The architects techne: the common language in the art of building

Jonathan Foote spring 2008-WAAC revised fall 2008

Socrates: The painter, we say, will paint both reins and a bit. Glaucon: Yes S: But the maker (poiesei) will be the cobbler or the smith. G: Certainly. S: Does the painter, then, know the proper quality of reins and bit? Or does not even the maker, the cobbler and the smith, know that, but only the man who understands (epistatai) the use of these things, the horseman? G: Most true. S: And shall we not say that the same holds true of everything? G: What do you mean? S: That there are some three arts (technas) concerned with everything, the users art, the makers 1 (poiesonsan), and the imitators (mimesomen).

This dialogue between Socrates and Glaucon, taken from Book X of the Republic, parallels Platos distinction between form, artifact, and image. The common bond between all of them is techne, a realm of knowing which, curiously, is also the space of the practicing architect 2 (possessing not only techne, but the arche, or ultimate principle of techne). If we accept the premise that the tripartite of form-artifact-image encompasses, in Platos worldview at least, the entire range of speculative and applied thought, from idea (eidos) to representation (mimesis), it is worthwhile to uncover this strange language which bonds them, the technai which are concerned with everything. In examining the Socratic nature of techne, we find remarkable similarities to the modern understanding of an architect as operating somewhere between art and science, between thought and material, at the same time defying specialization as well as suggesting it. There seems, even today, remnants of the same questions which plagued Plato: what is the common language which binds the builder, artist, scholar, and politician? This paper argues that an analysis of the classical use of techne can help raise important questions about the dominant role of technology in the practice of architecture today. Techne, we find, was a kind of common language exchanged among doctors, sailors, politicians, and almost
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Plato, Republic, 601c; all classical references are taken from the Loeb Classical Library editions, unless noted otherwise. 2 Peters, F.E. Greek Philosophical Terms: A Historical Lexicon. 1976, pg. 23-24. Interestingly, the common translation of arche as supreme or master, as in the architect as the master builder, is not supported in a cursory analysis of Greek philosophical use. Arche was related to the search for an ultimate sensible substance out of which all other substances originated, and did not necessarily signify a person or principle with supreme knowledge. See Aristotle, Metaphysics, 983-985, for a discussion of arche as the ultimate or principle causa materialis.

anyone who operated within the realm of 'skilled'. The architekton, in a classical sense, was the one who could overcome the burdensome life (negotium) and occupy himself within the realm of speculative thinking (otium), whose techne was in studying the principles of techne itself. Today it seems evident that, as in classical Greece, both the how and the why are necessarily present. Even in light of astonishing advances in digital technique, this observation seems just as relevant today as it was during the dialogues of Socrates. A close examination of techne, as a mode of knowing in the Greek manner, reveals surprising complexity in the intimate relationship between how and why, providing a starting point for reflection on the complicated nature of techn-ology within the realm of contemporary practice.

Roman architect (probably navel), 4th century, from Ddale, mythologie de l'artisan en grce ancienne, Franoise Frontisi-Ducroux

II. Pre-socratic techne: divine wonder Techne, as a kind of instrumental knowledge, originated in the rise of the sophists in the 4 and th 5 centuries BCE. Before this time, in the songs of Homer and Hesiod, techne signified a sphere of applied knowledge, the employment of which took place through poiesis, or making. Objects of techne, wrought with cunning skill, were known as daidala, exhibiting an obvious lexical 3 relationship with Daedalus, the mythical first architect. When Hephaestus [klutotechnes] fashioned the magical shield of Achilles, for example, he was not just making an inanimate object designed to protect the warrior from the wrath of Hector. It was also infused with cosmetic light, luminous by its well fitting materials and divine touch: First he made [poiei] a shield, great and sturdy, adorning it cunningly [daidallon] in every part, and round about it set a bright rim, threefold and glittering, and from it he fastened a silver baldric. Five were the layers of the shield itself; and on it 4 he made [poiei] many adornments with cunning skill [daidala].
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In Greek daidala are part of a whole range of linguistic terms deriving from the figure of Daedalus, the mythical first architect. The most indicative of the demioergoi, Daedalus worked as a sculptor, inventor of tools, and, most significantly for architecture, as the architect of the labyrinth in Knossos. See Alberto Perz-Gomz The Myth of Daedalus, AA Files 10, 1988. 4 Homer, Illiad, 18.478-482

