INTRODUCTION TO PROCESS HAZARD EVALUATION & Hazard and Operability Studies (HazOp)

Plant & Environmental Safety Colin S. Chip Howat Ph.D.

Kurata Thermodynamics Laboratory Department of Chemical & Petroleum Engineering University of Kansas
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Introduction to Process Hazard Evaluation & HazOp

Lecture: Title: Thought: One to Two Class Periods Process Hazard Identification and HazOp I dont like work - no man does - but I like what is in work - the chance to find yourself. Your own reality - for yourself, not for others - what no other man can ever know.
Joseph Conrad, Heart of Darkness, 1902

Question:

What are the implications of: What you dont have cant leak and People who arent there cant be injured? Introduce hazard evaluation procedures and introduce Hazard & Operability Studies Synthesis and Evaluation

Purpose:

Objective
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Outline
Purpose of Hazard Evaluation Introduction to Risk Assessment Types of Hazard Identification Procedures Focus on Two Methods Focus on Identification HazOp

Focus on Identification Checklist

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We have discussed the steps of process synthesis, in general. Again this is not a step-by-step procedure. But it does give a rough guide to what needs to be considered during the development of the base case, in particular, and of any design tier, generally. The steps are given below. The focus of this talk is to address the beginnings of Hazard Identification. Recall that the purpose of of Inherent Safety is to reduce or eliminate the hazard. In order to do that we need to know what the hazards are and where they exist in the process. Input Information Batch v. Continuous

Process Design & Process Analysis

Input-Output Structure Inherent Safety Structure Recycle Structure Separation Structure Heat Integration Structure Process Control Structure

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As a refresher, the strategies that we have for inherent safety are listed below from the previous lecture. After we identify our hazards during synthesis and analysis, we can incorporate these strategies into developing the recycle, separation, heat integration and process control structures.

Inherently Safer Processes Strategies

MINIMIZE SUBSTITUTE MODERATE Use smaller quantities of hazardous substances. Replace a material with a less hazardous substance. Use less hazardous conditions, a less hazardous form of a material, or facilities which minimize the impact of a release of hazardous material or energy. Design facilities which eliminate unnecessary complexity and make operating errors less likely, and which are forgiving of errors which are made.

SIMPLIFY

Chemical manufacturing processes which reduce or eliminate hazards associated with the materials and operations of the process such that this is permanent are INHERENTLY SAFER.
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Purpose of Hazard Evaluation A hazard is an inherent physical or chemical characteristic that has the potential for causing harm. Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures

We need to identify and evaluate the significance of Hazardous Situations.

Hazard Evaluation Procedures are an organized effort to identify and analyze the significance of hazards.

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Introduction to Risk Assessment Probabilistic Risk Assessment

RISK = PROBABILITY * CONSEQUENCE

Identify Hazard Identify Scenario Determine Event Probability Determine Event Consequences
For the purposes of this course, we are primarily interested in identifying the hazard, and then, subsequently, we are interested in identifying scenarios, determining probabilities and determining consequences.
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Our first emphasis in synthesis is to try to eliminate or reduce the hazard during the process process design stage. Our second emphasis is to try to eliminate the hazard once the plant is in operation. So, our focus is on inherent safety. Nevertheless, when hazards still exist in the design and operation, there is the potential that they can escape and cause harm.

System Description

Hazard Identification

Risk Assessment is an integral part of the design, start-up, operation procedure.

Scenario Identification

Event Probability

Event Consequence

Risk Determination
Once the hazard is identified, we attempt to identify accident or excursion scenarios so that we can determine the risk.

No Acceptable? Re-Design System

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Types of Hazard Identification Procedures

The successful Hazard Evaluation program meets the following: The need for risk information has been met; The results are of high quality and are easy for decision makers to use; The study has been performed with the minimum resources needed.

