G.R. No. L-59743 May 31 1982 NATIONAL FEDERATION OF SUGAR WORKERS (NFSW), petitioner, vs. ETHELWOLDO R.

OVEJERA, CENTRAL AZUCARERA DE LA CARLOTA (CAC), COL. ROGELIO DEINLA, as Provincial Commander, 3311st P.C. Command, Negros Occidental, respondents. PLANA, J: This is a petition for prohibition seeking to annul the decision dated February 20, 1982 of Labor Arbiter Ethelwoldo R. Ovejera of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) with station at the Regional Arbitration Branch No. VI-A, Bacolod City, which, among others, declared illegal the ongoing strike of the National Federation of Sugar Workers (NFSW) at the Central Azucarera de la Carlota (CAC), and to restrain the implementation thereof. I. FACTS 1. NFSW has been the bargaining agent of CAC rank and file employees (about 1200 of more than 2000 personnel) and has concluded with CAC a collective bargaining agreement effective February 16, 1981 February 15, 1984. Under Art. VII, Sec. 5 of the said CBA Bonuses The parties also agree to maintain the present practice on the grant of Christmas bonus, milling bonus, and amelioration bonus to the extent as the latter is required by law. The Christmas and milling bonuses amount to 1- months' salary.

2. On November 28, 1981, NFSW struck allegedly to compel the payment of the 13th month pay under PD 851, in addition to the Christmas, milling and amelioration bonuses being enjoyed by CAC workers. 3. To settle the strike, a compromise agreement was concluded between CAC and NFSW on November 30,1981. Under paragraph 4 thereof The parties agree to abide by the final decision of the Supreme Court in any case involving the 13th Month Pay Law if it is clearly held that the employer is liable to pay a 13th month pay separate and distinct from the bonuses already given. 4. As of November 30, 1981, G.R. No. 51254 (Marcopper Mining Corp. vs. Blas Ople and Amado Inciong, Minister and Deputy Minister of Labor, respectively, and Marcopper Employees Labor Union, Petition for certiorari and Prohibition) was still pending in the Supreme Court. The Petition had been dismissed on June 11, 1981 on the vote of seven Justices. 1 A motion for reconsideration thereafter filed was denied in a resolution dated December 15, 1981, with only five Justices voting for denial. (3 dissented; 2 reserved their votes: 4 did not take part.) On December 18, 1981 the decision of June 11, 1981 having become final and executory entry of judgment was made. 5. After the Marcopper decision had become final, NFSW renewed its demand that CAC give the 13th month pay. CAC refused. 6. On January 22, 1982, NFSW filed with the Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE) Regional Office in Bacolod City a notice to strike based on non-payment of the 13th month pay. Six days after, NFSW struck. 7. One day after the commencement of the strike (jan 28), or on January 29, 1982, a report of the strike-vote was filed by NFSW with MOLE.

8. On February 8, 1982, CAC filed a petition (R.A.B. Case No. 0110-82) with the Regional Arbitration Branch VI-A, MOLE, at Bacolod City to declare the strike illegal, principally for being violative of Batas Pambansa Blg. 130, that is, the strike was declared before the expiration of the 15-day cooling-off period for unfair labor practice (ULP) strikes, and the strike was staged before the lapse of seven days from the submission to MOLE of the result of the strike-vote. 9. After the submission of position papers and hearing, Labor Arbiter Ovejera declared the NFSW strike illegal. The dispositive part of his decision dated February 20, 1982 reads: Wherefore, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered: 1. Declaring the strike commenced by NFSW on January 28, 1982, illegal, 2. Directing the Central to resume operations immediately upon receipt hereof; 3. Directing the Central to accept back to work all employees appearing in its payroll as of January 28, 1982 except those covered by the February 1, 1982 memorandum on preventive suspension but without prejudice to the said employees' instituting appropriate actions before this Ministry relative to whatever causes of action they may have obtained proceeding from said memorandum; 4. Directing the Central to pay effective from the date of resumption of operations the salaries of those to be placed on preventive suspension as per February 1, 1982 memorandum during their period of preventive suspension; and

