[G.R. No. 137944. April 6, 2000] FERNANDA MENDOZA CEQUENA and RUPERTA MENDOZA LIRIO, petitioners, vs.

HONORATA MENDOZA BOLANTE, respondent. Jlexj FACTS: The Petition herein refers to a parcel of land. Prior to 1954, the land was originally declared for taxation purposes in the name of Sinforoso Mendoza, father of [respondent] and married to Eduarda Apiado. Sinforoso died in 1930. [Petitioners] were the daughters of Margarito Mendoza. On the basis of an affidavit, the tax declaration in the name of Sinforoso Mendoza of the contested lot was cancelled and subsequently declared in the name of Margarito Mendoza. Margarito and Sinforoso are brothers. [Respondent] is the present occupant of the land. Petitioner instituted an action for recovery of the property. The TC rendered judgment ordering respondent to surrender possession to the heirs of petitioner. On appeal the CA reversed the TCs finding because the genuiness and due execution of the affidavit allegedly signed by respondents had not been sufficiently established. ISSUES: 1) WHO HAS THE PREFERENCE OF POSSESSION BETWEEN THEM? Based on Article 538 of the Civil Code, the respondent is the preferred possessor because, benefiting from her father's tax declaration of the subject lot since 1926, she has been in possession thereof for a longer period. On the other hand, petitioners' father acquired joint possession only in 1952. 2) WHO HAS THE BETTER RIGHT AMONG THEM? But Article 538 settles only the question of possession, and possession is different from ownership. Ownership in this case should be established in one of the ways provided by law. To settle the issue of ownership, we need to determine who between the claimants has proven acquisitive prescription Article 540 of the Civil Code provides: "Only the possession acquired and enjoyed in the concept of owner can serve as a title for acquiring dominion." Ownership of immovable property is acquired by ordinary prescription through possession for ten years. Being the sole heir of her father, respondent showed through his tax receipt that she had been in possession of the land for more than ten years since 1932. When her father died in 1930, she continued to reside there with her mother. When she got married, she and her husband engaged in kaingin inside the disputed lot for their livelihood. Respondent's possession was not disturbed until 1953 when the petitioners' father claimed the land. But by then, her possession, which was in the concept of owner -public, peaceful, and uninterrupted had already ripened into ownership. Furthermore she herself, after her father's demise, declared and paid realty taxes for the disputed land. Tax receipts and declarations of ownership for taxation, when coupled with proof of actual possession of the property, can be the basis of a claim for ownership through prescription. In contrast, the petitioners, despite thirty-two years of farming the subject land, did not acquire ownership. It is settled that ownership cannot be acquired by mere occupation. Unless, coupled with the element of hostility toward the true owner occupation and use, however long, will not confer title by prescription or adverse possession Moreover, the petitioners cannot claim that their possession was public, peaceful and uninterrupted.

Although their father and brother arguably acquired ownership through extraordinary prescription because of their adverse possession for thirty-two years (1953-1985) this supposed ownership cannot extend to the entire disputed lot, but must be limited to the portion that they actually farmed. 3) WON the affidavit of the petitioner is admissible as evidence of ownership of the property? NO. Before a private document offered as authentic can be received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved first. And not all authorized documents are exempted from the rule on authentication. Thus, an affidavit does not automatically become a public document just because it contains a notarial juriat. Furthermore, the affidavit in question does not state how the ownership of the subject land was transferred from Sinforoso Mendoza to Margarito Mendoza. By itself, an affidavit is not a mode of acquiring ownership. In the absence of actual public and adverse possession, the declaration of the land for tax purposes does not prove ownership. In sum, the petitioners' claim of ownership of the whole parcel has no legal basis. The Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision and Resolution AFFIRMED.

Carbonell vs. Court of Appeals, and Poncio 69 SCRA 99 January 1976 FACTS: On January 27, 1955, respondent Jose Poncio executed a private memorandum of sale of his parcel of land with improvements situated in San Juan, Rizal in favor of petitioner Rosario Carbonell who knew that the said property was at that time subject to a mortgage in favor of the Republic Savings Bank (RSB) for the sum of P1,500.00. Four days later, Poncio, in another private memorandum, bound himself to sell the same property for an improved price to one Emma Infante for the sum of P2,357.52, with the latter still assuming the existing mortgage debt in favor of the RSB in the amount of P1,177.48. Thus, in February 2, Poncio executed a formal registerable deed of sale in her (Infante's) favor. So, when the first buyer Carbonell saw the seller Poncio a few days afterwards, bringing the formal deed of sale for the latter's signature and the balance of the agreed cash payment, she was told that he could no longer proceed with formalizing the contract with her (Carbonell) because he had already formalized a sales contract in favor of Infante. To protect her legal rights as the first buyer, Carbonell registered on February 8, 1955 with the Register of Deeds her adverse claim as first buyer entitled to the property. Meanwhile, Infante, the second buyer, was able to register the sale in her favor only on February 12, 1955, so that the transfer certificate of title issued in her name carried the duly annotated adverse claim of Carbonell as the first buyer. The trial court declared the claim of the second buyer Infante to be superior to that of the first buyer Carbonell, a decision which the Court of Appeals reversed. Upon motion for reconsideration,

