Wikipedia:Reference desk/Archives/Humanities/2014 March 20

Welcome to the Wikipedia Humanities Reference Desk Archives
The page you are currently viewing is an archive page. While you can leave answers for any questions shown below, please ask new questions on one of the current reference desk pages.

March 20

How do places like China, Japan, and Korea approach world history in grade schools?

In the United States, world history may be taught from the ancient civilizations (Ancient Sumer, Ancient China, Ancient Inca civilizations, etc.). As time goes on, the history becomes more and more focused on European history (the Ancient Greeks, Ancient Romans, the Middle Ages, the Renaissance, the Age of Reason, the Victorian era, World War I and II, which may mention the Asiatics). How do China, Japan, and Korean approach telling world history? Do they tell world history but focus more on what goes on in the Far East and everything significant to them? 140.254.226.195 (talk) 14:00, 20 March 2014 (UTC)

I happen to have edited and partly written a couple of world history textbooks for the US market, and I disagree with your premise. While Europe and the Americas get more attention than their share of world population would suggest, in fact, other parts of the world are also covered. There is typically at least a chapter each for each major world civilization during the ancient and medieval periods, though ancient Rome and Greece will typically get at least one chapter each, even though they are arguably different manifestations of the same civilization. During the early modern period, the focus is very much on the two sides of the Atlantic, and other parts of the world are neglected except as objects of colonialism. But a less eurocentric world perspective reappears around the 1930s with the story of Japanese aggression in China. This is all pretty much mandated by US state curriculum standards. Marco polo (talk) 16:15, 20 March 2014 (UTC)

Practical consideration have to figure in here. While you could ignore the contributions of, say, Easter Island, to history, you can't ignore the major players. Then, of course, any nation will emphasize their own history over others. The tendency to switch from history to propaganda is also problematic. For example, Japan tends not to admit that they were the aggressor in WW2, attacking pretty much anybody they could, committing war crimes against all and genocide against the Chinese. StuRat (talk) 16:20, 20 March 2014 (UTC)

Citation needed on the last claim. There are definitely ultra-nationalists who try to whitewash Japan's history, just like there are ultra-nationalists in America who try to deny the mistreatment of natives, but I see no evidence that it is commonplace. --Bowlhover (talk) 02:53, 21 March 2014 (UTC)

Likewise, North Korea's textbooks are a tad unusual when it comes to things like the Korean War. Or Korea in general. InedibleHulk (talk) 16:47, 20 March 2014 (UTC)

You wouldn't think them claiming total victory in the Korean War would be very credible to their people, who must have noticed that South Korea still exists, and US troops are right across their border. StuRat (talk) 18:47, 20 March 2014 (UTC)

It's definitely a Big Lie. They likely also have some Huge Rats. InedibleHulk (talk) 19:03, 20 March 2014 (UTC)

The textbooks in North Korea say that the country was successful in beating off the attacks and thus maintaining independence.

The textbooks in South Korea are, of course, much more worthy. They say that the country was successful in beating off the attacks and thus maintaining independence.

Personally I side with the Koreans, and then flip a coin. --Demiurge1000 (talk) 23:46, 20 March 2014 (UTC)

Well, somebody had to have attacked first, and I'm inclined to agree with the UN, that the North was the aggressor. (For one thing, it would have been rather stupid for the South to attack, as they were seriously outgunned.) StuRat (talk) 03:46, 21 March 2014 (UTC)

Not to carry this tangent too far (maybe too late for that) but the Korean War isn't really about assigning blame. The concept of "two Koreas" was all of 5 years old when the Korean War went hot. The entire concept of a divided Korea was basically a political expedient at the end of WWII, it was basically Europe in miniature with the US and Soviet Union carving out spheres of influence with little regard for existing culture or past history. While some historical precedent exists for there being two Koreas (the Three Kingdoms of Korea and Two Kingdoms periods), Korea had been a unified state for something like 1000 years before WWII. When one uses words like "aggressor", it implies that (at the start of the Korean War) one side or the other had moral rights to either a) their half of the peninsula or b) the entire peninsula. Neither is scrupulously true. While it is true that North Korea has been ruled by a megalomaniac family of batshit-insane dictators for the better part of 6 decades, it oversimplifies the entire history of the Korean conflict as "the North was the aggressor". The Korean War began as a proxy war between the communist and western alliances, and understanding the situation requires more than trite assignments of "blame". --Jayron32 04:45, 21 March 2014 (UTC)

Hope this is helpful. Oda Mari (talk) 10:42, 21 March 2014 (UTC)

Trade between two countries with the same currency

I'm reading a popular economics book which was written to dispel common myths about the economy. On international trade, one myth that the author addresses is the claim that exports are good for a country and imports are bad, because when a country exports goods money comes into the country, and money leaves a country when it imports goods. The author notes that if two countries (eg the US and Japan) are using different currencies (the yen and the dollar), then there basically won't be any money entering or leaving the country. If an American buys $100 worth of Japanese products, the Japanese manufacturers will have to exchange that $100 for an equivalent amount of yen. The bank that accepts the currency exchange will then distribute those $100, in the form of loans, interests, etc. Since basically the only place where you can spend American dollars is in the US, the $100 will eventually make its way back into the American economy.