Significantly, Achilles shield does not instantly appear from Hephaestus forge, at which point Homer might have simply recounted a description of its formal and material qualities. Rather, the embodiment of the Homeric cosmos is revealed temporally, as the making of the shield unfolds in 5 time. In reading the account of Achilles shield, one imagines it as almost alive, recounting tales of heroes, great cities, wonder. The making [poiesis] of the shield, its bringing-forth, becomes the shield itself. As Prez-Gmez writes, The principal value of daidala is that of enabling inanimate 6 matter to become magically alive, of reproducing life rather than representing it. Imagining the shield as a static art object in the modern sense, as something to be contemplated from a distance, is impossible. The temporal dimension of the shields five layers cannot be 7 disconnected from their spatial one. The notion of techne as a kind of instrumental knowledge is not yet entirely clear, since objects of techne, daidala, were still associated with a kind of subversive magic, aligned closely with divine power. The rise of sophism, however, concerned with the rhetoric of the new polis, began a path toward the eventual secularization of techne and into a version more familiar to us today. The techne of Daedalus, originating in the divine order of the unseen, becomes the techne of the rhetorician, now a kind of practical knowledge enabling the political order of the polis. Indeed, the results of this new techne become one of the chief critiques of Socrates and later Plato, who viewed the sophists as mere relativists more interested in political power than in 8 uncovering true wisdom. Techne, by the time of the sophists, had lost much of its divine power. The changing 9 attitudes toward techne demonstrate a general migration toward secularization in Greek culture. Practical knowledge becomes secularized, and praxis, as a political act concerned with persuasion, becomes elevated over techne, as knowledge concerned with production. Whereas in the Homeric mind techne was a letting-appear, where both the making and the object of the making were inseparable, this new Platonic notion of techne becomes the applied methodology of the craftsman producing objects of use. The products of techne are no longer the daidala of wonder, instead they become the objects of the marketplace in the secular space of the agora. Techne, as a rational notion connected with means, makes its first appearance during this time, and it is through the discipline of rhetoric that the sophists first introduce the notion of 10 instrumentality to techne, in the sense that it can now be employed for a specific end goal. Techne begins to take on the broader, more classical view adopted by Plato and Aristotle, becoming the means to achieve some ends outside of the sphere of the activity itself. III. Platonic techne: the beginnings of instrumental knowledge This notion of techne as having a specific sphere of knowledge, encompassing a clearly defined goal (ergon) is relatively consistent within Platos use of techne. In book I of the Republic, Socretes remarks:

see Indra Kegis-McEwen, Socrates Ancestor, pg. 72-76, for a masterly discussion of the relationship between kosmos (as a revealing), and making (in the craft tradition). Significantly, in regard to Achilles shield, she writes The shield is a cosmos, with Ariadnes dance, as the last feature described, a summation of its entire cosmic significance (p.64). The dancing floor for Adriadnes dance was another of the wonders produced by the metis of Daedalus. 6 Prez-Gmez, The Myth of Daedalus, p.52 7 For a critique of modern art and architecture as lacking the power of erotic distance, see Alberto PrezGmez, Build Upon Love, 2007, e.g. Erotic space also becomes the physical interval between the work and the new observer/participant, and between the architect and his work of techne-poiesis., pg. 34. 8 Copleston, Frederick. A History of Philosophy, 1985. pg. 81-95 9 In conjunction with the rise of the sophists, for example, we see the rise of democracy in Athens, a natural union as self-government depends so highly on the art of persuading fellow citizens. See Copleston, 75-80. 10 Vernant, Jean-Pierre. Myth and Thought Among the Greeks, translated by Janet Lloyd, 2006, pg. 300.

