Rise of The Spanish Empire 4

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THE RISE OF
THE SPANISH EMPIRE

IX
THE
IN
OLD WORLD AND
THE NEW
NEW YORK
THE MACMILLAN COMPANY

BOSTON CHICAGO DALLAS ATLANTA SAN FRANCISCO
MACMILLAN &
LONDON
BOMBAY CALCUTTA MELBOURNE
CO., Limited

OF CANADA,
Limited
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I .. First Page of an Original
UTTEN March 3, Letter, Written M.J 1575, by the Inquisitor-General (Cardinal Gaspar Quiroga) to Philip II, Respecting the Activities of THE MORISCOS IN ArAGON, WITH THE KlNG's HOLOGRAPH
Comments on the Margin. (B. M., Egerton MS. FOL. 1 cf. Gayangos, Catalogue, n, p. 228.)
;
1834,
Catholica
Md
He
visto est a carta y papeles

se entiende
y ya
muj' a priesa
en los despachos que se han de mewbrar l algo desosegado
llegado aqui essa carta y papeles de la Inquisicion d mandar ver de Aragon Por los quales podra V. lo que los Inqumdores sienten del desasosiego de los
Oy ha
conforme
lo
acordado.
moriscos de aquel Reyno. Y aunque podria ser que el papel que se hallo en Calatayud fuese fingido, no se
sin
prevenirlo.
Pero bien es myrar a todo y El mal es que

2
deuio fingir sin causa mayormente saliendose por cosa duda que tienen gran cantidad de polvora y vn
que
se
no pudiendose proveer
tanto^como convendria no
si es peor remover los humores destos moriscos y
numero grande de armas que no es sin algun fin tarn bien es mucho de considerar la deposicion que en
Y
la
darles
mas
priesa de la que
Inquisicion hizo Andres de Rosales y de Alagon Alcayde de Calanda y las palabras que dixo Damian de Granada morisco Cuerpo de Dios no fuera llegada la ora. Y si es
quiza ellos se tomarian.

lo
Pero
que agora me paresce es 3 que no ofreciendose es algun

ello
verdad que arman tantas fustas en Argel o galeotas, y que en la frontera de Jaca hay gente de cauallo de
Inconveniente en
diesedes
Vgonotes menester es que se piense en el remedio y se ponga con toda presteza Antes que nos veamos en mayor
trabajo y que se acabe de creer que estos son enemigos
esta tarde esa carta

al
y papeles [Conde de Chinchon].

.
. .
mortales y que nos han de hazer todo el mal que pudieren y que es justo escarmentar acordandonos de lo que passo
ble reading, but I means certain.
This seems the moat probaam by no
en Granada y que nunca fueran creidos los que algunos dias antes lo cert ificauan hasta que los moriscos saltaron
*Sic.
Sic.
en campana. Y si tienen minadas las ciudades y puestos barriles de polvora en las [minas y les dan fuego podra n
degollar los cristianos sin
deffenderse]
que
se
puedan juntar para
/-;
'
THE RISE OF THE SPANISH EMPIRE

IN
THE
OLD WORLD AND IN THE NEW
BY
ROGER BIGELOW MERRIMAN

GURNEY PROFESSOR OF HISTORY AND POLITICAL SCIENCE IN HARVARD UNIVERSITY, CORRESPONDIENTE DE LA ACADEMIA DE LA HISTORIA
VOLUME IV PHILIP THE PRUDENT
NEW YORK
1934
;<îb
COPYRIGHT, 1934,
By
All rights reserved
no
part of this book
may
be
reproduced in any form without permission in writing from the publisher, except by a reviewer who wishes
to quote brief passages in connection with a review
written for inclusion in magazine or newspaper.
Set
up
and
printed.
Published
August,
rovi
DP
v.z,
PlIMTfr. IN THF TUTTED STATES 07 AUR1'
PREFACE TO VOLUME IV
composition of this final volume of my "Rise of the Spanish Empire" has been spread over a period of nine years, but I can and has suffered from constant interruptions
;
The
truthfully aB,y
it
that I have spent

its
much more time and
labor on
predecessors, and that it is based to a I far greater extent than were they, on manuscript sources. some day, to be permitted to fortify its conclusions by hope, the publication of a number of documents, which I have
than on any of
twenty years in the archives of Spain, France, and England, and prepared for the press.
collected during the past
The
possibilities of
new
discoveries in this field are

it is
still
infinite,
and
it is
as inexplicable as
unfortunate that more
English and American scholars are not tempted to explore
them.
I trust that
the appearance, during the last five

.
years, of four different lives of Philip II (cf infra, p. 75)

in rather lighter
vein
all
will
not deter prospective readers
from the perusal of the somewhat solider pages which follow. The program which I set myself to carry out when I began more than twenty years ago to write this book, committed
me
of necessity to painstaking analysis of
many
topics not
in themselves
and I feel strongly that at the moment better service can be rendered, not only to scholars
dramatic
;
but also to the general reading public, by careful investigation of the period as a whole, than by merely concentrating
on the picturesque. A grant from the Committee on Research in the Social Sciences in Harvard University has greatly facilitated the
VI
PREFACE TO VOLUME
IV
final stages of
the preparation of this volume. hearty thanks are also due for wise advice and criticism from many
My
friends and colleagues both here

of all those
and
in
Europe.
who have
I
assisted
me
are too
The names numerous to men-
would acknowledge my very special obligations to Professor Henri Hauser of the University of Paris, bo Sefior Antonio Ballesteros of the Universidad Central in Madrid, to Professor Conyers Road of the University of
tion here, but
Pennsylvania, to the Reverend Robert H. Lord of St. John's Seminary, Brighton, to Professor Earl J. Hamilton of Duke
University, to Professor K.
Professors
d.
Salmon of Amherst, and to U. M. Ford and Chandler H. Post, and to

1).
Messrs. John
Llorens of
Harvard. Mr.
M.
Potter,
Robert
S.
ChamberlaiD and
J.
George W. Robinsoo has gone

and
d<
over
my
manuscript again and again with the most a>siduous

serves
care, at the various stages of its preparation,
a large share of the credit tor Buch accuracy as it may be found to possess. He has also prepared the genealogical table of the House of Mendoza at the end of hi- vol nine, and
t
am and compiled the table of contents and the in<l< \ to the trustees of the William V. Milton Fund in grateful
.
Harvard University
tn avail
for a grant
which made
it
possible for
me
myself of his Bervici
of
My work ha- benefited throughout from the criticism! the members of my immediate family, and the constant
of
encouragement
enabled
my
wife has been the inspirat ion w

it
.
..h ha
me
to
complete
R. B.
Cambrnlirf, Miiwnrhua
M.
iv,
CONTENTS
BOOK
VII
THE SPANISH EMPIRE AT ITS GREATEST TERRITORIAL EXTENT

CHAPTER XXXI
PAGES
A Spanish Sovereign, Champion of the Church ^The European situation early in 1556
L^War with Paul IV and Henry
L-Peace with the Pope
3-77
4 6 9 10
....
II
(April, 1559)
.
Battle of St, Quentin (August 10, 1557)
Treaty of Cateau-Cambresis
12 16
17 19
Philip returns to Spain Auto-da-fe at Valladolid (October 8, 1559)

Philip's ancestry
[is
and education
physical traits and habits Government by pen and ink

Philip's love of justice Simplicity of the royal court
20
23
.
tefusal to delegate to subordinates
25 27
and household
28 30
31
The royal
Family
recreations
life
The Infante Don Carlos

His imprisonment and death Question of Philip's culpability
Parallel
.
34 37 38
between Philip and Louis
XIV
and painting
building of the Escorial 'Decoration of the interior sculpture

;
The
40 42 44
vii
VI 11
CONTENTS
paoes
The
library Relics of the saints
......
Europe
;
46 47
49 50 52
53
y- Philip
and the Counter-Reformation Santa Teresa of Avila

religious conflict in
in the
The
church Council of Trent of the Counter-Reformation -^Philip champion Relations between Spain and the papacy Pius V the Monorchia Sicula
Reforms
Roman
....
.
55 57 60
61
Gregory XIII Jesuits and Dominicans relations with France Sixtus V and Clement VIII and the conclaves Philip
;
;
64
f
66'
Note on the General Authorities on the Reign

II
of Philip
Bibliographical
Note
to
Chapter
XXXI
69 76
CHAPTER XXXII
The Last of the Crusades
f-
Protestantism in Spain Autos-da-fe at Valladolid
The Alumbrados or Illuminati J The Spanish Inquisition The Moriscos

Reenactmenl
Political functions of the Inquisition
Fluctuating policies
..... ....
rebels
.1
78-160 78 79 80 81 82
83
of the Edict of 1526
84 86
ss
89
Diacontenl of the Morisoos of Granada

Rising at Christmas, 1568
d of
Mondejar againsi the Granadan
Outrages of the soldiery Don John of Austria in command Proclamation of war of fire and blood
96 91
92
93 94
The revolt stamped ou1 1571 The Morisoos deported from Granada
)
[pulsion of the MorJ
International asp<
from sp:iin (1009) the revolt
95 96
97
CONTENTS
Relations with the infidel
IX
PAGES
99
;
Ravages
j
of the infidel corsairs
Dragut
100
101
A/Expedition against Tripoli (1560)
Return to Gerba Attack by the Turks

Christian disaster
:
....
Oran
against
103 104
its effects
105 108
109
the
Pefton
Spanish
fleet lost at
fail
La Herradura
de
Velez
The Turks
before
Spanish expeditions
(1563-64)
111
to attack
The Turks prepare
Arrival of the Turkish
Malta armament (May 18 1565)

.
114 115 116

119
121 121
Desperate character of the siege Toledo and Bazan bring a relieving force
Flight of the Turks Effects on Spain \/
;
....
Malta delivered
. :
Death
Pius
The
Pius
Suleiman the Magnificent (1566) plans the creation of a Holy League Turks attack Cyprus
of
123 123
125 126
asks Philip's support Formation of the Holy League
Spain Venice, and the

128
131
Pope Terms of the League
Don John
League
of Austria in
Size of the fleet
.... ....
Turks
command
of the fleet of the
133 135 136

.
It sets forth to seek the
The Turkish fleet in the Gulf of Lepanto The fleets meet outside the harbor of Lepanto
Preparations for battle
137 138
....
7,
.
The
Lepanto (October Great victory of the Christians

Rejoicings in Italy
battle of
1571)
139,, 14lA
144 144 146 148
and Spain
The
fruits of the victory wasted Dissolution of the League Venice signs peace with the
;
Porte
CONTENTS
Don John occupies Tunis Aluch Ali recovers Tunis and takes La Goletta
Hostilities languish
Negotiations for peace
Truce with the Porte

\)
Consequences of the termination

Bibliographical Note
.... .... .... ....

.
150
151
152
153
154 154
of the conflict
157
CHAPTER XXXIII
A M ERICA AND THE PHILIPPINES
Passing of the heroic age Florida
*"
161-244
161
......
162
163 164
French competition Expedition of Tristan de Luna (1559) First French expedition led by Jean Ribaut (1562) Philip sends Menendez against the French Ribaut's second expedition (1565) Menendez, victorious, massacres the French Prot
of
Dread
166
169
170
171
estants
Reception of the news
Approval of Philip Vengeance of Dominique de Gourgues

Chile
....... ......
in
Europe
173 175 177
and the Araucanian war

of Drake, Cavendish,
178
Ravages
and Hawkins
179
180
181
Frequent changes of governor Halting progress of the Araucanian war

Exploration of the Strait of Magellan
Mendafia
Discovery
in
the Pacific
of the archipelago
La Plata and the refounding <f Buenos Aires Asuncion; Ortis de Vergara Nufrio de Ch Qd the 'exodus to Peru' The city ,f I.:i Plata Sucre and the audiencia of
(
.... ....
<f
184
184
1
Juan Fernandez
v.
186
186
188
L8Q
Chare
is
.....
Juan de Garay
de Z
191
CONTENTS
Death
of Ortiz de Zarate (1576)
XI
PAGES
194
.
Garay refounds Buenos Aires Jesuit missions in Paraguay Tucuman and Mendoza
9 The
administration of the Indies
Philip
makes few innovations

of the Indies
The Council
.... .... .....

(1580)
195
198
199
209200 200 202
Presidents of the Council
.....
admitted
at Seville
to
Non-Castilian
(1596)
Spaniards
the
Indies
The Casa de Contratacion

Presidents of the Casa
The
treasurer's department Revenues from the New World

of
....
Castile
203 204 205 206 207

209
211
System
leons
convoyed
fleets
the Flota and the Gal-
Viceregal administration
Viceroys of
New
.
Spain and
.
New
212
Francisco Alvarez de Toledo, viceroy of

(1569-81) Administrative reforms
New
Castile
213 214
Protection of the Indians
215
Execution of Tupac
Amaru
Reform
'
of the clergy
; '
216 216 217 218 219 221 224 225 227 228 229 230
231
vThe Inquisition autos-da-fe The Peruvian Solon

The
Philip dismisses him without warning or reward residencia and visita
.....
the Indians
.
Progress of civilization
among
Early exploration of the Philippines Expedition despatched under Legazpi (1564) Headquarters established at Cebii Repulse of a Portuguese attack (1568) Conquest of Luzon Occupation of Manila Guido de Lavezares succeeds Legazpi (1572)
......
232
Xll
CONTENTS
tAoma
Defeat of Li-Ma-Hong; Juan de Salcedo Later governors
233
The audiencia
of
Manila
Relations with the neighboring powers Conversion of the natives
234 235 236

238 240
Economic prosperity
....
.
242
CHAPTER XXXI V
Spain
'
in
Western Europe, 1559-78

of
haracter
period
The Burgundian The
Tranche Comte*
lands
Italian dependencies as
........ ...... ........

Philip's
....
during
this
245 321
foreign
policy
245
246
territories:
the
Netherlands and
for the Nether-
models
247
249
250'
The Council
Margaret of Parma regent of the Netherlands of State and the Consulta; Granvelle
.
;
Persecution of the Protestants
the
new
bishop]
.
252 253 255
Petition of the 'Beggars' (April 5, 1566) The Duke of Alva sent to the Netherlands
1567
t',7
.
Relations between Spain and France, 1559

Philip's
system
of H
of political
espionage
Peril of s Franco-Scottish alliance
Anthony
Blaise de
mrhon Monlue
The interview of Bayonne June The massacrcc in Florida

Peyrol de Monluc
Policy of Catharine
Philip
..... ...... .....

it
July
1,
1566
Madeira 1666) de Medici; her perplexities

of England
255 256 257 259 260 262 265 266

268
and Elisabeth
to
270
273
bind Elisabeth to the house of Baps-
burg
internal
relations
England
.......
between the Netherlands and

274
CONTENTS
Activities of the English sea-rovers The Inquisition as a weapon against English sailors Sir John Hawkins and the Spanish ships at Plymouth
.
Xlll
PAGES
276
278 279 280 281 282 284 285
vj
The Duke
Alva as governor of the Netherlands the Council of Blood Resistance organized under William of Orange Alva seeks to Hispanicize the government His ruinous fiscal policy the alcabala Paralysis of business and commerce
of
His severities
286^"^
286 288
290 292 293
S
I
Philip fails to appreciate the danger from
England
The Wars
Xw
France Tension between Spain and England

of Religion in
Plots against Elizabeth Philip's hesitations
d Successes of the Dutch rebels The massacre of St. Bartholomew (August Alva turns upon the rebels his recall
;
294
24, 1572)
296 299
301 304 305
Luis de Requesens governor-general
The relief of Leyden (October 3, 1574) Death of Requesens (March 5, 1576)

Mutiny of the Spanish soldiers at The Spanish Fury at Antwerp The Pacification of Ghent
'
'
Brussels
Don John
of Austria succeeds
Requesens
1,
The Perpetual Edict (1577) Death of Don John (October
1578)
306 307 307 307 311 313

313 314 315 317 319
Y Possibility
^
of foreign intervention
.
Elizabeth and the rebels
The Duke
of
Anjou and the
rebels
Summary
Europe
t5
L *i
progress of dissatisfaction and revolt in 1578; the Counter-Reformation; Portu

;
........
Note
Bibliographical
320
XIV
CONTENTS
CHAPTEB XXXV
PAGE*
The \\\k\ati<>\ o Portugal

I
defensive policy of Philip to 1578

;
Bis ministers
Ruy G6mei da
<!<
Antonio Perea Murder of Juan

Arrest
<>f
Peres
...... ......
Silva
.
Else
>vedo
Philip adopts a
I
more aggressive attitude
322-406 322 322 324 325 328 329

330 333
;i
trdinal Granvelle
summoned
to
Spain
expansion of the Portuguese Empire and the Far East \ mm da Gama and Affonso de Albuquerque Effect on Portugal of her expansion overseas
Portugal
;
Africa, India,
336
King Sebastian (1557-78)

Philip watches Portugal
.... ....
.
339 339
340 342 344
Sebastian's
campaign
in
Morocco
;
B 'If of Alcasar-el-Kebir death of Sebastian Cardinal Henry becomes king of Portugal

Philip- candidacy for the succession His rivals
rdinal
345 346 346

351
Henry favors
Philip
th of tho king-cardinal '.January 31, l",s|)
Thi-
Preparations for the invasion of Portugal uk- of Alva mad' commander-in-chief

.
1
354 355
d attempts d an appeal to arms the frontier; hi- first victories

'
on Lisbon
....
>ldiery
356 360 362

368 365 366
.168
tude of the foreign powers he bridge of .Meant<
'ondui-t of the
Bpa
lo
Philip in Pnvil.
il
the Cortes of
l>y
Thomar
371
inted
Philip
372
376
CONTENTS
Acceptance of Philip by the Portuguese colonies India and the Far East under his rule
XV
PAGES
379 380 384 387 390

393 397 397 398 399 400 403
Wealth
of Brazil
its
government
Its history
during Philip's reign
Most
of the Azores declare for
Naval
battle of the Azores
Antonio of Crato Santa Cruz victorious
(1582)
Santa Cruz's second expedition (1583) Death of the Duke of Alva (December
Philip returns to Spain
11, 1583)
Extent of
his
dominions
of decline
The beginning
.....
VIII
BOOK
THE TURN OF THE TIDE

CHAPTER XXXVI
The Government of Spain under
The underlying
J
Philip II
principles
unchanged
hilip supervises
every phase of the administration
The conciliar system The Council of State The Council of Castile,
....
or
.
409-489 409 411

412 412 413 416 418 419 420 421
422 425
Royal Council
Presidents of the Council of Castile
The Cdmara de Castillo, The Council of Italy The Council of Aragon The Council of the Orders
.
The Cortes
of Castile
Reassertion of ancient rights and privileges
XVI
CONTENTS
PAOia
\J\
Attitude towards foreign affairs Views of the Cortes on economics and finance
'
Concern
of the procur adores for coast defence
The procuradores on manners and customs The Cortes of the realms of the crown of Aragon
The royal exchequer The Contaduria Mayor and the Council
9eJe of offices
of
Finance
Increase of duties
and
The encabezami<
(1575)
rtto
Decree of suspension of payments on state debts
The medio general (1577) The milloties anticipation

j
.... ...... .....

taxes
of taxes
.
Second decree
of suspension (1590)
General economic conditions in Spain
The population Agriculture and pastur Industry and COmmerOE
.... .....
.
Establishment of a public postal service

Justice
mil crime
Law
1
codes;
--,69)
publication of the
leva
liecopilaciun
The Council
tribunal
<
of Castile remains the
supreme
judicial
ihancillerias and Audiencias Administration of justice in the municipalities

,-,,.
The The n
...
itra
sicU
ncia
of the Italian
The administration
d
dependencief
.
BUS
m yr~''
from papal encroachments Naples; n secular ami ecclesiastica] Milan; conflicts

i
jur
......
Military
affaii
CONTENTS
High reputation of the Spanish infantry The Spanish navy
XVll
PAGES
.
476 477 478 479 480 480 481 482 484 485 486
v Spanish diplomacy
employment
of Castilians
t7~ Power of the Roman Catholic church The Spanish Inquisition
....
Case of Archbishop Carranza Influence of the church in education and culture History, theology, and law Poetry and imaginative prose Architecture, sculpture, and painting Music
....
. .
.
488
CHAPTER XXXVII
The Invincible Armada
in Philip's policy
between 1578 and 1580 Change Philip determines upon more vigorous action in the Netherlands Alexander of Parma governor-general (1578-92)
. .
490-565 490
490
491 491
Character of Parma The Union of Arras (1579) The Union of Utrecht (1579)
....
;
493
the Netherlands di
vided into two hostile groups Parma's first triumphs capture Tournai
;
494
of Maestricht
and
495 496
499 499 50O501 501 502
503
Relations with France, 1578-81
the
Duke
of
Anjou
Relations with England, 1578-82 Bernardino de Mendoza ambassador at London

f-l
of Spain in England Depredations of Sir Francis Drake Antonio of Portugal seeks English aid against Philip
Growing unpopularity
Visit of the
Duke
of
Anjou
to
England (1581-82)
.
Philip driven to a more aggressive policy He offers a price for the assassination of Orange
(1580)
504
XV11I
CONTENTS
PAUEH
Philip deposed
as sovereign
by the provinces of the

504 505 506
Union of Utrecht Mo>i of the rebel provinces proclaim Anjou as sovereign
.........
. .
.
Attempts to assassinate Wilhîm of Orange Plots for the murder of Queen Elizabeth
506
507
Weakness and incompetence
<>f
the
The French Fury

\
Antwerp (1583) Departure and death of Anjou

dilation of William of
at
... .....
of
Duke
.
Anjou
Orange (1584)
508 508 509
Military operations of Alexander of Parma He proceeds by starvation and blockade

<
509 510 511 512 514 515 518 519 520

521
lapture of Ypres, Bruges,

of the reign
Parma captures Antwerp (1585)

Apogee
.... .......
Ghent, and Brussels
.
Project of an attack on England Santa Cnil draws up a plan of eampai;

ible
....
">>
.
preparations for a great enterprise

1
Death of Cardinal Granvelle (September 21, Aid promised by Pope Sixtus V. State of affairs in England cecution of Mary queen of Scots Treaty between Philip and the Pope
. .
36
.
..... ....
....
522
524
525
525 528
531
The Armada to ad in cooperation with Parma's army The 'uke of Medina Sidonia made commander of the Armada rengtb of the Armada '-h The Armada pu The Armada lea orunna (July 22, L588
.
I
........ ......
I
533
535
539 542
544
Pint oontacl with the English

\<
fleet
(July 31)
tion off the tsle of
Wight
.
. .
Calais
Ltle
The
I
of Qravelines (August 8) Armada Beet to the north

".-
gel
back
to
Spain
.... .....
547
540
551
CONTENTS
Continuance of the war with England, 1589-98
English expedition against Lisbon (1589) The war in the Atlantic and Caribbean
XIX
553 553
556 559
561
The sack of Cadiz (1596) The Armadas of 1596 and 1597

.
Bibliographical
Note
....
. .
)
564
CHAPTER XXXVIII
Antonio Perez and the Liberties of Aragon Conditions in the kingdom of Aragon The county of Ribagorza
Cortes of
.....
.
(1585) Philip visits Aragon into the royal domain Ribagorza incorporated Philip sends the Marquis of Almenara to Aragon
;
Monzon
566-606 567 569 570 572 572

573
Antonio Perez in captivity (1579) Attempts to make him confess the murder of Esco vedo
He
is
put to the torture (1590)
....
Aragon
.
575
576 577
His escape from prison and
flight to
Perez under the protection of the Justicia
He
is
lodged in the cdrcel de
los
manifestados
His revelations His removal to the prison of the Inquisition Ponular rising Perez returned to the cdrcel de
;
580 580 581 582

los
manifestados
.......
wounded by the
rioters
.
583 584
Almenara
fatally
Philip prepares to enforce his will Second attempt to remove Perez
he escapes
The royal forces cross the frontier Collapse of resistance Vengeance of the king
Flight of Perez to
.....
Beam
585 587 588 590 591 592

593
Question of the revision of the constitution Meeting of the Cortes of Aragon at Monzon (1592)
Constitutional changes
.....
595 597
XX
>XTENTS
PAGES
Philip attempts to gel Peres assassinated Perez in the service of Franco and Kngland
.
His Relaciones
]\\< last
......
;
yean and death
fate of his family
....
599 600 601 603
605
CHAPTER XXXIX
Spain, Francs,
(
and the Netherlands, 1584-98

.
policy in France after 1584 Bernardino de Mendoza ambassador there (15S5)
!hange
in Philip's
Philip and the Guises
The States-General at
Henry
III
Blois (1688)
Assassination of the Guises

assassination of
Difficulties of
....
. .
and Henry of Navarre
Henry
in
III (July 31, 1589)
607-670 607 609 610 613 613 615 616

616 617
Parma
the Netherlands
Elizabeth sends aid to the United Provinces (l.V
The war in Cologne Gebhard Truchsess Parma and the expedition against England
;
618
til!)
Philip's hesitations after the

ivity of
;
murder
of
Henn
III
624
627 628
Henry IV he drives Mayenne into decides to intervene in Prance Philip Parma invades France and relieves Paris
.
630
631
Spanish armies
throne
Languedoc and Brittany makes the Infanta his candidate for the French Philip
in
........
in
633
Parma again
Th<
1593
France
he relieves RoueD
.it
635
leneral
meet
the Louvre (January 26, *

.
Henry IV turns
Satholic
......
to the Estat<
637 639
tiiu
till
The Spaniards make vain proposals

Henry
I
V enters Paris
t
;
he pope recognises Henry he Spanish garrison depart

alli<
.
I\'
.
642
646 647
The United Provinces and their cesses of Maunee of Nassau
CONTENTS
vPhilip distrusts
XXI
PAGES
Parma and
decides to recall
2-3, 1592)
him
Death
of
Parma (December
of Fuentes Maurice recaptures Gertruydenberg (1593) The Spaniards expelled from the North (1594) Successes of Fuentes on the French frontier
The Count
.....
.
648 650
651 652 653 654
Victories of
JLOV/O/
Henry IV
;
Fontaine-Francaise (June 5
654 655 657 657 658 659

661
-Archduke Albert governor-general
of the
Netherlands
Capture of Calais (April, 1596) Treaty between Elizabeth and Henry IV (May 24) Victory of Maurice at Turnhout (January, 1597)
The The
treaty of Vervins (May 2, 1598) settlement in the Netherlands Albert and Isa
;
bella
health of Philip to the Escorial (June 30, 1598) instructions to his son Philip's last illness
Ill
664 665 666 668

669
Removal
Death
of Philip
(September
13, 1598)
Bibliographical
Note
CHAPTER XL
Final Reflections
671-680 671 Complexity 671 Composition and development of the Spanish Empire Dominance throughout of the separatistic trend 673 Over-extension of the Spanish Empire 674 Castile unprepared for its leadership 674 Position of the Indies in the Empire 675 676 Antiquated principles and ideals The annexation of Portugal the parting of the ways 677 677 Disappearance of the race of empire builders Immediate and specific causes of decline 678 Parallel with the British Empire 679
of historical causation
.
GENERAL INDEX
681-780
FACSIMILE,
MAPS,
AND GENEALOGICAL
TABLES
FACSIMILE
i
the Inquisitor-Gknkkal to Philip
II
Frontispiece
MAPS
PAGE
i
bntral Portugal
in
1.">no
si
360
Azores ok Wkstlkn Islands
390
494
The Netherlands, 1579-9S
TABLES
Tiii.
House
Hoi be
oi
oi
Hapsbubg
i\
mi. Sixteenth
<
itubt
680
681
Thi
M endoza
OQJ
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
For Volume IV
See the Lists of Abbreviations for Volumes
pp. xxvi-xxviii)
I
and
III (Vol. Ill, pp. xxiii-xxiv),
and II (Vol. and add:
I,
Adas
de las Cortes
Adas
de las Cortes de Castilla publicadas por

los
acuerdo del Congreso de Madrid, 1877-91.

C. de B.
Diputados, i-xvii.
...
Jeronimo Castillo de Bovadilla.
Politica para
Corregidores y Senores de Vassallos. 2 vols. lona, 1616.
Barce-
C. de C.
...
.
Luis Cabrera de Cordoba,
Rey de Espana.
C. S. P., Foreign
Madrid, 1876-77.
Felipe Segundo, 4 vols.
CalPublic Record Office. Great Britain. endar of State Papers, Foreign Series. Reign
of ed. W. B. Turnbull. London, Reign of Elizabeth, edd. Joseph Stevenson and others. London, 1863-
Mary,
1861.
21
vols., covering published to 1931.
the
period
to
1588,
Castries
....
Les sources inedites de Vhistoire du Maroc de 1530 a 184-5. Edited by Henry de Castries,
Dynasfie Saadienne, 15301905-26. Archives et biblio1660. Paris, theques de France, 3 vols, and index. Do.
Premiere
serie
:
des Pays-Bas, 6 vols.

(to 1552).
Do. d'Espagne,
i, ii
i,
Do. dAngleterre,
(to 1625).
Correspondance de Philippe II
.
Correspondance de Philippe II sur les affaires Edited by L. P. des Pays-Bas (1558-77).
Gachard.
Brussels, 1848-79.
5 vols.
XX1U
XXIV
LIST OF
Henri
ABBREVIATIONS
Forneron.
1881-82.
Histoire
4 vols.
moron
de
Philippe
II.
Paris,
Froudo
J.
A. Froude.
History of England from the

to
FaU
Ernest
les
of
Wolsey
the
Death of Elizabeth.
London, 1856-70.
Laviase
.
12 vols.
de France
Revolution.
Lavisse.
origines
Histoire
la
depuis
Paris,
is
jusqud
1900-11.
9 vols.
et covered by torn, L'Edit de Nantes (1559-1598)," la Ligue
The age of Philip II vi, pt. 1, "La Krforme

(Paris, 1911).
by
Pastor
J.
H. Mariojol
Ludwig, Freiherr von Pastor. The History of the Popes from the Close of the Middle Ages. English translation edited by R. F. Kerr. Vols, xiv-xxiv (London, 1924-33) deal with
the period 1555-1605.
IVenne
Henri Pirenne.
i-vii.
Histoire de
Belgique.
Vols,
Brussels, 1900 32.
B.
I.
Julian Suarez Inelan.
Querra
/<(i>in<l<>
<ic
Anerion en
Portugal duranU Madrid, 1897-98.
<l
de Felipe II.
2 vols.
BOOK
VII
THE SPANISH EMPIRE AT ITS GREATEST TERRITORIAL EXTENT
CHAPTER XXXI
A SPANISH SOVEREIGN, CHAMPION OF THE CHURCH
The
to
transition in Spanish
history from
Charles
to K
4
Philip II forms the antithesis to that from the Catholic Kings
1516 the destinies of the Spanish Empire had passed from native to alien hands Spanish interests had been suddenly subordinated to those of thethe Emperor.
In
house of Hapsburg.
plete
;
a process
Forty years later the reaction is comwhose beginnings we have already noted in
;
the Emperor's closing years has now attained its final stage the outlook of the Spanish monarchy is once more thor-
oughly Hispanicized. The second of these transitions was more gradual than the first, but when it was completed it
was much more permanent and far-reaching. Philip the Prudent will go down in history, both within the Iberian peninsula and without it, as the typical Spanish sovereign
of
all
time.
There can be no doubt that the heart's desire of the new king, when on January 16, 1556, the huge burden of governing the Spanish
shoulders, was
to Spain.
Empire had
first
at last fully devolved

his
upon
his
to
make peace with
The
enemies and get home sixteen years of his life had been spent
and had satisfied him of its wholly immeasurable superiority to every other part of the world. His many disagreeable experiences during the ensuing
in the Iberian peninsula,
Wanderjahre had but served to emphasize this conviction, and to implant in him a deep aversion to everything north
4
of the Pyrenees.
A SPANISH SOVEREIGN
His political education, the precepts and example of his imperial father, were hut added arguments in Charles had preached support "t tin- same conclusion,
peace and defensives

later years.
him with increasing fervor

also publicly confessed
at
in his
He had
the
last,
by
his
his abdication
and the division
of his inheritance, that
had stood tor an unrealizable ideal, that the greal jk be had undertaken entailed an impossible amount of travelling, and that a single sovereign could not continue to rule both the northern and the southern halves of the Haoslife
own
burg inheritance. And if it had been impossible t< bine them under the Emperor, it was certainly even more -o now. because, to the vast number of preexistent incompatibilities,
there
had
recently
been
BUperadded that
of
religion. 3, L555, only twenty-two days before Charles's abdication of the rule of the Low Counl ries, there
On October
was signed the peace

cism
in
of
Augsburg, giving Lutheran ism, under

Heresy,
in
certain restrictions, legal right to coexistence with Catholi-
the Empire.
other words, had at last
been formally recognized, in a fashion which Philip could neither tolerate nor comprehend. Unswerving zeal for unity of the faith was the Lesson from his Spanish education that
he had taken mOSl deeply to heart it mUSl have -reined to him almost the result of divine intervention that he
;
should have been relieved of the responsibility of ruling
rmana
at
the very
moment
of their
adoption of
point
of
modus
to
vivendi so abhorrent to him.
From every
he
view
personal, political, and religious urn to his ii.it ive land.

\'
first
deeply
that
longed
th<
emed good prospect

,
he would soon
be
abi'
atisfy this deein
\n honorable peace with his
ture,
and that wa<
he indispensable preliminary to his deparhi rni-med him, apparently at least by the

,
THE EUROPEAN SITUATION IN
1556
truce of Vaucelles, on February 5, 155^ just twenty days after he had become the official ruler of Spain and of the
Spanish dominions. In the three other possible centres of disturbance for him, outside the Iberian peninsula, the
situation, during the
first
half of this
not entirely satisfactory, In England there was little open indication of disloyalty to the Spanish alliance. The conspiracy of Sir Henry Dudley
same year, 1556, while might well have been far worse.
was
easily detected
and
foiled,
and the government seemed
principally occupied with the burning of the Protestant martyrs. In the Low Countries, destined to become a few
years later the worst sore spot of
all,
the discontent for the
time being was also latent.
Philip had been amply warned
against the dangers of any rapid Hispanicization of the administration there. For the present he seemed chiefly on preserving intact all the measures and policies of bent
his beloved father,
I
j
and
his
appointment to the governor-
generalship of Emanuel Philibert of Savoy, though really dictated by considerations of foreign policy and the military
ability of the nominee,
was taken by the Netherlanders

their
liberties.
;
as a
pledge of respect
for
In Italy, indeed,
Paul IV had virtually declared war but he seemed at least until July to be quite incapable of waging it. The truce of Vaucelles had deprived him of French support the
though they dared not openly oppose, silently 2 and meantime the Duke_of Alva, now viceroy disapproved of Naples, was getting his tercios into an admirable state of
cardinals,
;
In midsummer, 1556, it really looked as if Philip would soon get home to his beloved Spain indeed, there
readiness.
;
seemed an even chance that he would get home without a

fight.
1
Pirenne,
there.
and
iii, pp. 365 f., and notes Cf. also Forneron, i, pp. 86 f., Lucien Romier, Les origines poli-
tiques des Guerres de Religion,
ii,
pp.
179
2
f.
Pastor, xiv, pp. 114-118.
A SPANISH
SOVEREIGN
had entirely changed.
But
six
months
later the situation
So complicated were the cross currents, so self-contradictory the combinations Of international politics, during these critical years when Charles was giving way to Philip, that it
was impossible
to foretell
from day to day whether
it
was
The decision was to be friendship or enmity, peace or war. of the powers likely to remain with the most strong-minded
1556 there can be no question thai that For the distinction belonged to the octogenarian pontiff.
concerned, and
in
hatred of the house of Hapsburg took the precedence of his devotion to the church; blind to disastrous effeel on Catholicism, not only in the Hapsburg lands on the continent, bui also in England, of a war be-
moment,
at
least, his
the king of Spain, he offered such in the sumprovocation to the representatives of his enemy Uva in September the Duk< mer months of 1556 that
tween the see of
Rome and
invaded the Patrimohium Petri from Naples with an army The papal levies were quite unable to of 12,000 men. USi him. Though lie waged war with the inmost scru1
befitted a Spaniard who was attacking the puloUSl State- of the Church, his advance on Rome was methodical
ami rapid, and the 18th of November saw the Spaniards kblished in Ostia, where their leader offered an armistice But the lion-hearted Paul was ttol ye1 preto the Pope. that he pared t<. surrender; he still cherished the hope
would be rescued
thing. in fact,
Pastor, xiv, pp When Philip
at
the
lasl
moment by Fram
II
ery-
depended on whether or not Henry

130
seal
i
could
it
should
!-
Alvs against him that the sole frail ro<l of cy was that the means of causing the
l
most rigoroui means t>> foroe him i<> make himself worthy of tin- title <>f HoUneM which i- given him by the faithful." Duque ds Berwick y ds
Alba,
CotUrifrt
tudie
</<-
in
dmit him to his g

the
pontiff,
t
mdths
I
do not
r
ToUdo,
Don Fernando Alvarei d* III Duaut il< Alba (Madrid,

160.
<
win
(l,rit.
:.
Paul iv us
I
of
but
of the
1919), pp. 67, 70f. 'Pastor, xiv. pp. 147
tholic
King, nn<l
ahull
employ the
WAR WITH FRANCE

be induced to break the truce of Vaucelles.
Such a breach had seemed inevitable to the Argus-eyed Simon Renard in London as early as May, 1556, only three months after the truce had been signed, and the events of the following
autumn proved the accuracy

of Carlo Caraffa
of his foresight.
The urgency
and of the cardinal of Lorraine prevailed over the more cautious policy of Anne de Montmorency. In the end of December the Duke of Guise was permitted to
cross the Alps with an
of the
;
army
of 13,000
men
to go to the rescue
in the first week of January the Admiral Pope de Coligny made an ineffectual attempt to surprise Gaspard Douai. A state of war between France and the Hapsburgs had existed in fact, both in the Low Countries and in Italy, for more than a month before Henry II actually declared it,
on the
last
day
of
1 January, 1557.
his failure to preserve entered the ensuing struggle with the better peace, Philip he could courage because it had not been of his seeking
Though deeply discouraged by
honestly say that he was waging a defensive war of the type which his father had approved. Moreover the fact that he
had not been the aggressor did not prevent him from acting himself proverbially invigorously when the crisis came
;
capable of taking the initiative, he at least on this occasion permitted his representatives to seize it for him. During
the
flict
nine months of the year 1557 the course of the conwas wholly favorable to Spain. There was throughout the closest interdependence between
first
the events in both theatres of the war, widely separated though they were. The Spaniards planned to force the
fighting on the northeastern frontier of France, so as to
win
a decisive victory there before the

1
Duke
of
Guise could get

II,
Romier,
ii,
Francois II,
et
Francis Decrue, p. 178 Charles IX, pp. 186-197.

;
Anne de Montmorency sous Henri
SPANIsIl
SOVEREIGN
was
to rest
back from Italy

defensive
in
the French strategy
on the
Artois and Picardy in order to enable Guise not

1
only to rescue the Pope, Imt also to rehabilitate all possible

anti-Spanish combinations among the lesser Italian states. The fact thai the French leader was given so many different things to do was probably the chief reason for his initial ill
success
;
it
led
to Bharp differences of opinion
among
the
leaders of the Franco-papal force-, and prevented them from When the Duke finally concentrating in any one direction.
reached
Rome (March
2,
1557), he found the pontiff most
anxious
to resume the offensive against the Spaniards. Paul had been greatly encouraged by the recent recapture of )>i ia through the efforts of Ins generalissimo, Piet ro St rozzi
;
he had visions of driving "this mixture of .lews, Marrani, and Lutherans" such was Ins characterization of Alva's
army
well.
not only out
Naples but out of the rest of Italy as But his French and Italian allies did not share his
of
In May the French king aggressiveness. to turn his attention to Lombardy and
commanded Guise
J
two months
Church.
r
later
was he persuaded
not Tuscany countermand to

in
till
his
order, and allow the
army
to
remain
the States of the
then, just as everything was it last in readihe Kike of Alva, there a vigorous offensive againsl
I
1
And
arrived the .-tunning news of the greal defeaj which the Qch had sustained at St. Quentin '" 'be North, followed
the next day by an urgent

Giiise
me
tie-
and
In-
troops
for
from Henry II recalling defence of Paris. This, of
course, meanl the ruin

;
hopes of chastising the the only quesl ion now was whet her he could save aiards tne from a repetition of the greal Back which had so horof
Paul'.-
r.iied all
Europe
o
jus!
thirty year- before.

not
Put fortunately
the example
the
Duke
\!va was
minded
ii,
to follow
Etomier,
p. 178.
THE TWO THEATRES OF WAR

of the leaders of the imperial armies in 1527.
self far
He was him-
his
too scrupulous a Catholic. He knew, moreover, that master wanted peace, and the papal defences were not On August 25, he advanced to the outentirely negligible.
skirts of
Rome
as
if
to demonstrate the fact that the

just
was
in his
own hands, and
two weeks
later the
game Pope
admitted it, by sending out to him three cardinals to discuss terms of peace. On September 12, a treaty was arranged, whereby Alva was to make solemn submission to the Holy
See in the
name
of his sovereign, to restore to the
Patrimoin
nium
Petri
all cities
and
territories
which he had captured
the preceding months, and to receive in return the Pope's forgiveness and his promise thenceforth to remain neutral
war between Spain and France. The moderation of the Spanish leader had been well rewarded. He had restored the status quo ante bellum in Italy, which was all that Philip could have asked for. Henceforth Paul IV was to devote
in the
himself exclusively to his spiritual duties, and ceased to breed trouble for Spain and the house of Hapsburg. 1
North the struggle had begun more sucIn the spring a large army was assembled cessfully still. at Brussels under the leadership of the duke of Savoy. Its ultimate object was to strike directly at Paris, and on March 18 Philip crossed over from Calais to Dover, in order
in the
Meantime
to enlist the support of his wife.
the standpoint of Englishmen his visit was entirely disastrous. To all the old difficulties of 1554-55 was now added the fact that
Philip's hostility to the
From
Pope made
it
impossible for
him
whole-heartedly to support the great

1
work
of reconciliation
di
Pietro Nores, "Storia della guerra Paolo IV contro gli Spagnuoli," in
Archivio
storico Italiano, serie i, xii (1847), pp. 1-299; Romier, ii, pp. 167194; Pastor, xiv, pp. 152-174.
2 Jean de Vandenesse, "Journal des voyages de Philippe II," in Collection des voyages des souverains des Pays-Bas, edd. L. P. Gachard and Charles Piot,
iv (1882), p. 24.
10
A SPANISH SOVEREIGN
set
;
on which Mary's heart was

obvious that he proposed to kingdom simply and Bolely
never before had
it
been so
utilize
the resources of the island
But in the interests of Spain. Her hopes of the the queen's loyalty to him never faltered. heir whose advent would solve so many puzzling questions were renewed once more; with that happy prospect before
'
was not prepared to make. Henry II to carry him the Engvhen lish declaration of war on France; before July 6, Philip left her for the last time, she had sold crown property
her, there
was no
sacrifice she
In June she sent a herald to
to the
of his
annual value of over 10,000 pounds for the support campaign, and had raised upwards of 5000 troops for
the service of
Emanuel
Philibert
.-
By
the beginning of
August everything was in readiness, and an army of over 50,000 men was launched at St. Qaentin on the Somme.
The
diers
fortifications
of
the
place
were
almost
in
ruins.
of solwho was in command, had a on learning of the approach of the Spanish army he -ent word to his uncle Anne de Montmorency, who was at La Fere with about 18,000 troops, that unless i, was speedily
Coligny,
;
mere handful
Montmoreinforced he could only hold out a few days. came to his rescue on the morning of blgUSt 10, but his rency tics were so faulty that he Buffered crushing disaster
;i
Over 3000 of Ins men were 7000 were captured, among them the constable himkilled aelf; the resl only saved themselves by ignomini< is flight.'' notable defeat tor France and a glorious victory It was for Spain: the most glorious, perhaps, ever won by the
outside the walls of the town.
;
:i
armies of the
Pmdeni King over any

*D.
i.
I
of hi- Christian foes.
But so incapable was Philip

>c
11
of utilizing his
I. B.,ix,
I;
I
opportunity that
]>{>.
8
8
/'
vi,
ik. s.
1142,
-ISC
re.
"/' rit
,
I'urneron,
pp.
M
C
/'.
.-<Tll.-.
ii.
Vtnstian,
vi,
DM. 884
891.
Homier, referenda than.
MM;
pp
178-187,
203and
ST.
QUENTIN AND CALAIS
11
the battle remained almost barren of advantage to the
Spaniards. Indeed, it may justly be said of it, as of Malplaquet a century and a half later, that its chief importance
was that
it
marked the turn
of the tide against the
would-be
invaders of France.
When
the news of
it
reached the
Emperor at Yuste, he eagerly demanded whether his son had clinched his victory by marching on Paris, and was deeply cast down when word came that he had failed to do so. Philip, indeed had not even been present at the battle.
,
He was
writing letters at the time, a few miles distant, at 1 and on reaching the scene of the victory that Cambray had been won for him, he gave orders to besiege and cap;
ture St. Quentin before entering any farther into the enemy's
territory.
But the town was
with 700
men
waste before
its
by Coligny every day that Philip could be made to walls would bring nearer the winter season
heroically defended
and the return of the Duke of Guise. Not till August 27 was it finally taken and subjected to an unusually horrible 2 sack by the time that Philip's troops had recovered from their orgies, the autumn rains had already begun, and further advance was regretfully abandoned. The most that Philip could do was to take Le Catelet, Ham, and Chauny,
;
and
retire to Brussels to
Shortly
afterwards
put his army into winter quarters. came the counterstroke, not indeed
against Philip and the Spaniards, but against his English When the Duke allies, the subjects of his sorrowful queen.
Guise got back from Italy he found to his intense relief that Paris was safe. Discerning that what France needed above all things was a restoration of her morale, he deterof
mined to
effect it
real object
1
by the capture of Calais. Concealing his with masterly cunning, he arrived before the
v, pp.
Papiers d'etat du Cardinal de Granvelle, D, I. E., ix, pp. 495-522.
120-122.
12
A SPANISH
1558
SOVEREIGN
town on January
2,
it. together with its able to Bend a man to
eighteen days later ho had taken various outposts, before Philip had been
;
its
defence.
The
last
remnant
of the
conquests of the Bundred Years' War the grasp of England as the result of her sacrifice
had been torn from

in
the
interests of a foreign power; the queen and the nation were 2 It was a final and overcast into the depths of despair.
whelming demonstration
of the error of the
Spanish alliance.
The remaining operations of the war were unimportant. The strategy of both sides aimed at avoiding decisive battle-.
Philip's financial resources
in the
majority of near future was the inevitable conclusion.
were completely exhausted; the Frenchmen were obviously war-weary; peace

Confer-
ences were opened in October, 1558, at the abbey of Ceroamp in Cambr6sis, the principal Spanish representatives
being the
Duke
(
of Alva, the prince of

'.ranvelle.
3
Orange, '\uy (lomez
da Silva, and
unnecessary to enter into the details of the ensuing negotiations, which were interrupted Beveral times between the end of November, 1558,
It
is
ami the beginning of March, 1.">.V.). on account of the death of Mary Tudor and the proposal of Philip to marry her sucSo many and bo weighty were the issues sor Elizabeth.
that
hung on the acceptance

else could
or failure of that proposal that
nothing
be definitely determined until the question

settled in the negative.
permanently 2 and "-. I5.v., the

in
Finally on April
different article- of the treaty i ere signed

(
the
little
village of
':itcau-(
lamb n'-i-.
In
the
North,
France kepi Calais, and there were mutual restorations of conquests between the belligerent- on France's eastern
frontier.
All the territories of
en despoiled
i
by Francis
518;
'
which the duke of Savoy had in 1536 were duly returned to

iPapian d'Hai 4u Cardinal
i.//.
,
i)
|
/;
ii.
pp. 514
Etamfcr,
it Orancit.,
ii,
i
17
v,
pp, 207 584;
Dccrue, op.
Itood*,
vi,
pp 488
p. 216.
THE TREATY OF CATEAU-CAMBRESIS

and the settlement of the outstanding questions was such as connoted the abandonment by France Italy
him,
1
13
in of
was suitable
further schemes of aggrandizement in the peninsula. As at the close of a long dynastic war, the treaty ended with a marriage. Since Philip had been unable to
win the hand
of Elizabeth of England, he was given, in her Elizabeth of Valois, the eldest daughter of the king stead, 2 The proxy marriage was celebrated in Paris on of France.
the 22d of the following June, the bridegroom being represented by the Duke of Alva. In January, 1560, the new 3 queen arrived in Spain.
The
series of
treaty of Cateau-Cambresis put an end to that long wars between the French and the Spaniards which
of Charles
began with the raid
VIII on Naples
in 1494.
Though the prize for which the contestants were striving was originally Italy, the struggle later ramified in such
fashion as to affect most of the rest of Western Europe, so that the peace which concluded it was of universal signifi-
cance
men
was, in fact, the international settlement to which perpetually referred back, as establishing the normal
;
it
European powers, down to the treaties of Westphalia in 1648. In France it was generally as disastrous, as "a great misregarded by contemporaries 4 fortune to the king and to his whole kingdom," and though some subsequent historians have judged it more leniently, the most recent authority confirms the earlier verdict. He
state of the relations of the
censures
1
Henry
II for having granted such favorable terms

signed
2 Born April 2, 1545, she was three months older than Don Carlos.
A separate secret convention,
on March 25 at Griinendal near Brussels between the representatives of Philip and of Emanuel Philibert, virtually converted the neutrality of the duke of Savoy into obedient alliance with the king of Spain. Cf. Arturo Segre and Pietro Egidi, Emanuele Filiberto (Turin,
1928, 2 vols.),
i,
The standard account of the peace that of Baron Alphonse de Ruble, Le traits de Cateau-Cambresis (Paris, 1889). Cf. also Decrue, pp. 227-230, and
3
is
pp. 164-166.
Romier, ii, pp. 345-347. 4 Decrue, Anne de Montmorency sous Henri II, p. 228.
14
to an
A SPANISH SOVEREIGN
adversary so exhausted that he could not have continued to fight, and finds the explanation of the French
long's error in bis seal for the extirpation of heresy. .mate be just, the treaty must, ipso facto, be
a If this
notable
victory for Philip II.

of tin- Btrife,
and theatre
regarded as In Italy, the original cause there can he no question that Spain
estab-
had come out on top.

lished both in the north
Her power was now securely
the concessions of
and the south of the peninsula, and France at Cateau-Cambresis enabled her
to control the destinies of
most
is
of the intervening states.

tell.
Hut
in
Northern Europe there
a different tale to
The
settlement of France with England, her reconquest of Calais, and her military occupation of Metz, Toul, and Verdun
could not
of the
fail
to be ultimately prejudicial to the maintenance
Spanish power in the

that
1
Low
Countries and everything

Philip's
If
affairs.
which
reign,
implied.
The Netherlands, during
were to be the focal point of international
was and delivered her over at home to the miseries of religious war, it was also, as things ultimately worked out, of ominous significance for Spain. It weakened her hold in a region where her power
baleful portent for
the termination of the great dynastic struggle in 1559
of
France
in
Italy,
Bhould never have been established, and

in forcing her into a struggle to
it
was a factor
which
lost her
maintain
it,
not
only the Netherlands but also the sovereignty of the
ante
nee k "'
r
fii,
p,
346]
k>n
I
of
i
point* ou1 that !alaii before

<
officially
uh.it
<
uiilm'-iis,
and
not
captious. expect thai
conquered. Thin seems somePrance certainly did

the provisions of the
that tht in-iiy. instead of legally 0OH tirming her po*MMh)H of the town, it actually rendered furpp.M-ii.nril; thennoi the peso* did not i uec the three expteeely gw.- to LoUiiiriiiuijin biehopriee, which theretoe! militarily occupied, as they had been since 1.1.1 J, hut nol
I
peace would so work out as to require the recession of Calais; while her ooeupation of the three biahoprte was guarded by the express inclusion the treaty of their bishops and in
hapten
ninrit.
1
in
('nr)in
the list of her allies. Duunirrrxrl diplomatique, v,

l"
1728), p
PHILIP'S
All this, however,
COURT AT BRUSSELS
affair of
15
for the
was an
the future
present there could be no doubt that Philip had emerged He had got the peace for which his whole soul victorious.
longed, and the opportunity which it offered him to return to his beloved Spain he had got it, moreover, on ostensibly terms. triumphant "During the spring of 1559" his court
;
at "Brussels
was the
political capital of Catholic
Europe."
Thither flocked the political representatives of the petty
pay grateful homage to their protector and master, "the greatest monarch," so the Florentine ambassador described him, "that Italy has known since the day
Italian states to
of the
Romans."
Thither also came the princes of France
had won they begged him to come to Paris for his wedding, and " were visibly cast down when he refused The custom of the kings of Spain," he haughtily replied, "is not to go and fetch their brides, but to have them brought to them in their own 2 country and their own house." Philip, indeed, was wholly bent on getting home and the sole reason why he delayed hi- departure was to give himself time to make arrangements in the North which would relieve him of the necessity of ever leaving home again. In view of the role that he was to play in the immediately ensuing years, it is worth remarking that for the moment he seemed more preoccupied
to congratulate their conqueror on the victories that he
;
with political than with religious

rival,
cares.
His
quondam
Henry
II of France,
was apparently
far
more anxious
to extirpate heresy than he.

in
Philip refused to collaborate
an expedition against the Calvinists of Geneva, which
the
Most Christian King was
desirous to undertake.
He
was
1
also totally unwilling to take
version of
2
any measures for the subEnglish or Scottish Protestantism indeed, for

;
Romier, Romier,
ii, ii,
p. 348.
pp. 349-353,
and
refer-
ences
there;
Vandenesse,
"Journal
des voyages de Philippe II," pp. 66-73. 3 Romier, ii, p. 359.
loc.
cit.,
16
A SPANISH SOVEREIGN
the time being, he appeared to regard the British heretics rather as a chief bulwark for the defence of the island king-
doms against the designs of the Valois and the Guises. When, on July 9, the lance-thrust of Montgomery put a
1
sudden end to the

If
in regard to these
of the king of France, Philip's fears matters were naturally much relieved. France and Scotland were to be brought closer than ever
life
through the fact that their respective sovereigns were now husband and wife, 2 the youth and weakness of the new
Valois
s
in
monarch gave adequate assurance that Spanish interNorthern Europe were at least temporarily safe and
;
Philip prepared to depart.

nally for
His date of
sailing, fixed origi-
was delayed till the twenty-third because Nostradamus, who "with his threats of tempests and shipwrecks did put the sailors in great fear" on September 8 he landed at Laredo. 8
August
18,
of the advice of his astrologer,
before his departure from the Netherlands had devoted himself rather to the regulation of political than of
If Philip
religious affairs, his return to tin

foi the
peninsula gave the
sign.i!
emphasis to be reversed. His journey to Spain is, in fact, the real dividing line, as far as he was concerned,
between the era of the Hapsburg-Yalois w irs and that of the Counter-Reformation. During the ne: twenty yean, at Least, his principal interest was to be the advancement of
t
the faith. Now that he had got home he could follow undisturbed the path that was indicated to him by t! traditi<m< of hi- native land. had been made Arrangement*
there, even before his arrival, for

hi1
public demonstration of detestation of infidelity and heresy, and of his solemn

a
Homier, ii. p. 309, .ni.i Pornaron, i. and referen ce there. raadi II anil M:iry queen of Scots had Ixvn married on \pril 24, Lfi 1 Forneron, i. p. 138, rind roforonro*
I
.
Cad
Bratli,
Philippe II, p
L04,
who
thero;
VandonoiAo.
inc. eii.,
p.
73;
of.
Maoris that Philip wan far in advance of bii age in freedom from mperetition and in despising the propheCJW "f Mtrologen; unfortunately ho oitefl no oontemporary erklenee for hia view.
AUTO-DA-FE AT VALLADOLID
17
determination to extirpate them, and this demonstration took the form of a most imposing auto-da-fe. It was held,
directly in front of the great church of St. Francis, at VallaAt six o'clock in the dolid, on Sunday, October 8, 1559.
morning the
officials of the Inquisition took their places on Close by was a magnificent dais at one end of the square.
the royal gallery, occupied by the king, the Prince of Asturias, a number of privileged grandees, and the ambassadors of foreign powers directly opposite was the scaffold.
;
Then the bells began to

clerics,
in
the familiars, and convicts corozas and sanbenitos slowly out

filed
toll,
and the sad procession
of guards,
latter all duly attired

of the gates of
the Inquisition prison and into the great square. Spectators to the number of 200,000 are said to have followed.
The ceremonies began with the "sermon of the faith," which was preached on this occasion by Doctor Juan Manuel. Then Hernando de Valdes, the inquisitor-general, rose and faced the king, who also rose and bared his sword as a sign
that he would champion the cause of the Holy Office whereupon Valdes addressed to him the following solemn demand "Since the apostolic decrees and the sacred canons have
;
:
ordained that sovereigns must swear to favor the Holy Catholic Faith and the Christian religion, does your Majesty
swear by the Holy Cross to give
all necessary support to the Holy Office of the Inquisition and its ministers, against heretics and apostates and against those who help and favor them, and against all who directly or indirectly shall hinder
and to force all your the activities of the Holy Office and the inhabitants of your Majesty's Majesty's subjects realms to give obedience to the constitutions and decrees
;
which are published

or support
for the defence of the

all
Holy Catholic
it."
Faith against heretics and against
who
believe, receive,
them?"
The king
replied,
"I swear
Then
18
A SPANISH SOVEREIGN
followed the interminable reading of the sentences of the condemned, the separation of those to be 'reconciled' from
subdivision of those
those to be 'relaxed' to the secular arm, and the subsequent in the latter category into a larger group
who
elected
by confession
at
the last
moment
to purchase
the privilege of the milder form of death by the garrote, and a small minority who preonly two on this occasion ferred to undergo all the horrors of the quemadero. One of
these w:is a Florentine noble, Carlo de Sesa, a godson of