5. Directing, in view of the finding that the subject strike is illegal, NFSW, its officers, members, as well as sympathizers to immediately desist from committing acts that may impair or impede the milling operations of the Central The law enforcement authorities are hereby requested to assist in the peaceful enforcement and implementation of this Decision. SO ORDERED. 10. On February 26, 1982, the NFSW by passing the NLRC filed the instant Petition for prohibition alleging that Labor Arbiter Ovejera, CAC and the PC Provincial Commander of Negros Occidental were threatening to immediately enforce the February 20, 1982 decision which would violate fundamental rights of the petitioner, and praying that WHEREFORE, on the foregoing considerations, it is prayed of the Honorable Court that on the Petition for Preliminary Injunction, an order, after hearing, issue: 1. Restraining implementation or enforcement of the Decision of February 20, 1982; 2. Enjoining respondents to refrain from the threatened acts violative of the rights of strikers and peaceful picketers; 3. Requiring maintenance of the status quo as of February 20, 1982, until further orders of the Court; and on the Main Petition, judgment be rendered after hearing. 1. Declaring the Decision of February 2O, l982 null and void;

2. Making the preliminary injunction permanent; 3. Awarding such other relief as may be just in the premises. 11. Hearing was held, after which the parties submitted their memoranda. No restraining order was issued. II ISSUES The parties have raised a number of issues, including some procedural points. However, considering their relative importance and the impact of their resolution on ongoing labor disputes in a number of industry sectors, we have decided in the interest of expediency and dispatch to brush aside non-substantial items and reduce the remaining issues to but two fundamental ones: 1. Whether the strike declared by NFSW is illegal, the resolution of which mainly depends on the mandatory or directory character of the cooling-off period and the 7-day strike ban after report to MOLE of the result of a strike-vote, as prescribed in the Labor Code. 2. Whether under Presidential Decree 851 (13th Month Pay Law), CAC is obliged to give its workers a 13th month salary in addition to Christmas, milling and amelioration bonuses, the aggregate of which admittedly exceeds by far the disputed 13th month pay. (See petitioner's memorandum of April 12, 1982, p. 2; CAC memorandum of April 2, 1982, pp. 3-4.) Resolution of this issue requires an examination of the thrusts and application of PD 851. III. DISCUSSION 1. Articles 264 and 265 of the Labor Code, insofar as pertinent, read: Art. 264, Strikes, picketing and lockouts. ...

: the withholding of employment by an employer and the whole or partial closing of the business establishment in order to gain concessions (conceding) from or resist demands of employees (c) In cases of bargaining deadlocks, the certified or duly recognized bargaining representative may file a notice of strike with the Ministry (of Labor and Employment) at least thirty (30) days before the intended date thereof. In cases of unfair labor practices, the period of notice shall be shortened to fifteen (15) days; ... (d) During the cooling-off period, it shall be the duty of the voluntary settlement. Should the dispute remain unsettled until the lapse of the requisite number of days from the mandatory filing of the notice, the labor union may strike or the employer may declare a lockout. (f) A decision to declare a strike must be approved by at least twothirds (2/3) of the total union membership in the bargaining unit concerened by secret ballots in meetings or referenda. A decision to declare a lockout must be approved by at least twothirds (2/3) of the board of direcotrs of the employer corporation or association or of the partners in a partnership obtained by secret ballot in a meeting called for the purpose. the decision shall be valid for the duration of the dispute based on substantially the same grounds considered when the strike or lockout vote was taken . The Ministry, may at its own intitiative or upon the request of any affected party, supervise the conduct of the secret balloting. In every case, the union of the employer shall furnish the Ministry the results of the voting at least seven (7) days before the intended strike or lockout, subject to the cooling-off period herein provided. (Emphasis supplied).

FIRST RULING: ART. 265. Prohibited activities. It shall be unlawful for any labor organization or employer to declare a strike or lockout without first having bargained collectively in accordance with Title VII of this Book or without first having filed the notice required in the preceding Article or without the necessary strike or lockout vote first having been obtained and reported to the Ministry. It shall likewise be unlawful to declare a strike or lockout after assumption of jurisdiction by the President or the Minister or after certification or submission of the dispute to compulsory or voluntary arbitration or during the pendency of cases involving the same grounds for the strike or lockout. (Emphasis supplied.) (a) Language of the law. The foregoing provisions hardly leave any room for doubt that the cooling-off period in Art. 264(c) and the 7-day strike ban after the strike-vote report prescribed in Art. 264(f) were meant to be, and should be deemed, mandatory. When the law says "the labor union may strike" should the dispute "remain unsettled until the lapse of the requisite number of days (cooling-off period) from the filing of the notice," the unmistakable implication is that the union may not strike before the lapse of the cooling-off period. Similarly, the mandatory character of the 7-day strike ban after the report on the strike-vote is manifest in the provision that "in every case," the union shall furnish the MOLE with the results of the voting "at least seven (7) days before the intended strike, subject to the (prescribed) cooling-off period." It must be stressed that the requirements of cooling-off period and 7-day strike ban must both be complied with, although the labor union may take a strike vote and report the same within the statutory coolingoff period.

