Markets With Asymmetric Information: Prepared by

CHAPTER
17
Markets with
Asymmetric
Information
Prepared by:
Fernando & Yvonn Quijano
Copyright © 2009 Pearson Education, Inc. Publishing as Prentice Hall • Microeconomics • Pindyck/Rubinfeld, 7e.
CHAPTER 17 OUTLINE
17.1 Quality Uncertainty and the Market for Lemons
17.2 Market Signaling

Chapter 17: Markets with Asymmetric Information
17.3 Moral Hazard
17.4 The Principal–Agent Problem
17.5 Managerial Incentives in an Integrated Firm
17.6 Asymmetric Information in Labor Markets:
Efficiency Wage Theory
Copyright © 2009 Pearson Education, Inc. Publishing as Prentice Hall • Microeconomics • Pindyck/Rubinfeld, 7e. 2 of 28
17.1 QUALITY UNCERTAINTY AND THE MARKET
FOR LEMONS
● asymmetric information Situation in which a buyer and

a seller possess different information about a transaction.
The Market for Used Cars
Figure 17.1
When sellers of products

have better information
about product quality than
buyers, a “lemons problem”
may arise in which low-
quality goods drive out high
quality goods.
In (a) the demand curve for
high-quality cars is DH.
However, as buyers lower
their expectations about the
average quality of cars on
the market, their perceived
demand shifts to DM.
FOR LEMONS
● asymmetric information Situation in which a buyer and

a seller possess different information about a transaction.
Figure 17.1
(continued)
Likewise, in (b) the
perceived demand curve
for low-quality cars shifts
from DL to DM.
As a result, the quantity of
high-quality cars sold falls
from 50,000 to 25,000,
and the quantity of low-
quality cars sold increases
from 50,000 to 75,000.
Eventually, only low quality
cars are sold.
FOR LEMONS

The lemons problem: With asymmetric information,
low-quality goods can drive high-quality goods out
of the market.
Implications of Asymmetric Information
Adverse Selection
● adverse selection Form of market failure

resulting when products of different qualities are
sold at a single price because of asymmetric
information, so that too much of the low-quality
product and too little of the high-quality product
are sold.
FOR LEMONS
Implications of Asymmetric Information
The Market for Insurance
People who buy insurance know much more about

their general health than any insurance company can

hope to know, even if it insists on a medical
examination.
As a result, adverse selection arises, much as it
does in the market for used cars.
The Market for Credit

Credit card companies and banks can, to some
extent, use computerized credit histories, which they
often share with one another, to distinguish low-
quality from high-quality borrowers.
Many people, however, think that computerized
credit histories invade their privacy.
FOR LEMONS
The Importance of Reputation and Standardization
Asymmetric information is also present in many other markets.
Here are just a few examples:
● Retail stores: Will the store repair or allow you to return a

defective product?
● Dealers of rare stamps, coins, books, and paintings:

Are the items real or counterfeit?
● Roofers, plumbers, and electricians: When a roofer

repairs or renovates the roof of your house, do you climb
up to check the quality of the work?
● Restaurants: How often do you go into the kitchen to

check if the chef is using fresh ingredients and obeying
health laws?
FOR LEMONS
Asymmetric information is
prominent in the free-agent
market. One potential purchaser,

the player’s original team, has
better information about the
player’s abilities than other teams
have.
17.2 MARKET SIGNALING
● market signaling Process by which

sellers send signals to buyers
conveying information about product
quality.
To be strong, a signal must be easier for high-

productivity people to give than for low-productivity
people to give, so that high-productivity people are more
likely to give it.
A Simple Model of Job Market Signaling

Equilibrium
Figure 17.2
Signaling
Education can be a useful
signal of the high
productivity of a group of
workers if education is
easier to obtain for this
group than for a low-
productivity group.
In (a), the low-productivity

group will choose an
education level of y = 0
because the cost of
education is greater than
the increased earnings
resulting from education.

Equilibrium
Figure 17.2
Signaling
Education can be a useful
signal of the high
productivity of a group of
workers if education is
easier to obtain for this
group than for a low-
productivity group.
However, in (b), the high-

productivity group will
choose an education level
of y* = 4 because the gain
in earnings is greater than
the cost.

Cost–Benefit Comparison
In deciding how much education to obtain, people compare the
benefit of education with the cost.