(
lharles V,
who had once stood high
in the imperial favor.
how he
'
As be passed by the king, he haughtily demanded of him could suffer such things to be. And Philip replied,
If
my
|
Bon were as evil as you are,

l
myself would fetch the
woo,
wherewith to burn him."

at last got
So Spain
back her king.
The
wish, so often
expressed by the Cortes of Charles V, thai
the Spanish
fulfilled
monarch would stop

life
his travelling,
had now been
with the advent of his son.

thai remained to
the peninsula;
the thirty-nine years of never once sel foot outside Philip and his constant presence there during so
In
all
him
long
period,
and
in
such
monarchical
Jge,
made
its
administration the faithful mirror of his

ideals.
own
policy and
Seldom
in history
has
it
been given to any sover-
eign
stamp the impress <>f his personality so deeply upon the live- of his subjects. If one would learn the d'.tmies of the va-t dominions over which he bore -way, one must
t..
r l>eL in
with
is
.f
Careful
Btudy
of
his
character
fraylea
and
men-
There
int
(
mi
this
axoellenl
mmnuMtipl
in
I*
baataron
bI
I
B ton
im thr
M
ii.
Mito-da-M
tola.
M.
(of.
muchoa
tht
oi peraonaa roliKiosaa letradoa a oon vertirie." Cf.

i
21
tht
88
i,
pp. 276
'.
f.;
Praaoott,
8panM Lanu
"herejo
partinaz,
. .
pti
Philip
i.
BriHah
Museum,
a
9aM
.
Qaohard, l>"" Carlo* el M I'' Pornaron, pp

17''
pp. 420 Philippt 11. 17&i, pp.
que
no
PHILIP'S
tality
ANCESTRY AND EDUCATION

in turn
19
and these
without
cannot
the
be
adequately underorigin
stood
remembering
Spanish
and
background out of which they were evolved. If Spain and the Spanish Empire were represented in Philip, so Philip was a typical product of Spain and the Spanish Empire.
His ancestry, of course, was predominantly Iberian.

father
His
mother half Spanish and half and she doubtless impressed him in his boyPortuguese hood years with the idea that it was Portugal's destiny to
was
half Spanish, his

;
be ultimately reunited with Spain, the idea which her own marriage with the Emperor had represented, and which
Philip was subsequently, if only temporarily, to carry out. The influence of the Empress was also a potent cause of
She was very ' from his infancy hours in prayer devout and spent many the prince was surrounded by clerics and subjected to eccleThe other two chief things that stand siastical influences.
Philip's proverbial respect for the clergy'
;
out, as one reads the story of his early years, are the joyIt
-sness of his
life
and the
deficiencies of his linguistic equip-
ment.
of the
afi
He was
name
;
the Portuguese
never allowed to have a playmate worthy Ruy Gomez da Silva, who
rwards became his chief councillor, was perhaps the nearest to it, but Ruy Gomez was Philip's senior by no less
The Empress insisted that the prince be treated with the respect due to "the son of the greatest 3 his every emperor that the Christian world had ever seen"
than
five years.
;
movement was regulated by an etiquette so strict that it was scarcely possible for him to laugh. Everything combined to make him cold and reserved, to train him to conceal his real feelings, to
Cf. J. Vales Failde, Isabel (Madrid, 1917). 1 Bratli, p. 74.
1
enhance the characteristics of gravity

3
La Emperatriz
Michele Soriano (1559) in Relazioni
degli Ambasciatori Yeneti al Senato, ed. Eugenio Alberi, serie i, iii, p. 378.
20
A SPANISH SOVEREIGN
and melancholy which he had inherited from his father. 1 The hitter, though absent from Spain during the greater part
of
li
is
son's early
life,
tion of the prince's studies,
had given much thought to the quesand had provided him with the
Philip
best tutors that could be had.

in
made good
history,
progress
and gave at an early age of possessing unusually sound politipromise cal judgment. 2 But for languages he showed eren less than the Emperor; indeed it was well said of him aptitude
science and
in
art
he read
much
that from his childhood days he preferred to
communn
te
by writing rather than by word of mouth. Even in his native Castilian he always spoke slowly, though with great
and he seemed to have much difficulty in choos3 He could write and speak his Latin reasoning his words. well. He could understand a little French and Italian, ably and speak a little French but to converse readily in these 4 or any other foreign tongues was utterly beyond him.
precision,
;
Small wonder that he was so uncosmopolitan. He had no means of free communication with any oik beyond the
Pyrem Numerous contemporaneous accounts traits have come down to us those of the
;
of
\
I
his
net ian
physical
amhas-
Badors are mi the whole the most valuable, though
we have
Philip
Spanish,
-
of less
French, than
and
English
testimony besides.
medium
stature, hut
finely proportioned,
and
inch
of
in
;i
carriage "so straight and upright as he loseth no " the grace and dignity of his presence were heighl
;
further enhance.
'('
..'.
by the
i.
care, restraint,
and elegance with

non parla con i Leonardo Donato
j
da C.|
lit)
i.
<'!'
PreMOtt,
i,
and reference! there;
Florentine
J "I1 re quasi mni suoi delta camera."
"ReUdone
:
i
<li Bpeajna" (1591 T), pr<>l>ably by Cammillo Quidi Volterrano, in
(1673) in Alberi, Bri<- L, vi, p. i68. Federioo Badoero, fee. eU. I'n-scott,
*
i,
pp. 80
f.
Hratli, pp. 78
f.
ederico
!>rrie
i,
[a
iii,
Albert
Rflnzxani,
APPEARANCE AND HABITS OF THE KING

which he dressed. 1
beard
21
light, so that he
His eyes were blue and his hair and seemed at first sight to be rather a
Fleming than a Spaniard. His large protruding under-jaw and lip, though considerably less prominent than those of his father, were yet sufficiently noticeable to betray the 2 In early manhood he wore his beard Hapsburg ancestry.
"short and pointed, after the Spanish fashion"; later in life he permitted it to increase in length and breadth until
it
3
approached the style customary in the Netherlands. The pallor of his complexion was also remarked on by all observers, and most of them drew the proper conclusion, namely, that it indicated a weak stomach and lack of exer-
Reddened eyes were a penalty of his excessive devo5 He ate tion to the written word both day and night. and usually alone, restricting himself to slowly, sparingly, meats and the "most nutritious foods"; almost all the accounts of him emphasize his avoidance of fruits and of 6 He also suffered from asthma, stone, and gout 7 fish. and though his doctors recommended him to go hunting and " get out into the open air as the best means of strengthening his body and distracting his mind from melancholy refleccise.
; 1 John Elder (1555) in Joseph Ames, Ty] /graphical Antiquities, ed. T. F. Dibdin (London, 1810-19, 4 vols.), iii, Giovanni Micheli (1557) in p. 526; Alberi, Relazioni, serie i, ii, p. 333 Michele Soriano (1559), ibid., iii, Marcantonio da Mula pp. 378 f. ibid., 394; Philippe de (1559), p. Caverel (1582) in Relations des ambassadeurs Venitiens sur Charles-Quint et Philippe II, ed. L. P. Gachard (Brussels, 1855), p. lxx; Camillo Borghese, later Pope Paul V (1594), "Diario," in A. Morel-Fatio, UEspagne au XVI' et au XVII" siecle (Heilbronn, 1878), p. 175. 2 Micheli (1557), loc. cit.; Federico
;
3 4
Federico Badoero (1557), loc. cit. Philippe de Caverel (1582), loc. cit.,
Philippe de Caverel (1582),
loc. cit.,
p. lxxi.
5
p. lxx.
pp. 233
Federico Badoero (1557), loc. cit., iii, f. Soriano (1559), ibid., p. 379 Paolo Tiepolo (1563) in Alberi, serie i, Soranzo (1565), ibid., v, pp. 61 f
6
; . ;
p.
112; Borghese (1594), loc. cit., p. 190. Philip apparently got leave from the Pope to transgress, save on Good Friday, the rules for fasting prescribed by the church. Cf. Soranzo, loc. cit., and Sigismondo Cavalli (1570) in
Alberi, serie i, v, p. 183. 7 Gioan Francesco Cavalli, loc. cit. Morosini (1581), ibid., p. 322.
;
Badoero (1557) in Alberi, serie p. 233; Giovanni Soranzo (1565),

v, p. 112.
i,
iii,
ibid.,
22
1
A Sl'AMsil
SOVEREIGN
he paid little or DO attention to them; apparently, he was haunted by the fear lost he should die as the too, result of an accident, and kept constantly before his mind
turns,"
2 the experience of the king of France.
He was
totally defi-
cient
in
that
capacity tor
sudden and almost superhuman
in the case of some of Spain's greatphysical exertion which, esl empire builders, alternated so strikingly with long peri-
ods of doing nothing at all; "Ohne East, aber ohne Rast" Is is an accurate description of him, if one remembers that He activities were not those of the body, but of the mind.
'
was ever
great sleeper,
and the tendency increased with
advancing years.
In the later part of his life he seldom rose before half past nine, and always took a long nap after his mid-day meal; sometimes, it is true, he would work till to midnight, hut more often he retired early in the evening indeed read for a couple of hours before he closed his eyes
;
it
was
well said of
him when he was an

8
old
man
that hi- only
recreation was repose.
The
effect
of these habits
on his
was foreseen with strikpolicy and methods of government "From ing clarity by the Venetian ambassador in L659.
thru,
at
it
results," SO
the age of
remarks the report, "that though he is youthful appei ites and insatiable desire to rule,
all
the actions of his Majesty are invariably directed, not to the aggrandizement of his kingdoms by war,
nevertheless
but
rather to
their
conservation through
peace."
The
rest
counsels of the
Emperor
to avoid aggressive action
and
on the defensive had certainly been heard by willing ear.-. What his father had acquired with the sword, Philip proi
Federioo
;,.
Badoero
1669),
l<>r.
L667),
r,i.,
toe
oil.,
<>'
'"' //</. p.
eft.,
<'i
i,i,
1
L678), toe.
i
vi.
p,
463
il
"
:
I.
<kk<-
Di.nuto boo
Mul.
iii,
p.
una ""**'
eppreeao
lotto
leans
iii,
394.
1681 'liotod Martin F'liili(.| ion,
l,
org inn Mn/.i one

lot
eft.,
'
'
dorm*."
t, p. 822;
37fl
'
toe,
eft.,
p.
Bit
unter Pkilipp 11.:
Kardinal QranvtUa
GOVERNMENT BY PEN AND INK

1 posed to preserve with the pen. 2 the 'Prudent King.'
23
From
first
to last he
was
Reading and writing occupied the major portion of indeed he not seldom continued to read and Philip's day 3 We have to write while taking a drive in his carriage.
;
already alluded to his preference for written over oral comadd to this his firm determination to keep in munications 4 touch with everything that was going on, even in the re;
motest corner of his vast dominions, and his own persistent unwillingness to leave the centre of Castile, and it furnishes
the key to his methods of government. He had the highest he had possible sense of his royal prerogatives and duties taken deeply to heart his father's injunction to direct every;
thing himself, and never to give his full confidence even to ) the most faithful of his ministers, and the natural result
was that his time was completely occupied with receiving and answering reports and letters. Most of these were concerned with immediate affairs of state, and their number mounted so fast that in 1566 Philip took the first measures
for their conservation in the ancient castle of Simancas,
5 like Others which soon became a national archive. 6 were elaborate anthe famous Relaciones Topogrdficas
swers to royal requests for information in regard to existing conditions from all the cities of the realm. "They are sent
to him," writes the Venetian
all
1
sorts
serie
and conditions
Vendramino
i,
of
ambassador Morosini, "from men and treat of every sort and

in
Francesco
(1595)
cf
.
Alberi,
v,
p. p.
(1573), loc.
cit., vi,
446 463
Donate. "... e piu
Dicono i suoi ministri che la sua intelligenza e tanta, che non e cosa che non sappia e che non veda." Donato
. .
.
pronto nello scrivere che qualsivoglia II nunzio diceva che segretario. ... finalmente binognava negoziar con il re per biglietti, cioe con polizze, tanto si fa grande il suo ritiramento."
2 3
cit., vi, pp. 463 f. Considerando la importancia de que son papeles, como quien por medio
(1573), loc. 5 "
dellos
6
meneaba
list of
el
Real asiento."
C. de
Bratli, p. 225,
and reference
there.
serie
mundo desde C, i, p. 504.

of
su
these,
most
Lorenzo Priuli (1576) in Alberi,

"
i,
v, p. 257.
4
Vede
tutti
fatti suoi e sa tutto.
remain in manuscript, on pp. 614-617 of vol. morial of the R. A. H.
may
which still be found
vi of the
Me-
24
kiiul of subject,
it
A SPANISH SOVEREIGN
both great and small,
the number
of
in
is
such fashion that

infinite;
1
may
be said thai
them
indeed,
insisting
having BO
many
subjects and trusting no
one and
under his own hand and eye, he is so perpetually preoccupied with this business, with so great labor and toil, that I have heard many people say that they would not for the world be the ruler of so many stales as is
that everything pass
his
Majesty,
if
it
meant
living the kind of
life
he lives."
Reports, reports, and ever
more reports
Philip
was
literally
submerged with them in his later years, and moreover he did not stop at reading them he annotated them, as he a\ ent
;
along, with comments on matters as absurdly trifling as the all -lulling and style of the men who had written them
hand of his, one of the most with illegible hands of an age more than usually replete 8 A story of somewhat uncertain chirographical difficulties. origin which has come down to us, in regard to th< results of a night's work of this sort, is perhaps worth quoting in
in
that
strange, sprawling
1573), loc.
cit.,
vi,
p.
464:
:
il
"lire, per detto oomune, e assai sospet dioono i suoi proprj servitori toso l)r In ri.in nl CUChillo del rry no ay dos Cf. Moroaini (1581), loc. cit., dedos." The story of Antonio Peres r, p. 324. this illustrate iiifl other episodes
;
S.
qual stia tanto nell'officio BUO ooma suoi ministri, c M. Cosl dicono Ranke, pare chc sia vcro."
i
court, which is by Cabrera do C6rdoba, i. p :,U2 (of Philip's treatment of Don Carlos), "unos le llamabao prudente, utros severo, porque su risa y ouohillo confines," and by Antonio Pine,
proverb
ted,
"f
Philip's
Die Osmanen und die spmiisrhi "So war er narchic, 3d ed., p. 148 allerthatlajste Gei baftamann von Welt." ' Donato (1573), /"<-. n7 p. 404
:
, :
U
del del
"I
e.g.,
suoi segretarj gli s^rivono las<-iandi> tanto di margine quanto e lo ipaaio dove scrivono, acciocch. il re, Moondo
il
fata
i.
o.
Bratli's
discUM .ti (pp, 232 f.i is nugatory; be betray* no knowledge of the passages li.l M..rn-ini and aOOOfd* in Ioks the proverbial oharaoter iriRl Cf. also Zanc (1584), aying.
.
suo costume, poaea capo i"-r oapo < 'f also rispondere quanto nli piaoe Commpondanee <i< Philipp* li. <! C Kurih. P. Oaobard, i, pp. xlvii lii "Comment Philippe II travaillait,"
I
;
in
IfHongSI
/''//
/';
Brussels,
Bratli, p. 207; pp. 289-2.<:t; Balta*M PoXNlfiO, Dtchot u fl.<hnttdel
1904),
\,-
-,6.
A
loc.
Fdipe 8g%atdo
If
cit.,
v.
p.
832
L089).
:
the
jot
kin*?
t..
desired
(Seville, to oall
cf
Donate
<-.,n
ri<
le. cit., vi,
p.
464
na
speeial
attention
any
the
peesasjs,
he
"Travaglia
prendersi
would usually
the margin.
down
word
Oj<> in
n asione, che
pel
non
e official
alcuno ncl mondo,
luo ohs sia,
"BIEN ES
this connection
;
MYRAR A TODO"
25
primarily a proof of Philip's unlimited patience and self-control, but it also reveals his great kindness to his servants, an excellent test of a gentleman. Apit is
parently the king had sat up unusually late, covering sheet after sheet with handwriting and annotations when at
;
last
he had
finished,
he called his attendant to throw sand
over the papers in order to dry the ink. The attendant, however, was so confused and appalled by the responsibility placed on his shoulders that instead of the sand box, he took
up the ink pot and emptied

labors;
its
but Philip forbore to reproach him.
contents over his Majesty's "This is the
sand, that is the ink," was his only that had been done. 1
If
comment on the damage
we can visualize Philip niggling over these innumerable reports, we are furnished with the explanation of much else
besides.
He
2 possessed a tenacious memory, and was re-
a todo"
solved to superintend everything himself; "bien es myrar 3 But is a phrase frequently found in his writings.
he was curiously unable to separate the essentials from the

persuade himself ever to delegate the latter 4 to subordinates he was like the historian who has vastly more material than he can possibly hope to handle. And
details, or to
;
the obvious result was that under his rule the administration
of the Spanish
1
Empire became more notorious than ever*

2
This tale seems to be derived from "the most Iberian Parson Weems of the Prudent King," Dichos y Hechos (Seville, 1639), fol. 144; cf. also Prescott, iii, pp. 411 f. It is worth noting, as an evidence of the way in which stories of that kind were passed around in those days, that it appears in a brief paragraph appended, with other notes on miscellaneous subjects, to the second volume of John More's manuscript journal of the House of Commons, February- April, 1641 B. M., Harleian Ms. 476, fol. 455 (bottom).
Baltasar Porreno,
;
Matteo Zane (1584),

"It
is
loc.
cit.,
v,
p. 361.
well to consider everything." B. M., Egerton Ms. 1834. "Non s'espedisce alcuna sorte di negozio, sia di grazia o di giustizia, grande o picciolo, che non passi per mano sua." Morosini (1581), loc. cit., v, pp. 322 f. 4 "Pare che il re si occupi in molte minuzie che levano il tempo per le cose
Cf.,
e.g.,
maggiori."
p. 463.
Donato
(1573), loc.
cit., vi,
26
for
its
A SPANISH SOVEREIGN
slowness.
it
^ Emperor, but
had been bad enough under the was to be infinitely worse under his son.
1
It
So poor were the means of communication in those days, so vast and bo widely scattered were the dominions over which
the only possible method of governing them successfully was to invest the king's local representaBut this was tives with a large measure of independence.
Philip ruled, that
just
was
th<
what Philip could never bring himself to do and he more convinced that his own way was the only right
;
one because
it
tallied so closely
imperial father.
ing point,
It
was centralization
with the precepts of his carried to the break-
pushed so far that it paralyzed efficiency. While was deciding how the sailors on the Armada could best Philip be kept from swearing, Sir Francis Drake raided the Spanish His viceroys and ambassadors, who were constantly coast. kept waiting for orders, and for subsidies to enable 'hem to carry them out, frequently expressed the hope thai death would come to them by way of Spain, for thus they would
be certain to live to a ripe old age. 2 Prescott 3 prints part of a letter addressed to Philip by Luis Manrique, the grand
almoner, telling him in vigorous terms of the discontent of his subjects because of his manner of doing business, "sitting forever over your papers, from your desire, as they
want
intimate, to seclude yourself from the world, and from a of confidence in your ministers. Bence wch intermi<j-air.
. . .
nable delays a- fill the soul of every suitor with d< God did not send your Majesty and all the other
kin.us. his
Viceroys on earth, to waste their time in reading or writing, nor yet in meditation and prayer." The Cortes also point-
"Non si tii-n oonto del tempo, ebe nn negotio, U-nr)^ feeOe, vuole g}' annJ in trminarl>. CamiUo Borgneoe
1
MendoM
Spanish,
>
i.
Peril in IMO; >K7 1608, p.
of.
r
.
C. 8. f.,
>79.
This
epborina
beoetne
byword
Hi.
among
f.
(1694).
in.
1
;
\'<c
Hi.,
p,
102.
Cf,
Preeeott,
Philip's foreign repreeentettvee.
[.
-119-421.
for
'PhUiptiu Second,
Bernardino
He
pp. 420
A*,
inxtfuir<\
PHILIP'S LOVE OF JUSTICE
27
edly advised him to relieve himself of the details of administration and intrust them to the councils and tribunals to
which they belonged, so that business might be transacted more speedily and his time be free for weighty affairs 1 of state and war. And the tragedy of it all was that
these
disastrous
mistakes
the
duties
were
of
really
brought
about
his
chiefly as a result of
one of Philip's
finest
qualities, his
exalted
idea
of
kingship.
Certainly
of
worst
enemies
cannot justly accuse him
being a roi
faineant.
Two
other outstanding virtues of Philip call for special

;
they were both of them salient characteristics of his great-grandmother, Isabella the Catholic, and in both
comment
he showed notable improvement over the ways of his father. The first was his love of justice and determination to see
it
done throughout
his dominions.
"Justice
is
his
f avorite
interest," writes the Venetian

2
ambassador
in 1563;
"and
in so far as its administration concerns him,
he does his duty
well."
"He
is
by nature the
justest of rulers," writes
another in 1584, "and his justice extends so far that were it not regulated by the greatesfprudence and experience in the 3 The affairs of the world, it would pass into severity."
good old custom of the Catholic Kings the pleas of their subjects on Fridays
fallen into desuetude,
it
;
that had by
of hearing
this
time
in this matter at
and Philip made no effort to revive least and it would seem to be the
the king consented to exception that proves the rule and it should be added that the judges delegate to others
;
whom
1
he selected were famed for their probity and comde las Cortes,
xi, p.
Adas
501 (1588-
90, pet. 1).

2 3
la prima qualita si convertiva in ragjon di stato, la seconda in severita
Ma
Tiepolo, loc. cit., v, pp. 62 f. Zane, loc. cit., v, pp. 360
f.
Agostino Nani (1598), loc. cit., v, p. "era religioso, giusto, parco, e pacifico.
Cf 488
crudele, la terza in avarizia, la quarta in voler esser arbitro della cristianita." Cf. also Bratli, pp. 105, 223.
28
1
A SPANISH SOVEREIGN
Nevertheless, Philip was by no means entirely inaccessible, much as lie loved solitude and detested the
petence.
fatigue of audiences.
tions that were
2
We
are assured that on the
way
to and from divine service,
"he accepted
all
the supplica-
handed to him, and that if any one desired to speak with him, he stopped courteously to listen;" but Philip never showed, either by expression or gesture, how he 3 they were all distribproposed to deal with such requests
;
they respectively concerned, to be acted upon favorably or the reverse as the case might be
uted
t<
the
officials
whom
if favorably the signature of the king was necessary before 4 final action could be taken.
The other matter by which
Philip earned the gratitude
and respect of his subjects was his gradual restoration of the It pristine simplicity of the royal court and household.
will
be remembered that in the days of Charles V there had Keen constant complaints of the luxurious 'Burgundian'
fashions of the imperial establishment, and return to the ancient customs of Castile;
5
demands
for a
ginning of Philip's reign there
and at the bewas no evidence of improvement. When he got back from the Netherlands his iblishment was fully as magnificent ae ever it had been in the days of his father; it numbered no less than 1500 persons, of whom nine-tenths were Spaniard-, and the rest
Flemings,
Burgundians,
Englishmen,
Italians,
and Gerto the
man-;
'Bee,
there are, moreover, countless testimo

ive liberality of his grants
ho w ever
v,
,
and pensions, especially to

484
iii,
MoroainJ
in
(1681),
Bratli,
p.
p.
'.."
rentine "Rela-
gatto nolle brache, non si moverebbe ne dimoetrerebbe efteneJona
avease on
iiono
p. 21
<li
Bpagna" (15917)
(1670),
/"<-.
alcana."
vi, p.
'Mule
wall!
eft.,
v.
188;
(1669), loc. (1686), fa
oil., cit.,
p. p.
v,
395; 113;
in
i,
AJberi, eerie
rcn.-inl
T
!
maeo Contarini (1698)

i,
v, p,
1
v. p.
p.
422;
tl
in AJberi, Philippeon, Kordinal
Donato
Philip'i
(1673)
ferial
}
reported, in
I
Granvella,
I
trol,
that "il re
Immobility and oonlo bene tale,
ante, Vol. Ill, p. 177.
PHILIP'S
1
FRUGALITY
was by nature frugal
;
29
the
Spaniards.
But
Philip himself
lavish cost of his household at the beginning of his reign
represents rather the system which he had inherited from his father than what he would have chosen for himself and
;
on, with his resources growing gradually smaller and smaller, with Spanish influence increasing and
as the years
went
Burgundian growing correspondingly less, and with his own fondness for solitude becoming steadily more marked, 2 his natural frugality Logan to assert itself. In the middle of his reign we have numerous evidences that the expenses of the 3 at Madrid only royal household diminished year by year barely enough pomp and circumstance were maintained
;
to suffice for the preservation of the dignity of a king.
And
at the end, we find Philip living and dying the Escorial, only twelve feet square, unadorned and austere it has been well said that the humblest monk of San
in a little cell in
;
Lorenzo "had a better room and better furnished than did 5 the king of Spain." And the contrast, striking as it is with
the ways of his father,
his son.
is
even more obvious with those of
Philip
The gorgeousness of the courts of Philip III and IV was a prominent part of that great game of bluff
;
behind which the internal rottenness of seventeenth-century Spain was concealed from the observation of foreigners
Federico Badoero (1557), loc. cit., pp. 234, 236 Prescott, iii, pp. 417 f., and references there.
1
;
iii,
Marcantonio da Mula (1559),

p. 395.
loc.
to his father's profusion espargne fort pour employer tout a la guerre et au maintien de sa grandeur et estat, fors le superbe bastiment de
compared
"
cit., iii,
'
l'Escurial."
cit., vi, pp. 384 f. Montes, "El Caracter de Felipe II," in Ciudad de Dios, xlvii Philip also desired to (1898), pp. 73 f. maintain a certain standard of morality B. M., Add. Ms. 28,361, in his court. fols. 150-173 (cf. Gayangos, iii, pp. 84, 86 f.), shows that he was much disturbed by the prevalence of unnatural
4
account of these expenses, as they stood in the year 1577, may be found in B. M., Cotton Ms. Vesp. C. VI, fols. 37 ff. Cf. also Donato (1573), loc. cit., vi, p. 463: "II re coll' esempio suo ha introdotto molta modes-
A detailed
Donato
(1573), loc.
Jeronimo
Something may perhaps be ascribed to the influence of the king's confessor, the bishop of Cuenca. Brantome, Oeuvres, ii (Paris, 1866),
tia nella corte."
p. 90,
speaks of Philip's sparingness as
vice at the royal court in the spring Cf. C. de C, iii, pp. 205 f. of 1588.
30
A SPANISH SOVEREIGN
hut the Prudent King's mode of living at the end of his days was an accurate mirror of existing national conditions. There can be no doubt that his subjects respected and
admired him
not done
it
for
it.
If
he had impoverished them, he had
for Ins
own advantage.
would be a grave error to think of Philip as being naturally dead to all the pleasanter sides of life, and an even
Yet
it
him as deficient in affection or incapable of friendship. The joylessness of his early years, to which we have already alluded, was but the inevitable consequence of the way in which he had been brought up that he so loved to be alone during his later life was chiefly
graver one to conceive of
;
the result of circumstances and of a long series of family bereavements. Though he detested physical exercise of
every sort, he got recreation in other ways. To the end of his life he took much pleasure in the jokes of professional l we also get a glimpse a peculiarly Spanish trait buffoons 2 Still more notable of him playing piquet after dinner.
were his knowledge and enthusiasm for art. He loved music 3 and could play the guitar; he was a patron I artists and a real connoisseur of painting and tapestry, sculpture, and
i
architecture;
in
we
shall return to this
of his activities
|
more
detail in connection with the building of the Escorial.

in
lii-
And
there can be no doubt thai
earlier years
he had
various mistresses.
The Venetian ambassadors and others

liai-
his frequently advert to his incontinence." but save for

lerioo
Badoero
f.
1667), foe.
.
eft., iii.
Mateos,
L898), pp
"Felipe
in
II
y
</<
la
Cnltura
xlvii
v. p.
361;
in
iii,
afiola,"
Ciudad
i
Dio$,
loc.
BratH, pp. L16, 107
86
.
"Rdanone
dJ
Bpagna"
"Felipe
(1">91?)
II.
Badoero
p,
1667),
foe.
cit.,
23
Tiepolo
(1666),
foe,
ril.,
v,
Lola
1
Villalba,
Tafladot
p,
|i]>.
33;
Boranao
;
cit.,
v,
de Vihuela," in Ciudad <lr l)ii>, xriv 101 I), pp M^ 167 - Parnandea Montafia, /'</// II en rela> / \rtislas, MM Juan Cienciat y Sabios Madrid, l'J\2)
|
114 f Paacual de OayancM in prefaoe to Win edition of ludrai Mufioi, I fJ4QUndo d hmlaterra
.
(Bfadrid,
i,
1877),
p,
xxviii
I'/riiir,,,!,
p. 9.
THE ROYAL FAMILY
31
son with the Princess of Eboli, about which there are so 1 many divergent opinions, his amours do not seem to have
had the slightest influence on his policy or methods of government si non caste, saltern caute? But it was not, after
;
all,
in the
company
of his mistresses that Philip

;
found his
ill
principal relaxation from the cares of state
indeed his
health gives good reason for believing that he was rather 3 less than more amorous than the average man. It was
in the bosom of hi own family that the king hoped to find the affection and companionship for which he hungered, and it was perhaps the deepest tragedy of his whole life that
that hope, save for a few brief intervals, was destined to be

disappointed.
His mother had died when he was but twelve years old his first wife, Maria of Portugal, when he was eighteen, in
bearing him the Infante
Don
Carlos.
He wedded Mary
Tudor at twenty-seven, but of the four years and four months during which he was married to her he passed less than one-third in England with the queen the union had been dictated solely by political expediency no child was born of it, and it was profoundly distasteful to Philip. Until the time of his return to Spain in 1559 he had scarcely
;
;
taste
of the joys of a
happy family
of
life.
Thereafter
fol-
lowed the brightest period

lowing January
his
whole existence.
His
third spouse, Elizabeth of Valois, reached Spain in the fol;
her advent was the occasion of festivals

it
and
rejoicing, for
was regarded
as the sign
and
seal of
permanent reconciliation with France, and the new queen was popularly known as the Reina de la paz.* Soon after her it was a light case, arrival she was stricken with small pox
;
1 See below, Chapter XXXV. Bratli, *Forneron, i, p. 10: 114 f.
pp.
'Florentine "Relazione di Spagna" (1591?) in Bratli, p. 212. 4 Forneron, i, pp. 220 f., and references there; Bratli, pp. 115 f.
32
A SPANISH SOVEREIGN
and she soon recovered, but it is interesting to read of the worrit's of her mother 'atharine de' Medici, lest the disease should so disfigure her that she would lose her influence on
(
her husband and imperil the safety of the Franco-Spanish unMuch depended indeed on whether or not the derstanding.
1
new queen should bear a

answered
in
child,
till
and that question was not

six years after her arrival.
;
the affirmative
12, 1566,
On August
birth of the child
she was delivered of a daughter the was believed by the queen to have been due
to the beneficent influence of the Spanish Saint Eugenius,
whose remains the king, after interminable correspondence, had recently succeeded in having transferred to Toledo from their former resting place at St. Denis, 2 and the Infanta was accordingly named Isabella Clara Eugenia. This daughter and her younger sister Catharine, born October 9, 1567, were the joy of their father's heart and his affection for them increased with the death, on October 3, 1568, of their mother, who was mourned by the Spaniards 3 as "the best queen that they had ever had or could have." That year, 1568, which also witnessed the death of Don Carlos, was unquestionably one of the saddest in Philip's whole life. But the necessity for a male heir took the pre;
in November, 1570, Philip cedence over everything else married hia fourth and last wife, Anne of Austria, the daugh;
ter of his cousin, the
Emperor Maximilian
II.
She bore
25, 1580,
him four Bona and one daughter, and died Octol but of her children only one, who was to succeed
as Philip III, lived to be
his father
old.
more than eight years

and
neron,
then'.
'
iii,
i.
The
Ton,
t
i,
pp,
222-234,
pp.
:;;l
886,
and references
<!.
there.
On this eurkraa sffair, which oocnpiei largo placf in the .-, ,rr""pondence
r.nfh iiinl Spimish courts 1563 and For1500, cf.
I
Fourqoevaux, Dtpichtt,
p.
Douais,
107 (Ootob
Elisabeth
ii,
3,
betw
Du
4
Prat,
84
L568) ; Marquis de Valoia (Paris,
between
1859), p.
Forneron,
p. 400,
note
7.
PHILIP'S LOVE
Escorial
FOR HIS FAMILY
33
was scarcely finished before it was rilled with coffins. Philip had laid no less than seventeen members of his own family to rest there before he had completed his sixtieth
1
year.
This terrible series of family_bereayements
is
an element
too often forgotten by those who have attempted to portray the life and character of Philip II. One chief reason why
it
has been so
much
neglected
is
doubtless the king's
own
extraordinary self-control. It was one of his fundamental principles that a sovereign should never, under any circumstances, exhibit his inmost feelings.
concealing his affections," writes
"He is an adept at u No Morosini in 1581. 2
display of sorrow," was his order at the time of the death of the Infante Don Ferdinand, in October, 1578; "nothing but processions and public prayer, returning thanks to God
and humbly supplicating that he mitigate his wrath." Certainly it would be unfair to judge Philip by externals. But there has fortunately been preserved to us one glimpse
of the
man, as he
really
was
in the
bosom
of his
own
;
family,
one
is
rift in
the clouds of his impenetrable reserve
and that
a series of letters exchanged between
ters Isabella
him and his daughand Catharine when he was absent on the
campaign for the annexation of Portugal. These letters were discovered by Gachard in the archives of Turin, and
published
ties of
by him
at Paris in 1884
4
;
they prove, beyond the
possibility of doubt, that
whatever the crimes and barbari-
which Philip may have been guilty in his capacity of Spanish monarch, he was a most loving and tender father,
longed, in his self-imposed isolation, for the sympathy and love which only a family can afford. Their contents
1
who
D.
I. E., vii, p.
cit.,
410.
Loc.
v, p. 324.
Infantes
1583).
Lettres de Philippe II a ses filles les Isabelle et Catherine ecrites
'Herrera, Historia General del Mundo,

ii
pendant son voyage en Portugal (1581-
,p.
109.
34
are well
A SPANISH SOVEREIGN
known and need not be repeated here
the evidences
of his solicitude for his daughters'
spiritual
and physical
welfare, his interest in the
daily
of the
life,
his desire to
(
new
most intimate details of their if they had begun to make use rregorian calendar, which went into effect during
know
the period of the correspondence, his descriptions of the storms, the birds, the flowers, and of the local customs of
his
new kingdom, of everything, in fact, that would interand amuse them. These letters also afford addi' enal
:
evidence of the king's friendly relations with his servants; his kindly tolerance of the cranky eccentricities of Madalena. the old nurse of the Infantas,
forms the most amazing
contrast to the cold, stern lord of the Spanish Empire, as
portrayed by his
official visitors.
man
that
these letters
reveal the man whom
And
yet
it
was the
Philip
real
was
irrevocably determined that the outer world should never
know.
It
not impossible that this contrast between the real and the official Philip, coupled with his firm resolve that
is
the feelings of the former should never interfere with the duties of the latter, may point the way to the most reasonable BOlution of the mysteries that still surround the life and
death of the son of his

.
first
marriage, the Infante
Don
Car-
For over three centuries and a half .Inly 8, favorite theme of historians, novelists, and playit hae been All sorts of different theories have been -f'fered in wrights.
born
r>r>.
:i
the explanation of
it,
but
none
3
of
accorded any general acceptance.

iff.
them has as yet been The Legend which forms
H.
Ethical
i
Vain.
torieai
//
!46,
par-
ticularly
field,
'
pp
.
and John Mass

i
RatMwAA'u Don Carlo*, Krititcht t'nt.rtuchunatn (Freiburg i. B. L021), and It does not seem worth while to enumerHut it ii only biz t< ate them here.
poinl out that down to e.Mi
Philiptlu A
:-I
the
pp.
ihjeol
adon, 1914 moe1 important have been eurol
modern r<s.:ir< n. wfaiofa bad on tin- whole shown
fully
analysed
on
12
"f
Folix
a trend inereaeingly favorable to Philip, has recently, owing to the contributions
DON CARLOS
35
the basis of Schiller's famous tragedy, namely, that the Infante was sacrificed because of his love for his step-mother,
Elizabeth
of
*
;
Valois,
is
devoid
of
any
solid
historical
foundation
the tales that the sources of the trouble were
his fondness for the Protestants, intrigues in the
Nether-
in Spain,
lands, or deep-laid conspiracies against the royal authority seem also, on the whole, to be unworthy of cre-
it would appear reasonably certhe arguments of a recent authority to the contain, despite 2 trary, that Don Carlos, from his earliest years, showed
dence.
On
the other hand
himself physically and mentally quite unfit for the vast responsibilities that would devolve upon him should he ever
be permitted to succeed his father as the ruler of the SpanHis excesses in eating and in drinking, his ish Empire. passion for swallowing things and making others swallow
them, his whimsical cruelties all ture by Sanchez Coello confirms
different
tell
it,
the same tale

as
his pic-
ambassadors
at the court of
Madrid. 3
do the reports of the These bad
sufficiently alarming during his boyhood, became worse when, at the age of sixteen, he "fell down a rapidly 4 pair of stairs, broke his head and had two fits of an ague."
symptoms,
It
seems probable that his

of
life
was only saved on

5
;
this occa-
sion through the efforts of the learned Vesalius,
who
perof
formed the operation

of of
trepanning
there.
and the measure

ii,
in the Mitteilungen the Institut fur osterreichische Geschichtsforschung, xxxv (1914), pp. 484-494, and of Viktor Bibl, Der Tod des Don Carlos (Vienna, 1918), taken a turn in the other direction. Rachfahl's monograph is essentially a critique and correotion of that of Bibl; it adduces no fresh evidence. 1 See the careful study by F. W. C. Lieder, "The Don Carlos Theme," in Harvard Studies and Notes in Philology and Literature, xii (1930), pp. 1-73.
1
Anton Chroust,
Forneron,
pp. 108-116,
and references
The
possibility that
is
Don
Carlos
was sexually impotent

excluded.
4
not to be
Further details of this accident be found in a letter of Sir Thomas Chaloner to Queen Elizabeth, written
may
from Madrid on
graphs
5
May 11 cf. C. S. P., Foreign, 1562, no. 46, especially para:
3,
8, 9.
C.
S.
P.,
Foreign,
1562,
nos.
46,
and Joaquin Olmedilla y Puig, Andres Vesalio (Madrid, 1913), pp. 9171,
15.
Bibl, op.
tit.
'Tiepolo (1567),
loc. tit., v,
pp. 148
f.
36
SPANISH SOVEREIGN
and ignorance is revealed by the fact on attributing his son's survival to the thai miraculous healing powers of the corpse of the cook of a
Philip's superstition
lie
insisted
Franciscan convent, long since dead, which was placed in 1 In any bed beside the lever-stricken body of the Infante.
ease the evidences thai
lutely
Don
Carlos would
make an
abso-
unendurable sovereign multiplied apace after his When his father, in the hope recovery from this accident.
that the possession of authority might rouse him to some Bense of his duties and responsibilities, tried the experiment
of placing
him
in the
Council of State, the Infante upset

done, and seemed to take
everything.
cillors as
He
insulted and even assaulted his fellow coun-
no sane
man would have
most important state Irritated by the secrets with which he had been intrusted. to which he was subjected, he strictness of the surveillance laid plans to flee to Italy or Germany and make trouble for 2 Whether he had thoughts of murdering his father abroad.
a malicious pleasure in revealing the
Philip seems
is
much more
doubtful.
The
difficulty, in this
not the lack of evidence, for there is an abundance case, of it, but rather to know how much to believe.
How t< deal with the situation was a trulv terrible probone of the most agonizing with which a royal father lem
has ever been confronted
;
but early
in
the year 1568, Philip

that a strong
came
t>
a decision.
He was convinced
monrience
ntial to the welfare of Spain. archy of his predecessors had inspired him with
u.
Thi
a
deep dread of
ForaefOli, ii, p. 1<7. Two contem porary aeoonnta of the cum, by iiil dooton <>f the Brown, bava boom
1
'
i,
Fom
3-1
<>)i.
p.
'
f:ilil,
VOX, D4ptch*$, ed. Douaia, Forneron, ii, p. 119; Rachrii., pp. 94-96.
down
It
I
to um
l:
.
tbay
an
to l*> 574,
found
in
We
possess,
to
it
in
true,
contemporary
and xviii, It fa pp perhapi DOadWni to add that neithaf of than shows any confidence either in the methoda of
x
that he did; but PJhfllhof thry <'!in safely be given credanoa is anothar question. Etachfahl,
document*
how
p.
loy.
Veaaliua, or in
tl
y of the corpse.
DON CARLOS
37
the grandees, who had always seized the government when the kingship was weak only a century before, under Henry the Impotent, there had been a striking demonstration of
;
and Philip knew his Spanish history. Don Carlos promised to be far worse than Henry the Impotent had ever been was it not obvious, then, that Philip's duty to the state, of which he had the very highest conception, demanded that he should spare his realms from the perils of the rule of a madman ? To imagine that he could answer this quesit,
;
tion in the affirmative without a
pang
is
to ignore the evi-
dence we have already adduced to prove that Philip had an intense family feeling and a deep affection for his own
offspring
;
moreover there were some
risks in setting the
Infante aside, for the king, in that moment, had no other son. It must have been a heart-rending decision to make, but finally, on the night of January 18, 1568, Philip sum-
moned
Madrid Ruy Gomez, Luis de Quijada, and the Prior Antonio, and, "speaking as no man had ever spoken before," apprised them of the resolution he had taken. Then, with his helmet on his head and his sword
to his palace at
in his hand,
he led the
way
silently along the
dark corridors Everything
of the palace to the
apartments of the Infante.
had been
difficulty
The bolts had carefully arranged beforehand. been removed, and the door was opened without the least
;
before
Don
Carlos had
waked up, the loaded

were taken away.
pistols
which he always kept by
his bedside
The
of
brief agonized queries of the Infante as to the
meaning
it all
king.
were answered coldly and noncommittally by the The doors and windows were swiftly nailed up,
Philip superintending the whole process with the utmost care. When all was finished he committed his son to the
guard of the Duke of Feria, commanded that no one should be permitted to speak to him or bring him letters, and went
38
A SPANISH SOVEREIGN
a
out without speaking

to see
word to the Infante.
He was
never
him again. Six months later, on July 24, the world learned that Don )arlos was no longer living, and stories were circulated for more than a century afterwards to the effect that the king
(
had given orders that

put
2 to death.
in one way or another he should be Some maintained that he was beheaded,
and two
of the various
3
post-mortem examinations
of the
;
body
(the last in 1812)
appear to support this conclusion
but the evidences to the contrary are stronger and more The reports that he was strangled by slaves or reliable.
suffocated
bed are totally lacking in solid historical while the tale that he was poisoned rests prinfoundation cipally on the testimony of Antonio Perez, who, at the time
in
;
that he wrote his account,

of Philip II.
was bent on
vilifying the
tin
name
No
one of the countless stories of

at
Infante's
being
made away with

;
nitely substantiated
defithe royal command that being the case the king should be
can be
4 given the benefit of the doubt, if any continues to exist. Perhaps the best of all reasons for believing Philip to be
innocent of the crime with which, before the days of critical historical scholarship, he was so often charged, is that it was
unnecessary to the attainment of

foreseen
that
his
ends
for
he must have
physical excesses in solitary confinement would be ultimately certain to cause Ins death.
Carlos's
Don
son from the possibility of any active participation in the life of the world, and he That the Infante's effected that end by imprisoning him.
Philip's object
was to remove
his
death, biz months after his arrest, relieved the king from a
moat painful and embarrassing predicament

i
is
indubitable,
Surd
it
the
ra
.-*ii>r.v
in
tli.-
r-,,
litemit*
and
l
relation*
On
p.
iv,
vuliility,
cf. Raehfahl, "/<. eft., Rachfahl, pp. Chroust, loc. cit., p. 490.
108.
'Cf. BaUeeteroa, Hi*toria de BtpaAo, 126: "Hoy nadie acuaa eeria1, p. mente a Felipe II de haber onlcnado.la
muertc do su hijo."
DON CARLOS
but there
is
39
no adequate ground
1
for believing that Philip
was
guilty of accelerating it. The most recent authority on this tragic affair 2 regards " He rejects a matter between father and son." it simply as
the hypotheses of treasonable or heretical conspiracies on the part of the Infante, but fully admits his unfitness to on the other hand he is very harsh in his verdict on rule
;
the king.
Philip's refusal to visit his son during his impris-
onment seems to him

stand
utterly heartless.
He
cannot under-
why
the king failed to reward the improvement in
Carlos's disposition toward him, which apparently took place after the Infante had been permitted to receive the
Don
any relaxation of the rigor he even blames Philip for his unwillingof his confinement ness to take part in the prince's funeral, which the king watched, with his accustomed calmness, from a window in 3 But these strictures seem to reveal a very the palace.
;
communion
at Eastertide, with
imperfect comprehension of the true character of Philip II. If the king was notoriously slow in making up his mind, he was equally firm in adhering to a course of action, once he
had embarked upon it to reverse the line of conduct which it had cost him such sorrow to adopt was unthinkable.
;
Moi cover,
1
is
not Philip's refusal to visit his son in his prison

tence
The
official
death,
as furnished
story of the Infante's by Philip to his

;
may be found in B. M., Add. Ms. 8219, fol. 216 his letter to the Pope of July 28, 1568 (Archivo de
corregidores,
la
Chancilleria de Valladolid, Reales Cedulas y Pragmaticas, legajo 3), con.
Cf tains many of the same phrases. a also R. A. H., Mss., est. 21, gr. 3 no. 36, and B. M., Add. Ms. 8219, fol. 215 b. B. M., Ms. Sloane 2802, which
,
is
a vida
"Breue
.
.
Compendio
de
la
Phelipe Segundo ... compuesto in franees por Pierres de Prette, coronista del Rey de Francia, y traduzido en espanol," contains (fol. 18) the following significant sen.
de
"El Rey de Espafia quisso mas perder la Prenda mas cara que tenia en esta vida que ver alborotado sus estados, cossa nunca oyda que un Principe preferia la Republica a la vida de un hijo de tanta edad y unico." I have not been able to identify Pierres de Prette. 2 Rachfahl, op. cit. 3 It is perhaps worth noting, in this connection, that the king also witnessed the baptism (August 25, 1566) of his daughter Isabella Clara Eugenia from Don Carlos acted as a secret window.
:
godfather on this occasion. Cf. Lettres de Philippe II A ses fiUes, ed. Gachard,
p. 21.
40
A SPANISH SOVEREIGN
to participate in his funeral quite as explainable
and
on the
hypothesis that he could not stand the strain upon his own We have seen affections aa on that of heartless cruelty? that it was a cardinal principle of the Prudent King never
to
reveal his inmost
feelings.
How
can we be sure that

all
Ids heart
aa
was not
filled
with mortal anguish
the time
anguish which he dreaded every unable to control?
moment
to find himself
The
parallel
between Philip
11 of
grandson, Louis
historians.
It
XIV
of France, has
Spain and his greatbeen often drawn by
attempted over two centuries ago French Protestant, Jean Jacques Quesnot de la by !hesnee, who held strong views on the dangers of univer>a! monarchy. He shows how the liberties of Europe had been
was
first
the
threatened,
its
in
by the house of Austria, "which attained preponderance through the two most unstable things and then by the world, namely, women and the sea,"
first
-
Bourbons under the Roi Soleil; he points out that "whenever a Holofernes has threatened to sei... the sovereignty <.f the world," a "Judith has been supplied by Engthe
:;
land,"
in
the persons of
Queen Elizabeth
-\d
Queen Anne,
Moriscos
4
to curb his insatiable ambitions.

cal
He
con, pares the politi-
and economic results
of the expulsion of the

tin-
with those of the revocation of
Edict of Nantes;
led astray
Returning
he
is
convinced that both Philip and Louis were

nf which, aa far as I no oopy in the United tree published at Cologne In ti full till.- i- "Le ParaUata de Philippe I] et de Louis XIV.," and the "I. I. Q." author d apparently he rliil Dot oare to h*V0 Ihi full name known. He bad fled from
1
by
t<>
evil
'I
in-
Ix.r.k,
on
in
t<.
Denmark.
Franco
know, then
>*
1688 t" olelm en inheritance, he waa oast into prison, but after a few months be wai released, at the orgeat ivqueBt <>f the Daniafa mbaawrVwi and went hack t<. bit adopted oountry. Cf. E.
an.
2
I
Baag,
La I'rance Protestante,
f.
viii
(1868), pp. 339

V. 11.
t'
the Bdiet
of
tory '" Berlin,
Nantes, and established a lace motit subsequently moved
'
'
L3
f.
Pp. 129
PHILIP
counsellors,
II
AND
LOUIS XIV
of China,
41
minis-
and envies the kings
"who have
ters of incorruptible probity."
stoutly maintains that "all men are by nature equal," that "Princes derive their authority from the consent of those they govern," and that "those who do not regard their subjects as their sovereigns
are no better than tyrants."
of absolutism
He
He violently assails the theories

right divine,
and
of
monarchy by
on which the
governments were both built up. 1 But there are other points of resemblance than these. Quesnot was primarily a political theorist
of the
Prudent King and
of his great-grandson
and he used the similarities between and Louis in order to point a moral. Had he been Philip an historian, desirous of describing what actually existed, he would have found that there was even more to his 'Parallele' than he had thought. Both monarchs had the same high conception of their kingly duties and prerogatives, both the same haughtiness and reserve, both the same willingness to work constantly and hard for what they conceived to be the welfare of their subjects and the glory of their kingdoms. Both were unwilling to give full confidence to any of their ministers both were methodical rather than brilliant in their conduct of affairs there is the same deadabout both of their reigns. Both of them, weight impression
of Anglophile ideas,
;
finally, built
themselves residences in the country, not far
from their respective capitals. But the nature of these residences, and the motives that led to their erection, were
widely divergent.
of disagreeable associations for
Louis hated Paris, which had been full him since the days of the
;
Fronde
he therefore conenormous expense, a luxurious himself, palace in the forest of Versailles, and permanently transferred thither both his court and his government on May 6,
in the period of his minority
structed
for
at
Pp. 233-235.
42 1682
A SPANISH SOVEREIGN
;
then- they were to remain
till
the time of the French
Revolution.
in fact
Philip, on the contrary, was fond of Madrid;

it,
he
made
for the first time, the capital of Spain,

his court there in the spring of
and formally established

'
l.".iil
ut
his desire to find repose
from his regular duties,
his love for clerics
and fondness
for religious contemplation,
DOmbined with certain special episodes of his own early career to bring into existence on the spurs of the Guadai rainas a dwelling which bears no resemblance whatever
to the palace at Versailles, the
tlir
famous monument known as

to char-
Escorial.
The word 'monument' has been purposely used

acterize
it,
because
it
emphasizes the
fact,
which
is
too often
forgotten, that the Escorial was in a large measure designed as a mausoleum for the remains of Charles V, who had
directed in his will thai hie bones should remain at Yufite

until his son should
resting place.
The
have provided them with a permanent story, often denied and as often reas-
serted, that the building

1
owes
its
origin to a
:
vow made by
Cf Jose Amador de
.
I
los
Rios and
este afio
Seal, corte,
Juan de
//
>ios
de
la
Rada y Delgado,
toria d, la Villa y CorU <l> Madrid Madrid, 1861 64, 4 vols.), ii, p. 450, and Ram6n de Mesonero Romanos, /;/ Madrid (Madrid, 1861 The latter deforibM the pp. xxiv fT.
,
ohiof reaaon for the

. . .
move
as
"
la
polltioa
do oreai una oapital aueve, Aniea, y general a todo <! r<-ino, agena a las impatiaa, 6 antipal Matorioaa de lae anterioree, y quo pudiera mi igualmente aoeptable a oaetellanoa y arafloneeee, andalucea y oatalanee y vaeoongadoe, gallegoe, " Amador y valenoianon. I" lo>.-4. ii, p 450, n. 4, oites, without de "el ana! pe< Leon Pinelo oon referenoia al naiamo
1*
del dia en que entr6 el sello que t'H la insignia formal de la s61o se halla que a no consta 22 de Febrei eatava en Conaejo en Toledo, y que i l'-> de Julio despachava en Madrid aunque don Francisco de Herrera Maldonado pone esta en* trada de la oorte el afio de 80, y el liiinciado Ger6nimo do (juintana, no se con (pic. [undamentoj el afio de
;
. . .
88."
fiutoria del 'Jose de Sigfienaa, Monatterio del Eecorial (Madrid, 1881); 1 I. /:.. xxviii, pp 664 667; "Memoriae de Fray Juan de Ban Qeronimo" in I). I. A' vii, pp, 442; I'reweott, iii,
1
.
."
as
folio
Etey
don
t
Phelipe Segundo, haviendo
<-l<-xi'li
Villa [de nfadri b lensia de bu cort, la truj6 a ella dosde Toledo
or the neighboring iron mines; another view traces it to Aeteuletum, plaoe of nerul) oaks, these being, ording to the guide l>ook, "the weed of the locality."
$ooria*\
ilroMs,
is 470. The Dame pp probably derived From the

i
is
most
of
THE BSCORIAL
43
Philip at the battle of St. Quentin, does not seem likely to be true, at least in the form in which it is usually told, for the reason that Philip was not present at the fray l we may,
:
however, well believe that the fact that that great victory
had been won on

influence
in
St.
tradition that the saint
Lawrence's day, together with the was born in Spain, was of decisive
permanently took.
determining the form which the structure Finally, there can be little doubt that
the retirement of the Emperor, after his abdication, to Yuste, strengthened Philip in his natural inclination to
build himself a residence in combination with a monastery and church. Whichever of these various motives is to be
regarded as dominant,
Philip
we can be
pretty certain that
when
came back
to Spain in 1559 the plan of the building
had already taken shape in his mind. Soon after the royal capital had been established at Madrid, a site was selected some twenty miles to the northwest. The first stone of the great edifice, styled by the Spaniards the 'eighth wonder 2 of the world,' was laid on April 22, 1563, the last on September 13, 1584. 3
To
describe the Escorial
is
wellnigh impossible
if it is
to be understood or appreciated it must be seen. Yet it is essential to try to give some idea of it, for it sums up the
Spanish Empire in the period of Philip II more perfectly than any book can possibly hope to do. Its plan is that of a
commemoration of the instrument on which the church, the courtSt. Lawrence was tortured to death and the cells of the monks form the lines of the bars yard, the royal apartments, the handle. The main rectangle is
gridiron, in
; ;
Cf. ante, p. 11. Louis Bertrand, however, in Revue des deux mondes, septieme periode, xlviii (1928), pp. 528 f., accepts the tale.
manuscripts in the British Museum designated as Add. Ms. 28,355 (cf. Gayangos, iii, pp. 24-32) deals almost exclusively with the founding of the
Escorial.
3
*D.
iii,
I.
E.,
vii,
pp. 7-23;
Prescott,
of
pp.
449-453.
The
volume
D.
I. E., vii, p.
393.
44
SPANISH SOVEREIGN
by 530
1
of gigantic proportions, 675 feet long

it
feet wide,
and
took twenty-one years to complete

is
it
its style,
though
distinctly reminiscent of that of the Italian school unique, of the second half of the sixteenth century, as illustrated by 2 the (iesu at Rome and the Granvelle palace at Besancon.
was the gray stone obtained from the quarries near by perhaps the most remarkable feature of it, as one views it from a distance, is the way in which it fits into the
Its material
8
;
surrounding landscape, the sombre colors of the lonely hills, the wild inhospitality of the frowning crags. Philip superintended the planning of it with that meticulous care for which his name has become a byword, and his ideas were
faithfully carried out
by
its
principal designer,
de Toledo, and also by his Herrera, who completed the work. The king constantly visited it while it was in the process of construction, and
Castillo
Juan Bautista successor, Juan de
urged on the workmen with an energy such as he seldom dis4 He shared with the ascetic played in anything else.
Hieronymite monks whom he had determined to establish there the rude habitation in which they were temporarily m -tailed he watched the rising of the great walls for hours
;
Rey, a rocky nook on one of the mountain spurs a mile and a half distant from the edifice itself. The whole scene is an epitome of the sterner and
on end from the Silla
del
Philip can be studied aspects of his character. in that landscape perhaps even better than in the books
lonelier
and manuscripts of the great monastic library. But if the prevailing impression of the Escorial as seen from without is one >f sombre simplicity and gloom, the gorgeous1
Appnrontly.
however,
finished
till
vault
was not
IV;
4tli
the burial the reign

1918),
tcrnlh
ulury, pp. 409-427.

;
The name of the stone is bmroqueha

i'
of Philip
rf.
Baedeker, Spain and

c<l
reeemblee granite, but

'
is
not quite so
Portugal, pp. iok f.