Does the situation change if the two countries are using the same currency, like in the Eurozone? Should Germany, France, etc. be concerned with the effects of imports on their economy? 65.92.4.156 (talk) 16:10, 20 March 2014 (UTC)

That book sounds completely wrong to me. First, you can spend the US$ just about anywhere. Second, you can just stockpile those dollars in a "war chest", as the Chinese seem to have done. I'd look closely at the qualifications of the author(s).

The reality is that trade between two nations favors both when it is even, regardless of currency, and hurts the net importer, when uneven, regardless of currency (although there will be local industries which are exceptions, in each case). I'd look to see if that book was funded by a net exporter nation or by an importer corporation, like Walmart, either of which would like to confuse the issue. StuRat (talk) 16:24, 20 March 2014 (UTC)

No. This is a common misconception, but careful analysis of the principle of comparative advantage shows that even where the economies are not evenly matched there are still advantages for both countries. Interestingly, this misconception is so entrenched that many otherwise well-informed people believe it. (I had to sit and think for the best part of a weekend to get my mind round this subject when I first studied it - it's by no means obvious, which is why economists tend to regard David Ricardo as remarkably smart for pointing it out.) There are, of course, real-world frictional costs in some cases, but these are sufficiently rare marginal that they can generally be ignored in the first round of analysis. RomanSpa (talk) 17:57, 20 March 2014 (UTC)

Like so many economists, the author of your book has ignored or assumed away important points. When a nation, such as the United States, has a persistent trade deficit, that deficit typically ends up being financed, directly or indirectly, by credit from its trade partners. If this situation persists long enough, the deficit nation faces the risk that surplus nations (such as China) will no longer be willing to accept as many dollars when these are seen to add to a pile of uncollectable debt. In fact, China is shifting its economy away from export dependence and trying to boost internal consumption. Meanwhile, it has a stockpile of more than $1 trillion in credit, mainly to the US government. If, as the result of an economic or political crisis or merely in an effort to pressure the United States, China decided to sell its holdings of US debt at a loss, borrowing costs in the United States would shoot up, the value of retirement and corporate assets invested in bonds would plummet, and the US economy would be severely damaged. This situation is not very different from what happened in the euro zone, in which lenders from northern countries, especially Germany, lent euros to southern countries, such as Greece and Portugal, to finance a substantial trade deficit with Germany and other northern countries. The result has been a severe debt crisis, very weak growth across the euro zone, and sharp economic contraction in the debtor countries. The situation is worse when different countries share a currency because there is no possibility of a devaluation, which would make the debtor country's exports cheaper and its imports more expensive to correct the deficit. If the US dollar lost its appeal as a reserve currency, we would expect a devaluation of the dollar to help correct the US trade deficit. Nor is there the possibility of inflating away the debt, as the United States could do by sharply increasing the money supply. Because individual countries do not have control over the euro money supply and because the European Central Bank has a very strong anti-inflationary mandate, this is not possible within the euro zone. Marco polo (talk) 16:29, 20 March 2014 (UTC)

Marco polo's analysis is broadly correct, but the point your book is making is also broadly correct. This is because the point that Marco polo is making refers to large scale capital and macroeconomic activity, while your book is simply trying to describe a single small transaction, where larger economic features are basically unchanged after the trade. Where two currencies are involved, the relative build-up of debt in the two currencies will over time drive a change in the exchange rate between the currencies. In a single currency zone the build-up of debt on one side of the trade imbalance can't be managed through a currency depreciation (as used to happen with, for example, the Italian Lira before the creation of the Euro), so instead what happens is that the borrowing costs of the country increase relative to the risk-free interest rate - that is, its credit spread increases. Where two countries have different currencies one way to address the issue of capital outflow is by the use of capital controls; this is generally not possible - or at least substantially more difficult - where both countries use the same currency. To learn about this in more detail, you will need to develop an understanding of the Mundell-Fleming model, an economic model that examines the relationship between capital flows, floating currency rates and governmental monetary policy. This will lead you on the the Impossible trinity, also known as the "macroeconomic trilemma". All of this, though, should not distract you from the main point that the book is trying to make, which is that trade between different economies is good. To understand why, take a look at our articles on comparative advantage and the work of David Ricardo. RomanSpa (talk) 17:42, 20 March 2014 (UTC)

The theory of comparative advantage, like so many other hallowed economics concepts, assumes away factors that are crucially important at the microeconomic level of households, such as wealth inequality. I won't contest the point that trade is theoretically good. In practice, however, apart from cases where a good is impossible to produce in an importing country because of climatic or resource constraints, who benefits from trade? In capitalist economies, trade mainly benefits capitalists, or those who rely for their income mainly on the ownership or management of capital. The owners of capital reap most of the benefit from comparative advantage, part of which results from global labor arbitrage or the related substitution of capital for labor (i.e., automation) in high-wage countries, since only by reducing labor costs can producers in high-wage countries compete with those in low-wage countries. Labor arbitrage, in turn, clearly disadvantages those who rely on salary and wage income in countries with above-average incomes, such as those of Europe and North America. Substantial income distribution has blunted this disadvantage particularly in Europe, but workers in many countries have clearly lost out from the expansion of global trade. According to this economist, trade is no longer really motivated by comparative advantage as Ricardo conceived it as much as it is by labor arbitrage, which this economist labels absolute advantage. Marco polo (talk) 18:03, 20 March 2014 (UTC)

