AGUAS V.

LLEMOS FACTS: Petitioners Francisco Salinas and the spouses Felix Guardino and Maria Aguas alleged to have received a copy of a petition for a writ of possession which was filed by respondent Hermogenes Llemos before the CFI of Catbalogan, Samar. From their residence in Manila, they went to Samar together with their counsel to appear in court, only to discover that there was no such petition filed and that respondent Llemos maliciously caused them trouble. Petitioners filed an action for damages against Llemos for causing them mental anguish and undue embarrassment, but before Llemos could file his answer, he died. The complaint was amended and Llemos heirs were included as party defendant. The case was dismissed on the ground that the legal representative and not the heirs should have been made as party defendant and that the action to recover money should be filed as a claim in the estate or intestate proceeding. MR having been denied, hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not actions for damages caused by tortious conduct survive the death of the defendant RULING: YES. Under Rule 86, Section 5, the actions that are abated by death are: (1) claims for funeral expenses and those for the last sickness of the decedent; (2) judgments for money; and (3) "all claims for money against the decedent, arising from contract express or implied". 1. Thus, the action to recover all claims of money against deceased defendant shall only be barred if such arise from contract express or implied and it includes all purely personal obligations other than those which have their source in delict or tort. 2. On the other hand, Rule 87, section 1, enumerates actions that survive against a decedent's executors or administrators, and they are: (1) actions to recover real and personal property from the estate; (2) actions to enforce a lien thereon; and (3) actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property. 3. The present suit falls on the 3rd category. It having been held that "injury to property" is not limited to injuries to specific property, but extends to other wrongs by which personal estate is injured or diminished. To maliciously cause a party to incur unnecessary expenses, as charged in this case, is certainly injurious to that party's property. However, since parties have arrived at an amicable settlement of their differences, they have agreed to dismiss this appeal. The case have become moot.

SANTOS v. MANARANG FACTS: Don Lucas de Ocampo died and left a will containing a clause on debts he contracted which his wife and executors shall pay for. One of the creditors is plaintiff-appellant Santos who presented a petition asking the committee to be reconvened to consider his claims against the estate of the deceased. The petition was denied by the court prompting the plaintiff to institute the present proceedings against the administratrix of the estate. The relief was denied in the court below. ISSUE: Whether or not the court erred in refusing to reconvene the committee for the purpose of considering plaintiff's claim. RULING: The range of the period specified in the rule is intended to give the probate court the discretion to fix the period for the filing of claims. The probate court is permitted by the rule to set the period provided it is not less than six (6) months nor more than twelve (12) months from the day of the first publication of notice thereof. Such period once fixed by the court is mandatory. The purpose of the law, in fixing the period within which claims against an estate must be presented, is to insure a speedy settlement of the affairs of the deceased person and the early delivery of the property to the person entitled to the same. If the committee fails to give the notice required, that is a sufficient cause for reconvening it for further consideration of claims which may not have been presented before its final report was submitted to the court. But this is not the case made by the plaintiff, as the committee did give the notice required by law. Where the proper notice has been given the right to have the committee recalled for the consideration of a belated claim appears to rest first upon the condition that it is presented within six months after the time previously limited for the presentation of claims. In the present case the time previously limited was six months from July 23, 1907. This allowed the plaintiff until January 23, 1908, to present his claims to the committee. An extension of this time rested in the discretion of the court. In other words, the court could extend this time and recall the committee for a consideration of the plaintiff's claims against the estate of justice required it, at any time within the six months after January 23, 1908, or until July 23, 1908. Plaintiff's petition was not presented until July 14, 1909. The plaintiff was laboring under a mistake of law a mistake which could easily have been corrected had he sought to inform himself; a lack of

information as to the law governing the allowance of claims against estate of the deceased persons which, by proper diligence, could have been remedied in ample to present the claims to the committee. Plaintiff finally discovered his mistake and now seeks to assert his right when they have been lost through his own negligence. Ignorantia legis neminem excusat. We conclude that the learned trial court made no error in refusing to reconvene the committee for the purpose of considering plaintiff's claims against the estate. HEIRS OF GREGOIRE V. BAKER FACTS: J. H. Ankrom, died on September 18, 1922; and on September 25, thereafter, the appellee, A. L. Baker, qualified as his administrator. On December 13, 1922 the administrator filed his inventory of the assets pertaining to the estate of his decedent, in which inventory was included a tract of land covered by Torrens certificate of title and containing an area of more than 930 hectares and with an estimated value of nearly P60,000. On September 24, 1924, the heirs of Rafael Gregoire, filed a claim against the estate of Ankrom for the sum of P70, 877.56, based upon a judgment rendered in the Supreme Court of the Republic of Panama. As the affairs of the estate stood upon the original inventory, there appeared to be sufficient assets to pay all claimants. However, pending the intestate proceedings, the administrator discovered that before his death, Ankrom had executed a mortgage on the property here in question in favor of the Philippine Trust Company to secure a note in the amount of P20,000.00 and that this appears to have been assigned to one J. G. Jung for a purported consideration of the sum of P1 and other good and valuable considerations. In view of these conveyances by his intestate, the administrator presented an amended inventory, omitting therefrom the tract of 930 hectares with its improvements thereon. The court, however, made an order on October 7, 1925, directing the administrator to restore said item to his inventory. Later on, the court made a new order, approving of the omission by the administrator of said property from the inventory. ISSUE: Whether or not a creditor may still bring an action against the decedents estate RULING: When there is a deficiency of assets in the hands of an executor or administrator to pay debts and expenses, and when the deceased person made in his life-time such fraudulent conveyance of such real or personal

