Metaethics
Metaethics
Metaethics
Anthony Encarnacion
King Aljon Alberto
Michael Dave Bellen
Three branch of ethics
To easily get the relationship of this topics here is the analogy of a football game
Example:
Peter Railton (1950–) - “stark, raving Moral Realism” which in virtue of believing that mind-
independent moral truth exists in the world.
-in ethics, realists hold that certain moral properties or facts exist and that they exist
objectively and independently of the minds or beliefs of individual people
-realists thus believe in the possibility of error — believing that “murder is wrong” does
not make murder wrong.What would make murder wrong would be the presence of an actual
moral property of wrongness (objective and mind-independent) associated with the act of
murder.
It is under the non cognitivism
-Emotivism states moral judgements are not claims about reality, but are emotional
expressions of the speaker
Moral Naturalism - They only seeks to fit moral properties into the non-
mystical world of ordinary science.
If I am asked, ‘What is good?’ my answer is that good is good, and that is the end of the
matter. Or if I am asked ‘How is good to be defined?’ my answer is that it cannot be
defined, and that is all I have to say about it.8
Moore’s critique of Naturalism sets the scene for his own metaethical view.
According to Moore, moral properties do exist but they are fundamentally simple
non-natural properties.
Richard Price (1723–1791) suggested that truths are intuited when they are
acquired “without making any use of any process of reasoning”.
W. D. Ross (1877–1971) suggested that we intuit self-evident moral truths “without
any need of proof, or of evidence beyond itself”.11 An example should make this
method of intuiting non-natural moral properties much clearer.
Firstly, Intuitionism might be thought to struggle when explaining moral
disagreement. If moral truths are self-evident and can be intuited, then why do
even self-professed intuitionists such as Moore and Ross have radically different
ethical views (Moore is a teleologist, whereas Ross intuits protoKantian moral
truths).
Samuel Clarke (1675–1729) suggested that, amongst other things, stupidity may
lead to our intuitions going astray and this may explain continuing moral
disagreement. If only we were less daft, our intuitive moral sense might be more
reliable!
Cognitivism tends to be associated with Realism.
In Mackie’s own words, “Although most people in making moral judgments
implicitly claim, among other things, to be pointing to something objectively
prescriptive, these claims are all false”.
Argument from Relativity
Mackie’s first objection to Realism is built out of his appreciation of the depth of moral
disagreement, and so shares something with one of the objections to Intuitionism offered in
the previous section.
Error theory is a cognitivist view of metaethics that put forward by JL Mackie
-Moral judgement express beliefs that have truth-value
-our moral judgements are false
-we think we have true moral beliefs, but we are really don’t because
objective moral facts are duties do not exist in the real world so our beliefs cannot
correspond anything objective so we are in ERROR for thinking we have true moral
beliefs.
Mackie says that it doesn’t assert our beliefs are true to us, or within a specific
culture
There is much more that could be said in this chapter. Metaethical theories are as
varied and nuanced as their normative rivals, and it is impossible to give a fair
hearing to all of them in a single chapter. Catherine Wilson has authored an
enquiry into Metaethics that reflects the challenge of coming to your own, first-
person, view on these issues.17 However, we have tried as far as possible on this
whistle-stop tour to outline these theories clearly and to give them such a fair
hearing. It is for you to decide where you sit in the debate between Cognitivism
and NonCognitivism, Realism and Anti-Realism, and, more generally, to decide how
much importance Metaethics has relative to the normative and applied camps of
ethical study