1
(Leipsie,
hard.
Cf.
ley,
Arthur Byne and Mildred StapSpanith Architecture of the Six-
Bertrand, toe. eft., p. 547; con toda furia was the phrase used by the annalists of the convent.
THE ESCORIAL
ness of
is
45
its
interior furnishes a
most notable contrast.

inmate
There which
but the
no
trace of this, indeed, in the royal apartments,

;
accurately reflect the asceticism of their
church, the galleries, the library, and its collections remain as a permanent memorial to Philip as a patron of art. The wished the Escorial to contain samples of the best king
products of all his dominions. Jasper was fetched from Burgo de Osma, and marble from the quarries of the Sierra
Nevada.
The
iron
work was
principally contributed
by
Toledo, which had been renowned, since the days of the Goths, for its preeminence in that art. Milan furnished
specimens of its workmanship in silver, gold, and precious stones, the Low Countries their most exquisite tapestries
fine
;
sent their curiously tinted 1 woods. Philip's determination to get the best paintings is more notable still. Like his father before him, he was a
and the colonies
in the
New World
and Tintoretto, who are both Madrid, though much less adeanother of his early favorites was quately at the Escorial the Fleming Antonio Mor, who first came to Spain in 1552 and enjoyed Philip's special good will for a number of years,
great
patron
of
Titian
splendidly represented in
;
by committing the unpardonable on the royal good-nature. The Cretan Dominico Teotocopuli, better known as El Greco,
only to lose
it
in a trice
error of presuming too far
crossed over to Spain in the middle seventies though the altar piece which he was commanded to paint for the
;
Escorial failed to please, he lived on at Toledo

in
till
his death
1614, doing
work whose true greatness has only been

2
appreciated in very recent years.
More
satisfactory to the
royal taste was the Italian Federigo Zuccaro, who was summoned to Spain about 1585 for the special purpose of
Lafuente, xiv, pp. 426 f The recent literature on El Greco is enormous. See, e.g., A. L. Mayer,
.
Dominico Theotocopuli (Munich, 1926).
El
Greco
46
A SPANISH SOVEREIGN
decorating the Escorial, and who brought the two Carducci brothers with him when he came. But this long list of
must not lead one to suppose that Philip had no Spanish talent; quite the contrary, he was firmly convinced that in painting, as in everything else, it was the destiny of his native land to emerge supreme, and his faith
foreigners
faith in
was gloriously rewarded
in the
age of his grandson.
In his
it
own day he showed
special favor, particularly
when
came
to the painting of portraits, to the Spanish-born Portuguese Alonso Sanchez Coello (1531-90) and to his pupil, Juan Pantoj a de la Cruz (1551-1609). These two, and, in the early years, Antonio Mor, painted pictures of almost every
member of
t
iers,
the royal family, as well as of the prominent coursecretaries, and generals of the day. It is worth noting
that Sanchez Coello got only fifteen ducats apiece for his porraits executed from life, and twelve for copies; for detert
mined though he was
that nothing should be lacking for the
decoration of the Escorial, Philip was constantly anxious to

Bave expense. Raphael's famous 'Lo Spasimo di Sicilia' was obtained without cost to the king by a really scandalous piece of corruption; and Arias Montano, his representative
in
the Netherlands, drove the hardest of bargains in the

1
purchase of books and of manuscripts. No .part of the Escorial was more precious to the king than its library. His fondness for reading was one of his
prominent characteristics; he was also a real conHe gave Qoisseui of rare books and precious manuscripts. constant employment to Fray Andres de Leon, one of the
mosl
ktest
1
masters of the
art
of illumination
Zaroo
then living; he
On all
y
la
thia tee
'.,,!,.
I).
Juan Mateoa, " Felipe

Eapafiola ra
rfvii
I.
/;.,
II
Cultura
si
Bisk)
8cm
Cuevaa, Pintuns Kspaholes en Lortnac -/ Reoi </< vl Escorial
\\l "fa
pp.
It,
ii.
(1896),
p.
xli.
pp.
Ml
184
pp.
386, 189;
L80
.
!">7;
187 ( Fornaron,
Julian
i t
<
imperially
(Madrid, 1931), and Pintont Italianos . . . J Btoprial (Madrid, 1988), publications <.f !< Iii.stitiitode Valencia da Don Juan.
THE ESCORIAL
47
spared no pains to furnish the monks of the Escorial with the most magnificent copies of the liturgy and the Scrip1 tures. Into the library itself there poured a steadily increasing stream of volumes and codices, both ancient and modern, in manuscript and type, some donated from the royal col-
them acquired through the Argus2 The eyed agents whom Philip employed all over Europe.
lections,
but most
of
treasures in the Greek and Oriental languages were probably the most precious of all indeed a complete history of the li;
of the renaisbrary 3 sance of classical literature in Spain. The richness of the decorations rivalled that of the content of the collections, and
of the Escorial
would be practically that
described in glowing terms by the first librarian, Jose de 4 and the books, which are placed on the shelves Sigiienza
is
;
with the backs inward, and the titles stamped on the edges of the pages, furnish the walls of the rooms in which they
are stored with a mellow
background
of old gold.
But it was not merely books and manuscripts that Philip was determined to gather in. He was also resolved that the Escorial should be a great repository of precious relics and bones of the saints. His zeal for amassing these was well known all over Europe one of the surest ways to win his favor was to send a gift to his collections. In them were
;
to be found the remains of St. Justus and of St. Pastor, an
arm of St. Lawrence for whom the monastery was named, "a head of St. Undelina who was queen of Sicily and suffered
martyrdom together with the 11,000
virgins,
and
of
another head of one of the 11,000 virgins, and another head one of the companions of St. Maurice the martyr, and
1
Jose de Sigiienza, Historia del Escorial (1881). pp. 403-406. 2 Ibid., pp. 399-408. 'J. Mateos in Ciudad de Dios, xlvii, Charles Graux, Essai sur pp. 109-111
;
les origines des
(Paris, 1880)
fonds grecs de VEscurial also B. M., Add. Ms. 28,(cf.
355,
4
fols.
271-273
Gayangos,
iii,
p. 29).
Sigiienza, pp. 388-399.
48
A SPANISH SOVEREIGN
another head of one of the companions of St. Gereon the martyr, and a bone of the same St. Gereon, and another
and two bones toand St. James, and another bone of the blessed apostle St. Bartholomew." 1 Such an assemblage of pious relics "out of those good old centuries when there was so much faith and so little
bone
of one of the
;
Holy Maccabees
gether of the blessed apostles St. Philip
not unnaturally produced the most gratifying results in the shape of miracles, and miraculous visions by
money"
'At four o'clock in the morning the Hieronymite monks. of the day after the delivery of the remains of St. Justus and
the prior was awakened by two young people who urged him to say mass. He made haste to obey and to run to the altar, for the holy friar fully understood that
St. Pastor,
those two young people were indeed St. Justus and St.
Pastor.'
3
This brief description

it
will at least
have served to make
and the Escorial are quite as incomparable as are the motives of the two monarchs that led to
clear that Versailles their construction.
Versailles symbolizes the splendor of

;
the age of Louis XIV it became the centre of French societ y and the seat of the French government. The Escorial was
a place of retirement for Philip II.
there,
it
He
brought his court
summer, and is said to have been able to accomplish four times as much work there as in Madrid; but it never became the capital erf Spain. The real reason why the Spanish monarch was so deeply
is
true, for a brief period during the
attached to
it
was
atmosphere
1
of
gave him a chance to live in the a monastery and contemplate the glory of
that
it
I) I also K.. vii, pp. 54-59; Rirhard Twiss, Trnvh through Portugal nrui Spain in 177t and 177S (London,
177.%). pp.
3
104
108
n/., p. 197.
Cf. also *D. I. B. vii, p. 54. B M Add. Ms. 28,355, fols. 304-326 (Gayangns. iii, p. 30); C. de C, ii, p 214; iii, p. 199.
t
,
Sigurnua.
Of),
PHILIP
God. 1
AND THE CHURCH
49
have drawn,
religious
In order to complete the picture of Philip which we it remains to say something of the nature of his
life.
Castilian tradition for eight centuries past furnished the background for it. Philip was a typical product of a coun-
try whose national existence and imperial expansion had been inseparably bound up with the advance of the Christian
faith,
whose greatest
victories
with the church.
\o
had been won hand in hand sooner had Spain driven the infidel
from her dominions than she began to carry the Cross to the inhabitants of the New World, and to make herself the bulwark of Roman Catholicism against the forces of the
The natural consequence of this historical < development was that she had come to regard her welfare
Reformation.
and even with that of Almighty God and this conviction was But that was by no means personified in Philip the Prudent. all. The conditions which obtained, both within the peninsula and without it, at the time of the king's return there in 1559, were such as must intensify all his inherited zeal As Charles V got his opporfor the Roman Catholic cause. tunity in the Hapsburg-Valois wars, so Philip was given
as necessarily identical with that of the ancient faith
;
his
by the era of the Counter-Reformation. The blows that had been struck during the previous forty years by the Protestants in their different branches against the authority and supremacy of the Roman church had
sufficient to
been
convince
its
it
leaders that they constituted
the most serious threat that
had ever been called upon to face. On all hands there went up a cry, spontaneous and enthusiastic, for the revival of the morals, discipline, and The movement it zeal of the Catholic clergy and laity.
1
Cf.
Bertrand
loc. cit., p.
in
Revue
des
deux
mondes,
545.
life
of Philip's
everyday
the routine at the Escorial,
On
see Forneron, there,
iii,
p. 264,
and references
50
elicited
A SPANISH SOVEREIGN
;
it was gathered headway with miraculous speed led by devoted priests and bishops, theologians and scholars, saints and mystics, who, though widely scattered over the
face of Western Europe, were united

service in a
by the
inspiration of
Spain contributed more than her share to this galaxy of splendid figures. We have no space to enumerate them all, but must restrict ourselves
common
cause.
instead to a few words about the greatest of them, the noble
Santa Teresa
of Avila. of age
life
She was forty-seven years

to her that her mission in
when was to
first it
was revealed
reform of the
life
of the Spanish clergy.
stupendous task.
The
position of
permanent was indeed a the clerical estate had

It
effect a
become
that
tions
its
;
so unassailable,
and
members had come many of them were notoriously

of
authority so unquestioned, to neglect their spiritual funcits
corrupt,
and the
multitude
privileges
the
and
hangers-on who participated in their immunities was a public scandal. But

;
Teresa was nothing daunted in the year 1562 she founded the order of the barefoot Carmelites in the convent of San Jose, to serve as a model of her conception of what monastic
life
should be.
The
rigor of the discipline
which she
>ul>-
jected her followers almost passes belief; her own deepesl of eating, grief, so she once confessed, was the necessity
especially
when
it
meant the interruption
of her prayers;
lie
when
she died in 1582, at the
age of sixty-seven,
left
was reputation bo -pot less that forty years afterwards she She was not wholly successful in effecting the canonized.
the evils againsl prhjpfc she had dedicated her life which she fought were too firmly intrenched, and her own But ideals were SO exalted as to be practically unattainable.
effrmaio
it
lb
certain that
tin-
veneration which her
own
career evoked
among
the Spaniards tended to emphasize their already
PHILIP
AND THE CHURCH
51
strong tendency towards the mystical and emotional phases of religious observance, possibly even somewhat to the detri-
ment
of their zeal for the rectification of abuses
and other
1 practical demonstrations of their loyalty to the faith.
Philip himself
things.
was profoundly influenced by all these There seems to be some reason for believing that
;
he received Santa Teresa at the Escorial either in December, 2 even if he did not, it is certain that 1577, or in May, 1578
the training that he had received in his early years rendered him particularly susceptible to the examples and precepts of
such a person as she, and that his religious life, particularly at the close, was marked by the intensity of its devotional This was evident not only in the frequency attendance at mass, in the strictness of his observance of ecclesiastical ceremonies, and in the fervor of his prayers
manifestations.
of his
;
it
was
discernible also in his musical
and
artistic predilec-
and he could give it fullest play when living with the in the gloomy solitudes of the Escorial. In it he found his only consolation for the defeats and bereavements of his later years by it he persuaded himself that however patent the ruin and decay which were going on around him, his cause was the cause of God and must, therefore, triumph 3 in th<j end. But it was not only in his own dominions and
tions,
monks
by seconding the
vinced that
efforts of
such enthusiasts as -Teresa of

;
Avila that he proposed to play his part he was also conit was his most sacred duty to champion and protect the cause of Catholicism all over the face of the
1 See Santa Teresa, Obras, ed. Vicente de la Fuente (Madrid, 1881, 6 vols.), particularly her autobiographical Vida
(i,
pp.
modern
life is
1-271). that
;
The best known by Louis Bertrand
(Paris, 1927) Rodolphe Hoornaerts Sainte Terese ecrivain (Paris, 1922) has a good bibliography. ' It seems probable, however, that
the letter published in the Boletin of the R. A. H., lxvi (1915), pp. 439-442. in which Teresa describes her interview with the king, is apocryphal. Cf. Bertrand, Sainte Therese, pp. 379 f. 3 On the decay of the Escorial and the
dispersal of its treasures, see Prescott,
iii,
pp. 468
f.
52
globe.
A SPANISH SOVEREIGN
the
far
And by the time that ho got back to Spain in 1559, reform movement within the church had progressed so
and become organised to such an extent as to give him
precisely the opportunity he desired. Clearly, unless the Protestants should voluntarily
come
back within the
fold, that
reform
;
movement was
bound
tially
to
mean
religious
war
its
ultimately connotations were essen-
In the Emperor's day the political and had predominated witness Charles's constant postponement of the war against the Lutherans, and the French king's alliance with the Turk Europe had been divided on the basis of Hapsburg against Valois rather
militant.
dynastic issues
than on that of Catholicism against Protestantism. But now that was no longer the case. The Catholic church bade
fair to
be reestablished on a firmer foundation.

I
Long
steps
had been taken toward the elimination of those a uses which had given point and justification to the complaints of the Protestants. Rome felt she had a right to reclaim their and if it was refused, to compel it. More and allegiance, more did she convince men that her cause was more worth fighting for than the worldly ambitions of rival sovereigns,
that earthly triumphs were as nothing CO u pa red to salvation in the world to come. And what rendered the impending religious conflict even
more
bitter
and more certain was

that the church of
the fact that almost at the very
moment
Rome
had purged
-
itself for
the fray, the hegemony of the
passed from the Lutherans to the ( Jalvinists, and therewith from passive to aggressive hands. The SaXOD
Protestani
reformer had always maintained thai "the word of (!i>i| would take care of itself"; the Genevan was equally convinced that
it
needed vigorous human
effort
its
to support
it,
ami he preached the duty
of fighting for
active advance*
ment
as ardently as the Catholic leaders -ounded the call
PHILIP
to
AND THE COUNTER-REFORMATION
53
arms on the other side. Under the circumstances religious war, on a scale hitherto unprecedented, was inevitable.
Dynastic and national
into abeyance
;
lines of cleavage
and Europe
for
were bound to fall some time to come would be
divided, irrespective of political allegiances, into Catholic
and Protestant camps. It is also interesting to observe that at the same moment and in some measure for the same reasons that the issues which disrupted Europe changed from
a predominantly political to a predominantly religious character, the scene of the conflict shifted too.
In the days of
and Martin Luther, the centres of interest were in Germany and Italy henceforth, they were to move westward to the Low Countries, to France, and to England.
Charles
;
But we must not wander too

solely in those phases of the
far afield.
Our
interest lies
affected Philip II
European and the Spanish Empire
situation which vitally

;
it is,
therefore,
on the
Roman
Catholic side of the
drama that we must
focus
our attention.
Obviously the success of the Counter-Reformation would depend, in large measure, on the effectiveness of its organization. It had got started, indeed, on a great
wave
of spiritual
enthusiasm
the shoulders of
had been borne forward on devoted men and women who had dedi;
it
cated their lives to the task
but their
efforts
might well
have proved unavailing, particularly in the impending struggle against heresy, without a correlation of its energies and a marshalling of its hosts. Clerical leadership was furnished by what a Protestant historian has characterized as the rechristianized papacy. Certainly popes like Pius IV, Pius V, Gregory XIII, and Sixtus V, whose joint pontificates
'
'
cover the years 1559 to 1590, were

ecclesiastical duties first of
all,
men who would put

sacrifice
their
and not
them, as
had some
of their predecessors in the

artists,
Emperor's day, to the
patronage of scholars and
and to the aggrandizement
54
of their relatives
in
A SPANISH SOVEREIGN
and bastards.
Even Paul IV deserves
the roll of these reforming Popes. Certainly his place zeal for the church was unbounded, though the effectiveness
of his efforts
behalf was impaired by his undying his pontificate forms a hatred of the house of Hapsburg
on
its
fit
transition from the age of the

at
Emperor
to that of his son.
And
the same time that reinvigorated Catholicism had
once more got a leader worthy of the name, it was supplied with a militant platform by the decrees of the Council of
That assembly, during whose earlier sessions there had been some faint hope of compromise with Protestantism, was summoned for its final and decisive meeting on January 18, 1562; and it promptly proceeded to render irrepaAll the doctrines rable the breach between the two faiths.
Trent.
and principles to which no Protestant could possibly subscribe, transubstantiation, the necessity of good works for
justification, clerical celibacy,
and the
all
rest,
were unequivo(
cally sanctioned and upheld;
the heretical ones were
No loyal 'atholic could equally unequivocally condemned. henceforth have any doubts about the tenets he was expected to maintain.
There still remained the important question of the instruments of which the 'rechrist ianized' papacy could avail
itself in
number
hand.
A order to carry the Tridentine decree- into effecl <>f primarily ecclesiastical ones were already to
.
mediaeval religions orders, sin h as the Franciscans and the ( "armelites, had already been thoroughly reformed and placed at the service of the church of Home;
of the
Some
other new ones, like the Theatines and the Jesuits, had ently sprung into being and were animated by the same
purpoc
tion
in
The Roman
Oil
the great conflict
Lines reminiscent
first
Inquisition had been reorganised for of the sister institu-
Spain, and the
Index Librorum Prokibitorum
PHILIP
AND THE COUNTER-REFORMATION

in 1557.
*
55
though they indubitably were, would avail but little by themselves, without the support of the lay powers. It still remained for the
religious leaders of the
was drawn up
But
all
these, efficient
Counter-Reformation to find some
in the interests great of the church, extirpate heresy in Western Europe, repel the infidel in the Mediterranean and in the Danube valley, and
sovereign who would marshal his armies
carry the Cross to the heathen. Rome found such a champion in Philip the Prudent, to the lasting misfortune of both. Of course it was evident from the outset that it must be
place there was the conclusive negative argument that there was no other possible candidate for the Ferdinand, in the Empire, was too weak and too place.
he.
In the
first
lukewarm
the last scions of the house of Valois were
unworthy the king of Poland was not to be thought of, and Elizabeth of England had gone over to the foe. There were also positive reasons in abundance. The Spanish Empire
;
had been the product of a great crusade the peninsula was the only portion of Western Europe that was virtually untainted by heresy, and Charles V had taken stern measures
;
The Spanish against the Protestants in the Low Countries. monarch was also master of the New World. If the Western Hemisphere was to be preserved for Rome, his cooperation was absolutely essential. Finally, there was the decisive
factor of Philip's
own
personality.
Of
his zeal for the faith

;
there could not be the least possible doubt his character, his training, and the precepts of his father combined to make
that certain.
awaited him.
He He
ardently longed for the great task that instinctively felt that he was the man of
the hour, specially fitted and summoned by Divine Providence to win the great battle for which Rome was girding her loins.
1
Pastor, xiv, pp. 276-282.
56
A SPANISH SOVEREIGN
Yet the situation was not, after all, quite so simple as at Ardent though he was in his sight it would appear. loyalty to the church, Philip was not the man to give without
first
getting something in return.
importance of his as the reward of it, for favors of a nature that the papacy might be unwilling to grant. There could be little doubt as to what those favors would be, namely, such a share in the
control of the policy of the
Abundantly conscious of the own support, he would be tempted to ask,
Holy See
as
would ultimately
make Madrid and the
Escorial, rather than
Rome, the
if
real
centre of Catholic authority.
In other words,
the battle
was to be won, and won with Spain's support, the church of the future was to conform to Spanish interests and printhat was Philip's idea of his share in the spoils. It ciples was not difficult to foresee the vast implications of this demand. Religiously they foreshadowed a Pope "n Spanish leading-strings, but politically their import was wider stillWe have already seen that Philip had openly renounced all
;
schemes of further
of the Valois
territorial
aggrandizement at the expense

I
"owing his he had proclaimed his intention of remaining henceforth politically on the defensive; h had retired to
\
and
his other Christian foes.
father's advice,
Spain after the treaty of 'ateau-Cambresis, ostensibly to busy himself with internal problems. But now, as the lay leader of the militant forces of Catholicism, he was reenter(
ing the international arena by another door.

of Spain
If his
COncep-
power would inevitably be increased by every victory that he won for Rome; tinder cover of advancing the faith, he would be adding to the already intolerable preponderance of
his native land. 1
1
tion of his relation to the church should prevail, the
It
\a
doubtful
if
this
conception had taken

F'olonia
tntdUa d* <an Ctetm mbajador en Alcmania, nobre la intcrvencuin de

'f.
'
hen,{.
Exjuinn in
1008,
ed.
y UnnQria,
of
1581-
11/
the
Marquis
Ayerbe
(Saragossa, 1892).
PHILIP
definite
AND THE PAPACY
57
shape in his mind at the time of his return to the peninsula in 1559 but as the century wore on, and the polit;
ical lines of
it
cleavage began gradually to reassert themselves,

earliest of all the
became increasingly obvious whither he was tending.
powers to appreciate the true was the papacy itself, the head of the church whose lay champion he had become. On the closeness of the cooperation of the two allies in the great cause much depended, far more in fact, than could have been evident to
state of affairs
Perhaps the
contemporaries during the early years of Philip's reign. It is high time, therefore, that we should give some attention to
the story of the relations of the Prudent King to the successive occupants of the Holy See during the forty-two years in which he wore the crowns of the Iberian realms. 1
The
age-long tradition of Spanish loyalty to the church
must not blind us to the fact that the more recent history of the relations between Spain and the papacy had not been entirely happy. Europe had not forgotten the terrible sack of Rome in the days of Clement VII. Charles V had openly with Paul III. The war between Paul IV and quarrelled With the advent of Philip was still fresh in men's minds. the Medici Pius IV in 1559, 2 there was indeed much reason to expect a marked change for the better. Political complications, the chief cause of the
different pontiffs of his day,
Emperor's quarrels with the

at least temporarily
had been
ended by the treaty

1
of
Cateau-Cambresis.
Philip
was back
in Spain, apparently using all his influence to secure the

" Of. Martin Philippson, Philipp von Spanien und das Papstthum,"
II.
-
On the conclave that elected him and
in
Historische
Zeitschrift,
xxxix
la
(1878),
pp. 269-315, 419-457.
The important
Diplomacia
volume Los Despachos de
Pontificia en Espaha, torn, i (no more published), by Ricardo de Hinojosa (Madrid, 1896), extends to 1605 and is devoted chiefly to the reign of Philip II.
attitude thereto, cf. Ricardo de Hinojosa, Felipe II y el Cdndave de 1559 (Madrid, 1889) Paul Herre, Papsttum und Papstwahl im Zeitalter Philipps II., pp. 33-64 Pastor, xv, pp. 1-65; Ludwig Riess, Die Politik Pauls IV. und seiner Nepoten (Berlin, 1909), pp. 379-398.
Philip's
;
.58
A SPANISH SOVEREIGN
prompt election of a good Pope, and Pius was far gentler and more eomplai>ant than his predecessor. But all these
favorable circumstances were insufficient to prevent clashes between Philip's Caesaropapismus and the determination of
arose
Pius to maintain the dignity of the Holy See. Trouble in the first place over the status of the Spanish
Inquisition,
whose autonomy and 'supercminence' Philip
regarded as the brightest jewels of his crown.

of Toledo,
The
story of
the king's persecution of Bartolome Carranza, archbis] who was unjustly suspected of Protestant lean-
ings, and the papacy's interference therein is the most it will be narrated more fully in a obvious case in point subsequent chapter.' For the present it will suffice to
;
remark that there

u
is
no reason to think that the Prudent
King cherished any personal antagonism to the archbishop; was simply a case of asserting the authority of his own favorite tribunal as againsl that of Rome, and possibly also
of getting a
chance to seize
tin
4
for the
crown the archiepiscopaj
revenues during
vacancy
of the see.
Whether
(
financial considerations
it
'arranza case,
is
had any bearing on the certain that they were a constant sourer
his
of friction
1
In papal contemporaries. 556, the distinguished theologian Melchior Cano boldly advise. the king to reform the administration of the Spanish
1
between Philip and
church
in
such fashion thai
it
should be able to enjoy
its
;
them drained away to Rome as things stood, he maintained, Spain had to go on her knees to the papacy in order to get the clerical subsidy, which wa< paid her in funds that were really her own. 2 As far as
own revenues
instead of having
Infra.
\,\>.
4X0
f.
Cano cf. Permfn Cntwllwu). Conquenim lluttrrx, (Madrid, 1871),

ii
On
381 .'596; CftBO'l "PlIMK tooante astado en qui so haUan laa cos.sas dc la Inl(>8sia" (1. Nov.
1867),
.
pp.
to
en
.-i

timon
f..
and
.\ri>
t.
.1
M
.
('.iiardia's
wo/nut-
tin-
<{<
t
Qobernar
.ni-
ftrri1x-.|
An
Plra
'Paris,
il to be found in CabaUafO, ii, At BOS 523. present, bo Cano insist*, "aunojue rvtomos aRraviadoa
15. >>,
pp.
PHILIP
AND
;
PIUS IV
59
this Philip did not venture to go

it
on the other hand he made
plain at the outset that he did not propose to fight the
he was adequately reimbursed. Not only did he demand the continuance of the cruzada, but also an
infidel unless
to reimburse him for the special extraordinary subsidy efforts that he was to be called upon to make. Pastor cal1
culates that he derived no less than 1,970,000 gold ducats a

2 year from clerical subventions sanctioned by the Pope. But the 'special efforts' for which these revenues were
often failed to equal the papal expectations. At Rome Philip was regarded as almost criminally slack in send3 and after the ing aid to the Knights of Malta in 1565
;
demanded
campaign of Lepanto and the loss of Tunis, when the Spanish monarch refused to make any further efforts to recover Algiers and even began negotiating with the Sultan for peace, Gregory XIII put a stop to the extraordinary subsidy
two years. 4 Philip's attitude toward the Council of Trent was another fertile source of trouble. At the outset he no doubt agreed with his ambassador at Rome,
for a period of
Francisco de Vargas, who could see nothing in it but a reunion of heretics and Gallicans 'in which the devil was
working and
and he kept the closest watch, and his satellites, on the doings of all its through Vargas members. Not until the Spanish bishops had fully gained
plotting,'
the upper hand there were his suspicions allayed, and he

y damnificados, con nuestros propios dineros nos pagan, sin que nada les cueste," whereas "no dependiendo en lo temporal de la providencia de Roma, Roma dependiera de la nuestra y les
;
wards supplemented by an additional

grant
called
the
excusado.
Donato
podriamos dan el agua y el pan por pesso y medida sin gastar hacienda, sin peligrar conciencia, ganando mucho credito, con hacer de los mas enemigos que alia tenemos, los mejores y mas ciertos ministros de nuestra voluntad
(1573) in Alberi, Relazioni, serie i, vi, pp. 379-383, and infra, pp. 442 f. 2 Pastor, xvi, p. 361. According to B. M., Cotton Ms. Vespasian O. VI, fol. 86, the cruzada amounted to 600,000 ducats a year, the subsidio to 350,000, and the excusado to 293,000 total, 1,243,000 ducats.
:
3 * 6
y pretensiones."
1
This began in 1561, and was after-
Pastor, xvi, pp. 367 f. Pastor, xix, pp. 347-368. D. I. E., ix, p. 291, October
7,
1562.
60
A SPANISH SOVEREIGN
deeply resented every effort of Pius to guide its deliberations. Small wonder if the gentle Medici took alarm at such tre-
mendous pretensions. "You in Spain," he once burst out, "want to be popes and submit everything to the king;"
but
at
*'
if
the king wants to be king in Spain,

'
i
want to be Pope
Rome
It
was evident that the difficulties which had begun under Pius IV would sensibly increase when, in January, 1566,
that peace-loving pontiff
was succeeded by the much abler and more vigorous Pius V. 2 He had been elected with the
full
approval of the Spanish monarch, who, as usual, professed himself to be chiefly desirous of a 'good Pope for
but the contest which had begun under his The predecessor was to ramify and intensify under him. new pontiff was not content to rest on the defensive; he
(
hristendom,'
proposed to take active measures for the

ecclesiastical
rehal.il r
it
ion of
authority.
Most
of
in
these
measures had a
BpeciaJ bearing
Italy.
th<-
on the situation
the Spanish dominions in
Especially noteworthy were his efforts to undermine so-called Monarchia Sicula, or claim of the secular rulers
()
i
of Sicily to exercise there all the rights of a Legate

9
;
the Holy
the resources of some of the most notable historical
scholarship of the period were brought to bear to prove that the crucial words in the bull of Pope Urban (.Inly 5, 1098)
1
1
was based, probability forged, and thus to restrict the pretensions of the Spanish king in the island. 4 Three years
I
to
Count Roger
in
all
of Sicily, on
which
this claim
were
earlier,
by republishing the ancienl
bull
/// <<>citmini in a
-killully altered form, he took further steps to emancipate

r. xvi, :{72; pp. DOlttnger, Britrtg; i, pp tun f. 'On thfc period <f Co reapondenda itaStd* Diplomat durani, ,i Pontiflcado <i, I'm l', ed,
'On
.,/..
l
tin-
.cii.lav.-
<<
Herre,
xvii,
op.
pp,
C'f.
no
,
181
Vol.
Pustor,
I,
pp.
16
*
nut.
'.:>
p.
516;
Pastor,
rviii,
pp.
42
LuciftiM.
SoRsno Madrid, uu
i,
vols.).
PHILIP
AND
PIUS V
61
ecclesiastical authority all over the world, particularly in
financial
matters, from secular control. This naturally affected all the dominions of the Spanish Empire, but it was
1
aimed at the kingdom of Naples, where the papal In Milan pretensions were greater than anywhere else. there were a whole series of clashes between the ecclesiastical authorities and the representatives of the king of Spain, the
specially
champion in the arch2 Yet bishop, Carlo Borromeo, the nephew of Pius IV. succeeded in maintaining his position. Both in the Philip north and in the south of the peninsula, his authority was more unquestioned and the rivalry of the papacy less menacand an ing_at the end of the reign than at the beginning
;
case of the former finding a strong
Italian proverb, current at the time, declares that while
the Spaniards nibble, in Naples they eat,, and in Most of the older causes of Lombardy they devour."
"_in Sicily
from the previous pontificates also continued under Pius V. The affair of Carranza reached its acutest stage during this period there were interminable ^difficulties about clerical subsidies Castagna, the papal nuncio in Spain, wrote back to Rome that he found the 4 authority of the Pope there diminishing on every hand. Ye^ the period of Pius V ended without an open breach. The
friction inherited
;
pontiff
praised
Philip's
conduct in the matter of
Don
all, the king and the Pope were drawn together again in 1571 by their common interest in the cam-
Carlos
above
paign of Lepanto.
sable.
The outstanding
fact
still
remained that,
despite perpetual quarrels, they were mutually indispen-
Under Gregory XIII

1
(May,
1572-April,
1585),
the
Cf. ante, Vol. I, pp. 524 f. Cf. below, pp. 474 f., and Pastor,
E. Lavisse and A. Rambfvud, Histoire

generate, v, p. 700.
4
xviii,
'
pp. 16-26. Cf. below, p.
Pastor,
xviii, p. 9,
472
Pietro Orsi in
Ibid., p. 45,
62
situation
A SPANISH SOVEREIGN
went from bad to worse; and during the years L579 81, matters came oearer to a formal break than they Political difficulties had been since the lime of Paul IV. as (Iregory complained were in large measure responsible;
1
of Philip's slackness in fighting
the
infidel, so Philip insisted
that Gregory's unwillingness to proceed vigorously against the heretic- in the Netherlands was due to his desire to see
the
Low Countries
lost to Spain.
The Pope's
attitude on
the annexation of Portugal was also displeasing to the SpanIt was evident that Gregory dreaded the extenish king.
sion of Spanish
and
for
power which would inevitably result from it, some time he strove to remain neutral between the
claimants;
different
indeed his
final recognition of Philip
as lawful Portuguese monarch was largely due to the fact that the latter, who, on this occasion, for once in his life was on time, was able to present him with the accomplished fact
before he
had had a chance

will
to lay plans for anything else.
These matters
tion;
be taken up more fully in another connecfor the present we must confine ourselves to topics
and point out that under the new Pope another source of friction with the Spanish monarch came prominently to the fore in the widely divergent at tit. des of the two
ecclesiastical,
Some of the preregard to the Society of .Jous. attitude in regard vious pontiffs had taken a rather negative
powers
to the
lie
in
Jesuits^ but (iregory supported glowered privilege utter privilege
them
heart
and soul;
;
upon them
indeed,
1
order was generally admitted to be hi- favorite;

the generalship of
L681
.
Under
Claudius Aqiuyixa b-lected February 7, had entered upon one of the really greal periods of its career; it gave countless proofs of its growing influble victories over many of its ence ami power; it woi
it
1
"
Paator. xix. pp. 869 Ibid., p. 364.
IWd., pp. 357-361. Ibid., p. 234.
PHILIP
bitterest enemies.
AND THE
JESUITS
63
Among
these .enemies, not the least con-
was Philip the Prudent. It may seem strange that an order which had such a distinctly Spanish origin l should have found itself opposed by the lord of the Spanish
siderable
Empire
the explanation
lies in
the king's dread lest the
and generals, might become so 2 So useful had the powerful as to get beyond his control. Jesuits proved themselves in advancing the cause of Catholicism all over the world, that it is doubtful if Philip would have ventured to proceed directly against them, had not the way been prepared for him by other foes of the Society. It
Society, like his counsellors so happened, however, that,
some years before
his accession,
they had aroused the lasting jealousy of the Dominicans, who always regarded themselves as the preeminently Spanish order in 1549 they had been bitterly attacked as
;
precursors of Antichrist
of
by Melchior Cano
Toledo and Saragossa were also openly
hostile.
the archbishops 3 In the
early part of Philip's reign the quarrel slumbered, though the new king's ardent support of the Inquisition, in which Do-
minican influence had always been very strong, 4 made it evident that an open breach could not be long delayed not
;
until the year 1580 did the Spanish
tunity which he so malcontents within the order started a

For the detailed history of the Spanish Jesuits, see Antonio Astrain, Historia de la Compafiia de Jesus en la Asistencia de Espana (Madrid, 19021
monarch get the oppordesired. At that time a few ardently
movement
for the
al
Ms. 5972, "Discorso Politico intorno Governo di Napoli di Incognito
25, 7 vols.).
new
was generally hostile to all religious orders, particularly to those of foreign origin. It is said that when certain Italian monks crossed over to Spain to obtain his license to establish a branch of their brotherhood within his realms, he replied: "Padres
2
Philip
Autor." 3 Joseph Brucker, La Compagnie de Jesus (Paris, 1919), pp. 119-125. 4 Cf. Lea, Inquisition of Spain, ii, 30-37. T. J. The pp. Campbell, Jesuits (New York, 1921), p. 202, says that the king frequently expressed a wish to have a Jesuit in one or another of the important offices of the Inquisi-
vayanse con Dios, que yo en Espana quiero que haya mucha religion y pocas religiones." Bib. Nac. Madrid,
mios,
was suspected, that by means he might "lay hold of the machinery of the Society and control
tion, in order, it
that
it."
64
A SPANISH SOVEREIGN
purpose of diminishing the authority of the general at Rome, so as to render the different provinces of the Society more
independent of his control. The plea for this change was that in no other way could the Spanish Jesuits remain free from the contamination of heresy the effect of it, of course,
;
would be to give Philip just the opportunity to control them for which he longed, and which he could not possibly acquire he thereas long as they were ruled from outside the realm
;
fore supported the malcontents in every possible
the Pope, for the same
reason, did his
way, while utmost to put them
down.
During Gregory's pontificate, Philip accomplished When in 1587 he applied to Sixtus for a revision nothing. of the constitution of the order, he found that the new pon-
though far less well disposed to the Jesuits than his predecessor, had no intention of changing its rules in accordance
tiff,
with the interests of Spain, but rather cherished

of
schemes
that time
modifying them
to suit his
own
views.
From
on the quarrel continued, with fluctuations according to the attitude of the successive Popes toward the order, till the end of the reign and beyond but Philip's enmity 10 it never 2 ceased till the end of his days. Under Sixtus V, and finally under Clemenl VIII, the ecclesiastical phases of the quarrel between the see of Rome
;
and the Spanish monarch were again largely obscured by the Sixtus, who had been elected against the will of political. Philip, was a fiery, impetuous soul, not unlike Julius II
just the sorl
person that could not possibly understand 3 and the or cooperate with the Blow-moving Spanish king; at the Vatican, the Count haughty Spanish representatives
<>f
shadowed by an
was foremodification order, <lrawn up by papal command in the last days of tinpontificate of Bbrtui \ requiring the ooiety to drop the name of Jeene from hut the death Of SixtllS WftS itM title; followed by ft reversal of his policy, and
ft
.
Such
Gregory
\I\ by the bull Bcclentu Catholieat (June 23, 1591) confirmed the Cf. society in its name and privileges. Brueker, op eit., pp. 194 196.
'On
WO.
*
all
this
of.
Brueker,
pp.
193-
Pastor, xxi, pp. 362-373.
PHILIP
of Olivares
AND SIXTUS V
of Sessa,
65
and the Duke
grew more and more
unpopular there as the years went by. The Pope's relations with the non-Spanish Italian states, particularly his intimacy with Venice, were also highly displeasing to Philip II, and
the refusal of Sixtus in 1589 to contribute to the sending of a second Armada against England was an even greater source
But it was with regard to the situation in France that the most serious divergence occurred. The death of Catharine de' Medici and the assassination of
of complaint.
Henry
fight
it
III in 1589 eliminated the middle party in the civil

;
wars there
Henry
out for
Navarre and the League were left to the mastery and the throne of the realm.
of
other grounds besides religious ones for detesting the Bourbon claimant, ardently supported the cause of the League, for its triumph would enable him to
Philip,
who had many
keep France in leading-strings and prevent her from becomThe papacy, on the other hand, desired ing a rival of Spain.
a France loyally
Catholic indeed, but independent
and
strong, to use as a counter-weight to the preponderance of
The all-important question, then, was whether Henry Navarre could be induced to abandon the religion of his 1 fathers and accept the Roman faith. For four long years, the last twelve months of Sixtus, the three brief covering
Spain.
of
and the first year and a half of Clement VIII, that question remained undecided when in July, 1593, it was answered in the affirmative, not finally,
pontificates that followed,
;
only did Philip lose
all
hope
of controlling the destinies of
France, but also a large measure of his influence with the see of Rome. He was no longer indispensable to it, for there
was
2 at last a possible alternative to his support.
Yet
it
was
thoroughly characteristic of him that he refused, to the very last, to abate one jot or one tittle of his earlier pretensions,
1
Pastor, xxi, pp. 273
f.,
358-364.
Pastor,
xxiii, p.
202.
66
A SPANISH SOVEREIGN
it
but heroically brazened
out to the bitter end, and so
successfully, moreover, that despite the altered situation, Clement VIII continued to the very end of his life to show
marked reluctance
to
briii:g
to adopt
any measures that might tend
about a breach with Spain. Filippo Sega, the at Madrid during the pontificate of Gregory papal nuncio XIII, summed up the story of the whole period admirably when he compared Philip and the Pope to two merchants, each of whom was firmly convinced that the other had
countless different ways, but who neverthe1 less could not afford to stop doing business with one another.
pronged him
phase of the relations of Philip to the papacy remains to be mentioned namely, the attitude and conduct of the Spanish king and his representatives at Rome with
final
:
One
It has been made the regard to the different conclaves. subject of a most painstaking investigation by a competent German scholar;- and his general conclusion furnishes a
significant
confirmation
of
the tendency,
noticed
in
the
immediately preceding pages, of political issue* to regain, in the last two decades of the century, that predominance over religious ones which they had enjoyed in the time of
(
Jharlea V,
but had temporarily
lost
during ihe
first
part of
the rule of his son.

of
Down
to,
and including, the election
Sixtns
little
V, Philip had really interfered comparatively with the choice of the successive pontiffs for the purpose
Of
advancing the interests of Spain. The most that he did \v;is occasionally to insist on the exclusion from candidacy of persons whom he knew to be avowedly hostile to his own
endg;
3
political
his chief interest
never tired of reiterating

1
the
M
seemed to be
J
as he was
Pope
(1591?)
313, :ux f., for Florentine also
in
'choice of a good
('f.
for
Pii.otor. xix,
|.
and referanoM
Emm,
of
1.
pp.
.6
f.,
th>
i'il
instances
this;
<li
Ham, Papattum und 1

Philipp*
II.
"Relatione
Hrntli. p. 21
Spagna"
fan
ZrxtalUr
(Lcipcig,
1007
PHILIP
Christendom.'
l
AND THE CONCLAVES
67
But during the pontificate of Sixtus there was a great change. The close bond between Spain and the papacy, which had made possible the Counter-Reformation, had done its work the old political lines of cleavage were
;
indeed, the Pope's own Struggling to regain the mastery attitude towards the various projects of the Spanish king
;
was
When powerful factor in bringing this to pass. realized the new state of affairs, his policy towards the Philip succeeding condives altered accordingly. JMore vigorous
a
measures were clearly necessary in order to keep the papacy in line with the interests of Spain and the obvious method
;
of accomplishing this end
was
to take a
more
tude with regard to the papal elections. claves which succeeded one another with such extraordinary rapidity in the eighteen months following the death of
Sixtus V, the Spanish monarch came boldly forward and indicated the names of the candidates whom he wished to
positive attiIn the four con-
have chosen
the policy of merely excluding undesirables was thus exchanged for the much more far-reaching one of
;
putting through the election of favorites. "The least we can demand at this time," so wrote Philip to his representative at Rome in November, 1591, "is that the victorious
should cooperate with me." For the time being the new policy seemed outwardly to attain its end. Despite the defeat of the Armada and the
cai didate
was
Countries and in France, Philip and dreaded at Rome and the four i)th respected successors of Sixtus V were all, at least at the time of their
ensuing reverses in the

still
Low
respective elections,
'
among the candidates recognized

4
as
Yet agreeable' to the representatives of the Spanish king. one of Philip's keenest henchmen at Rome, Francisco de
1
2
3
Herre, p. 603, note 3. Herre, pp. 363 f. Herre, p. 603, and references there.
4 See Herre, pp. 442-444, 453, 532 ( 541-543, 588 f., 624 f., for details.
68
A SPANISH SOVEREIGN
Pena, auditor of the Hot a, was not without his apprehensions in regard to the ultimate effects of the new attitude
Very serious consequences, he insisted, might result from the naming of persons whom his Majesty wished to have made Pope; "certainly it is not good policy to do so openly it would be far less dangerous
;
that had been
assumed.
to rest content with the exclusion of undesirables.

latter gains us
feel that
merely the ill will of a certain the former makes us they have been wronged hated by the entire Sacred College for there is not a single cardinal who does not daily conceive of the possibility that
;
;
The number, who
through some particular merit, capacity, or means, he may himself be chosen Pope." l But if Philip shared the auditor's fears,
all
he could not be induced to alter his policy.
While
the world was changing around him, he remained at heart the same; he continued to cherish his origin d ideal
of a universally
triumphant Roman Catholic church which should be guided and controlled from Spain. The more
dominant attitude towards the see Btancea had compelled him to adopt
of
Rome, which circum-
after the death of Sixtus
V, turned out ultimately to be a powerful factor in forcing the two powers apart; it had results, in other words, precisely
Qgpgsilfi to those
which he had intended.
The
era
which made Philip, and which he in turn contributed so much to make, was the era of the Count er-Reformation at itWhen height, the era in which he began his reign.
Europe began
to regulate
its
life
along other
lines,
he was
never quite able to accommodate himself to the change, and Spain and the Spanish Empire paid the penalty for
his failui
9ei
Bei
re, p.
541.
NOTE ON THE GENERAL AUTHORITIES
69
NOTE ON THE GENERAL AUTHORITIES ON THE REIGN OF PHILIP II

Archives and Indices to Manuscript Collections. In view of the fact that the field covered by this volume is so enormous, and the material on it so much more abundant than that for the period
Guides
to the
of Charles V,
it seems worth while to give the names of the principal printed indices and analyses of the more important collections of manuscripts for the benefit of those who desire to pursue researches
into
any one
to
of the different phases of the story.
It
is
the more
important have appeared in the last ten years. Of the older ones, the earliest is the list of manuscripts relating to Philip in the Biblioteca Nacional at Madrid which is to be found on pp. 50 f. of the appendix to vol. ii of Bartolome Jose" Gallardo's Ensayo but it is most de una Biblioteca Espanola (Madrid, 1863-89, 4 vols.)
;
do
this because so
many
admirable catalogues and indices
inaccurate and incomplete and there are also some manuscripts listed in Gallardo which are not to be found in the Biblioteca Nacional today. Next, and far more valuable, though also often inaccurate, is the
;
Catalogue of the Manuscripts in the Spanish Language in the British Museum by Pascual de Gayangos (London, 1875-93, 4 vols.). The most of the material on Philip II is listed on pages 653-824 of vol. ii and 1-194 of vol. iii; but much more is to be found in other parts of
The collection is enormous and the catalogue under other headings. has been relatively little used. Corresponding to this is the Catalogue
des manuscrits espagnols et des manuscrits portugais in the Bibliotheque Nationale at Paris by Alfred Morel-Fatio (Paris, 1892).
recently we have a Catdlogo de los Manuscritos Castellanos de Real Biblioteca del Escorial by Julian Zarco Cuevas (Madrid, 1924curiously enough this collection is rather disappointing 29, 3 vols.)
la
;
More
student of Philip II it is far richer on Charles V. Finally we have a whole series of indices and analyses of manuscript collections in Spain and elsewhere by Julian Paz, the chief of the Department of Manuscripts in the Biblioteca Nacional at Madrid. Of these the first five are all officially labelled Archivo General de Simancas, and have for their titles Diversos de Castilla (Madrid, 1904) Capitulaciones con la
for the
;
Casa de Austria y Papeles de las Negociaciones de Alemania (Vienna, Documentos de las Negociaciones de Flandes, Holanda, y 1913)
;
Bruselas (Paris, 1915)
Capitulaciones con Francia y Negociaciones ; de los Embajadores de Espana en aquella Corte, i, 1265Diplomdticas
;
and Patronato Real (Madrid, 1912) ; but it 1714 (Madrid, 1914) should be carefully noted that the fourth of these volumes is really a
70
A SPANISH SOVEREIGN
catalogue of the manuscripts from Simancas in the Archives Nationales at Paris, whither they were carried off by Napoleon at the time of the " Inventaire de la Collection Valuable also is the Peninsular War. " Tiran in the Archives Nationales, by G. Daumet, in B. H., xix
1917), pp. 189-100; xx (1918), pp. 36-42, 233-248; xxi (1919), Paz ha- also published a Cntdlogo de Docupp. 218-230, 282-295. WtefUoe l\spanolcs e.ci*te>ites en el Archivo del Ministcrin de Xegocios
cf. especially pp. 80-155 for the Philip II) and a Cntdlogo de Manu8crit08 de A?nerica In 1930-31, morer.ristentes en la Biblioteco Sncionnl (Madrid, 1933). over, he put forth an admirable two-volume Caldlogo de la Coleccidn
Ertrnnjems de Paris (Madrid, 1932;

of
period
ill Doeumentoe Ineditos para la Historiade Espana. It is an indispensable guide to the 112 volumes in question, and is far more useful than the less exhaustive analysis of the D. I. E. by R. Foulchd-Del
1
de and R. Barrau-Dihigo on pp. 113-179 of vol. ii (New York, 1925). These catalogues of Paz leave something to be desired. He often ignores the work on Spain and Spanish bibliography that is being accomplished beyond the Pyrenees
of the
Manuel
V Wepanisani
no evidence, for instance, that he knew of the analysis of FoulcheVDelbosc and Barrau-Dihigo at the time that he published His indices, too, are often faulty, no his catalogue of the D. I. E. distinction being made between different men of the same name. But it is all so much better than anything of the sort that has gone before that one is not disposed to complain. Naturally these indices contain material on other reigns as well as on that of Philip II but the Prudent King occupies a prominent place in them all. There also remain many important manuscript collection-, like those of the R. A. H., of which DO printed 'alogue has yet
there
is
;
appeared.
still
iii
Hut
it
the
way
of
the historical
it
student
sure to
in
Spain
is
far
smoother than
librarians
was ten years ago, and
is
become smoother
the near future.
It is a pleasure to add thai the Spanish ami archivists put themselves generously and courteously
at the disposal of
those
who
visit their collections
or write for informa-
tion about them,

in
and do their utmost
to facilitate their investigations
every way.
Bibliographies. S&nchez Ak>ns(
An enlarged and improved

i
edition
of
Henito
Hietoria Espafiola has appeared (1927, l-.i since the of the third volume of this work, and the publication Pages 17-55 pages on the period of Philip II are particularly good.
ntee de la
and 239 284
of the revised
French translation
ban-.
1912) of Carl
historical
Bratli'c Philippe II. rot d' Eepagne, first published in
Danish at Copen-
hagen three years before, are exclusively devoted to the
71
This author spent many literature of the reign of the Prudent King. years of laborious research in Spanish and foreign archives collecting material for a fresh picture which should refute the various calumnies
and misconceptions of which, in his opinion, the king had so long been his attitude the victim, particularly among Protestant historians throughout is frankly favorable to Philip. Bratli's book is not,
;
strictly speaking, a history of the reign, but rather a portrait of the king and a summary of his life's work but he gives full references for
;
and publishes a number of valuable documents in his appendix. Pages 17-55 comprise an essay on the historical literature pages 239-284, an alpharelating to Philip, buth in Spain and abroad The book is the work of an betical list of the principal authorities. amateur, rather than of a professional historian it is not for a moment
his
facts,
;
compared with A. Morel-Fatio's Historiographie de Charlesthe author is primarily There are many careless mistakes Quint. interested in Philip's rule in Spain, and therefore neglects, both in the text and in the bibliography, the progress and literature of foreign worst of all, one feels throughout that he is more interested in affairs fortifying his own conception of the Prudent King than in characterizing impartially the different authorities on the reign and letting the With these reservations, however, reader draw his own conclusions. It contains much that is the book may be used to great advantage. available nowhere else, and the hostile tendencies which it seeks to refute are still so prevalent, particularly in England, Holland, and
to be
; ;
America, that there is a certain advantage in having the emphasis placed on the other side. The Coleccion de Documentos Sources and Contemporary Works.
Prudent King. volumes are filled with original material for the study of Many it is also worth noting that a considerable number of the his reign most important documents, which are given in sometimes abbreviated
Ineditos
is
particularly valuable for the reign of the
of its
;
found there in
English translation in the Calendar of State Papers, Spanish, are to be That Calendar, however, for the full in" the original.
years 1558-1603, ed. M. A. S. Hume (London, 1892-99, 4 vols.), is also indispensable, not only for Anglo-Spanish relations, but also for other as are likewise volumes vi-ix of the phases of Spain's foreign affairs
;
Calendar of State Papers, Venetian, edd. Rawdon Brown, G. C. Bentinck, and H. F. Brown for the years 1555-1603 (London, 187597), and the first series, in six volumes, of the Relazioni degli Ambasciatori Venetial Senato durante il secolo decimosesto, ed. Eugenio Alberi The most valuable volumes in the great Collec(Florence, 1839-62). tion de documents inedits sur Vhistoire de la France for the reign of
72
A SPANISH SOVEREIGN
du Cardinal de For internal
Granvelle, ed. Charles Weiss
affairs
Philip are the Papiers d'etat (Paris, 1841-52, 9 vols.).
the
first
seventeen
de Castilla publicadas por acuerdo del Congreso de los Diputados (Madrid, 1877-91) are the most important source of all, though it is not so easy to find one's way about in
las
volumes of the Adas de
C dries
them
a* it is in the five volumes of the preceding set, which close with the death of the Emperor; and one sadly misses the learned introduction of Manuel Colmeiro. The Nueva Recopilacidn was first
published in this reign (infra, pp. 427, 455) and

for the period.
is
particularly useful
At the head
of the list of
contemporary authorities on
Philip's reign
stands the monumental work of Luis Cabrera de C6rdoba (1559-1623), Felipe Segundo, Rey de Espafia, of which the first part only (to 1583) was published at Madrid in 1G19; the complete edition, in four vol-
umes, appeared in 1876-77. The author's father and grandfather had been noted soldiers he himself was employed on different missions by the Prudent King, in Naples, in Flanders, and elsewhere, but returned
;
to the royal service in Madrid before the end of the reign during these " which years he took copious notes for the composing of his history, could not have been accomplished without them." In view of the
;
fact that Philip would never allow his life to be written (C. S. P., Venetian, ix, no. 737), it seems natural to suppose that Cabrera de
C6rdoba did not actually begin the composition

next reign, but
rary authority.
reign, with the
it
of his
work
till
the
deserves, nevertheless, to be treated as a contempoIt is chiefly a very detailed narrative history of the
main emphasis on foreign affairs and military campaigns, but the constitutional, economic, and social sides of the story are not wholly neglected, and there are occasional glimpses of the progress of the Spanish regime in the New World; the standpoint
throughout
is of course highly favorable to the Prudent King, bike the vast majority of the historians of his day and generation, Cabrera was a constant plagiarist indeed the second half of his work has been
;
described as
Ib-rrera
(cf.
little
more than a compilation
of the writings of others;
infra) is perhaps the one from whom lie took the most. But the thing that distinguishes the plagiarism of Cabrera from that of the mass of his contemporaries is that he was not ashamed to steal
a passage or phrase from another writer and utilize it for a totally different purpose from that for which it had been orginally composed he take-, for u the very words which Diego Hurtado de Men;
.
dosa
in his (iHcrra de
who volunteered
idr the
Granada uses to characterize the men of Seville war again-t the Mori-rM- m 1570 (of. B. A. A'.,
i,
Hi-toriadores de Buoesos Particulares,
p.
114, col.
1,
lines 13-34),
73
and applies them to the Sevillans who were recruited by the Marquis of Santa Cruz for the second expedition against the Azores in 1583 (cf.
C. de
C,
iii,
p. 16, lines 2-17).
Despite these defects, however, his
indispensable, and any serious historian of the reign must have The only other contemporary works of a it constantly by his side. general nature on Philip and his period which it seems worth while to mention here are the brief Latin biography by the learned Juan Gin6s de Sepulveda, which only goes to 1564, and was first published at Madrid in 1780, in the third volume of the collected edition of the
book
is
author's works put forth
by the R. A. H.
'
the Historia General del

'
Rey Felipe II. el Prudente by Antonio de HeTiempo rrera y Tordesillas, better known as the Coronista de las Indias (best and the Historiae sui Temporis edition, Madrid, 1601-12, 3 vols.)
del del
;
Mundo
Thou (best edition, London, The works of Cabrera de Cordoba and of Herrera 7 vols.). 1733, served as the basis for the formation of the Spanish conception of the
(1543-1607) by the Frenchman
J.
A. de
Prudent King, which, fortified by Baltasar Porreno's more popular Dichos y Hechos del Rey Philipe Segundo (first ed. at Cuenca, 1621, latest at Valladolid, 1863), endured unchanged for over two centuries That of de Thou, reenforced by such partisan accounts as to come. the Relaciones of Antonio Prez and the tales of Brantome, laid the foundation for the hostile and distorted estimates of him which were
perpetuated during the same period outside the peninsula. Later Works. It is no wonder that the latter of these views became overwhelmingly prevalent during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, so prevalent, in fact, that it has not been entirely abandoned even today. In Spain Porreno's work had no successor
for over
two hundred years, either in history, drama, or fiction. In other countries, however, Philip steadily continued to be presented in a most unfavorable light, in histories, such as the prejudiced and inaccurate History of the Reign of Philip the Second by Robert Watson,
published in London in 1777; in historical novels, such as the Don Carlos of Cesar Vischard de Saint-R6al, which first appeared in Amsterdam in 1672; and above all in dramas like the Don Carlos of Thomas Otway (London, 1676) and the still more famous play of the same name by Friedrich von Schiller (1787) it was chiefly indeed by
first
;
historically inaccurate dramatizations of the tragic story of Philip's relations with his son that the popular hostile conception of the Pru-
dent King was kept before the public eye.