Selection of Hazard Evaluation Program

The motivation for the study and types of results needed The type of information available, perceived risks, characteristics The resource availability and analyst/management preference
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Examples of Hazard Identification & Evaluation Procedures

Safety Review - Qualitative descriptions of potential safety problems Checklist -Written list of items to verify status of system Relative Ranking -A strategy to compare systems for further study Preliminary Hazards Analysis -General method to focus on system What-if Analysis -Brainstorming approach concerning undesired events What-if/Checklist -Combined brainstorming/detailed list Hazard and Operability Study -Systematic method to identification Failure Modes/Effects Analysis -Tabulate equipment failure modes Fault Tree Analysis -Deductive approach from event to cause Event Tree Analysis -Inductive from initiating to all outcomes Cause Consequence Analysis -Combined Fault and Event Trees Human Reliability Analysis -- Systematic evaluation of factors affecting personnel

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Examples of Hazard Identification & Evaluation Procedures

Safety Review - Qualitative descriptions of potential safety problems Checklist -Written list of items to verify status of system Relative Ranking -A strategy to compare systems for further study Preliminary Hazards Analysis -General method to focus on system What-if Analysis -Brainstorming approach concerning undesired events What-if/Checklist -Combined brainstorming/detailed list Hazard and Operability Study -Systematic method to identification Failure Modes/Effects Analysis -Tabulate equipment failure modes Fault Tree Analysis -Deductive approach from event to cause Event Tree Analysis -Inductive from initiating to all outcomes Cause Consequence Analysis -Combined Fault and Event Trees Human Reliability Analysis -- Systematic evaluation of factors affecting personnel

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Typical Uses of Hazard Evaluation Procedures

(Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures, p.77)

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So what is our focus?

The previous slide indicates that the checklist procedure is applicable for conceptual design and operation. Checklists do give insight into the exploration step because they help engineers consider initiating events beyond intended performance. I have included checklist information at the end of this talk.

The identification of toxicity, high pressure and high temperature hazards may be relatively straightforward. With that identification you can invoke the inherent safety strategies to reduce the hazard. Oftentimes, though, the hazard is not clearly evident. A formal method is useful to analyze the design as it evolves. This can be considered routine operation in the previous table. The most widely used method for identifying hazards is the Hazard & Operability Study ~ HazOp, for short.
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Hazard and Operability Studies Hazard and Operability Analysis was developed to identify and evaluate safety hazards in a process plant and to identify operability problems which could compromise a plants ability to meet design productivity. The purpose is to carefully review a process or operation in a systematic fashion to identify excursions which could lead to undesirable consequences. This gives insight into the hazards that are present in the plant. The results are identified hazards and operability problems, recommended changes and studies etc.
These are typical requirements when analyzing an existing plant or new design. Accurate P&Is , detailed process info, knowledge of instrumentation and operation etc. are required. The team requires design, operation, maintenance etc. experience.

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We will be able to apply this method. It will guide us in selecting inherently safer strategies.

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HazOp Procedure A HazOp Guide Word is combined with a Process Parameter to Identify: Deviations from intended design/operation Causes of those deviations Identification is the focus! Consequences of those deviations Safeguards to prevent causes and mitigate consequences of the deviations Actions (recommendations) for design or operation changes to avoid deviation

HazOp Studies do not provide insight into the probability or likelihood of the deviation.
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HazOp Guide Words No or Not Less More Part of As well as Reverse Other than The complete negation of the intention ex. No flow to reactor Quantitative decrease in the intent ex. Less flow to the reactor Quantitative increase in the intent ex. More flow to the reactor Qualitative decrease in the intent ex. Part of the reactants to the reactor Qualitative increase in the intent ex. Cooling water in the reactor Logical opposite of the intention ex. Reverse flow into the reactor Complete substitution ex. Another material besides reactants in the reactor

Other words may be more appropriate such as sooner for other than when considering time, higher instead of more when considering level, etc. -Consider the intent of the words.
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Common HazOp Parameters Flow Pressure Temperature Level Time Composition pH Speed Viscosity Voltage Information Mixing Addition Separation Reaction Frequency

This list is tailored to the task at hand -- not all used, more added as required.
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Preparing for the Review

Preparation

Attitude

Meeting Leadership

HazOp Review Documentation by Team Knowledge/ Information Experience for Study Teams HazOp Experience Table

Follow-up

Deviation
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Causes

Conseq.