Agreed. The US economy was OK while it's principle trading partners were other developed nations. Then, when we started trading with China in a big way, the middle class started to decline. This in turn also reduces domestic consumption. None of this is good for the US economy or democracy in the long run, as we end up with fewer people controlling all the resources and the elections. StuRat (talk) 18:38, 20 March 2014 (UTC)

StuRat: I'd really strongly encourage you to get a clear understanding of comparative advantage. You may also wish to examine the history of the US's international trade. A good and recent example would be the history of US-Japan trade, which evoked similar (groundless) fears in the 1970s. RomanSpa (talk) 18:47, 20 March 2014 (UTC)

I understand comparative advantage. This is why trade is often advantageous to both parties, when more or less even. But if one side has all the advantages on it's side (lower wages, less safety regulation, no unions, fewer environmental controls, currency manipulation, industrial spying, lack of enforcement of patents, etc.), it no longer helps the other side.

As for the comparison with Japan, you're failing to consider the relative population sizes. The US did suffer an economic setback when competing with Japan, until Japanese wages were brought in line with US wages. This happened relatively quickly, since the Japanese population is substantially lower than the US population. At that point, Japanese companies started placing factories in the US, to save on shipping costs, etc. However, it will take many decades for the US economy to bring Chinese wages in line with it's wages, and, due to the relative sizes of each population, this will largely take the form of dropping US wages, with some increase in Chinese wages. So, bad news for the US. StuRat (talk) 03:16, 21 March 2014 (UTC)

StuRat: No, you aren't grasping the point. Even if "one side has all the advantages" trade is still beneficial to both sides. You're confusing comparative advantage with absolute advantage. (It's not easy to master this distinction: what I did was to sit for a couple of days with a notepad and a pencil, carefully thinking through lots of worked examples. Even when you do the algebra, it doesn't really sink in: you only really see the point when you do a whole bunch of numerical examples. As I've already remarked, this principle is by no means intuitively obvious.) RomanSpa (talk) 13:59, 21 March 2014 (UTC)

Marco polo: I'm afraid that your first sentence is incorrect. The theory of comparative advantage does not "assume away" microeconomic factors, it simply summarises them by macroeconomic variables. The beneficiaries from trade are the consumers of the traded goods. If the traded goods are different from the locally produced ones, the consumers gain increased choice, and will adjust their spending to get their favorite shopping basket of goods: this will clearly be better than what they had before trade was available, since otherwise they wouldn't make the change in their purchasing patterns. Where the traded goods are the same as the locally produced ones, they will only switch to buying the traded goods if they are cheaper than the locally produced ones, again providing them with a benefit. In all cases, then, the consumers gain. This is true for both trading economies, though the change in purchasing patterns in each will obviously be different. Trading firms will only be able to make sales if they can offer the consumers a lower price or some other benefit (variety or better quality of goods). The trading firms themselves are compensated for providing these benefits by making a profit. So long as there is reasonable competition between the trading firms and along the trading route (I believe the estimated number to ensure this tends to be about 5 or 6 as a minimum, but I don't recall the paper offhand) the trading firms do not make excessive profits in comparison with the risks they take. The assertion that "owners of capital reap most of the benefit from comparative advantage" is therefore generally false, as suppliers of capital will not be making excessive profits on a risk-adjusted basis. It is certainly the case that introducing free trade tends to lead to labour market disruption, but this can be well-mitigated by phasing in the free trade over a period of a few years and providing governmental programmes such as Trade Adjustment Assistance to help with economic restructuring. RomanSpa (talk) 18:40, 20 March 2014 (UTC)

So then, what's your explanation for the rich getting richer and middle class getting poorer, in the US in recent decades, if not due to globalization ? Your analysis that consumers gain fails to account for the fact that they also have to work, and depressed wages/unemployment due to globalization means they have no choice but to buy cheaper, shoddy foreign goods, as they can no longer afford quality goods built at home. StuRat (talk) 03:23, 21 March 2014 (UTC)

For one thing, it's harder here than it was a generation or two ago to start a business or otherwise change one's line of work, and thus harder to squeeze one's employer for more money by credibly threatening to do so, because far more jobs require licensing; an effect not obviously related to globalization. —Tamfang (talk) 04:31, 21 March 2014 (UTC)

Why would that be ? We've had plenty of business-friendly Republican presidents, senators, and representatives, since Reagan. And few of the Democrats have been the old-time Teddy Kennedy liberals. StuRat (talk) 04:43, 21 March 2014 (UTC)

Friendly to existing businesses, yes. See RomanSpa's remarks below. Businesses prevented from coming into existence don't hire lobbyists. —Tamfang (talk) 20:32, 21 March 2014 (UTC)

