Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill

Science, Law & Policy

Donald F. Boesch
University of Maryland Center for Environmental Science

Sustainable Fishing and Health of the Oceans

Tampa  July 10, 2018
The Macondo Well

Deepwater Horizon
April 21, 2010
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 My Inescapable Engagement

VA • Oil Spills and the Marine Environment 1972

LA • OCS Scientific Committee 1979-1986
• National Academies Fates and Effect of Drilling Fluids
• The Long-Term Environmental Effects of Offshore Oil and Gas
Development 1989
• Research on effects of oil and gas canals and produced water
discharges 1987-1990
MD • National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill
and Offshore Drilling 2010-2011
• Key witness on environmental harm Clean Water Act
violation trial 2014-2015
• Consultant to Natural Resource Trustees in completion of
Damage Assessment & Restoration Plan 2015
• Advisory Board, NASEM Gulf Research Program, 2012-2016 3
Oil Spill Commission

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 Oil Spill Commission Charge

• Created by Executive Order 13543, dated May 21, 2010

• The President asked the Commission to
– Examine the relevant facts and circumstances concerning the root
causes of the Deepwater Horizon oil disaster;
– Develop options for guarding against, and mitigating the impact of, oil
spills associated with offshore drilling, taking into consideration the
environmental, public health, and economic effects of such options
• The Commission did not attempt to:
– Fix legal culpability
– Reformulate US energy policy

No subpoena power!

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 Major Factors Leading to Blowout

 Flawed design for cement slurry

 High risk cementing procedures

 Misinterpretation of negative pressure tests

 Risky Temporary Abandonment Procedures

 Inattention to signs of “kicks”

 Failure to respond appropriately once the

blowout began

 Bad communication

 Hurry and confusion

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Key Findings on Causes of Explosion

• The Deepwater Horizon disaster was foreseeable

and preventable

• The immediate causes of the Macondo well

blowout can be traced to a series of identifiable
mistakes made by BP, Halliburton, and Transocean

• The Decisions made by these companies reveal

such systemic failures in risk management that they
place in doubt the safety culture of the entire
industry.

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 Commission’s Recommendations

A. Improving the safety of offshore operations

B. Safeguarding the environment
C. Strengthening oil spill response, planning and capacity
D. Advancing well-containment capabilities
E. Overcoming impacts of the spill and restoring the Gulf
F. Ensuring financial responsibility
G. Promoting Congressional engagement to ensure
responsible drilling
H. Moving to frontier areas, esp. Arctic

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 Drilling Safety Responses: Government

1. Reorganization of MMS: separation of BOEM & BSEE 2011

2. Increased funding & staffing
3. Modest improvements in EIS process
4. Interim Drilling Safety Rule 2012
5. Safety & Environmental Management Systems II 2010-2015
6. Blowout Preventer and Well Control Rules 2016
7. Industry and political pushback on new safety regulations
2015-2017
8. Revisions to Production System Safety and Well Control Rules
2018

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 Congressional Gridlock

Congress did pass: RESTORE Act 2012

CONGRESS did not:
• Codify DOI reorganization
• Mandate safety regulations
• Raise spill liability >$134 m

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 Industry Responses

Joint Industry Task Forces

“Restoring confidence in deepwater drilling
operations through comprehensive improvements
to well containment and intervention capability,
spill response capability and drilling standards.”
Marine Well Containment
API Center for Offshore Safety
Company Capping Stack 11
 Legal Proceedings Involving Governments

• BP and Transocean pleaded guilty to criminal

violation of federal statutes including the
Clean Water Act, January 2013. ~$5 billion.
• Trial held for BP’s civil violations of Clean
Water Act, 2013-2015. Could have been fined
up to $1,000 per barrel of oil spilled, $4,300 if
grossly negligent.
• Assessment of Natural Resources Damages
under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990.

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 Clean Water Act Civil Trial
Federal District Court
New Orleans

Judge Carl Barbier

Phase 1. Incident
-BP 67%, Transocean 30%, Halliburton 3%
-BP gross negligence $1100 $4300/bbl
Phase 2. Source Control & Quantification
-3.19 million barrels (Govt: 4.9, BP: 2.45 m bbl)
Phase 3. Penalty
-8 mitigating factors, including seriousness,
past history, economic impact & efforts to
minimize 13
 Boesch Expert Testimony: Actual Harm

 Plankton & seaweed at surface

 Biota at seabed in vicinity of

well, incl. coldwater corals

 Moderately-heavily oiled
coastal marshes & mangroves

 Birds, sea turtles & dolphins

exposed to slicks

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 Boesch Expert Testimony: Potential Harm

 Bottom fishes on outer shelf &

continental slope

 Tunas & mahi mahi with

significant larval exposure

 Biota on continental shelf

seabed under heavy slicks

 Oysters exposed to oiling &

spill response actions

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 BP Expert Witness #1

Fish and shellfish populations did not suffer significant harm

Red Snapper Gulf-wide landings

Ten year trend
SEAMAP Catch/effort

Laughing Gull

Brown Pelican Black Skimmer

Bird populations did not suffer significant harm

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 BP Expert Witness #2
• No harmful exposure to oil-related chemicals or dispersants in the
vast majority of the area. Potentially harmful exposure to was
limited to the area very close to the wellhead during the summer of
2010.
• Much of the oil released from the Macondo wellhead was rendered
harmless very quickly through biodegradation, evaporation,
dilution, weathering, and other processes.

