"Multitask principal-agent problems: Optimal contracts, fragility, and ..."

Philip Bond, Armando Gomes (2009)

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DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2008.05.008

access: closed

type: Journal Article

metadata version: 2024-10-06

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Philip Bond, Armando Gomes:
Multitask principal-agent problems: Optimal contracts, fragility, and effort misallocation. J. Econ. Theory 144(1): 175-211 (2009)

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