in all this period
Practically the only writer
word to say for him was the Italian Protestant, Gregorio Leti, whose Vita del Catolico Re Filippo II appeared in 1679 but as Leti wrote primarily to amuse, and was not
a good
;
who had
74
A SPANISH SOVEREIGN
ashamed to invent stories out of whole cloth when he could not find what he wanted in the authorities, his work was never taken seriously by historians. It thus came about that when history began to be scientifically studied and rewritten in the middle decades of the nineteenth century, an enormous amount of revision of the older verdicts was
inevitable.
The Spanish
share in that process of revision has been rather that
of rendering accessible fresh material than of examining and sifting it and utilizing it in the composition of scientific historical works. The
Spanish archives were thrown open for the first time in 1844 the pubDocumentos Ineditos was forthwith begun, and the activities of the Real Academia de la Historia took on a new lease of life. Notable histories covering wider fields, such as Cesareo Fernandez Duro's Armada Espanola, in which many of the misconand likeceptions of Philip have been corrected, have also appeared
;
lication of the Coleccion de
wise a
us the
number
Marquis
of excellent
special nature, such of Pidal's Historia de las Alteraciones de Aragon en el
monographs
of a
more
Reinado de Felipe II (Madrid, 1802-63) and Julian Suarez Ionian's Qlierra de Anexion en Portugal, which will be described more fully in the
subsequent bibliographical notes. But for the most part the saner verdicts on Philip II which have begun to prevail in recent years
are the fruit of the
investigations of historians from
beyond the
Pyrenees.
took some time for the older prejudices to be forgotten; W. II. History of the Reign of Philip the Second (Boston, 1855One cannot help feeling that it was 58, 3 vols.), is a case in point. almost a pity that he undertook this work. It seems clear that he failed to gauge the enormous amount of the avail. tble material, for he it barely succeeded in carrying his story to the middle of the reign breaks off in some of its phases at 1568, and in others at 1581. His eyesight, moreover, was failing at the time, and he had to rely, far more than in any of his earlier books, on the labors and investigations of others. No one can question his perfect historical honesty, or his desire to be absolutely fair; but the difficulties we have already enumerated, coupled with his inherited training and predilections, made it impossible that he should produce, in this his final effort, anything
It
Presoott's
comparable with his previous masterpieces. to turn at an even earlier date. In a

that the
it
In Europe the tide began may be truthfully said
first really accurate modern portrait of the Prudent King was drawn by Leopold von Ranke in hi- Dii 0$mantn und die spanische
at
Monarchic im sechszehntcn und siebzehnten Jahrhundert, first published Hamburg in 1827. That portrait was chiefly based on the Rela-

zioni of the Venetian
;
75
had
just
ambassadors which Ranke's
efforts
brought to light and it started subsequent investigators on the Reinhold Baumstark's Philipp II. Konig von Spanien right road. " Konig Philipp II. von (Freiburg i. B., 1875), Martin Philippson's " in Der neae Plutarch, iii (Leipzig, 1876), pp. 1-116, and Spanien M. A. S. Hume's very readable Philip II. of Spain (London, 1897)
are typical, each in its different way, of the sort of monograph that has begun to be produced by those who have had the opportunity to examine the new material recently made available, and have been trained
in
modern methods of scientific historical research. The largest and most ambitious work which has appeared on the Prudent King in the period under review is Henri Forneron's Histoire de Philippe II, which was published in four volumes at Paris in 1881-82. The author was
exceedingly inaccurate in details (cf., e.g., Surez IncMn, Guerra de Anexion en Portugal, i, p. xvii, and ii, pp. 157 f.) it is not a difficult task for any one who knows the period to go through his book and find petty mistakes on almost every page. Forneron also was overfond of dramatic effect and dearly loved a good story his outspoken admiraOn the other tion of Brantome is thoroughly characteristic of him.
; ;
hand, he spared no efforts to get at the sources he cites his authorifor every important statement ties though often incorrectly that he makes, and an unusually large proportion of those authorities the broad outlines of his picture, moreover, are original manuscripts The book is at once profoundly irritating and are essentially correct. None of its statements can be accepted wellnigh indispensable. on the other hand, the task of the without careful verification historian of Philip II would be far harder if he did not have it beside
him.
There have
also appeared, in the course of the past fifty years, sev-
eral over-favorable estimates of the character of the king,
such as Jose Fernandez Montana's Nueva Luz y Juicio Verdadero sobre Felipe II a (2 ed., Madrid, 1891), his Mas Luz de Verdad Historica sobre Felipe II el Prudente (Madrid, 1892), and Fidel Perez Minguez's Psicologia de but these are scarcely to be regarded as Felipe II (Madrid, 1925)
;
serious historical works.
The same may
in general be said of the four

:
Jean Cassou, La vie de most recent books on the Prudent King e Philippe II (7 eU, Paris, 1929), Reinhold Schneider, Philipp II, oder Religion and Macht (Leipzig, 1931), David Loth, Philip II of Spain (New York, 1932), and J. H. Mariejol, Philip II, the First
Modern King (New York,
1933).
;
The
last
named
is
the work of a
recognized master in the field but unfortunately it is little more than " L'Oeuvre de a translated expansion of the author's excellent article
76
A SPANISH SOVEREIGN
of Lavisse
Philippe II." which first appeared in vol. v, pp. 49-107, and Ramhaud's Histoirt grncrale in the year 1895.
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE TO CHAPTER XXXI

See notes at the end of Chapters
XXVI,
ante,
and
XXXIV
and
XXXVI,
infra,
Sources.
tions des
The
and add:
decimosesto, ed.
Relazioni degli ambasciatori Veneti durante il secolo Eugenio Alberi, serie i, vols, ii, iii, v, and vi the Rela;
ambassadeurs Venitiens sur Charles-Quint el Philippe II, ed. and the D. I. E., especially vols, ii, L. P. Gachard (Brussels, 1855) vii, ix, xv, and xviii, all contain precious material for the topics covThe " Journal des voyages de Philippe II de ered in this chapter.
;
1551 a 1560
"
by Jean de Vandenesse, edd. Gachard and Piot
in vol. iv
of the Collection des voyages des souverains des Pays-Bas (Brussels, 1882), is also useful; and the Lettres de Philippe II a ses filles les
Infantes Isabelle
et
Catherine ecrites pendant son voyage en Portugal
(1581-1583), ed. L. P. Gachard (Paris, 1884), shed a flood of light on Los Despachos de la Diplomacia Ponthe true character of the king.
tificia
en Espaiia, i (no more published), by Ricardo de Hinojosa (Madrid, 1896), the Correspondencia Inedita de Cuillcn deSan Clemente, Embajador en Alemania, ed. the Marquis of Ayerbe (Saragossa, 1892), and the Correspondencia Diplomatics entre Espaiia y la Santa Sede durante el Poniificado de Pio V, ed. Luciano Serrano (Madrid,
1914, 4 vols.), will be found indispensable by those who desire follow the details of the negotiations of Philip with the see of Rome. The Historia del Monasterio del Escorial by Jose de Sigiienza
to
-
(1544-1606) (best edition, Madrid, 18S1 is still tl e standard authority on the subject with which it deals. The English translation by R. P. Kerr of Ludwig Later Works. von Pastor's History of the Popes has now reached the seventeenth century in twenty-four volumes and is an invaluable guide to the whole period of Philip's reign; vols, iii and iv of Henri l'irenne' llistoire de History of the Inquisition of Spain (New 'i/iie and H. 0. Lea's
)
The standard exceedingly useful. " Note Prudent Bang are discussed in the preceding on the General Authorities"; and volumes xlvii and xciv of the Ciudad de Dio contain additional information in regard to the king's The footnotes to pp. 34 39, supra, give character and personality. adequate indications of the literature in regard to Don Carlos. Paul
Y'>rk.
1006 07,
vols.) are also
biographies of the
Serre'i
1907) and
Paptltum imd Papttwahl ita ZeUalter Philipps II. (Leipzig, und seiner Nepoten Ludwig Riess's Die Politih I'm/Is I
I
.
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE
(Berlin, 1909) are useful
77
monographs on the subjects with which they Therese (Paris, 1927) and Joseph Brucker's La Compagnie de Jesus (Paris, 1919) are also valuable and everything from the pen of Julian Zarco Cuevas in regard to the NumerEscorial and its contents may be accepted as authoritative.
deal.
Louis Bertrand's Sainte
ous other monographs of too special a nature to be inserted here will be found in the footnotes to the preceding pages.
CHAPTER XXXII
THE LAST OF THE CRUSADES
Philip could undertake the great task of marshalthe hosts of regenerate Catholicism against the infidel ling and the Protestant outside the limits of the Iberian peninsula, it was essential to make certain that Spain itself was
as nearly as possible untainted by any suspicion of heresy or unbelief. One of the principal reasons why he had been so anxious to get home was that he might give personal supervision to such work as should prove necessary to the accomplishment of this end; and The history of the of his reign is largely the record of his efforts to arly years
Before
attain
it.
As
far as
Protestant ism was concerned, the
wa& com-
So far removed was Spain from the paratively simple. centres of the Reformation, and so powerful and all-pervadwas the machinery of the [nquisition, thai the doctrines ing
chance to establish it used, indeed, to be thought that the Spanish Protestants were so numerous and well organized that considerable efforts were necessary to suppress them;
a
ol
Luther and Calvin never really go1
themselves there,
thirty year- ago, it was conclusively proved thai this a gross exaggeration, that the number of native Spanish Protestants tried by the [nquisition, exclusive of the congregations of Valladolid and Seville, was probably not over
-
but
tour hundred
in
in all,
and that
of those
who
preferred death
the flames
cantatioo then- were perhaps hardly more

78
PHILIP
AND PROTESTANTISM
79
than a score, though a much larger number perished by the
The moreover, was

1
garrote.
greater part of the work of extirpating them, finished at the very beginning of the reign.
In 1557, while Philip was still in the Netherlands, two small Protestant conventicles were discovered, one at Valladolid and one at Seville it would also appear that many of the
;
heretics in the latter city were of Jewish origin,

a tradition of nonconformity behind them.
and thus had

Office
The Holy
made
haste to pouDce on them. It had been in a somewhat decadent condition during the latter years of the reign of
Charles V, for lack the metaphor is particularly apt of fuel to feed the flames, and it now eagerly seized upon the
opportunity for renewed activity, exaggerating the peril and posing as the saviour of society in averting it. Indeed, it is largely through the rumors and reports which it circulated
that contemporary and modern historians were misled into thinking that the danger was much greater than was actually
the case.
Most
of the suspects
da-fe at Valladolid, on
latter
May
were disposed of in two autos21 and October 8, 1559 the

;
was considerably the more important, and Philip, as we have already seen, graced the occasion with his presence. 2
After this, the process of extirpation continued in much less wholpsale fashion, and the culprits were increasingly few. After the middle seventies they were mostly foreigners, who
naturally claimed
Holy
Office,
immunity from the jurisdiction of the and the problems which arose in connection
with their cases played their part in the formation of the then nascent science of international law. One of the most
bitterly contested points
of the
ambassador England should be permitted to have the Anglican service performed in his own house. Dr. John
or not the
was whether
queen
of
E.
des
Schafer, Beitrage zur Geschichte spanisclien Protestantismus, i, pp.
Schafer, op.
cit.,
iii,
passim
and
pp.
208-232.
Lea, The Inquisition of Spain, 437-442.
iii,
80

sent to
Man, who was
Madrid
in the spring of 1566, insisted
on this privilege, and apparently was given reason to believe hut the king was obdurthat it would be accorded to him ate and required him to 'sequester himself from the capital
;
at the little village of Barajas, where it was impossible for him to perform the duties of his office. Man forthwith demanded his recall, which was immediately granted him
and
ect
it is
significant of the intensity of Philip's dread of Prot-
ant contamination that he

to return to
would not even permit the

provision for his journey. sense of the word was not
1
envoy
Madrid
to
make
But Protestantism
in the full
the only form of heresy against which Philip waged relentThe slightest deviation from the laws of the less war.
church, as upheld by the lay and ecclesiastical authorities of Spain, was almost certain to be detected and mercilessly
It might be failure to observe a fast, or to conpunished. form to the established rules of the service of the church of
mighl be the possession of forbidden books, or any one of a multitude of other derelictions the agents of the Inquisition were sure to be on the watch and to receive
Rome;
it
Philip's enthusiastic support in their
demands
for investi-
much conOffice gation and judgment. cerned in this period with the suppression of another form of heresy, thai <>f the Alumbrados or Illuminati, which, though
The Holy
also
its
wm
origin
is
nearly Weiahaupl three centuries earlier, in the Spain of the Catholic Kings. A- n appeared in the [berian peninsula it was essentially a form of mysticism, whose adherents recognized he supremt
usually associated with the Bavarian in 177<. really arose for the first
Adam
acy
selv<
the internal Light, and consequently regarded themreleased from the obligation of obedience to the
ron.
i.
r,
.'1
pi.
L90
C. 8. P.. Forrign, LOOfl '.V
DM. 2087. 2008, 2109, 2112.
2127.
THE SPANISH INQUISITION
81
It often vented itself regular ecclesiastical authorities. in hallucinations and in sexual aberrations, and was utterly
abhorrent to the
officials of
the Suprema.
There had been

;
processes against the Alumbrados in the Emperor's reign on the other hand, the edict formally declaring their faith
to be heresy
was not published
till
the time of Philip
IV
it was under problem of extirpating them was first seriously and systematically taken up, so that
but
Philip II that the
thenceforth the ultimate issue could not reasonably be in doubt. 1
Holy Office. Never had its supereminence been so far-reaching and complete. For the king it was not only the emblem and instrument of his
It
of the
was indeed the heyday
own conception
dominance
lic
of the purity of the faith,
but also
of the
of that conception
world.
He
kept
full
throughout the Roman Catho2 control of it in his own hands. He[

;
he kept appointed and dismissed the inquisitors at will them all under the closest surveillance he gave them defi;
nite orders for the discharge of their functions.
In the dread
and impenetrable secrecy which shrouded all its operations, seemed to be the very mirror of himself. He used it not only to keep his own subjects, both lay and ecclesiastical, in strk t conformity to the lines he laid down, but also to fortify
it
his
It made position with regard to the see of Rome. trouble for the Spanish poet, Fray Luis de Leon, the glory of the order of the Augustinian Friars, and even attempted
;
own
same for Santa Teresa that her persecution did not proceed further than certain rather humiliating interto do the
Marcelino Menendez y Pelayo, Historia de los Heterodoxos Espanoles, ii, pp. 521-585 (2d ed., v, pp. 205-280) Lea, Inquisition of Spain, iv, pp. 1-94 J. Melgares Marin, Procedimientos de
1
; ;
Llorente, Histoire de VInquisition d'Espagne, iii, pp. 102 ff. * On the supposed subjection of Philip to the Inquisition, cf., e.g., C. S. P., Foreign, 1566-68, no. 2109.
la
Inquisition,
ii,
pp.
5-159
J.
A.
Lea, Inquisition of Spain, 129-131.
ii,
pp.
82
of the king, to whom rogations was less due to the attitude she applied for protection, than to her own high character and saintly presence, and to the support of the Society of
Jesus.
The
hostility of the Inquisition to the
members
of
that order, though latent, was absolutely consistent throughout the reign, and had the widest ramifications. The Jesuits
as vigorously upheld the authority of the Holy See almost and the the supremacy of the king as did the Inquisition from the time of the struggle between the two institutions,
;
accusation of Carranza to the very end of the reign,

ful
is
a use-
barometer
2
of the
Spain.
The
tale of
mutual jealousies between Rome and Philip's repeated efforts and ultimate
Holy Office into the Spanish possesMilan forms another significant chapter sions in Naples and of the same story. Its establishment was, for him, an insepafailure to introduce the
rable adjunct and sine qua non of the solidification a f his own of the authority in his Italian dominions but the intensity
;
local detestation of
it,
and the hostility of the Council of
Trent and of the successive Popes, were finally successful in 3 But it would be a great mistake to think keeping it out.
of the
solely
also of
power and influence of the Holy Office as restricted It was to Spain and her relations to the see of Rome.
;
with profound importance in Philip's political dealings for church and state the other realms of Western Europe was imposwere, in his eyes at least, so closely fused that it the other as sible to interfere in the one without affecting
have already alluded to the trouble that arose with Elizabeth of England over the question of a Protestant It is also worth service at the house of her ambassador. customs officials noting that in 1578, when the Spanish
well.
We
showed themselves incapable

iv,
of preventing the exportation

'
Lea. Inquisition of Spain, pp. 10 ff., 149 ff. * Lea, op. cit., ii, pp. 33-36.
ii,
p.
520;
l)i
Lea, The Inquisition in the Spanish pendencies, pp. 86 ff., 125 ff.
THE MORISCOS
of horses to France, the king,
83
on the pretence that these
animals were intended for the forces of the Huguenots, handed the whole matter over to the jurisdiction of the Holy
Office,
with the result that a Saragossan horse dealer,
who
had broken the regulations, was punished with two hundred lashes, a fine of a hundred ducats, and five years in the There were countless other instances of Philip's galleys.
1
utilization of the Inquisition for his political ends significant of
the most
them
all will
be discussed in a later chapter in
connection with the 'troubles' of the kingdom of Aragon. But enough has already been said to indicate how allpervasive was its power and ideas of the King.
Philip's firm resolve to
how completely
it fulfilled
the
make
himself the unquestioned
leader of the forces of militant Catholicism, his determination to extirpate Protestantism, and the measures which he
adopted to attain these ends, were thus potent factors in

shaping the course of Spain's relations to the other states of Western Europe. But there was another very serious
matter
as essentially and traditionally a cosa de Espana as

towards
Philip's attitude
heresy which demanded his attention before he could plications
was international
in its im-
embark on any
This was the treatment by the Spanish government of the remnants of the Moorish population of the peninsula, which had been suffered to remain,
crusade.
under increasingly
rigid restrictions, since the
Granada by the Catholic Kings. One result of the Germania of Valencia, as has already been indicated in the preceding volume, was to extend in 1525 to the realms of the crown of Aragon the edict in regard to the Moriscos which had been in operation in Castile since
1
conquest of
Llorente, op.
cil., ii,
pp. 394
f.
Cf. infra, p. 582.
84
1502
1
;

for
all
father
at
least,
thirty-one years before Philip succeeded his the Moorish inhabitants of Spain had, in iheory accepted the Christian faith. But there had
naturally arisen grave doubts as to the genuineness of this enforced conversion. Under the Emperor, who was so
much
of the
regard to the
fluctuations.
time absent from Spain, the policy adopted in Moriscos had been chiefly remarkable for its
It
must have been obvious that
certain
amount
of instruction in the tenets of the faith
they were
to adopt would be the indispensable to their loyal acceptance of it but the efforts preliminary in this direction were spasmodic, untactful, and constantly beset with almost insurmountable linguistic difficulties
; ;
now compelled by law
and the Inquisition, to put it mildly, was not helpful. Another method, to which the Holy Office was likewise uncordialj was to facilitate intercourse between the Moriscos and Old Christians in every possible way. The walls which marked off the barrios, or Moorish quarters, in the different
were occasionally pulled down; there were a fewedicts to the effect that Old and New Christians should
cities
occupy alternate houses; and marriage between the two races was sometimes encouraged by providing that the dowry which a Morisco bride should bring to her Christian
husband should never be subject to confiscation. But the tradition of intolerance and persecution was a potent influence
:iL :iin--t
r
the permanent adoption of any of these wise

of
Moriscos, which was great, and w.i- probably supposed to be even greater than it was, made a constant temptation to subject them to penalties
polici(
The wealth
the
which would involve confiscation;

of the officials of the
light
nowhere
is
the avarice
Holy
Office revealed in a
more odious
than
in its
grasping after the property of relapsed con'
Cf. tnte, Vol. Ill, pp. 128-131.
THE MORISCOS
versos.
85
The
ability of the Moriscos to pay, moreover, often
resulted in_flagrant disregard of the government's solemn promises that, upon their conversion, they should in all respects be treated like Christians, and regarded as entitled It suited the purto the possession of Christian privileges.
pose of their
set
quondam
;
lencian estates, to retain
masters, especially on the great Vathem in semi-serfdom and not to
them
free
it
tually remained tvUlables
has been well said of them that they vir1 et corveables a merd. And those
who knew
must have
the character and ideals of Philip the Prudent realized that when he succeeded his father and
it
returned to Spain,
was the
any
less
enlightened side of the
government's Morisco policy that was ultimately bound to

prevail.
One
thing, in
case,
was absolutely
certain
there would be no toleration of the slightest indication of a relapse to the religion or customs of Islam.
Yet
it
would be unfair to the new monarch to assume that
he at once gave full adherence to a policy of persecution, without making any efforts to attain his ends by gentler means. While he was still in Flanders, he had been ap-
proached by envoys of the Moriscos, and though nothing definite came of it at the time, it is evident that he realized
In 1564, we have a record that he strove to mitigate the severity of the Inquisition against the Moriscos of Valencia, where it had recently
tha. there
were two sides to the
case.
been particularly active, owing, apparently, to letters which 3 In the same year he also it had received from Paul IV. made an effort to improve and extend the instruction vouchsafed to the conversos
intrusted with
it
he even ordered that those who were should possess, whenever possible, the
;
obvious qualification of knowing Arabic.

1
One
;
of his archy Collado,

pp.
Lea, The Moriscos of Spain, pp. 82Ibid.,
212, passim,
*
Expulsion de
f.
Danvila Ibid., pp. 102 f. los Moriscos,
160-
pp. 222
172.
86
bishops sanctioned the profanation of having the catechism l but unfortunately the vast printed in that language
;
majority of Philip's henchmen, and particularly the officials of the Holy Office, were far less anxious to make the most
enthusiasm for a more liberal policy, and the experiment did not yield the fruits that were expected In the year .1566, more sinister forces were brought of it.
of their master's fleeting
Diego de Espinosa, who, though Philip once declared him to have been the best minister he ever had, was in reality the king's evil genius, had been recently rising
into play.
He had just been made president of the (Ouncil of Castile, and was shortly to become inquisitorgeneral; and he and his agent, Pedro Deza, prevailed on
into prominence.
Philip to permit the full reenactment for the Moriscos of Clranada of a series of restrictions, generally known as the
Edict of 1526, which a similar set of influences had extracted from the Emperor, but which, in the succeeding years, had
been suffered to
fall
into desuetude.
This edict was one of

the whole history of
the most vexatious
and unwise
in
Spanish legislation. quired the'education of
It forbade the use of Arabic,
all Moriscos in Castilian. ornaments were subjected to the ban; names, dress, and Moorish baths were strictly prohibited; and disarmament
and reMoorish
was to be
(
strictly enforced.
All births
were to be attended
by Christian midwiv< ceremonies were secrei
as to
ly
make
;
sure thai no Moorish
performed and all the doors of the houses of M<'ii -cos were to be kept wide open on feast days, days, and special occasions, so that any one could look
And the and satisfy himself as to the conditions inside. time and under reenactment of the edict, at this particular
in
1
I. i-ii,
lioriteoa,
p.
p.
149; Danvila y
Oarrajal,
Ifori
Collide,
'
160
cos, p. 226.
A
13,
leye
opilacuin, lib. viii, tit. ii, Luis del M:irmol 15, 17;
Castigo de los de Granada, in B. A. /.'., Historiadores de Sucesos PartioulaTM, i. p. 158; Lea, Moriscos, pp. 215 f.
Rtbelion
cot
'hi
Reino
RE ENACTMENT OF THE EDICT OF

these circumstances,
1526
87
was vastly more irritating to the Moriscos than the original had been to their ancestors. There no excuse for it, as there possibly may have been before, was,
in the state of
affairs. Its long period of the result of a JDribe which the suspension, though largely Emperor, unlike his son, had been unscrupulous enough to
Spanish foreign
had naturally given its victims the notion that the Spanish government w as not really in earnest in its policy of persecution and it came as a great shock to them to learn that they were wrong. Finally, the reenactment, in itself, was far harsher than its original though it aimed at the same end, its methods were much more severe. The Morisaccept,
r
; ;
cos were
years,
now
flatly
ordered to learn Castilian within three
instruction.
valid.
though no provision whatsoever was made for their All contracts in Arabic were pronounced in-
Not only were the Moorish baths no

they were to be formally destroyed
used
longer both the public
to be
and private ones.

ish civilization.
If
1
The government,
in fact,
seemed bent on
blotting out every trace of the existence of the ancient
Moor-
the edict
all
tradicted
the
way
itself was inspired by principles which conthe dictates of humanity and statesmanship, in which it was published showed an equally crim-
inal lack of foresight.
Lopez de Mendoza, Count of Tendilla and third Marquis of Mondejar, was captaingeneral at Granada at the time. He had the benefit of a long
Ifiigo
in that high office,
family tradition, besides thirty years' personal experience and was generally respected and trusted
by Morisco and Christian alike. It would, therefore, have seemed indispensable to consult him in regard to the violent
2 change of policy that was proposed.
This, however,
2.
was
Marmol Carvajal, loc. Lea, Moriscos, p. 229.

1
cit.,
pp. 161
f.
2
;
Lea, Moriscos, p. 219, note
88
not

done although he was
r
actually at the court at the time
indeed, the first intimation of it that he received was an order to L <> back to his post, and be ready when the edict
should be published. He not unnaturally remonstrated at being treated in such fashion he vigorously represented the probability of a Morisco rising, and the inadequacy of the
;
garrison, munitions,
and state
of defences at
Granada, and
he was heartily supported by the Consejo de Guerra. But chose to pay no attention to his advice. the government
It
was
tin
priests,
and not the
soldiers, that for the
moment
held the upper hand, and Mondejar was commanded to stop complaining and mind his own affairs. He had every right
to be bitter
about
foresaw, and as
had already become, as he plainly Cabrera de Cordoba afterwards wrote, a case

it.
It
not for friars' caps but for steel helmets.

It
was on January 1, 1567, the seventy-fifth anniversary of the capture of Granada, that the new edict was formally published with appropriate ceremonies; and as an earnest
government's intention rigorously to enforce it, the 2 destructioD of the Morisco baths was immediately begun.
of the
That the answering insurrection was postponed tor nearly two years was due, in the main, t<> the fad hat it had been
arranged that some oi the more vexatious provisions of the edict should not go into immediate operation; and, to a r extent, t.> tinrepresentation- which even Kspinosa's
minions
at
Granada were now induced
to
make
to
he gov-
ernment,
danger they had been commanded to carry out. But the postponement only served to make the outbreak th<- more serious when it
for the
<l<
f.
in regard to the evident
of the policy
occurred;
'
Moriscos had had time to muster their

lot
Bled*,
ff.
;
Coroniea
p|
in
\fros
de
i.
pp.
17
f.
BipaUm, pp. 663

<.f
C'.
<>f
do
tin-
Ci
p
'
167
Memorial
'.r
Marqnii
tiocit,
Lm, Monaco*, Marmol Carrajal,

;
M/irmnl Cnrvnjal, pp. 227

lot.
Inc.
f.
cil.,
eit.,
f.
pp.
''
M'.r
pny
am
WW
UififT.;
Liti,
Murisrus. pp, 880
RECEPTION OF THE EDICT
89
own resources, as well as to become acquainted with the weaknesses of their oppressors. Their fighting blood grew hotter as the different provisions of the edict were successively enforced
;
and the
failure of their various
deputadespair.
tions to procure its relaxation served to drive
them to
and stores, and to prepare strong places in the sierras to which they 1 could retire. They sent messages to ask for aid from their 2 and some of them dressed coreligionists in North Africa
They began
secretly to accumulate munitions
themselves after the Turkish fashion, in order to make the Spaniards believe that they were receiving aid from Con3
stantinople.
They encouraged each other by
reciting
;
ancient prophecies of the reconquest of Spain by Islam 4 and they found a leader in one Aben Humeya, who had
already
blood,
made a name for and who boasted
himself
descent
by shedding Christian from the Omayyads. 5
Appreciating the obvious advantages of striking their first blow on the day of a Christian festival, when their oppressors
guard, they planned their initial rising for Holy Thursday (April 15), but the Spaniards on (1568) this occasion were better prepared than they had supposed, and the rebels were obliged to abandon the attempt. 6 At
would be
off their
Christmas time, however, they struck again, this time with better results. Excess of caution at the critical moment
prevented them, indeed, from capturing the Christian garrison of the Albaycin, or Moorish quarter of the town, which
at the time
1
numbered only twenty-three men

3
;
but in
all
the
MarBleda, Coronica, pp. 660-666 loc. cit., pp. 181 ff. * Castries, France, i, pp. 286-289 Antonio Tiepolo (1567) in Alberi, Relazioni, serie i, v, p. 145; Marmol Memorial Carvajal, loc. cit., p. 179 of the Marquis of Mondejar in MorelFatio, L'Espagne au XVI" et au XVI I e 19 siecle, p. Bleda, Coronica, pp.
mol Carvajal,
;
;
Castries, France, i, p. 294. Lea, Moriscos, pp. 234, 434-437. 5 C. de C, i, pp. 595 ff. Hurtado de Mendoza in B. A. E., Historiadores de Sucesos Particulares, i, pp. 74, 102; Jose Palanco Romero, Aben-Humeya en la Historia y en la Leyenda (Granada,
*
;
1915).
674
f.
Lea, Moriscos, references there.
pp.
234
f.,
and
90
country about Granada the Moriscos rose in arms, robbing, spoiling, and desecrating churches, and torturing and murdering their Christian foes.
1
intolerance and ineptitude, which the wiser heads had foreseen, very uprising So the government turned to Mondejar to put it down. violent were the jealousies between the different factions at
Having brought
on,
by
its
the
Granada that he was given practically no support indeed, it would appear that Deza actually put obstacles in his 2 But Mondejar was equal to the occasion. The path.
:
Andalusian
cities
were called on to send
in their contingents,
and on January 3, 1569, he was able to set forth from Granada with a force of about 2000 men. 3 The critical point was The bridge over the deep gorge of Tablate, which commanded the approach to the sierras. Though the Moors
had so dismantled the bridge that only
cross
it
a single soldier
could
at
a time.
Mondejar managed
to drive
away
the force
that guarded its further end, and so possess himself of the

4 key to the country beyond.
From that moment

Mondejar was
the
first
phase of the rebellion was over.
relentless in
Town following up the advantage that he had gained. after town surrendered at discretion. By fche beginning of the revolt was practically pu1 down.8 In case of February
-
resistance the victor

of his
was very
stern,
a
and there
is
at
6
least
one instance
commanding
general massacre;
but when submission, as was usually the case, wae absolute and complete, he promised the vanquished that they should
not
be permitted to suffer harm.

(
His Bole object, so he

Mmwlejar
in
Mnrnu.l
.
'firvnjnl,
lor.
cil..
pp
"/*
jar in
cit
1
Moiwl-Fatio,
Ibid., pp. 230 f. Ifbrol-Fatio, pp. 24 ff.
Bifida. CorottSoa,
pp. 19
i.'-ri.
ff.
pp. 062
p.
fT.
Mi rueot,
238,
and
rofo r onma
<
the
Letter of the tbfarquii <le ins Yelp* (n H. If., xxxi. pp 607 600.
C. de
C,
,
i.
p.
C>4\>;
ff.
ICirmol
'ar-
I..
II
MM,
pp.
242
f.
vajal. /or. r\t
pp, 210
THE REBELLION AT GRANADA
91
repeatedly assured them, was to bring about a permanent Such a plan, however, did not suit pacification of the land.
the views of the vast majority of the soldiers who composed his forces their main object was to gorge themselves with
;
in the annals of sixteenth-century warfare booty. is there a blacker record in this "There were even respect
;
Nowhere
men who
reels,
stole cats, caldrons, turnspits,
kneading troughs,
cow bells, and other worthless things, all simply because would not givo up the right to plunder. I mention no they
names," adds the soldier who wrote the account, "for in this campaign we were all thieves together, and myself the first of them." l With all his efforts, Mondejar found it impossible to restrain these outrages
;
this, in turn,
convinced
the Moriscos that he had no intention of observing the fair
promises he had made them, and consequently encouraged them to continue their revolt. A few weeks after he had
reported to Philip that the rebellion was at an end, the evidences began to multiply that it was about to burst forth
afresh.
fugitive in hiding,
least
Aben Humeya, who just previously had been a was now reported to have an army of at
4000 men. 2
if
the weary work of suppression was to be done all over again, the government was resolved that it should not
But
be done by Mondejar.
Deza's hatred of him had been
increased by the success of his campaign, and by the high regard in which he was held by Christian and Moslem alike and he assured Philip and Espinosa that things would never
;
go the way they wished until the Marquis was removed. Deza's representations, fortified by the soldiers' complaints of the way in which it had been attempted to put a term
to their pillagings, finally produced the desired effect
1
;
in
Marmol
ii,
Forneron,
p.
as cited in Carvajal, 163 cf. also Hurtado

;
de Mendoza in B. A. E., Historiadores de Sucesos Particulares, i, p. 106.

2
Lea, Moriscos, p. 246.
92
March, Mondejar was ordered to relinquish the supreme command to the king's half-brother, Don John of Austria,
the bastard of Charles
and Barbara Blomberg. 1 This 2 prince, who was born at Katisbon on February 24, 1547, had been kept in concealment during the Emperor's day, and
even Philip did not learn of his existence until after his The news may very likely have been unwelfather's death.
come, but the king determined to make the best
of
it.
He
gave his newly discovered kinsman the name by which he was afterwards to be known, 3 and commanded that he be There furnished with a large household and many servants.
this royal bastard in a position far
to
was, perhaps, a certain measure of sound policy in placing above the grandees, so
accentuate the vast difference that separated them
from the throne.

respects,
Don John was
certainly, in all
outward
most agreeable contrast to Philip. Goodlooking, affable, and courteous, without any of that air of suspicion and taciturnity which no one could help remarking about the king, he seemed to contemporaries as one intrusted
a
witli a
play
divine mission, prepared, nay, almost predestined to 4 The task of putting down the insurhero's part.
(
rection at
rranada was to be his
first
to speak, and Philip
was determined
public appearance, so that he should be
equipped for
success.
dejar
in such fashion as would secure complete it was given many times more troops than Monhad been able to command (a whole tercio was brought
H<'
'Hurtedo de Mendoza ami

.
M.'irmul
st),
in
H. A.
in
I.
Bistoriadorei de
i,
pp.
'_'")<),
though most of the older pp. 1 authorities, and soma evea of the more recent ones, give it as February 24,
.'{
;
Mondejar
Morel-Fatio,
p.
49.
1646.
'
Cf.
I'.
i.
O. von
pp. L8S
Tome, Don Juan

f.,
paniah monograph, lidrlmra di B i. Nicolas Aoaro y tiy L901), has been oompletely aupcieeded by Paul Herre'i Barbara BL Leiprig, L009 Tin-': be regarded as having finitely establiahed by StirlingDon John of Austria, i, xwell,
tTAutrichi,
It
note.
would appear that
Don John was
cf. Fororiginally called Gcr6nimo; neron.ii, pp. 168 f., and referenoes there. 4 ('f. D. /. S., xxviii, pp. 8-12. 60 f..
73 87| 92 f. Stirling-Maxwell, Don John of Austria, i, pp. 146 ff. Pirenne,

;
iv,
up.
H'.i
f.
WAR AGAINST THE MORISCOS

;
93
over from Naples for the purpose) a detachment of Spanish galleys cruised up and down the coast so as to prevent all
possibility of aid
from without
and Don John had a war
council of experienced captains. 1 But there was also a whole series of restraints and inhibitions, such as was inevitable in
which Philip was concerned. Don John's youthful pride was galled by being commanded to remain at Granada to issue orders, and on no account to take a per-
any enterprise
in
war council was rent with opinions everything had to be referred to Madrid. Nine whole months went by with practically nothing done, save to encourage the Moors to continue their
sonal part in the campaign
conflicting
; ;
his
new
resistance.
Many
of those places which, in the spring,
had unconditionally submitted to Mondejar now renounced their allegiance and made common cause with the rebels, whose forays reached right up to the gates of Granada. The town was virtually isolated in the midst of a hostile land. 2 Finally, on October 19, 1569, Philip issued an edict prohitherto it had been only claiming a war of fire and blood the suppression of a revolt against the Moors of Granada, the soldiers leave to plunder at will and keep all they giving could get, and considerably increasing their pay. 3 At the sauu time he yielded to the entreaties of Don John, and gave him leave to take the field in person. On January 19, the prince was able to sit down before the stronghold of Galera with an army of at least 12,000 men. Despite the fact that the garrison was scarcely one-fourth as large as the besieging force and pitifully lacking in arms and munitions, it was over
A set of instructions from the Duke Alva to Don John on the conduct of the war against the infidels both on land and sea is to be found in the It. A. H., est. 27, gr. 3a, E, no. 80 ff., 30 ff. See D. I. E., iii, pp. 273-283. Cf. also D. J. E., xxviii, pp. 5-19
1
of
de Mendoza and Marmol Carvajal in B. A. E., Historiadores de Sucesos Particulares, i, pp. 89-91, 251 f. 2 Lea, Moriscos, pp. 248 f., and
Hurtado
references there.
'Hurtado de Mendoza and Marmol

Carvajal,
loc. tit.,
pp. 107, 292.
94

;
throe weeks before the place could be captured
one of the
Spanish assaults
self
was disastrously repulsed; Don John himwas wounded, and the Moors got the better of such
fighting as
hand-to-hand
occurred.
When
Galera
was
taken, all the survivors were put to the sword without disand the ensuing orgies so demoralized tinction of age or sex
;
the victors that,

'
the next stronghold which they attacked, they were speedily put to flight by the sorties of a handful of I would never have believed," wrote Don John their foes
at
;
to the king,
"that such a panic as
have witnessed could
2 It is needless to follow the possibly have taken place." campaign in detail. There were a few bright spots in it,
particularly the duels of certain doughty champions reminis3 cent of the heroic days of the wars of the Catholic Kings
:
but for the most part it was the sort of struggle that it is not Despite all their but sling and pleasant to dwell upon.
barbarity the Spaniards -were not to be denied.
of
The
over-
numbers and resourcewhelming preponderance finally decided the day, and though the last embers of resistance were not stamped out till the first weeks of 157 J, when the Moorish leader, Aben Aboo, successor to Aben Humeva,
their
was treacherously murdered by an outlaw in Spanish pay, 4 the end was plainly inevitable at least a year before. It had become evident to the more intelligent of the Moriscos
that they must accept whatever terms the victors should
please
t<>
impoe
little
There could be terms would be.

1(
'
In
ft.;
f.
;
question what the nature of' those the eyes of the government the conMArmol
'
'
,
ii.
nrajai, loc. dt.,

ii,
I
pp. 42 pp. 813
Foraeron,
If .
ii,
l-Mi-ii-ron,
'Cf.
>f
pp
'
188
IT.,
"
''!'.
and reference! than;

\iilt<, <|e
:
Homaya
his
H B. t iii, pp. 85-37 Aben bed been aaaaaaionted by two

follower! in October, 1509. i, pp. 291, note 4, 294.
;
p. 186.
|;i
villa
spafiola
He da
nun
Caatriee, France,
L<
/I'fin.w:
p
1>
I.
'
268;
Korncron,
ii,
67.
188
xxvui. pp
40
f.
TREATMENT OF THE MORISCOS
95
centration of so large a portion of the Morisco population of the peninsula in the neighborhood of Granada was the fun-
damental cause
of
all
the difficulties of the past.
The
Moriscos were, therefore, to be deported inland and .arbiOrders for the trarily distributed throughout the country.
Don John as early as February, 1570, long before the successful termination of
execution of this measure were issued to
his
campaign. The peaceable Moriscos of each place that he conquered were successively to be collected and sent inland,
batches, under guard.
their
în
They were allowed

sell
to take with
them
women and
children, to carry with
them such
is
movables as they could, and to
the rest
1
but
it is difficult
to believe that they ever got fair prices,
and there
abundant
evidence that they were often robbed.
The Venetian envoy,
Donato, writing in 1573, calculates that the king got an

annual revenue of 125,000 crowns from the dues on their confiscated lands and from their goods which had fallen to 2 the crown since their rebellion. On October 6, 1572, an
elaborate pragmdtica was drawn up, regulating the conditions under which they were to be permitted to live. 3 / They were
under the perpetual surveillance of a series of different functionaries, who were encouraged to spy upon
J every way. They were forbidden to change the residences that had been assigned to them without a royal license, or to return to within ten leagues of the kingdom of
to be kept
them
in
Granada under pain
of death
all
the restrictions of the
detestable edict of 1566 were declared to be fully in force.
That the Moriscos were unwelcome guests in the communities where they were quartered is evident from all the conand the archives of the Inquisition temporary records
;
Carvajal, loc. 363, passim.

s
Hurtado de Mendoza and Marmol cit., pp. 116-120, 342Leonardo Donato in C. de C,

iv,
p.
421 (last line), also in Alberi, Relazioni, serie i, vi, p. 378.

s
Nueva Recopilacidn,
lib. viii, tit.
ii,
ley 22.
96
furnish
ample proof that their enforced conversion to But perhaps the most Christianity was but nominal. remarkable feature of the whole affair was the success with
which the
exiles, in spite of all limitations
and persecutions,
official
found means
report
to
make good
livings.
In 1582 an
declared that their numbers were fast increasing, because they were not "wasted by war or religion," and that
they were so industrious that, though they came to Castile ten years before without a scrap of land, they were becoming
well-to-do,
that in
and that there was good prospect twenty years more the natives would become their
and even
rich
;
servants.
It must have been pretty obvious by the death of Philip II what the end was to be, though the final act of the tragedy was to be reserved till the reign of his son. Dispersion and persecution were not enough Spain would never )e satisfied
;
Dread of religious contaminashort of absolute expulsion. but it is also worth noting tion was the fundamental cause
;
that the government welcomed every other kind of comthat was plaint, whether political, social, or economi
,
addressed to
action.
It
it,
for all contributed to exculpate the final

in 1G09 that the
was
blow
at
last fell.
By
series of edicts all the
Moriscos in the different Spanish were forced to depart from the peninsula, by kingdoms mutis or from ports that were designated to them in advane-.
time or opportunity was given them in which to dispose of such property as they could not ry willi tfiem; sales at forced prices and robberies were
No adequate
Yet there was surprisingly little the order of the day." the deep Borrow that it must have resistance. Despite
.'
<lc
lux
Lea.
op.
cit.,
Moriscox, p| pp. 265-270.

xi,
J,
I.i
i,
Moriscog,
MoritCOt, pp. 320 pp. -"'7 fT.
fT.
Jimcr,
Of.
44fM
de lot
C&rU:
pp. 542
f.,
and
p. 431, infra.
THE EDICTS OF
1609
97
caused them to abandon their last hold on a land where

their ancestors
had reigned supreme, the majority of the Moriscos were by this time so thoroughly convinced of
all
things Christian that they seemed, for the most part, to be glad to go, and even competed for the 1 first places on the transports that had been provided.
the horror of
them sought the Barbary coasts but there were number who made their way .into France, where they found themselves far less welcome than they had been given reason to expect, and whence most of them 2 A trifling number ultimately embarked for North Africa. to remain hidden in Spain, and had to be hunted attempted down in the succeeding years by commissioners specially and some of the exiles were so appointed for the purpose
of
;
Most
also a considerable
ill
treated in Barbary, that they elected to return to Spain and be consigned to the galleys. 3 A fair estimate of the
total
number
of those deported
from half a million
about
4
would be probably not
far
population of Spain. inhabitants of the peninsula should have been regarded by the government as constituting a serious menace, fur-
one-sixteenth, that is, of the That such a small proportion of the
and conclusive proof of the intensity of the passion that animated Spain's rulers for sacrificing everything on the altar of unity of the faith. The government's treatment of the Moriscos, and the rebellion which it evoked, belong primarily, as we have
nishes a final
already remarked, with the internal history of Philip's but it would be an error to assume that they were reign
;
affairs.
effect on the course of Spain's foreign For the dream of a reconquest of the Iberian peninsula by Islam had never wholly lost its place in the
entirely without
Lea, Moriscos, pp. 327 Ibid., pp. 340 ff

.
ff.
Ibid.,
pp.
363
ff.,
and references
there.
*
Ibid., p. 359,
and
references there.
98
vi-ions of the

Moslem prophets, nor had it ceased to be by the Christians; and the
1
contemplated rising of 1568 certainly furnished a better opportunity for the realization of it than had ever been presented since
the days of the Catholic Kings.
do1 taken of
it
as a possibility
is
That more advantage was one of the most curious facts in the his-
tory of the period.

3
The
coasts of Andalusia were virtually
unguarded, and there was considerable correspondence between the Morisco leaders and the Moorish kings of North
Africa
eigns
;
the rebels even circulated stories that these soverin
had landed
Spain with overwhelming
force,-
in
order to encourage one another to persist in their uprising. 8 But beyond the sending of messages and the spreading of
false reports,
the North African monarchs did
little
to avail
themselves of a really golden opportunity, and the same was

the case with the Turks farther eastward.
Writing
in 1573,
if the Sultan, the signory, had sent a few galleys instead of breaking with and troops to the south coasts of Spain at the time of the
the Venetian envoy, Donato, declares that
insurrection, he could
have kindled
;
flame which would not

t
even then have died out
and that he had heard on
he best
authority that it had often been feared in the Council of -tile that the Granadan rising might be the means of
1
encouraging the Huguen.it> to pour across the Pyrenees The Kianco-Turkish aUiancg, which had been such a thorn
m
in
its
the side of the

full
Emperor
lharles V,
resuscitation,
working order; and that fear continued to persist after

of
but
was do longer, indeed, there was considerable fear of

insurrection.
the
re;il
suppression
the
Granadan
plot,
or pretended, for
an attack on Mers-el-Kebir by the

'Lea,
4
lolarvm,
3
( '(.
Martyr d'Anghiera, Opus no 199 LSI 2). Antonio Tiepolo >i.r,t'i7) Is

rfc
i.
Moriteot,
pp.
236.
237,
i,
279,
vi,
and raferenoM than

In
Alberi,
Relation*,
serie
p.
Alti^ri,
Hiln
v, p,
145.
Wfl
SPAIN
rulers of
AND THE INFIDEL

Algiers, to
99
be aided by a rising of the Valencian Moriscos, by a possible invasion of Spain from France, and even by promises of support from Constanx Anwas unearthed in 1573 and again in 1577. was said to be afoot in 1583, and incrimother similar plan inating correspondence was reported to have been interand the danger apparently recurred again in later cepted 2 All these episodes, however, were little more than years. aftermaths. The great chance had passed in 1570, before Philip's foreign enemies could combine to utilize it, and it 3 never was to present itself in such favorable form again. But the fact that the Spanish government took the peril so seriously shows that the Granadan revolt had the possibility of the widest ramifications, and it will thus serve as a connecting link between the events we have already described and the great naval campaign against the Turks on the
Tlemcen and
tinople,
Mediterranean, to which we devote the remainder of the

present chapter.
However much the advice of the Emperor and Philip's own iDclinations may have dictated a policy of peace with Christian sovereigns during the first part of the new reign,
theie were
adopt a
infidel.
abundant reasons why the Prudent King should more aggressive attitude in his relations with the In the first place, over and above the age-long
tradition of the Spanish monarchy, Philip's conception of
himself as the true head of Christendom

striking demonstration
demanded some
cause of the Cross.
champion the In the second, the opportunity was

of his worthiness to
unusually favorable. The in addition to ending the

1
peace of Cateau-Cambresis, strife with France which had

3 Forneron, ences there.
Lea, Moriscos, pp. 281 f. Ibid., pp. 279, 283-285.
ii,
pp. 158
f .,
and
refer-
100

a
absorbed such
large proportion of Spain's energy during
the preceding reign, had naturally served to loosen the 1 The infidel was bonds of the 1'Yanro-Turkish alliance.
unsupported in the Western Mediterranean, as he had not been Bince L535; furthermore, his own attention was now
constantly
disl
racted
of his wars with the
by revolts Shah of
at
Persia.
home and by the pressure 2 And lastly, there
wire a long series of defeats and affronts which called aloud for revenge. We have already alluded to the tragic tale of reverses in North Africa which had saddened the
last
all.
but that was by no means years of the Emperor's reign Never had the ravages of the infidel corsairs, of whom
;
by
far the
most
terrible
was the ubiquitous Dragut, attained
such shocking proportions. Not only did they harry the Mediterranean shores of Spain, swooping down like vultures
on commercial vessels and fishermen, seizing the cargoes, and sending their crews away to terms of dreadful servitude
1
,
in the
they now also ventured out into the broad and played havoc with the Indian galleons outside Atlantic, 'adiz and Seville.' Even worse than the lot of Spain was
Orient
;
<
that of the Italian states;
and
of these
it
was the Spanish

all.
Ims of Sicily and Naples that suffered mosl of

Iriicrlr
De
towns and villages were sacked, and their inhabit-
ant- carried off to slavery, never to be seen again in Western
Europe, Bave hi the exceptional cases where a chance victory over an isolated Turkish galley served to deliver individuals
from the
1
rower.-'
benches.
It
has been well said that one

Cbaloner, the English ambassador to Spain, mote home to Queen Klizabeth that "the Moors have spoilt many
The comments
of the Sultan
on the
immunicated to tin- reprapea< tentative of Henry II at Constantinople. may be found in Oi.'irriere, NigociaI,
ii,
pp. 686
fT.
fpagnole de 1660
p
'
I
bieourt, L'expidition contre /'{/. d, f)j,rl,n,
merchant hip* about Seville and India, and ,'imongHt them three English ships,, with a booty of more than
I
30
'
100,000 duoata." 1662, do M8

<
C.
8.
P.,
Foreign,
pp. 508397-399;
':
li.im.
r.-.
\ ',
"
goeiotioiU,
iii,
ii,
>n
June
Jl,
1662,
Bil
Thomas
628;
Boaio,
latorta,
pp.
THE MEDITERRANEAN
of the chief reasons
101
why
the Turks were so dangerous to
Europe was because they were_so successful in employing Europeans against her. Every one of their recent victories
be regarded, in other words, as possessing a double not only did it strengthen them and weaken significance it almost invariably furnished them with the their foes
may
material for repeating it. Clearly then, at the time of the return of Philip II to the
peninsula,
were both ample justification and an exceptional opportunity for Spain to launch a vigorous attack against her traditional foe. If the Prudent King had
there
come boldly forward and himself assumed the leadership of the different forces that demanded that a campaign be forthwith begun, it would probably have taken the form
of another assault
on Algiers, one of the recognized centres of the Turkish power in North Africa, or at least on some one of the infidel ports on the western part of the North African coast, where a victory would have chiefly redounded
Philip, as usual, failed to seize the initiative, with the result that the early stages of a which really mattered more to the Spaniards than to
2
to the benefit of Spain.
But
game
played by others, and in regions was Jean de La Valette, grandcomparatively remote. master at Malta, and Juan de la Cerda, Duke of Medina Celi and viceroy of Sicily, who planned the blow and decided
any one
else
were
chiefly
It
where
and it was consequently the should be planted and not the Western Mediterranean that became Central
it
;
the scene of action.
The grand-master longed

fols.
to recover
P. de Salazar, Guerra de Africa,

i-iiii.
1 Forneron, i, p. 353. It might perhaps be argued that this statement
holds equally true of the employment of Turkish captives by the Christians but as the Turks had won the large
;
majority of the recent encounters, the principle applied, for the time being at least, in a manner wholly favorable to them. : Mercier, Histoire de VAfrique septentrionale,
iii,
p. 98.
102

whence the Knights had been expelled
in
Tripoli,
1551.
The
viceroy had bad an unusual number of pirate raids to avenge; he adopted the grand-master's proposals with an enthusiasm to which his criminal dilatoriness .in action
forms
in-chief.
-hocking contrast, and was duly appointed generalHe also got the approval of Philip - hut not
-
Despite the urgency of the viceroy, the Prudent King gave him little active support; he did not wish to imperil his ships in an enterprise so remote; he
much more.
proposed to participate in the expedition to just such an extent as would enable him to claim some credit and derive
should succeed, but not enough to run 2 The composition of the grave risks in case of defeat.
if it
BOme advantage
expeditionary forces
fifty-four ships of
is
highly
significant.
The
fleet,
of
war and
thirty-six transports,
3
was exclu-
sively
composed Gian Andrea Dona, twenty-one years old, the grandby nephew and successor of the Emperor's great admiral; the Spanish naval leader, Juan de Mendoza. who was at
Naples with a number of Spanish galleys
fleet
it
of Italian vessels,
and was con manded
at
tin
time the
was being
collected, entirely refused to cooperate,
and
i-
difficult to resist
the conclusion thai
his refusal
fleet
was
dictated
by the king.
The army which
the
carried,
between 11,000 and 12,000 strong, was only a little more than half composed of Spanish troops, and all of these were taken from the trrrios of Lombardy, N and -,
Sicily;
-
their
general-in-chief,
at
AJvaro
miard commanding
Naples;
in
its
was a the expedition was in

de
S.-mde,
origin, composition, or
857
no
truly Iberi;m, either
Vol
(II, p.
!>
U. Foglietta,
pp. 206-224. tinCortes
It
34 Sun,, y,,,,!,
kiiiK
r,
,
CortM,
:
v,
pp.
t>>
f.
infra,
rt<\,
pp,
a
ti
is
wrrc
worth Doting thai more apparently

prist
than the
add that of these, four furnished by Sicily and five Cf Idonobioourt, pp. 87 f. by Naples
It
in
mn
tmt fair
GERBA
103
1 purpose. And it is reasonable to suppose that Philip's failure to take a more active interest in it was chiefly responsible for the long delays and lack of cooperation which characterized
the enterprise from the very start. By no means all the contingents reached Messina, the original rendezvous, at the
appointed time. There was a month's wait at Syracuse Not till February 10, 1560, to permit the laggards to join. 2 did the expedition finally set sail from Malta.
These delays were of evil augury for the success of the enterprise, and the events of the ensuing weeks made its Lack of drinking water compelled the failure inevitable. fleet to touch at Rocchetta, on the east coast of the island
replenished its stock at the cost of a trifling encounter with the inhabitants, it gained no information in regard to the plans or resources of Dragut,
of
Gerba, on the
way
though
it
who commanded
Failure to inquire about the and plans was, throughout, one of the enemy's position worst mistakes of the crusaders. Their next landing was
at Tripoli.
effected
five
on the North African coast at a point some seventybut the miles to the west of their ultimate objective
;
place was unhealthy, the water bad, and Dragut, who knew
every inch of the country, within disagreeable proximity and so, after interminable disputes as to the proper course to take, it was decided to return to Gerba, where they felt
;
they could be safe and prepare at leisure on March 7, accordingly, the expedition finally disembarked at the
;
northwest corner of the island.
The
inhabitants at
first
made no
1
effort
cf.
to
prevent them.
op.
They belonged
to
For
pp.
details,
Monchicourt,
cit.,
87-94. It is worth noting, however, that the number of troops sent on this expedition was as large as that used in the attack on El Mehedia in 1550 (cf. ante, Vol. Ill, p. 342), and had only been exceeded, in all the various Spanish enterprises against
the infidel since the fall of Granada in 1492, by those employed in the battle of Prevesa in 1538, and against Algiers in 1541. 2 Monchicourt, Merrier, iii, p. 98
;
p. 87.
3
*
Monchicourt, pp. 98 ff Monchicourt, p. 101.
104
different

tribe
iSof)
from the men
of
Rocchetta, whose
1
weeks before had been inspired by Dragut; they professed the deepest hatred of the pirate, and permitted the Christians to occupy the castle of Gerba without making any serious difficulty. But when they saw signs that the new comers intended to establish themselves
resistance three
permanently, their suspicions were aroused.
Their original
hope, that the Christians would rid them of Dragut and then depart, now seemed illusory. Before long they began
overtures to their neighbors to the southeastward for a joint assault upon the crusaders, to be delivered at
to
make
firs!
the
favorable opportunity. While the evidences that the

at
Spaniards
its
remain
Gerba were converting
inhabitants
proposed to from
potential allies into formidable foes, the ubiquitous Dragut made active preparations to expel them. The ex ellence of
his
information
enemies stands out

his;
regard to the movements of his Christian in sharp contrast to their ignorance of and the hesitation of the crusaders h;id given him a
in
chance no1 only to repair the defences of Tripoli, but also On May 10, to send for naval aid to Constantinople.
while the viceroy was in the midst of his leisurely arrangements, a galley arrived from Malta with the stunning news
that
Piali
a
Turkish
fleet
of eighty-live sail,
(
under the dreaded
Pasha, had been sighted off ioz/.o and was making 3 A scene of terrible confusion ensued. straighl for Gerba.
Doria wished to take
1
flight
at
once and save his galleys

pp.
rtla
The
pint
.
touched
ra
..f
actually present time the Christiana iIi<t>-, though they wen' not it at the time; of. HoneMit
tin-
the two oontemporarj follow on pp. 67 244 Honohicourt, pp. 101 f.