...a craft (techne) has a function (ergon); this is what it characteristically does or what it characteristically accomplishes. In fact, crafts are differentiated by their 11 specific functions (erga). In this sense the goal (ergon) of farming is not the continuation of farming but the production of food; and a similar way, the goal of medicine is health. These technai belong to the farmer and the doctor, respectively, whose activity is fundamentally productive. This notion of means and 12 ends, the mode of production and the product, is at the root of the Platonic usage of techne. Platos techne is a rational mode of knowing, following the rules of practical apprenticeship. This can be contrasted with the teachings of the sophists, who operated within the realm of praxis, or 13 the general conduct of living well. Praxis, typically translated as doing, practice, or acting, has no productive goal other than the continuation of itself. That Platonic techne is defined by its objective becomes most evident in Gorgias, in a sustained speech by Socrates on the nature of the arts (technai) as superior to those productive activities which are known merely through habit or experience (empieria): Flattery, however, is what I call it, and I say that this sort of thing is a disgrace, Polusfor here I address youbecause it aims at the pleasant and ignores the good; and I say it is not an art (techne), but a habitude (empieria), since it has no account to give of the real nature of the things it applies, and so cannot tell the cause of any of them. I refuse to give the name of art (techne) to anything that is 14 irrational (alogos)... Continuing a few lines later, still in the voice of Socrates, we learn that the craftsman: ...arranges everything according to a certain order, and forces one part to suit and fit with another, until he has combined the whole into a regular and well15 ordered production. Techne, it seems, must give an account of what it offers to the user, its products. One operating within the realm of techne knows the reasons for which something is produced, and presumably makes rational choices in such an execution. He thus knows what to do according to a given objective. A craftsman, doctor, or sailor practice their technai within the shifty and unpredictable realm of nature, hence the importance of knowing the kairos, or right opportunity to act, also a 16 distinguishing mark of techne. Knowledge through experience only, empieria, lacks this attribute, relying only on habitude or prescriptions in their productions. One possessed merely of empiera, furthermore, acts without recourse to the greater good and only for immediate gratification. This point is furthered in the Laws, where Plato gives us the example of two doctors: one who is a slave-doctor and proceeds by way of empieria, through observation and hasty prescriptions; and one who doctors the free, who studies nature and prescribes treatment through methodical investigation. Even though both are called doctors, it is the free doctor who is able to

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Plato, Republic, 346a See Plato, Symposum 205b, for the division between the mode of production (techne), the name of the product (poiesis), and the mitigating action (ergasia). cf. Jean-Luc Nancy. The Muses, translated by Peggy Kamuf, 1996, pg. 6-7, pg. 104n5. 13 See Isocrates, Against the Sophists, 9: ...those who profess to teach political discourse...have no interest whatever in the truth, but consider that they are masters of an art [techne] if they can attract great numbers of students by the smallness of their charges... Although the sopists claimed the goal of rhetoric was concerned with the conduct of daily life, or praxis, critics like Isocrates viewed rhetoric as just another techne, the goal of which was political power in the new democracy. 14 Plato, Gorgias, 465a 15 Plato, Gorgias, 503d-504e 16 Plato, Republic, 370a. Even though the artisan retains a sense of opportunity, he must never desert his workshop for fear of it passing and the work be spoiled. Unlike the sophists, whose sphere is praxis and the art of living, the man of techne is but a slave to kairos, not its master. cf. Vernant pg. 475n38

offer an account as to the nature of health for the greater good of the patient. He is the only one 17 who actually works in the mode of techne. In this same regard, Plato scholar J.E. Tiles describes technai as the models of the 18 intelligent application of thought to practice. He illustrates this point through the example taken from Xenophons Memorabilia, wherein Socrates approaches the workshop of an armor maker named Pistias and begins questioning the craftsman on his techne. It seems that Pistias charges more money for his armor although they are made from the same materials and are no stronger than that of other armor makers. Pistias replies that he is able to charge more because his are better proportioned for the bodies of the soldiers, a retort which pushes Socrates into a prolonged inquiry as to the quality of proportion related to the human body. In the end Pistias recounts that, in spite of the advantages his well-fitting armor offers, ...some prefer to buy the ornamented and 19 gold-plated breastplates... of his competitors. What is important for this discussion is not so much the conclusions of Socrates on the nature of well and ill proportions, but rather it is a concrete example of an artisan discussing the nature of his techne through reasoned action. This example, according to Tiles, illustrates aptly the kind of practical thought which a man with a techne had to exercise. He had to keep a clear and precise idea before him of the requirements of the user...and relate his procedure to that goal. Tiles concludes, finally, that the productive and rational exponents of techne are defined by the one who grasps the principles which govern 20 the goal of his activity and relates his procedure to those principles. In this way we see that the 21 22 techne of a politician is the polis , the techne of the flute-player is music , and the techne of a 23 Lover is poiesis.

