DECEMBER TERM, 1856.

393
Dred ScoU v. Sandford.

LATHROP L. STURGIS, PLAINTIFF IN ERROR, V. CHRISTIAN R1ONOLD.

The decision in the preceding case again affirmed.

Tnis, like the preceding case, of which it constituted a

branch, was brought up, by writ of error, from the Circuit
Court of the United States for the eastern district of Louisiana.
It was similar in all respects to the preceding case, except
that Honold purchased five-sixteenths of the ship from Sturgis,
and four-sixteenths from Bulkley. The two cases proceeded
through the courts pariyassu, and were argued together in this
court.
Mr. Justice CURTIS delivered the opinion of the court.
This case depends on the same facts and principles as the
preceding case, and the judgment of the Circuit Court therein
is aErmed.

DRED SCOTT, PLAINTIFF IN ERROR, v. JomT F. A. SANDFORD.

I.
1. Upon a writ of error to a Circuit Court of the United States, the transcript of
the record of all the proceedings in the case is brought before this court, and is
open to its inspection and revision.
2. When a plea to the jurisdiction, in abatement, is overruled by the court upon
demurrer, and the defendant.pleads in bar, and upon these pleas the final judg-o
meat of the court is in his favor-if the plaintiff brings a writ of error, the judg-
ment of the court upon the plea in abatement is before this court, although it
was in favor of the plaintiff-and if the court erred in overruling it,.the judgment
must be reversed, and a mandate issued to the Circuit Court to dismiss the case
for want of jurisdiction.
3. In the Circuit Courts of the United States, the record must show that the case
is one in which, by the Constitution and laws of the United States, the court had
jurisdiction-and if this does not appear, and the court gives judgment either
for plaintiff or defendant, it is error, and the judgment must be reversed by this
court-and the parties cannot by consent waive the objection to the jurisdiction
of the Circuit Court.
4. A free negro of the African race, whose ancestors were brought to this country
and sold as slaves, is not a "citizen" within the meaning of the Constitution of
tae United States.
5. When the Constitution was adopted, they were not regarded in any of the States
as members of the community which constituted the State, and were not num-
bered among its "people or citizens." Consequently, the special rights and
immunities guarantied to citizens do not apply to them. And not being "citi-
zens" within the meaning of the Constitution, they are not entitled to sue in
that character in a court of the United States, and the Circuit Court has not
jurisdiction in such a suit.
6. The only two clauies in the Constitution which point to this race, treat them as
persons whom it was morally lawful to deal in as akticles of property and to
hold as slaves.
Y.7Since the adoption of the Constitution of the United States, no State can byany
subsequent law make a foreigner or any other description of persons citizens of
394 SUPREME COURT.
Dred Scott v. Sandford.

the United States, nor entitle them to the rights and privileges secured to citi-
zens by that instrument.
8. A State, by its laws passed since the adoption of the Constitution, may put a
foreigner or any other description of persons upon a footing with its own citizens,
as to all the rights and privileges enjoyed by them within its dominion and by
its laws. But that will not make him a citizen of the United States, nor entitle
him to sue in its courts, nor to any of the privileges and immunities of a citizen
in another State.
9. The change in public opinion and feeling in relation to the African race, which
has taken place since the adoption of the Constitution, cannot change its con-
struction and meaning, and it must be construed and administered now accord-
ing to its true meaning and intention when it was formed and adopted.
10. -The plaintiff having admitted, by his demurrer to the plea in abatement, that
his anceators were imported from Africaand sold as slaves, he is not a citizen
of the State of Missouri according to the Constitution of the United States, and
was not entitled to sue in that character in the Circuit Court.
11. This being the case, the judgment of the court below, in favor of the plaintiff
on the plea in abatement, was erroneous,
II.
1. But if the plea in abatement is not brought up by this writ of error, the objec-
tion to the citizenship of the plaintiff is still apparent on the record, as he him-
self, in making out his case, states that he is of African descent, was born a
slave, and claims that he and his family became entitled to freedom by being
taken, by their owner, to reside in a Territory where slavery is prohibited by-act
of Congress-and that, in addition to this claim, he himself became entitled to
freedom by being taken to Rock Island, in the State of Illinois-and being free
when he was brought back, to Missouri, he was by the laws of that State a
citizen.
2. If, therefore, the facts he states do not give him or his family a right to free-
dom, the plaintiff is still a slave, and not entitled to sue as a "1citizen," and the
judgment of the Circuit Court was erroneous on that ground also, without any
reference to the plea in abatement.
3. The Circuit Court can give no judgment for plaintiff or defendant in a case
where it has not jurisdiction, no matter whether there be a plea in abatemerit
or not. And unless it appears upon the face of the record, when brought here
by writ of error, that the Circuit Court had"jurisdiction, the judgment must be
reversed.
The case of Capron v. Van Noorden (2 Cranch, 126) examined, and the principles
thereby decided, reaffirmed.
4. When the record, as brought here by writ of error, does not show that the Cir-
cuit Court had jurisdiction, this court has jurisdiction to revise and correct the
error, like any other error in the court below. It does not and cannot dismiss
the case for want of jurisdiction here; for that would leave the erroneous judg-
ment of the court below in full force, and the party injured without remedy.
But it must reverse the judgment, and, as in any other case of reversal, send a
mandate to the Circuit Court to conform its judgment to the opinion of this
court.
5. The difference of the jurisdiction in this court in the cases of writs of error to
State courts and to Circuit Courts of the United States, pointed out; and the
mistakes made as to the jurisdiction of this court in the latter case, by confound-
ing it with its limited jurisdiction in the former.
6. If the court reverses a judgment upon the ground that it appears by a particu-
-lar part of the record that the Circuit Court had not jurisdiction, it does not
take away the jurisdiction of this court to examine into and correct,, by a re-
versal of the judgment, any other errors, either as to the jurisdiction or any
other matter, where it appears from other parts of the record that the Circuit
Court had fallen-into error. On the contrary, it is the daily and familiar prac-
tice of this court to reverse on several grounds, where more than one error ap-
pears to have been committed.. And the error of a Circuit Court in its'jurisdic-
 DECEMBER TERM, 1856. 895
Dred ScoU v. Sandford.