I
63,
and
e/hicli
Monobioonrt,
p.
109.
It
is
worth
oouxl
(
'irni,
Succeui,
ll
pp.
74
ff.
Alfonso
Hi
'I'-
Dlloa, //
Ibis,
!
toria /<//'
ft
;
Tripoli,
Iom
Impreta of. Fernandas Qelves," in hi*

d*
alue-fl Piali I'asha and thai noting Ali wen- both Italian born; ami Brantome assert! that th latter wan onoe
a monk. Forneron, and Charriere, V<

<
t
i,
pp. 866,
"is
dan*
Sttua
i.
ado
Felipe
II,
Lmani,
ii,
pp. 610-613,
note.
DISASTER AT GERBA
105
The
honor was far higher than his would be an outrage to abandon his men, who were too scattered and too distant to make it possible to embark them all. The point was finally settled in Doria's favor there was a wild scramble for the ships, and a certain number finally managed to get on board.
viceroy,
of
whose sense
military skill, insisted that
it
On
the morning of May 11, the admiral gave the order to but before even his best ships could gain the put to sea open water, the Turkish fleet appeared on the northern
;
horizon, bearing
down on them
before a favorable breeze.
panic seized the Christian forces,
who were
so anxious
result
to escape as to be totally unable to fight,
and the
was a foregone conclusion. The Turkish admiral, almost without striking a blow, captured twenty-seven Christian galleys and one galliot, and killed or took prisoners some
5000 men.
their escape, but Alvaro de
Doria and the viceroy succeeded in effecting Sande and about 6000 soldiers
were
without adequate supplies, in the castle of Gerba, sentenced to death or capture before succor from virtually Europe could possibly arrive. The news of the disaster
left,
came
as an awful shock to Spain, to the Italian states,
and
to the Knights of Malta,
and perhaps most

;
of all to old
Andr< a Doria, the admiral of Charles V indeed, it is reasonable to suppose that it hastened his death, which occurred on Monday, the 25th of the following November,
at the age of five
days less than ninety-four years. There were many brave resolves, both in Italy and
in
Spain, that help should be forthwith dispatched to Alvaro

1
"Une
brave
pp. especially to F. Cirni, Successi, pp. 81 ff. 2 Monchicourt, p. 114. C. Sigonius, De Vita et Rebus gestis Andreae Doriae, lib. ii, cap. xliii, makes him just one
belle fuite valait mieux qu'un combat." Cf. Monchicourt, 109-114, and references there,
year younger at the time of his death; but Lorenzo Capelloni, Vita del Prencipe Andrea Doria, p. 185, E. Petit, Andre Doria, p. 353, and Fernandez Duro, Armada Espanola, ii, p. 43, note 3, give his age as I have given it in the
text.
106

men who had been
interminable delays
1
de Sande and his
left
behind
it
but there
to the
were
point
as
usual,
when
came
of execution. Philip showed energy in forwarding the necessary preparations; but refused to let the expedition It serins evident that, for the time being, he set sail.
favored
dispersal of Spain's naval resources rather than their concentration as a united fleet, and that his worries
a
over the maintenance of the Spanish hold on Tunis prevented him from giving his undivided attention to the
problem
of
the
moment.
of
moned Dragul out
Meantime, Piali Pasha sumTripoli to aid him in the capture of
the fortress of Gerba, which he planned, not to assault, but to surround and starve out, rightly judging that its
scanty supplies and lack of water would compel it to capit2 ulate before reinforcements could arrive. On May 26, he
.-at
down
before
it,
with some 8000
men and about twenty
pieces of artillery,
off all
possibility of access
in
wells
five days in cutting the garrison to the various by the neighborhood.' Don Alvaro. who had failed
5
and occupied the next
vigorous attack before the investment was completed, tried sorties, too late, on June 2 and on July 28. The fir.-t wlo b had some chance of BUCCess, was inadequately supported and finally driven
seize several excellent opportunities for a
,
back;
while the second, which

lost
was attempted after the
troops had
<>t
their morale,
had no other result than the
Don Alvaro. On July 31, the castle surrendered' capture All of its 6000 defenders who were not already dead were taken prisoners. 4 The fortifications were razed to the
The victors returned in triumph to Tripoli, where was now established beyond possibility of overthrow )ragut and Piali Pasha, after ravaging the eastern shores of Sicily,
ground.
I
;
'Monchioourt, pp
L,
'
U4
f.
'The Christian
losses,
soldiers
and
pp
p
1
Mil.
sailor*,
cf.
/'"/
not Monchicourt,
did
fall
short of
15,000;
p. 135.
RESULTS OF THE DISASTER
107
got back safely in the end of September to Constantinople, to receive the plaudits of the multitude and the thanks of
Suleiman the Magnificent. This reverse was by far the most serious that had been
suffered in
Algiers.
North Africa since the defeat
of Charles
V before
The object of the expedition had been to regain, the reestablishment of the Knights of St. John through at Tripoli, the control of the central part of the Mediterranean for the Christians; and its failure naturally encouraged their enemies to believe that it would be possible
completely to expel them from it. In the following year Dragut asked the Sultan to grant him an army to recapture
La Goletta from the Spaniards the idea, in other words, which bore fruit in 1574, was first conceived just after the 2 Cierba campaign. Moreover, the Turkish attack which was to be delivered against Malta in 1565 should be logically
;
considered as the counterthrust to the Christian attempt on Tripoli in 1560 since the Knights had so signally failed to win back their African home, was it not reasonable
;
would be possible to oust them from 3 their stronghold on the island? But most important of all for the student of the Spanish Empire was the effect of
to suppose that
it
the disaster at Gerba on the situation farther west.
Philip's
is
slackness in supporting the expedition against Tripoli

to be chiefly explained, as
his conviction that the
we have already remarked, by blow was to be planted in a region

;
so remote as to be of comparatively little consequence to the maintenance of Spanish power in North Africa now he
was to learn that the encouragement

Monchicourt, p. 134; nandez Duro, "Desastre de
Felipe II, pp. 50
fols.
2 f.
;
which
135;
his
enemies
Istoria,
hi,
also
Fer-
los Gelves," in his Estudios Historicos del Reinado de
Ibid., p. 441.
4
p.
Bosio.
A. de Ulloa, op.
cil.,
34 ff. Monchicourt,
p. 136.
The authorities at Constantinople, however, were much more inclined to caution than was Dragut. Cf. Charriere, Xegociations, ii, pp. 616 f.
108

their vietory
In
had derived from

his
very doors.
was to carry the contest to the spring of 1561 the Turkish fleet
in
Majorca and proceeded inhabitants, fortunately, were both brave and resourceful, and the assault was repulsed on May but the expedition was of sufficient magnitude to show that the enemy meant to force the fighting. Vague
suddenly appeared before Soller
to attack
it.
The
rumors
poured in of an infidel attack to be launched against Oran, the most important Spanish stronghold still remaining on the Mauretanian coast everything pointed
also
;
to the necessity of
2
Prudent King. to be staged in the western basin of the Mediterranean, on the Barbary coasts, with the infidels at the outset taking the
role of aggressors,
more vigorous action on the part The next chapter of the story was
of the
and Spanish
soldiers
it
ing
them
but the ultimate result of
and sailors resistwas to restore the
prestige of the Christian arms.
In the beginning, the weather took a hand in the
game
and played
3
wars,
in
was usually the case in these Mediterranean it, a manner adverse to the interests of Spain. In
as
response to the petition of the Cortes of Toledo of 1559, 4 he ordered Philip had taken measures to enlarge his navy
;
number of new galleys to be built, and sent for others from Genoa to guard the coasts of Spain in October, 1562, a large squadron was collected off Malaga, ready at need
a
;
to defend either Valencia or Oran. Fearing the east winds which raged at that season, the Spanish admiral, Juan de Mendoaa, who had been brought up on shipboard by the side of hifl famous father, Bernardino, sought refuge forty
'J.
na-
M. Bovor,
i,lh r
(
Hittoria
Piilriwi,
<li
la
Etpuqf>a.i.iim.
the
i, J
MoHscoh
f.
of
Valencia.
III.
C. de C.
lNJVOi,
pp. Mifi
('f.
f.
Herder, iii. pp. 99 f .; Fernlndei Duro, Armada Etpaflola, ii, pp. 44 40. The Moors at Algiers nnd Tlemcen were also reported to be in close touch with
ante,
Vol.
pp.
Wl
f.
f.,
326,
'S-ix
'
Cortes, V, pp. 836,
857
LA HERRADURA
109
miles eastward in the anchorage of La Herradura, which was admirably adapted for protection against the Levanters but no sooner had he arrived than the storm shifted to the south, whence it soon began to blow with the violence
;
good defence against the east winds, La Herradura was worse than useless against such a gale as
of a tempest.
this.
began to drag their anchors. Others cut their cables and were dashed in pieces on the rocks, and most of those that were able to hold their moorings
Some
of the galleys
No less than twenty-five of the twenty-eight that composed the squadron were lost, together with at least 4000 lives, among them that of Juan de
were sunk.
vessels
Mendoza, who assuredly deserved a better fate. The news of this disaster, which was promptly reported
1
at Constantinople, naturally caused the Sultan to hasten
the plans, which he had been maturing since the disaster at Gerba, for an attack against Oran. The execution of this
was intrusted to Hassan, the son of Kheireddin Barbarossa, who was now Suleiman's representative at he had a small fleet 2 at his disposal to carry his Algiers cannon and supplies, and an army of over 25,000 men. In April, 1563, he arrived before Oran, and at once made preparations for a vigorous attack. The place was defended by Alonso de Cordova y Velasco, son and heir of the Count of Alcaudete who had been slain there in 1558, and the neighboring fortress of Mers-el-Kebir, which was the key 3 to it, by his younger brother, Martin the combined 4 garrisons cannot have numbered much more than 1000 men.
project
; ;
1
D.
this
I. E., 1, pp. 285-287 (the date of letter is wrongly given in the
heading as 1572 instead of Fernandez Duro, ii, pp. 46-49.

*
1562)
Fernandez Duro, ii, p. 49, speaks of the depredations of cosarioa francesea. * Pedro de Salazar, Hispania Victrix,
fol. 73.
4 This is only a guess. But there were only 470 left in Mers-el-Kebir after the
It is a significant fact that
among
the ships were three French caravels. C. de C, i, p. 361 Mercier, iii, p. 101.
;
repulse of the
first assaults,
and as
it
110
To maintain
themselves indefinitely was clearly impossible; everything really depended on whether or not they could hold out until the arrival of help from Spain. During late
and early May, they delayed the besiegers before two not until May 8 were they subsidiary outside forts;
April
driven hack into Mers-el-Kebir.
There
for a
month more
they continued to defend themselves; they repulsed one assault after another, and refused to haul down their ftagl
Reports occasionally reached them that the Spanish fleet was on its way, and finally, in the middle of June, their endurance was rewarded. By superhuman efforts Philip
1
had collected thirty-four galleys, some of them from the Italian states," and the rest brand new, off the dockyards
of Barcelona,
3
and despatched them, under Francisco de

4
They Mendoza, to the relief of his hard-pressed subjects. 5 Hassan had learned reached Oran in the nick of time. that their coming was imminent, and was preparing to but launch the decisive blow which should forestall them
;
Mendoza
was
arrived just at the very moment that the attack beginning, and threw the besiegers into confusion.
of their ships succeeded
in
Twenty
escaping to the eastward, but five others were captured, and also four large French b Hassan's vessels which formed a part of the infidel fleet
.
land forces, it is needless to add, mad'' haste to raise the they left behind them a large Biege and seek safety in flight quantity of munitions and supplies, and also sixteen pieces
;
of artillery.
Altogether, the defence of Mers-< 1-KeblT was

Cf.
ct
was
tin1
Oran,
strategically more important than it does ool seem probable that
Morel-Fatio,
I
L'Espagui
ii,
an
XVI*
au XVII*
tiide, p. 62.
p. 62.
/'.'.,
latter had any more. Marder, iii, p. 102, says Juno 7; Fernandas Duro, ii, p. 51, makes it
ernandea Dun.,
M.
6
II.
xi, p.
13
Menier.
ii.
iii,
p.
102;
Fernanda*
the 16th.
Duro.
/.
A,'.,
p. S3.
'Cf.
>
/;.
xxiii, p.
L66
Son of the old viceroy of Mexico and Peiu, and oommonljr known as el /ndso.
I" addition to tin- standard aecounts, such as those in C. de C, i, pp :<59-370, U. Foglietta, De Harm
ORAN AND PENON DE VELEZ

the most
successful
111
operation which the Spaniards had conducted on the shores of North Africa since the capture
Tunis twenty-eight years before. Both the Alcaudetes were worthily rewarded the elder by the viceroyalty of the kingdom of Navarre, the younger by a grant of 6000
of
:
ducats.
If
full
before Oran,
advantage was to be reaped from the victory it was indispensable to follow it up with a
vigorous
counter-offensive.
There could be
little
doubt
where Philip would elect to strike the blow. The disaster at Gerba had but strengthened his aversion to operations
in the
Central Mediterranean
Algiers
was
still
too strong
but there was another pirates' nest farther westward, twothirds of the way from Oran to Tangiers, which had been
2 Spanish hands from 1508 to 1522, and which he was eager to recover from its infidel possessors. This was
in
the town of Yelez de la Gomera, commonly known at the time as the Penon de Velez from the rocky islet which
guarded the approach to it from the sea. Soon after the victorious fleet had got back from Oran, orders were received from the king to attack it. As Mendoza, who had captained
the galleys on the previous expedition, was suffering from a fever at the time, the command devolved on Sancho de
Leyva, who, captured at Gerba, but subsequently released,
On July 23, 1563, he put to sea with some fifty ships in the hope of surprising the Penon by night, but the defenders were keenly on the
was now general
of the galleys of Naples.
watch, and at daybreak de Leyva retired.

pp. 225 ff., and Fernandez Duro, ii, pp. 51 ff., cf. an anonymous account by an eyewitness, which is published by J. M. Sanchez in the
Foedere,
2
His next move

f.
;
Cf. ante. Vol. II, pp. 248
III,
p. 294.
Archivo
1911,
1
de
Investigation's
Historical,
ii, pp. 206-235. C. de C, i, p. 384.
He was the nephew of Antonio de Leyva, the defender of Pavia though socially prominent, his military and naval reputation was not high. Fernandez Duro, ii, pp. 55 f.
3
;
112

to
was
disembark his troops, to the number
of
some four
or five thousand, at a point six miles distant from the fortress, in the hope that a land attack would make him master of
town, but this enterprise failed even more signally than the first. The infidels knew every inch of the ground
the
at one moment de Leyva knowledge well was in terror lest he should be surrounded and cut off. Turkish galleys, moreover, soon appeared on the horizon
and used
their
and eluded
all
council of
war was
the efforts of the Christians to capture them. finally held, and despite the vigorous
protests of Alvaro de Bazan,
who
insisted that the
Penon
should and must be taken, de Leyva abandoned the enterOn August 2 the expedition returned to Malaga, prise.
after
having suffered some damage from a storm.

effect of this miserable fiasco
infidels,
The
was
in
turn to encour-
who not only seized the opportunity to the Penon and raid the Spanish coasts, but even strengthen 2 ivumors also carried their depredations to the Canaries.
age the
came
in of the preparation of a
huge
fleet at
Constantinople
for operations
spring.
on an unprecedented scale in the following Other maritime rivals of Spain likewise took heart.
off
Eight English vessels which were lying

a French ship which
Gibraltar attacked
;
were
finally
came up and anchored near them they captured by Alvaro de Bazan, and long corres-
pondence ensued before the prisoners were released, but the boldness of the attempt was highly significant. 3 It was
obvious that strong measures must be taken for a fresh
rehabilitation of Spain's prestige, and that the first of them find a leader more capable than de Leyva; as
1
would be to
C. de C, i. pp. 394-396, who gives the date as August 6; F.tm.-ukI.-z )uro, ii. pp. 56-68; A. de Ulloii. <>,,. rit., fob. 60S.
I
: I
MnfaOM
On
DtlfO, this singular
ii,
p. 69.
pp. 443-446; Fernandez Duro, ii, DOto; C. 8. P., Fortign, 1563, DM. 1424, 1466, L4S8, 1488, 1 8, 5, 1525, 1526. 1541. 2, 1561. England was, of course, intervening at this time
viii,
p.
80,
affair cf.
Froude,
in the first Civil
War
in France.
PEftON DE VELEZ
113
meantime, had died as a result of his illness, the choice finally fell on Garcia de Toledo, a cousin of the
Mendoza,
in the
Alva and the son of the viceroy of Naples, who had 1 seen service on the sea for a full quarter of a century before. He was not in all respects an attractive personality, but he
Duke
of
had proved, during
his tenure of the viceroyalty of CataIt that he possessed great talent as an organizer. lonia, was characteristic both of his own abilities and of those of
subordinates, that, just as the expedition which he headed was about to start, he discovered that all the gunhis
2 His mission, of course, was powder had been left behind. to renew the attack on the Penon Philip's persistence would not tolerate the abandonment of the enterprise, and every The whole winter of effort was made to insure its success. 1563-64 was spent in preparation. Galleys were contributed by Portugal, by Savoy, by the Knights of Malta, and by the Italian states. When Don Garcia set sail from Malaga on August 29, 1564, he had a fleet of at least 150 ships, in addition to the transports, and land forces of over 3 The prompt success of this second expedition 16,000 men. more than atoned for the failure of the first. The defenders of Velez were terrified and amazed when they saw Toledo's
;
4 imposing armament appearing over the horizon.
Most
of
them gathered up
their belongings
and
fled to
the interior,
so that the Christians were able to land

selves of the ancient castle of Alcala
and possess themand then of Velez itself,
more
almost without striking a blow. The Penon gave promise of a few companies of Turks shut serious resistance
;
1 He was given the title of captaingeneral of the Mediterranean, which had previously been held by Andrea Doria. Cf. Fernandez Duro, ii, pp. 59-
Fernandez
Duro,
ii,
pp.
67
f.
Philip
went
off to
Monzon
of the
from the Cortes crown of Aragon,

October, 1563.
*
to get funds realms of the convoked there in
61.
1
C. de
C,
i,
pp. 396
f.
D.
I. E., xxvii,
pp. 448
ff
Forneron,
D.
I. E., xxvii,
pp. 398
ff .
i,
p. 372.
114
THE LAST OP THE CRUSADES

its
themselves up within
walls with the obvious intention of
holding out until the Last.

a
But Toledo
set
up
his heaviest
batteries in a favorable position
on the shore, and speedily
opened
breach
in
the walls;
fenders began to make Leader entered the place on September

tically
shortly afterwards the detheir escape, and when the Spanish

8,
he found
garrison
it
prac-
deserted.
He
installed
strong
under
Aivaro de Bazan, with instructions to repair and improve the defences, and got back to Malaga by the middle of the
he had captured, with the loss of only thirty men, a place which was certainly one of the most dangerous of
month
and which many contemporaries had regarded In the following spring, the good work was as impregnable.
pirate aests,
1
continued by Aivaro de Bazan, who sank several transports, laden with stones, in the mouth of the River Tetuan (now
the Oued-Martine), thus temporarily immobilizing a dozen infidel vessels which lay at anchor farther up the stream,
and preventing its utilization as months to come. 2

In the
a corsairs' reftfge for
many
Western Mediterranean, then,

Philip had
tie
tide
had apparin
ently turned.
hifi
shown vigor and persistence

hi-
effort- to
maintain control of the water.- near
0WI1
shores;
COastfi of
he had scored two considerable victories on the
North Africa; the memory of the defeats of Ins father's closing years and of the disaster at Gerba had been
least
at
partially wiped OUt.
But the next

in a
trial of
strength
was
of
1
to
come
farther eastward,
region for
the Spanish monarch was far less solicitous;

dissipating
i
whose safety he was afraid

envisage
the
ii,
his
.
energies,
n, pp, 749pp. 240-300;
and
i,
failed
IT
;
to
Caati
oe,
i,
pp, 403 pp. 66 71.
l'iriiaiiiicz
Duro,
74,
v.,
i
;
xiv.
pi
xxviii, pp. 50'
606 687; 672
xxvii,
<
.
pp,
'
Peraaadei
rafetenoet
Dura,
ii,
p<
and
da
<
,
then
MALTA
IN
DANGER
115
Mediterranean as a single whole. The issue of the new but only conflict was to be favorable to the Christian arms a very small part of the credit for it can be given to the too
;
Prudent King.
The only
real hero of the
ensuing campaign,
it
at least as far as Spain's participation in
was concerned,
was Garcia de Toledo, now promoted,

viceroy of Sicily.
as a reward for his
success against the Pefion de Velez, to the difficult office of
was being prepared at Constantinople became increasingly definite and alarming in the early months of 1565; and it was an open secret that its objective was to be the island of Malta.
Rumors
of a great naval expedition that
was the sole remaining stronghold of the Knights of St. John of Jerusalem, whom Suleiman had already expelled from Rhodes and from Tripoli. Its capture would be the
It
culmination of his achievements in the Mediterranean
it
would open
for
him
a road to Sicily
and Naples and perhaps
into the western basin of the inland sea.

lected a fleet of 200
;
The Sultan
col-
which 130 were galleys fit for combat they carried ample supplies of artillery and muniThe tions and land forces to the number of 30,000 men.
sail,
of
latter
were commanded by Mustapha, a veteran of the Danube wars, and the fleet by Piali Pasha and most of the
;
more famous of the Turkish corsairs,

and Hassan
gents.
of Algiers, joined in
among them Dragut,
On May
with their special contin18 a cannon-shot from the castle of St.
Elmo announced the arrival of this formidable armament, a full month before the Christians had expected it, in the
waters surrounding the island fortress of the Knights. The grand-master, Jean de La Valette, had realized for
2
many months
1
the peril of his position and had been making

fols.
F. de Sallea, Annales de I'Ordre de Malte, p. 124.

2
rella,
157-159; C. Sanminiatelli ZabaAssedio di Malta, p. 170.
Pedro de Salazar, Hispania
Victrix,
116

to avert
it.
superhuman efforts to gel ready

his defences, he
He strengthened
1 besought the aid of the European powers, he recalled his absent knights, he mustered his auxiliaries,
and armed the inhabitants

of
of the island.
In
all
he disposed
of whom possibly 700 were members of but unfortunately St Klmo, the key to the entire position, against which it was obvious that the enemy would launch his first attack, was only able to contain 600. Failing
some 8500 men,

;
the Order
help from outside, that fortress was doomed the sole possible source of such outside help
and virtually
wa
larcia
de
Toledo, the
new viceroy
of Sicily.
Toledo had shown feverish energy from the moment of He saw the coming danger his arrival in his new domain.
quite as clearly as the grand-master not only did he muster all the military and naval resources of his own realm, he also
;
both Naples and La Goletta, in order personally to assure himself that they were in an adequate state of defence. La Valette began to correspond with him at o.icc a few
visited
;
weeks before the Turks arrived he sent for him to come to Malta to inspect the fortifications, which Toledo found in a
satisfactory state, though inadequately provided with sol3 The viceroy himself did \ervlhing he diers to man them.'
I
possibly could; he loaned the grand-master several companies of his Spanish regiments; he shipped him grain and money, and did his utmost to persuade the king to do still
more.
Hut
Philip, with the disaster of
ierba
-till
fresh in his
mind, could not be brought to see the importance of a peril so far to thi' eastward; the most that Toledo could induce
him
order the assembling of 1000 men in 'orsica, and to command the viceroy of Naples to send troops into
to
do
u;i- to
Ftti/wi'I.-7.
DtirO,
ii.
p.
79',
I'
de
ff.
D. I
E., xxix, p. .'U4
Btllw. 1imnf>i. p 12 1 Juricn de la Graviere, dt Malte, i, p. 162.
ZabarelU,
Chevaliers
Amdie
,*/"/'".
Snnminintolli pp. 127
SLACKNESS OF PHILIP
Sicily
;
117
food and
money were
all
that Philip would permit

1
to be despatched direct to
Malta from Spain. be believed that the Turks made the most
It will readily
of these delays.
19, they began to land their troops, without any 2 and after a disopposition on the part of the grand-master of four days' duration as to whether to start in with an pute
;
On May
II Burgo, the principal fortress of the island, or on the outer castle of St. Elmo, they decided in favor of the on the 24th they opened their trenches within latter 3 600 yards of their objective. Thereupon there ensued a
attack on
furious
bombardment both by land and
sea.
It lasted for
than twenty-three days, and under cover of it the besiegers were able to advance their parallels of approach so close to St. Elmo that on June 16 they could launch their no
less
Every day La Valette reenforced the little garrison in the confident expectation that succor would soon arrive he redoubled his demands for help in his extremity, but all without avail. The heroism of the besieged was
first
assault.
all praise. They slew some 6000 of their assailants, them Dragut, and wounded Piali Pasha but it was among
beyond
impossible permanently to resist the overwhelming superiOn June 23, the walls were so ority of the Turkish forces. badly breached that the enemy was able to enter the castle,
And where they found only nine of the defenders alive. having taken St. Elmo, they at once made their preparations to attack
Burgo and the other forts. Garcia de Toledo in Sicily was at his wits' end. On May 31, while the cannonade was at its hottest, he wrote another despairing letter to Philip, beseeching him to act "If Malta is not succored," vigorously and without delay.
II
1
D.
I. E., xxix,
pp. 53-68.
Victrix,
.
tile
'Pedro de Salazar, Hispania

fol. 159.
3
ed.
and Achelia, Deux veritables discaurs, H. Pernot (Paris, 1910), pp. 12 ff. D. I. E., xxix, pp. 413-419; De-
Fernandez Duro,
ii,
pp. 77
Gen-
fontin-Maxange, Eudj'Ali, pp. 89-92.
118

it
He even suggested that the loss of his Spanish galleys, he might if Philip feared borrow those of France, not knowing that Catharine de'
declared) "I hold
to be lost."
'
Medici
at that
very
moment was sending
a special emissary
to Constantinople to assure the Porte of her friendship." But the king of Spain still hesitated. He continued to preto start. Even the news pare, but would not give the word
of the
fall
of St.
Elmo
in
his precious
navy
did not avail to persuade him to risk the most he would do was a sea fight
;
to sanction the landing of troops, "provided it could be accomplished without evident peril of the loss of the gal3
leys."
A month
earlier
Don
Garcia had demon (rated
the thing could be done. Taking full advantage of atom of autonomy that Philip had permitted him, he every
that
hail
a
11
managed,
after
reinforcement of
two failures, to introduce, on June 29, some 600 soldiers, mostly Spanish, into
Burgo, where the grand-master was so overjoyed at their arrival that he rushed amongst them in tears and embraced
them. 4
moreover, under the the numbers of the garrison dwindled rapidly Every day the blockade pressure of the Turkish assaults.
stricter
Hut
this, after all,
was but
handful;
became
and
stricter;
it
master's divers found
even the best of the grandalmost impossible to get through
with his desperate appeals. Every Letter that Toledo rea note ceived from Malta Beemed certain to be the last
;
from
governor, Pedro de Amezqueta, dated August contained the significant message: "Four hundred men 22, still alive don't lose ;ili h0UT."
the
''
. .
Had
1
their been other cnu>e>
,.!
delay than the hesitations

l>.
I.
ii. I
/-..
l>
xxix. |.p. 171

i>i>
.
17.',.
F,Ti,.mff .
'
xxix,
f.
p.
276;
Imtik'hhI.-/.
cUi Duro,
ii.
418 Ufl
ii,
Duro,
pp. 791
pp. 84
I'.
m. p
\\>\.
pp. 466-468;
San-
h Fan
'
I
>
xxix. p|.
ii-...
184
318,
i"
pamm;
ii,
pp sj
minUtelli ZabarelU, pp. 108 553.; Qna\< h''-lis, ed. Pernot, pp. 51 ff. tilt? lad
THE SPANISH COMMANDERS

of the king,
119
Malta must assuredly have fallen. But fortunately when, about August 20, Philip's consent to a landing operation had at last been received, all the men and material were ready for the enterprise. This was chiefly due to the
energy of Garcia de Toledo but a share of the credit also belongs to Alvaro de Bazan, who was at that moment in
;
and charged with the defence of Gibraltar. In May he had been ordered to take reenforcements from Malaga to Oran subsequently he got leave to pass on to Cartagena, Barcelona, and Genoa, where he added to his fleet and picked up the tercio of Lombardy, which Philip had at last allowed to be sent to Sicily. At
of the galleys of Seville
1
;
command
Civitavecchia he was further reenforced by a detachment

of papal galleys,
Finally, in early
and at Naples he took on more troops. August, after his forces had joined Toledo's,
at
Messina an armament of some ninety 2 All that galleys, forty transports, and over 11,000 men. was now lacking was the consent of the king, which finally
there
was united
arrived after a delay of three

tioned, as
we have already
;
battle on the shore
it only sancthe landing of soldiers for a seen, to imperil the Spanish fleet against the
;
more weeks
obviously superior forces of the Turks was still to Philip's cautious nature unthinkable. This inhibition, however, had
been foreseen.
During the weeks
of waiting for the royal
missive, the various leaders of the Christian
armament had
been discussing the best methods of carrying out the only operation to which Philip would consent, and they finally
agreed on the adoption of a scheme suggested by Alvaro de Bazan. This was, in brief, to choose the best sixty of the Christian galleys, place 150 soldiers on each, and make a
dash for the shore of Malta at a point some distance from the fortress, trusting that the main body of the Turkish fleet
1
Salazar, Hispania Victrix,
fol.
157.
Fernandez Duro,
ii,
pp. 88
ff.
120

rest
would be so occupied with the bombardment, and the

of
it
so widely dispersed, that a naval action could either

if
it
be
avoided, or
a
detachment of doubt that the Christians would be able to account

them.
1
occurred, would be fought against so small the enemy's vessels that there would be no
for
The weather was

put
this
at its very worst
when the time came
to
plan into effect. The ships left Messina on 26 in a "tempest the like of which few sailors had August ever seen before"; it continued to rage for the next two its first wicks, and the fleet was cruelly buffeted about
;
attempt to
ever, on
make
a landing was unsuccessful, and

2
it
had to
return to Sicily for fresh
September 7, that 9600 men had been
water and supplies. Finally, howToledo was able to report to the king
safely set ashore
;
on the island of
for
Malta without the
loss of a single oar

t
on his return
reinforcements, moreover, he viceroy passed contemptuously within sight of the main body of the Turkish fleet,
he sailed by as a tribute to the besieged, and a confirmation of the great news that the longed for succor had at last arrived. Tin infidels were dismayed when they
firing a salute as
1
realized
what had happened.
If
t<>
the
little
band
of
the
original defenders
detain them for so long, had been able what could they hope t< accomplish against a large force of the dreaded Spanish infant rv, whose superiority to all Other soldiers of the period was quite as fully recognized in the East
as in the
West?
For
moment
Piali
Pasha had
thought
it
of attacking the Christian fleet,
but he abandoned
when
he reflected that the loss of the support of his galleys would expose the Turkish land forces to inevitable destruction;
one
1
final
FWllilllkl
attack OB the relieving forces was attempted and r Hnzrin, pp. X ff., ami NMNNnSM there; Dun SS; pp.
.
ii.
'.'1
>
AltolfMruiiTP
Piivnle,
Alraro
'/<
S:nminiiitclli Z.ilmrHln, pp. 557 ' Fwnlnfiw Duro, ii, p. 94.
ff.
THE RELIEF OF MALTA

1
121
infidels
repulsed,
retire.
and on the following day the

:
began to
On September
12, the last of their sails had dis-
Hassan toward Algiers, Piali appeared over the horizon Pasha and the rest to the eastward. The second lot of reinforcements which the viceroy was bringing over from Sicily
reached Malta at the very moment of the departure of the Turks, and was not even landed, and Toledo spent the rest
removing from Malta the now unnecessary original detachment, and in pursuing the enemy to the
of the
month
in
coasts of Greece.
It
was
a glorious deliverance,
and was
fittingly celebrated
both in Spain and in Rome. Coupled with the death of Suleiman the Magnificent, which occurred in the following year, it marked the passing of the climax of the Turkish
peril,
it,
both on sea and on land.
But though the
credit for
as
we have already remarked, belongs

in a lesser degree to
little
largely to Garcia
de Toledo, and as a whole got
Alvaro de Bazan, Spain or nothing of the glory, because of the
hesitations of her king. Indeed, it is scarcely too much to say that she lost rather than gained in reputation from the
had been the first occasion since his return to the peninsula in which Philip had been concerned in an He was, enterprise which interested the whole of Europe. for a moment, the cynosure of all eyes, and men satisfied themselves for the first time of his slowness and vacillation.
whole
affair.
It
"The King has
lost a great deal of reputation
by not
suc-
coring Malta," reported the English special agent at Madrid on September 3, 1565, 3 and there is every reason to think
1
Pedro de Salazar, Hispania Victrix,
fols.
J
258-261. F. Balbi de Correggio, Verdadera J. Bosio, Istoria, Relation, pp. 105 ff.
;
y cinco mil hombres, y entre ellos Dargut, y otros muy muchos senalados." 3 C. S. P., Foreign, 1564-65, no. The succors, of course, had by 1455. this time arrived, but the fact was not
iii,
Fernandez Duro, ii, pp. 690-703 Sanminiatelli Zabarella, pp. 94-97 pp. 577-603. Balbi de Correggio (fol. " 121) gives the Turkish losses as treynta
;
yet
known
369
in Spain.
f.
Cf. also Pastor,
xvi, pp.
122
envoys sen1 similar opinions to their govIn some respects the verdicts were probably ernments. harsher than Philip really deserved; the fact of the matter \v;i> that he had never been quite whole-hearted in his desire
that other foreign
to
have Malta saved.
The
enterprise lay
ish horizon, at least as
he conceived of
beyond the Spanit, and his interests,
at that period of his rule,

\\
were
strictly limited to Spain.
He
as intent on the preservation of the safety of his

of his control of the adjacent seas.
own
shores
and
And
he could never
quite forget that the large majority of the Knights were

a French grand-master; should he bestir himself to give aid to subjects of why. then,
a1 the moment, had a long and pro-Turkish tradition behind it, and might anti-Spanish
Frenchmen and commanded by

which, though friendly
its
a state,
subsequently revert to
former hostile attitude?
He
had certainly shown himself considerably more energetic when it was a question of purely Spanish enterprise, such
as,
for instance,
the defence
^\'
Oran.
Yet, even allowing

in
for all this, there can be little
doubt that Philip's conduct

effect
connection with the

his position in
relief of
Malta had an adverse
on
It showed his fellow soverWestern Europe. he was not to be the factor of ubiquitous and universal importance which his father had been before him;
eigns that
it
continued
to
fitness
disagreeable suspicions in regard to his champion the interests of the faith. And if
many
Philip's hesitations diminished
his
prestige,
an
Increased
the jealousy and distrust
of his neighbors,
least
t<>
have begun
to
reveal,
at
the
they may also keener minds, the

defeat him.
methods whereby it would ultimately be possible to
The
-aw
;i
immediately succeeding the attack on Malta

lull
temporary
i.
i
in
the activities of the

MpseUtty
D.
/.
Turks
,
in
the
tad
Pormtob,
xxx, pp.
ml
reforaaoei there,
xxix, p. 645,
PROJECTS OF PIUS V
Mediterranean.
It
123
was expected that Suleiman would seek vengeance for his defeat in 1566, and Philip ordered the construction of eighty galleys to meet the threatened peril but the Sultan's anger vented itself principally in a last campaign against Hungary, in which he met his death and Piali Pasha, who had begun to ravage the coasts of Apulia, was prompt to retire when Garcia de Toledo's fleet drew near. But this same year 1566, though in itself comparatively
1
;
advent on the scene of a new personality, the incarnation of the crusading ardor of the Counterquiet, witnessed the
Reformation, who was to arouse and unite the Christians for a holy war against the infidel with an enthusiasm which
they had rarely shown before, and to carry the combat into the waters of the foe. Eight months before Suleiman the to Selim the Sot, the papal tiara had Magnificent gave way
passed from Pius IV to the far abler and more energetic Pius V.
From
the
moment
of his accession the
new
pontiff
was
:
inspired with the idea of the creation of a Holy League not the sort of Holy League which the sixteenth century had
already occasionally produced, in which religious pretexts were put forward to cover the most selfish of political ambitions,
defe.it
but a genuine alliance for the purpose announced, the and humiliation of the infidel Turk. 2 The death of
Suleiman, with the prospect which it opened of plots and revolts before the recognition of his successor, seemed to
furnish an unusual opportunity for decisive action, and the
depredations of Piali Pasha, to justify it. In the winter of 1566-67 the Pope sent messages to all the Catholic powers of
Western Europe to urge them to take arms and unite

1
for a
Fernandez Duro,
ii,
p. 101.
.
account
League.
of
the
principal
authorities,
Luciano Pastor, xviii, pp. 353 ff Serrano, La Liga de Lepanto (Madrid, 1918-19), i, pp. 1-27, gives an admirable
contemporary
and
modern,
on
the
124
crusade.
1

From France,
aa
was
to be expected in
view of her
also quite
recent policy, he obtained nothing, and he

;
was
before long it unable to move the Emperor Maximilian II became obvious that the sole possible sources of help were Venice and Spain. But the tradition of Venice was to maintain peace with the
Turk, particularly for commercial pur-
cs;
furthermore, she feared that a war would
mean the
she
loss of her colonial possessions in the Levant,
and especially
;
of the island of
Cyprus, which she had held since 1489
therefore refused, for the time being, to consider the papal

2
proposals.
Philip also, at
3
first,
what
different reasons.
He had
;
held aloof, though for somegreat respect for the char-
moreover, it seems probable that Malta had given him some inkling of the narrow the fact that the Mediterranean situation must be considered as a whole, and that the western basin could not be really safe as long as the infidel was in control of the The principal consideration which caused him eastern.
acter of the
pontiff
new
escape of
to
hold back was the threatening state of affairs in the Netherlands, where rebellion was plainly beginning to raise
Dissipation of his forces in a crusad< against the Turks would be certain to increase his difficulties in that
its
head.
quarter;
might even conceivably encourage, the Protestant Like his father states of the Empire to move against him.' before him, Philip was beginning to discover that the size
it
and extent of
from
his scattered
dominions exposed him to

discouraged
1506
i.
peril
many
different directions at once.
Pius,
Pastor,
.
however,
I., i,
was not
despite
his
first
p.
./i
iviii,
p.
pp. 84 f. '..*.<;; Serrano,
as
the
pp.
n<>.
4
tit.
nl*
tli>-
oontemporary Hmrra
Cipro, by Paolo Paruta (Siena, (T. 1827), pp 'The latter of Pitti V to Philip, wrjrbig bin to make w;ir on the Turks, waa, of ooune, written In 1568, and not in
'.
and 238-244, 6720, have it. Serrano, i. pp.

r
Stmanario Erudito, viii, Banehea Alonao,
f.
pp. :*. 6 Potitik
f.;
<"<
P.
Herre,
cyprieeaen
Pastor, xviii, VurojXlitchc Krieg, pp.
3743.
VENICE AND CYPRUS

rebuff,
125
he refused to abandon his crusading projects, and in 1570 his persistence was rewarded. The primary cause of the change in his fortunes was the rashness and stupidity of
the
new
Sultan, which drove the Venetians,
who
really
desired to keep the peace, into the reluctant necessity of The island of Cyprus was the chief bone of declaring war.
"in the vitals of the Turkish Empire" 1 in Venetian hands it imperilled the infidel control of the
contention.
It lay
;
eastern basin of the Mediterranean

of Syria
it menaced the coasts and Palestine, and was a bar to maritime communi2 cation between Constantinople and Egypt. The Sultan, was firmly convinced that he would never have moreover,
; ;
in 1569
it from Venice a bad harvest had deprived her of supplies, and the explosion of a powder magazine was reported to have destroyed a large
a better opportunity to wrest
number
In March, 1570, accordingly, an ambassador from Selim appeared in Venice with a curt
of her galleys.
for the cession
demand
was
still
and evacuation
of the island.
There
a strong faction in the councils of the republic, to
be heard from again and again in the succeeding years, which held that peace with the infidel must at all costs be pre-
but the Turkish demand was so uncompromising and so insolent that the majority felt that compliance was Selim's envoy was accordingly sent back to his impossible. master without even being permitted to make formal stateserved
;
ment
of his errand, and war was therewith practically declared between Venice and the Porte. No one realized
better than the republic that she

alone.
1
The only
;
was incapable of waging it course was to apply to the Pope possible

well brought out by the exploit of three galleys of the Knights of St. John,
Serrano, i, p. 42, note 1. pp. 37-41 Pastor, xviii, pp. 361 f. Stirling-Maxwell, Don John The posof Austria, i, pp. 303-305. sibilities of Cyprus as a haven for Christian corsairs at this time were
2
Ibid.,
which, issuing from one of its harbors, captured two Moslem treasure-ships en route from Alexandria to the Porte.
126

to the other Catholic
and through him

for the
powers
of
Western
formation of the very Holy League in which Europe Her three years before Venice had refused to participate. <>\\M crusading ardor was no whit stronger than it had been
then, but she was only too glad to utilize that
of others,
provided
1
it
could avail for the preservation of her colonial

illusions about the attitude
empire.
The Pope had no

of the republic.
Belfish,
and objects
He knew
that her motives were exclusively

of
Christendom did not appeal He also but the chance was too good to lose. to her at all realized thai nothing of importance could really be accom;
and that the welfare
plished unless he secured the cooperation of Spain.
France
and the Empire were clearly of no avail; his own military and naval resources were scanty; the independent Italian To Philip, accordStates would only follow a Spanish lead.
ingly, Pius
spring of 1570 a
of the
once more applied, and sent over to Spain in tinMalagan cleric, Luis de Torre.-, who had
resided for years at the papal court, to ask for the support
Prudent King.
Spanish
The envoy had

at
his
in
first
interview
with
the
monarch
in
Cordova
all
April."
For-
tunately for the success of the Pope's proposals, the situation

in
Spain, as well as
to
Venice, had
in
such fashion
the present
8
as
make them much more acceptable OU
The rebels occasion than they had been three years before. in the Low Countries, now confronted by the terrible Alva, he were far Less of a menace than they had been in L567.
1
infidel corsair,
Aluch
Ali.
had recently captured the city of
Tunis, and expelled the local Hafside ruler,

rrino,
171
i,
who was
still,
pp. 41
40;
Pastor, xviii,
di
oorrespondence of Tome baa recently bean published, with an oxrfllont introduction, by I Dragonetti
[*he
Lepanto net eatrteggio diptomatieo intdito Luyi de Torre* (Turin. 1931) particularly pp. 97 116, and *<<> :i1sm Sorrano, Pastor, xviii, pp. 369 372; 60 62; Harro, op, dt., pp. 84 111. i. pp
j
index the
title of La. Logo.
<fi
rrano,
i.
pp.
68,
SPAIN
AND THE LEAGUE

Prudent King
;
127
a sub-
in theory at least, a vassal of the
sequent assault
had
at least
on La Goletta had been repulsed, but it served as a reminder that Spain was still menaced
1
by
of
a Turkish peril.
The high
character and reputation
Pope Pius himself doubtless counted for something. But the consideration which unquestionably had the greatest weight of all was the fact that the Morisco rebellion in Granada, if not yet completely suppressed, was doomed to inevitable failure its back had by this time been thoroughly broken. That revolt and the maimer of its suppression had done much to undermine the prestige of the Prudent King. That it should have been permitted to occur at all was an evidence that he was not master in his own dominthat such overwhelming force and such cruelty had ions been necessary to put it down, had but strengthened the bad
;
;
2 The impression at the different courts of Western Europe. tercios which had been called on to do the bloody Spanish
work longed
cerned
all
to
win back their good name

;
in a
war that conof Austria,
Christendom
their leader,
all.
Don John
was the most
insistent of
Finally, there
had been
just
enough danger that the rebellion might be aided by infidel cooperation from without to make adherence to the League
which the papacy was proposing the logical sequel to what had already been accomplished at home. And whatever remaining doubts the king may have entertained, on the
ground
cleared
of the perennial emptiness of his exchequer,
were
up by the papal offers, conveyed through Luis de Torres, of wellnigh unlimited concessions in the matter of
clerical subsidies.
3
By
1
the middle of
May,
then, in the year 1570, Philip

'Serrano, i, pp. 58 pp. 372, 386, 390; Torres, pp. 144-163
p. 131.
f
.
had
121
Defontin-Maxange, Eudj' Ali, pp. ff.; Fernandez Duro, ii, pp. 117 f.
Pastor, xviii,
Mercier, iii, pp. 106-108. 2 Serrano, i, pp. 56 f.
Dragonetti de cf. also below,
128

to join the
determined
League; but
it
is
scarcely too
much
as
to say that the Venetians deplored rather than
welcomed
the news that he had decided to become their ally.

feared
Much
they dreaded yet more lest they they should become the cat's-paw of Spain; and they were determined thai the League should be constituted in such
the Turk,
fashion as to prevent
its
being directed
in
1 Spanish interests.
the outset the republic desired a merely temporary agreement, from which she could withdraw when it suited her
From
own convenience; she would have nothing
to do with
the more permanent and binding treaties which were advocated by Philip and the Pope. She also proposed to keep the control of the naval campaign as far as possible out of
Spanish hands, by the creation of a pontifical fleet to which all the allies should contribute their contingents, and which
was to be commanded by the papal general, Marcantonio Colonna; this appointment had the additional advantage in Venetian eyes that it was certain to be resented by (ban Andrea Doria, who had been placed in command of the
galleys of Spain.
2
Philip could not be blind to the
meaning
of these arrangements,
in
and was naturally slow to acquiesce

contingents took a long time to to combine; not till the last day
ofT
3 the shores of Crete.
them.
The
different
of
mobilise and longer still August did they unite
The
Venetians
wished
to
rescue
besieged by believe that
the Turks,
this
but
Cyprus, which was already Doria and Colonna did not
would be feasible)
the Turks,
and
in
the midst of
21, the
the ensuing discussions there arrived, on
September
tunning
capture.
1
QeWfl
that
Nicosia, and therewith bee.
twelve days before, had niic masters of all of
Serrano, pp. 379 fT.
i.
pp, 87
p. 71
fT.
Puntor,
xviii,
Cipro.
\>\>.
OS
i.
fT.
ItaLn>,a. pp.
i,
;
147
p.
f.,
Manfroni, Marina 458 f.
Serrano,
Paruta, (iuerra di
'Swimno,
78.
PHILIP
AND THE LEAGUE
129
1 Cyprus save Famagosta.
This disaster and the advent of

to
all
the
autumn winds put an end
projects for a vigorous
proposed
Plans were offensive during the remainder of the year. which were for various minor operations, all of
abandoned after mutual recriminations between the allied and the upshot of the matter was the ignominious leaders retirement of Doria to Sicily and of Colonna to Rome. Had the Christians acted vigorously and unitedly in the early summer, before the Turks had got a foothold in Cyprus, they could almost certainly have prevented its loss. As things fell out, iheir sole achievement was the tardy rein;
forcement by the Venetian leader, Zanne, of the garrison and on his return of Famagosta with a force of 1500 men
;
from
it
he lost thirteen vessels in a storm.
issue of the campaign of 1570 proved that and better organization were imperative if anylarger forces thing was to be really accomplished in the ensuing year. The terms of the League had not yet been settled, though plenipotentiaries for the arrangement of them had met at
The unhappy
Rome
Philip
all his
in June.
By
this
time
it
also
became evident that
was determined to enter upon the undertaking with might. Whether it was that he had caught the spark
because of the unusually
of the Pope's crusading ardor, or
favorable state of Spain's foreign and domestic affairs, it in any case he seemed more anxious to fight is hard to say
;
was resolved to give whole-hearted support to the League, and was prepared to shoulder the principal burden of the work that it was to be called upon to do, he was equally determined to have the principal voice in the control of it, and to have
than he had ever been before.
But
if
Philip
its
constitution
so
drawn up that Spain should derive

p. 321.
Stirling-Maxwell, op. Ibid., p. 324.
cit., i,
'Serrano,
pp. 382
ff,
i,
pp. 85
ff.
Pastor, xviii,
130

benefit
duo
representatives whom he sent from Madrid were given ample instructions to this effect, and :it Home they were powerfully aided by the
from
its
activities.
The
efforts
more
Cardinal GranveUe, who was accused of being 1 As the Spanish than the Spaniards themselves.
o\
principal the chief
means
of attaining their end, they insisted that

of
command
the forces of the allies should be
conferred
on Philip's half-brother,
Don John
of Austria,
who had been
righting the infidel in Granada for nearly two Don John himself had applied for the po Lyears past. on November 19, 1570, 2 and though the appointment tioD
elicited
some objections from the other allies, it was thenceHe was at that time nearly forth recognized as inevitable. twenty-four years old, in the fresh vigor of his early manhood,
and well
fitted
by his inheritance and by Ids personal attractions to arouse men's enthusiasm. There is no reason to believe that he possessed any great
graceful, gallant, courteous,
knowledge
fleets of
of
naval
affairs,
despite
the
fact
thai
since
of the
the spring of 1568 he had been commander-in-chief
matters of strategy he had to be guided by the counsels of older seamen like (ban Andrea Doria 3 But such an arrangement was not and Alvaro de Bazan.
Spain;
in
uncommon
at
the time
ami
it
seemed
part Lcularly desirable
on the presenl occasion, when charm and personality were obviously Indispensable tor the holding together of
mutually distrustful allies. And it was not solely in the mutter of the command that Spain manifested her resolve
that
the operations of the League Bhould redound to her

-
own advanl
b.th
She
insisted
that
its
a
objects should
be
offensive and defensive, and. as

,,.
i
guarantee against
B"-i
p.
M
14:<
i.
Baa&n,
11'
pp. 51
Fsrnindei Duro
xii.
in
ff.
xxvni. pp. ;rln.K-Mnxwrll.

I
I
pp %
SI
BoUHn of the K A. EL, Cf. bo ante, p. 98, note
pp. 102
i.
ilaguim
Dimrie,
Alvaro
de
TERMS OF THE LEAGUE

desertion
131
by her
colleagues,
that
it
should last for at least
twelve years. She also demanded that Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli should be included in the sphere of its activities as
well as the territories of the Eastern Mediterranean, and
2 succeeded, with some reservations, in carrying her point. The question of relative costs made less trouble than usual
Spain was quite ready to pay for the preponderant position which she had elected to assume, and promised not only to meet half the total expense on her
in such cases.
own
account, but also to be responsible for such portion of the share allotted to the see of Rome as the papal exchequer might be unable to contribute. It was, after all, but
the retort courteous for the financial concessions of Pius, of which Philip had taken special pains to make doubly sure
beforehand.
The Holy League was solemnly concluded on May 26, and on the following day it was published to the world in the
basilica of St. Peter.
Holy Leagues
the outset that
of the
it
it
In view of the history of previous did not seem superfluous to proclaim at was formed "for the destruction and ruin
Turk," including his subject states of "Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli of Barbary"; and that there was to be no limit to the period of its duration. Spain was to furnish
one-half of the funds, troops, ships, and munitions of war, 5 Don John was Venice one-third, and the Pope one-sixth.
least
That her fears of such desertion, at on the part of the Venetians, were by no means groundless, is proved by
1
the fact that in January-February, 1571, entertained a proposal for a It was separate peace with the Porte. just at the time that the plenipotentiaries at Rome were having the great-
Venice
Cf. ante, p. 127 Serrano, i, pp. 89Pastor, xviii, pp. 385 ff 4 C. de C, ii, pp. 86-92; Paruta, Historia Vinetiana (Venice, 1605), ii, The Pastor, xviii, p. 405. pp. 162 f. treaty is printed in Dumont, Corps universel diplomatique, 1 v, (1728),
;
90
est difficulty in reaching an agreement, and their sessions were suspended for more than a month. For details cf.
Serrano, i, pp. 95 f. 2 Serrano, i, pp. 88
f.
pp. 203-205. 5 Serrano, i, pp. 87, 97 ff. StirlingMaxwell, i, pp. 340 ff. As a matter of fact Venice contributed a few more than her share of the galleys, and fell somewhat short of her assigned propor;
132
invested with
his

all
the powers of commander-in-chief, and in
Marcantonio Colonna was to fill his place, but the authority of the generalissimo was limited by the provision that he was not to be permitted to take any
absence
decisive action without the consent of the general of each
of the forces of the allies;
this stipulation originated with
the Venetians,
who thus hoped

the
to prevent the Spaniards

suit
from
directing
League to
themselves.
It
was
the chief interests of Venice lay in the recognized Adriatic and in the Levant, and those of Philip in North
that
was provided that in years when no common enterprise should be undertaken each of the two powers should have the right to engage in ventures of its own, and to call upon its ally for support and assistance, save when
Africa
;
and
it
the
territories
of
that ally were
danger from the Turk. France and Portugal were invited to join the League, under conditions to be agreed upon; but no one can have been In France surprised at their determination to hold aloof.
themselves actually in The Emperor and the kings of
the belief was openly expressed that the differences between Spain and Venice were too deep-rooted to make it possible
them to accomplish anything in alliance; nay more, the Spanish Mich was France's jealousy of the power her government actually tried to thwart the kiiiL that
for
>t
the purposes of the League by ottering every facility to Venetians tor q separate peace with the Porte. Still less
welcome was the news

in
in
England,
in
the Netherlai
all
Is,
and
felt
the
Protestant
states of the
Empire,
of
which
themselves menaced by the power of In their eyes the League could not fail the lung of Spain.
directly or indirectly
r,f Spain troopi and mjpplica; furnished these, and was permitted, in turn, t,, full DUOfa short i.f her
ii..n
.[.1.
in.
nt
of
ships
us
Venice
had
exceeded hers. Any deficiency in the Pope's contingent wa* to be made up by Spain Mid V.-nire in due proportion. Sirnmo, i, pp. 99 101.
'
THE FALL OF FAMAGOSTA

to be a fresh
133
means
of the
of
enhancing the already dangerous

of the South.'
*
preponderance
'Demon
News of the conclusion of the League reached Madrid that very day Don John left for Barcelona on June 6 on the way to Messina, the appointed rendezvous of the 2 He was himself in a fever of impatience to allied fleets. reach the scene of action. If there was to be a real campaign before the coming of the autumn winds, there was not a
;
moment
of
to
be
lost.
It
was indispensable, moreover, to

for the rescue
reassure the Vene+ians,
who were clamoring
Cyprus before Famagosta should fall, and who suspected the Spaniards of trying to delay matters in order to divert 3 But despite the fact that the expedition to North Africa. all the leaders professed to be in such haste, it was not until
September 2 that the entire armament could be united at the appointed place. The Spanish galleys had been scat-
up and down the coasts and in the harbors of the Balearics, and it took a long time to collect and repair them. Though Venice had been so anxious for the Spaniards to make haste, her own preparations were the most tardy of all and it was typical of her jealous and distrustful attitude that the last of all the allied squadrons to reach Messina was a detachment of sixty ships of the republic which had wintered at Crete. 4 At the council of war, which was held
tered
;
immediately afterwards to determine the course of the ensuing campaign, the Venetians soon learned that Don
John was
fully as anxious as
they were themselves that a

;
and as the news vigorous blow be immediately struck of the fall of Famagosta, on August 1, and the dastardly massacre of its defenders in the ensuing weeks, made it
evident that an operation against Cyprus was no longer to
1
Serrano, 'Serrano, Serrano,
i,
i,
pp. 100
p. 103. p. 102.
f. ii,
p. 199;
Paruta, Historia Vinetiana (1605) Serrano, i, p. 112.
i,
134

of,
it
be thought
was resolved
to seek out the infidel fleet

it
and give
I
it
battle wheresoever
:
should be found.
It
was
one which the Emperor at the height of his power had never been able to bring himself to make, and one which tin sages of the time universally condemned as
daring decision
1
utterly
enemy
in
contrary to the dictates of common sense.' The was known to be more numerous, both in ships and
his janizaries
men, and
were
still
the terror of
in
much
of
Western
Europe.
Christian defeat
eastern
waters,
where there would be practically no chance of escape for surviving galleys, would give the Turks unquestioned mastery of the Mediterranean. Spain in many ways was
taking
a
much
greater risk than the Venetians;

infinitely
she had
far less to gain
and
more
to lose.
For the republic,
immediate and drastic action was imperative; without it, she would be deprived of all her colonies in the Levant.
For Spain, on the other hand, the status quo was, at least tolerable. With her navy at its existing strength, the Turks
might venture to raid the Western
could scarcely hope to control it. If, all her galleys should be lost, her hold on
Mediterranean, but on the other hand,
North Africa
would
infallibly
be broken, and the enemy permanently

striking
iblished
within
j"in
distance
of
her
fche
own
coasts.
When we
with these Considerations
caution and
hesitancy which usually characterized Philip II, and the difficulties born of the distrust between the allies, we shall
!<
the Wetter able to appreciate the
meaning
of the leader-
ship of
Don John.
Pope.
He seemed
to personify the
crusading
ardor of the
their
feet,
His inspiring presence swept
men
off
r
and
p.
in.'ide
them temporarily
'/ in
forget
their
at
l.
ow n
Seville
F,.,
rrano,
i.
lis.
in
Ci the contemporary Relation
in
Barren, originally ptihliHhod 1572, and reprinted in l>

pp.
xxi,
</.
Cipri
/
o
I
<i<
hninlln
<!<
rnando
242 382, (pp. 831 3
especially
ohapter
xxi
THE CHRISTIAN FLEET

selfish
135
aims in an overwhelming enthusiasm for the
common
cause.
He seemed
Never had the
the incarnation of the spirit of 1095. Counter-Reformation given evidence so
dramatic of the power of its creed. 1 When finally assembled in the port of Messina, the entire
Christian
forts
numbered six heavy galleasses, floating carrying 44 cannon apiece, which were contributed by
fleet
;
the Venetians
208 galleys, of which the republic furnished and about 100 smaller 106, Spain 90, and the papacy 12 vessels and transports, of which three-quarters were either
;
and there were in all some Spanish or in Spanish pay The fleet carried about sailors and rowers on board. 50,000
;
31,000 soldiers, of
Italians
whom
and
Germans
enlisted
19,000 were either Spaniards, or in the Spanish tercios,
2000 volunteers, fitted and equipped at their own cost but credited to Spain, 8000 Venetians, and 2000 troops furnished by the Pope. The Venetians galleys were
by no means the equal surplus number of them

by
the Spanish ones, and the in excess of the proportion that had been allotted to the republic was further compensated
of a corresponding surplus of the troops
and equipment
This arrangement, which had been tentatively agreed upon at the time of the formation of the League, was clearly to the advantage of
that were furnished
by Spain.
concerned, and was a tribute to the recognized superiThe forthcoming action, ority of the Spanish veterans.
all
had been plainly foreseen, was to be a contest at close range, of ramming and boarding, between vessels which relied chiefly for their propulsion on oars a transference, one
as
:
1 Costiol, Chronica, lib. ii, cap. xiii Stirling-Maxwell, i, pp. 380-383, 406 f. 2 On the galley of Don John cf. G.
de Artinano y de Galdacano, Arquitectura Naval Espanola, p. 47 and the