Greeks practicing their technai: vase painting, from Ddale, mythologie de l'artisan en grce ancienne, Franoise Frontisi-Ducroux

IV. Techne and Episteme: Aristotles reasoned production In spite of wide usage within Plato, he never offers a clear philosophical definition of techne. Presumably, the use of the word was common enough in everyday speech that a special

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Plato, Laws, 720b. Slave doctors, acquire their art under the direction of their masters, by empeiria and not by the study of nature (phusis)which is the way in which the free-born doctors have learned the techne themselves.... See also Gorgias, 501a-b, for further discussion of empeiria in opposition to techne. 18 Tiles, J.E. Techne and Moral Expertise, Philosophy, Vol. 59, No. 227 (Jan. 1984), pg. 54. 19 Xenophon, Memorabilia III.x 20 Tiles, pg. 55. 21 Plato, Republic 342d-e 22 Plato, Republic 601e 23 Plato, Symposium 197a. And who, let me ask, will gainsay that the composing (poiesis) of all forms of life is Loves own craft, whereby all creatures are begotten and produced?

re-framing of techne was unnecessary. Although Plato offers sometimes contrary characteristics 25 of technai they are, above all, experientialmodes of knowing which are born from the experience of the knower himself, the knowledge of which cannot be taught through speculative reasoning. Following Plato, Aristotle opens up this difference between speculative and practical reasoning even wider, arguing for clear distinctions between these different types of knowledge. This occurs most clearly in the Nicomachean Ethics, where Aristotle sets up his dichotomy between episteme and techne, a distinction which still resides within our modern division between 26 art and science. Thus a thing known through episteme, or science: cannot vary...it is therefore eternal, for everything existing of absolute necessity 27 is eternal; and what is eternal does not come into existence or parish. Objects of episteme, the eidos, are therefore unchanging; they are first principles. They are known through the faculties of deduction and induction and can be rationally taught through the logos. Episteme constitutes the highest form of speculative thinking, the goal of which is absolute 28 certainty. Aristotle expounds furthermore in Posterior Analytics that to know something without 29 qualification is to know the causes and to demonstrate that something cannot be otherwise. For our inquiry into techne, however, the introduction of episteme by Aristotle adds clarity to some of the ambiguity of Plato. Since there is a certain category of knowledge which cannot be otherwise, it is natural that a category should exist which can be otherwise. As such, Aristotle declares: All Art (techne) deals with bringing something into existence; and to pursue an art (techne) means to study how to bring into existence a thing which may either exist or not, and the efficient cause of which lies in the maker (poiesis) and not in the thing made; for Art (techne) does not deal with things that exist or come into existence of necessity, or according to nature (phusis), since these have their 30 efficient cause in themselves. Techne, in Aristotles mind, occupies a clear position in relation to universal knowledge. Unlike episteme, which contains the efficient cause within itself, objects of techne require an efficient cause, an agent or maker, to bring the thing into existence. Naturally, it is possible to view an object of techne as something which could also be something else, or not exist at all, since its origin is in the hand of the person making it, not in nature itself. That such an activity produces

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Note that these points on techne are, above all, interpretationsbalancing oftentimes contrary evidence in search for general principles. It is not possible, nor desirable, to seek a technical definition of words used in common speech. cf. John Lyons, Structural Semantics: An Analysis of Part of the Vocabulary of Plato, Oxford, 1963. This is in accord with a principle familiar in linguistics : to accept everything that the native speaker says in his language, but to treat with reserve anything he says about his language, until this has been checked, pg. 40. 25 See, for example, Republic 342c., where Plato uses episteme and techne almost interchangeably: But surely, Thrasymachus, the arts (technai) do hold rule and are stronger than that of which they are the arts (technai)...[and] then no art (episteme) considers or enjoins the advantage of the stronger but every art (episteme) that of the weaker which is ruled by it. 26 Indeed, in the Latin translation of Greek texts by Medieval scholars, episteme and techne were typically translated as scientia and ars, respectively. 27 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, VI.iii.2 28 ibid. VI.iii.4 29 Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, 71b.10-15. Aristotle often uses geometry as a method of demonstrating episteme, cf. Plato, Meno, 80d-86c. 30 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics VI.iv.4, Loeb Classical Edition. In many other translations, techne is often rendered as craft rather than art, e.g. the Hackett edition translated by Terence Irwin, 1999. The differences in translation render significant disparity in interpretation, reflecting the inherent enigma still present in the relationship between art and craft.