If only the filing of the strike notice and the strike-vote report would be deemed mandatory, but not the waiting periods so specifically and emphatically prescribed by law, the purposes (hereafter discussed) for which the filing of the strike notice and strike-vote report is required would not be achieved, as when a strike is declared immediately after a strike notice is served, or when as in the instant case the strike-vote report is filed with MOLE after the strike had actually commenced Such interpretation of the law ought not and cannot be countenanced. It would indeed be self-defeating for the law to imperatively require the filing on a strike notice and strike-vote report without at the same time making the prescribed waiting periods mandatory. (b) Purposes of strike notice and strike-vote report. In requiring a strike notice and a cooling-off period, the avowed intent of the law is to provide an opportunity for mediation and conciliation. It thus directs the MOLE "to exert all efforts at mediation and conciliation to effect a voluntary settlement" during the cooling-off period . As applied to the CAC-NFSW dispute regarding the 13th month pay, MOLE intervention could have possibly induced CAC to provisionally give the 13th month pay in order to avert great business loss arising from the project strike, without prejudice to the subsequent resolution of the legal dispute by competent authorities; or mediation/conciliation could have convinced NFSW to at least postpone the intended strike so as to avoid great waste and loss to the sugar central, the sugar planters and the sugar workers themselves, if the strike would coincide with the mining season. So, too, the 7-day strike-vote report is not without a purpose. As pointed out by the Solicitor General Many disastrous strikes have been staged in the past based merely on the insistence of minority groups within the union. The submission of the report gives assurance that a strike vote has been taken and that, if the report concerning it is false, the majority of the members can

take appropriate remedy before it is too late. (Answer of public respondents, pp. 17-18.) If the purpose of the required strike notice and strike-vote report are to be achieved, the periods prescribed for their attainment must, as aforesaid, be deemed mandatory., ... when a fair interpretation of the statute, which directs acts or proceedings to be done in a certain way, shows the legislature intended a compliance with such provision to be essential to the validity of the act or proceeding, or when some antecedent and prerequisite conditions must exist prior to the exercise of power or must be performed before certain other powers can be exercised, the statute must be regarded as mandatory. So it has been held that, when a statute is founded on public policy [such as the policy to encourage voluntary settlement of disputes without resorting to strikes], those to whom it applies should not be permitted to waive its provisions. (82 C.J.S. 873-874. Emphasis supplied.) (c) Waiting period after strike notice and strike-vote report, valid regulation of right to strike. To quote Justice Jackson in International Union vs. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 336 U.S. 245, at 259 The right to strike, because of its more serious impact upon the public interest, is more vulnerable to regulation than the right to organize and select representatives for lawful purposes of collective bargaining ... The cooling-off period and the 7-day strike ban after the filing of a strike- vote report, as prescribed in Art. 264 of the Labor Code, are reasonable restrictions and their imposition is essential to attain the legitimate policy objectives embodied in

the law. We hold that they constitute a valid exercise of the police power of the state. (d) State policy on amicable settlement of criminal liability. Petitioner contends that since the non-compliance (with PD 851) imputed to CAC is an unfair labor practice which is an offense against the state, the cooling-off period provided in the Labor Code would not apply, as it does not apply to ULP strikes. It is argued that mediation or conciliation in order to settle a criminal offense is not allowed. In the first place, it is at best unclear whether the refusal of CAC to give a 13th month pay to NFSW constitutes a criminal act. Under Sec. 9 of the Rules and regulations Implementing Presidential Decree No. 851 Non-payment of the thirteenth-month pay provided by the Decree and these rules shall be treated as money claims cases and shall be processed in accordance with the Rules Implementing the Labor Code of the Philippines and the Rules of the National Labor Relations Commission. Secondly, the possible dispute settlement, either permanent or temporary, could very well be along legally permissible lines, as indicated in (b) above or assume the form of measures designed to abort the intended strike, rather than compromise criminal liability, if any. Finally, amicable settlement of criminal liability is not inexorably forbidden by law. Such settlement is valid when the law itself clearly authorizes it. In the case of a dispute on the payment of the 13th month pay, we are not prepared to say that its voluntary settlement is not authorized by the terms of Art. 264(e) of the Labor Code, which makes it the duty of the MOLE to exert all efforts at mediation and conciliation to effect a voluntary settlement of labor disputes.