;
contemporary Description de la Galera Real del Sermo. Sr. D. Juan de Austria by Juan de Malara (1527-71), published by the Sociedad de Bibliofilos Andaluces (Seville, 1876).
13G
might almost say, to the decks of ships, of a land battle of the type in which the Spaniards excelled. Sailing ability
and
long-range cannonading would consequently count for comparatively little, and the troops which the
skill
at
1
transported would be quite as important as the galleys themselves. On September 16 the great fleet streamed out of the port
galleys
of
Messina and headed across the Ionian Sea
for Corfu,
each galley being separately blessed by the papal nuncio as 2 Once at sea, it assumed the format ion which it passed.
it
was
to retain, with a few trifling changes,
when
it
en-
foe. There was a vanguard of eight swift under Juan de Cardona behind it, in the centre, a galleys squadron of sixty-six galleys under Don John on the left,
countered the
the main
body
of the Venetians, to the

3
;
number
of fifty-four,
on the right, another detachunder Agostino Barbarigo Gian Andrea Doria in the rear, ment of equal size under
;
reserve
of
thirty-one,
under Alvaro de Baz&n. 4
On
September
1
27, the Christians arrived at Corfu,
where they
All the accounts, both contemporary and modern, of the Christian armament
differ
slightly
from
one
another
in
regard to the numbers of the men and the ships; the discrepancies, however, are not large, and the figure of 208 for the sum total of the galleys seems to be accepted by practically all, except Normann-l'riedenfcls (p. 23), who makes
I have relied chiefly on Fer209. nandez Duo, ii. pp. 137 f.. and Serrano, i. pp. 97, 119 f., and the contemporary authorities cited l>y them.
and three others, despite their plea that he had no jurisdiction in their case. Don John not unnaturally was highly incensed at what he regarded as an affront to his honor, and for a time there was good prospect that the Spaniards would fire int. 'heir allies; but it was
of
it
through the mediation Colonna, that Veniero should be punished by the loss of his command
finally arranged,
and
4
of
his
i,
seat
in
the
war
council.
'Cottiol,
1
Chronica,
ii,
lib.
ii,
cap.
xiii
Fernandez Dnro,
kl the time Venetians were
pp. 138
f.
of leaving
Messina, the
commanded by Sebas-
bu1 he whs raplaood by the harlx.r of Corfu as the outcome of an incident too significant to be omitted. When a small detachtian Veniero;
Barbarigo
in
pp. 121 f. The galleys were scattered, generally without reference to the power that furnished them, among the different detaohmenta of the fleet, but it is worth noting that there were no Spaniards and only three Neapolitans in the left wing, where the Venetians were in
Serrano,
leasses
preponderant were
which Don John had became insubordinate, the Venetian leader hanged the captain
ment of trrx>ps lent to Veniero
among
the the allied fleet.
The six Venetian galdistributed, two apiece, three main squadrons of

e.
THE TURKISH FLEET

received the
first
137
news
it
plundering Corfu shortly before

at their departure
The Turks had been from prisoners exchanged was learned that the enemy had a fleet
of their foe.
;
fully equal to that of the Christians, that its chiefs
were
two minds whether or not to offer battle, and that when was steering for the Gulf of Lepanto. 1 Whether the forces of the infidel had remained united, or had subsequently split into two detachments, it was impossible definitely tu determine; but in any case Don John was resolved to pursue them, and he soon succeeded in persuading the war council to agree.
in
last seen, it
The Turkish fleet was, in fact, all collected at the time in the inner harbor of the Gulf of Lepanto, doubly secure in the protection of the fortresses that guarded its narrow
mouth.
to its
The contemporary estimates vary widely in regard size. It seems probable that the total number of its
ships
was approximately equal to that
but that a larger were galleys. There
perhaps proportion
is
2
of the Christians,
as
many
as 230
it
also reason to believe that
carried
a somewhat larger number of troops. It was now commanded by Ali Pasha, substituted for Piali at the order of
who had been displeased at the manner in which the latter had permitted aid to be brought to the garrison 3 of Famagosta in the preceding year. Ali Pasha was young,
Selim, vigorous,
anxious
to
distinguish
himself,
somewhat over-confident
as a result of his
and probably recent promotion

;
The title of Marquis of Santa Cruz had been conferred upon Alvaro de Bazan by a royal cedula of October 9, 1569. Altolaguirre y Duvale, Don
Alvaro de Bazdn, p. 49. 1 Stirling-Maxwell, i, pp. 390 f. 2 Costiol, Chronica, lib. ii, cap. xv; Fernandez Duro, ii, p. 152; Serrano, i,
p. 130,
fleet was originally composed of 170 large galleys and 200 smaller vessels, but gives no reference for his statement.
printed
The contemporary Relation Espanola, at Rome, puts the total of

soldiers, sailors,
Turkish
s
and rowers as
high as 130,000.
Cf.
and references
(p.
there.
Normann-
Duro,
ii,
ante, p. p. 133.
129
and Fernandez
Friedenfels
29)
says the Turkish
138
he also believed the Christian forces to be considerably smaller than they actually were, and wished to sally forth
and give battle in the open. But many voices in the Turkish war council were raised against this plan as too audacious:
Pasha, the general of the Turkish infantry, and of Aluch Ali, the viceroy of Algiers, a renegade Calabrian fisherman who had become a Moslem,
among them
those of Pert an
and had crowded a multitude of adventures into the fifty-two years of his existence; he was to be a thorn in the side of
the Christians for
many
years to come.
These men, who
could scarcely be accused of timidity, had their own information in regard to the Christian fleet, and stoutly maintained
that
and
its size.
composed of them at the

favored
their
Pasha underestimated both its quality They knew that their own crews were largely Christian captives, who would naturally desert
Ali
first
favorable opportunity.
They
therefore
a policy of
avoiding decisive action, and of awaiting

of the fortress of
enemies under the protection
Lepanto,
where they would have every advantage, and a safe place of retreal they were confident, moreover, that the coming
;
of the
autumn winds would soon
oblige the Christians to
disperse.
Hut Ali Pasha rejected these opinions as derogaHe pointed out tory to the honor of the Turkish Empire, that there were many other tort resses to the south of Lepanto
to
which
his fleet
could retire
the
last
in
case
<>f
need
and
his
views
were confirmed
seek the
toe.
at
from the Sultan,
moment by a peremptory order commanding him to go forth at once and

li.
accordingly, lie Weighed anchor and moved Blowly west out of the inner harbor of Lepanto, one hour after daybreak, on in the direction of Vphalonia
(
;
On October
the morning of the 7th. he Bighted the Christian

Jtfriing-M&xweU,
Forn<.T(in,
ii.
i.
armament
pp.
807
.rrano,
i,
pp. 1U5
f.
207,
Mid
ralaneoM
Ibm
PREPARATIONS FOR BATTLE

in battle array,
139
1
moving slowly down out of the northwest. The moment which both commanders so ardently desired had at last arrived. A decisive battle was inevitable. That battle, however, did not begin till eleven o'clock
in the
morning no less than four hours were spent by both combatants in arranging their respective fleets for the oncoming encounter. The Turks exchanged the crescent formation in which they had issued forth from the inner harbor for a linear one, with a centre and two wings, closely
;
resembling that of their foes. Since it would clearly be the object of the Christians to keep them penned up in the narrow waters of the gulf, where the superior number of
would be necessary for around their enemy's them, flanks, and the sole way to do this was to advance the two ends of their line. The Christians, on their side, brought forward their six heavy galleasses and placed them, two in
their galleys
of
avail,
it
would be
no
in order to defeat this aim, to get
front of each of the three divisions of their

;
fleet,
to serve as
a sort of vanguard with the great cannon of these floating castles they could hope to disable the enemy's best ships before they came within range of the main body of the
Christian armament, and thus break the force of the infidel

attack.
Don John
also
gave orders for the removal of
all
the cspolones, or high wooden structures which were built over the prows of the Christian galleys to facilitate the operations of
his ships
ramming and boarding he thereby rendered more difficult for the enemy to hit, and at the
;
same time made
possible the
more
effective
working
of his
own
in the
proceeding was made evident while a large proportion of the enemy's missiles passed harmlessly over the heads of the
guns.
of this
;
The wisdom
approaching battle
Stirling-Maxwell, references there.
i,
p.
402
Serrano,
i,
pp. 126-128
Fomeron,
ii,
p. 200,
and
140

own discharges
1
Christians, their
usually found the Turkish
vessels a1 the waterline.
Bpectacle presented by the proached one another is described
The
two
in
fleets
as they apin all
glowing terms
a
the
contemporary
accounts.
The day was
Sunday;
a gentle westerly breeze was blowing, and the Christians advanced before it with their sails unfurled; and "it was
beauty to see the sea covered with so many galleys with their banners and standards of different 2 When everything was colors, in all their magnificence."
ready, Don John, clad in shining armor, transferred himself to a fast galley and ran along in front of the Christian line,
a sight of marvellous
exhorting and encouraging each of the different contingents in the words best suited to arouse its fighting ardor; and such was the enthusiasm which his eloquence inspired that
even the Venetians forgot their distrusts and grievances." As the Turks drew near, they rent the air with taunting shouts and screams they blew their trumpets, clashed their
;
cymbals, and shot off their musketry to frighten the foe; the Christians, on the contrary, preserved complete silence. At the last moment, however, a signal nun was fired, and Don a crucifix waa raised aloft on every vessel in the line.
John, standing
prominent place OH the prow of his Bagship, knelt to adore the sacred symbol, and his example The followed by every soldier and sailor in the fleet.
in a
while
deck- were bright with the gleaming arms of kneeling men, friars, erect and conspicuous in their robes of black
and brown, promised absolution to all who should loyally Never before, in the whole fighl the battle of the Cross.
COUrse of the sixteenth century, had there been so striking
Coetiol, Chronica, lib. ii. cap. xvi Stirling-Maxwell, i, pp, <>) 406; Man>
;
Nonnann-Friedenfela, pp. 86 *D. I. /:.. xxi, p. .148.

'Stirling-Maxwell,
i.
If.
Sturm dtUa Marina froni, Serrun... i, pp pp, -is? fT.

;
Italia
p.
i'>~
128
181
THE BATTLE OF LEPANTO

a demonstration of the
141
power
of religious
enthusiasm as a
motive force in a
fight.
left,
where the Venetians were stationed, the combat began with the utmost fury. The two galleasses in advance of the main line did yeoman service with
On
the Christian
their artillery in breaking the force of the initial Turkish
attack
but most of the
infidel ships finally got past
and sought safety from
their
2
fire
alongside the Christian galleys. vessels contrived to get around the Christian flank, despite all the efforts of Barbarigo to prevent it, so that for a time
them, themselves by laying Some few of the Turkish
the Venetians found themselves between two
fires.
There
were murderous discharges of cannon, musketry, and arrows, and Barbarigo received a wound in the eye which three days no quarter was asked or given, and later proved mortal
;
the slaughter was very

itself for
great.
But fortune
as
finally declared
the Venetians,
who were
much encouraged
as
their adversaries were disheartened
conflict was taking in the centre. noon large numbers of the enemy's galleys had been either captured or sunk. A few ran ashore, and their crews sought safety by jumping overboard and swimming for land, where
3 they were pursued and mostly slain by their relentless foes. It was principally on the result of the combat in the centre
by the course that the By the middle of the after-
and as that the fate of the entire engagement depended soon as the hostile fleets had closed for the encounter, it
;
became evident that each making
of the rival
commanders was
directly for the flagship of his foe.

fight
3
an hour of the opening of the

Stirling-Maxwell, nandez Duro, ii, p. Friedenfels, pp. 38 f.
1
i,
Within half the two galleys had

ii,
p.
;
408;
Fer-
Paruta, Hisloria Vinetiana,

;
pp.
;
156
Normann;
Costiol, lib.
ii,
cap. xviii
Serrano,
i,
p. 134.
215 ff. Stirling-Maxwell, i, pp. 412 f. Manfroni, Storia della Marina Italiana, 490 ff. Normann-Friedenfela, pp. pp. 55 f.
;
142
THE LAST OP THE CRUSADES
grappled one another, and the soldiers that they carried 'the were engaged in a desperate hand-to-hand conflict pick of Selim's janizaries against the flower of the tercio
of
Don Lope de
Pigueroa.
supported by their best swarmed forward on ladders as fast as they were needed; and for two long hours the issue remained in doubt. Owing
largely to the removal of the espolones,
t
Both of the rival flagships were galleys, from which reinforcements
he cannon
fire
of the
but this advantage Christians was superior from the first was neutralized by the Turkish arrows, which did deadly execution on the troops who were attempting to board;
;
Twice the Spanhimself was slightly wounded. iards got a footing on the decks of Ali's flagship, only to be A third attempt driven back again with terrible loss.
carried
Don John
them forward beyond the mast, and
then, as he was
leading on his janizaries to repel them, the Turkish commander fell dead with an arquebus shot in the forehead.
A Malagan soldier pounced upon to Don John. The head was cut
and
the body and brought

off
it
and swiftly raised on
the point of a lance, where it was plain to be Been by friend This incident determined the iss the day. foe.
i
One
of
final
rush was sufficient to take the
I- standard was hauled
down and
rent
Turkish flagship. transferred to the galley
Don John.
desperate
The banner
air
of the Cross
was hoisted
cheers.
in
its
place, and the

lasl
was
with
Christian
One
was
effort
of the infidels to retrieve their loss
frustrated by the ready aid of Bazan and In- resi rves. By three o'clock in the afternoon the battle in the centre had
been decisively won. Not bo conclusive, however, was the victory of the Chris)oria was opposed by the crafty tians on the right, where
1
tiol,
i.
lib
i'j<
ii.
'-in.
xix
Stirlingi,
pp.
'<'
Nonnana-FritdaBfate, pp.
nraU,
414
-117;
Serrano,
47
ft
ESCAPE OF ALUCH ALI

Aluch Ali and the swiftest vessels of the Turkish
contest there began
fleet.
143
The
somewhat
later
than
it
had
in the centre
and on the
of
left,
owing
fire
chiefly to the masterly
manoeuvring
the Turkish leader.
been done by the
Perceiving the damage that had of the heavy galleasses to the other
parts of the infidel line, he skilfully eluded the pair in the vanguard of Doria, and after baffling the chief galleys behind
them by wheeling first to one side and then to the other, he finally bore away to the southwest as if to outflank his
adversary's right.
suffered the
In intercepting this manoeuvre, Doria

of his contingent to
;
main body
his left
be drawn away
from the
rest of
opened between
Ali,
seizing his
fleet a large hole was thus and Don John's right and Aluch chance, suddenly changed his course and
the Christian
all possible speed for the gap in the Christian So rapid were his movements that he succeeded in getting through it, with the most of his ships, to the rear of
made with
line.
Doria and
Don John
on<>e there,
he found himself close to
a small group of galleys of the Knights of St. John of Malta, for whom he cherished rancor and profound contempt. In
a trice
their
he succeeded in overpowering them. He captured banner and took their prior's ship in tow. Then,
seeing that the fight on the other wing and in the centre was irretrievably lost, he started to escape to the open sea. But at the same moment the Christian reserve, under Alvaro de Bazan, bore down on him at full speed. To engage so formidable an antagonist was under the circumstances impossible, and the Turk had the wisdom to realize it. He cut his prize adrift, and plied his oars with might and main in one last desperate effort to get away. By the
merest hair's breadth he succeeded, with upwards of fifteen

1
Fernandez Duro,
ii,
p.
159,
makes
it
sixteen
Serrano,
i,
p.
137, puts it at
thirty.
144

him on the
at large.
1
of his besl galleys, despite all efforts to prevent
part of Bazan,
who
realized that the victory could never be
complete as long as this dangerous
enemy was
was indeed a serious matter, far more serious in fact, as the sequel was to show, than any of the Christian leaders could have foretold. For the moment, however, it seemed but a trivial misfortune; the victors were all convinced thai they had gained, as a contemporary put it, "the greatest triumph that had been won 2 in a thousand years." Cervantes, who was present and severely wounded in the fray, has rightly characterized it as "the disillusionment of the world and of all the nations who believed that the Turks were invincible upon the sea." Of the ;>00 or more infidel vessels which had entered the had got away; 117 had been captured by fight, a bare
The escape
of the pirate
.">(>
the Christians, together with about
150 pieces of artillery.
Some
of
30,000 Turks had been slain, and al least one-fourth uumber had been taken prisoners; and 1">,000 On the Christian slaves had been liberated from captivity.
that
(
christian side there
had been between 7000 and 8000

;
killed,
and about
nificant
the loss of ships was insig15,000 wounded 15 or 20 at the most and most of them were
Venetians.
Great were the rejoicings
in
Italy
and
;
the glorious news of the victory arrived
in
in Spain when both peninsulas
the ensuing month was virtually given over to processions, Te Deums, and ovations to the returning heroes Titian,
then
of
it
in
his
ninety-fifth
year,
did
r for the kiiiL of Spain,
which
is
an allegorical painting now in the gallery at

perished,.
iii
;
Madrid;
1
two pictures
of
it
by Tintoreito have
'
'
no
'
Dcfontin-Maxange, Bud?
161.
rr.irin,
i,
Mi,
pp.
stiol, lib.
i,
;
iii,
caps,
i,
;
Stirling-
Maxwell,
p,
,
]
pp. 137
i,
f.
440 f. Serrano, i, FernAndei Duro, ii, pp. 160

]<\>.
Den Quixote
pi.
mp.
xxxix.
f.
Norauuin-FtfedeiifeU, pp< 52-66.
NEWS OF THE CHRISTIAN VICTORY
145
while two by Veronese are still to be seen in Venice. 1 The glad tidings reached Philip at San Lorenzo on the afternoon
while he was at vespers and it was characteristic of him that he suffered no outward evidence of
of
8,
;
November
his joy to escape him,
but ordered that the service be con-
tinued without interruption to the very end, when he commanded that a solemn Te Deum be sung. 2 Very different was the ecstatic welcome which the news received at the
Vatican from the Pope, the real creator of the Holy League. Ever since the fleet had left Messina, Pius had been inspired
with the belief that
it
was destined
to return victorious.
He
longed to give the
lie
to the taunts of the sceptics,
who
had reminded him
Holy Leagues Emperor's day. When his sublime faith was at last rewarded, he is said to have burst out, in his gratitude to the victor, with the words of the Evangelist, "There was a
of the fate of the
of the
man
if it
was doubtless but a momentary effusion of ardent thankfulness and joy but it has a deeper and more permanent significance as well. Whether the
;
sent from God, whose was ever really used,
name was John."
The
phrase,
disposition of the different units of the Christian fleet, the excellence of its cannon, or the superiority of the tercios to
the janizaries, offers the best technical explanation of the victory, is for the naval and military experts to determine
the outstanding fact remains, that had it not been for the inspiration of Don John's leadership, and the help of the
Venetians, there would not have been any campaign at all. The latter of these two essential elements was temporary,
1 Pastor, xviii, pp. 446-448 Guglielmotti, Storia della Marina Pontificia, vi, pp. 255 ff.
;
contemporary "Relacion de la batalla naval de Lepanto," in D. I. E., J. Zarco Cuevas, Docuiii, pp. 257 f mento8 para la Historia del Monasterio
. .
Cf
San Lorenzo el Real de El Escorial, Jose de Sigiienza, Historia pp. 15, 51 de la Orden de San Jerdnimo, 2 a ed., ii, p. 426. 3 Cf. Pastor, xviii, p. 425 Stirlingde
i,
; ;
Maxwell,
ii,
i,
p.
446
Fernandez Duro,
p. 165.
146
uncertain, and, one might almost say, accidental; it had been the product of the rage of the republic over the loss of
Cyprus, and could not be expected to last, for the interests <>t' the Venetians and the Spaniards were too radically
divergent to
for
make
it
possible for
them
to be loyal allies
long.
1
But
Spain's
crusading enthusiasm, personified
by
>
> 1
John, was
a factor of
much deeper and more
per-
manent significance. 1 That enthusiasm had, indeed, been somewhat dissipated and obscured in recent years by the
multiplicity of Spain's other interests,
by her
differences
with the papacy, and by numerous other minor considerations; but it had behind it an age-long tradition, and it
flamed out like a beacon at the hour of need.

in
It
was
in
the splendid triumph just recognition of Spain's major part that had been so gloriously won, that the Sandjak, or grand standard of the Turks, was handed over for safe-keeping to
the
it
monks
of the Escorial.
fit
Not even
in
the Vatican could
have found so
Seldom,
if
a resting place.
ever, in the history of
modern times have the

"
fruits of a line victory
been more shamefully v. asted. Now we must take Jerusalem," was the cry of iareia de Toledo,
'
:
Lepanto had come attack on Constantinople was also mooted

iirst
when the
news
of
in.
;
A combined
far
:
but before long
it
was decided
ilden opporhad been -uttered to slip by. tunity During tie ensuing winter, the old differences and jealoU-ie> between the allies
for
was already too further offensive operations, and the firsl

that the season
advanced
broke forth afresh.
Spain and Venice could ao1 agree as to where the next blow should be planted while I'ope PlUS W8& attempting to bring them together, he was overtaken, on
j 1
Fi-rniindei
Duru,
there.
li,
pp.
165-167,
Form-run,
<
ii,
and references
op.
it.,
i,
pp,
IC
,
1">.
p. 206 61.
Zarco Cuevaa,
>. /
lii,
p. 81.
OPERATIONS OF THE LEAGUE TN
1572
147
May
1,
1572,
by death
and though
his successor,
Gregory
XIII, seemed at first almost to surpass him in his enthusiasm for crusading, he was unable to command the same confidence
on the part of the members of the League. 1 Philip II, he was much especially, seized every opportunity for delay
;
worried by the evidences of the hostility of France and of a possible recrudescence of the ancient Franco-Turkish alliance.
He was
also beginning to
be suspicious of
Don
John,
who now threatened

to suit his taste.
this
to
become too prominent and popular
It is also significant that we find him, at very juncture, reverting to a project which had been initiated two years before, of bribing Aluch Ali to desert the Sultan had not Selim given the corsair the supreme com;
which he succeeded, by the spring of 1572, in raising to the number of some 135 galleys, it is not impossible that Philip's plots might have succeeded. 2 All this naturally reacted most unfavorably on the attitude of the Pope and the Venetians, who continued to urge active operaof his fleet,
mand
tions in the Levant.
demnation
of the Spanish
Gregory was outspoken in his conmonarch, while the republic began
seriously to consider the advisability of
making a separate
peace with the infidel behind the backs of her allies, and of 3 But the utilizing the offers of France to facilitate this end.
energy and enthusiasm of

forces of the
Don John would
not suffer the

effort.
League to disperse without one more
He
finally secured the reluctant permission of Philip for the mobilization of the Spanish squadrons. There was a tardy
reunion of the
clusive
fleet
1
allies in August at Corfu, and a series of inconminor operations against Aluch Ali and the Turkish 4 The nearup and down the western shores of Greece.
i,
Serrano,
Forneron, ences there.

3
4
ii,
pp. 188-195. pp. 207 f.,
and
refer-
Serrano, Serrano,
i,
ii,
pp. 251-268. pp. 1-118.
Miguel Servia's contemporary "Relacion de los Suceaos de la Armada de la Santa Liga desde 1571 hasta 1574," in D. I. E., xi, pp. 359-454.
Cf.
also
148
est

to a decisive battle that
occurred during the campaign took place on the anniversary of Lepanto off the harbor of
Navarino; but the Turk refused to

longed engagement
retired,
risk his ships in a pro-
when
the
against superior forces, and prudentlyenemy bore down upon him, under the
protection oi the guns of the fortress of
Modon.
;
A whole
year had been
the magnifilost, and nothing accomplished cent outburst of crusading ardor which had made possible
the ureal victory of 1571 had been succeeded by the revival of the old suspicions and distrusts; and in the meantime the infidel had once
If
the wasting of
more become formidable. 1 the year 1572 was primarily due
to the
procrastinations of Philip,
the dissolution of the League, which was to follow in L573, must be charged first of all to
the treachery of the Venetians.
of 1572
campaign had convinced the republic that the Spanish monarch would bear no share in any active offensive operations in the
all
The
issue of the
Levant, where
that
her interests lay.

his
She had
also
observed
Don John had
eye fixed
on Tunis, which did not
in the least. Throughout the winter months were rumors and suspicions ^^ her meditated treachery, there both at Rome and at Madrid. They were strengthened by
concern her
the refusal of the republic to

fore
for
arm
to
as
the coming campaign.
many /alleys The Pope was

in
as heretoso
much
alarmed that he urged Philip
come
person to Italy as
the sole possible way of saving the situation, and though the Prudent King could not bring himself to do this, he certainly
showed
far
more energy and
interest
in
in
the affairs of
the League than he had exhibited the preceding year.'" Hut it was all in vain. The conviction of the republic that she could not herself derive any further advantage from
1
Bem&O,
i,
ii.
Mmw.-ll,
pp, L19 IfiO; BtirilngFeraiadei pp. 488 802;
Serrano, ii. |>I>. 198-284, paaaim, refereoeei there.
and
Duo.
ii.
i'P-
169-1*
DEFECTION OF VENICE
continued adherence to her
allies
149
had made her abandonment of them practically certain in November, 1572 and French influence and help facilitated her defection. On
;
March 7, 1573, she signed peace with the Porte, on such terms as might have been expected to be made had the verdict of Lepanto been reversed she tamely gave up Cyprus, whose retention had been the chief inducement that had
;
caused her to join the League, and paid in addition an annual indemnity of 100,000 ducats for three years to come. 1 Gregory was furious when the news reached him a month
later,
and the
;
different
scarcely less so
Spanish representatives in Italy for a moment there was even talk of chastis-
2 But the wiser heads ing the republic for her treachery. soon realized that vengeance was, for the present, quite out-
side the sphere of practical politics, especially in state of affairs in France and the Low Countries
;
view of the
and
Philip,
when he learned the

them, and he knew
facts, did
3 against the deserters.

;
He
not utter a word of reproach could not afford to quarrel with
it and even Gregory, before many months had passed, came reluctantly to the same conclusion. It remained to be seen what the Pope and the
Spaniards could accomplish against the infidel without the aid of the republic.
If
the defection of the Venetians

to
made
it
impossible
attempt any extensive operations
manifestly in the
Levant, it also removed the principal objection to Don John's directing his efforts to some purpose more immediately advantageous to Spain. Late in the summer it was decided that the victor of Lepanto should be permitted to attack
'Serrano, ii, pp. 285-310; N. Jorga, Geschichte des osmanischen Reiches, iii, p. 156, and references there treaty in Dumont, Corps universel diplomatique,
;
Pastor, xix, pp. 333-339

ii,
Fernandez
Duro,
*
p. 186.
ii,
Serrano,
pp. 332-334.
v, 1, pp.
218
f.
150

now occupied by the Turkish garrison L569 by Aluch Ali, though the Spaniards
(
the city of Tunis,

installed there in
still
held on
1
at
La
loletta.
Don John
left Sicily
on Octo-
ber
for this purpose, with

;
and some 20,000 troops Goletta, where he was welcomed
an armament of over 100 galleys, a week later he arrived off La

like
a conqueror.
The
Turks
at
Three days
Tunis, reading the signs, made haste to evacuate. later the Spaniards entered the city almost with-
out striking a blow, and set there again in the person of
Hassan, the protege of <asy triumph were speedily lost through the failure of the victors to consolidate their gains. The usual story is that
Philip
up the old sham Hafside dynasty Muley Mohammed, son of Muley 2 But the fruits of this Charles V.
had only consented to the expedition on condition
that, after the expulsion of the Turks, the walls both of
Tunis and of La Goletta should be completely destroyed, and the place evacuated that he was unwilling to spend
;
money on an outpost
terror lest
so remote;
and that he was
in
mortal
Don
John, of
whom
he was becoming more jealous
every day, should establish himself there as a semi-inde3 Others reject these allegations as groundpendent prince. and insist that Philip wished Tunis to be preserved/
.
Whatever the
certain that
to
rights
and wrongs
of the point a1
issue,
it
is
Don John
maintain what he had won.
received no real support in his efforts Alter the capture of Tunis,
he gave orders for the preservation of the existing fortresses,

1
C'f.
ante, p.
ii,
l-'i
'
On
f..
the intervenStirlingiii,
'So,
e.g.,
Forneron,
ii,
pp.
211
f.,
ing
viciflsitu
fell,
p|>.
12
and Merrier,
pp. 106
1
ff.
Alberi,
;
in 1574) pp. 171 176 Bervii in D. I. /.'., xi, pp. 113 C da C, ii, p. 205; U Foglietta, 233 264; loedere, etc., pp Ill 116; Mi-rn.T, iii, pp. Stirling'(.
Plaoido
Riigmtoni
though the evidence in I). I. S., iii, L36 L42, doM not entirely bear pp. him out. e.g., Fern&ndea Duxo, ii. p. 190;
,
/.'
mie
i.
vi.
bill
t<>
those
who
are
familiar
with
methods the document he

I'liilip's
of expressing himself. cite* in support of his
views
is
hardly eonclusive.
Maxwell,
ii,
pp. 13-19.
ALUCH ALI ATTACKS TUNIS

and
for the erection of a
151
on his departure for an experienced officer in charge later, Sicily, of the work, together with a garrison of 8000 men and on his return to Sicily he besought Philip to send over yet more
;
new one
two weeks
he
left
troops and supplies. But he was everywhere met with the most exasperating excuses and refusals, not only from the king himself, but also from the royal representatives in
1
Italy.
Despite
;
all
to stand a siege
the place remained unfit and the Argus-eyed Aluch Ali, who, ever
his
efforts,
since his flight
from Lepanto, had burned
for revenge,
was
ready to seize his chance. Fresh rumors began to reach Western Europe in the early spring of 1574 of the preparation of another large fleet in
Constantinople, of which Aluch Ali was to have command and there could be no reasonable doubt what its destination
;
was
to be.
Don John saw

it.
utmost to avert
less to
He
for the preparation of 100 sail at add, too late Messina, and sent off some twenty galleys with men and
the approaching peril and did his elicited orders from Philip need-
munitions to reenforce the garrison of La Goletta. 2
enemy was
more.
fleet of
On
too prompt and too powerful to July 13, Aluch Ali appeared before Tunis with a
But the permit him to do
230 galleys and a host of smaller ships. 3 There were apparently as many as 70,000 troops on board under comof
mand
pasha
in
Sinan Pasha, the son-in-law of the Sultan.
The
of Tripoli
and the inland tribes
also furnished their

;
contingents, so as to blockade the fortress on the land side

all,
the infidel armies numbered nearly 100,000 men. 4 Against such overwhelming forces, the Christian garrisons
in
1
La Goletta and the unfinished new

3
;
fortress
still
'
cow-
D. I. E., xxiii, p. 238; xxviii, pp. 185-190 C. de C, ii, p. 234. 2 Fernandez Duro, ii, p. 191.
Relazioni, serie
*
Placido Ragazzoni (1574) in Alberi, i, vi, p. 477. Fernandez Duro, ii, pp. 191 f Mercier, iii, pp. 116 f.
.
;
152
pen,' to use the picturesque Language of the soldiers, rather
naturally insufficient, and the Turks began operations too swiftly to permit the larger reenforcc-
than
fort
were
menta which Don John was painfully preparing

arrive in time.
in Sicily to
On August
23,
La Goletta was
taken, and
the garrison massacred, save for two or three hundred men, among them the commander, Portocarrero, who were en-
slaved;
and the new
fortress,
after
a heroic resistance.
succumbed on September 15. The new fortifications were promptly blown up a Turkish pasha was installed, with an
;
adequate garrison, to organize the conquest after the infidel

fashion;
and
in
October Aluch Ali was back
in
Con-
stantinople, bringing with him, in token of his triumph, some 1-500 Christian cannon, a number of distinguished captives,
Bidefi
and
finally
Muley Mohammed, the
last
of the
Haf-
tories
The greatest of the Emperor's North African vichad been reversed, and the defeat of Lepanto at leasi
partially avenged.
From 1574 onward, Philip lost all interest in fighting the The papacy made several Sorts to revive hereditary foe. 3 his crusading ardor, but in vain. The loss of Tunis con(
vinced the Spanish monarch that it wa policy to sp< money on the maintenance of remote outposts the verdict
;
of
Lepanto had been at least sufficiently decisive to deter the infidel from annoying him by raids into the western basin
any such scale as had been customary in the days of his father; above all, the pressure of In- multifarious projects and responsibilities in Western Europe was sufficient, during the remaining years of his rule,
Mediterranean
<>n
of the
rnAadei Dun.,
iii,
ii.
p.
192.
':
Word,
3
i
p.
B37;
pp. 163
f.
Dofontin-Maxangc,
ix,
//
C, pp 11M
dc
\.
ii.
;
i-
J. tk.i.
op.
)!.,
Merrier, Ui, p. 158
Budf AH,
Pastor, xix, rh.
Julian,
//
VAfrioui d"
NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE PORTE

to
153
occupy
all
his time.
One
of these projects, the
annexa-
we shall later see, to bring with the rulers of Morocco him temporarily into relations but that was a minor affair, quite apart from the main probtion of Portugal,
was indeed,
as
lem
it
toward the Turks, and his handling of was such as to demonstrate beyond any doubt that he had
of his attitude
lost all
enthusiasm for North African campaigning. Oran 1 and Mers-el-Kebir he continued to hold, despite the opinion
of
many
it
of his counsellors that their

;
maintenance cost more
than
was worth
and
their successive
commanders con-
tinued to wage the same series of petty and fruitless wars with the neighboring tribes which had meant so much labor
and pains to
istic
their predecessors.
It
was
entirely character-
of the Spanish king that here, as in so
many
other of
his affairs,
he should have insisted on the policy of a rigid maintenance of the status quo. And it is interesting to
observe that Philip's resolve to retain these two places prevented him, for several years, from obtaining the definite peace with the Porte which, despite all the threats and censures of the papacy, he had determined to seek since at least as early as 1575, when secret Spanish agents began to appear
in Constantinople.
By
1577, his efforts in this direction

;
a certain Milanese became more vigorous and definite called John of Marigiliano and an Albanian named Bruti
were charged with the
difficult task,
only to be told that a
3 treaty was impossible as long as the Spaniards kept Oran. For three years more the matter hung fire. A report which
1
And
in
also,
of
course,
certain
out-
in
Morocco, notably Melilla, which Spain had held since 1496 (cf. ante, Vol. II, p. 241), and Ceuta, which came to her with the annexation of both of these places she Portugal
posts
;
1732 {ibid., pp. 355-360), and evacuated them finally in 1792 (ibid.,
pp. 432-436).
She made a
last fruit-
less effort to possess herself of Algiers
in 1775 (ibid., pp. 403-409).
retains
lost
today.
f.,
308-310, 318
(Mercier,
iii,
Mercier, 343 f., 402, 438.
Cf.
iii,
pp.
Oran and Mers-el-Kebir
in
Spain 1708
pp. 333-335), retook
them
Mercier, iii, pp. 125 f Charriere, Negotiations, iii, pp. 705, 710-714, 733, 777 f. Jorga, Geschichte, iii, Pastor, xix, pp. 354 f. p. 160 Philippson, Kardinal Granvella, pp. 99 f.
.
154

in
reached Rome,
advance
of the fact, in
February, 1579, to
the effect thai peace had been actually concluded, elicited a

final protest
on bis
end.
from Gregory XIII; but Philip went steadily course, and on March 21, 1580, he at last attained his A revolt of the local Berber tribe- against the Turkish
representative in Algiers apparently convinced Sultan Murad III that he could ill afford to remain at enmity with
Spain, whether she continued to occupy han or not. and he finally granted the Spanish representative a truce to last
(
till
was twice renewed till 1585, when further serious i^lit in^ had ceased to be pracThe whole negotiation was conducted in tically possible.
January, 1581;
1
'
after
that
f
it
most extraordinary fashion. The Spanish representatives at Constantinople were treated rather as prisoners than .is
ambassadors, and they were constantly impeded by the but the enhancecounter-plots of the French and English
:!
;
ment
of the
power and
territories of their master,

in
I
through
East and
the annexation of Portugal and her colonies
West, furnished an argument in their favor which the Turks found increasingly potent. Save for motives of religion, far less powerful than heretofore, Spain and the infidel had
really little left to fight
about.
Each entertained
some-
Both what excessive respect for the power of the other. \nd the natural were exceedingly busy about other things.
ilt
was that though they were

foi
far
from becoming friends,
they ceased to be active
Such was the rather Borry termination of a conflict which had gone on intermittently for over eight centuries, and in which the most ancient and permanent traditions of the
1
Pastor, xix.
/.
i>;
895; Coayers Read, S
Walring-
QioanFi
AlU-n.
Jf.rK.-i.
111.
Morcwml
no
i,
L681
.'{27
f
in
;
torn,
iii,
pp 226-228,326-832;
Arni;nl:i
I
v,
pp.
ui.
[.|.
L60f.
,
rhe Spanish Ottoman Porte," In the

Pearl
Ed and the
n
439-466.
pp, B60
torieal Review, vui (1893), pp.
END OF THE CONFLICT
155
Spanish Empire were intimately bound up. The fact is worth emphasizing that the end came simultaneously with, and in some measure because of, the expansion of the Spanish
Empire
in other directions,
an expansion which was to
carry it to its greatest territorial extent. From the eighth to the thirteenth century Spain had made practically all her conquests at the expense of the infidel from the thirteenth
;
to the latter part of the sixteenth, she cost of infidel

of the
had advanced
at the
and Christian alike, and after 1580, the infidel really Western Hemisphere in the drops out of the picture; he is virtually forgotten run pressure of other things. But what perhaps in the long of the cessation is even more significant than the coincidence of war against the Turk with the annexation of Portugal and
;
also of the aborigines
her dominions overseas, is the fact that the ensuing era of peace with the infidel is also that of the beginning of Spain's decline when bereft of the ancient inspiration of crusading,
;
she ceased to go forward and began to go back. She had more than done her part during the preceding century in maintaining the great struggle of the Cross against the
other European nations in the carrying of the Gospel to the natives of the New World. But when it came to the assertion of her supremacy over
Crescent.
She had surpassed
all
the task her Christian neighbors to the north of her she which was to occupy her in the succeeding decades her was destined to experience a series of bitter defeats for
adversaries had attuned their lives to modernity, while she, It has often in large measure, was still living in the past.
been pointed out that Spain's reverses in Western Europe were at least one reason why she ceased to carry on the
struggle against Islam
tified
;
and the observation

it is
is
entirely jus-
by the
facts.
But
also quite possible to turn the
statement around the other way, and to maintain that the
156
fact

that Spain
had ceased to
fight the infidel
was
in itself
a contributing cause of the disintegration of her mighty empire, in that it deprived her of the most powerful of all the
incentives which
in
had made possible her greatest triumphs
the ages that had gone before.
157
See note at the end of Chapter
"
XXV, and add
its suppression see the Correspondencia de Felipe II y otros personajes con Don Juan de " " DocuAustria desde 1568 hasta 1570 in D. I. E., xxviii, pp. 5-154 ments relatifs a la Guerre de Grenade," ed. R. Foulche-Delbosc in " Memoire du Marquis de R. H., xxxi (1914), pp. 486-523; the Mondejar," ed. A. Morel-Fatio, on pp. 1-96 of L'Espagne au XVI' e siecle (Heilbronn, 1878); Diego Hurtado de Mendoza, et au XYII " Guerra de Granada," in B. A. E., Historiadores de Sucesos Particulars, i, pp. 65-122 (on the vexed question of the authenticity of this, cf. Lucas de Torre y Franco-Romero in the Boletln of the R. A. H.,
;
Sources. On the rebellion at Granada and
lxiv (1914), pp. 461-501, 557-596; 369-415; also R. Foulche-Delbosc
lxv (1914), pp. 28-47, 273-302, in R. H., i, pp. 101-165, 338; " xxxii, pp. 1-86; xxxv, pp. 476-538; and A. Morel-Fatio, Quelques in Ecole pratique des Hautes Etudes, section des sciences remarques,"
historiques et philologiques, Annuaire, 1914-15, pp. 5-50) ; Luis del Marmol Carvajal, " Historia del Rebelion y Castigo de los Moriscos
del Reino de
Granada,"
;
in B.
ticulars,
i,
pp. 123-365
and " Sumario
de Castillo, in M. H. E., iii, campaigns, Pedro de Salazar's Hispania Victrix (Medina del Campo, Uberto Foglietta's composite volume, 1570) covers the years 1546-65 De ISacro Foedere in Selimum Libri Quattuor and Variae Expeditiones
;
A. E., Historiadores de Sucesos Pare Recopilacion," by Alonso For the Mediterranean pp. 1-164.
in Africam,
cum Obsidione Melitae (Genoa, 1587; Italian translation, Genoa, 1598), gives an excellent contemporary picture of the sea fights and sieges down to the year 1574 and Alfonso de Ulloa's Historia
;
li>presa di Tripoli, della presa del Pegnon di Velez, et del successo della Armata Turchesca venuta sopra I'isola di Malta, Vanno 1565
dell'
(Venice, 1566?) is a good general guide to the naval conflict of the Vols, xiv and xxvii of the D. I. E. contain years with which it deals. valuable contemporary documents and relaciones on the attack on the
Penon de Velez in 1564 vols, xxix and xxx comprise the correspondence of Philip II with Don Garcia de Toledo and others on the defence
;
of
relaciones of the
iii, xi, and xxi give a number of contemporary Lepanto campaign and the ensuing events. From the manuscripts of the R. A. H. Cesareo Fernandez Duro published in the Boletln of the Academy, xii (1888), pp. 185-223, an anonj mous contemporary account, without title, of the wars of Spain against the
Malta
and
vols,
158
infidel
it<

from the days
is
of the
Emperor
to the capture of
objeol
Alvaro de
to glorify Alvaro do Basin. The Sande) in C. Fernandez Duro's
Tunis in 1574 two relatione* (one by
Estudios
Hietoncos del
Reinado de Felipe II (Madrid, 1890), pp. (17-244, and the Success! dell' Armata dclln U'" C by Antonio Francesco Cirni (Florence, 1560)
'
Two little-known congive vivid pictures of the disaster at Gerba. descriptions of the siege of Malta are Lu Verdadera Relation temporary V. ha Buccedido cu la Tela de Malta tic todo lo que el anno de M. D. L
by Francisco Balbi de Correggio (Barcelona, 1508) and Deux veritable* dieeoure on the siege of Malta by Pietro Gentile di Vend6me and Antonios AcheJis, published in French and in Greek in 1567, and dited at Paris in 1910 by Hubert Pernot; and the Primera Parte de la Chronica del muy alto y poderoso Principe Don J nan de totria, by Hieronymo de Costiol (Barcelona. 1572), is important for the
]
La Liga de Lepanto entre Espana, Venecia, y la I.epanto campaign. Santa Sede (1570-1573), by Luciano Serrano (Madrid, 1918-19, 2 vols.),
and La Lega di Lepanto nel carteggio diplomatico inedito di Luye de Torres, by A. Dragonetti de Torres (Turin. 1931), are invaluable for the diplomatic negotiations between the signatories of the league both have excellent introductory summaries, which completely supersede the very inaccurate and biassed Felipe II y la Liga de 1571 by Miguel Sanchez (Madrid, 1868). The Negotiations de la Fjance dans lc
:
Levant, ed. Ernest Charriere in the Collection de docunu
ts
inidits sur
Vhistoire de France (Paris, 1848-60, 4 vols.), is almost as indispensable for this period as for that which precedes it; and Henry de Castries.
Les sources inrdiles de Vhistoire du Maroc de 1530 a 1845, premiere se>ie, Dynastie Baadienne (Paris, 1905-26, 12 vols, and index), is the standard collection for the region and period with which it
deals.
Later Works. 1902,

vols.)
For the history of Spanish Protestantism Ems!

is
Bchftfer's BeitragezurGeeckichte dee epaniaehen Proteetantismut (Gutersloh,

'3
a final authority;
iii,
its
principal conclusions are

II.
('
l
well
summarised
of
in vol.
(
pp. 411-479, of
Inquisition
Spain
\ew
York,
Hietory of the 1906 07, 4 vols.), which in turn
Mm 'Spain (Philadelphia, 1901) also renders unnecessary for any save the Bpecialisi to delve in the older accounts of the rebellion of Granada, Buch as those contained in book vi of Jaime Bleda's Coronicadi lot Moroede Espana (Valencia, 1618), or in the second part of Gines P6rei de Hita's more romantic than historical G de Oranada lition by Paula Blanchard-Demouge, Madrid,
it
virtually supersedes such older standard authorities Julio Melgares Marin, and Men6ndez y Pelayo. II. C.
Lea's
Uorente, The
1913-15, 2 vols.)
;
159
Lea's book is a model of the best American scholarFlorencio Janer's Condicion Social de los Moriscos de Espana (Madrid, 1857) may still be consulted with profit. On the campaign of Gerba, the first 63 pages of C. Fernandez Duro's Estudios are still valuable, but Charles Monchicourt's L' Expedition espagnole
ship of its day.
de 1560 contre Vile de Djerba (Paris, 1913) is the last word on the subit contains transcripts of a number of valuable documents and
;
ject
careful
estimates
of
all
the
contemporary authorities.
Angel de
Altolaguirre y Duvale's Don Alvaro de Bazdn (Madrid, 1888) and Defontin-Maxange's Eudj'Ali, corsaire barbaresque (Paris, 1930) are both have adequate both useful biographies for the ensuing period and the former contains 400 pages of published docubibliographies, For the defence of Malta, Carlo Sanminiatelli Zabarella's ments. Lo Assedio di Malta, 1565 (Turin, 1902) and Felix de Salles's Annates
;
de VOrdre de Matte (Vienne, 1889), pp. 125-131, have superseded Giacomo Bosio's Istoria della Militia di San Giovanni Gierosolimitano, 2d ed., iii, pp. 487-716 (Naples, 1684), the Abbe R. A. de Vertot's
Histoire des Chevaliers Hospitaliers (Paris, 1726, 4 vols.), and Edmond Jurien de la Graviere's Les Chevaliers de Malte et la marine de Philippe II (Paris, 1887, 2 vols.).
Paul Herre's Europaische Polilik im
cyprischen Krieg (Leipzig, 1902) gives a good account of the diplomatic negotiations leading up to the formation of the Holy League.
the campaign of Lepanto and the events which followed it, Sir William Stirling-Maxwell's Don John of Austria (London, 1883, 2 vols.) is not yet out of date, but the little monograph of Eduard von
On
Normann-Friedenfels, entitled
Heiligen Liga und
Don Juan
de Austria als
Admiral der
Lepanto (Pola, 1902), gives the best description of the formation of the rival fleets before and during the
die Schlacht bei
and contains a number of valuable reproductions of contemporary pictures and charts. Those who are interested in the details of the &aval construction of the period can find useful information on
battle,
ft. of Gervasio de Artifiano y de Galdacano's La Arquitectura Naval Espanola (Madrid, 1920). The Venetian and papal sides of the story are adequately told in Paolo Paruta's Storia della Guerra di Cipro, ed. P. Rossi (Siena, 1827), which is a reprint of the second part in Camillo Manof the author's Historia Vinetiana (Venice, 1605)
pp. 38
and in vol. vi of Italiana (Rome, 1897) Alberto Guglielmotti's Storia della Marina Pontificia (Rome, 1887). "C. Fernandez Duro's Armada Espaiiola, vol. ii, N. Jorga's Geschichte des osmanischen Reiches, vol. iii, L. Pastor's History of the Popes, tr.
froni's Storia delta
Marina
Kerr, vols, xvi, xvii, and

septentrionale, vol.
iii,
xviii,
and E. Mercier's Histoire de V Afrique
are, of course, indispensable throughout.
The
160
by C. A. Julien's HisV Afrique du Nord (Paris, 1931), but the portions of Julien's book which are devoted to the period of Philip 11 are so brief that it is The list of works here given may of little value for our purposes here.
toire de
la-t-nanied has been, to an extent, superseded
works
be indefinitely extended by referring to the special bibliographies in the of Serrano and of Monchicourt, cited above, and to the appropriate pages of S&nchez Alonso.
CHAPTER XXXIII
AMERICA AND THE PHILIPPINES
story of Spain in the New World is far less interesting during the reign of Philip II than under Charles V. The age of the greatest explorers and conquistadores is past
The
there are no adventures comparable to those of de Soto or Orellana, no feats of arms like those of Cortes and the
The novelty of it all had begun to wear off, and the mother country was no longer fascinated by the 1 Indies in the way that it had been in the Emperor's day. Yet if measured by a less exalted standard, the progress of the Spanish rule in America under the Prudent King is by no means unimportant. There were, at least, several 'Phoenixes of the conquistadores such was Francisco de 2 who first brought effectively under Spanish control Ibarra,
Pizarros.
9
the regions comprised in the province of Nueva Vizcaya, roughly corresponding to the four northwestern states of the present republic of Mexico
such were Fray Agustin Antonio de Espejo, and Juan de Ofiate, who Rodriguez, penetrated and began to colonize the southwestern portion
;
of
what
is
Viscaino,
now who
the United States
such was also Sebastian
(after Philip's death) followed

1
explored the Gulf of California, and later up the Pacific coast as far
2
It
is
worth noting that the proporJ.
Cf. the admirable biography, Fran-
tion of pages in Cabrera de Cordoba's Felipe Segundo which are devoted to the achievement ol the Spaniards in the
cisco de Ibarra
and Nueva Vizcaya, by

;
New World
Charles V.
is far less than that in the contemporary histories of the reign of
1927) bibliography (pp. 240-250) will give ample indications to those who wish to pursue the story further.
its
L.
Mecham (Durham, N. C,
Cf. also infra, p. 486.
161
162
aa ('ape

Blanco
in
1
Oregon; by those, and others like them, the area of the Spanish dominions in America was greatly Bnt it would be foolhardy to attempt to chronicle enlarged.
all
these achievements in a
therefore select
will
each one of them

with
a
work of the present size; we three principal lines of development, typical of the Spanish method of dealing
of imperial
different
problem
domain, and try to
These are, first, the settleportray them in some detail. ment of Florida and conflicts with the French (1559-68), which indicate the attitude of the Spaniard toward the
foreign
infringer of his colonial
monopoly;
Araucanian war, which shows how

Indian
king
of
secondly, the he fought the native
who
refused to acknowledge the authority of the Spain; and thirdly, the refounding of Buenos
Aires and the opening up of La Plata, an early stage of the long process of the transference of the economic centre of
gravity of South America from tin

coast
.
Pacific to the Atlantic
the whole, had been grievously disapthe results of the expeditions that had hitherto pointed by -int out to explore and subject the region which they
:i
The Spaniards, on
called Florida.
of eternal
The
Legend that
it
contained the fountain
youth was not yet, indeed, wholly extinct, and
Cabesa de Vaca, despite all the terrible privations thai he had undergone there between L528 and L536, described
T)>
mporary account* of these

other
!><
</<
/.t.s ;,
ed.
11.
Mariano
pp.
'
hne\
and
niaiiy
expedition*
in
of
the
plo-
"1
may
found
'
Spa
ork,
mi
it
l
ad
Bolton
I!
1918]
In
'"
217f.; III. Spaniards of thai time Florida was an indeterminate
Mexico, J Ct
19J
Vol
pp
To
the
H
and
Wafl
';
rancieeo, 191
//
'
'
in
de Obregon,
1
inland stretching indefinitely the northeastern chorea of tinGulf of Mexico and the Atlantic ooaal from Cape S:it)lc northward. Cf. Tin
f
.tii
<pm.i
])
I.
i.
unn
p
/'!/..;
tr
:ind
<<!
II
I'rn^tley,
In
Xurm
Espafla, etcriln
six.
FLORIDA
it
163
in his narrative as the "richest country in the world"; but as no tangible proof of these wonders had been forthcoming, men had generally gravitated to the verdict of
Castaneda in 1543 that

poisonous
is
it
was actually
"full of bogs
and
fruits, barren,
warmed by
the sun."
and the very worst country that Save for shipwrecks and certain
sporadic and generally unsuccessful missionary endeavors, the Spaniards left the whole region virtually untouched 2 during the ensuing seventeen years.
At the time that the Emperor was giving place

son Philip, there
interest.
to his
were signs of a great recrudescence of

sure
of
The missionary appeal was always
favorable audience at the court of the Prudent King; the second viceroy of Mexico, Luis de Velasco, 3 who had suc-
ceeded Mendoza in 1550, sent home pressing demands for the occupation of Florida and Philip was the more inclined to listen to them because of his fear that if its settlement
;
was not speedily effected there was grave danger of his being forestalled by the French. Ever since the expedition
Jacques Cartier to the 'codfish waters' in 1534-35, the dread of French competition in the New World had been
of
felt
very seriously at the Spanish court.
The Emperor had

and
it
laid stress
upon
it
in his instructions to his son,
had
been reemphasized in dramatic fashion, not only by the establishment in 1558 in the bay of Rio de Janeiro of the short-lived settlement of Nicolas Durand de Villegagnon,
known
as 'La France Antarctique,'
but
also,
much
closer
at hand,
by a
series of daring
French raids on the Spanish

Spanish
351-353.
3
'Narrative of Castaneda, pp. 468, 545, in G. P. Winship, The Coronado Expedition, 1540-1542 (Washington, 1896), an extract from the Fourteenth
Settlements,
1513-1561,
pp.
Annual Report,
Ethnology.
1
pt. 1, of the
tr.
Bureau
ed.
of
I.
The Luna Papers,

i,
and
H.
Lowery, op. cit., pp. 353-356. 4 Paul Gaff arel, Cf. infra, pp. 387 f. Histoire du Bresil Francais au seizieme siecle (Paris, 1878), is still a standard authority on this subject.
Priestley,
p. xxi;
Woodbury Lowery,
164
settlements on the shores of the Gulf of Mexico and the

islands
of
the
Caribbean Sea.
1
Porto
Bello,
Cartagena,
and Havana were perhaps the favorite points of attack, It was noted, moreover, that and much booty was taken.
these raids occurred not only at times
when France and
Spain were at war In Europe, but also in years when they were officially at peace; in other words, a brood of French corsairs and adventurers was apparently growing up which
home government was unable to control, and it was impossible to tell when or where they would next strike Let them change their aims from piracy to colonization, and
the
the scene of their activities from the region of the Gulf of Mexico to the hitherto unoccupied mainland farther
and they might easily found a settlement which would It may imperil the Spanish monopoly of the New World.
north,
possibly be a slight exaggeration to speak of Philip as de-
veloping "the policy ... of carrying expansion into the heart of the continent as a means of repelling the aggressions of his
European rivals";
but there can be no doubt

French was one of the
L557, to
that the desire to anticipate the
principal motives that caused him, in December,

listen to the
urgent
pleas d( Yelaseo,
to
and order him, despite
previous
prohibitions,
"send
in
out
...
to
make new
gave
discoveries and
settlements
Florida."*
Velasco
the post of governor of the prospective colony (October 30, L558) to Tristan de Luna y Arellano, who had been resident
in
New
Spain
for
some
thirty years and

4
was highly esteemed
and efficiency. Preparations to fit out an adequate expedition were pushed rapidly forward in the winter of 1">">n 59 j in June, 1559, 8 fleet of thirteen vessels
for his uprightness
'<'
II
SfMM and
235.
Haling, Trade and Narration the //c/mi, pp. 281
Tkt
' '
Bo I'rH-stloy, Luna Paptrt,
in
introduction
to
p. xix.
Luua
I'npcra, p. 44.
Ibid., pp. 14-16,
32-52.
EXPEDITION OF TRISTAN DE LUNA

carrying some 1500 persons Spaniards, renegade Florida
165
children,
men,
women, and
240 horses, Dominican friars ammunition and supplies, set sail with high hopes from Vera Cruz for the northeast. The expedition, however, was unlucky from the very first, and the result was to add one more to the already
,
Indians,
negro slaves, and and an abundance of
long
list
of disastrous experiences of the Spaniards in Florida.
The adventurers made

Mobile Bay; but,
>i
their first landing at
what
is
now
the belief that a better place could be
found farther eastward, they moved on some twenty leagues 2 to Pensacola, where they finally established their base.
This was most unfortunate.
they remained in Mobile Bay they could have ascended the Alabama River in boats, and made settlements in the rich lands along its banks
;
Had
within easy reach of the sea as it was, the exploring expeditions which they sent out from Pensacola struck the comparatively poor pine lands farther south and eastward. Some of the native Indians proved friendly and others
hostile,
3
and some
of the adventurers
became involved
it
in the
;
warfare of the local tribes.

content became
Provisions ran short
dis-
almost impossible rife, after a year in Florida almost every to maintain discipline one k, the expedition was clamoring to return to Mexico.
;
and de Luna found
It
was
in the early
months
of
1561 that the miseries of the

;
on Palm Sunday a mutiny was narrowly averted through the devotion of the Dominican friars and then two days later the long awaited succor arrived from Mexico with supplies sufficient to relieve
colonists reached their climax
;
present needs.
1
The
relief
expedition brought also, howG. R. Fairbanks, Florida, (Jacksonville, 1901), p. 60.

