Bhopal gas tragedy : Saga of The

Divided World

Structure of the Presentation

Industrial scenario in developing countries and double
standards of transnational companies

Bhopal Gas Tragedy

Union Carbide Corporation
Equipment and Safety Regulations/Norms
UCC Approach Key Problems
Safety Measures in UCC plants - the USA and India

Legal Action Against Union Carbide

Conclusion
Lessons Learnt

Double Standards of Transnational Companies

The companies use differing standards in Developed and
Developing countries.
Different labour norms in its overseas operations
Exploiting the weak legal system in host country
Non-disclosure or compliance of environment policy

Weak safety norms and improper implementation

Exporting chemical wastes to other countries

Union Carbide Corporation

Started in 1969 in Bhopal, situated at the northern edge of
Bhopal city.
Phosgene, Monomethlyamine, Methyl Isocyanate (MIC) and the
pesticide Carbaryl, also known as Sevin were manufactured here.
Gas leakage from its facility in 1984.

Taken over by DOW Chemicals in 2001.

DOW refused Union Carbides Liabilities in Bhopal, India.
The company still operates under the ownership of Dow
Chemicals and still states on its website that the Bhopal disaster
was "cause by deliberate sabotage".

Bhopal Gas Tragedy Sad Statistics

Happened in the night of 2nd & 3rd December 1984 when a
pesticide plant of Union Carbide India Limiteds (UCIL) spewed
about forty to forty five tons of highly lethal MIC gas in Bhopal,
Madhya Pradesh, India.
One of the worst industrial disaster in human history
Among people, who were exposed to the gas:
25,000 people died
558,125 injured

120,000 continue to suffer devastating health effects

Toxic Materials in Soil and Water

Gas Vent Scrubber

Gas Vent Scrubber Stack

Haphazard Dumping of Hazardous Material

Equipment and Safety Regulations/Norms

UCC had different operational practices such as use of a more
dangerous pesticide manufacturing method, large-scale Methyl
Isocyanate (MIC) storage, plant location close to a densely
populated area, undersized safety devices, and the dependence
on manual operations in developing countries whereas better and
safer measures were adopted for operating at home.
It did not equip the plant with the safety mechanisms to deal
with accidents. UCC was aware that some of the technology it
transferred was not proven, and entailed operational and safety
risks.
It failed to set up any comprehensive emergency plan or system
in Bhopal to warn local communities about leaks, even though it
had such a plan in place in the USA.

UCC Approach Key Problems

The various problems in the plant that were ignored:
The alarms of MIC tank had not worked since past four years
Only single manual back-up system as compared to USA where four-stage
system was used
The flare tower and the vent gas scrubber had been out of service for five
months before the disaster due to which flare tower could only hold a quarter
of the gas that leaked during the incidence
The refrigeration system was idle and the MIC was kept at 20 degrees Celsius,
not the 4.5 degrees as suggested by the manual
Due to absence of Slip-bound plates, the water leaked into the MIC tanks from
pipes being cleaned
Faulty valves were not installed by the operators
the MIC tank pressure gauge was not functioning properly for roughly a week
before the accident.
On the night shift, no maintenance supervisor was in place to record
instrument readings.

Safety Measures in UCC Plants - the USA and India

UCC plant in West Virginia was better equipped compared to the plant in
Bhopal. There were a number of critical differences in levels of design and
operations of the Bhopal and Institute plants.
Institute, West Virginia, USA

Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh, India

Capacity

High production of MIC matched with high processing

capacity. MIC not stored for long periods of time.

High production capacity of MIC but low processing

capacity. MIC stored in large quantities for long
periods of time.

Emergency scrubbers

MIC storage tank equipped with emergency scrubbers

(to neutralize any escaping MIC) designed to operate
under emergency conditions.

No emergency caustic scrubber to neutralize any MIC

leak.

Computerized
monitoring

Computerized monitoring of instruments (gauges,

alarms, etc) and processes to support visual
observation.

No computerized monitoring of instruments and

processes. Relied solely on manual observation.

Cooling system

MIC field storage tanks used a cooling system based

on chloroform (inert and nonreactive with MIC).

MIC tanks used a cooling system based on brine

(highly reactive with MIC).

Refrigeration unit

Refrigeration unit to control temperature in the tanks

was never turned off.

