An Economic Analysis of Financial Structure

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Chapter 8

An Economic
Analysis of
Financial
Structure

Basic Facts about Financial Structure


Throughout the World
This chapter provides an economic analysis of how
our financial structure is designed to promote
economic efficiency
The bar chart in Figure 1 shows how American
businesses financed their activities using external
funds (those obtained from outside the business
itself) in the period 19702000 and compares U.S.
data to those of Germany, Japan, and Canada

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Figure 1 Sources of External Funds for


Nonfinancial Businesses: A Comparison of the
United States with Germany, Japan, and Canada

Source: Andreas Hackethal and Reinhard H. Schmidt, Financing Patterns: Measurement Concepts and Empirical Results, Johann
Wolfgang Goethe-Universitat Working Paper No. 125, January 2004. The data are from 19702000 and are gross flows as
percentage of the total, not including trade and other credit data, which are not available.
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Eight Basic Facts


1. Stocks are not the most important sources of
external financing for businesses
2. Issuing marketable debt and equity securities is
not the primary way in which businesses finance
their operations
3. Indirect finance is many times more important
than direct finance
4. Financial intermediaries, particularly banks, are
the most important source of external funds used
to finance businesses.

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Eight Basic Facts (contd)


5.
6.
7.
8.

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The financial system is among the most heavily


regulated sectors of the economy
Only large, well-established corporations have
easy access to securities markets to finance their
activities
Collateral is a prevalent feature of debt contracts
for both households and businesses.
Debt contracts are extremely complicated legal
documents that place substantial restrictive
covenants on borrowers

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Transaction Costs
Financial intermediaries have evolved to
reduce transaction costs
Economies of scale
Expertise

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Asymmetric Information: Adverse


Selection and Moral Hazard
Adverse selection occurs before the
transaction
Moral hazard arises after the transaction
Agency theory analyses how asymmetric
information problems affect economic
behavior

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The Lemons Problem: How Adverse


Selection Influences Financial Structure
If quality cannot be assessed, the buyer is willing to
pay at most a price that reflects the average quality
Sellers of good quality items will not want to sell at
the price for average quality
The buyer will decide not to buy at all because all
that is left in the market is poor quality items
This problem explains fact 2 and partially explains
fact 1

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Tools to Help Solve Adverse Selection


Problems
Private production and sale of information
Free-rider problem

Government regulation to increase information

Not always works to solve the adverse selection problem,


explains Fact 5.

Financial intermediation
Explains facts 3, 4, & 6.

Collateral and net worth


Explains fact 7.

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How Moral Hazard Affects the Choice


Between Debt and Equity Contracts
Called the Principal-Agent Problem
Principal: less information (stockholder)
Agent: more information (manager)

Separation of ownership and control


of the firm
Managers pursue personal benefits and power
rather than the profitability of the firm

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Tools to Help Solve the PrincipalAgent Problem


Monitoring (Costly State Verification)
Free-rider problem
Fact 1

Government regulation to increase information


Fact 5

Financial Intermediation
Fact 3

Debt Contracts
Fact 1

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How Moral Hazard Influences


Financial Structure in Debt Markets
Borrowers have incentives to take on
projects that are riskier than the lenders
would like.
This prevents the borrower from paying back the
loan.

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Tools to Help Solve Moral Hazard in


Debt Contracts
Net worth and collateral
Incentive compatible

Monitoring and Enforcement of Restrictive


Covenants

Discourage undesirable behavior


Encourage desirable behavior
Keep collateral valuable
Provide information

Financial Intermediation
Facts 3 & 4
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Summary Table 1 Asymmetric


Information Problems and Tools to Solve
Them

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Asymmetric Information in Transition


and Developing Countries
Financial repression created by an
institutional environment characterized by:
Poor system of property rights (unable to use
collateral efficiently)
Poor legal system (difficult for lenders to enforce
restrictive covenants)
Weak accounting standards (less access to good
information)
Government intervention through directed credit
programs and state owned banks (less incentive
to proper channel funds to its most productive
use).
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Application: Financial Development


and Economic Growth
The financial systems in developing and transition
countries face several difficulties that keep them
from operating efficiently
In many developing countries, the system of
property rights (the rule of law, constraints on
government expropriation, absence of corruption)
functions poorly, making it hard to use these two
tools effectively

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