People in each group make the following cost-benefit calculation:
Obtain the education level y* if the benefit (i.e., the increase in
earnings) is at least as large as the cost of this education.
Guarantees and Warranties

Firms that produce a higher-quality, more dependable product
must make consumers aware of this difference. But how can they
do it in a convincing way?
The answer is guarantees and warranties.
Guarantees and warranties effectively signal product quality
because an extensive warranty is more costly for the producer of
a low-quality item than for the producer of a high-quality item.
Job market signaling does not

end when one is hired. This is
especially true for workers in

knowledge-based fields such as
engineering, computer
programming, finance, law,
management, and consulting.
Given this asymmetric information, what policy should
employers use to determine promotions and salary
increases? Workers can often signal talent and productivity
by working harder and longer hours.
Employers rely increasingly on the signaling value of long
hours as rapid technological change makes it harder for
them to find other ways of assessing workers’ skills and
productivity. The worker will know more about his abilities
than the employer.
17.3 MORAL HAZARD
● moral hazard When a party whose actions are

unobserved can affect the probability or magnitude of a
payment associated with an event.
Figure 17.3
The Effects of Moral Hazard
Moral hazard alters the ability of

markets to allocate resources efficiently.
D gives the demand for automobile
driving.
With no moral hazard, the marginal cost

of transportation MC is $1.50 per mile;
the driver drives 100 miles, which is the
efficient amount.
With moral hazard, the driver perceives

the cost per mile to be MC = $1.00 and
drives 140 miles.
17.3 MORAL HAZARD
For buyers of livestock,

information about the animals’
health is very important.

Because of asymmetric
information in the livestock
market, most states require
warranties on the sale of livestock.
Although warranties solve the problem of the seller having
better information than the buyer, they also create a form
of moral hazard.
In response to the moral hazard problem, many states
have modified their animal warranty laws by requiring
sellers to tell buyers whether livestock are diseased at the
time of sale.
17.4 THE PRINCIPAL–AGENT PROBLEM
● principal–agent problem Problem arising

when agents (e.g., a firm’s managers) pursue
their own goals rather than the goals of
principals (e.g., the firm’s owners).
● agent Individual employed by a principal to

achieve the principal’s objective.
● principal Individual who employs one or

more agents to achieve an objective.
The Principal–Agent Problem in Private Enterprises
Most large firms are controlled by management.

Managers of private enterprises can thus pursue their own

objectives.
However, there are limitations to managers’ ability to deviate
from the objectives of owners.
First, stockholders can complain loudly when they feel that
managers are behaving improperly.
Second, a vigorous market for corporate control can develop.
Third, there can be a highly developed market for managers.
CEO compensation has increased sharply over time.

For years, many economists believed that executive

compensation reflected an appropriate reward for talent.
Recent evidence, however, suggests that managers have
been able to increase their power over boards of directors
and have used that power to extract compensation
packages that are out of line with their economic
contributions.
First, most boards of directors do not have the necessary
information or independence to negotiate effectively with
managers.
Second, managers have introduced forms of compensation
that camouflage the extraction of rents from shareholders.
The Principal–Agent Problem in Public Enterprises
The principal–agent framework can also help us understand

the behavior of the managers of public organizations.
Although the public sector lacks some of the market forces that
keep private managers in line, government agencies can still
be effectively monitored.
First, managers of government agencies care about more than
just the size of their agencies.
Second, much like private managers, public managers are
subject to the rigors of the managerial job market.
Do the managers of nonprofit

organizations have the same goals

as those of for-profit organizations?
In a study of 725 hospitals, from 14
major hospital chains, researchers
compared the return on investment
and average costs of nonprofit and for-profit hospitals to
determine if they performed differently.
The study found that after adjusting for services performed,
the average cost of a patient day in nonprofit hospitals was
8 percent higher than in for-profit hospitals.
Without the competitive forces faced by for-profit hospitals,
nonprofit hospitals may be less cost-conscious and
therefore less likely to serve appropriately as agents for
their principals—namely, society at large.
Incentives in the Principal–Agent Framework

Suppose, for example, that the owners offer the repairperson the
following payment scheme:
(17.1)
Under this system, the repairperson will choose to make a high level
of effort.
Incentives in the Principal–Agent Framework

This is not the only payment scheme that will work for the owners,
however.
Suppose they contract to have the worker participate in the following

revenue-sharing arrangement. When revenues are greater than
$18,000,
(17.2)
(Otherwise, the wage is zero.)
In this case, if the repairperson makes a low effort, he receives an

expected payment of $1000. But if he makes a high level of effort, his
expected payment is $12,000
*17.5 MANAGERIAL INCENTIVES IN AN
INTEGRATED FIRM
● horizontal integration Organizational form in

which several plants produce the same or related
products for a firm.
● vertical integration Organizational form in

which a firm contains several divisions, with
some producing parts and components that
others use to produce finished products.
INTEGRATED FIRM
Asymmetric Information and Incentive Design in the
Integrated Firm
In an integrated firm, division managers are likely to have better
information about their different operating costs and production

potential than central management has. This asymmetric
information causes two problems.
1. How can central management elicit accurate information about
divisional operating costs and production potential from
divisional managers?
2. What reward or incentive structure should central management
use to encourage divisional managers to produce as efficiently
as possible?
INTEGRATED FIRM
Integrated Firm
For example, if the manager’s estimate of the feasible production level
is Qf, the annual bonus in dollars, B, might be