Tamfang: You're right to be concerned about the increase in licensing; it's a matter of concern to labour market economists too. Such licensing is very often a covert attempt to develop restrictive business practices, but may sometimes also arise where interested parties see a profit opportunity in the licensing process itself (one well-known professional credential in the finance industry started that way). It's not my area, but I believe that the problem is worse in the USA than in some other economies because there is a greater tendency towards Regulatory capture where politics is driven by monetary interests. RomanSpa (talk) 14:13, 21 March 2014 (UTC)

Regulatory capture favors business over consumers, although possibly it might favor large business over small, as large businesses are more able to buy off politicians to get the regulatory agencies to do what they want. Still, I don't see how even large businesses would fight for stricter licensing requirements, and, if for some reason they did, they would presumably be good for business (for example people don't want to put their money in a bank with no guarantees). So, I don't see any way that regulatory capture is a net harm for business, just for consumers. StuRat (talk) 16:08, 21 March 2014 (UTC)

I think StuRat is right when he says that regulatory capture favours business over consumers, though it's not obviously the case that larger businesses benefit more - consider the ridiculous cases attempting to impose a licensing regime on interior designers! Businesses of all sizes like licensing because it provides an additional barrier to entry, so protecting them from competition. This, of course, is why economists dislike licensing except in special (public good) cases (e.g. banks, insurance companies, medical care providers), because licenses make the economy less efficient and consumers suffer. As I've already said, though, I'm not a specialist in this area. RomanSpa (talk) 16:30, 21 March 2014 (UTC)

65.92.4.156: You're very wise to try to understand this subject, but it isn't easy, and our naive assumptions about economics turn out to be false as often as they're true. On the subject of trade, it might be worth mentioning this well-known remark by Greg Mankiw: "Few propositions command as much consensus among professional economists as that open world trade increases economic growth and raises living standards." To summarise from the above, though, the answer to your question is "yes, the situation changes, because instead of being able to absorb the effects of trade through changes in the exchange rate, the country that is buying more than it is selling will experience a deterioration in the terms on which it can finance its debt, so in the Euro zone countries should be concerned about this". It's also worth noting that one way to reduce trade imbalances is simply for the country that's importing more than it exports to increase the efficiency with which it produces the goods it exports, but this is true where there are two currencies as well as where there is a shared currency. RomanSpa (talk) 18:56, 20 March 2014 (UTC)

If one nation has wages 1/10th as high, the other nation will have to be a heck of a lot more efficient to negate that advantage. It would be nice if there was a button we could press to make that happen. StuRat (talk) 03:28, 21 March 2014 (UTC)

To a fairly significant extent, free trade and free movement of capital is that button. It doesn't work immediately, of course, but the empirical evidence that greater freedom of economic activity leads to improved standards of living is very strong. The road is sometimes bumpy, but it is well worth traveling. (Consider a country that hasn't traveled that road: present-day North Korea.) It's easy to see that a manufacturer who has a choice of two countries in which to locate a factory will, other things being equal, locate where the wage and other costs are lower. This increases average wages in the "cheaper" country, while putting pressure on wages in the "expensive" one. This is uncomfortable for people in the "expensive" country, which is why trades unionists and some politicians in that country will tend to resist free trade and free movement of capital, but the full effect (when both countries are considered) is an increase in average standard of living. A good way to make things easier for the "expensive" country is to phase in free trade/free capital movement over a period of time so that the labour market has time to adjust (that is, so that people can change jobs), and to provide something like Trade Adjustment Assistance to help dislocated workers to re-train or otherwise improve their employability (which in effect tends to improve their productivity). Where there is a substantial difference in the level of economic development between the two countries, the "cheap and dirty" industries tend to be the first to move to the less-developed country, but gradually more sophisticated industries follow, until the gains from such moves have been more-or-less fully captured, and the less-developed country has to some extent caught up with the more-developed one. At that point businesses will move for other reasons - to be near to customers, or to take advantage of particular local skills: you will have read of cases where (for example) semi-conductor fabs are now returning to the USA from Taiwan, or customer service teams are re-opening in the UK to replace business units previously outsourced to India. The good thing is that free trade still works between the two economies as they draw closer together, because every country is different, with different skills and culture, and this always gives them an advantage in some areas. For example, it is likely that France and Italy will always lead in fashion design and marketing, and probably in high-end fashion manufacturing: there are clusters of expertise in both countries that would be extremely difficult to replicate elsewhere, and there is a cultural interest in clothes and self-presentation. There is no point in Germany (say) trying to develop a haute couture industry: it's easier for them to trade their magnificent precision engineering, and buy their fashion from the people who do it better than they do.