(e) NFSW strike is illegal. The NFSW declared the strike six (6) days after filing a strike notice, i.e., before the lapse of the mandatory cooling-off period. It also failed to file with the MOLE before launching the strike a report on the strike-vote, when it should have filed such report "at least seven (7) days before the intended strike." Under the circumstances, we are perforce constrained to conclude that the strike staged by petitioner is not in conformity with law. This conclusion makes it unnecessary for us to determine whether the pendency of an arbitration case against CAC on the same issue of payment of 13th month pay [R.A.B No. 512-81, Regional Arbitration Branch No. VI-A, NLRC, Bacolod City, in which the National Congress of Unions in the Sugar Industry of the Philippines (NACUSIP) and a number of CAC workers are the complainants, with NFSW as Intervenor seeking the dismissal of the arbitration case as regards unnamed CAC rank and file employees] has rendered illegal the above strike under Art. 265 of the Labor Code which provides: It shall likewise be unlawful to declare a strike or lockout after assumption of jurisdiction by the President or the Minister, or after certification or submission of the dispute to compulsory or voluntary arbitration or during the pendency of cases involving the same grounds for the strike or lockout. (Emphasis supplied.) (2) The Second Issue. At bottom, the NFSW strike arose from a dispute on the meaning and application of PD 851, with NFSW claiming entitlement to a 13th month pay on top of bonuses given by CAC to its workers, as against the diametrically opposite stance of CAC. Since the strike was just an offshoot of the said dispute, a simple decision on the legality or illegality of the strike would not spell the end of the NFSW-CAC labor dispute. And considering further that there are other disputes and strikes actual and impending involving the interpretation and application of PD 851, it is important for this Court to definitively resolve the problem: whether under PD 851, CAC is obliged to give its workers a 13th month

salary in addition to Christmas, milling and amelioration bonuses stipulated in a collective bargaining agreement amounting to more than a month's pay. Keenly sensitive to the needs of the workingmen, yet mindful of the mounting production cost that are the woe of capital which provides employment to labor, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 851 on 16 December 1975. Thereunder, "all employers are hereby required to pay salary of not more than all their employees receiving a basic P1,000 a month, regardless of the nature of their employment, a 13th month pay not later than December 24 of every year." Exempted from the obligation however are: Employers already paying their employees a 13th month pay or its equivalent ... (Section 2.) SECOND RULING The evident intention of the law, as revealed by the law itself, was to grant an additional income in the form of a 13th month pay to employees not already receiving the same. Otherwise put, the intention was to grant some relief not to all workers but only to the unfortunate ones not actually paid a 13th month salary or what amounts to it, by whatever name called; but it was not envisioned that a double burden would be imposed on the employer already paying his employees a 13th month pay or its equivalent whether out of pure generosity or on the basis of a binding agreement and, in the latter ease, regardless of the conditional character of the grant (such as making the payment dependent on profit), so long as there is actual payment. Otherwise, what was conceived to be a 13th month salary would in effect become a 14th or possibly 15th month pay.

This view is justified by the law itself which makes no distinction in the grant of exemption: "Employers already paying their employees a 13th month pay or its equivalent are not covered by this Decree." (P.D. 851.) The Rules Implementing P.D. 851 issued by MOLE immediately after the adoption of said law reinforce this stand. Under Section 3(e) thereof The term "its equivalent" ... shall include Christmas bonus, mid-year bonus, profit-sharing payments and other cash bonuses amounting to not less than 1/12th of the basic salary but shall not include cash and stock dividends, cost of living allowances and all other allowances regularly enjoyed by the employee, as well as non-monetary benefits. Where an employer pays less than 1/12th of the employee's basic salary, the employer shall pay the difference." (Italics supplied.) Having been issued by the agency charged with the implementation of PD 851 as its contemporaneous interpretation of the law, the quoted rule should be accorded great weight. Pragmatic considerations also weigh heavily in favor of crediting both voluntary and contractual bonuses for the purpose of determining liability for the 13th month pay. To require employers (already giving their employees a 13th month salary or its equivalent) to give a second 13th month pay would be unfair and productive of undesirable results. To the employer who had acceded and is already bound to give bonuses to his employees, the additional burden of a 13th month pay would amount to a penalty for his munificence or liberality. The probable reaction of one so circumstance would be to withdraw the bonuses or resist further voluntary grants for fear that if and when a law is passed giving the same benefits, his prior concessions (GRANTS) might not be given due credit; and this negative attitude would have an adverse impact on the employees.

