The Supreme Court upheld the conviction of the appellant for murder under Section 302 of the IPC. While the appellant claimed he was acting in private defense, the Court held that even if private defense was accepted initially, the circumstances had ceased to give reasonable grounds for apprehension of danger by the time the fatal blow was delivered. The right of private defense is limited by Section 99 of the IPC and does not extend to causing death or bodily harm unless there is a reasonable apprehension of danger to life or body at that time.
The Supreme Court upheld the conviction of the appellant for murder under Section 302 of the IPC. While the appellant claimed he was acting in private defense, the Court held that even if private defense was accepted initially, the circumstances had ceased to give reasonable grounds for apprehension of danger by the time the fatal blow was delivered. The right of private defense is limited by Section 99 of the IPC and does not extend to causing death or bodily harm unless there is a reasonable apprehension of danger to life or body at that time.
The Supreme Court upheld the conviction of the appellant for murder under Section 302 of the IPC. While the appellant claimed he was acting in private defense, the Court held that even if private defense was accepted initially, the circumstances had ceased to give reasonable grounds for apprehension of danger by the time the fatal blow was delivered. The right of private defense is limited by Section 99 of the IPC and does not extend to causing death or bodily harm unless there is a reasonable apprehension of danger to life or body at that time.
The Supreme Court upheld the conviction of the appellant for murder under Section 302 of the IPC. While the appellant claimed he was acting in private defense, the Court held that even if private defense was accepted initially, the circumstances had ceased to give reasonable grounds for apprehension of danger by the time the fatal blow was delivered. The right of private defense is limited by Section 99 of the IPC and does not extend to causing death or bodily harm unless there is a reasonable apprehension of danger to life or body at that time.
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KATTA SURENDERA ----
APPELLANT VS STATE OF A.P. ----RESPONDENT CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1525 OF 2007 Citation: 2008 (3) Cr.L.J. 3196 SC Bench: Arijit Pasayat, P.P. Naolekar PROVISIONS OF IPC INVOLVED Section 96: Things done in private defence- Nothing is an offence which is done in the exercise of the right of private defence. Section 97: Right of private defence of the body and of property-Every person has a right, subject to the restrictions contained in section 99, to defend- (First) — His own body, and the body of any other person, against any offence affecting the human body; (Secondly) —The property, whether movable or immovable, of himself or of any other person, against any act which is an offence falling under the definition of theft, robbery, mischief or criminal trespass, or which is an attempt to commit theft, robbery, mischief or criminal trespass. Section 302: Whoever commits murder shall be punished with death, or [imprisonment for life], and shall also be liable to fine. Section 304: Punishment for culpable homicide not amounting to murder-Whoever commits culpable homicide not amounting to murder shall be punished with 1[imprisonment for life], or imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine, if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death, or of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, or with fine, or with both, if the act is done with the knowledge that it is likely to cause death, but without any intention to cause death, or to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. Section 324: Voluntarily causing hurt by dangerous weapons or means-Whoever, except in the case provided for by section 334, voluntarily causes hurt by means of any instrument for shooting, stabbing or cutting, or any instrument which, used as weapon of offence, is likely to cause death, or by means of fire or any heated substance, or by means of any poison or any corrosive substance, or by means of any explosive substance or by means of any substance which it is deleterious to the human body to inhale, to swallow, or to receive into the blood, or by means of any animal, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both. FACTS OF THE CASE The deceased and material witnesses were the residents of Chinnavenkataramanagari Pale and the accused were residents of Kammavaripalle. Since the time of MPTC elections in 2001, there were disputes between both the villagers. As there was no road facility to approach Chinnavenkataramanagari village, the deceased and material witnesses were trying to lay a road connecting to their village to Mulakalachervu. About six months prior to the incident, they purchased a land from PW- 16 in the name of PW5 and another to lay the road. Against the said purchase, the villagers of Kammavaripalle filed a suit seeking an order of injunction restraining the defendants from laying the road and the result of the suit went in favour of villagers of Chinnavenkatramangaripalli village. On 8.3.2002, on information that the villagers were attempting to lay the road, the Sub- Inspector of Police(PW-31) called both villagers and advised them to wait for one week as the matter was pending. Inspite of it, on 9.3.2002 the villagers started laying the road. PW-5 and another, in whose name the land was purchased, requested PW-31 to arrange police protection, on which PW 31 sent PW 17 along with him immediately and also sent PW-18 and three other constables to the scene of offence.Subsequently, PW-5 and PW 17 went and informed the villagers to stop the work, as there was likelihood of some incident. While they were standing, all the accused armed with sickles, knives, daggers and a bag containing bombs and sticks went near them shouting as to how they dared to lay road and they