One common objection to free trade and free flow of capital is that workers in less-developed countries will find themselves working in sweat-shops or in working conditions that those in more-developed countries would regard as dangerous or otherwise unsatisfactory. This makes the mistake of assuming that a "more-developed point on view" holds in a less-developed country. A better way to think about it is to consider the development of countries that are now "more-developed": labour moved from working on the land and living in villages to working in factories and living in towns because each individual worker believed they would be better off by doing so. (There are a small number of important exceptions to this, such as certain classes of Scottish miners, who were appallingly badly treated by law, but they do not affect the overall population movements.) Certainly, by moving to work in factories these workers took on the risks of such jobs, but they will have taken these risks because they balanced the risks against the higher pay they would have earned. Certainly, much early factory work was grim and unpleasant, but for those workers the alternative was pushing a plough in rain or heat of sun for 12 or 14 hours a day, staring at the productive end of an ox or mule. Once workers made the choice to move to factories, they of course unionised, and gradually workplace standards improved. The same reasoning applies to people in less-developed countries today: the good news is that the economic development that in the past took countries four or five generations can today be accomplished in one. There isn't a "magic button" that will instantly lift hundreds of millions of people out of poverty, but freedom of economic activity is a very good "practical button". Other things help - better education for women (perhaps surprisingly, this is much more important than improving education for men), carefully targeted medical assistance, reduction of corruption, and the creation and management of land and property registers would be my personal picks - but free trade and free movement of capital are an immensely important part of moving towards a fairer world where everyone can hope to reach their full potential. RomanSpa (talk) 13:48, 21 March 2014 (UTC)

It is probably true that global free trade raises median living standards globally, since doubling the living standards of 1 billion Chinese people outweighs cutting the living standards of 250 million Americans by 25%. (These aren't actual numbers, just hypotheticals to point at the reality. Note that I don't claim that living standards have dropped for all Americans, just a substantial majority.) So, from a global perspective, perhaps one should support it, though the benefits in the developing world would be more widely shared, and the costs to individual households in the developed world more limited or even eliminated, if the income disparities were not so sharp and labor could claim a greater share of GDP. Still, from the perspective of an American dependent on selling his or her labor power for an income, free trade has not been a winning proposition over the past 35 years or so. Nor are there any signs of this situation reversing. The real median wage has been falling for some time now. The fact that economists are in consensus in favor of free trade reflects the fact that the careers of most economists depend on being useful to the owners of capital. Marco polo (talk) 15:11, 21 March 2014 (UTC)

Agreed on all points, Marco. The one thing I would add is that if the West is going to systematically give the wealth of it's middle class to developing nations, we should at least ensure that we pick democratic nations, like India, over non-democratic nations, like China. To fail to do so will eventually lead China to have the largest economy, then the largest military. At that point they will be free to invade their neighbors, as they are already showing signs of planning to do, by flexing their military muscle in disputed areas. The West will then be unable to stop them either militarily or by economics means, as China will have the upper hand in both spheres. StuRat (talk) 15:58, 21 March 2014 (UTC)

StuRat: I think you may have missed the point about trade: if I trade $100 worth of bananas for $100 worth of transistors, by definition I have the same total value of goods when I start as when I finish. I'm not giving my trading counterparty more than I'm getting in return. RomanSpa (talk) 17:28, 21 March 2014 (UTC)

That would apply to barter, not trade for cash. If we buy semiconductors from China, we get semiconductors, which soon become obsolete or fail, while they accumulate our cash. Meanwhile they get better at making semiconductors and increase their efficiency and capacity, while our industry languishes and our skills are lost. StuRat (talk) 23:51, 21 March 2014 (UTC)

Suppose China has a large store of dollars. For simplicity, imagine them as a stack of paper dollar bills. One option, of course, is just for the USA to pass a law saying that from now on dollars must be blue, not green. Then the USA can just say to China, "Oh, sorry, you've got the old kind of bills, those are worthless now". In other words, the USA could simply default. (The reality of such a default is more complicated, but I think it's best if we keep things clear and simple here.) Alternatively, the USA could say "Well, why don't you use those dollars you've got to buy some of the stuff we make?" China then has two options. One is to say "OK", in which case there's no particular problem, the other is to say "But the stuff you make is too expensive". At this stage, the USA can either become more efficient, so as to offer cheaper goods to China, or can say "Well, we won't be changing our dollar price, because we can't get any more efficient, but really your accounts over there are all denominated in yuan, so what's really happening is that your dollars are now worth less in yuan terms than they were before"... In other words, the dollar has simply depreciated relative to the yuan - the foreign exchange rate has moved. As the dollar depreciates, goods from the USA become more and more attractive to China, while goods from China become less and less attractive in the USA, until the trade balances at a new level. Your error is essentially that of Colbert, in believing that trade is a zero-sum game. The reality is that as exchange rates move both participating economies end up making net gains. RomanSpa (talk) 01:22, 22 March 2014 (UTC)

China engages in currency manipulation to keep their exports cheap and imports expensive. And I'm quite aware that trade is not a zero-sum gain, as my earlier comment that even trade is beneficial to both parties indicates. However, when uneven, it's more of a benefit to one and less to the other, and at some point it becomes uneven enough to be a net negative to one party. As for the eventual result, I do think a US default is inevitable, and this leads to a world ruled by nondemocratic China. This is a very bad thing. StuRat (talk) 15:49, 22 March 2014 (UTC)