'
Luna
ery, op.
2
Papers, pp. xxxiii-xxxv pp. 355-359. Luna Papers, pp. xxxiv f

tit.,
.
Low-
2d
ed.
Luna Papers,
tit.,
op.
pp. xxxv-lxv pp. 357-374.
Lowery,
166
ever, a

new governor, Angel de
bo
Villafafie,
commissioned by
viceroy supersede de Luna, of whoso leadership As Villafafie had unfavorable reports had boon received.
the
and trace tho Atlantic orders to occupy Cape Santa Elena one was anxious to remain at Pensacola, coast, and as no tho settlement there was virtually abandoned. De Luna
'
departed for Havana and then for Spain, in a vain attempt to reimburse himself for the expenses which he had personally
incurred
and most
of the rest
of Ids
company
that
remained accompanied Villafafie on his mission to Cape Santa Elena. On May 27, 1561, ho reached it by sea,
after touching at
boring river
Havana on tho way he ascended a neighsome fourteen miles, and formally took posses;
sion in the king's
name;
and
in
tho next two weeks he
Cape But he found no country suitable for permanent occupation; his small fleet was in grave peril fr< m storms: and finally, on July 9, he got back to Hispaniola. He had
Hatteras.
totally
failed
reconnoitred the Atlantic coast northward as far as
to
establish
settlement, but
ho had also
convinced himself that there was no danger that any other
power would make the attempt. Moreover, h> appears to have succeeded in persuading Philip that the region was e from foreign intrusion, for on September 23 the king
orders.
1
the
abandonment
1
of
all
attempts
to
colonize the
th;it
Atlantic
coast.
The very next
year was to prove
these calculations were entirely wrong. The Btory of the first expedition of the French Protestant, Jean Ribaut, to the shores of Florida has been so often told
-I
the different
location! ascribed
to
ttn-
Punt* Santa
.hi'!
Elena,
of.
first
<lis-
red
named
1626,
xxviii,
i>v
Lucas Vasques
of the state of South Carolina, Mat Saint Helena Island, than farther northward, near the mouth of the
de
i'i>
\yllon
xx,
in
Luna
l'nirx,
Bantee
'
and Lowery, "/< 374, and references than n certainly seems more likely that it Wftfl in what is now the southern Corner
xxvii,
Probably the Savannah. 'Lowery, /'. oi'L, pp. 375

references there.
f..
ami
JEAN RIBAUT
that
it is
1
167
it
outline.
not necessary here to do more than repeat The adventurers were sent out through
;
in
the
Admiral Gaspard de Coligny they had two and three small ones, carrying in all some 150 men, large ships most of them ardent Calvinists they sailed from Havre
efforts of the
;
on February
of the St.
16, 1562,
and landed on
May
at the
mouth
There Ribaut erected a stone column with the arms of France engraved on it 3 then he coasted northward, finally landing again at a point which most historians have now agreed in identifying as Port
;
John's River. 2
4 There he built a small Royal Sound, South Carolina. blockhouse which he named Charlesfort, in honor of his
and then, leaving twenty-eight of his most devoted followers to form the nucleus of a colony, he hurried back
king,
to
France to get reinforcements. 5
But what
is
of greater
interest for our present purpose is the accuracy of the information furnished to Philip in regard to this enterprise. His ambassador at the French court, Perrenot de Chan-
tonnay, had got wind of the project long before Ribaut

sailed,
and sent home full details, laying horrified emphasis on the fact that those engaged in it were heretics and pirates, and had no official sanction from the government of France
;
them as corsarios Luteranos. 6 This impression, moreover, was materially strengthened by the course of events after Ribaut's return. Civil war was in France at the time and as Ribaut was conraging
Philip could only regard
;
sequently unable to get the help he desired, he crossed the

1
The most famous account

course,
of
it
is,
that contained in Francis Parkman's Pioneers of France in the

of
Doggett Corse, The Key to the Golden Islands (Chapel Hill, N. C, 1931), pp. 7-10.
3
New World
(Boston, 1865)
it is
not,
Lowery, op.
Ibid.,
however, entirely fair to the Spaniards. Cf. E. G. Bourne, Spain in America, 1460-1580 (New York, 1904), pp. 188 f. * Lowery, Spanish Settlements, FlorCarita ida, 1562-1574, PP- 28-33;
cit., pp. 393 f. pp. 399-403, and references
there.
6 6
Ibid., pp. 34-36.
Ibid., pp. 24-27, 31,
and references
there.
168

in
Channel
HO success there;
rarily in prison
;
hopes of bettei fortune in England. He had ill fact, his activities landed him tempoas
but his doings were reported to Madrid byQuadra quite fully as they had previously been by Chantonnay, and Philip's jealousy and resentment were
fanned to a white heat.
1
The whole matter was

and
legalistic
frankly
unintelligible to his meticulous

his exclusive right to the
mind.
That
New World
should be challenged
by any one was hard enough to understand; but that his neighbors, with whom he was honestly striving to maintain
amicable relations at the time, should permit rebels and
heretics to
trespass there,
Efforts to get satisfaction from Catharine
was utterly incomprehensible. and Elizabeth
proved unavailing, and so finally, in May, 1564, a small expedition was sent out at Philip's order by the governor of Cuba, under Hernando Manrique de Kojas, to find
and obliterate
Florida coast.
all
traces of the French occupation of the
It
the remnants of the

(
proved an unexpectedly easy task; for little colony which Ribaut had left at
loneliness
by internal dissension and discouraged by and privations, had by this time deserted their post and gone home. On June 1"> Manrique left the shores of the continent for Cuba, convinced that his enemies had departed for good. It was just seven days after he had
'harlesfort, rent
gone that
second and far more formidable French expedi2
tion arrived.
The newcomers, some 300

like
their
Coligny.
England, imprisoned they were commanded by Rene* de Laudonniere, one of Ribaut's companions on his first voyage. They established
1
predecessors, Since Ribaul was
Btrong, through the

still
had been sent out,

instrumentality
in
of
Lowwy. OJ)
eit.,\ p.
P.,
Spanuh. 1558-G7,
ida,
iWBty, Spanish SetllemenU, Flor15G2-1574, pp. 44-48, 64.
EXPEDITION OF LAUDONNIERE
themselves at the mouth of the
St.
169
John's River at the
point where Ribaut had planted the column with the arms * there they built a redoubt which they called of France
;
Fort
Caroline.
But they were

insubordination
of their
singularly
unsuccessful
both as colonists and as explorers.

of
their
arrival
tember 20 thirteen and started

off
Within two months became rife. On Sepnumber took one of the ships
on a piratical cruise against the Spaniards in the West Indies after seizing a shipload of gold and
;
silver, they were themselves captured and taken to Havana, where they were forced to give information about the
colony from which they had come. Other similar incidents, on a somewhat larger scale, followed in the succeeding months. To the French they made it evident that Lau-
donniere was not strong enough to control his followers, and that if the colony was to be saved he must be superto the Spaniards they furnished seded by a better man
;
convincing proof that the insolence of the corsarios Luteranos had reached greater heights than ever and that they must 3 The events of the consequently be vigorously chastised.
year 1565, both in Europe and in America, were to bring the opposing theories of right and title to the New World
into dramatic conflict with one another.
Madrid, Philip put his signature to Pedro Menendez de Aviles adelantado creating of Florida, and appointing him captain-general of a fleet which was to carry 500 colonists to settle it. 4 Menendez,
20,
On March
at
an asitnto
who was
1
at that time forty-six years old,
was an Asturian
of distinguished ancestry,
who had
had
already given high proof
Which
Manrique
cit.,
de
p.
Rojas
failed to find.
58. Mrs. Lowery, op. Corse (pp. 14 f.) puts the location of Fort Caroline on a small island at the mouth of what is now Shipyard Creek,
about four miles up the river from Mayport, where Ribaut first landed. 3 Lowery, op. cit., pp. 59-85, and
references there.
4
Printed
Florida,
in E.
ii,
Ruidiaz y Caravia,
La
pp. 415-427.
170

valor,
his
of exceptional
he had rendered It was characteristic of him that he staked the New.

1
and loyalty by the services master both in the Old World and in
ability,
all
his private fortune
on the success of
it
the venture,* and that
he succeeded, before
of
set sail, in trebling its size.
News
of
counter-preparations in France emphasized the wisdom this course, and the expedition, when it finally departed
from Cadiz on June 29, consisted of ten ships carrying 3 Seven weeks previously Jean Ribaut, released 1500 souls.
from prison, had embarked at Dieppe with a fleet of seven 4 ships and a large number of followers, to supersede Laudonniere and reenforce his colony. Coligny, as before, was the
the enterprise, but t lie queen-mother was also cognizant of it, and though she was informed of the preparations of Menendez, and knew that his destination
moving
spirit
in
was identical with that
of
to justify the latter's expedition on the
Ribaut, she was fully prepared ground that it was
directed to the Terre des Bretons, which had been claimed
by France since the time boundary was of course

northern
limit of
of Verrazzano,
just
6
and whose southern

Seel
as indeterminate as
New
Spain.
Ribaut V
was the was long
delayed by adverse winds. Not until August 28 did the adventurers reach the mouth of the St. .John's, where they found the last remnant of Laudonniere's colony, utterly
disheartened and actually on the point of setting sail to 6 return to Prance; had Ribaut arrived a day later he would As it was, he had little infallibly have found it gone.
Laudoninducing his countrymen to remain. with dignity, and preparations niere accepted his demotion
difficulty in
1
Lowery,
op.
at,
ii,
pp.
120
f.,
and
p-ncea there. Ruidlaz, op. rit,
p. 64. pp. 147 149.
* Probably about 300 of., however, Lowery, op. cit., p. 96, note 3. i Ibid., pp. 114-117, and references
;
there.
Ibid., pp.
97
f.
PEDRO MENENDEZ DE AVILES

were
at
171
once begun to refound and extend the settlement, when suddenly, on September 4, just one week after Ribaut's
another large fleet was descried on the southern It was the advance guard of the expedition of horizon. Menendez, which had also experienced bad weather in
arrival,
and had been obliged to put in at the He had landed at last on the Florida coast, some twelve leagues to the southward of the Frenchmen, on the very day (August 28) that Ribaut
crossing the Atlantic,
West Indies
for repairs.
had reached the
and had established a base which he called St. Augustine, in honor of the saint whose He was now coasting northward in search festival it was.
St.
John's,
of his foes.
story of the next six weeks is a sad chronicle of bloodshed. Menendez immediately attacked four of Ribaut's ships which were lying outside the harbor and dis-
The
persed them.
for
Two
where he landed
a
his troops
days later he was back at St. Augustine, and munitions in preparation
land attack on Fort Caroline.

rain,
in
That attack was

small
delivered in a pouring
the
hours of the
of September 20, and was completely successful. with the flower of the garrison, had gone off in chase Ribaut, of the Spanish fleet, so that the defenders, most of whom
morning
were
in their beds,
were in no condition to
;
resist.
One
hundred and thirty-two were killed outright fifty women and children and half a dozen drummers and trumpeters were taken prisoners 2 the rest escaped into the forests,
;
Lowery, op. cit., pp. 154 f "In a work [La Reprinse de la Floride, supposedly by Dominique de Gourgues] written in France some seven years later, and first published in 1586, it is related that Aviles hanged some of his prisoners on trees and placed above them the Spanish inscription, 'I do this not to Frenchmen, but
1
.
it
but this story, though "found ready acceptance among the French of that period ... is unsupported by the testimony of a single witness, and bears all the earmarks of an apocryphal origin." Lowery, op. The cit., p. 178, and references there.
to Lutherans'
;
"
Reprinse
tions, et
is published in Voyages, relamemoires originaux pour servir
172
or
\MERICA AND THE PHILIPPINES

out to the ships that remained in the harbor,
swam
and
Mene*ndei rechristened the place San Mateo. Eight days later, after he had returned to St. Augustine, he got word from some Indians that about 140 of Ribaut's men, the
remnants
wrecked
of the
in
crews of two of his ships which had been the storm, were stranded on a marshy island
to the BOUth of him.
advanced
seen
;
to a point
Taking some sixty men witli him, he on the mainland where he could be
of the
Frenchmen swam over and asked for a safe conduct to Fort Caroline. Menemlez in his reply stated plainly that he was there as Philip's adeUmr
whereupon one
tado,
commissioned to purge
his
Majesty's dominions of
all
heretics.
He
safe
conduct
bluntly refused to give the Frenchmen the they asked for, and furnished convincing
When proof that Fort Caroline was already in his hands. they came back with the request for a ship and sailors to take them back to Prance, he refused again, demanding
that they
all
of
them
give up their arms and place them-
selves at his mercy, "in order thai he might do with
them
'he
rejected
Lord
a
commanded him";
1
finally,
he
indignantly
ransom
of 5000 ducats that
would spare their lives.
was proffered if he The Frenchmen, then, had no valid
reason tor expecting anything but death it his hands; but their situation was so desperate that they had no alternative
All their arms were place themselves at his mercy. -cut across to the mainland in then they themselves boal were ferried over in groups of ten once on the hore, their
Bave
t<>
;i
hands were
wise
tied
behind their backs, on the plea that other-
they
might
overpower
>l<
their
in
/.'
Less
i<
numerous captor-.
turir/ur,
V Ami'rii/ur,
II
cviii
(1011),
"
pp.
Henri
I
Ternaax-Compeni
I'm-.
.'{f)6,
283-286.
'
rolt.), xx. pp. :J01 anil the .ic mint of the inscription
Fran. dfOO
in
ii.
I.
'!-/
<\r
M<ti.Io7,:i,
EU
l.n
"i>
may
be found on pp
aran,
''<'
Cf also Chariet
.
Ineion," Florida,
'
KuidiaZ
pp.
'
181
y Caravia, 486; Lowwyi
"Dominique de QourguM
PP
'-''
MENENDEZ AND RIBAUT

Ten
of
173
boat to
them, who were found to be Catholics, were sent bySt. Augustine the rest, who confessed themselves
;
were given food and drink and were then started out on their march north to the Spanish camp four leagues away. After proceeding a few hundred yards they came to a line in the sand which Menendez had drawn
Protestants,
with his spear
at that point they were set
upon by the
1 Two weeks later, Spaniards and butchered to a man. on October 12, the selfsame tragedy was reenacted, in the selfsame manner, and on the selfsame spot, the victims this
time being Jean Kibaut himself and some seventy of his men, who found themselves in exactly the same predicament
as their predecessors,
selves
of
and elected rather to throw themon the mercy of Menendez than to face the certainty death by starvation. 2 In early November, when the
Spanish commander learned that the remnant of his enemies had gathered near Cape Canaveral, where they had built
a fort and were constructing a ship to return to France, he
lives
advanced against them, and this time promised them their if they would surrender. All but five accepted the
and Menendez loyally kept his word. 3 Before attempting to pass judgment on these events, it will be interesting to examine the story of the reception of the news in Europe. The Spanish king had learned
proffered terms,
about the preparations for Ribaut's second expedition

late
in
or early April, only a short time, if at all, before he had signed the asiento with Menendez, 4 and Coligny,
also, in all probability, the queen-mother, knew all about the proposed voyage of Menendez before Ribaut set sail. But neither Philip nor Catharine gave the other
Lowery, op. references there.
8
1
March
and
cit.,
pp.
193
f .,
and
3
*
Ibid., pp.
214-218.
Ibid., p. 106.
Ibid.,
pp. 194-204,
and references
there.
171
any official notification of what had happened for many weeks to come. It was natural that the queen-mother
Since Ribaut had departed without her official sanction, she would do nothing to make it difficult for her to disavow him. Philip's motives for delay were
should not do
so.
somewhat
different.
The conference
at
Bayonne
was
to
take place in early June, and nothing must be suffered to mar the harmony of that reunion. Moreover, by the time
had actually opened, Ribaut had already left, and Philip saw that the question would have to be solved rather by righting in the New World than by diplomacy
that the conference
He commanded Alava, Chantonnay'a succesnot to say a word to Catharine about Menendez until sor, the latter had been gone so long that it would be imposin
the Old.
overtake him; as a matter of fact the Spanish ambassador did not notify the French court until
sible to recall or
November
23, probably at least a
month
in
after Philip
had
learned of the arrival of
Menendez
Florida,
and
six full
weeks after Ribaut and his companions had been massacred." On that occasion Alava bluntly demanded that the French
withdraw;
protesting
but
that
Catharine skilfully avoided the issue by she had no intention of trespassing on

to colonize the
Spanish
Bretons.
Boil,
and was only seeking
Terre des
With the turn of the year, however, the news of the massacres and of the Spanish triumph had reached both Parifi and Madrid, and there was no longer any point now was in further evasion or pretence Philip's sole obj<
;
I
to
utilize
the matter to discredit

In
the cause of the French
Madrid the whole Btory was French ambassador by the Duke of Alva, who justified he conduct of Menendez at very point, and laid the whole blame for the tragedy 00
Huguenots.
mid-February
at
retailed wiih brutal frankness to the

I
Mow.
pp. U61-205.
'Lowery, pp. 106-118.
THE NEWS
!
IN
FRANCE AND SPAIN
175
Moulins, Alava staged a similar 2 The performance for the benefit of Catharine de' Medici. had learned all the facts long before the queen-mother
Coligny
on March
16, at
Spanish ambassador related them to her, and was therefore the better prepared to hold her own in the interview but
;
though she fought "like an enraged lioness" in debate, and protested that "neither Turks nor Moors would have been
guilty of so great a cruelty as the Spaniards
had practised
on the subjects of her son," she knew that for the present she was powerless to get redress. She could not afford to
quarrel with Philip, and she realized
it.
sequel was
turer.
to prove,
was to be obtained by
a private
Revenge, as the adven-
More significant still was the reception of the news in Spain. Menendez wrote a full account of his doings to the king,
omitting nothing and palliating nothing, and Philip conveyed to him his full approval of the massacre; "as for
upon the Lutheran corsairs," so his letter runs, "we believe that you have acted with entire justification and prudence, and we hold that we have been well served." The whole Spanish court was at the news, "more gladdened," said Fourquevaux, delighted "than if it had been a victory over the Turk." 4 Clearly in the pyes of his compatriots Menendez had every reason to be proud, and none whatever to be ashamed, of what he had done and if the line of reasoning on which his actions were based fails to appeal to us today, we must remember that it would scarcely have been possible for him to have followed any other. His master's claim to the whole of the Western Hemisphere except Brazil, by
;
the judgment you have executed
62
Fourquevaux, Depeches, Lowery, pp. 304-307.

Ibid., pp.
i,
pp. 59-
in
*
Ruidiaz y Caravia,
La
Florida,
i,
ii,
p. 363.
1
3
307-310.
Fourquevaux, Depeches,
p. 56.
Philip to
Menendez,
May
12, 1566,
176

VI and the Tordesillas Line, as well priority in discovery and colonization, must
unimpeachable.
the bull of Alexander

as
by righl have been
of
in
his eyes
The French were
hut
common
trespassers
and pirates; that they were not
officially
supported by their government proclaimed as much, and the fact that most of them were Protestants made the matter even worse. He had treated them, indeed,
;
but the fact that his prisoners with relentless severity were more numerous than their captors gave his conduct the sanction of prudence, if not of humanity, and there
is
not the slightest reasonable evidence that he ever broke
his
word.
The massacres he ordered have

it
stained
his
reputation with a blot that

efface
;
will
never be possible to
he had been given a happier task, and a more favorable opportunity in which to display his talents, he
but
if
might well have been numbered among the foremost of the great conquistadores who planted the banners of Spain in the New World.
the story of the Spanish settlements in Florida the period of Philip II is not lacking in dramatic during interest but its practical importance for our purposes is
rest of
;
The
comparatively slight, and we cannot do more than sumAfter disposing of the French, marize it briefly here. M< nendez planned to devote his energies to exploring the
interior,
and
also
the
Atlantic
coast
to
the
northward
find
as far as
Chesapeake Bay, where he believed he would

efforts
the longed-for strait ustent
leading to the Pacific; the In. bans. to convert
he also
1
made
Ill
fortune,
however, attended bis effort.-. The natives were generally treacherous and hostile; the garrisons at St. Augustine and Sail Mateo were discontented and mutinous, and in
May,
L567,
Menendezwenl back
1
to Spain,
where he
suco<
Lowery, op.
cit
pp. 269-368.
DOMINIQUE DE GOURGUES
177
fully vindicated himself against the reports of his detractors, received high honors and rewards at the hands of his king, but failed to get the prompt and effective assistance for 1 And in the interim his colony which he desired most of all.
between
of 1565.
his departure
2
from Florida and
his return thither
in 1568-69,
the French took their revenge for the massacres Rumors had reached France, through Fourque-
vaux, of the wretched state of the Florida colony. Such a favorable opportunity to attack it might never come again, and since the Yalois government was in no condition
to give official sanction to such an enterprise, it was undertaken, instead, on his own initiative, by a restless patriot
Dominique de Gourgues, who, though in all probability a Catholic, was determined to right the wrongs of his fellow-countrymen, and whose enthusiasm for fighting Spaniards had been fired by the maltreatment to which he 3 had been subjected when a prisoner aboard their galleys. On August 2, 1567, he set sail from Bordeaux with three
called
ships
and 180 men. expedition even from

that
it
concealed the real object of his his own followers, under the pretence
;
He
was intended for a slave raid in North Africa but on reaching the West Indies, he revealed to them its true 4 He was purpose, and in April, 1568, he accomplished it.
Indians, who detested the delivered while the defenders A surprise attack, Spaniards. "5 " after their midday meal, was were still picking their teeth
greatly aided
by the Florida
San Mateo and its two subsidiary forts were captured, most of the garrison being killed in the all of the rest, save a few who escaped, were assaults hanged on the adjacent trees, under an inscription which
completely successful.
;
read
1
"I do this not as to Spaniards, nor as to Marranos,

cit.,
Lowery, op.
Ibid., p. 345.
pp. 291
f.
Ibid., pp.
325
f.
Ibid., p. 329.
Ibid., p. 324.
w.r ?
Yi
178
but as to traitors, robbers, and murderers." With this signal act of vengeance de Gourgues elected to rest content.
St.
now keenly on the watch, he decided to leave alone, and on Monday, May 3, he set sail for France. When he learned of the event, Philip was prompt to demand
Augustine,
1
satisfaction
from Catharine, which he naturally
failed to
get; but as the French showed no intention of following up their vengeance with renewed attempts to colonize, the
matter was allowed to drop.

history of the Florida colony during the rest of Philip's reign is a dreary chronicle of discouragement and
destitution.
The
Menendez,
the
only
it
person
who had
its
interest really at heart, visited

3
1571/ but death claimed him in 1574 before he could accomplish

its
for the last time in
anything in
behalf.
Six years later St. Augustine
was
The natives, despite perraided by Sir Francis Drake. sistent attempts to civilize and convert them, continued to
no gold was found, and At the time provisions were perpetually running short.
be both treacherous and hostile
;
probable that the total number of and there is Spaniards in the colony did not exceed 300 reason to believe that they would have deserted their every
of Philip's death,
it
is
post,
had
it
not been for the

it
home government's
unwilling-
ness to leave
aries for the
unoccupied, and
for the zeal of the
mission-
conversion of the Indians.
The
contrast between the conditions which obtained in
Southern Chile during the reign of Philip II and those that we have outlined on the coasts of Florida furnishes a significant illustration of the variety of the different
op. cit., pp. 329-336; Samaran, "Dominique de rgUM," in Rtxuc Hiatorique, cviii
* '
problems
Charles
Lowery, op. cit., pp. 367-386. cf. also Colonial p. 383; Record* of Spanish Florida, i, pp. 2-115.
Ibid.,
(1911), pp. -'76-293.
CHILE AND THE ARAUCANIANS
179
to establish their title to the
with which the Spaniards were confronted in their efforts New World. In Chile the
corsarios Luteranos,
who had been
their chief rivals in Florida,
counted for almost nothing.
Sir Francis
Drake,
it is
true,
passed through the Strait of Magellan in August, 1578, ravaged the Chilean shores, got a rich booty at Valparaiso, was repulsed at La Serena, and continued on up the coast.
him
His fellow countryman, Thomas Cavendish, followed after in 1587, neglected to relieve the starving remnants of
a small Spanish colmy which had been planted a few years previously in the .Strait, landed at Quinteros, was defeated
in a skirmish with the inhabitants there,
and
sailed north
to Peru.
Finally, seven years
who had
inherited
all
Richard Hawkins, his father's enthusiasm for plundering

later, Sir
up in arms all the way from Valparaiso northward to Atacames in Ecuador, where he was finally assailed by an overwhelming force and captured. But these were merely incidents, pirate raids of
the Spaniards, put Philip's subjects
1
the sort from which
all
of Philip's colonies suffered with
increasing frequency in the latter years of the reign, and they only occasionally disturbed the Chilean Spaniards in
their efforts to accomplish
principal task.
of the
what may be regarded as their That task was the conquest and subjection
We
1
Araucanian Indians. have seen that the war against the Araucanians had
;
ral de Chile,
Diego Barros Arana, Historia Jeneii, pp. 465-471 iii, pp. 83The Hawkins' Voyages, ed. 95, 195-206 C. R. Markham (London, 1878), pp.
;
frequent, but pages 25-36 deal with his doings on the Chilean and Peruvian
coasts. Reference should also be made at this point to the volume edited in 1914 for the Hakluyt Society by Zelia
xxiv-xxvii, 83-349.
Cf. here also the
contemporary poem called the Discurso de el Capitdn Francisco Draque, written by Joan de Castellanos at Tunja in 1587, and first published by Angel Gonzalez Palencia at Madrid in 1921. It is principally devoted to the exploits of the hero in the regions of the Gulf of Mexico, where his raids were most
Nuttall,
Drake.
series of
and entitled New Light on It consists of a well selected
tions,
contemporary letters, deposiand reports, mostly of Spanish
or Spanish-American origin, concerning the activities of the Englishman on his
voyage
of circumnavigation, 1577-80.
180

in
the Emperor's day, and that the Spaniards had had sufficient experience of it to learn that their foes already were vastly nn. ic warlike than most of the American Indians,
begun
and that they had no desire to he converted or civilized, hot were bent on maintaining their independence. The home government, however, had failed to Learn that continuity
of
the
successful
administration and personnel was essential to prosecution of such an arduous struggle.
Philip's perpetual jealousy of his subordinates, his haunting dread that they might somehow get out of hand and attempt to embark on enterprises of their own, manifested itself
most clearly of all in the case of his remoter possessions; he dared not leave them undisturbed for any length of time,
and
his constant replacings of the governors of Chile caused
disastrous interruptions of the campaign against the Araucanians. We have already seen that in 1557 Yillagran and Aguirrc, the two rival veterans of the early days of
the conquest, had been displaced,
at
the order of Andres
Hurtado de Mendoza, viceroy
by Mendoza's son, Garcia Hurtado, and thai the young man had won splendid victories over the Araucanians in the course of the next two
of Peru,
1
But Philip could not bear to see so much power in the hands of a .-ingle family; so in 1560 he recalled both the viceroy and his son, and quite characteryears.
concentrated
istically
rival,
\
permitted the latter to be superseded by his ancient diagram- The veteran, however, was much less
the Indians than the
BUCCessful againsl
man
he replaced
he Buffered
in
Beries of disastrous defeats,
and when he died
dune, 1563, his cousin and successor, Pedro de The latter's place was taken Yillagran. was equally luckle
office,
in
by Rodrigo de Quiroga, an adherent
of the
Mendozas, who
ii,
Ante, Vol.
HI,
p.
noa
f.
Axana,
pp.
219-215,
GOVERNMENT OF CHILE
signalized his advent to
181
power by a brilliant victory over the Araucanians. Yet Philip, despite the good reports of Quiroga which he received, continued to be distrustful. His next step was to confide the government of Chile to an audiencia of four oidores, which arrived and took office in 1567 but it was even more unfortunate than the Villagrans in its conduct of the war, and it was consequently suppressed in January, 1575, when Quiroga came back to power at the mandate of the crown, and did his best to retrieve the
;
disasters of the preceding years. 1

of the chapter
;
So
it
went on to the end
the royal dread of the too successful conquistador being the only permanent element in the situation.
No
real
continuity in
office
was allowed, and precious
News of a experience was thus suffered to go to waste. over the Indians was gratefully received at home, victory
but
it
also constituted a strong reason for suspecting the

local jealousies
victor;
in order to prevent
predominant. the Araucanian war continued throughout the reign, without any decisive result.
if
were kept alive, nay even fostered, any faction from becoming dangerously Small wonder, under all these circumstances,
It is not
2
worth while to follow the ups and downs
of the
struggle.
of wai
At the time of Philip's accession, the theatre was limited to a small tract between the Biobio and the Tiina, and that portion of it was usually known as the
1
Barros
Arana,
ii,
pp.
The relationship of the passim,ernor of Chile to the viceroy at
299-427, gov-
Lima
government of Chile save in "casos graves y de mucha importancia." It was not till February 17, 1609 (ibid.,
lib.
ii, tit. xv, ley xii), that a regular audiencia was permanently established
varied rapidly in the ensuing years. In 1589 (Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias, lib. v, tit i, ley iii) Philip orders the "gobernador"' to be "subordinado
in Chile.
2 Good accounts of it are given in R. G. Watson, Spanish and Portuguese South America, i, pp. 234248, and in Barros Arana, iii, pp. 141-152, 189-212. 222-261.
Virey," and recommends that they keep constantly in touch with each other; in 1597 (ibid., lib. iii, tit. iii, ley xxx) he forbids the viceroys and audiencia at Lima to interfere in the
al
182
guerra
vieja

because
it
dated from the Emperor's time; under Quiroga, the natives near Yaldivia, Yillarrica, and Osorno rose in arms, and the campaigns against them came But the struggle was no to be called the guerra nueva.
termination at the end of the reign than at the Indeed, the decade covering the last five years beginning.
nearer
of Philip's
life
and the
first
five of that of
his successor of their
saw the Araucanians
seize the offensive
under one
greatest chieftains, Paillamachu, and to such good effect that in 1603 the Spaniards had been practically ousted
from
country south of the Biobio. The Spaniards had been obliged greatly to increase their forces during Whereas Yaldivia had made war with comPhilip's reign.
all
of the
panies of a hundred men, his successors, forty years later, were commanding five times that number. But they could
never get
it
into their heads that the Araucanians, unlike
the majority of the South American natives, were not to be
frightened into submission by a single defeat, and that after it had been inflicted on them, a series of desultory raids
would be quite
they consequently were often overwhelmed by the unexpected And if the Araucanians were offensives of their foes.
insufficient
to
keep
them down
slightly less
QUmerOUS
at
the end of
tie
reign than at
the
beginning, they had enormously increased the efficiency of their fighting machine. They learned from the Spaniards the value of defensive armor, of hit renchinents, and of
1
gned retreats;
to the besi
they possessed horses,

;
which they used
possible effect
moreover, they showed signs of

abandoned by him vrheo his settlement at Bnanoi Aires was given up. The horse had indubitably wilted in Amerbut it had loa in the eazlieet times;
been eztinol
fori-
K. I> Carbia, Manual </< Hittoria de In irgentina, i. p. 808, note. Tin- oommon theory as to those
1
hors<--.
is
Krhiefa were called cimarronn, that they were the progeny of thoet
many thousand
years be-
broughl over by Pedro '!> Mendoea in 1536 (cf. ante. Vol. III. p. 608) and
the Bpaniarda arrived.
THE ARAUCANIAN WAR
183
appreciating the desirability of diminishing the horrors of warfare. Though they had not abandoned cannibalism at
the end of the sixteenth century, they had begun to see that it was better to exchange their prisoners than to execute
them.
Altogether
it
is
small wonder that in presence of
rapidly perfecting themselves in the methods of European warfare, the Spaniards returned battered and disheartened from the terrible privations and
foes so relentless,
sufferings of the successive campaigns.
who were
progress of the Araucanian war had its Beinevitable reaction on the life of the Chilean colony.
The
halting
sides being in large
changes of
measure responsible for the frequent administration, it made the whole settlement a
In-
debit rather than a credit item in the royal accounts.
stead of receiving gold and silver from it, Philip had to be constantly sending money thither to pay his troops. That
his Spanish soldiers could not terminate the struggle victori-
compreit also served to and deeply galled his pride arouse fresh suspicions, and confirmed his conviction that his representatives in Chile were somehow playing him In the colony itself the results were scarcely less false. lamentable. At the outset there had been much enthusiasm for the war, which was expected to end in a triumphal
hension,
;
ously and at once
was something that passed
his
proces.-ion
in
down
to the Strait.
Men
served in
it
without
;
the hope of being rewarded with encomiendas pay, in 1546 there had even been fears lest Santiago be depopuIt was Fifty years later all this was changed. almost impossible to get soldiers to fight. Desertion was frequent nothing but high pay in cash would induce men
lated.
;
to enlist, for there

in the war,
was
1
little
or no chance of obtaining booty
and nobody cared any longer to possess landed

Barros Arana,
i,
pp. 271-289.
184
ti-s

which were certain to be raided by the Indians.
Mining activities, also, came almost to a standstill; agriculture and pasturage, though the climate was highly favorable to them, were neglected; and the Spanish population, at
the end of the reign, did not reach :><)()() souls. Altogether, the condition of the colony gave cause for
1
anxiety and dissatisfaction, both in Spain and in America, at the time of Philip's death. Perhaps the most notable thing that was achieved during his reign on what
much
is
now Chilean
Magellan;
territory
of
and that
was the exploration ol the Strait was undertaken, not through the
at
efforts of the local
Spanish authorities, but
the behest of
the viceroy of New Castile. furnished the impetus for it,

to
The voyage
Drake in 1578 and the task was intrusted

of
2 Pedro Sarmiento de Gamboa, a Galician sailor of conHe returned to Spain, visited Philip siderable repute.
during the progress of the Portuguese campaign, and was commanded by him to erect fortifications in the narrows;
but vile weather and the rivalries of his captains prevented him from accomplishing all that had been Imped, and the
two -mall settlements which he established in the strait 1 perished wretchedly a few years later from starvation.
While the Chileans were in the throes of the Araucanian war. their more fortunate neighbors to the north of them were able to make at leasl two fresh contributions to the
-'ward
The
L9,
first
Spanish was the expedition which
inarch
of
the
Empire
left
the
Pacific
Callao on
November
L567, under
command
>f
AJvaro de Mendana, discovered
in the following February, and, after encounters with the cannibal native-. go1 back to Several
the Solomon Islands
New
Spain
U.ui.'i,
in
March, L569.
pp. 187 177.
low.
Mendana's
failure
to
bring
iii.
\r:m:i,
rliia.
p. 219,
Manual,
i,
iii. 50-82; pp. pp. 451-1'it.
JUAN FERNANDEZ home
185
gold made it difficult for him to get the government interested in the project of colonizing the archipelago, on which he had set his heart but his indomitable resolution
;
triumphed over every obstacle, and in April, 1595, more than a quarter of a century after his return from his first
expedition, he set sail again, with four ships and 368 emi-
This time, however, he was diverted from his course by discovering the Marquesas group on the original way, with the final result that he established his colony
grants.
not on the Solomon Islands but in the

the settlement
died within two
New
;
Hebrides.
But
was not destined to endure. Mendana months of his arrival his followers were decimated by dissension and disease, and the survivors were only too thankful to find a refuge at Manila in 1596. l In November, 1574, the Spanish pilot, Juan Fernandez, in search of a means of shortening the voyage from Callao to Valparaiso by avoiding the adverse winds and currents
that hugged the coast, 2 discovered the three small islands, some 350 miles to the westward, which ever since that day
have borne
There seems no good reason to give credence to the legend that on a subsequent voyage he reached out much farther into the west and possibly struck
his
name. 3
New Zealand, or even to believe the story that he established himself in the islands that
the shores of Australia or
he had found;
1
for
we know
that he continued to direct

Callao took generally a month, sometimes less the return trip was con;
For
cf.
full
accounts of these expedithe
tions
The Discovery of
Solomon
Islands by Alvaro de Mendana in 1568, edited for the Hakluyt Society by Lord Amherst of Hackney and Basil Thomson (London, 1901, 2 vols.) Antonio
;
sidered fast
three.
3
if
it
was accomplished
in
de
tr.
Morga, The Philippine Islands, H. E. J. Stanley, pp. 65-74; and Georg Friederici, Alvaro de Mendana: Die Entdeckung der Inseln des Salomo
(Stuttgart, 1925).
*
J. T. Medina, El Piloto Juan Fernandez (Santiago de Chile, 1918), is the latest authority on this episode. He takes issue, in the matter of the date of it, with Barros Arana (iii, pp. 51-58), who places the discovery in 1583 or
1584.
to
The voyage from Valparaiso
186
\\!KKI\
AND THE PHILIPPINES
navigation between Chile and Peru until at least as late as 1593, and that there was no trace of any European
occupation of the archipelago of Juan Fernandez when it became, between 1704 and 1709, the home of Alexander
Selkirk, the prototype of
Robinson Crusoe.
tin
1
It
will
he remembered that with
dispersal in 1537-39
of the little settlement
lished
at
the
mouth
of the
which Pedro de Mendoza had estabRio de la Plata, the town of
Asuncion, far up the river in Paraguay, had become the chief nucleus of Spanish activity in the southeastern portion
of
South America.
this
Buenos
Aires,
however,
was
to
be
permanently, during reign of Philip II, and the vast economic possibilities of the country of which it is now tin capital began for the first time to
refounded,
1
time
the
be dimly foreseen. The death, on October de Irala, was at Asuncion.

a
3,
1556,
of the patriarch
Martinez
he should
harbinger of
stormy days
in
for the little colony
He had
provided
his will that
succeeded by his son-in-law, Gonzalo de Mendoza, who was accordingly proclaimed adelantado without any opposition
;
hut
Mendoza
a
died
in
the early
to get
summer
of 1558, before
he had had
fair
chance
his administration started
or to nominate his successor, with the result that the inhabitant- of Asuncion, taking advantage ^\ a privilege which
had been granted by the crown

fie la
to
the settlers of the Rio
Plata
in
1537, elected as their governor another BOn-
in-law of
latter
Irala
a
named Francisco
Ortiz de Yergara.'
The
was
ruling
1
'
kindly soul, bul totally deficient in talent for The fir.-t ye.u- of his administration were men.
Ill,
Am,, Vol.
'
I
Lfv.-t..-.
-if,
f.rrrinnr.i
r>(l.,
/
I
ih
'.11
HutoHa
;
QtOUMM, pp. 2fa

i,
tina,
4*
i,
p,
P:ml
pp. :<J7,
LeccMKtM, i, pp. 28 1 CsrMA, 358

|
94-96;
OflUOl,
isno,
Ml id >m
nay.
p. 277.
LA PLATA AND THE ANDES
187
marked by Indian risings which he was quite unable to suppress, and by discontent and insubordination on the
part of his own followers, who resolved to prevent his obtaining the confirmation from the king or his viceroy which would be necessary to give him permanent possession
of the office of governor.
But
it
was
chiefly as a result of the
expeditions that were sent out from Asuncion during the

period of his governorship, for purposes of exploration and settlement, that a crisis in his fortunes and in those of
his colony
was
finally
brought to pass.
We
recall that the first
hope
of the early discoverers

it
and
would prove the entrance to a strait leading through to the Pacific and that when that illusion had been dissipated, they continued to
explorers of
;
La Plata had been that
lay plans for the utilization of the great river as a means of shortening the route to Peru. During the period of Irala, this idea rather fell into the background. He did little or
nothing to establish connections with the regions to the westward, and Mendoza and Ortiz de Vergara were simi1
larly neglectful.
Many
of their
followers, however,
had
larger vision.
up the Pilcomayo and ultimately get over the mountains to Cuzco. The nost dominant and ambitious figure among them was
to follow a certain Nufrio de Chaves, a conquistador after the pattern
wealth of the Andes.
They longed to gain They wished
access to the mineral
Cortes and Pizarro, who, in 1561, signalized himself by pushing through and founding the town of Santa Cruz de la Sierra some sixty leagues to the west of the modern
of
Bolivian city which bears that name today. The forces with whose aid he accomplished this object had been intended by the governor at Asuncion for another purpose, so that his
action
was tantamount to a declaration

x
,
of revolt against
Carbia, Manual,
i,
pp. 350-359.
1SS

There were, moreover,
rival
Ortiz de Vergara.
claimants
the region where he proposed to establish himself; in fact he had been obliged, in 1560, to make a trip
from
Peru
to
to
Lima
in
viceroy.
to
order to get confirmation of his title from the By 564, however, he felt strong enough to return
1.
Asuncion to
pic-k
up
his family for
the wrath of the governor;
and belongings and face he was fully aware of the and was convinced that
Unpopularity of Ortiz de Vergara,

if
he offered the inhabitants a chance to return with

it.
the Andes, the majority would gladly accept
him to And thus

in
indeed it proved; 'exodus to Peru."
in October,
1504, occurred the so-called
Almost
all
the vecinos of Asuncion est
their lot with Chaves.
Ortiz de Vergara himself came along, because he felt that it was the only way to pieprobably serve such measure of authority as was left to him; he
had hopes, moreover, of getting confirmation in his office In the course of their progress into the from the viceroy.
northwest, the inevitable occurred.
gradually elbowed
aside
Ortiz de Vergara was

his
and Chaves assumed
place;
when Vergara was

finally,
the expedition reached Santa Cruz de la Sierra, informed that he could be permitted to go no
1
farther,
('haves and the new ideas which he represented
were
fully in control.
In the
meantime
to
certain constitutional changes had also
been carried through, which served to focus attention on

the
Andes, and lessen the measure <>i their previous isolation. On the ground that the hind- under the jurisdiction of the audiencia of Lima
territories
the east
of
the
were ton extensive

1
to permit of
adequate administration
1'
I
of
ilu
F X P. Paraguay
in
i
.
de
(Paris,
h\
;i
i
'./
Charlevoix, Hitioirt 17.">7, 8 vols.), i. '! Ifanual, i, p] ,. pp j77

;
~'<
bibliographies] infornation in regard to the topios dealt with

urtlicr
in
Antigua 90
this
del
Paraguay,
pp
paragraph
i,
may
,
be
found
in
ludibert,
Lo
lAmiUt
<l.
la
Carbia,
pp. 400 f
THE AUDIENCIA OF CHARCAS

justice, the
189
Council of the Indies, on April 20, 1551, had recommended to the crown the establishment of a new audiencia at the "villa de la plata que es en los charcas cerca
de las minas de Potossi"

Sucre and
is
the
city
which today
is
1
called
The the capital of the Bolivian republic. suggestion had to be several times repeated before any 2 but finally, on September 4, 1559, attention was paid to it
;
at Valladolid, directly after his return to Spain, Philip
orders that the
gave and on September 7, 3 It at once became popularly 1561, it was formally installed. known as the audiencia of Charcas, and it was composed at the outset of a regente and four oidores, who were to be presided over, in theory, by the viceroy of New Castile, and
new tribunal be
set up,
were restricted, in his absence, to functions exclusively 4 but when it was found, after two years' experience, judicial that the viceroy was never able to attend, Philip pro;
vided, on August 16, 1563, for the creation of the office of a president, to be held
encia.
by
a resident
fell
member
its
of the audi-
The
territories
that
within
jurisdiction
extended originally only for a distance of 100 leagues around the city of La Plata in which the audiencia sat 6 but they were progressively enlarged in the immediately succeeding
;
years, until they finally stretched

Pacific,
and comprised what

Audiencia de Charcas,
is
from the Atlantic to the today Bolivia and Paraguay,

otra cosa mas de en lo tocante a justicia entre partes." Ibid-, p. 93. 5 Audiencia de Charcas, pp. 572 f
.
R.
Levillier,
f.
pp. 503
2
R. Levillier, Audiencia de Lima, pp. 63-67, 157 f. idem, Audiencia de Charcot, pp. 505-510. 3 de Leyes de las Indias, Recopilacion lib. ii, tit. xv, ley ix Audiencia de Charcas, pp. xviii, 23-35. 4 Audiencia de Charcas, pp. 511 ff. Writing to Philip, on February 6, 1563, of its action in regard to the pacification of the Indians, the oidores tell how " vino una carta del visorrey e comysarios para que no entendiesemos en
; ;
The new
president was Pedro Ramirez de Quinones, one of the four original oidores, who had had the title of regent
It would appear, however, before. that one of these original oidores never actually took office (p. xxv), so that down to 1572 the audiencia was com-
posed
of
Ramirez de Quinones and

;
three others another oidor

6
in
that year, however,

out.
17.
was sent
Audiencia de Charcas, p.
190
a

slice
good
of the
northern pari of Argentina,
portion
1
The Uruguay, and the Peruvian department of Puno. fad that the region committed to its charge had been carved out of territory hitherto under the jurisdiction of the audienof
cia
of
Lima must
lost
not
be taken as
in
ail
evidence that
of the
the
viceroys had
interest
the Lands east
Andes.
Quite the contrary, it was the sole means by which they could hope to exercise any real control there, and prevent the inhabit nuts of the lower reaches of La Plata from becoming wholly
of divide
tinies of
ct
autonomous; it was inspired by the principle While apparently separating the desimpera.
the lands on the easl from those on the west of

;
the
it
Jordilleras, it was really intended to hold them together was aimed, from a totally different angle, at the attainment of an end very similar to that which had inspired
(
Ntifrio
de
('haves.-
And
certainly
the
new
audiencia
Recopilacidn de Leyes de las Indias, tit. xv, ley ix J. M. Urquidi, ii, Xuevo Compendio de la HiMnria <l, Bolivia, 3* ed. (La Paz. 1921), pp. 45 f. Audiencia de Charcas, pp. 168 ff.. 588590, 676, 688 f. Audibert, Lot dr Paraguay, pp. 83 f-. maintains that the audiencia of Charcas had no jurisdiction over Paraguay till 1566.
1
lib.
of
Um
The same
foundation
principle
also
inspired
the
cf. lib.
Recopiluiiiin tit. xv, ley x) of the audiencia ii, of Quito it was composed of a president
;
(November de Lcym de
29, L663, las Indias,
ol the measure independence enjoyed by such subordinate tribunals, and the nature of their relationship to the viceroys and the viceregal audiencias at Mexico and Lima. The matter is too complicated to be dealt with thoroughly in a footnote; but it may perhaps be summarized as follows. (1) In matters political and administrative the viceroy was the supreme authority in his viceroyalty, and all the subordinate audiencias and governors were in theory bound to obey him f>ut as a matter of
up the whole question
and four
oidorcs, and oomprised within the limits of it-* jurisdiction somewhat more than the territory of the present
republic
of
Ecuador,
reaching
south-
ward t. d Peru, and northward to Buenaventura in Colombia, Binoe at Lima were unabll
-
authority far more completely over the audiencias of Charand Quito than over the remoter ones, and the viceroy of New Spam.
dalajara,
l
fact the viceroy Of to exercise this
ihle
correspondingly, over that than over those

.
of of
GuaSanto
e authority in the region in question, it was deemed n local j to establish in. Cf. also B. Kulx Guinasu, La Magistral Indiana, pp. l-' ibliahment of the audiei
1 -
ruatemala geographical other words, eras the real determining factor. 3) In matters of justice, the viceroy was forbidden to interfere with any of the audiencias
'
;
imingo and
in
proximity,
in
his
vioeroyalty;
in
all
this
of
Charcas and Quito naturally brings
tii'.reover,
they were
respect, theoretically
VERGARA AND CHAVES
191
rendered Chaves an important service by ridding him of his enemy Vergara, who was summoned to appear before it in
the year 1566.
of the charges
After a long trial he was declared guiltless
which had been brought against him, and
was even temporarily restored to the headship of the settlement at Asuncion, pending the arrival of a new governor who had meantime been appointed, subject to the royal
approval, by the viceroy.
to
professed himself, however, be dissatisfied with this verdict, and went back to Spain efore the Council of the Indies to plead his cause need-
He
less to add, without success. From that time onward he subsides into insignificance and when he came back to
;
Asuncion
in 1.373
it
was
in a subordinate office in the govern-
ment
rival
Five years earlier his successful Chaves had met his death, the victim of a blow from
of
his
successor.
an Indian porra, or war club, delivered from behind, by a member of a hostile tribe. He was a remarkable man, with
qualities better suited to the age of the
Emperor than
to
that of his son.

with, his
Though
cut off in the midst of his labors
objects only partially attained, his restless had at least been instrumental in reopening the activity
own
whole problem of Peru and the La Plata basin. 1 The man whom the viceroy had meantime selected to take
over che government of Paraguay was a certain Ortiz de Zarate, who had come out with Blasco Nunez Vela in 1544,
and remained there ever
since.
He had
not been in any
way
involved in the various quarrels by which the settleLima

Carbia, Manual, i, pp. 360 f., 363; Groussac, Mendoza y Garay, pp. 277Further information in regard to 314.
1
equal, though the audiencias of
and Mexico sometimes heard appeals from the subordinate ones. Further information may be found in the
Leyes de las Indias, lib. ii, tit. xv in Solorzano Pereira's Politico, Indiana, lib. v, cap. iii, paraand R. Levillier, graphs 43 and 71 Audiencia de Charcas, passim.
Recopilacion
; ;
de
events, which have been only very briefly summarized here, may be found in Audibert, Limites del Para-
these
guay, pp. 75-90, and in Charlevoix, Historia del Paraguay, i, lib. iii, passim.
192
merit
at

Asuncion had beeD rent, and could consequently
enter upon his
new duties without favor
or prejudice.
He
promised, moreover, to Bpend 20,000 ducats of his own in fitting out the expedition which he was to lead into his new
domain, and to bring with him 400 or 500 soldiers, 4000 cows, and as many sheep and goats apparently, both he and the
;
viceroy had
at
leasl
some
possibilities of the basin of
conception of the pastoral La Plata. As the royal confirmataint
tion
was necessary
for his
it.
new
It
office,
he departed
for
Spain
f
via
Panama
to obtain
therefore
became
ne<
to
send >oine one direct from Pent to Asuncion to represent him there during his absence. The choice for this difficult
on one Felipe de Caceres, who had been active in Paraguayan affairs ever since the days of Cabeza de Vaca in the end of 1568 he arrived at Asuncion. The four years
dice fell
ol his
rule there
were
chiefly
remarkable
for a violent struggle

|
for
of
supremacy between himself and the bishop of 'ie diocese La Plata, 2 who finally got him shipped off to Spain to
answer before the Inquisition to a charge oi atheism and 3 But Caceres also succeeded during the period blasphemy. <>f his down the governorship in leading two reconnaisf u Parana to the estuary of La Plata he w&8 firmly convinced
;
that
of
the
new settlement should be made on Hie lower reaches river. As Caceres himself was sent off to Spain
the second of these expedito be
directly after his return from

tion-, he
was unable
to carry his
work
ot
that he had initiated
was
projed into effect, but tincontinued by one of his
Bubordin
This was
certain
Juan de Garay,
nephew
Ortiz de Zarate, then in his early forties, who had come out to Peru with his uncle in 1544, and had profited by "a He long and active acclimatization" in South America.
Manual, i. pp. .161 f. had been eatabUahad in July. 1547; rf. Cartas, Manual, i. p. .i-~>\
ThU
trhioh,
howavar, he was finally

i,
aaqtrfttad.
Ibid.,
p. 866.
GARAY AND ZARATE
193
had gone down to Asuncion in 1568 as a sort of lieutenant to Caceres, and accompanied him on both his trips to the lower
regions of the Parana.
1
He
surpassed his chief in his en;
thusiasm for starting a settlement in these regions

ardor was
still
and
if
his
further quickened
by the
fear that
he did
not act at once he ran grave risk of being forestalled by the Spaniards of Tucuman, who had founded the town of
and were now straining every nerve 2 The result was that to gain an outlet to the Atlantic. he immediately sought and obtained permission from the
Cordoba on July
6,
1563,
authorities at Ai uncion to equip at his
river, expedition the town of Santa Fe, near the junction of the Parana and 3 It was there that the Rio Salado, on November 15, 1573.
down the
own expense a new with the aid of which he founded
in the following
Indian scout
whom
February he received word, through an he had despatched for the purpose, of
the arrival of his uncle, Ortiz de Zarate, at the estuary of

Plata.
La
Zarate had done well for himself during his sojourn in Spain. By a capitulation agreed upon between himself and
the king on July 10, 1569, the terms of his tentative appointment by the viceroy had not only been confirmed but en4
larged.
his
He was to be permitted to import African slaves into

it is
new domain, and
highly significant that
it
was
stipu-
lated that of the 500 Spaniards whom he brought with him, at least 100 should be workmen, artisans, and agricultural
laborers.
Moreover, in addition to the post of governor and captain-general, with an annual salary of 4000 ducats,
title of
he was given the
adelantado for himself and for his

leagues to the northeast of the present
city.
*
1 Groussac, Mendoza y Garay, pp. 211 f 308. 2 Carbia, Manual, i, p. 369. 3 The actual site (cf. Carbia, i, p. 368) was apparently about twelve
Carbia,
i,
pp. 370-373;
Groussac,
p. 368, note,
194
AMERICA AM) THE PHILIPPINES

;
he w&b vested, in other words, with a measure of hereditary authority in the territory which he proposed It took him over three years to collect his folto colonize
descendants
lower- and his armament.
he able were bo
Plata
of
to Bel sail,
Not until September, 1572, was and the delays and mishaps of the voyage numerous that he did not reach the mouth of La
till
November
off
2(5,
1573.
There, on the
little
island
San Gabriel,
the Uruguayan coast, and directly across
from the modern city of Buenos Aires, he found a cross with a gourd hanging on it in the gourd were letters telling of wh;it had already been accomplished by C&ceres and by
;
Garay.
latter,
Communication was speedily

and there was
fierce fighting
established with the
with the natives on the

the king
north bank of the river.
Zdrate,
who had promised

to
to establish a settlement at its
obligation by founding a on the Uruguayan coast, which was destined to endure but a shorl three years. Finally he passed on up the river, and
fulfil his mouth, attempted small outpost called San Salvador
leaving his nephew
;it
Santa
a
Fe",
reached Asuncion on Febru-
year he devoted himself to the difficult task of restoring order after the internal quarrels and revolts by which the settlement had been rent, but
ary
.").
1575.
For nearly
death overtook him

L576.
1
in
the midst of his laboi
on January 26,
The
nutterable confusion ensued during the next three years. heiress <>t Zarate was his daughter Juana, who was then
lmL
:it
Charca8.
her cousin,
Carina,
.. i.
Her representative :it Asuncion was de Mendieta, a fatuous youth of some Diego
376 f. A
historical
It
pp.
was
Argentina, describing the glories of tin- region and the principal events of its history in this period, was written nion of Ortiz t\p Zarate, nami'i Martin del Barce Centenera, and first published at Lisbon in 1602.
notes
.-mil
reprinted, in facsimile, with a scholarly introduction by
Juan
Pffin,
al
Maria QutiAlTM Buenos Aires

*
">
and
in
Knrique
Of.
1912.
TioknOT, History of Spanish ed. (Boston, 1888, LiUruturt, 3 vols.;, ii, pp. 556 f.
GeOTgS
t }
THE REFOUNDING OF BUENOS AIRES

twenty years
of age,
195
the contempt of all the inhabitants, and in 1577 was turned loose to perish in In the meantime at the Ciudad de la Plata the wilderness.
there ensued an unseemly rivalry between three ambitious men to secure the hand of Juana and the inheritance which
who soon earned
went with it but the viceroy and the audiencia prevented the finally successful candidate from assuming the govern;
sole
ment, and soon after landed him in prison at Lima. The permanently important development of these miserable
years was the steady growth of the power and prestige of Juan de Garay. In April, 1578, he was appointed legal representative of the government at Asuncion, and during the
following year occupied himself chiefly with the difficult work of restoring order and fighting the neighboring Indians.
December, 1579, he prepared to carry through the unfulfilled task which was nearest his heart, the reestablishment of a permanent settlement at the mouth of La Plata. This, indeed, was obligatory on
tranquillity
When
was
restored, in
him, as Zarate's successor, under the terms of the latter's In March, 1580, Garay left capitulation with the king.
Asuncion
at the
head
of
an expedition
of
some
sixty en-
the river past Santa Fe, he finally selected a site on the south side of the estuary, sufficiently far from the shore to be safe from the danger of
thusiastic followers.
Dropping down
inundation, and three or four miles distant from the spot
where,
forty-four years
before,
;
Pedro de Mendoza had

is
planted his temporary outpost the centre of it Plaza 25 de Mayo in the city of Buenos Aires.
today the
The formal
ceremony
of establishing the municipality
took place on
Saturday, June 11, 1580, and in view of the fact that the next day was Trinity Sunday, it was called La Trinidad but
;
the older
name
of
designate the port,
Buenos Aires continued to be used to and ultimately was to prevail as that of
196
the city

itself.
Hie
details of the story
make
interesting
reading, particularly the fertility and extent of the surrounding estancitis with which Garay rewarded his faithful folof a future prosperity of could then have conceived. At any which few Europeans rate the settlement was now permanently established, never
lowers.
They gave happy promise
again to be abandoned, and Garay thus became the real founder of the future capital of the Argentine. The last three years of his life were chiefly spent in the less congenial
tasks of maintaining authority at Santa
F6 and Asuncion
fro
at the
and
in
the course of his journeying
to
and
between these
places,
hostile
he met his death
in
March, 1583,
in
hands
of
natives, while resting
the forest.
He was
the
noblest figure in the early history of the Argentine, vigorous,

far-sighted, upright,
and
fearless, explorer,
conqueror, and
of disorder in
master of men.
The death
of
Garay ushered
in
;i
new period
the government of the settlements on the Rio de la Plata. Juan Torres de Vera y Aragon, the husband of Juana Ortiz
de Zarate, and lawful
through her, of her uncle's office of adelantado, had by this time got out of prison, but was still prevented, by the hostility of the viceroy and the audiencia of Charcas, from entering his domains til' the summer of
heir,
1")S7
i
in
was only permitted to remain there till

of
">,
1590.
The
importance which took place during his brief tenure of power waa the founding 'April 1588) of the city of Corrientes. Discouraged by the opposition which he
sole .vent
everywhere encountered, he retired to Spain and resigned hii position in 1593; and from that moment the hereditary office "f adelantado <f the Rio de la Plata, which had been
kbli&hed in
].~>u*>
for Ortiz
d<'
though
it
continued
Carbia.
i.
to exisl in theory
pp. 381-389;
Zarate and his successors, down to the year 1658 ,
Grousaac, pp. 450-543.
ARIAS DE SAAVEDRA
197
rule of that
became
for practical purposes extinct,
and the
territory passed into the