will see their end. So saying, the accused attacked the prosecution party. A-13 hurled a bomb, which exploded, and A-2 also hurled a bomb which fell on the ground but did not explode. They all tried to run away due to explosion of the bombs. A1 stabbed the deceased No. l with a dagger on his left chest due to which he fell down and succumbed to the injury on the spot. Then A-2 to A-4 attacked deceased No.2. Immediately, A-2, A-4 to A-11, A-13 to A-18, A-19 to A-24, A-30 and A-32 attacked PWs. 1 to 11. On a complaint given by PW-l, the police registered a crime and took up investigation. After completion of the investigation, the police laid the charge sheet. DECISION OF TRIAL COURT The prosecution, in order to prove the guilt of the accused, examined PWs 1 to 33 and marked their statements. On defence side DWs 1 and 2 were examined and Exs. D-1 to D-65 and their statements were also marked. Contradictions in the statements of the prosecution witnesses were marked. The trial Court, after considering the oral and documentary evidence, convicted A-1 for the offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC and sentenced him to undergo imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs. 2,000/- in default to suffer simple imprisonment for three months. A7, A9, A 11 and A-17 were convicted for offence punishable under Section 324 IPC and sentenced each to undergo imprisonment for three years and to pay a fine of Rs.1,000/- each, in default to suffer simple imprisonment for two months. All the accused were acquitted for all other offences. The appellant and the three convicted accused persons being aggrieved by the judgment of the trial Court, preferred appeal before the High Court challenging its validity and legality. APPEAL BEFORE HIGH COURT The allegation of the prosecution was that A-1 stabbed deceased No. l with a dagger and killed him. A-7, A-9, A-11 and A-17 were convicted for the offence under section 324 I.P.C. for causing injuries to the witnesses. The accused pleaded that there was pelting of stones by the mob in connection with the dispute regarding the laying of the road, therefore, it is very difficult to say as to who beat whom and who threw stones on him and it is not safe to find the appellants guilty of any of the offences and they shall be given benefit of doubt and the judgment of the lower Court has to be set aside. The High Court found that the accusation was clearly established so far as the appellant is concerned and did not accept the plea that because a single blow was given the offence was not covered under Section 302 IPC and was to be altered to Section 304 Part II IPC. The High Court upheld the judgement of the trial court. APPEAL BEFORE SUPREME COURT In support of the appeal, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the background facts have not been correctly analysed by the trial court and the High Court. It should have been held that the appellant was exercising the right of private defence. According to the appellant even if the prosecution version is accepted in total he was exercising the right of private defence and therefore no offence was made out. Learned counsel for the respondent-State on the other hand submitted that the case is clearly covered under Section 302 IPC. The accused-appellant was the leader of the group and no explanation was offered why he was carrying a knife with him unless he had requisite intention to cause homicidal death of the deceased No. 1. Additionally it is submitted that there is no scope for accepting the plea of right of private defence. The Supreme Court held that a plea of right of private defence cannot be based on surmises and speculation. In order to find whether the right of private defence is available to an accused, the entire incident must be examined with care and viewed in its proper setting. Section 97 IPC deals with the subject-matter of right of private defence. The plea of right of private defence comprises the body or property (i) of the person exercising the right, or (ii) of any other person; and the right may be exercised in the case of any offence against the body, and in the case of offences of theft, robbery, mischief or criminal trespass, and attempts at such offences in relation to property. Section 99 lays down the limits of the right of private defence. Sections 96 and 98 give a right of private defence against certain offences and acts. The right given under Sections 96 to 98 and 100 to 106 is controlled by Section 99. To claim a right of private defence extending to voluntary causing of death, the accused must show that there were circumstances giving rise to reasonable grounds for apprehending that either death or grievous hurt would be caused to him. The burden is on the accused to show that he had a right of private defence which extended to causing of death. The right of private defence commences, as soon as a reasonable apprehension of danger to the body arises from an attempt, or threat to commit the offence, although the offence may not have been committed but not until there is that reasonable apprehension. The right lasts so long as the reasonable apprehension of the danger to the body continues. In Jai Dev v. State of Punjab (1963 (3) SCC 489) it was observed that as soon as the cause for reasonable apprehension disappears and the threat has either been destroyed or has been put to route, there can be no occasion to exercise the right of private defence. In the instant case, even if it is accepted that at some point of time the appellant was exercising right of private defence, the same had ceased long before the blow was given by the appellant. It cannot be laid down as a rule of universal application that whenever a single blow is given application of Section 302 IPC is ruled out. It would depend upon several factors. In the circumstances of the present case, conviction is accordingly altered. The appropriate conviction is under Section 304 Part I IPC. Custodial sentence of ten years would meet the ends of justice. The court allowed the