Again, I think you may not have fully grasped the concept of "trade": you only do it if it provides a net positive. It wouldn't be rational to trade if it made you worse off than when you started, and in a free market system you can't be forced to trade if it's to your disadvantage. As for the question of a possible US default, it's highly unlikely to arise for trade-related reasons, as the USA has exorbitant privilege. (US default is possible for other reasons, of course, the main one being economic incompetence and social dereliction within the Republican party.) RomanSpa (talk) 20:29, 22 March 2014 (UTC)

Marco polo: If I hadn't heard it so often, I might be inclined to take offence at your suggestion that I reach my conclusions because I'm under the thumb of some capitalist. I suspect most (reputable academic) economists are interested simply in getting at the facts as best we can. Please don't confuse serious professionals with pundits and politicians who use a BA in PPE as an excuse to call themselves economists! (Sorry for the rant...) Returning to your point: It's certainly true that the real median wage in the USA has fallen since 2008, while since 2010 the mean has been rising. This is certainly a symptom of increasing inequality in the USA; there have been similar increases in inequality in many countries around the world. This is probably a matter for concern - there is somewhat convincing evidence that increased inequality in a society is damaging to all members of society, not just to its poorer members, and if this can be fully proven would provide a compelling case for active intervention to promote greater social equality. What is less obvious is your assertion that this increase in inequality can be attributed to increased international trade. For example, the decline in real median wages in the USA seems to be linked not to trade, but to the financial crisis that started in 2008. There's some evidence to support the hypothesis that businesses have used this crisis as a spur towards removing a large number of middle-management positions, and this has led to an increase in income inequality. Another possibility, perhaps linked, is that increased automation has led to a reduction in this kind of job; this is linked to the idea that there may be broader structural changes in the nature of work going on at present. I suspect that we're still not really sure what's happening: pundits and politicians may spin the story one way or another, but it's not obvious to me that we have a full answer. However, I do think that your assertion that "free trade has not been a winning proposition over the past 35 years or so" is misleading, even if you look only at real median wages in the USA: data from the Department of Commerce shows that the median real wage in the USA has actually grown since 1984 (the first date for which I have figures readily to hand), although not by anything like as much as mean wages, and this is despite a significant growth in the quality and variety of goods available to the "median person" in the USA. For example, 30 years ago items such as computers, mobile phones and 3D televisions were beyond the reach of such a consumer. Most of these gains in quality and choice can be attributed to increased international trade. RomanSpa (talk) 17:19, 21 March 2014 (UTC)

What you're seeing there is the rich benefit from free trade right from the beginning, while the middle class may have had a slight initial benefit (cheaper goods), but then the long-term problem of job export caught up with them and now they are losing ground not just to the rich, but even to where they were. StuRat (talk) 00:04, 22 March 2014 (UTC)

Your comments do not match the observable facts. As I mentioned, both mean and median real wages in the USA have grown since 1984. The figures I mentioned are available for download from the Economics and Statistics Administration. You may find it useful to graph the figures. RomanSpa (talk) 20:00, 22 March 2014 (UTC)

I'm using the very facts you provided. They showed that the rich started getting richer relative to the middle class right away, but that both still had increasing incomes until recently, when the middle class started to lose ground, in real terms. This is what I said above. Try reading it again. StuRat (talk) 01:48, 26 March 2014 (UTC)

You might also take hypothetical offense at the implication that a regulatory regime friendly to Megacorp is "free trade" as you meant the phrase. (A useful search-key for this point is "zaxlebax".) —Tamfang (talk) 20:59, 21 March 2014 (UTC)

Sorry, but for some reason the only references that come up when I google "zaxlebax" are crank sites. RomanSpa (talk) 21:49, 21 March 2014 (UTC)

Excuse me for thinking that even an anarchist might make a valid point once in a while. —Tamfang (talk) 20:39, 22 March 2014 (UTC)

Many seem to think that nations are the main traders, rather than economies. US imports from East Asia have been fairly flat as a percentage of total US imports, for 15-20 years. What caused the surge in US imports from China was the relocation of production to that country. So, as the US bought less from Japan-based factories (Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Europe, American, etc), and more from China-based factories, the US imported more from China. But, imports from other economies declined as a share of US imports. Since 55% of China’s exports are by foreign-invested companies, the main source of goods from China are Japanese, Korean, Taiwanese, Hong Kong, European, American, etc, companies producing in China.

The other forgotten point is that wealthier economies, where people have higher standards of living, are those most open to trade. DOR (HK) (talk) 08:05, 24 March 2014 (UTC)

Victorian theatres in London

I'm helping to edit a book about 19th century theatre in the UK (the original author is deceased). It mentions "The Soho Theatre". We have an article Soho Theatre but this relates to a theatre founded in 1969. Does anyone know of a theatre of the same name existing in 1855? rossb (talk) 17:14, 20 March 2014 (UTC)

The article Theatre in the Victorian era might  be useful, but it has problems.  :(  However this link looks promising: Theatres in Victorian London. (I'll attempt to track down your specific query...) ~:71.20.250.51 (talk) 18:45, 20 March 2014 (UTC)