an object is inherent in Aristotles techne, who carefully distinguishes making, or poiesis, from 31 doing, or praxis. Like Plato, Aristotle stresses the nature of techne as inherently rational: Art (techne), therefore, as has been said, is a rational (logos) quality, concerned 32 with making (poieses), that reasons truly. Aristotle places techne clearly within the sphere of genesis. Unlike Plato, whose techne included 33 horsemanship, navigation, and healing, Aristotle emphasizes its inherently productive nature. Here Aristotle contrasts the realm of episteme with that of techne, their main philosophical difference arising from the notion of agency. Episteme (being) is unchanging, necessary, and contains the causa efficiens within itself. It is speculative knowledge, described by the logos, discovered through the mind by induction and deduction. Techne (becoming), however, admits variation, subscribes to the logos, and is made present through the hand of an agent. The very actions of a maker presupposes the mode of techne.

V. The architects Muse: the techne of the logos While the concept of agency is inherent in techne, neither Plato nor Aristotle are suggesting that applied knowledge is at the origin of becoming. Plato provides our most poignant example in Phaedrus, where Socrates embarks on a sustained monologue in praise of divine inspiration, the greatest of blessings, signifying a gift of the gods: But he who without divine madness comes to the doors of the Muses, confident that he will be a good poet (poietikas) by art (techne), meets with no success, and the poetry of a sane man vanishes into nothingness before that of an 34 inspired madman. Indeed, like many have suggested, techne itself cannot be the origin of the creative impulse. Another realm exists, which is the space of the divine. Critic Jean-Luc Nancy eloquently summarizes this impulse when he writes, The Muses do not happen upon a craftlike operation; 36 they install it. For the architect, this is the space of the architectural idea. It is the same space that a much cooler Aristotle describes when he speaks of the master craftsman (architekton) in his Metaphysics: ...who are superior in wisdom (sophia), not because they can do things, but 37 because they posses a theory and know the causes.
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ibid. VI.iv.2: But making (poiesis) is different than doing (praxis)...Hence the rational quality concerned with doing is different than the rational quality concerned with making...Now architectural skill, for instance, is an art (techne), and it is also a rational quality concerned with making... This distinction reinforces the notion of agency in Aristotles techne, that it is, without question, a mode of knowing concerned with bringing something into existence. It is possible that this careful distinction is made by Aristotle to distance himself from the commonly held notion that rhetoric, as the highest form of praxis, is a form of techne. 32 ibid. VI.iv.6 33 Aristotle harkens back to an earlier emphasis on the generative power of techne as a bringing forth. See Indra Kegis-McEwin, Socrates Ancestor: Craft gives things life, and it is no accident that tiktein is to give birth, tektein to build, and techne a letting appear pg. 55. Also see Heidegger, On the Origin of the Work of Art, p.57-59. 34 Plato, Phaedrus, 245a. 35 For supporting inquiry into this notion see, for example, Heidegger, The Origin of the Work of Art: But what is it that distinguishes bringing forth as creation from bringing forth in the mode of making?, pg. 57. 36 Nancy, pg. 25. 37 Aristotle, Metaphysics book I, 981b. In this section Aristotle echoes the Platonic hierarchy when he claims that techne is superior to mere empeiria, because the former know the cause, whereas the latter do not. For the experienced know the fact, but not the wherefore; but the artists know the wherefore and the cause.

For Aristotle the presencing of an object in its entirety takes place across four distinct causes (i.e. something exists by cause of). Within this framework, techne, or knowing-how, is not sufficient, the architect must be in possession of both speculative (final and formal causes) as 38 well as applied knowing (material and efficient causes). Techne operates by reason (logos) and chance (tuche) yet lacks any keys to the realm of the universal (eidos) or with true knowing 39 (episteme). The remnants of Homeric techne, of the intelligence to overcome uncertain realities through cunning (metis), is inherited by the classical architekton, who, through the life of leisure 40 (otium) over toil (negotium), studies mathematics and understands the nature of things. It was, after all, an architekton who was said to be one of the first to solve complex practical problems 41 using witty theoretical devices. In this way we see a kind if reciprocal how-why relationship, where the how informs the why, and the why informs the how. This notion is wellsummarized by Marco Frascari, who proposes an architecture which is composed of both the techne of the logos and the logos of the techne. Literally, word of the craft, the logos of the techne is predominantly manual and operative and is fundamentally a constructive procedure. The techne of the logos (craft of the word), on other hand, is a rhetorical procedure and is mental and reflective. It is the mind of an architect operating within the space of the 42 architectural idea (construing). While the architect must speak the language of agency in building, the logos of the techne, (those technai of the client, the builder, and the critic), he or she must also posses his own techne, which is the craft of architecture itself, the techne of the logos. This techne operates internally within the mind of the architect, whose products are drawings and models, not buildings. It is a techne which suggests a sphere of applied knowledge that depends highly on reflective execution, resisting the often reductive separation present today between theory and practice. It is also a techne, borrowing from its Homeric roots, which is fundamentally generative (poiesis), retains a sense of opportune action (kairos), and is manifested in crafty know-how (metis).