In the case at bar, the NFSW-CAC collective bargaining agreement provides for the grant to CAC workers of Christmas bonus, milling bonus and amelioration bonus, the aggregate of which is very much more than a worker's monthly pay. When a dispute arose last year as to whether CAC workers receiving the stipulated bonuses would additionally be entitled to a 13th month pay, NFSW and CAC concluded a compromise agreement by which they agree(d) to abide by the final decision of the Supreme Court in any case involving the 13th Month Pay Law if it is clearly held that the employer is liable to pay a 13th month pay separate and distinct from the bonuses already given. When this agreement was forged on November 30,1981, the original decision dismissing the petition in the aforecited Marcopper case had already been promulgated by this Court. On the votes of only 7 Justices, including the distinguished Chief Justice, the petition of Marcopper Mining Corp. seeking to annul the decision of Labor Deputy Minister Amado Inciong granting a 13th month pay to Marcopper employees (in addition to mid- year and Christmas bonuses under a CBA) had been dismissed. But a motion for reconsideration filed by Marcopper was pending as of November 30, 1981. In December 1981, the original decision was affirmed when this Court finally denied the motion for reconsideration. But the resolution of denial was supported by the votes of only 5 Justices. FINAL: The Marcopper decision is therefore a Court decision but without the necessary eight votes to be doctrinal. This being so, it cannot be said that the Marcopper decision "clearly held" that "the employer is liable to pay a 13th month pay separate and distinct from the bonuses already given," within the meaning of the NFSW-CAC compromise agreement. At any rate, in view of the rulings made herein, NFSW cannot insist on its claim that its members are entitled to a 13th month pay in

addition to the bonuses already paid by CAC. WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit. No costs. SO ORDERED. Aquino, Guerrero, Escolin, Vasquez, Relova and Gutierrez, JJ., concur.

Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmarias Street, from 7:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. and from 1:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m.; and along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Echague Street, from 7 a.m. to 11 p.m., from a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic. The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission, on 18 July 1940, recommended to the Director of Public Works the adoption of the measure proposed in the resolution, in pursuance of the provisions of Commonwealth Act 548, which authorizes said Director of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, to promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on national roads. On 2 August 1940, the Director of Public Works, in his first indorsement to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, recommended to the latter the approval of the recommendation made by the Chairman of the National Traffic Commission, with the modification that the closing of Rizal Avenue to traffic to animal-drawn vehicles be limited to the portion thereof extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Azcarraga Street. On 10 August 1940, the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, in his second indorsement addressed to the Director of Public Works, approved the recommendation of the latter that Rosario Street and Rizal Avenue be closed to traffic of animal-drawn vehicles, between the points and during the hours as indicated, for a period of 1 year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic. The Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and

Calalang vs Williams GR 47800 December 2, 1940 Social Justice as the aim of Labor Laws CRUZ, J.: Facts: The National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of 17 July 1940, resolved to recommend to the Director of Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along

caused to be enforced the rules and regulations thus adopted. Maximo Calalang, in his capacity as a private citizen and as a taxpayer of Manila, brought before the Supreme court the petition for a writ of prohibition against A. D. Williams, as Chairman of the National Traffic Commission; Vicente Fragante, as Director of Public Works; Sergio Bayan, as Acting Secretary of Public Works and Communications; Eulogio Rodriguez, as Mayor of the City of Manila; and Juan Dominguez, as Acting Chief of Police of Manila. Issue: Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the Director of Public Works infringe upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people. (defeat) Held: The promotion of social justice is to be achieved not through a mistaken sympathy towards any given group. Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy," but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored

principle of salus populi est suprema lex. (the welfare of an individual yields to the community) This phrase is based on the implied agreement of every member of society that his own individual welfare shall, in cases of necessity, yield to that of the community; and that his property, liberty and life shall, under certain circumstances, be placed in jeopardy or even sacrificed for the public good" NOT INCLUDED Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting the health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about "the greatest good to the greatest number."