 3. The parade/march shall
proceed from the corner of Gordon Ave.,

________________

4 Resolution of this Court dated November 29, 1983.

5 Manifestation of Respondent Mayor, 1-2.

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238 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Ruiz vs. Gordon

and Magsaysay Drive, through Magsaysay Drive, to Rizal

Ave., thence to the Rizal Triangle. Please coordinate with
the Integrated National Police for appropriate traffic
assistance. Very
6
truly yours, (Sgd.) Richard J. Gordon,
City Mayor."
At its next session then of November 27, the Court, in
the light of the above manifestation, resolved to grant such
plea for dismissal. From petitioner came, on December 1,
1983, a motion dated November 29 to withdraw petition. As
therein stated: "Petitioner, by counsel, respectfully moves
to withdraw the above-entitled petition on the ground that
the permit being sought in the prayer-rally to be held on 4
December 1983 from7
1:00 to 6:00 PM has been granted by
the respondent." Then the next day, December 2, 1983, the
answer of respondent came reiterating what was set forth
in his manifestation. The reason for the delay of such
pleading, the due date the service had been served on
petitioner being December 1, 1983, was obviously the
distance between Manila and Olongapo City. It was not
served until November 30. At any rate, no prejudice was
caused either party as in the meanwhile, the Court had
acted on the very day the manifestation was submitted.
That was on December 1, 1983.
There is relevance to a recital of such facts. It appears
that the guidelines set forth in the extended opinion in the
aforesaid J.B.L. Reyes decision as to the role of the
judiciary in petitions for permits to hold peaceable
assemblies may have to be supplemented. This is how the
J.B.L. Reyes opinion reads on this point: "The applicants
for a permit to hold an assembly should inform the
licensing authority of the date, the public place where and
the time when it will take place. If it were a private place,
only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal
possession is required Such application should be filed well
ahead in time to enable the public official concerned to
appraise whether there may be valid objections to the grant
of the permit or to its grant but at another public place. It
is an indispensable condition to such refusal or
modification that the clear and present danger test be the
standard for the

________________

6 Annex B to Manifestation of Respondent.

7 Motion to Withdraw Petition, 1.

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VOL. 126, DECEMBER 19, 1983 239

Ruiz vs. Gordon

decision reached. If he is of the view that there is such an

imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil, the
applicants must be heard on the matter. Thereafter, his
decision, whether fa vorable or adverse, must be
transmitted to them at the earliest opportunity. Thus if so
minded, they can have recourse to the proper judicial
authority. Free speech and peaceable assembly, along with
the other intellectual freedoms, are highly ranked in our
scheme of constitutional values. It cannot be too strongly
stressed that on the judiciary,·even more so than on the
other departments·rests the grave and delicate
responsibility of assuring respect for and deference to such
preferred rights, No verbal formula, no sanctifying phrase
can, of course, dispense with what has been so felicitously
termed by Justice Holmes 'as the sovereign prerogative of
judgment.' Nonetheless, the presumption must be to incline
the weight of the scales of justice on the side of such rights,
enjoying as they do precedence and primacy. Clearly then,
to the extent that there may be inconsistencies between
this resolution and that of Navarro v. Villegas, that case is
pro tanto modified. So it was 8made clear in the original
resolution of October 25, 1983."
As shown both in the manifestation and the answer, this
action for mandamus could have been obviated if only
petitioner took the trouble of verifying on November 23
whether or not a permit had been issued. A party desirous
of exercising the right to peaceable assembly should be the
one most interested in ascertaining the action taken on a
request for a permit. Necessarily, after a reasonable time
or, if the day and time was designated for the decision on
the request, such party or his representative should be at
the office of the public official concerned. If he fails to do so,
a copy of the decision reached, whether adverse or
favorable, should be sent to the address of petitioner. In
that way, there need not be waste of time and effort not
only of the litigants but likewise of a court from which
redress is sought in case of a denial or modification of a
request for a permit.

________________

8 J.B.L. Reyes v. Bagatsing, G.R. No. 65366, November 9, 1983, 14-15.

240

240 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Ruiz vs. Gordon

Lately, several petitions of this character have been filed

with this Court. It could be due to the lack of knowledge of
the guidelines set forth in the extended opinion. Steps have
been taken to send the Regional Trial judges copies thereof.
In the future, therefore, without precluding the filing of
petitions directly with this Court, the interest of justice and
of public convenience would be better served if litigation
starts on the trial court level.
While, therefore, this petition should be dismissed, the
Court deems it best to set forth the above to specify in more
detail, the steps necessary for the judicial protection of
constitutional rights with the least delay and
inconvenience to the parties and with the greater
assurance that the factual background on which is
dependent the determination of whether or not the clear
and present danger standard has been satisfied. Lastly, a
certiorari petition to this Court is likewise available to the
losing party.
WHEREFORE, as prayed for, this case is dismissed.