IV. Platos relative techne: the logos of the techne One enigmatic aspect of architecture is based, in part, on the fact that building depends on the employment of a wide range of authors. Each one, from the client to the field laborer, can to one degree or another make a legitimate claim toward authorship in the final work. The individual stroke of the genius, then, is hidden or often disputed. In the production of architecture, the question of the causa efficiens is perhaps as old as the profession itself. What is the relationship between the client, the builder, the architect, and what are their respective products, their technai? Arguably, it was the employment of those with multiple and varied technai, which gave rise to the architekton, the one who knows the constructive procedures in their entirety, who is able to communicate between and above the entire cast of characters involved in the generation of a building project. The architects logos is techne itself (archetechne).

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Aristotle, Physics II, 194b; Metaphysics 1041a; An object is apprehended through an analysis of its four causes: A house, for example, can be known because it is made of bricks and mortar (material), resembles the idea of house-ness (formal), is made for the purpose of dwelling (final), and comes to being through the labor of the craftsman (efficient). The loose separation of Aristotles causes into speculative and applied are my own. 39 Vernant, pg. 299 40 ibid. pg 315 41 Herodotus 3.60, The architekton Eupalinus of Megaria constructed a kilometer-long underground canal at Samos in 520 BC. Presumably using triangulation, two teams of laborers began at opposite ends of the mountain and met perfectly in the middle. cf. Vernant pg. 302 42 Frascari, Marco. A New Angel/Angle in Architectural Research: The Idea of Demonstration, Journal of Architectural Education, Nov. 1990, pg. 11-19.

This understanding of techne as the common language of building brings us closer to the employment of techne in our opening dialogue from the Republic. Recall that the user, the maker, and the painter all have their respective technai. On the subject of horsemanship, Plato has us believe that it is the end user, or horseman, who knows best about horsemanship. The cobbler, whose techne is the making of reins and bit, is unskilled with respect to horsemanship, 43 but presumably knows best with regard to production of the horsemans use-objects. The professional responsibility of the horseman, then, is to dictate to the cobbler what are the proper qualities of those objects he needs in order to act in his capacity as a horseman. Through the 44 logos, his episteme acts as a guide for the techne of the craftsman. Thus techne refers to and outlines the type of knowledge related toward good action according to a given objective, but it 45 makes no provisions for what the objective of end actually is. This is in the realm of episteme, the knowing why, which is clarified again for us, further down in Book X of the Republic: Socrates: It quite necessarily follows, then, that the user of anything is the one who knows most of it by experience, and that he reports to the maker the good and bad effects in use of the thing he uses. As, for example, the flute-player reports to the flute-maker which flutes respond and serve rightly in flute-playing, and will order the kind that must be made, and the other will obey and serve him. Glaucon: Of course. Socrates: The one, then, possessing knowledge (eidos), reports about the goodness or the badness of the flutes, and the other, believing, will make 46 (poiesei) them. In strictly following Platonic reasoning, we can infer that the techne of a seaman, navigation, makes no reference to where the vessel is to be navigated. This episteme belongs to the ship captain, who sees the strict sphere of the seamans activity with respect to a greater whole of vessel operation. Furthermore, as in our previous example of Pistias, the armor maker, it seems plausible that Pistias himself depends exclusively on the soldier, whose episteme is armored combat, to dictate the merits and defects of the armor back to himself. It should be pointed out that while each of the users retain their respective epistemai, they are relative epistemai, not absolute, as is the case of the Aristotelian episteme. One can imagine, for example, that the vessel captain does not see the greater implications of his maneuvering with respect to the other military vessels in the area, as this would belong to the episteme of the strategist. Ultimately, this hierarchy of episteme-techne rests on the decision of the politician, who (one hopes) sees such implications within the managing of the greater good. It is no accident that political skill, as a special form of techne, is the exclusive domain of the philosopher47 rulers in the Republic. What allows these relationships to be productive and fruitful is that they share a common language, or logos, the mode of which is techne. While each is unskilled with respect to the one below, all posses skill within their own sphere, providing a common bond between all spheres in a given activity (such as horsemanship). It is tempting to see the production of architecture in this
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The artisan knows nothing about horsemanship insofar as he is acting strictly as a craftsman, the sphere of whose techne lies in the production of the use-objects themselves and not in their employment. One can imagine that the best cobblers are the ones who practice horsemanship themselves, however, this skill does not operate within the limited and rational sphere of the cobblers techne, i.e. within his capacity as a maker of reins and bit. cf. Tiles, pg. 57. 44 On the idea that the user knows best, see Phaedrus, 274e. There is easily disagreement as to whether the groom knows more about horses than the master. cf. Republic, pg.444, note c. 45 Bambrough, Renford. Platos Political Analogies, Plato, Popper, Politics, 1967. The craftsmans function is a mastery of the means by which a given end can be achieved; the choosing of the end is not the concern of the craftsman qua craftsman., pg. 165. 46 Plato, Republic, 601d-e. 47 Bambrough, Plato, Popper, Politics, pg. 159-160.

