Operation Husky Sicily 1943: Maj R L Simmons

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OPERATION HUSKY

Sicily 1943

Maj R L Simmons

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What problems in joint and combined
operations were revealed by Operation
Husky? How effectively were they
resolved?

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OUTLINE
• OP HUSKY in context
• OP HUSKY in overview
• Preliminary Planning (Strategic)
• Planning (Operational)
• Operational issues (against functions in
combat)
• Endgame

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JULY 1943

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PRELIMINARY PLANNING
• Casablanca Conference Jan 1943
• National Strategic Issues US/UK
• Aid to Stalin
• Spanish Neutrality
• Add pressure to Italy (Trident
Conference May 1943)
• Secure Mediterranean
• Delay Op ROUNDUP
• Compromise

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PRELIMINARY PLANNING
‘ A strategic compromise conceived in
dissention and born of uneasy alliance’

Garland and Smyth, 1986

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ORBAT
• HQ - Eisenhower
• Air – Air Chief Marshall Tedder
• Maritime – Admiral Cunningham (2590
Ships and LC)
• Land – General Alexander 15th Army Gp (7
Divisions + 1 Reserve)
• 8th Army (UK/CAN) – General Montgomery
• 7th Army (US) – General Patton
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OPERATIONAL PLANNING
• Key personalities
• Dislocated HQs
• Fighting the current
battle
• National Pride
• Single Service Pride
• Joint? Combined?

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OPERATIONAL PLANNING
‘ There were no decisions reached about
how to exploit a victory in Sicily…it was an
egregious error to leave the future
unresolved. It led to misguided planning
for and a cloudy conclusion to the Sicily
operation’

General Bradley, Commander 2 Corps, 7th


Army
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MANOEUVRE
• Airborne Assault
• Amphibious Assault – Initial
• Amphibious Assault – Subsequent
• Fixed Plan – No flexibility
• Axis Delay – Etna Line
• Denial of MSRs

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AIR MANOEUVRE

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MARITIME MANOEUVRE

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MANOEUVRE
• Airborne Assault
• Amphibious Assault –
Initial
• Amphibious Assault –
Subsequent
• Fixed Plan – No flexibility
• Axis Delay – Etna Line
• Denial of MSRs
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MANOEUVRE
‘ A secondary attack on Calabria would have
enabled the Sicily landing to be developed
into an overwhelming Allied victory’

General Albert Kesselring


German Commander-in-Chief Army
Command South

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PROTECTION
• Denial of routes to Axis reserves
• Air Superiority – Pre Ops
• Control of Maritime manoeuvre space
• Axis use of delay to enable withdrawal

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FIREPOWER
• Naval Gunfire –
Battleships + LC
• Air – CAS vs Strategic
targeting
• Air – Overwhelming Air
Superiority
• Armour – US/UK Attitudes
• Artillery
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INFORMATION AND
INTELLIGENCE
• Deception – Op MINCEMEAT
• Initial approach to Amphibious AO
• Beach Recce
• Air Recce
• Joint Communications
• HUMINT

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COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
• Initial number of LC
• Subsequent perception of LC availability
• Sea basing of stores
• Build up of combat power over logistical
elements

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COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
• Tactical stowage
• Beach masters

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ENDGAME
• Axis withdrawal to Italy
• Failure to capitalise on victory
• Slow to communicate intelligence
• Slow to advance
• Costly victory in human terms
• Air and Maritime reluctance (Gallipoli)

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The enemy failure to exploit the last chance of hindering the
German forces crossing the Straits of Messina, by continuous and
strongly coordinated attacks from the sea and the air, was almost a
greater boon to the German Command than their failure
immediately to push their pursuit across the straits on 17 August.
Unquestionably the troops on both sides had to face extraordinary
exertions in the heat of a blistering midsummer sun in the rocky and
almost treeless mountain regions, but the halt called by the Allies
until 3 September, which was not absolutely dictated by the
situation, was again a gift to the Axis.

General Albert Kesselring

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POLITICAL FALLOUT
• Grand Strategic victory
• Mussolini Arrested
• Loss of trust between Axis nations
• Springboard to Italy
• German Forces split
• Complete control of Mediterranean
• Time to build up combat power before Op
OVERLORD
• Valuable lessons learned

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LESSONS IDENTIFIED
• Inherent complexity of amphibious operations
• Planning coordination
• Careful selection of commanders
• Rehearsals and training (Joint)
• Air Superiority and Sea Control
• Flexible approach within a defined plan
• Importance of deception and shaping
• Understanding the 1 Up Intent

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