Bit-Level Automotive Controller Area Network Message Reverse Framework Based on Linear Regression
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. Background and Feasibility
2.1. CAN Bus Overview
2.2. DBC File
2.3. Linear Regression Preliminary
2.4. Feasibility
3. Framework Design
- : the raw CAN dataset of the vehicle obtained from the OBD-II interface, containing the entire behavioral trajectory of the vehicle.
- : the sensor dataset, containing the complete set of measurable vehicle behavior measurements, collected simultaneously with .
- : the raw set of measurements of a particular vehicle behavior collected using the sensor. is the particular vehicle behavior that includes speed, acceleration, steering wheel steering angle, brake pedal angle, accelerator pedal angle, gear angle, and switches angle.
- : a more detailed vehicle behavior dataset obtained after processing , where represents more detailed vehicle behavior.
- : the dataset containing data fields of messages with ID in , and .
- : the result of resampling of according to the frequency of .
- : the coefficient of determination of a multiple linear regression model between and .
- : the regression coefficient set of the multiple linear regression model between and .
- the threshold value used for the message filter.
- the CAN message with ID .
- : the threshold used for filtering the .
3.1. Data Collection and Processing
3.1.1. Data Collection
3.1.2. Data Processing and Resampling
3.2. Related Messages Filter
- Step 1: After processing, select a resampled vehicle behavior data and a data set with ID in the CAN bus trajectory.
- Step 2: Build a multiple linear regression model with as the dependent variable and as the independent variable and calculate the model parameters and .
- Step 3: Select the obtained in step 2 corresponding to , and keep only the greater than .
- Step 4: Iterate through each and repeat step 1 to step 3. According to the filtering result, obtain the most relevant messages and the corresponding models with the vehicle behavior .
- Step 5: Execute step 1 to step 4 for all to obtain the candidate messages and the corresponding models for each vehicle behavior.
3.3. Bit-Level Message Reverse
- Iterate through each in , keeping only those that are not less than the threshold value. If the value of is less than the threshold, it means that the th bit of the data field is not related to the specific vehicle behavior. Otherwise, this bit may represent how the behavior of the vehicle is recorded in the CAN messages. The result after threshold filtering is .
- If the filtered is discrete, the corresponding discrete bit likely represents the state of vehicle. If the filtered is continuous, then analyze whether Equation (8) or Equation (9) is satisfied between . If satisfied, the bits of the CAN message data field corresponding to the continuous describe the modeled vehicle behavior . Moreover, the bits satisfying Equation (8) are in Motorola alignment, and those satisfying Equation (9) are in Intel alignment. When not satisfied, the CAN message has no relation to the vehicle’s behavior.
- Analyzing the discrete values and the vehicle state data, the correspondence between the discrete bits and the vehicle state can be obtained reverse. For continuous , the data length, the alignment form, and the linear relationship describing the vehicle behavior can be gained.
4. Performance Evaluation
4.1. Performance in Real Vehicle
4.1.1. Device Description and Data Processing
4.1.2. Message Filter Results
4.1.3. Bit-Level Reverse Results
4.2. Framework Accuracy
4.3. Time Consumption
4.4. Result of Comparison with Other Methods
4.4.1. Boundary Delineation
4.4.2. Related Message Filtering
4.4.3. Execution Complexity
4.5. Application and Discussion
4.5.1. Application
4.5.2. Discussion
5. Conclusions
5.1. Implication
5.2. Limitations and Future Work
Author Contributions
Funding
Data Availability Statement
Acknowledgments
Conflicts of Interest
Appendix A
Behavior | ID | Bits | Description |
---|---|---|---|
speed | 0x212 | 48–56 | real-time speed data |
0x23A | 32–40, 56–64 | real-time speed data | |
0x21A | 17–32 | real-time speed data | |
mileage | 0x21A | 48–64 | mileage per unit of time |
steer | 0x236 | 58–64 | real-time steering data |
brake pedal | 0x668 | 0–16 | brake pedal angle |
0x668 | 36 | brake status | |
accelerate pedal | 0x668 | 17–31 | accelerate pedal angle |
gear | 0x235 | 39, 42, 44 | D |
39, 42, 43 | R |
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Field Name | Definition |
---|---|
Name | The overall function of this message (e.g., body, speed, etc.) |
ID | The identifier of this message |
Cycle time | The sending period of this message |
Length | The length of this message |
Function | The specific function contained in this message (e.g., angel change) |
Byte order | The arrangement of the specific function |
Start byte | The starting byte of the specific function |
Start bit | The starting bit in first byte |
Bit length | The length of the function |
Unit | The unit of the function |
Resolution | The resolution of the function |