same way: the episteme of the client is why to build, but is unskilled with respect to how to build, which is the techne of an architect. The episteme of the architect is in the totality of why the building is made in a certain way, but possess no techne with respect to the actual execution of the building plan, which is the exclusive techne of the builder. Yet while Platos model of horsemanship seems to fit neatly when applied to the production of architecture, one important difference remains. Recall that the techne of an architect is not only the craft of architecture (the techne of the logos), it is also techne itself, or the logos of the techne. The architect simultaneously practices his or her own techne and oversees constructive procedures through the knowledge of techne itself, the speaking of which is common to all agents in the production of architecture, from the client to the field laborer. This idea is well supplemented by Tiles, who writes, But while the flute player is unskilled at flute making and the horseman unskilled at bridle making, Plato would not want us to leave them under the description unskilled without qualification. The horseman and flute player, after all, have their own technai, and it is this which 48 qualifies them to dictate to their respective suppliers. The architects skill, then, is to speak the language of skilled production. It is the breakdown of relative techne which infects the modern construction process, giving rise to more and more agents of construction, each possessing less and less knowledge with respect to the entire building project. General contractors have turned into construction managers, and the building activity itself has been scattered among sometimes scores of subcontractors. Clients often retain several people to act in their place, adding more layers of management. Often supported by sophisticated software platforms, the trend in architecture is for the architect to retreat from the logos of the techne and focus entirely on the idea and production of the building plan, or the techne of the logos. Perhaps the general practice of architecture is becoming just one more step in the production a building project, aligning itself much closer to Platos model of horsemanship. In such situations technology often fills in the void left by a retreat from the 'word of the craft', promising to bring all parties together through increasingly transparent collaboration. The architect can know less about the totality of construction, since scattered knowledge among the various agents of building can be recomposed by way of performative information modeling. In this way the logos of the techne is replaced, ironically, by technology itself.
Putti at work: fresco, Pompeii, House of the Vetti

VI. The technical techne As one is removed further and further from the actual crafting of the thing, the more one sees the implication of the making in its entirety. The architect, who sees the entirety of construction, must know the implications of the parts within the whole, but it is the craftsman who concerns himself with the production (balancing means, methods) of an individual part within the specifications of the whole as supplied by the architect. This is an inherent quality of relative techne, in that there always remains an understanding of something within its appropriately conceived whole. With an increasing fragmentation of the architects knowledge, i.e. the
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Tiles, pg. 56. Such a belief supports the idea of an active workshop in a school of architecture, the goal of which is not the training of skilled craftsman, but rather the education of techne itself.