appeal to the aforesaid extent. LATEST CASE LAWS Lalu Joseph vs The State Of Kerala on 20 February, 2020(CRL.A. No. 1149 of 2016) In this case one Abdul Sammad (PW13) was the owner and in possession of 33 rubber trees at Palemad comprised in Edakkara Village. On 5.1.2011, PW13 executed greement in favour of PW1- Rasheed. The accused had made an unsuccessful attempt to take the aforesaid rubber trees for slaughter tapping. The accused had earlier taken the rubber trees standing in his adjacent properties for slaughter tapping and ever since then he had an eye on the aforesaid 33 rubber trees as well for slaughter tapping. On 5.1.2011 at about 4 pm on account of the previous enmity, the accused had stabbed Ibrahim, one of the close friends of PW1, on his chest, by means of MO1 chisel and when PW1 tried to intervene, the accused had inflicted stab injuries on his right abdomen and left underarm by using the very same weapon. Ibrahim succumbed to the injuries and PW1 was taken to the hospital for treatment. By judgement dated 11.11.2016 the session judge convicted the accused for life imprisonment and 1 lakh rupees fine. Aggreived by the conviction and sentence the accused appealed in the high court. Before the court, the learned counsel for accused contented the accused was validly exercising right of private defence. According to the learned Senior Public Prosecutor the injuries sustained to the accused in the very same occurrence were explained by the prosecution and the right of private defence was not available to the accused. The Apex Court held in various cases that the non-explanation of the injuries sustained by the accused at the time of occurrence or in the course of altercation, is a very important circumstance from which the court can draw the inference that the prosecution has suppressed the genesis and origin of occurrence and has thus not presented the true version. The court held that the appellant, who in the aforementioned facts and circumstances, only inflicted stab injury on the chest of the deceased, cannot be said to have exceeded the right of private defence. The court held in this case, the prosecution had suppressed the injuries sustained to the accused. Non explanation of serious injuries sustained to the accused has cut the root of the prosecution case. Judged by the above standards, the court was of the view that the acts done by the accused were in the reasonable limits of exercise of right of private defence and he was entitled to the protection afforded in law under Section 96 of the IPC. Accordingly, the court set aside the conviction and sentence imposed by the trial court. The appeal was allowed. Chellapandi vs Madurai District on 14 November, 2017( Crl.R.C MD 251 of 2008) The brief facts of the case is that on 07.12.2003 at about 08.30 p.m., while P.W.1/defacto complainant namely, Kannadichamy was standing in front of one Selvam Tea Stall, all the accused appeared before P.W.1/defacto complainant in which accused-1 had a knife and others had wooden logs and iron rods and A1 told towards the defacto complainant that he betraying the Ganja hidden by me to the police, then attacked P.W.1 complainant on his lip with knife and caused injury, then A2 attacked P.W. complainant on his left elbow with wooden logs and caused injury, then A3 attached P.W.1 complainant on his right elbow with wooden logs and caused injury at that time P.W.1 complainant raised alarm, after his wife namely Rani came to the place of occurrence while A4 attacked the wife of P.W.1/defacto complainant on her lip and caused injury then A5 slapped at her cheeks by hand. Accused A1-A5 were convicted under diferent sections of IPC –147,148,149,323,325,326 by the trial court. Against the judgement of trial court an appeal was preffered before Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No.II, Madurai, and the same was dismissed on 08.02.2008, by confirming the Judgment of the Trial Court. Challenging the same, the revision was filed befor the high court. The learned counsel for the petitioners / accused submitted that the main grounds for revision are that the occurrence is free fight with the petitioners / accused that had happened at the village and that P.W.1 complainant and his associates are the aggressors and that the second petitioner in this case/second accused had suffered injury whereas when he had gone to the police station to prefer the complaint, the Inspector of Police, without properly conducting the investigation, had arrested him and foisted a false case against him. Having regard to the principles emerged in case of Darshan Singh v. State of Punjab, the court held the view that the appellant reasonably apprehended a danger to his life when the deceased and his brothers started strangulating him after pushing him to the floor. As observed by the Court a mere reasonable apprehension is enough to put the right of self- defence into operation and it is not necessary that there should be an actual commission of the offence in order to give rise to the right of private defence. It is enough if the appellant apprehended that such an offence is contemplated and is likely to be committed if the right of private defence is not exercised.? Here is a case where the 2nd petitioner had suffered injuries and he had examined himself and marked the wound certificate as Ex D1.The wounds are not superficial. No investigation has been done by the respondent to conclude who the real aggressors are and no explanation had been given to explain the injuries suffered by the 2nd petitioner. The prosecution had not proved the case beyond reasonable doubt. In the result, the Criminal Revision Case was allowed and the conviction and sentence imposed against the petitioners/accused by the learned Judicial Magistrate No.II, Usilampatti, Madurai District, and confirmed by the learned Additional Sessions Court , Madurai, was set aside. The fine amount if any paid by the petitioners was directed to be refunded to them. Submitted by- Prabhsimran Singh Section- B Semester-5 Roll No. 82/18