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TRUTH, LOGICAL VALIDITY AND DETERMINATENESS: A COMMENTARY ON FIELD’S SAVING TRUTH FROM PARADOX

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 October 2011

P. D. WELCH
P. D. WELCH*
Affiliation:
University of Bristol, England
*
*DEPARTMENT OF MATHEMATICS, UNIVERSITY OF BRISTOL, BRISTOL, UNITED KINGDOM
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Abstract

We consider notions of truth and logical validity defined in various recent constructions of Hartry Field. We try to explicate his notion of determinate truth by clarifying the path-dependent hierarchies of his determinateness operator.

Type
Author meets his critics Forum
Information
The Review of Symbolic Logic , Volume 4 , Issue 3 , September 2011 , pp. 348 - 359
Copyright
Copyright © Association for Symbolic Logic 2011

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References

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