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ORCIDJournal of Economic Theory, Volume 144
Volume 144, Number 1, January 2009
- Pierpaolo Battigalli, Martin Dufwenberg:
Dynamic psychological games. 1-35 - Alex Gershkov, Balázs Szentes:
Optimal voting schemes with costly information acquisition. 36-68 - Gorkem Celik
:
Mechanism design with collusive supervision. 69-95 - Hervé Moulin:
Almost budget-balanced VCG mechanisms to assign multiple objects. 96-119 - Ichiro Obara:
Folk theorem with communication. 120-134 - Françoise Forges, Enrico Minelli:
Afriat's theorem for general budget sets. 135-145 - Faruk Gul, Wolfgang Pesendorfer:
Partisan politics and election failure with ignorant voters. 146-174 - Philip Bond, Armando Gomes:
Multitask principal-agent problems: Optimal contracts, fragility, and effort misallocation. 175-211 - Paul Milgrom, Bruno H. Strulovici:
Substitute goods, auctions, and equilibrium. 212-247 - Xiao Luo, Chih-Chun Yang:
Bayesian coalitional rationalizability. 248-263 - Benoît S. Y. Crutzen, Nicolas Sahuguet:
Redistributive politics with distortionary taxation. 264-279 - Christos Koulovatianos, Leonard J. Mirman, Marc Santugini:
Optimal growth and uncertainty: Learning. 280-295 - Gabriella Chiesa, Vincenzo Denicolò:
Trading with a common agent under complete information: A characterization of Nash equilibria. 296-311 - Mehmet Barlo, Guilherme Carmona, Hamid Sabourian:
Repeated games with one-memory. 312-336 - Atsushi Kajii, Takashi Ui:
Interim efficient allocations under uncertainty. 337-353 - Igor Kopylov:
Finite additive utility representations for preferences over menus. 354-374 - Christopher P. Chambers:
An axiomatic theory of political representation. 375-389 - Laurent Lamy:
The Shill Bidding Effect versus the Linkage Principle. 390-413
- Srihari Govindan, Robert B. Wilson:
Global Newton Method for stochastic games. 414-421 - Nicolas Houy:
Structural holes in social networks: A remark. 422-431 - Yeneng Sun, Yongchao Zhang:
Individual risk and Lebesgue extension without aggregate uncertainty. 432-443
Volume 144, Number 2, March 2009
- Manolis Galenianos, Philipp Kircher:
Directed search with multiple job applications. 445-471 - Albert Marcet, Andrew Scott:
Debt and deficit fluctuations and the structure of bond markets. 473-501 - Alessandro Pavan, Giacomo Calzolari:
Sequential contracting with multiple principals. 503-531 - Nicolae Gârleanu:
Portfolio choice and pricing in illiquid markets. 532-564 - Yeon-Koo Che, Jinwoo Kim:
Optimal collusion-proof auctions. 565-603 - David Martimort, Lars Stole:
Selecting equilibria in common agency games. 604-634 - Yuzhe Zhang:
Dynamic contracting with persistent shocks. 635-675 - Attila Ambrus:
Theories of coalitional rationality. 676-695 - Ben McQuillin:
The extended and generalized Shapley value: Simultaneous consideration of coalitional externalities and coalitional structure. 696-721 - Kin Chung Lo:
Correlated Nash equilibrium. 722-743 - Adam Meirowitz, Kenneth W. Shotts:
Pivots versus signals in elections. 744-771 - Arnaud Dellis:
Would letting people vote for multiple candidates yield policy moderation? 772-801 - Yuichi Yamamoto:
A limit characterization of belief-free equilibrium payoffs in repeated games. 802-824 - Juan Dubra, Federico Echenique, Alejandro M. Manelli:
English auctions and the Stolper-Samuelson theorem. 825-849
- Seok-ju Cho, John Duggan:
Bargaining foundations of the median voter theorem. 851-868 - Jawwad Noor:
Decreasing impatience and the magnitude effect jointly contradict exponential discounting. 869-875 - José Alvaro Rodrigues-Neto:
From posteriors to priors via cycles. 876-883 - Nicolás Figueroa, Vasiliki Skreta:
The role of optimal threats in auction design. 884-897
Volume 144, Number 3, May 2009
- Haluk Ergin, Faruk Gul:
A theory of subjective compound lotteries. 899-929 - Peter Klibanoff, Massimo Marinacci, Sujoy Mukerji:
Recursive smooth ambiguity preferences. 930-976 - Jing Li:
Information structures with unawareness. 977-993 - Louis Eeckhoudt, Harris Schlesinger, Ilia Tsetlin:
Apportioning of risks via stochastic dominance. 994-1003 - Christopher P. Chambers, Federico Echenique:
Supermodularity and preferences. 1004-1014 - Youichiro Higashi, Kazuya Hyogo, Norio Takeoka:
Subjective random discounting and intertemporal choice. 1015-1053 - Klaus Nehring:
Imprecise probabilistic beliefs as a context for decision-making under ambiguity. 1054-1091 - Donald C. Keenan, Arthur Snow:
Greater downside risk aversion in the large. 1092-1101 - Enrico Diecidue, Ulrich Schmidt, Horst Zank:
Parametric weighting functions. 1102-1118 - Brian Hill:
When is there state independence? 1119-1134 - Masaki Aoyagi, Guillaume Fréchette:
Collusion as public monitoring becomes noisy: Experimental evidence. 1135-1165 - Leonardo Martinez:
A theory of political cycles. 1166-1186 - Jorge Alcalde-Unzu, Marc Vorsatz:
Size approval voting. 1187-1210 - Pablo Amorós:
Eliciting socially optimal rankings from unfair jurors. 1211-1226 - Mehmet Ekmekci:
Manipulation through political endorsements. 1227-1248 - Ryo Arawatari, Tetsuo Ono:
A second chance at success: A political economy perspective. 1249-1277 - Parimal Kanti Bag, Hamid Sabourian, Eyal Winter:
Multi-stage voting, sequential elimination and Condorcet consistency. 1278-1299 - Guilherme Carmona, Konrad Podczeck:
On the existence of pure-strategy equilibria in large games. 1300-1319 - Paulo Barelli:
On the genericity of full surplus extraction in mechanism design. 1320-1332
- Guilherme Carmona:
An existence result for discontinuous games. 1333-1340 - Bernard Lebrun:
Auctions with almost homogeneous bidders. 1341-1351 - Thomas Wiseman:
Reputation and exogenous private learning. 1352-1357 - Kristof Bosmans, Luc Lauwers, Erwin Ooghe:
A consistent multidimensional Pigou-Dalton transfer principle. 1358-1371
Volume 144, Number 4, July 2009
- Eugen Kovác, Tymofiy Mylovanov:
Stochastic mechanisms in settings without monetary transfers: The regular case. 1373-1395 - Maria Goltsman, Johannes Hörner, Gregory Pavlov, Francesco Squintani:
Mediation, arbitration and negotiation. 1397-1420 - Steven Callander, Johannes Hörner:
The wisdom of the minority. 1421-1439 - Brian W. Rogers, Thomas R. Palfrey, Colin F. Camerer:
Heterogeneous quantal response equilibrium and cognitive hierarchies. 1440-1467 - Bernardino Adao, Isabel Correia, Pedro Teles:
On the relevance of exchange rate regimes for stabilization policy. 1468-1488 - Quy-Toan Do, Andrei A. Levchenko:
Trade, inequality, and the political economy of institutions. 1489-1520 - Olivier Loisel:
Bubble-free policy feedback rules. 1521-1559 - Tomoo Kikuchi, John Stachurski:
Endogenous inequality and fluctuations in a two-country model. 1560-1571 - Alberto Martín:
A model of collateral, investment, and adverse selection. 1572-1588 - Thomas Eichner, Rüdiger Pethig:
Pricing the ecosystem and taxing ecosystem services: A general equilibrium approach. 1589-1616 - René Kirkegaard:
Asymmetric first price auctions. 1617-1635 - Dennis L. Gärtner, Armin Schmutzler:
Merger negotiations and ex-post regret. 1636-1664 - Josef Hofbauer, William H. Sandholm:
Stable games and their dynamics. 1665-1693 - Michel Benaïm, Josef Hofbauer, Ed Hopkins:
Learning in games with unstable equilibria. 1694-1709 - William H. Sandholm:
Large population potential games. 1710-1725 - Daisuke Oyama, Olivier Tercieux:
Iterated potential and robustness of equilibria. 1726-1769 - Nicolas Houy, Koichi Tadenuma:
Lexicographic compositions of multiple criteria for decision making. 1770-1782 - Marcello D'Agostino, Valentino Dardanoni:
The measurement of rank mobility. 1783-1803
- Rahul Deb:
A testable model of consumption with externalities. 1804-1816 - Sophie Bade, Guillaume Haeringer, Ludovic Renou:
Bilateral commitment. 1817-1831 - Takeshi Momi:
Excess demand functions when new assets are introduced. 1832-1843
Volume 144, Number 5, September 2009
- Roger E. A. Farmer, Daniel F. Waggoner, Tao Zha:
Understanding Markov-switching rational expectations models. 1849-1867 - Arianna Degan, Antonio Merlo:
Do voters vote ideologically? 1868-1894 - Ronald Fadel, Ilya Segal:
The communication cost of selfishness. 1895-1920 - Guillaume Haeringer, Flip Klijn:
Constrained school choice. 1921-1947 - Juan Pablo Rincón-Zapatero, Manuel S. Santos:
Differentiability of the value function without interiority assumptions. 1948-1964 - Diego García, Joel M. Vanden:
Information acquisition and mutual funds. 1965-1995 - Huberto M. Ennis, Todd Keister:
Run equilibria in the Green-Lin model of financial intermediation. 1996-2020 - Dan Bernhardt, John Duggan, Francesco Squintani:
Private polling in elections and voter welfare. 2021-2056 - Tilman Börgers, Peter Postl:
Efficient compromising. 2057-2076 - Jawwad Noor:
Hyperbolic discounting and the standard model: Eliciting discount functions. 2077-2083 - Subir Bose, Arup Daripa:
A dynamic mechanism and surplus extraction under ambiguity. 2084-2114 - Qingmin Liu:
On redundant types and Bayesian formulation of incomplete information. 2115-2145 - Massimiliano Amarante:
Foundations of neo-Bayesian statistics. 2146-2173 - Lu Hong, Scott E. Page:
Interpreted and generated signals. 2174-2196
- Marcus Hagedorn:
The value of information for auctioneers. 2197-2208 - Onur Kesten:
Why do popular mechanisms lack efficiency in random environments? 2209-2226
- Bettina Klaus, Flip Klijn, Toshifumi Nakamura:
Corrigendum to "Stable matchings and preferences of couples" [J. Econ. Theory 121 (1) (2005) 75-106]. 2227-2233
Volume 144, Number 6, November 2009
- Lee E. Ohanian, Edward C. Prescott, Nancy L. Stokey:
Introduction to dynamic general equilibrium. 2235-2246 - Boyan Jovanovic:
Investment options and the business cycle. 2247-2265 - Edward J. Green:
Heterogeneous producers facing common shocks: An overlapping-generations example. 2266-2276 - Richard Rogerson, Johanna Wallenius:
Micro and macro elasticities in a life cycle model with taxes. 2277-2292 - Gary D. Hansen, Selahattin Imrohoroglu:
Business cycle fluctuations and the life cycle: How important is on-the-job skill accumulation? 2293-2309 - Lee E. Ohanian:
What - or who - started the great depression? 2310-2335 - Dale T. Mortensen:
Island matching. 2336-2353 - Drew Fudenberg, David K. Levine:
Self-confirming equilibrium and the Lucas critique. 2354-2371 - Narayana Kocherlakota, Christopher Phelan:
On the robustness of laissez-faire. 2372-2387 - Francisco Barillas, Lars Peter Hansen, Thomas J. Sargent:
Doubts or variability? 2388-2418 - Nancy L. Stokey:
Moving costs, nondurable consumption and portfolio choice. 2419-2439 - Pamela Labadie:
Anonymity and individual risk. 2440-2453 - Ellen R. McGrattan, Edward C. Prescott:
Openness, technology capital, and development. 2454-2476 - Klaus Desmet, Esteban Rossi-Hansberg:
Spatial growth and industry age. 2477-2502
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