Water samples Sediment samples

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 Global Settlement Reached

July 2, 2015 settlement reached

April 4, 2016 approved by Court

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 Natural Resource Damage Assessment
• 2-5 trillion larval fish & 37-68 trillion
invertebrates in upper water column killed
• Millions to billions of fish did not reach age 1
• >770 sq mi of deep-sea benthic habitat & 4 sq mi
of mesophotic reef habitat injured
• ggggg • 11-53% loss of marsh plant biomass over >350
mi of shoreline, some permanently; recovery 2-7
years
• Loss of 4-8.3 billion oysters over 7 years

• 51,600-84,500 birds died as result of spill

• 4,900-7,600 large juvenile & adult sea turtles
killed, 55,000-160,000 juveniles injured
• Coastal bottlenose dolphin stocks injured,
with 51% & 62% maximum reduction in
Barataria Bay & Mississippi Sound

www.gulfspillrestoration.noaa.gov/restoration-planning/gulf-plan 19
 Alternate Perspective Based on Models
• Used Atlantis ecosystem model
incorporating fish growth, mortality &
recruitment
• Exposure determined from oil
transport & fate models not
observations
• Oil effects determined by dose-
Fish biomass trajectories
response model based on literature
Grouper biomass reduction
• Little impact of fisheries closures &
loss of fish larvae due to oil exposure
• Large declines in biomass (25-75%) of
many fish guilds
• Recovery from <10 to >50 yrs
• Impacts extend far beyond area oiled
Ainsworth et al. 2018. PLoS ONE 13(1) e0190840 20
 Restoring Long-Degraded Ecosystems

• Massive wetland loss,

Gulf Dead Zone,
endangered species
• Unprecedented
restoration opportunity
• Criminal plea agreements
• Clean Water Act fines:
RESTORE Act
• Natural Resource
Damage Restoration

Hypoxia

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 $20.8b BP Global Settlement

OPA 90 $ Billions State & local claims

Natural Resource 0.35
0.7 0.25
CWA civil penalty
1
5.9 Natural Resource
Damages
Early Restoration

7.1 Unknown injury & AM

NRDA costs
5.5
False Claims Act, etc.

CWA penalty
 Overview of Payments, Penalties & Damages

Natural Resource
Damages Civil Penalties Criminal Payments Others

NRDA $8.3b RESTORE $5.2b NFWF $2.5b

National Academies of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine. 2016. Effective Monitoring to Evaluate
Ecological Restoration in the Gulf of Mexico.
Restoration Funding from Criminal Pleas & Civil Settlements

8,000,000,000

7,000,000,000
Coastal habitats
Fish
Birds
6,000,000,000 Deep benthic
Birds, turtles, mammals
5,000,000,000
Dollars

Water quality NFWF GEBF

4,000,000,000
Recreation Coastal habitats Sea turtles NRD Restoration
3,000,000,000 Water quality Birds RESTORE Restoration
Oysters
2,000,000,000

For RESTORE assumes

1,000,000,000 50% of Direct
Component, 75% of Spill
0
Impact Component goes
to restoration, except in
AL FL LA MS TX Region Ocean AM
Recreation LA where both are
dedicated to restoration.
Coastal habitats Coastal habitats Adaptive
Birds & turtles Mgt.
 Accountability for Unprecedented Rehabilitation

 Project relevance?

 Waste, fraud & abuse?

 Effective integration of projects?

 Adequate monitoring of outcomes?

 Adaptive management?

 Collectively address ecosystem health?

 Account for climate change?

 Resilience and sustainability?

 Idle Iron: Rigs to Reality

• liabilities

Structures removed • Strong support for leaving structures in

Structures installed Gulf as artificial reefs among recreational
fishers & industry.
• Enhances production or makes fish easier
to catch?
Million barrels • Planning at scale lacking.
• $38 b in decommissioning liability, only
$2.9 b secured.
Shallow water • Multiple ownership transfers.
Deepwater
• Trump Administration overturning &
weakening removal requirements. 26
 Closing Thoughts

• Almost all U.S. offshore oil & gas production will be in

Gulf of Mexico
• Likely to become stranded fossil-fuel assets around
mid-century
• Must emphasize safety & spill prevention
• Apply lessons from Deepwater Horizon to improve
containment & control of deepwater blowouts
• Address risks and disposition of aging production
infrastructure
• Don’t squander >$15 billion ecosystem rehabilitation
opportunity or ignore likely effects of climate change
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 Thank You!

[email protected]
www.umces.edu/don-boesch
@DonBoesch

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