Far-right politics in Russia
In contemporary Russia, the far-right scene spans a wide spectrum of political groups, authors, activists, political movements, skinhead subcultures and intellectual circles.[1][2] The mainstream radical right that is allowed or supported by the government to participate in official mass media and public life includes parties such as the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) and Rodina as well as far-right political thinkers such as Aleksandr Dugin and Lev Gumilev.[1] Other actors of Russia's far right include skinheads and political movements like the Movement Against Illegal Immigration and contemporary successors of the Pamyat organization.[1]
Some of the main radical right-wing groups and figures in contemporary Russia had become active in politics before the dissolution of the Soviet Union.[3] Alexander Dugin and Vladimir Zhirinovsky started their political career in the 1980s.[3] Zhirinovsky's LDPR and Dugin's Eurasia Movement and Eurasian Youth Union and affiliated organizations remain fixtures in Russia's far-right scene and, since 1991, were joined by many other parties and networks.[3]
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, radical right-wing ideas have shaped Russia's political system, public discourse, domestic and foreign policies, and intellectual life.[3][4]
History
Extreme right-wing groups began to openly organize, hold meetings and publish newspapers and journals during the 1980s.[5] Their political and ideological frame of reference was the Black Hundreds movement which consisted of antisemitic and ultranationalist organizations and was best known for organizing Jewish pogroms in the Russian Empire during the early 20th century.[5]
In 1985, the organization Pamyat began its political activity, holding meetings and demonstrations at state premises and propagating its main idea that the global Jewish population had conspired against Russia.[6] The group's leader Dmitri Vasilyev read aloud excerpts from The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, claiming that the course of history proved their authenticity.[6] While many members of Pamyat adhered to Russian Orthodoxy and had sympathizers in the hierarchy of the Russian Orthodox Church, some members of the far-right rejected religion in favor of paganism.[7] Pamyat's pagan branch centered around the figure of Valery Yemelyanov.[7] He and other representatives of the Russian neo-pagan movement argued that Christianity has a negative influence because it was founded by Jesus — a Jew —, an idea echoing Nazi ideology.[7]
In 1987, several official magazines including Nash Sovremennik and Molodaya Gvardiya started publishing The Protocols of the Elders of Zion and other antisemitic literature by Russian writers the majority of whom did not belong to Pamyat but sympathized with the organization and expressed similar views.[6]
Russian authorities did not oppose the publishers and distributors of antisemitic and often purely fascist literature as the law enforcement and Communist party leadership reportedly had many sympathizers in their ranks.[8] Representatives of the Leningrad City Communist Party Committee and police attended meetings of Pamyat in 1987—1988, where organizers called for a ban of marriages between Russians and non-Russians and for the deportation of all Jews.[8]
The adoption of the Soviet press law in 1990 led to the proliferation of even more extreme publications and focused almost entirely on the Jewish question and published excerpts from works by Nazi ideologists. Several magazine including the monthly of the Defense ministry, Voenno-Istorichesky Zhurnal, published Mein Kampf.[9]
Themes
An important theme of the Russian far-right has been so-called Russophobia.[9] It is based on the belief that the Western world and internal groups driven by hatred for everything Russian have conspired and striven for centuries to harm Russia.[9] A 1989 publication by Igor Shafarevich titled "Russophobia" garnered much attention.[9] In the essay, he argued that the course of Russian history was characterized by the desire of "Little people" — here he singled out mostly Jewish members of the intelligentsia — to malign "Great People", that is, the majority of the Russian population.[10][11]
Notes
- ^ a b c Arnold & Umland 2018, p. 582.
- ^ Varga, Mihai (2008). "How Political Opportunities Strengthen the Far Right: Understanding the Rise in Far-Right Militancy in Russia". Europe-Asia Studies. 60 (4). Abingdon, England: Routledge: 561–579.
- ^ a b c d Arnold & Umland 2018, p. 583.
- ^ Van Herpen, Marcel (2013). Putinism: The Slow Rise of a Radical Right Regime in Russia. New York City: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 105–108. ISBN 978-1-349-44873-9.
- ^ a b Tolz 1997, p. 179.
- ^ a b c Tolz 1997, p. 181.
- ^ a b c Tolz 1997, p. 182—183.
- ^ a b Tolz 1997, p. 183.
- ^ a b c d Tolz 1997, p. 182.
- ^ Rossman, Vadim Joseph (2002). Russian Intellectual Antisemitism in the Post-Communist Era. The University of Nebraska Press. pp. 166–170. ISBN 978-0-8032-4694-2.
- ^ Dunlop, John (1994). "The 'sad case' of Igor Shafarevich". East European Jewish Affairs. 24 (1): 19–30. doi:10.1080/13501679408577760.
References
- Arnold, Richard; Umland, Andreas (2018). "The Radical Right in Post-Soviet Russia". In Rydgren, Jens (ed.). The Oxford Handbook of the Radical Right. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. pp. 582–607. ISBN 978-0190274559.
- Tolz, Vera (1997). "The Radical Right in Post-Communist Russian Politics". In Merkl, Peter H.; Weinberg, Leonard (eds.). The Revival of Right Wing Extremism in the Nineties. New York: Routledge. pp. 177–203. ISBN 0-7146-4676-8.
 | This article related to politics in Russia is a stub. You can help Wikipedia by expanding it. |