Safeguard

Action

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HazOps require discipline. The use of the guide word must be strictly followed. Usually there is a moderator whose purpose is to keep the committee on task. As we have seen in our discussions, it is easy to drift to other topics or explore other ideas. In the context of the HazOp, this could lead to failure to identify the hazards in the process and to evaluate the systems in place the control the hazard. While it is possible to apply HazOp to an entire process, it is typically applied to specific areas which have been prescreened for potential hazards. In our case, we will be focusing on issues such as inventory, toxicity, reactivity, pressure and temperature. We will also be concerned with our control system ability to keep the process operating at intended conditions as the base case evolves. Basically, we take a very small section of the process to focus on at one time. We select the process parameter that we want to investigate and then select the menu of guide words that we wish to study. We then successively fill in HazOp forms for each guide word applied to each process parameter for each section of the plant that we might study. Finish one guide word before going on to the next.
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Example Problem The reaction system shown below is exothermic. A cooling system is provided to remove the excess energy of reaction. In the event the cooling function is lost, the temperature of the reactor would increase. This would lead to an increase in reaction rate leading to additional energy release. The result could be a runaway reaction with pressures exceeding the bursting pressures of the reactor.

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Intent:
Deviation Causes

Guide:
Consequences

Process Parameter:
Safeguards Actions

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Intent:
Deviation Causes

Guide:
Consequences

Process Parameter:
Safeguards Actions

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Intent: Cooling Flow in Coils Guide: No Process Parameter: Cooling

Deviation No Cooling Causes Plug in Line Blocked Line Pipe Breaks CV Fails Controller Fails Consequences Temperature Increases Possible Runaway Relief Valve Broken Coils due to Block in CW Low Flow Alarm Study of Water Reactant Interaction Emergency Shutdown CW System Fails Air System Fail Sewer Backs Up Back up CW System AFO Valve Filter on CW Safeguards Actions

None Temperature Alarm

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HazOp

Hazard & Operability Studies will help us identify the principal hazards in our plant. We can use this identification to invoke the Inherent Safety Strategies to reduce the hazards and to invoke High Reliability System Theory to evaluate Layers of Protection. Remember, while HazOps identify hazards, they do not give insight into the probability that they will escape and cause harm.

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Checklists
Process Hazard Checklists Another method to identify hazards is the process safety checklist. While the literature calls this hazard identification, the use of hazard in this context is broader than the specific definition that I want us to use for Inherent Safety. This is a list of items that the reviewer needs to consider. This list contains itemizes problems and failures. The items on the list may or not apply to the situation. The list acts as a reminder to stimulate thought. The list can be used for: Conceptual Design Pilot Plant Operation Detailed Design Construction Start up Routine Operation Modification/Expansion Decommissioning
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Checklists

The checklist reminds the reviewer or operator of potential problem areas. A check-off is required. For a checklist to be effective the reviewer or operator must respond.

ACTION REQUIRED!
All controls fail safe? The following is an example from Crowl & Louvar.
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Further Study Required Does Not Apply Completed

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Further Study Required Does Not Apply Completed

General Layout
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. Areas properly drained? Aisle ways provided? Fire walls, dikes and special guardrails needed? Hazardous underground obstructions? Hazardous overhead restrictions? Emergency accesses and exits? Enough headroom? Access for emergency vehicles? Safe storage space for raw materials and finished products? Adequate platforms for safe maintenance operations? Hoists and elevators properly designed and safeguarded? Clearance for overhead power lines?

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Further Study Required Does Not Apply Completed

Buildings
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. Adequate ladders, stairways and escape-ways? Fire doors required? Head obstructions marked? Ventilation adequate? Need for ladder or stairway to roof? Safety glass specified where necessary? Need for fireproofed structural steel?

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Further Study Required Does Not Apply Completed

Process
1. Consequences of exposure to adjacent operations considered? 2. Special fume or dust hoods required? 3. Unstable materials properly stored? 4. Process laboratory checked for runaway explosive conditions? 5. Provisions for protection from explosions? 6. Hazardous reactions possible due to mistakes or contamination? 7. Chemistry of processes completely understood and reviewed? 8. Provisions for rapid disposal of reactants in an emergency? 9. Failure of mechanical equipment possible cause of hazards? 10. Hazards possible from gradual or sudden blockages in piping? 11. Hazards possible from gradual or sudden blockages in equipment? 12. Public liability risks possible from sprays, fumes, mists or noise? 13. Provisions made for disposal of toxic materials? 14. Material safety data sheets available for all chemical species? 15. Hazards possible from simultaneous loss of two or more utilities?