tion stands on the same ground, and is to be treated in the same manner as any
other error upon which its judgment is founded.
7. The decision, therefore, that the judgment of the Circuit Court upon the plea
in abatement is erroneous, is no reason why the alleged error apparent in the
exception should not also be examined, and the judgment reversed on that
ground also, if it discloses a want ofjurisdiction in the Circuit Court.
8. It is often the duty of this court, after having decided that a particular decision
of the Circuit Court was erroneous, to examine into other alleged errors, and to
correct them if they are found to exist. And this has been uniformly done by
this court, when the questions are in any degree connected with the contro-
versy, and the silence of the court might create doubts which would lead to
farther and useless litigation.
In.
1. The facts upon which the plaintiff relies, did not give him his freedom, and
make him a citizen of Missouri.
2. The clause in the Constitution authorizing Congress to make all needful rules
and regulations for the government of the territory and other property of the
United States, applies only to territory within the chartered limits of some one
of the States when they were colonies of Great Britain, and which was surren-
dered by the British Government to the old Confederaton of the States, in the
treaty of peace. It does not apply to territory acquired by the present Federal
Government, by treaty or conquest, from a foreign nation.
The case of the American and Ocean Insurance Companies v. Canter (1 Peters,
511) referred to and examined, showing that the decision in this case is not in
conflict with that opinion, and that the court did not, in the case referred to,
decide upon the construction of.the clause of the Constitution above mentioned,
because the case before them did not make it fiecessary to decide the ques-
tion.
3. The United States, under the present Constitution, cannot acquire territory to
be held as a colony, to be governed at its will afid pleasure. But it may acquire
territory which, at the time, has not a population that fits it to become a State,
and may govern it as a Territory until it has a population which, in the judg-
ment of Congress, entitles it to be admitted as a State of the Union.
4. During the time it remains a Territory, Congress may legislate over it within
the scope of its constitutional powers in relation to citizens of the United
States-and may establish a Territorial Government--and the form of this local
Government must be regulated by the discretion of Congress--but with powers
not exceeding those which Congress itself, by the Constitution, is authorized to
exercise over citizens of the United States, in respect to their rights of persons
or rights of property.
Iv.
1. The territory thus acquired, is acquired by the people of the United States for
their common and equal benefit, through their agent and trustee, the Federal
Government. Congress can exercise no power over the rights of persons or
property of a citizen in the Territory which is prohibited by the Constitution.
The Government and the citizen, whenever the Territory is open to settlement,
both enter it with their respective rights defined and limited by the Constitution.
2. Congress have no right to prohibit the citizens of any particular State or States
from taking up their home there, while it permits citizens of other States to do
so. Nor has it a right to give privileges to one class of citizens which it refuses
to another. The territory is acquired for their equal and common benefit--and
if open to any, it must be open to all upon equal and the same terms.
3. Every citizen has a right to take with him into the Territory any article of
property which the Constitution of the United States recognises as property.
4. The Constitution of the United States recognises slaves as property, and pledges
the Federal Government to protect it. And Congress cannot exercise any more
authority over property of that description than it may constitutionally exercise
over property of any other kind.
5. The act of Congress, therefore, prohibiting a citizen of the United States from
396 SUPREME COURT.
STATEXENT OF T3E CASE.] Dred &oU v. Sandford.