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distancing from the logos of the techne, the relationship between the architect and the constructed building comes into question. The reciprocal unity of techne and logos, of technology in its original sense, is suffering with the recent elevation of techne to a universal 49 instrumentality. Thus one very real interpretation of modern technology is that techne has become too technical. Emphasizing its inherent quality of instrumentality, techne has come to dominate over the generative power of the imagination, the original poiesis. In its most advanced stage, technology replaces the techne of the architect altogether, consistently resisting the ancient contention that techne by itself cannot originate an idea. While technology has retained this sense of techne as inherently instrumental, it increasingly scatters the notion of agency which originally accompanied it. As agents in building become more technical and highly specialized, it is increasingly difficult to find Aristotles efficient cause, the one who brings the thing into being. The causa efficiens has been replaced by the 50 causa instrumentalis, which is, a cause without intention. In this sense the tool contains its own means outside of the intention of the agent, replacing, in its most advance stage, the agent altogether. In digital fabrication the final agent of production is removed and is given over to a 51 mechanistic process, so highly advanced as to threaten the causality of agency itself. This disconnection occurs, furthermore, without a corresponding increase in awareness of a greater whole, as would be the case in a traditional application of relative techne. The architect in reality knows far less about the technical workings of the digital device. When the architect willingly (and sometimes longingly) constructs barriers of specialization around the practice of architecture, it is easy to see how the techne of the logos would come to dominate over the logos 52 of the techne. Of course, the opposite approach to technology is that improvements in digital fabrication give the architect more control, i.e. greater agency, in the building process, not less. With the direct exporting of the computer model onto the building site, so-called 'file to factory', Aristotles efficient cause is brought back into the realm of the architect, who now engages in form-making 53 without the mitigating activity of a craftsman or the heavy-handed resistance of material. By this interpretation, episteme and techne, for centuries separated by agency, are coming closer
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Vesely, Dalibor. Architecture and the Conflict of Representation, AA files 8, 1985. The history and notion of instrumentality is a complex one, beyond the scope of this paper. See William Braham and Jonathan Hale, Rethinking Technology, 2007, introduction, for a recent summary of this ongoing discussion of the relationship between architecture and technology. See also, Alberto Perz-Gomz, Architecture and the Crisis of Modern Science, 1992; Vesely, Architecture in the Age of Divided Representation, 2004; Illich, Ivan, Tools for Conviviality, 1975; for instrumental thinking among the Greeks, See Vernant, Myth and Thought Among the Greeks, translated by Janet Lloyd, 2006, chaps. 10-13. 50 Illich, Ivan. The Rivers North of the Future: the Testament of Ivan Illich, as told by David Cayley. Illich th claims that before the 13 century the instrumental and the efficient cause were impossible to differentiate: My hand without the pencil, and my hand armed with the pencil were both orgnona. There was no way of distinguishing the pencil from my hand. pg. 72-73. 51 ibid. p77. Contemporary society has advanced past of the age of tools into the age of systems, wherein reality becomes subjugated to the preservation of the system itself. Veiled under the guise of unlimited choice, individual members of the system can control their choices insofar as they operate within the laws of the system. 52 See the work of Marc Fornes (www.theverymany.net) for an example of the architect as technical specialist. Applying complex computing processes (scripts), the author manipulates virtual form through the abstraction of a mathematical model. No doubt this process is crafty, and it certainly taps the metis inherent in an architects mind. However, the products of the architects techne now become the computer script, void of any sensible or phenomenal connection to material, thereby removing him even further from the logos of the techne. 53 This observation was first brought to my attention during conversations with J-P. Mueller, owner of OEC engineering, a prominent local digital fabricator. My job, he said, is to take whatever is in the architects mind, and make it real. I should qualify my statement of heavy-handed resistance of material in that I refer to an attitude toward material which favors the natural difference in material, not its sameness. It is no coincidence that modern materials favor consistency, predictability, stability, modularity, and reproducibility, qualities which contribute to freedom in form-making. In the Aristotelian sense the formal cause unnaturally dominates the material cause.

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together. The traditional congruency between form and material has been turned upside down with digital fabrication, new formal desires, never before possible, are now possible, directly from the hand of the architect, acting now as 'master-builder'. However, with the breakdown of the barriers inherent in the traditional separation between episteme-techne, the architect's construing procedure looses one its most potent horizons: the resistance of construction. In sum, we should not allow techne to become invisible through the dominance of technology. Rather, technology should leverage and architect's techne into the realm of new possibilities, becoming invisible, in a way, to the ingenuity (metis) of the architect. A practice which is defined primarily by technology inevitably becomes its slave (a similar phenomenon seems possible in a practice which rejects technology). The architect retains agency over the instrumental authority of advanced technology when he or she is able to bring it to bear within the generative power of poiesis. Thus the strength of an architects practice is founded on a balance between the logos of the techne as well as the techne of the logos; of an architect who is, as Socrates remarks, concerned with everything.

dedicado a c*

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