Refrigeration unit had been turned off since June

1984.

Nitrogen pressure

MIC was always maintained under nitrogen pressure.

MIC tanks had not been under nitrogen pressure since

October 1984.

Safety Measures in UCC plants - the USA and India

Institute, West Virginia, USA

Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh, India

Emergency plan

An elaborate four-stage emergency plan to deal with

toxic releases, fires, etc, including a general public alert
linked to community police, river and rail traffic and
local radio stations. Various emergency broadcast
systems in place to alert and disseminate appropriate
information to the public.

No system to inform public authorities or the people

living adjacent to the plant. No emergency plan shared
with communities living adjacent to the plant; no
system to disseminate information regarding
emergency to the public with the exception of a loud
siren.

Maintenance
programme

A maintenance programme to determine and evaluate

replacement frequency for valves and instrumentation
and alarm systems. Weekly review of safety valves and
reviews and maintenance recorded extensively.

No evidence of an effective instrument maintenance

programme. Safety valve testing programme largely
ineffective and no proper records maintained of
reviews of instruments, valves and alarm systems, etc.

Lab analysis

A lab analysis of MIC was conducted to test quality and

check for contamination prior to storage, processing or
distribution.

No lab analysis of quality was undertaken. MIC stored

for long periods without testing for contamination.

Training

Extensive employee training programme to ensure high

level of training and information among all employees
of normal and emergency procedures.

Operators put in charge without sufficient training.

Protective equipment

Extensive provision of appropriate personal protective

equipment to employees including protective clothing,
air respirators, etc.

Personal protective gear and breathing air equipment

not easily accessible, inadequate and of poor quality.

Legal Action Against Union Carbide

December 1984: Legal proceedings were started against UCC, the
United States and Indian governments, local Bhopal authorities.
March 1985: Government of India passed the Bhopal Gas Leak
Act in March 1985, making the GOI to act as the legal
representative for victims of the disaster that helped in leading to
the beginning of legal proceedings.
1985: The US government called for inquiry into the Bhopal
disaster, by Henry Waxman, a Californian Democrat.
March 1986: UCC offered a settlement figure, providing a fund
for Bhopal victims of between $500600 million over a period of
20 years
May 1986: US District Court transferred the litigation to Indian
courts from US.

Legal action against Union Carbide

1988: US$ 350 million was claimed by The Government of India
from UCC.
November 1988: Indian Supreme Court told both sides to come
to an agreement and "start with a clean slate".
1989: UCC agreed to pay US$ 470 million for damages caused in
the Bhopal disaster.
October 2003: The Bhopal Gas Tragedy Relief and Rehabilitation
Department awarded the compensation to 554,895 people for
injuries received and 15,310 survivors of those killed.
June 2010: 7 ex-employees of the company were sentenced to
two years imprisonment and fined Rs. 1 lakh approx 2000$.

Conclusion
All the disasters that occurred in developed countries were
neither due to the managerial operations nor due to the safety
regulations. However these were the biggest component in the
Bhopal gas tragedy as the management gave only lip service to
process and personnel safety and the governments did not
ensure compliance with the regulations.

There is a need for the improvements in method of safety. New

legislation, stricter enforcement and personnel training should be
in place.
Elementary R&D is needed in the causes of accidents and in
industrialized processes used in the chemical process industries.
All the stakeholders need to play their part in building a safety
culture.

Lessons Learnt
National governments and international agencies should focus on
widely applicable techniques for corporate responsibility and
accident prevention as much in the developing world context as
in advanced industrial nations .
Local governments clearly cannot allow industrial facilities to be
situated within urban areas, regardless of the evolution of land
use over time.
Industry and government need to bring proper financial support
to local communities so they can provide medical and other
necessary services to reduce morbidity, mortality and material
loss in the case of industrial accidents.
Existing public health infrastructure needs to be taken into
account when hazardous industries choose sites for
manufacturing plants.

Lessons Learnt
Legislation and regulation needs to evolve in active consultation
with all stakeholders laying emphasis on emerging requirements,
and increasing standards with appropriate emphasis on actual
functioning of safety mechanisms and inculcation of an active
safety culture.
Multinationals, by virtue of their global purpose, organization,
and resources, should be treated as single, monolithic agents,
rather than as a network of discrete, non- interdependent units.