taking with him his slaves when he removes to the Territory in question to
reside, is an exercise of authority over private property which is not warranted
by the Constitution-and the removal of the plaintiff, by his owner, to that
Territory, gave him no title to freedom.
V.
1. The plaintiff himself acquired no title to freedom by being taken, by his owner,
to Rock Island, in Illinois, and brought back to Missouri. This court has here-
tofore decided that the status or condition of a person of African descent depend-
ed on the laiws of the State in which he resided.
2. It has beeni settled by the decisions of the highest court in Missouri, that, by
the laws of that State, a slave does not become entitled to his freedom, where
the owner takes him to reside in a State where slavery is not permitted, and
afterwards brings him back to Missouri.
Conclusion. It follows that it is apparent upon the record that the court below
erred in its judgment on the plea in abatement, and also erred in giving judg-
ment for the defendant, when the exception shows that the plaintiff was not a
citizen of the United States. And as the Circuit Court had no jurisdiction,
either in the case stated in the plea in abatement, or in the one stated in the
exception, its judgment in favor of the defendant is erroneous; and must be
reversed.

THIS case was brought up, by writ of error, from the Circuit
Court of the United States for the district of Missouri.
It was an action of trespass vi et armis instituted in the Cir-
cuit Court by Scott against Sandford.
Prior to the institution of the present suit, an action was
brought by Scott for, his freedom in the Circuit Court of St.
Louis county, (State court,) where there was a verdict -and
judgment in his favor. On a writ of error to the Supreme
Court of the State, the judgment below was reversed, and the
case remanded to the Circuit Court, where it was continued to
await the decision of the case now in question.
The declaration of Scott contained three counts: one, that
Sandford had assaulted the plaintiff; one, that he had assaulted
Harriet Scott, his wife; and one, that he had assaulted Eliza
Scott and Lizzie Scott, his children.
Sandford appeared, and filed the following plea:
-DaxD Scovr
DR .SCTT Plea to the ATriidion of the Court.
Jomi F. A. SNDronD.f
Apn.e Tzas, 1854.
And the said John F. A. Sahdford, in his own proper per-
son, comes and says that this court ought not to have or take
further cognizance of the action aforesaid, because he says that
said cause of action, and each and every of them, (if any such
have accrued to the said Dred Scott,) accrued to the said Dred
Scott out of the jurisdiction of this court, and exclusively
within the jurisdiction of the courts of the State of Missouri,
for that, to wit: the said plaintiff; Dred Scott, is not a citizen
of the State of Missouri, as alleged in his declaration, because
 DECEMBER TERM, 1856.
Dred Scott v. Sandford. [STATE,ENT OF THE CASE.

he is a negro of African descent; his ancestors were of pure

African blood, and were brought into this country and sold as
negro slaves, and this the said Sandford is ready to verify.
Wherefore, he prays judgment whether this court can or will
take further cognizance of tlie action aforesaid.
JoHN F. A. SANDFORD.

To this plea there was a demurrer in the usual form, which

was argued in April, 1854, when the court gave judgment that
the demurrer should be sustained.
In May, 1854, the defendant, in pursuance of an agreement
between counsel, and with the leave of the court, pleaded in
bar of the action:
1. Not guilty.
2. That the plaintiff was a negro slave, the lawful property
of the defendant, and, as such, the defendant gently laid his
hands upon him, and thereby had only restrained him, as the
defendant had a right to do.
3. That with respect to the wife and daughters of the plain-
tiff, in the second and third counts of the declaration men-
tioned, the defendant bad, hs to them, only acted in the same
manner, and in virtue of the same legal right.
In the first of these pleas,'tbe plaintiff joined issue; and to
the second and third, filed replications alleging that the defend--
ant, of his own wrong and without the cause in his second and
third pleas alleged, committed the trespasses, &c.
The counsel then filed the following agreed statement. of
facts, viz:
In the year 1834, the plaintiff was negro slave belonging
to Dr. Emerson, who was a surgeon in the army of the United
States. In that year, 1834, said Dr. Emerson took the plain-
tiff from the State of Missouri to the military post at Rock
Island, in the State of Illinois, and held him there as a slave
until the month of April or May, 1836. At the time last
mentioned, said Dr. Emerson removed the plaintiff~from said
military post at Rock Island to the military post, at Fort
Snelling, situate on the west bank of the Mississippi I'iver, in
the Territory known as Upper Louisiana, acquired, by 'the
United States of France, and situate north of the latitude of
thirty-six degrees thirty minutes north, and north of the State
of Missouri. Said Dr. Emerson held the plaintiff in slavery
at said Fort Snelling, from said last-mentioned date until the
year 1838.
In the year 1835, Harriet, who is named in the second count
of the plaintiff's declaration, was the negro slave of Major
Taliaferro, who belonged to- the army of the United States.

Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org)