Makasiar, Aquino, Guerrero, Abad Santos, De

Castro, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Relova and
Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.
Teehankee, J., concurs in a separate opinion.
Concepcion, Jr., J., files separate opinion.

SEPARATE OPINION

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:

The Chief Justice's opinion for the Court reaffirms and

reproduces the guidelines in the J.B.L. Reyes vs. Bagatsing
case (G.R. No. 65366, November 9, 1983) for the guidance
of applicants for permit to hold peaceful assemblies in
public places and of the licensing authorities, generally the
city or town mayors. It stresses that the right to peacefully
assemble, speak out freely and petition the government for
redress of grievances should be accorded the utmost
deference and respect and is not to be limited, much less
denied, except under the clear and present danger
standard, i.e. there must be a

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VOL. 126, DECEMBER 19, 1983 241

Ruiz vs. Gordon

clear showing of the "danger, of a character both grave and

imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public morals,
public health, or any other legitimate public interest·a
substantive evil that the State has a right to prevent (at
paragraph 1).
The Court's opinion suggests that in the future such
petitions of mandamus to compel the granting of such
permits be filed with the regional trial courts rather than
directly with this Court, with the statement that "without
precluding the filing of petitions directly with this Court,
the interest of justice and of public convenience would be
better served if litigation starts on the trial court level" (at
page 5). This is the ideal situation and would need
reorientation on the part of everybody concerned·the
applicants and the licensing authorities, as well as the
police authorities·to resolve the question of granting of
such permits for peaceful assemblies at the administrative
and regional trial court levels rather than to get the
ultimate verdict from the Supreme Court. This Court has
after all laid down the clear guidelines in the J. B. L. Reyes
case for the licensing authorities and has taken steps to
furnish copies thereof to all regional trial courts for their
information and guidance. It is to be hoped that what has
happened in Manila after the J. B. L. Reyes case, wherein
the Mayor as the licensing authority has in compliance
with the guidelines granted all subsequent applications for
such permits, seeing to it only that there be no conflict in
the scheduling of such assemblies and thereby eliminated
the need for the applicant's having to go to court, would be
emulated by all other cities and towns concerned. The
granting of such permits for the exercise of a fundamental
right, absent any clear and present danger, is after all
practically a ministerial duty.
The salient points of such guidelines need only be
restated herein for the guidance of all concerned:
As stressed by the Chief Justice in the J. B. L. Reyes
case, the presumption "must be to incline the weight of the
scales of justice on the side of such right [of free speech and
peaceful assembly], enjoying as they do precedence and
primacy,"

242

242 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Ruiz vs. Gordon

The application should be filed ahead of time and the

licensing authority should act promptly thereon and his
decision, whether favorable or adverse, must be
transmitted to the applicants at the earliest opportunity to
give them time to go to court, if necessary.
It is an "indispensable condition to such refusal or
modification [of the application] that the clear and present
danger test be the standard for decision reached," and if
the licensing authority "is of the view that there is such an
imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil, the
applicants must be heard on the matter."
The burden to show the existence of such grave and
imminent danger that would justify an adverse action lies
on the mayor as the licensing authority. There must be
objective and convincing, not subjective or conjectural,
proof of the existence of such clear and present danger. As
the Court stated in its Resolution of October 25, 1983 in the
J. B. L. Reyes case, "It is essential for the validity of a
denial of a permit which amounts to a previous restraint or
censorship that the licensing authority does not rely solely
on his own appraisal of what public welfare, peace or safety
may require. To justify such a limitation, there must be
proof of such weight and sufficiency to satisfy the clear and
present danger test. The possibility that subversives may
infiltrate the ranks of the demonstrators is not enough."
As likewise underscored in the J. B. L. Reyes case, the
exercise of the right of peaceable assembly is not to be
"abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some
other place" (at paragraph 6) and "It is the duty of the city
authorities to provide the proper police protection to those
exercising their right to peaceable assembly and freedom of
expression" (at paragraph 7).
The organizers of the assembly should take all the
precautions that the march-rally be peaceful and orderly.
As Chief Justice Hughes had aptly pointed out, such
liberties "as guaranteed by the Constitution, imply the
existence of an organized society maintaining public order
without which liberty itself would be lost in the excesses of
unrestrained abuses." Still, Condition No. 2 of respondent
Mayor's permit

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VOL. 126, DECEMBER 19, 1983 243