The Royalty Theatre was briefly known as the Soho c. 1850, but by 1855 it seems to have become the New Royalty. Andrew Gray (talk) 18:48, 20 March 2014 (UTC)

The Survey of London gives the date of becoming the New Royalty as 1860; from 1850 to 1860 it was the Royal Soho or simply Soho. So this looks likely. Andrew Gray (talk) 18:51, 20 March 2014 (UTC)

...and this goes into a little more detail, suggesting that the "New English Opera House" name was very short-lived. It is not clear from this source if the theatre was open from 1850 to 60, but if it was, it seems to have been under the old name. Andrew Gray (talk) 18:52, 20 March 2014 (UTC)

[e/c] ::See also: New Royalty (Dean Street, Soho) from my link (above): "The new management changed the name to the Royal Soho, which opened on 30 January 1850; by November, it was "The New English Opera House." ... the theatre closed in 1938; the building was destroyed in the Blitz." ~:71.20.250.51 (talk) 19:07, 20 March 2014 (UTC)

Many thanks for the clarification. I've added a footnote to the book. I'd not been aware of our Theatre in the Victorian era article, but it does indeed seem to be woefully inadequate.rossb (talk) 09:14, 21 March 2014 (UTC)

Singing Southern Baptists

Do Southern Baptists have a tendency to sing less often then other types of Christians, particularly in "contemporary worship"? In other words, they may listen to the music, but their mouths aren't moving. 140.254.227.122 (talk) 20:02, 20 March 2014 (UTC)

I avoid contemporary services, but my Granddad, a Southern Baptist minister, will start singing hymns for no reason, whether or not it's appropriate. Bathroom? Singing. Pie? Singing. Someone having convulsions and coughing out blood? Singing. That said, he's older than sliced bread. Ian.thomson (talk) 20:07, 20 March 2014 (UTC)

You go only to services that are already over? —Tamfang (talk) 04:18, 21 March 2014 (UTC)

Here is a somewhat relevant discussion from: Just another "unofficial" Southern Baptist "non-entity" ~:71.20.250.51 (talk) 20:19, 20 March 2014 (UTC)

Southern Baptists "contemporary worship music" (indeed ALL Southern Baptist music, even traditional hymns) is about leading the church in an act of worship, not performing. All people in the church are expected to "sing along" (though, of course, it is never demanded or required) as the purpose of the worship leaders (either the organ and choir in a "traditional" service, or the band in a "contemporary" service) is to lead others to sing songs. Hymnals with lyrics and music and/or video screens are usually provided to everyone may sing along. You can read more in many of the articles in this Google search, but in my experience, This article captures the purpose of such teams best: "The role of the praise & worship team then is to lead the congregation in worship. Everything that comes from the worship team must have the goal to lead the congregation in worship to God, not to entertain." So no, Southern Baptists don't have any expectation that the congregation is to sing less in "contemporary worship". The same expectation is there as in many other denominations: During times of congregational singing, the entire congregation is expected (not forced, coerced, or demanded to, but still expected) to sing along. (full disclosure: I play guitar in a contemporary praise-and-worship team in a Southern Baptist-aligned church). --Jayron32 01:00, 21 March 2014 (UTC)

Christian pilgrimages

Do modern-day priests ever tell their parishioners to go on a pilgrimage in order to release a soul from purgatory? 140.254.227.122 (talk) 20:16, 20 March 2014 (UTC)

Just remember that purgatory is basically just a Catholic concept, so Protestant clergy (whether or not they use the term "priest") won't be doing this. No idea about the various flavors of Orthodox churches. Nyttend (talk) 22:24, 20 March 2014 (UTC)

Purgatorium isn't Catholic per se, but Roman. It was the name of the corridor in a Roman bath between the frigidarium and the caldarium which was hung with off-key bells, painted with muted, but clashing earth-tones, and staffed by homely but otherwise not-unpleasant dwarves who touched your knees soflty as you passed in a tickly fashion. It made getting to the tepidarium all that much more enjoyable. As for buying indulgences, that hasn't been around for a while, and "pilgrimage" is only mentioned under "abuse of" in our article on indulgences. But the veneration of the shrines and relics of saints still is, as is praying for saintly intercession. μηδείς (talk) 00:00, 21 March 2014 (UTC)

Of course, we have an article titled Christian pilgrimage which describes modern sites where Christians are known to make pilgrimage. In the modern Roman Catholic doctrine, purgatory is where you go do do penance for sins which have not been atoned for while you were alive. Ideally, practicing Catholics will undergo a regular confession and penance to cleanse their souls; during the course of the sacrament, the penitent says the Act of Contrition and the priest gives the penitent their act of penance to be performed (usually some cleansing prayer) performs the rite of absolution. No pilgrimage is required anymore. In some protestant churches, those with a theology close to that of the Catholic church have similar rites and theology relating to absolution of sins. Many protestant churches require no specific acts to absolve one of one's sins, instead the act of Jesus's crucifixion is seen as enough to absolve all believers of all of their sins, so no concept like purgatory exists in such faiths. This stems from the general concept of the Five solae, specifically Sola fide which holds that faith alone is enough to be justified before God, and no acts are needed (or more to the point, no act of contrition or penance is sufficient, instead ONLY the sacrifice of Jesus is, and only faith in Jesus allows Jesus's sacrifice to justify one before God). That distinction (the difference in the attitude towards absolution and penance) is a key distinction between Catholic and Protestant theology. But to make it simple, no, you aren't going to find any church in any major denomination where the clergy demands that parishioners go on a pilgrimage to get out of purgatory. Does that mean that you would never find one such clergy in all of Christendom? I have no idea. But that sort of specific order is not part of the theology or doctrine of any significant branch of Christianity. --Jayron32 00:50, 21 March 2014 (UTC)