however, Court of Appeals annulled and set aside its first decision and affirmed the trial courts decision. ISSUE: Who has the superior right over the subject property? COURT RULING: The Supreme Court reversed the appellate courts decision and declared the first buyer Carbonell to have the superior right over the subject property, relying on Article 1544 of the Civil Code. Unlike the first and third paragraphs of said Article 1544, which accord preference to the one who first takes possession in good faith of personal or real property, the second paragraph directs that ownership of immovable property should be recognized in favor of one "who in good faith first recorded" his right. Under the first and third paragraphs, good faith must characterize the prior possession, while under the second paragraph, good faith must characterize the act of anterior registration. When Carbonell bought the lot from Poncio on January 27, 1955, she was the only buyer thereof and the title of Poncio was still in his name solely encumbered by bank mortgage duly annotated thereon. Carbonell was not aware - and she could not have been aware - of any sale to Infante as there was no such sale to Infante then. Hence, Carbonell's prior purchase of the land was made in good faith which did not cease after Poncio told her on January 31, 1955 of his second sale of the same lot to Infante. Carbonell wanted to meet Infante but the latter refused so to protect her legal rights, Carbonell registered her adverse claim on February 8, 1955. Under the circumstances, this recording of Carbonells adverse claim should be deemed to have been done in good faith and should emphasize Infante's bad faith when the latter registered her deed of sale 4 days later.

BUKIDNON HOSPITAL VS MBTC Facts: Bukidnon Doctor's Hospital obtained a P25M loan from MBTC for the construction of its hospital. It also constituted a REM over the lands over which the hospital would be built as a security. As the Bukidnon Doctor's defaulted, MBTC foreclosed the REM and then was able to buy it. No redemption made by Bukidnon Doctors so MBTC consolidated ownership over the properties. ---however, it was apparent that before the end of the redemption period, Bukidnon Doctor's and MBTC had a lease agreement so that the operation of the hospital erected on the lands mortgaged would not be disrupted. but after the consolidation of the ownership over the properties, MBTC asked Bukidnon Doctors to vacate the property. Bukidnon Doctors refused, invoking the lease agreement -MBTC filed EX PARTE MOTION FOR WRIT OF POSSESSION w/ RTC RTC: granted ISSUE: WON MBTC ENTITLED TO WRIT OF POSSESSION AS A MATTER OF RIGHT DESPITE THE LEASE AGREEMENT BETWEEN ITSELF AND THE FORMER MORTGAGOR-SELLER?

Held: NO where a lease agreement, whether express or implied, is subsequently entered into by the mortgagor and the mortgagee after the expiration of the redemption period and the consolidation of title in the name of the latter, a case for ejectment or unlawful detainer, not a motion for a writ of possession, is the proper remedy in order to evict from the questioned premises a mortgagor-turned-lessee. The rationale for this rule is that a new relationship between the parties has been created. What applies is no longer the law on extrajudicial foreclosure, but the law on lease. And when an issue arises, as in the case at bar, regarding the right of the lessee to continue occupying the leased premises, the rights of the parties must be heard and resolved in a case for ejectment or unlawful detainer under Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. Bukidnon Doctors v. MetroBank: In extrajudicial foreclosure, a writ of possession shall be issued as a matter of course upon proper motion after expiration of redemption period without the mortgagor exercising his right of redemption. Macasaet v. Macasaet September 30, 2004 Panganiban, J. Facts: Children were invited by the parents to occupy the latters 2 lots. Unfortunately, an unresolved conflict terminated this situation. Out of pique, the parents asked them to vacate the premises. Thus, the children lost their right to remain on the property. They have the right, however, to be indemnified for the useful improvements that they constructed thereon in good faith and with the consent of the parents. In short, Article 448 of the Civil Code applies. Held: The portion requiring Spouses Vicente and Rosario Macasaet to reimburse one half of the value of the useful improvements, amounting to P475,000, and the right of Spouses Ismael and Rosita Macasaet to remove those improvements (if the former refuses to reimburse) is deleted. The case is remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings to determine the facts essential to the proper application of Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code.