estate or of a right or interest therein, any creditor of the estate may, by license of the court, if the executor or administrator has not commenced such action, commence and prosecute to final judgment, in the name of the executor or administrator, an action for the recovery of the same and may recover for the benefit of the creditors, such real or personal estate, or interest therein so conveyed. The remedy of the appellants is, therefore, to indemnify the administrator against costs and, by leave of court, to institute an action in the name of the administrator to set aside the assignment or other conveyance believed to have been made in fraud of creditors. Orders made by a court with reference to the inclusion of items of property in the inventory or the exclusion of items therefrom are manifestly of a purely discretionary, provisional, and interlocutory nature and are subject to modification or change at any time during the course of the administration proceedings. MODESTO V. MODESTO FACTS: Bruno Modesto died leaving several heirs among them were Cirilo Modesto and Jesus Modesto, the latter acting as administrator of the estate of Bruno. Jesus Modesto filed a motion to cite and examine under oath several persons, especially Cirilo Modesto regarding the properties concealed, embezzled or fraudulently conveyed. Jesus Modesto listed properties supposed to belong to the estate of Bruno such as jewels, furniture, other personal properties and real properties. Jesus Modesto filed in court to require Cirilo Modesto to turn over the personal properties belonging to the intestate supposed to be in Cirilos possession. The trial court required Cirilo Modesto to deliver the property listed. A writ of execution was issued to the Provincial Sherriff upon motion and thereafter writ of possession after the administrator bought the properties under execution being the only bidder. Cirilo was ordered to place Jesus in possession of the real property sold to him. Cirilo then filed the present petition for certiorari to annul the proceedings had before lower court ISSUE: Whether or not probate court has the authority to determine to whom the properties belong and propriety of issuing such writs RULING: 1. The purpose of examination under oath of persons suspected of having concealed, embezzled or conveyed the properties of deceased is merely to elicit information or secure evidence from them. 2. Probate court has no authority to decide whether or not the

property belongs to estate or to persons examined. And should it found good reason to believe it belong to the estate, then the next step to be taken should be for the administrator to file an ordinary action in regular court to recover the same. 3. Moreover, the findings of the probate court in the case at bar as to the ownership of properties involved was not even supported by evidence on record. Thus the issuances of writs are not proper. 4. Even if Cirilo, the person examined admitted possession of the properties, still it is not correct to require him to deliver possession but an ordinary action to proper court is necessary to determine ownership. Certiorari granted. DINGLASAN v. ANG CHIA FACTS: Rafael Dinglasan, et al. filed a case in the CFI of Capiz, against Ang Chia, her son Claro Lee and one Lee Bun Ting to recover the ownership and possession of a parcel of land located in Capiz, Capiz, and damages in the amount of P1,000 a month. Subsequently, the plaintiffs filed a motion for the appointment of a receiver to which counsel for the defendants objected, and it was only at the hearing of said motion when plaintiffs discovered that there was a case pending in the same court concerning the intestate estate of Lee Liong. In view thereof, the motion for the appointment of a receiver was withdrawn and the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint seeking the inclusion of the administratrix of the estate as party-defendant, who is the same widow Ang Chia, who was already a party-defendant in her personal capacity. In order to protect their interests, the plaintiffs also filed in the intestate proceedings a verified claim in intervention and a motion praying that a coadministrator of the estate be appointed and the bond of the administratrix in the amount of P500 be increased to P20,000. By their claim in intervention, the plaintiffs made of record the pendency of the aforesaid civil case and prayed that the intestate proceedings be not closed until said civil case shall have been terminated. The administratrix filed a motion to dismiss the claim in intervention and objected to the motion for the increase of her bond and for the appointment of a co-administrator. The court issued an order denying the petition for a co-administrator but increasing the bond to P5,000, and as regards the petition not to close the intestate proceedings until after civil case shall have been decided, the court stated that it would act thereon if a motion to close the proceedings is presented in due time and is objected to by petitioners. The court however took cognizance of the pendency of said civil case. The administratrix did not appeal from said order nor file a new bond and instead moved for the closing of the proceedings and her discharge as administratrix on the ground that the heirs had already entered into an extrajudicial partition of the estate. To this motion the petitioners objected,

whereupon the court issued an order holding in abeyance the approval of the partition and the closing of the proceedings until after the decision in said civil case has been rendered. From this order the administratrix and the heirs appealed. ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court erred in holding in abeyance the closing of the intestate proceedings pending the termination of the separate civil action filed by the petitioners-appellees. RULING: The Supreme Court held in the negative. The Court affirms the order appealed from. Appellants' claim that the lower court erred in holding in abeyance the closing of the intestate proceedings pending determination of the separate civil action for the reason that there is no rule or authority justifying the extension of administration proceedings until after the separate action pertaining to its general jurisdiction has been terminated, cannot entertained. Section 1, Rule 88, of the Rules of Court, expressly provides that "action to recover real or personal property from the estate or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property, real or personal, may be commenced against the executor or administrator". What practical value would this provision have if the action against the administrator cannot be prosecuted to its termination simply because the heirs desire to close the intestate proceedings without first taking any step to settle the ordinary civil case? This rule is but a corollary to the ruling which declares that questions concerning ownership of property alleged to be part of the estate but claimed by another person should be determined in a separate action and should be submitted to the court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction. (Guzman v. Anog and Anog, supra). These rules would be rendered nugatory if we are to hold that an intestate proceeding can be closed by any time at the whim and caprice of the heirs. Another rule of court provides that "after a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court shall order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased to appear and to be substituted for the deceased, within a period of thirty (30) days, or within such time as may be granted. If the legal representative fails to appear within said time, the court may order the opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal representative of the deceased within a time to be specified by the court, and the representative shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the interest of the deceased." (Section 17, Rule 3.) This rule also implies that a probate case may be held in abeyance pending determination of an ordinary case wherein an administrator is made a party. To hold otherwise would be also to render said rule nugatory.