(17.3)
where Q is the plant’s actual output, 10,000 is the bonus when output
is at capacity, and .5 is a factor chosen to reduce the bonus if Q is
below Qf.
We will use a slightly more complicated formula than the one in (17.3)
to calculate the bonus:
(17.4)
The parameters (.3, .2, and .5) have been chosen so that each
manager has the incentive to reveal the true feasible production level
and to make Q, the actual output of the plant, as large as possible.
INTEGRATED FIRM
Integrated Firm
Figure 17.4
Incentive Design in an Integrated Firm
A bonus scheme can be designed

that gives a manager the incentive to
estimate accurately the size of the
plant.
If the manager reports a feasible
capacity of 20,000 units per year,
equal to the actual capacity, then the
bonus will be maximized (at $6000).
INTEGRATED FIRM
Applications
Companies are learning that bonus schemes provide better

results.
The salesperson can be given an array of numbers showing
the bonus as a function of both the sales target chosen by
the salesperson and the actual level of sales.
Salespeople will quickly figure out that they do best by
reporting feasible sales targets and then working as hard as
possible to meet them.
17.6 ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION IN LABOR
MARKETS: EFFICIENCY WAGE THEORY
● efficiency wage theory Explanation for

the presence of unemployment and wage
discrimination which recognizes that labor

productivity may be affected by the wage
rate.
● shirking model Principle that workers still

have an incentive to shirk if a firm pays them a
market-clearing wage, because fired workers
can be hired somewhere else for the same
wage.
● efficiency wage Wage that a firm will pay to

an employee as an incentive not to shirk.
Figure 17.5
Unemployment in a Shirking Model
Unemployment can arise in

otherwise competitive labor
markets when employers cannot
accurately monitor workers.
Here, the “no shirking constraint”

(NSC) gives the wage necessary to
keep workers from shirking.
The firm hires Le workers (at a

higher than competitive efficiency
wage we), creating L* − Le of
unemployment.
One of the early examples of the

payment of efficiency wages can
be found in the history of Ford

Motor Company.
Ford needed to maintain a stable
workforce, and Henry Ford (and
his business partner James
Couzens) provided it.
In 1914, when the going wage for a day’s work in industry
averaged between $2 and $3, Ford introduced a pay policy of
$5 a day. The policy was prompted by improved labor
efficiency, not generosity.
Although Henry Ford was attacked for it, his policy
succeeded. His workforce did become more stable, and the
publicity helped Ford’s sales.

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CHAPTER

17.1 Quality Uncertainty and the Market for Lemons

17.2 Market Signaling

17.3 Moral Hazard

17.4 The Principal–Agent Problem

17.5 Managerial Incentives in an Integrated Firm

17.6 Asymmetric Information in Labor Markets:

Efficiency Wage Theory

● asymmetric information Situation in which a buyer and

The Market for Used Cars

When sellers of products

● asymmetric information Situation in which a buyer and

The Market for Used Cars

Implications of Asymmetric Information

● adverse selection Form of market failure

People who buy insurance know much more about

their general health than any insurance company can

The Market for Credit

● Retail stores: Will the store repair or allow you to return a

● Dealers of rare stamps, coins, books, and paintings:

● Roofers, plumbers, and electricians: When a roofer

● Restaurants: How often do you go into the kitchen to

market. One potential purchaser,

● market signaling Process by which

To be strong, a signal must be easier for high-

A Simple Model of Job Market Signaling

In (a), the low-productivity

A Simple Model of Job Market Signaling

However, in (b), the high-

A Simple Model of Job Market Signaling

benefit of education with the cost.

Guarantees and Warranties

Job market signaling does not

especially true for workers in

● moral hazard When a party whose actions are

The Effects of Moral Hazard

Moral hazard alters the ability of

With no moral hazard, the marginal cost

With moral hazard, the driver perceives

For buyers of livestock,

health is very important.

● principal–agent problem Problem arising

principals (e.g., the firm’s owners).

● agent Individual employed by a principal to

● principal Individual who employs one or

The Principal–Agent Problem in Private Enterprises

Most large firms are controlled by management.

Managers of private enterprises can thus pursue their own

CEO compensation has increased sharply over time.

For years, many economists believed that executive

The Principal–Agent Problem in Public Enterprises

The principal–agent framework can also help us understand

Do the managers of nonprofit

organizations have the same goals

Incentives in the Principal–Agent Framework

Incentives in the Principal–Agent Framework

Suppose they contract to have the worker participate in the following

(Otherwise, the wage is zero.)

In this case, if the repairperson makes a low effort, he receives an