Catholic teaching is also that penance does not absolve sins: absolution is freely available to all who repent fully, and the Sacrament of Reconciliation allows full absolution from partial repentance ("whose sins you forgive...") whether or not the penitent actually does any penance. Penance is about undoing damage to your soul, aligning yourself more fully to God's will: it's not about absolution at all. Everyone in Purgatory, according to Catholic teaching, has already had their sins absolved: that's why they're on their way to Heaven. Purgatory is the process of cleansing, because nothing impure can enter Heaven (most Christians would agree that having your sins absolved does not make you completely pure and perfectly aligned to God's will: some use "imputed righteousness" and others use a process of "glorification" at the moment of death which sounds an awful lot like Purgatory, and I'm sure there are many other work arounds). Penance is supposed to be a way of repairing some of that damage before death, so that you have less cleansing to do in Purgatory. And you have the opportunity to grow more if you align more closely to God's will while still on Earth :)

Something of an explanation of the Catholic view is found here: [1], or you could always look it up in the Catechism of the Catholic Church or the old Catholic Encyclopedia, if you wanted to. This answer has only been addressing the Catholic position, from an internal perspective. 86.157.148.65 (talk) 21:05, 21 March 2014 (UTC)

That you for that clarification. I was raised in the Catholic Church myself, but it's been 20+ years or so, and some stuff gets a bit muddied. Thanks for your fixes to my misrememberings. --Jayron32 22:21, 23 March 2014 (UTC)

It's no big. If I tried to answer questions about something, based on what I understood about it as a child, I'd probably make a lot of mistakes: that's why I suggested good sources you can use if you want to answer this sort of question confidently in future. ~the more you know~ and all that. 86.157.148.65 (talk) 16:38, 24 March 2014 (UTC)

To "purge" is to "cleanse", and "purgatory" is a "means of cleansing", from Latin "purgatorium".[2] It's a method, not a hallway. I think Medeis is channeling Richard Armour again. Either that, or Medeis is confusing purgatorium with vomitorium.[3] :) ←Baseball Bugs ^{What's up, Doc?} carrots→ 04:38, 21 March 2014 (UTC)

No, "purgatorium" is from the Latin, the "purring" pur- "of the cats" cattus > gen. pl. variant gatorium. They would sit in the windows and watch the dwarves tickle your knees as you passed. μηδείς (talk) 22:20, 21 March 2014 (UTC)

I've just realised that the question hasn't actually been answered.

Modern priests don't generally "tell" people to do anything to release souls from Purgatory, although praying for the souls in Purgatory is encouraged by Catholic priests and the Catholic Church in general. I do not know whether it was ever common for priests to tell people to go on pilgrimage in order to release a soul from Purgatory. When I think of a priest telling someone to do some act of penance, I can only imagine it in the context of Confession (the Sacrament of Reconciliation), and then it would only ever be offered up as reparations for their own sins, not another soul. Many Catholics choose to do all sorts of things as penance for their own sins, to align more closely with God, and as penance for souls in Purgatory. Some of these things are indulgenced, and some are not. Many do choose to go in pilgrimage for these reasons.

There is also a vein of Catholic thought and practice that tends to think we aren't very good at knowing what is best, and so aren't very good at asking for the right things. Those inclined most strongly to this way of thinking tend to do things like simply naming a thing they want to pray about, and then asking Mary or another saint in Heaven to pray to God about it for them, on the basis that the saint will have a better idea of what specifically to ask for. This is relevant because there is a practice called the total consecration to Mary, in which someone basically offers everything they do, pray, and merit to Mary to distribute as she sees best: so, when these people do penance such as a pilgrimage, they are offering it all up to Mary so that it might be used either as penance for themself, or as penance for another such as the souls in Purgatory. So these people (and this is a niche thing, but more common among people who are more likely to go on pilgrimage) couldn't actually say whether their pilgrimage was offered for the Holy Souls in Purgatory.

The only things in Catholic teaching that come close to guaranteeing that a soul is released from Purgatory would be plenary indulgences, but since obtaining a plenary indulgence requires that you have absolutely no attachment to any sin whatsoever, no Catholic priest in line with Church teaching is going to tell someone that doing something will release a soul from Purgatory. Praying for the souls in Purgatory, and offering penance for them, is generally about more gradual, cumulative change. Sanctification, in the Catholic view, is a process, not a moment. 86.157.148.65 (talk) 15:03, 23 March 2014 (UTC)