"Managerial Biases and Debt Contract Design: The Case of Syndicated Loans."

Tim R. Adam et al. (2020)

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DOI: 10.1287/MNSC.2018.3165

access: closed

type: Journal Article

metadata version: 2025-01-19

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Tim R. Adam, Valentin Burg, Tobias Scheinert, Daniel Streitz:
Managerial Biases and Debt Contract Design: The Case of Syndicated Loans. Manag. Sci. 66(1): 352-375 (2020)

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