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Further Study Required Does Not Apply Completed

Process (cont.)
16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. Hazards involved in sewering materials? Safety factors altered by design revisions? Consequences of reasonably worst incident reviewed? Consequences of combination of incidents reviewed? Process diagrams correct and up-to-date?

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Further Study Required Does Not Apply Completed

Piping
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. Safety showers and eye baths required? Sprinkler systems required? Provisions for thermal expansion? All overflow lines directed to safe areas? Vent lines directed safely? Piping specifications followed? Washing-down hoses needed? Check valves provided as needed? Protection and identification of fragile pipe considered? Possible deterioration of exterior of piping by chemicals? Emergency valves readily accessible? Long and large vent lines supported? Steam condensate piping safely designed? Relief valve piping designed to prevent plugging? Drains to relieve pressure on suction/discharge of process pumps?

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Further Study Required Does Not Apply Completed

Piping (cont.)
16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. City water lines not connected to process pipes? Flammable fluids feeding prod units shut off from safe distance? Personnel protective insulation provided? Hot steam lines insultated?

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Further Study Required Does Not Apply Completed

Equipment
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. Designs correct for maximum operating pressure? Corrosion allowance considered? Special isolation for hazardous equipment? Guards for belts, pulleys, sheaves and gears? Schedule for checking protective devices? Dikes for any storage tanks? Guard rails for storage tanks? Construction materials compatible with process chemicals? Reclaimed and replacement equipment checked structurally? Reclaimed/replacement equipment checked for process pressures? Pipelines independently supported to relieve pumps? Pipelines independently supported to relieve other equipment? Automatic lubrication of critical machinery? Emergency standby equipment needed?

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Further Study Required Does Not Apply Completed

Venting
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. Relief valves or rupture disks required? Materials of construction corrosion resistant? Vents properly designed? (Size, direction, configuration) Flame arrestors required on vent lines? Relief valves protected from plugging by rupture disks? Telltale pressure gauges installed between rupture disk/relief valve?

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Further Study Required Does Not Apply Completed

Instrument and Electrical

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. All controls fail safe? Dual indication of process variables necessary? All equipment properly labeled? Tubing runs protected? Safeguards for process control when instrument out of service? Process safety affected by response lag? Labels for all start-stop switches? Equipment designed to permit lockout protection? Electrical failures cause unsafe conditions? Sufficient lighting for both outside and inside operations? Lights provided for all sight glasses, showers and eye-baths? Breakers adequate for circuit protection? All equipment grounded? Special interlocks needed for safe operation? Emergency standby power on lighting equipment required?

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Further Study Required Does Not Apply Completed

Instrument and Electrical (cont.)

16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. Emergency escape lighting required during power failures? All necessary communications equipment provided? Emergency disconnect switches properly marked? Special explosion proof electrical fixtures required?

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Further Study Required Does Not Apply Completed

Safety Equipment
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. Fire extinguishers required? Special respiratory equipment required? Diking material required? Colorimetric indicator tubes required? Flammable vapor detection apparatus required? Fire extinguishing materials compatible with process materials? Special emergency procedures and alarms required?

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Further Study Required Does Not Apply Completed

Raw Materials
1. Any materials and products require special handling equipment? 2. Any raw materials/products affected by extreme weather conditions? 3. Any products hazardous from a toxic or fire standpoint? 4. Proper containers being used? 5. Containers properly labeled for toxicity, flammability, stability, etc.? 6. Consequences of bad spills considered? 7. Special instructions needed for containers? 8. Special instructions needed for storage and warehousing distributors? 9. Does warehouse have operating instructions covering each product? 10. 11.

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Checklists are not a substitute for a more rigorous approach. However, they can be a constant reminder to reviewers of items to consider for the situation at hand. They can be used as a stimulant for more formal studies.

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