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Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 103
Volume 103, May 2017
- Ehud Kalai, Marco Battaglini, Gary Charness, Vincent P. Crawford, Françoise Forges, David C. Parkes, Jennifer Byrd:
Introduction to the John Forbes Nash Jr. Memorial Special Issue. 1-18 - Carlos Alós-Ferrer, Klaus Ritzberger:
Does backwards induction imply subgame perfection? 19-29 - Vincent Anesi, John Duggan:
Dynamic bargaining and stability with veto players. 30-40 - Mario Bravo, Panayotis Mertikopoulos:
On the robustness of learning in games with stochastically perturbed payoff observations. 41-66 - Kalyan Chatterjee, Manipushpak Mitra, Conan Mukherjee:
Bidding rings: A bargaining approach. 67-82 - Alan Deckelbaum, Silvio Micali:
Collusion, efficiency, and dominant strategies. 83-93 - Tingting Ding, Andrew Schotter:
Matching and chatting: An experimental study of the impact of network communication on school-matching mechanisms. 94-115 - Mikhail Drugov, Dmitry Ryvkin:
Biased contests for symmetric players. 116-144 - Piero Gottardi, Jean-Marc Tallon, Paolo Ghirardato:
Flexible contracts. 145-167 - Luisa Herbst, Kai A. Konrad, Florian Morath:
Balance of power and the propensity of conflict. 168-184 - P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Andrey Meshalkin, Arkadi Predtetchinski:
A one-period memory folk theorem for multilateral bargaining games. 185-198 - Arnd Heinrich Klein, Armin Schmutzler:
Optimal effort incentives in dynamic tournaments. 199-224 - Yunan Li:
Approximation in mechanism design with interdependent values. 225-253 - Bezalel Peleg, Hans Peters:
Choosing k from m: Feasible elimination procedures reconsidered. 254-261 - Cemil Selcuk:
Auctions vs. fixed pricing: Competing for budget constrained buyers. 262-285 - Bassel Tarbush, Alexander Teytelboym:
Social groups and social network formation. 286-312
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