Offset | The offset of the function |
Location | Physical Characteristics |
---|---|
Bodywork | Speed, Acceleration |
Steering wheel | Steering angle |
Brake pedal | Pedal angle |
Accelerator pedal | Pedal angle |
Gear knob | Gear angle |
Wiper switch | Switch angle |
Raw Data (r) | Operation | Detailed Vehicle Behavior (s) |
---|---|---|
Speed | - | Speed |
Integrals | Mileage | |
Judgment by threshold | Drive/Parking | |
Brake Pedal Angle | - | Brake pedal angle |
Differential | Angle change rate | |
Judgment by threshold | Brake or not | |
Accelerator Pedal Angle | - | Accelerator pedal angle |
Differential | Angle change rate | |
Judgment by threshold | Accelerate or not | |
Gear Angle | - | Gear angle |
Judgment by threshold | P/R/N/D | |
Wiper Switch Angle | - | Wiper switch angle |
Judgment by threshold | Stop or frequency |
Vehicle Behavior | Number of Sensor Record | Number of CAN Messages |
---|---|---|
Bodywork | 298,649 | 1,769,768 |
Steering Wheel | 16,148 | 132,122 |
Brake Pedal | 7961 | 57,399 |
Accelerator Pedal | 6364 | 60,772 |
Gear Handle | 13,105 | 113,001 |
Wiper Switch | 12,876 | 118,095 |
Gear | Status | ID 0x165 | ID 0x228 | |||
Bits 54–51 | Bits 39–35 | Bit 10 | Bits 7–5 | Bit 3 | ||
P/N | 0110 | 00010 | 1 | 110 | 0 | |
D | 1100 | 10000 | 1 | 001 | 1 | |
R | 1101 | 00010 | 1 | 010 | 1 | |
Wiper | Status | ID 0x09A | ||||
Bit 50 | Bits 38–37 | |||||
Auto | 1 | 10 | ||||
Slow | 0 | 10 | ||||
Fast | 0 | 01 |
Behavior | DBC Defined Messages | Messages Captured from OBD-II | Framework Filtering Results | Accuracy |
---|---|---|---|---|
Speed | 0x25E, 0x217, 0x202, 0x215, 0x35F, 0x361 | 0x217, 0x202, 0x215 | 0x217, 0x202, 0x215 | 100% |
Steer | 0x86, 0x240, 0x243, 0x82 | 0x86, 0x240, 0x82 | 0x86, 0x240, 0x82 | 100% |
Gas | 0x202, 0x21C, 0xFD, 0x167, 0x165, 0x21F | 0x202, 0xFD, 0x167, 0x165, 0x21F | 0x202, 0xFD, 0x167, 0x165, 0x21F | 100% |
Brake | 0x165, 0x78 | 0x165, 0x78 | 0x165, 0x78, 0x165 | 66.67% |
Gear | 0x228, 0x165 | 0x228, 0x165 | 0x228, 0x165 | 100% |
Wiper | 0x9A | 0x9A | 0x9A | 100% |
Vehicle Behavior | Number of Relevant Bits in DBC | Reverse Results | Accuracy |
---|---|---|---|
Speed | 96 | 74 | 77.1% |
Steer | 43 | 28 | 65.1% |
Throttle | 44 | 34 | 77.3% |
Brake | 13 | 11 | 84.6% |
Gear | 13 | 13 | 100% |
Wiper | 3 | 3 | 100% |
Total | 212 | 163 | 76.9% |
Step | Shortest (s) | Longest (s) | Average (s) |
---|---|---|---|
Resample | 1.150728 | 190.674251 | 37.23192305 |
Linear regression model | 0.007088 | 0.83345 | 0.179022554 |
Bit reverse | 0.000007 | 0.000025 | 0.0000099 |
Total | 1.157823 | 191.50772 | 37.4109555 |
Algorithm | Boundary Delineation | Related Message Filtering | Bit-Level Reverse |
---|---|---|---|
Bit-level reverse based on linear regression | √ | √ | √ |
READ | √ | × | × |
LibreCAN | √ | √ | × |
ReCAN | √ | × | × |
Reverse engineering based on correlation coefficient | × | √ | × |
Vehicle Behavior | ID | Linear Regression | Bit Flip (READ, ReCAN, LbreCAN) |
---|---|---|---|
Speed | 202 | √ | √ |
215 | √ | √ | |
271 | √ | √ | |
Steer | 082 | √ | √ |
086 | √ | × | |
Throttle | 0FD | √ | × |
167 | √ | × | |
202 | √ | √ | |
21F | √ | √ | |
165 | √ | × | |
Brake | 078 | √ | √ |
165 | √ | √ | |
Gear | 228 | √ | × |
165 | √ | × | |
Wiper | 09A | √ | × |
Total Accuracy | 100% | 53.33% |
Methods | Number of Messages | |||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1000 | 2000 | 3000 | 4000 | 5000 | 6000 | 7000 | 8000 | 9000 | 10,000 | |
Linear regression | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% |
Correlation coefficients | 80% | 72% | 82% | 86% | 90% | 92% | 90% | 92% | 92% | 90% |
Algorithm | Devices Requirements | Data Requirements | Average Time | Reverse Results |
---|---|---|---|---|
Bit-level reverse based on linear regression | OBD-II data acquisition device, Behavior sensors | CAN traffic, Sensors data | 37 s | Boundary Delineation, Related message filtering, Bit-level reverse |
READ | OBD-II data acquisition device | CAN traffic | 35.9 s | Boundary Delineation |
ReCAN | OBD-II data acquisition device | CAN traffic | 35.9 s | Boundary Delineation |
LibreCAN | OBD-II data acquisition device, Smartphone | CAN traffic, Smartphone data | >60 s | Boundary Delineation, Related message filtering |
Reverse engineering based on correlation coefficient | OBD-II data acquisition device | CAN traffic, UDS data | <20 s | Related message filtering |
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Bi, Z.; Xu, G.; Xu, G.; Wang, C.; Zhang, S. Bit-Level Automotive Controller Area Network Message Reverse Framework Based on Linear Regression. Sensors 2022, 22, 981. https://doi.org/10.3390/s22030981
Bi Z, Xu G, Xu G, Wang C, Zhang S. Bit-Level Automotive Controller Area Network Message Reverse Framework Based on Linear Regression. Sensors. 2022; 22(3):981. https://doi.org/10.3390/s22030981
Chicago/Turabian StyleBi, Zixiang, Guoai Xu, Guosheng Xu, Chenyu Wang, and Sutao Zhang. 2022. "Bit-Level Automotive Controller Area Network Message Reverse Framework Based on Linear Regression" Sensors 22, no. 3: 981. https://doi.org/10.3390/s22030981