Ruiz us. Gordon

that "petitioner organization would be responsible for any

loss or damage to any government property and for the
cleanliness of the assembly site" seems to be too loosely
worded. The basic right of peaceable assembly could well be
abridged, if not denied, if its exercise were to be saddled
with onerous conditions. Generally, the individuals
responsible for any damage should be the ones sought out
and held accountable and the task of cleaning up the
assembly site would normally rest on the city or town
authorities who presumably have the necessary facilities
therefor, secured with revenues or funds paid by the
taxpayers.
As we stated in the J. B. L. Reyes case, "the leaders of
the peaceable assembly should take all the necessary
measures to ensure a peaceful march and assembly and to
avoid the possibility of infiltrators and troublemakers
disrupting the same, concommitantly with the duty of the
police to extend protection to the participants 'staying at a
discreet distance, but ever ready and alert to perform their
duty.' " Should any disorderly conduct or incidents occur,
the police authorities may well recall the injunction since
the 1907 case of U.S. vs. Apurado (7 Phil. 422) that such
instances of "disorderly conduct by individual members of a
crowd (be not seized) as an excuse to characterize the
assembly as a seditious and tumultous rising against the
authorities" and render illusory the right of peaceable
assembly.
If these clear guidelines were followed by all concerned
with goodwill and in good faith, there would then be hardly
any need to have to go to court to exercise the primary and
fundamental right of peaceable assembly, free expression
and petition for redress of grievances.

244

244 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Ruiz vs. Gordon

SEPARATE OPINION

CONCEPCION JR., J.:

1. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of

speech, or of the press, or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble and 1
petition the Government
for redress of grievances.
2. These constitutional rights give life and meaning to
a democratic society. They are sacred and inviolate.
3. But while they are sacred, they are not absolute;
while they are inviolate, they are not licentious.
The exercise of these rights must take into account
 the exercise of the rights of others·and of the
State.
4. While a person has a constitutional right to freedom
of speech, the exercise of such right does not give
him any license to libel or slander another. Nor to
incite the people to commit the crime of treason,
rebellion or insurrection, sedition2 or assault upon a
person in authority or his agents.
5. Neither can those who choose to exercise their
constitutional right to peaceably assemble and
petition the Government for a redress of grievances
claim the privilege to use a public park, plaza, or
street to the exclusion of the general public and all
others. The right to peaceably assemble is not
absolute but relative.
6. Public officials charged with the duty of granting or
denying permits to hold rallies, demonstrations,
parades, and the like, do right by basing their
decisions on the existence or non-existence of a
"clear and present danger of a substantive evil that
the State has a right to prevent."
7. But it should be remembered that the clear and
present danger rule is not a hard and fast rule. Its
application and interpretation should be measured
and weighed in the light of circumstances as to
persons, time, and place.
8. To grant a permit for holding a rally along Ayala
Avenue in Makati presents no problem to the
authorities

________________

1 Section 9, Article IV. Constitution.

2 Arts, 114, 134, 142-A; 146-149, Revised Penal Code.

245

VOL. 126, DECEMBER 19, 1983 245

Ruiz vs. Gordon

because Makati is a peaceful and law-abiding

community. But the same application filed in a
place where ambuscades of government troops and
assassination of government officials have occured
cannot be considered in the same light as that one
filed in Makati.
 9. In order that public officials may not be charged,
rightly or wrongly, with dereliction of duty or abuse
of powers in the granting or denying of such
permits, the following guidelines are deemed
necessary:

(a) When a peaceful assembly is to be held in a private

lot, house, or edifice, only the consent of the owner
of the place is necessary. No permit from the
government or any public officer is required.
(b) When an application to hold a rally, parade, or
peaceful assembly has to make use of public places
like parks, plazas, and streets, the public authority
charged with the duty of granting or denying the
permit should also consider the convenience and
the right of the rest of the public to use and enjoy
these same facilities.
(c) Conditions of peace and order in the locality should
be carefully considered and precautionary steps
taken to prevent vandals, hooligans, provocateurs,
and other criminals from turning into a violent one
what otherwise should be a peaceful demonstration.

10. Anarchy should never again be permitted to return to

the streets of our cities and towns. We experienced it before
and certainly we have no desire that the experience be
repeated. The right to free speech and assembly must never
be suppressed. At the same time, there can be no
indiscriminate granting of permits to anyone who applies
lest we jeopardize the lives and security of the general
public and prevent our people from living in peace and
tranquility and enjoying the fruits of their labor.
Case dismissed.

Notes.·Zeal in the performance by soldiers of their

duties cannot justify erosion in their respect for the
liberties of a citizen. The holding of meetings for peaceable
political action

246

246 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Ablaza vs. Court of Industrial Relations

cannot be proscribed and those who assist in such meetings

cannot be branded as criminals. (Carpio vs. Guevarra, 106
SCRA 685.)
 Curtailment of the freedom of speech and press over the
radio and TV stations is permissible for election purposes.
(UNIDO vs. COMELEC, 104 SCRA 17.)
LOI 1211 prescribing guidelines of arrest of persons
thereunder is merely a directive of the President to his
commanders and was not intended to submit the President
to the authority of a judge. (Garcia-Padilla vs. Enrile, 121
SCRA 472.)
A prior judicial warrant is not necessary for the arrest of
persons involved in the continuing offense of rebellion.
(GarciaPadilla vs. Enrile, 121 SCRA 472.)
The freedom of assembly and expression occupy a
preferred position in the hierarchy of human rights.
(Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization vs.
Philippine Blooming Mills, Co., Inc., 51 SCRA 189.)

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