1
hands of a series of gobernadores appointed by the viceroy at Lima and confirmed by the Of these the most eminent was Hernando Arias crown. de Saavedra, born of Spanish parents at Asuncion in 1561, and married to a younger daughter of Garay he was the
;
first creole to hold public office in the Argentine,
even been called the

the foremost
Argentine patriot. colony from the early part of 1592, when he was chose n by popular vote as the representative Five years later he was raised to of the absent governor.
figure in the
first
and has He was really
that office in his
own
right,
and held
it
with intermissions
down
to the year 1617, when, largely as a result of his repre-
sentations to the
home government,
la
the territories of the
Plata were divided, and Paraguay was definitely separated from Buenos Aires. 3 His rule was not only marked by firmness and wisdom in matters political
province of the
Rio de
and administrative progress, and above

;
still
more was
it
notable for educational
The
the development of commerce. enormous natural economic advantages of Buenos Aires

all for
time to be properly utilized, so that it moreover, by the speedily came to overshadow Asuncion end of his life the old route across the isthmus of Panama
began
for the first
had ceased to be the sole means of access to Peru, and traffic had been started from La Plata up the Parana and over the
Andes. 4
Other evidences of nascent realization of the

of the
possibilities
Argentine had begun to multiply before the death of

continued to form a part of the audiencia of Charcas until the erection of the audiencia of Buenos Aires in 1661. Cf. Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias,
lib.
4
Carbia, i, pp. 389-397. Levene, Lecciones. i, p. 128. 3 Pedro Lozano, Historia de la Conquista del Paraguay, Rio de la Plata, y Tucuman (Buenos Aires, 1873-75, 5 vols.), iii, pp. 304 f. Levene, LeeBoth provinces ciones, i, pp. 128-137.
1
ii,
tit.
xv, ley
xiii.
Carbia, Manual, i, p. 398; Haring, Trade and Navigation, pp. 140-142.
198
Philip
II.
AMERICA AM) THE PHILIPPINES
Cnrsnrins Ingleses thought the settlements there 1582 Edward well worth tin- harrying, and in the winter of after establishing himself on the island of Santa
Penton,
Catalina
off
the
Brazilian
const,
made an
effort
to
raid
Buenos Aires. The attempt, however, proved a and crew of one of the ships that had fiasco, and the captain alternative to been intrusted with it were obliged, as the only
being killed by the Indians, to seek safety
at
1
miserable
the gates of the
The period is had expected to sack. very town that they A few the missionaries. also noteworthy for the activities of the earlier expeditions to the basin frailrs had accompanied but their of La Plata from the time of MendoM onward, restricted to the efforts had at first been almost completely been made to conhad settlements, and no serious attempts After the refounding of Buenos Aires in vert the natives. the work of converting tin1580, and partly as a result of it, A body of eighteen FranIndians was vigorously taken up. in January, ciscans who reached the estuary of La Plata
to be regarded as the pioneers; but L583, deserve, perhaps, be overshadowed bv their activities were soon destined to
those
->f
the Jesuits, who, arriving

in
in
L588, IB BUCCestfully
in
extended their system of missions
Paraguay
the cour
of the next thirty or forty years that they
inverted the vast
exclusive majority of the Cuaranis. and obtained virtually the followcontrol of the whole region about Asuncion .hiring actual DOSand a half. Though they never got ing century there, their influencf remained of the
Biorj
government
dominant
Perthe colony until their expulsion in L760. all was the persistency of the efforts haps most significant of of the Andes, of the new settlements on the eastern Blopes which had been founded by expeditions sent out from Chile
in
,
. , .
dbo
life oi
''
Hanoi Biography and

f
nfanaoM thaw.
anion
in
Wdiotun
v "-
"r
,1,,,ni1 "-
TUCUMAN AND MENDOZA
199
and Peru, to break the ties that bound them to the audiencia of Lima, and unite their political and economic destinies with
those of Buenos Aires.
cisco de Aguirre in the
itself
Tucuman,
first
1
exploited
by Fran-
Emperor's day, succeeded in getting declared independent of Chile by a royal cedula of August 29, 1563, and placed under the jurisdiction of the
audiencia of Charcas
2
;
between 1593 and 1595

its
it
was even
la
temporarily united with the government of the Rio de

Plata.
Economically speaking,
its
whole history during
this period resolved itself into a series of efforts to obtain a
direct outlet for
rich products via
Atlantic and to Spain. The story of the farther south is much the same. Like
Buenos Aires to the town of Mendoza
Tucuman,
it
was
founded
Chile
;
in the early sixties

like
Tucuman,
it
by an expedition sent out from at once made every effort to get

its
an outlet on the Atlantic and link

of
destinies with those
Buenos Aires. In matters commercial it attained its object, and before the reign of Philip II had closed, it succeeded in establishing connection with the future capital of the Argentine. Politically, however, it failed to gain its end,
despite
it
all
the efforts to help
it
on the part
continued
officially to belong to Chile
of Tucuman, for down to the year
1776,
when the natural

and
frontier
on the ridge of the Cordillera

3
was
finally
definitely established.
The
old idea, that
the political and economic centre of gravity of the Spanish domination in South America must necessarily reside in the but even mining regions on the Pacific slope, died hard before the end of the reign of the Prudent King there were
;
only those in authority had been able to read them, that the original emphasis was destined ultimately to be
signs,
if
reversed.
1
'Carbia,
Cf. ante, Vol. Ill, pp. 604 i, pp. 414-433.
f.
Carbia,
i,
p. 447.
200

principles on which Philip guided the administration throughout his reign are a faithful reflection of
The
his
of the Indies
own character and ideals, and of the precepts which his From first to last he played father had passed on to him. His object was rather to make sure of what he had safe.
already inherited, and of the maintenance therein of the Spanish monopoly and of the absolute power of the crown, than to increase the extent of his transatlantic possessions.
The
is
cunijuistador
is
therefore relegated to second place;
he
largely supplanted by the hardworking, reliable crown official, whose pole star was the establishment of the royal
There are, consequently, few innovationSuch authority. changes as were made were really only the logical consequences of the ramifications and development of the system which had been founded by the Emperor they solidified,
;
but did not alter

for the future
;
it.
The absence
of
new
ideas
was ominous
was another proof of the comph teness with which Spain was wedded to the old ways, while her neighbors It to the north of her were launching out into modern ones. as prophetic of showed an inability to go forward which
it
v.
going back.
The supereminence, under
the crown, of the Council of
the Indies, was fortified by a Beries of Ordi \anzas Reales para d Cnnsejo de las India* which Philip issued on September 24,
3
1571,
that
and which formed the basis
tor practically of the
followed
down
to the advent
Bourbons
everything in the
eighteenth century. By these ordinances the ( oiincil was given unlimited authority, under the king, in the territories
committed
cially,
1
to it- charge
Legislatively, executively,
.
and judi-
it
was made, the count erpa it

Cf.
for the
de
Indies, of the
de
las
ofl
ropy of tho original edition Ordenanzo* in the British 8(H2 .1 and most of their Museum. provisions are to be found in the
these
;
There
is a
Htcojnioei&n
ftlao
Leyes
Indiaa.
Politico
BoloriUM
I'oreira,
/wiuin/i, lib
v, caps, xv-xvii.
THE COUNCIL OF THE INDIES

Consejo de Castilla for Castile.
201
As in the Emperor's day, the court, and met every day save it resided continually at on regular holidays, three hours in the morning, and two
more
in the afternoon.
No
business was to be transacted

present,
until at least three
members were
1
and not
till
then
were the three hours of the morning session to be regarded

as having
begun to
elapse.
The membership, which had
been fixed by the Emperor in 1542 at eight, over and above the president, the attorney-general, two secretaries, and
other minor functionaries, was now confirmed, twenty-nine 2 years later, at the same figure by his son, but it does not
if we seem always to have been actually filled up may trust the statement of Cabrera de Cordoba, there were but
;
six regular councillors
at the time of the king's death in
the other hand, it would appear that the duties responsibilities of the Consejo multiplied so rapidly in the latter part of Philip's reign that it became necessary,
1598.
On
and
shortly after his death, to create two offshoots of it with These were the Consejo de special functions of their own.
Cdmara
first
de las Indias, a committee of the Council
itself,
created in the year 1600 to advise the king about all appointments to secular and ecclesiastical office, the distri-
bution of pensions, and the exercise of the pardoning power 4 in the New World and the so-called Junta de Guerra y
;
Armadas members
Guerra
1 ;
de Indias, also set
up
in 1600,
and composed
of the
of
of the Council of the Indies

its special
and
Consejo de
function was to oversee the arming and despatch of the American fleets and to confirm nominations
lib.
2
Recopilacidn de Leyes de las Indias, ii, tit. ii, ley v. Recopiladdn de Leyes de las Indias,
ii,
lib.
'
tit. ii,
ley
i.
In addition to the president, secC. de C, retary, and attorney-general.

iv, p.
Solorzano Pereira, Politica Indiana, cap. xv, paragraphs 18 and 19 Charles de Lannoy and Herman vander Linden, Histoire de I'expansion coloniale des peuples europeens (Brussels, 190721, 3 vols.), i, p. 342.
lib. v,
;
332.
202
sent
up to it by the Casa de Contrataci6n for the various It thus served incidentally as an posts ami offices involved. additional moans of keeping the doings of the Casa at Seville
1
under the supervision oi the crown. A few significant fads may be noted
presidents
o'i
in regard to the the Consejo de las [ndias during the reign of the
2 Prudent King. There were eight of them in all, beginning with Francisco Tello de Sandoval, who replaced Luis Hurtado de Mendoza on December 2, 1559, when the Latter
was called
to the presidency of the
Council of
astilej
the
average term, in other words, was a little less than five years, Of a considerably longer period than the law prescribed. the eight, no less than seven were licenciado8 men. of technit
cal training in
theology or law, and

in
all of
them had had
pre-
vious experience state. Only the
one or more of the great departments of first two of them, however, had been mem-
bers of the Council of the Indies before they were elevated to the presidency of it, and of this pair only one had ever been
America, namely, Francisco Tello de Sandoval, who had gone out to Mexico as vwitador, and published the New Laws there in 1544. 3 The only other one of the eight presiin
who had visited the New World was Pedro de Moya y Contreras, who had been sent out to set up the Inquisition in Mexico in 1573, New Spain in 1570, became archbishop
dents
<!
and served temporarily as viceroy there in 15X4-85. 4 There seemed, in other words, to be Little disposition on the part of the king to profit by the experience of those who had
actually been on the ground.
anxious to have the Council of

Recopilacidn de Leyes de las India*, ii, tit ii, U-yos lxxii lxxxii Haring, Tni<U and Navigation, a. 281. * Cf. the liat in Antonio lbrrera y de las India* Tordesillaa, Des<
1
was apparently more the Indies ad in consonance

Philip
Oo
'
(Madrid,
[l72'.t]),
i,
p.
71.
lib
'A. B Uton, Antonio <lr Mwn&Qta (Durham. \. ('.. 1927), pp. 72, 90 ff. Lea, The Inquisition in the Spanish
Dependencies, pp. 200-2(12.
EMIGRATION TO THE
with his
NEW WORLD
203
own preconceived
notions of what was for the best
interest of his subjects in the
New World
than to permit
it
to
be too well informed as to the actual
facts.
It is also clear
that he proposed that the administration of his transatlantic domains should be kept closely in touch with the InquisiIn addition to Pedro de Moya, three others of the tion.
eight presidents of the Council of the Indies during Philip's
and last, had previously been memThe elimination of bers of the Consejo de la Suprcma. heresy was to be the government's first duty not only in the
reign, the fourth, sixth,
Old World but

excluded
New. In the year 1596 the ban which had hitherto

in the
officially
non-Castilian
Spaniards from the

1
Indies
was
formally lifted by a pragmatica removing the inhabitants of the realms of the crown of Aragon and Navarre from the
category of estranjeros, and therefore conferring on them, by implication, if not directly, the privileges of emigration to
the
New
World.
It
seems natural to attribute this gratify2
ing change to the remodelling of the constitution of the
eastern kingdoms in 1592, which brought them much more closely than ever before under the control of the crown
Philip had no longer any reason to fear lest his transatlantic possessions might be contaminated by Aragonese 'liberties.' But is doubtful if the pragmdtica of 1596 actually brought
i
about any great change in the situation as

right of granting special
it
was.
The
royal
of
exemptions from the operation
had been so frequently utilized in the past for the benefit of desirable inhabitants of the eastern realms, that large numbers of them had already found their way
existing laws
across the Atlantic
1526, of
1
and there was also the imperial decree of which mention has been made in the preceding
;
Recopilacidn de Leyes de las Indias,

ley xxviii.
Cf. infra, pp. 595-598.

-
lib. ix, tit. xxvii,
204

1
volume.
It
is
worth noting that the law of 1596
failed to
take the Portuguese ou1 of the category of estranjeros ; indeed, a clause which was added thereto in 1614 specifically
declared them to he in
it;
they continued,
in
other words,
to he debarred from Spanish America, though naturally not
from Brazil.
Even
after the annexation of Portugal
and
its
;is
colonies in 1581, Philip did not
regard their inhabitants
quite in the same category with Spaniards. While the personnel of the Council of the Indies remained
practically unchanged during the period of Philip II, that 2 the Casa de Contrataci6n a1 Seville was considerably
of
The firsi and obvious reason for this was the enormous increase of the business that expansion the Sasa had to do; a second and subsidiary one, which
altered and enlarged.
(
began to make itself seriously felt only in the latter half of the reign, was Philip's characteristic determination
really
to extend the royal supervision

details of the
down
to tin m<
1
significant
its
commerce
of the
New
World, as well as of
government. Finally, the creation of new offices was not without its value as a financial expedient, for it is impossible to deny that, in Philip's later years, the minor p isil ions went
more often
There
to the highest bidder- than

3
to
those
who
best
erved them.
is
every reason to BUppose that the old inherited organization, under three officials, the treasurer, factor, and
C0Tltador f
powers, had demonstrated its It must have inadequacy before the death of Charles V. overwhelmed by the sudden increase of the work that
with
coordinate
Cf. ante, Vol. Ill, p. 65

i-
cation did not touoh the Mediterranean

that
the the
will
be
remembered
to
(Forte
Americas trade ko in bad bean 1673 Philip failure; aitely revoked his father*! deeree
whi< h permitted |> 620, n. 1.
it;
cf.
throw opes <>tlicr Bpaniab porta
Malaga and Cartagena; do evidence that they took advantage of the right which, \>y im plication, they continued to possess. <i'l Trait Baring Navigation,
porta, niofa ai
bat there
is
ntly
onla, Vol. Ill, this n-vo-
\>\<
16
THE CASA DE CONTRATACION

it
205
had to perform during the last fifteen years of the Emin fact, it seems probable that Charles's peror's reign absence from Spain and his preoccupation about other matters were the chief reasons why some remedy for the In any case we know that on situation had not been found. October 7, 1557, some twenty-one months after Philip had
;
for the
taken the reins of government, a president was appointed Casa de Contratacion. 1 The first incumbent, Juan
Suarez de Carvajal, only served a
little
more than a year,
office thereafter remained vacant till 1579, when it After conferred on the licentiate Diego de Salazar. was that, the succession remained unbroken down to the sup-
and the
pression of the Casa in 1790, and it is worth noting that all.. four of the remaining presidents under the Prudent King were, like their predecessors, licenciados, while the first three /
of the next reign were caballeros de capa y espada the Prudent King could not get over his innate preference for the On the other hand, it is fair scholar over the man of action. to add that during his reign, though not invariably under
;
his successors, the rule requiring all presidents of the
Casa to
have had previous experience was faithfully observed. 2
in the
Council of the Indies
The
first
duty
of the president
was to keep the Casa as a
wholv, and every department of it, in the closest possible touch with the Council of the Indies for since it was resi;
dent at Seville, there was always the danger that it might strive to attain some measure of independence. In order to
accomplish this end, he was expected to supervise and coordinate the activities of the three offices into which the Casa
from
its
inception had been divided

s
3
;
to preside over the
1 Joseph de Veitia Linaje, Norte de la Contratacion de las Indias Occidentales,
lib.
i,
cap. 37,
1.
Veitia Linaje, lib. i, cap. 3, 4; i, cap. 37, 2, 3, 4. Cf. Vol. 224ante, II, pp. 227.
lib.
206

1
tribunal of the Consulado;
and
to attend, and,
if
he was a
de J usticia de la letrado, to cast a vote in, the so-called Sala < \is<i ,/( < 'ontratacio'i, created in 1583 to deal with the steadily
increasing
3a
amount
of litigation
which the
activities of the
it
rendered inevitable.-
This body, when

third.
Its
was
first
set up,
later
it
was composed of only two became necessary to add a
oidores, but thirteen years
form and pro-
of the realm
cedure were closely assimilated to those of the higher courts and the president, as ex officio member thereof,
;
became, ipso facto, the indispensable connecting link between it and the older established administrative offices of the
Casa.
It
was
characteristic of Philip's fondness for courts
and
determination to have justice done down to the minutest detail that this Sala should have been created and
his
;
and he doubtless felt that given such prominence by him the right to participate in its proceedings was the greatest Nevertheless the privilege that the president possessed.
administrative side of the work of the Casa increased, during we must therehis lifetime, even faster than the judicial
;
turn our attention to the expansion of the responsibilities of the offices of the treasurer and 1 B$or, and its
fore
1
results.
department was more than doubled during the reign of the Prudent King, and its staff Not only did it have trap in Consequence greatly increased. to handle much larger amounts of money from the New
of the treasurer's
The work
World than
of the
in
the Kmperor's day;
it
proceeds of the rich silver

in
1
mine
of
was made receiver ruadalcanal, which
bad been discovered
">.">")
<m the border of ESstremadura,
and
1
also, in
L579,
Andalusia.
I
almojonjazgos and a I cabalas of What inference is to be drawn from the assignof all the
69
'
Cf. ante. Vol. Ill, p

I
Haring,
p. 47,
and references
UmM
irinK.
f
.
Trade
t-
and
tli.
Navigation,
to.
pp. 57
and
REVENUES FROM THE INDIES
207
merit of the collection of these purely Spanish revenues to a body whose functions were theoretically restricted to
amounts received from the

mine.
Indies,
it
were
difficult to deter-
Probably the arrangement was made because, whatever the defects of the Casa, it was decidedly more efficient
than the regular authorities of the Hacienda. Possibly it may also be taken to indicate a dawning realization of the necessity of reducing the excessive
number
of
government
officials,
theory is sharply contradicted by the facts as existed in other departments. In any event, the they revenues received by the Casa from sources purely Spanish
though
this
wore but an exceedingly small fraction of the total sum it had to handle it was chiefly through the increase of the amounts which arrived from the Indies that its responsibili;
ties
were enlarged.
The revenues which Philip derived from the New World mounted steadily during the course of the reign. All the
expenses of the king's
government
in the Indies
;
were paid
out of these revenues before they left America the sums received by the Casa de Contratacion were thus only the 1 In surplus available for the use of his Majesty at home.
1554 they reached

1585, 700,
223-g- cuentos, in
2
1566, 252, in 1577, 445, in

principal sources of
and
in 1598, 945.
The
them
were the royal quinto (often more and sometimes less than one-fifth) of the yield of the American mines sundry special
;
Cf. C. H. Haring, "Ledgers of the Royal Treasurers in Spanish America in the Sixteenth Century," in Hispanic American Historical Review, ii (1919), In the decade 1553-63 pp. 181 f. only 628 of the 1523 cuentos received in New Spain were actually sent home to Seville. Cf. Archivo General de
1
Indias, Contaduria, legajo 666. 2 The estimated amounts set down in the official budgets are always con-
siderably
less
than the amounts
re-
corded as actually received by the Casa chief reason for this is probably that the former were reckoned on the basis of what had been received the year before. Moreover, the amounts recorded as actually received by the Casa included the averia, which the official budgets omitted, since it had to be forthwith paid back to the special averia account, which in 1590 reached 68 cuentos. Cf. Archivo General de Indias, Contratacion, legajo 4556.
.
The
208
trOnUot

;
the proceeds of the alcabala, </t Indios y de Xegros which was extended by law to the Indies in 1558, and estab1 lished there in facl at the rate of two per cent in 1574-76
;
crown monopolies such as that of playing cards; and the ahnojarifazgos de los puertos on both the cruzada and the amounts derived from every sides of the Atlantic
certain
;
one of these items increased between 1555 and 1598.

rate of the various imposts
The
and taxes was steadily raised, and the gold, silver, and quicksilver mines of the New World yielded the crown between three and four times as much
3 In addition to end of the reign as a1 the beginning. from the New World, the Casa had also the royal revenue to handle the sums derived from the Indies by individual
at the
The latter averaged about two and one-half Spaniards. 4 times as much as the former in the period under review.
These
totals are certainly impressive,
is
increase during the reign
and the rate of their even more so. But (thai is far
more noteworthy still is their relative smallness compared with the sums which Philip drew from European sources. According to the budget of 1554 the income derivable from amount the Indies was reckoned at less than 11% of thi
1
due
1577
in
1
to the royal treasury; in

a1
1566
at
little
over
7%;
in
10%.
it
In 1585
falls
it rises
to a little
mdre than 25%, and

at
1598
only
back to 22%, 5 but even

xiv.
the very end
Rtcojnlaci&n de Leyes de las Indias,

leycs f. infra, p. 441. Trade flaring.
1
lib. viii, tit. xiii,

*
and
In seocion 11, lcgajo 21fi. in the /.' ETwjXMtglM,
my
article
lxxxi,
"A
and
K.
.1.
Navigation,
also
"Imports
of
American
GoM
1603-1660," in trrly Journal of Economic*, xliii (1029), pp. 486 172, " 'I II American Treasure Miilton, and Andalusian Prioea," in the Journal
Spain,
I
Hamilton, and Silver the Quar-
Note OD the Finances of Philip II," which MfM written in the summer of '.:>. though it was not published till 19:W, reckoned thfl American crown as "on the revenues amounting,
1
average,
during
the
first
half
of
his
of Economic (1928),
|
and Husinms History,

de
Indias,
>;
more than six DM due annually to the royal tre.i-ury," but the documents in the British Museum on which thiestimate was based happened to fall
reign, to a little cut of all the sums
Archivo
Indiferente
on three very lean years.
Simanoas Mas.,
THE TREASURE FLEETS

of the reign
it is
209
obvious that the American revenues did not

large a portion of Philip's
constitute
anywhere nearly so
income as has been popularly supposed. They did not even equal some of the more important single items in the list of
the Spanish king's European resources. During the first half of the reign they averaged less than three-fourths of the
sums derived from the
ecclesiastical
revenues in Europe (the

;
excusado, and maestrazgos) only 1 after 1580 did they begin to exceed them. In 1554 they were only about two-thirds of the proceeds of the encabezatercias, cruzada, subsidio,
miento in Spain, 1566 only a little better than one-half, in 1577 a little more than one-third. At the end of the reign,
indeed, the current begins to flow the other
yield 945 cuentos
it is
way
the Indies
and the encabezamiento only 1035. 2 But evident that the legend that America constituted an
inexhaustible treasure house for Philip cannot possibly be substantiated by the facts.
It
was
in the years
sailings to and from
America
1564-66 that the organization of the in two annual fleets was defi-
and permanently set up. There had been foreshadow3 henceit, as we have seen, in the Emperor's day forth it was formally established, to last to the advent of the
nitely
ings of
Bourbons. 4
On
October
18, 1564, a set of
ordinances was
put forth providing for the annual despatch of two convoyed fleets, one for New Spain, the other for the Isthmus of
Castile they subsequently became known and the Galleons, and they averaged, in the latter years of Philip's reign, some seventy ships each. 5 The first was to sail in April for the Greater Antilles and the the second was to leave in ports on the Gulf of Mexico
;
Panama and New

as the Flota
Simancas Mas., seccion Simancas Mas., secci6n
11, 11,
legajo
3 <
Cf. ante, Vol. Ill, pp. 631
f.
216.
*
legajo
Haring, p. 207. Ibid., pp. 210-212.
380.
210
August for tlic northern coast of South America and Xombre de Dios. Both were to winter in the Indies, and to repair to
they were to leave for Europe not earlier than the tenth of that month, and were generally expected
in
;
Havana
March
to sail
home
separately.
The
details of these regulations
were nut
Bailing
invariably
observed.
The
;
prescribed
times
of
occasionally a year was and it was only rarely that either of the fleets skipped, But the routes arrived anywhere at the appointed times. and schedules were at least sufficiently regular to enable the
were not rigidly adhered to
pirates to
possible the Flota and the (ialleons had heen established to prevent, with the result that increasing attention and expense had to
swoop down on the fleets at the must awkward moments, that is, to facilitate the very thing that
be devoted to convoy and armament.
At
first
it
had been
the custom to rely on a few cannon and a handful of soldiers, borne by each of the larger merchant men of the fleet, but
the ships were so crowded with passengers and goods as to
be virtually useless
when any
t
fighting
was
to
be done; SO
iii
1565
it
was provided thai

'!<)()
hejlagship.of e ach fleet

tons, with th irty-six
to
itself
was to be
a galleon of at least
canno n and
200 men, and
it
was never
chandise of any kind, wrecks. The number of warships assigned for this purpose
gradually increased as the reign wore on. and their efforts were supplemented by those of the so-called Armada de la
with merencumber save when it rescued the cargoes of
in
de las
India*, which
patrolled
the wa
off
the
Spanish coasts, and occasionally escorted the fleets across the sea. To us the system seeme cumbersome and ineffective, a faithful reflection of Philip's excessive
confidence in
the power of combination and weight, and of his inability to see the Value ot manoeuvring and speed. But it seems
1
Cf Haring, pp. 222-225,

.
for details of these.
THE FLOTA AND THE GALLEONS
211
probable that it actually worked out, under the conditions prevalent at the time, rather better than the modern student
would have reason to suppose. Despite all their foreknowledge of the dates and routes of the Spanish sailings, none of Philip's maritime enemies was ever able to capture an entire
treasure-fleet
.
They had
to content themselves with the
cutting
off of isolated vessels
and minor squadrons.
The
Flota and the Galleons continued to maintain their

It will readily
sailings.
be seen from the foregoing paragraph that the provisioning, irming, and outfitting of the American
had become, under Philip II, a task far too heavy to be performed by the factor alone, who had had charge of it in the Emperor's day. The natural result was a large increase in his staff and the gradual distribution of his duties among Of these by far the most important a number of officials. was the purveyor-general of the armadas and fleets of the It was his duty Indies, who was first appointed in 1588.
fleets
!
to
make
sure that the ships themselves were in
fit
condition
and that they were fully supplied with provisions voyage and he was expected to buy such commodities and to employ such labor as were necessary for these The matter of armament, however, still remained purposes. under the jurisdiction of the factor, who was aided, during
for the sea, for the
;
the last twenty-five years of the reign, by an artillero mayor. The J unta de Guerra y Armadas de Indias, as we have already
remarked, was not created until 1600.
On
the other side of the Atlantic the consolidation and
development of the system of vkrrcgal administration inaugurated by the Emperor is by far the most significant fact of the period. Long lines of successors to Antonio de Mendoza were established under Philip II, both at Mexico
1
Haring, p. 49.
212
and at Lima, and continued, with occasional interruptions,
down
to the era of the Revolutions.
were but eight viceroys of New the departure of Antonio de Mendoza for Spain between New Jastile in 1550 and the death of Philip II in 1598, and
Strictly Bpeakingj there
(
Bame number in New Castile between Mendoza's death In other at Lima (July 21, 1552) and the end of the reign. won Is, the law of 1555, prescribing a three-year term, 1 was There were, moreover, three practically in abeyance. in New Spain, during which the government was interregna carried on by the audiencia, and three of a similar nature in New Jastile 8 the second of this latter trio, which lasted from .")f>4 to 1569, amounted in fact to a suspension of the viceregal regime, for the home government was so disturbed by
the
1
'
the succession of calamities
by which
so
many
of the early
viceroys of Peru had been taken off, that it determined to try the experiment of having the viceroyalty governed by the
audiencia, under the able presidency of the licentiate Lope iarcia de Castro, who had been a member of the Council of
(
the Indies.
The
longest term served
by any viceroy
'
in
the Philip's time was that of Velasco, 'the Eman< ipator,' successor of Antonio de Mendoza in Mexico, from 1550 to the next, that of Martin Enriqu 1564 Almansa, who
;
ruled
New Spain
tit. iii,
from 1568 to 1580, and
tin n
was transferred
opilacidn de Leyes de las Indias,

lib
1
iii,
month term
of
ley lxxi.
of office: and the Count Nieva was murdered in February,
LS66; 1568;
Between July, 1564, and September, between March and November, and between June, 1583, and
I
1564
Ant.,
Vol.
Ill,
590;
R.
pp.
Levillier,
Audienda
Kstelle
de
Fisher,
Lima,
xxxvi, lxxi.
i
mber, en July, 1552, and June, be t w een February, 1664, end 1666; and bftwi M irch, L669
:
in
Viceregal
Administration, p. 31;
rente, //
I i
!.
oeo,
Sebastian Lo*/>/ Peri hajo la Dinaslia 164S-1698 (Lima, 1863),

"
for
I,
1
Blaeoo Ntifiee by a black sin
and November, 1586. Wla was bebj

ii.
pp JH9f.
called
of
freei
his first
official
act
Anaquito had died
in
he battle of \ Qtonio de Mendoza July, 1662, after a tenr

t
ng one hundred and
fifty
thou-
sand Iri'iian slaves." Lowery, Spanish S.tiUmmts, 1613-1561, p. 353.
THE VICEROYS
to
213
New Castile from
1581 to 1583
cases of terms shorter than
two years.
and there are at least four Save for Enriquez
de Almansa, the second Velasco, who governed New Spain from 1590 to 1595, was the only Mexican viceroy to be pro-
moted during
of Lima.
this period to the
more
dignified viceroyalty
In general it is fair to say that under Philip the viceroys were carefully selected from men who in various ways had
given proof of efficiency in the service of the crown. There is no evidence of any tendency, such as appeared in the
seventeenth century, to lay special emphasis on military if anything, qualifications Philip preferred the trained
;
administrator to the soldier, and on one occasion he ap-
pointed a
cleric.
Most
of his happiest choices, in
both
viceroyalties, were made from the great families of the Mendozas and the Velascos. Of the former there were
three,
one in
New
Spain and two in

2
New
Castile, the last
pair father
and
son,
and
all
of
them
of kin to the great
Antonio de Mendoza of the Emperor's day; of the latter there were two, father and son, in New Spain, and the son,
was promoted to New Castile. But of all the viceroys appointed by the Prudent King, the greatest by far was Francisco Alvarez de Toledo, who was sent out .o New Castile in 1569, when it was in utter confusion and disorder, and brought it back to peace and prosperity
as
we have already
seen,
in the ensuing
twelve years.
A brief summary
of his career
some slight idea of the conditions in Philip's American possessions in the middle prevalent years of his reign, and of the policies that were pursued in
there will serve to give
dealing with them. Pedro de Moya y Contreras,

1
arch-
This son, Garcia Hurtado de
Men-
bishop of Mexico, and viceroy there from 1584 to 1585. He was also the first inquisitor in Mexico, and later president of the Council of the Indies.
Caiiete, who ruled from 1590 to 1596, was very highly esteemed in Spain. Cf. C. de C,
doza,
Marquis
of
iv,
pp. 17-23, 212-215.
214
Toledo had proved his value both as a diplomat and as a Boldier before lie was sent out to the New World, but Philip hail no idea of leaving him a free hand in his new office.
1
elaborate set
His unties and responsibilities were specifically defined in an of instructions given him on his departure. Perhaps the most important of all these instructions was
that ordering
him
to
make
a tour of inspection of his vice-
royalty, in order that he might

of its conditions
become personally informed

to the crown.
and needs, and report them
to make that tour of inspection in October, 1570, with him as counsellors a Jesuit priest, a judge, and a taking licentiate. It covered in all over 5000 miles, and occupied
He began
him
for
more than
five years,
2
and
its results
were far-reach-
ing and beneficent.
The two problems
to
winch he gave his

first,
chief attention were the traditional ones:
crease the output of the mines, and, secondly, better the conditions of the Indians. 3 had tended Past experience
how how to
to in-
show that neither could be solved save at the expense of but Toledo was convinced that it would be possible to deal with them separately and satisfactorily, and
to
the other;
succeeded
in
proving that he was
right.
Ne
thods were
iblished for the extraction of the silver
from the ore by
the use of mercury, which had been discov< red at HuancaveA wise code of mining laws and regulations was drawn lica.
up and enforced; and

tablished
a1
mint to stabilize the currency was
Potosi.
These measures, and others, which

it
Toledo adopted, Were no small elrin.nl in bringing ..bout the h. This is /., viii, pp. 217 '>.//. viii, pp. 243-256; Zim1
f.
curious, though unfortunately [noomplete acrmmt <>f Toledo'! term of "t! written in the first purt of the lerenry,
I
merman, ' The Pope wrote him a

|
probably by one Tristen Zimmermen'! Fran.
letter before hiH departure, frmphssiring the importance of Christianising the natives.
Bt of
i
;i
I'ni-
Illinois
Urban
i.
IS
doctoral iHesriiliition. tins a useful bfbli'
214-216. pp. 282-287; Itelacionca de los Virtue* y Awlienciaa que han gobernado si Peru, i, pp. 267-348.
l>
I.
viii,
I
|>|>.
'
1>
viii,
ographical note.
TOLEDO AND THE INDIANS
215
gratifying increase, beginning about 1580, in the revenue which Spain was able to derive from the New World. At
the same time the viceroy labored manfully to put an end to the maltreatment and exploitation of the loyal Indians.
The
chief
means which he took
to effect this
end was to
towns of his viceroyalty a system of and corregimientos modelled on that of Castile, corregidores and in the smaller ones, which were almost exclusivelv
establish in the larger
populated by natives, lesser officers called corregidores de India.?. Authority was thus gradually withdrawn from the
encomendero,
who had
generally misused
officials,
it,
and placed
in the
hands of responsible
on
whom
the duty of caring
for the welfare of the natives
had been
specifically laid,
if
and
that they were likely to lose their positions 1 The Indians were no longer victimized neglected
it.
who knew
they by the
greedy lawyers and judges who had hitherto reaped rich harvests out of their ignorance and special codes with
;
them were provided to regulate their affairs. A scale of wages was established for them, and a census of their population was taken, so that the tribute due from them could be justly apportioned. 2 But though Toledo was a sturdy champion of the rights
special officers to administer
of the loyal native,
he would not tolerate any refusal to

crown.
reco mize the sovereignty of the Spanish
Tupac
Amaru, the youngest son

to the east of
days of the maintained an independent court in the mountains Pizarros,

of
Manco Inca
of the
Ayacucho
it
was
a place of refuge for all sorts
of undesirables, a potential centre of disturbance

lion.
and
rebel-
On
his arrival at
Lima, Toledo strove by peaceful

2
Memorial of Toledo in D. I. E., xxvi, pp. 143 f. Zimmerman, pp. 8 f Ruiz Guifiazti, La Magistratura Indiana,
1
; .
Relaciones de los Vireyes,
i,
pp. 109.
111, 155-266; Sir Clements
pp. 301-311.
to
of
Zimmerman, pp. 10 f Markham's introduction Pedro Sarmiento de Gamboa's History the Incas, pp. xv f.
;
216

to induce the Inca to
of his race;
means
abandon
this last vestige of the
but Tupac refused to listen to independence him, and the viceroy reluctantly determined that it would be necessary to use force. An army was sent against the
he was captured, brought back to Cuzco, youthful Inca found guilty on testimony the greater part of which tried, was false, and, despite the passionate protests of almost all
;
the inhabitants, both lay and clerical, of the city, suffered death at the hands of the public executioner in December,
1571.
1
The
It
act has left a dark stain on the record of the
viceroy.
and
it
has been characterized as a 'judicial murder/ gave Philip an excuse for cruelly turning against
Toledo,
when ten years

of
later
he became convinced that he

2
was
tial
in
danger
becoming too powerful.
But
it
it
was
essen-
for the king's representative to
make
evident, at the
outset of his regime, that he had the power to enforce his will, and the rulers of the sixteenth century were not wont
to be merciful to rebels.
Toledo
affairs.
was
also
much concerned with

Churchi.
ecclesiastical
The
state of the clergy at the time of his arrival in
New
'astile cried
aloud for reform.
n, like
lay-
men, had flocked across the Atlantic, primarily with the

idea of enriching themselves.
neglected the principal duty which had been assigned to them, that of educating the Indians in the principles of the Christian faith only a few
They
>f
had even taken the trouble to learn the native languages, and most of them were both immoral ami There was every prospect, moreover, that these corrupt.
them,
in
fact,
evils
would
lie
perpetuated, for the higher clergy in the

"
New
1 D. I. I., viii. pp. 262-282; Baltasar de Ocampo, Xarratire of the BzteuUon Of thr I urn Tii pur Amaru, tr. and ed.
' V<.\i were sent to Peru to serve kings, not to kill them," is the phrase which trsditioD has placed in Philip's
Bb Ckmenti Murkh.-im
II
C. K.
Mark-
pp.
l-'l
story of l.YY
Peru (ChioafO, 1892),
<l,\
mouth. Hey
I'nrreflo,
/'./,..
Dichoa
Hechoa
Stgundo
(Seville. 1639),
fol. 15.
TOLEDO AND THE CLERGY
217
World had begun to usurp the royal right of patronage, and doled out the most lucrative posts to the highest bidders. One of the principal duties that had been given Toledo was
that of reestablishing the powers of the crown in this regard,
The king, in 1574, put forth lost no time in doing so. an edict consolidating all the gains his representative had and already made, and definitely providing for the future
and he
;
thereafter Toledo
was able to bring about numerous salutary
Laws governing the conduct of clerics were promulgated and enforced. They were obliged to learn the
reforms.
1
Indian languages within a specific time, and if they did not 2 succeed in so doing, they were deprived of their salaries. Moreover in January, 1569, two months before Toledo left
Spain for
alleged
New
Castile, Philip
determined to establish tribuat
nals of the Inquisition at
Mexico and
Lima.
The motive
for this decision was the danger lest his dominions should be contaminated by the transatlantic taint of Protestantism, and French and English Lutherans
by the king
'
'
suffered death in the first
November
15,
two autos-da-fe 1573, and at Mexico on the 28th

:
at
Lima on
heresy
of the follow-
ing February.
It is
hard to believe that the
perils of
were as great as the Inquisitors, in order to justify their own but the vocation, almost invariably sought to make out
;
institution
had proved its value as an instrument for the detection and punishment of clerical irregularities and as a means of fortifying the authority of the crown and as such
;
it
was inevitable that Toledo should bid

it
it
welcome.
He
lent
his heartiest
support during the entire period of his

its
term
of office,
and established
power and supereminence
in his viceroy alty after the fashion of the parent institution

in Castile.
1
The
Indians, however, both in Mexico and in

;
D.
1. 1., viii,
pp. 237-239
Zimmer-
Zimmerman,
p. 7.
man,
p. 11.
21 s
Peru, were exempted from inquisitorial jurisdiction, and, despite numerous protests, remained subject to the authority
of the bishops.
1
The
ned
and the Spanish Empire

literally
viceroy also rendered priceless service t<> New Castile in a multitude of other ways; he
title of
deserves the
indefatigable and omniscient, and richly He built roads, the 'Peruvian Solon.'
to
and aqueducts and canals

principal
cities
convey drinking water to the

2
of
the viceroyalty.
set
He
established inns
and hospitals, and

gic points, so that
it
up regular military outposts at stratewas safe, for the firsi time, for merchants
highways of his
and
travellers to journey by the principal

3
domains.
He
fostered the lucrative culture of the cocoa

;
leaf in the
low hot valleys of the interior yet he took <rreat pains, at the same time, to put an end to the shocking maltreatment of the Indians who worked on the plantations. 4
The
welfare of the native was never absent from his mind
moreover, he realized that there were

profitably be utilized
many
;
features of the
ancient institutions of the days of the Eneas which could
and
preserved
some
of
of
his
most
native ideas.
happy regulations were inspired by a fusion 5 The "Memorial" which he

ra
Spanish and
for the in-
left
struction of his bui
at
his
them
as an
"authoritative text
"all
departure was regarded by book," and one of them

of
declared
disciples."
1
that
fl
future
rulers
Peru
all
were
but
his
And
pp.
del
yet
2.i2
f.
;
this greatest
.1.
of
/.
Philip's colonial
Zimpp.
I. E.,
I).
I.
I.,
viii.
T.
drl
'
/).
Medina.
8at
Ilixtnria
<!i
Tribunal
merman,
In
Jnnuixician dc I.iinn
1887, 2 vols.),
i.
M
166 f.
/.. viii. pp. 280 262; pp. 10 f. trkliim. Bittory of Peru,
Chile,
pp.
tion
47-55;
in
tht
H. C. Lea, The InquUi8pttnUh Depend mi

32.
TIh-
Memorial
122
it.
if
printed in D.
In
I'.
'/'
xxvi, pp.
161,
/.,
PP
1
516 563,
<l'l
lot
pp. Yircyet
%i,
Fu
Stptdioita
edd. II II Urteaga and I. una. 1926), p]

'
C a Romero
y .1 />;.
roiitni
at
i,
tf
::
pp,
31
han gnbernadn volume also Toledo'! laws), and in

(thia
Zimrwrmnn,
p, 11.
Beltrao
Roapide'a Coleeeion
dc lot
TOLEDO AND THE CROWN
219
administrators was deprived of his office without warning or reward. Though he had frequently asked to be relieved of but the his requests had been invariably refused his
post,
;
very fact that he
had been
so successful
had
at last aroused
the jealousy of his distant master, and in 1581 the viceroy of Mexico was suddenly sent down to Lima to supersede him. When Toledo got back to Spain, the king would not consent
to receive him.
accused and found guilty of having derived unlawful profit from his term of office, and in 1584 he died in his native town of Oropesa, broken hearted and worn out. Similar tragedies were to be frequently reenacted,
He was
with Philip's most notable European representatives as their the principal victims, in the closing years of the reign of
Prudent King.
story of Toledo's dismissal will serve as a salutary reminder of the all-important fact that Philip was quite as determined to keep all independent authority out of the
The sad
hands
of his subordinates in
America as
in Europe.
In
theory, the viceregal powers were fully as extensive during

Memorias
los
o Relaciones que escribieron Virreyes del Peru, i, pp. 71-107. A collection of similar memoriales left by the viceroys of New Spain is the Instrucciones que los Vireyes de Nueva Espaha dejaron a sus Sucesores (Mexico, Another great service which 1867). Toledo rendered not only to his viceroyalty and to Spain, but to posterity, was to order the famous cosmographer
translation, with notes by Sir Clements Markham, was also printed for the Hakluyt Society in 1907. It has been described as the "most reliable and authentic history of the Incas that has
and
navigator, Pedro Sarmiento de to write his history of the Incas, of which the second part, the only one to be completed, was discovered in manuscript in the library of the University of Gottingen in the beginning of this century, and first published at Berlin in 1906, with a learned introduction by Richard Pietschmann, in the Abhandlungen of the Konigliche Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften at Gottingen, phil.-hist. Klasse, neue Folge, vi, no. 4; an English
Gamboa,
yet appeared," but it is marred by the fact that it was written mainly for the purpose of vindicating the viceroy's conduct in executing Tupac Amaru, and therefore takes the stand that the king of Spain was the rightful sovereign of the country, and the Incas but usurping in a sense it may also be tyrants regarded as an answer to the pleadings In the introductory of Las Casas. epistle to the king, Sarmiento assures him that "the work done by your viceroy is such that the Indians are regenerated, and they call him loudly their protector and guardian, and your Majesty who sent him, they call
;
their father."
tion, pp. xii
f.
Cf.
Markham's
8.
transla-
and
220
the reign of the Prudent King as ever they had been in the days of his father; nay more, the viceroys were given by
Philip, either temporarily or permanently, certain rights
and
them in the New Laws. Such were the extraordinary powers with which they were
duties which had not been accorded
of peace with the native tribes,
invested in cases of rebellion, the authority to make treaties and the duty of maintaining
1
the royal supremacy over the tribunals of the Inquisition. Yet it would probably be a safe generalization to ay that the viceroys of the latter part of the reign were not actually so
strong in their independent authority as the earlier ones. Jealous though the Emperor had been of the aspirations
autonomy of his representatives across the sea, his son was vastly more so. Moreover, by the end of the century the colonial system was working sufficiently well to Spanish enable the Spanish monarch to give his jealousy effect. Long as was the journey from the mother country to Mexico
for
or to Peru in the latter years of the Prudent King, and likely as it was to be intercepted by the attacks of hostile corsairs,
it it
was shorter, more regular, and more frequently made than had been in the Emperor's day. There in fact, what
'service,'
might be charitably described as a

in the
and the king
could consequently keep in touch with his representatives
New World as his father had never been able to do. More and more meticulous were the instructions he sent out;
and
less
were the viceroys permit ted to settle matters on own authority; more and more were they Dinmanded to send home information and wait lor the royal orders as to
their
with the existing facts. The six interruptions, of the viceregal succession by the government already noted, of an audiencia, both in New Spain and New Castile, during
to deal
II.I
how
''i-li.T.
ministration,
pp.
19,
252
VictrtgalAdf. Recopi;
Utei&n
tit.
da
l.-.\
Ltyu
.
de
las
In/linn,
lib.
i.
xix,
xi, xii, xviii,
xix, xxi, xxix.
THE RESIDENCIA IN AMERICA
221
the reign of the Prudent King, though each one of them had its immediate origin in specific events and conditions, may, perhaps, taken together, be interpreted as an evidence that
Philip
strate that
to seize every opportunity to demonhe could, if need be, govern his transatlantic 1 dominions without the aid of viceroys.
was not sorry
most characteristic of all the methods employed by the Prudent King to keep watch on the doings of his representatives across the sea was the development during his 2 For the present purreign of the residencia and visita.
By
far the
poses it will suffice to describe the former, that is, the obligation incident on every official, from the viceroy down to the municipal corregidor, to continue to reside, for a specified
period after the expiration of his term of office, at the place where he had exercised jurisdiction, in order that all those
who
considered themselves to have been aggrieved
by any
of his acts or decisions
might
prefer their complaints before
The the person or persons appointed to receive them. visita was essentially only a residencia taken without notice
any time during the incumbency of the residenciado, and generally implying that things were not believed to be in good case. Philip, one of whose best qualities was a firm determination to see justice done to each and every one of
at
his subjects, attached great
experience had shown it 3 more than onerepressing the arrogance of ministers"; third of the laws on the subject in the Recopilacion de Leyes
de las Indias are
weight to the residencia, "since to be most necessary as a means of
from
his reign.
They bear eloquent
testi-
mony
to the excellence of his intentions, particularly in
regard to the treatment of the Indians,

1 Cf. Fisher, Viceregal Administration, pp. 26-32. 2 The main authority on these is
who were
to be given
Juan de Sol6rzano Pereira's Politico

Indiana, lib. v, cap. x. 3 Sol6rzano Pereira,
lib.
v,
cap.
x,
paragraph
14.
222
every chance to get their grievances heard. They reveal his willingness to work hard and long, and to take infinite pains
in order to secure his ends,
and
his desire
and expectation
as
that
his
subordinates
do
likewise.
But
it
the
system
actually worked in the
New
World,
probably produced
more harm than good. Dread of the oncoming test caused the magistrates to become timid, to act negatively rather
than positively, to seek at every turn rather to avoid giving offence than to take vigorous measures for the public good. Whether or no the dictum of Solorzano that good judges ran
more risk than bad ones can actually be substantiated, it is certain that the system tended to paralyze initiative, a defect which Philip would have been the last to appreciate. 1
Even worse was the waste of energy, money, and above all The number of officials employed in the taking of residencias was enormous, and their written re2 The period occupied by ports filled scores of bulky tomes.
of time involved.
the taking of the test evoked universal complaint, but nevertheless constantly tended to increase even Philip was obliged to admit the evil, and in 1582 he put forth a law that
;
all lesser officials should not exceed sixty days. 3 In the case of residencias of viceroys, however, he remained obdurate; nothing would induce him to set any time limit for them at all, with the result that a
the duration of the residencias of
became a synonym for eternity. "In the year 1589," writes SoWrzano, 1 "the visita of the Marquis of Villa Manrique, viceroy of Mexico, was committed to the
viceregal residencia
bishop of Thiscnln, and never ended

'.rzano
a1 all
and
in
vi.
in
the margin
1
1
Percira,
21.
lib.
v,
cap.
cap.
x,
wen- put forth

an- Leyee
iii.
the reign of Philip

xi,
paragraphs IS
l.'.rzuM.
v.
xiv, xx, xxi, xxiv,
Pereira,
<l<
lil.
v,
x.
nv,
in
xxviii,
xxxiii,
xxxvii, xl,
and
xliii
prph4.
opilaci6n
lib.
Leye$
</<
Uu
Indian,
Qthex important laws governing residencias which
v, tit. xv, ley xxix.
'<//<. the There are fortynine /. yea in this HI ulu de las residencias. * Lib. v, cap. x, paragraph 21.
EFFECTS OF THE RESIDENCIA

of the cedula or
223
commission of the same, there was written a note to the effect that this had happened because no time limit had been set, and that therefore it would be well to set
one."
this
was not advice was taken

it
But
until seventy-eight years later that

;
viceregal residencia to six
the law limiting the period of a months was not put forth till the
1
reign of Charles II in 1667.
The
and
its
residencia
conception of
its faults
was indeed the quintessence good government. He saw only

;
of Philip's
its virtues,
virtues under ideal conditions

as things actually
he refused to admit
worked
out.
There
is it
evidence
that his successors were far less enthusiastic for

Philip
than he.
fully aware of its defects, and wished to subsome other method of attaining the desired end and 2 Solorzano, whose great book was issued in 1629, dilates on
stitute
;
IV was
the evil effect of the appalling slowness of the residencias. "It is better," he declares, "to omit to ascertain and punish
some things than

it
to retard everything.
sovereign will
never cure his republic with such medicine, if it brings with greater ills and evils than those which it was intended to
remedy."
And even
earlier
than
this,
in
the reign of
Philip III, the Marquis of Montesclaros, who was viceroy of Peru from 1607 to 1615, drew his famous parallel between
and the little whirlwinds which commonly blow up in the squares and the streets, with no other result than to raise the dirt, filth, and other refuse there, and let it fall down again on the heads of the people." 4 It would be quite futile, in a book which attempts to cover
"these
visitas
as vast a field as does this, to describe all the other institutions in Spanish
1
America
at the close of the reign of

3 Solorzano Pereira, paragraph 22. i Solorzano Pereira, paragraph 19.
the
x,
lib. v, tit.
Recopilacidn de Leyes de las Indias, xv, ley i. 2 In Latin. The first Spanish edition came out in 1648.
lib.
v, v,
cap. cap.
lib.
v,
224
Prudent King. It must be remembered, moreover, that even the most important of them were but ephemeral they were all to be swept away during the era of the Revolutions. If one bears this fact in mind, one is likely to conclude that
;
the most notable achievement of the Spaniards in the New World was the conversion and civilization of the American
Indians
and
it
was
really in the reign of Philip II that this
work was
effectively begun.
The foundations
for
it
had
1
;
indeed been laid by the Catholic Kings and the Emperor but the Spaniards of those days had been so much occupied with exploration and fighting that they had little time to
Under Philip, on spare for the gentler sides of their task. the other hand, the Spanish colonial regime was definitely established, and the apostles of Spanish culture got their
first real
opportunity for effective work in the
New
World.
One is tempted, at first sight, to characterize their of operation as negative rather than as positive.
methods
One
is
staggered by the number of restrictions on 2 and the setting-up of printing presses, by the extent to
the sale of
books
of
which
of
clerics
were suffered to monopolize the conduct
instruction,
by the barriers placed in the way of the study the sciences, by the rigid control, through the monarchy
of the intellectual
and the church,

habitants of the
New
World.
development of the inThese inhibitions, however,
apply almost exclusively to what we should today call the higher education, and especially to the teaching of the chil-
dren of Spanish parents in the universities; moreover, tiny were but the counterpart of the regulations in force at the
Cf. Vol. Ill, pp. 662-664. Recopilacidn de Lcyes de las Indias, V. G. tit. lib. i, xxiv, leyes i-xiv Qucsada, La Vida Inlelectual en la
1
' F. Barreda y Laos, Vida Inlelectual cf. also de la Colonia, pp. 142-160 Irving A. Leonard, Romances of Chivairy in the Spanish Indies, with some
;
America Espanola (Buenos Aires, 1910),

cap.
i.
liegistros of
Shipments of Books to the Spanish Colonies (Berkeley, California,

1933).
EDUCATION
same time and
for the
225
in Spain,
same purposes
and
therefore,
in a sense, inherent in the transportation of
Spanish cultural What is really more significant for our ideals across the sea. that was made present purpose is the story of the progress at the other end of the scale, in the elementary instruction From the nature of the case, it was bound of the Indians.
and we only get occasional glimpses of but the efforts that were made to teach it here and there * the natives Castilian prove the eagerness of the king and
to be inconspicuous,
;
of his representatives in the
New World
to raise his trans-
atlantic subjects to the standards of European civilization. much was accomplished in this direction before Philip's
How
obviously impossible accurately to determine, though the history of the seventeenth century leaves no doubt 2 In this as in many other that much progress was made.
death
it
is
respects,
some
of the principal results of the reign of the
Pru-
dent King belong in the category of the imponderables.
be remembered that the group of islands in the Pacific in which the explorer Magellan had met his death, though situated well to the westward of the line of demarcation established by the treaty of Saragossa in 1529, had been
It will
by the Portuguese within whose waters they aomittedly lay but that in 1542 the Emperor had sent out an expedition from Mexico, which had further explored them, and had christened them the Philippines, in honor of 3 This expedition, however, had made the heir to the throne. no attempt to conquer or to colonize it had merely asserted
virtually neglected
; ;
a legally invalid Spanish title

1 Quesada, La Vida Intelectual en la America Espanola, pp. 43-45, 74-77. The insistence of the Viceroy Toledo
by
labelling the islands with a
(cf. ante, p.
of the doctrinas should
217) that priests in charge know the native
was principally a means to that ultimate end. ! Ibid., pp. 131 f. 8 Cf. ante, Vol. Ill, pp. 453-456 and map opposite p. 433.
dialects
226
Spanish name. The first serious effort to bring the archipelago under the dominion of the Spanish crown was not
made until twenty-two years later, in 1564. The change of rulers and the pressure of affairs
in
Europe
an- perhaps adequate to explain this long delay; but when Philip got back to Spain after the conclusion of the treaty
of
Cateau-Cambresis in 1559, he at once took up the problem of Spain's possessions in the Pacific. It seems natural to assume that the chief consideration which impelled him
to
do so was the prospect that he might some day be able to
realize the
dream
of his ancestors
by reannexing the kingdom
and thus acquire its dominions across the seas. the time was not yet ripe J for the title of King Obviously Sebastian could not be impugned, and Philip was not the
of Portugal,
man
to act without legal justification.
On
the other hand,

of an
;
the Portuguese
monarch had already given evidence
instability which augured ill for a long duration of his reign there was no prospect of a lineal heir, and if the opportunity to act should suddenly arise, it would be of inestimable
advantage to the Prudent King to have an established base in close proximity to the Portuguese dominions in the Orient. At any rate, on September 1M, 1. Philip sent orders to
">.">!),
Luis de Velasco, the viceroy of New Sp in, to organise and send "in an expedition for the discover} of the islands of the " West, hazia los Malucos," but enjoined him to be particuOn larly careful not to trespass on Portuguese territory.
1
the
.-.tine
day the king

in
then residenl
ing
also wrote to certain Augustinian Mexico, named Andres de Trdaneta, desir:,
accompany the expedition in the capacity of chief The reason for this choice was the fact that navigator.* rdaneta bad made a reputation for himself as a mathematito
I
him
cian
1
and cosmographer before he turned monk, and had

.
n.
pp. 94-97.
Ibid., pp.
9&-100.
LEGAZPFS EXPEDITION
227
accompanied Loaysa's expedition to the Moluccas in 1525 and remained in the Orient till 1536. Urdaneta accepted in an interesting letter of May 28, 1560 moreover, it seems
1
;
to
have been largely in order to please him that the supreme command of the expedition was given by Velasco to Miguel Lopez de Legazpi, the scion of an ancient family of
Guipuzcoa, who had lived in Mexico since 1532
2
:
a wise
and
generous man, who apparently sold most of his own property 3 His in order to help defray the costs of the enterprise. armada consisted of two galleons and two pataches, "the
had been launched on the Southern Sea, and the 4 stoutest and best equipped"; they carried upwards of
best that
350 persons, comprising
soldiers, sailors, four
Augustinians
who accompanied Urdaneta

and
also a
in order to convert the heathen,
expedition was practically ready in the end of 1563, and lay at Navidad awaiting orders to sail but the illness of the viceroy, and a number of other
few servants.
The
delays of the typical Spanish brand, postponed

till
its
departure
November 21, 1564. 5 Good fortune accompanied the adventurers on the voyage out. They touched at the Marshall and Ladrones groups, 6 and solemnly took possession of them in the name of Spain.
they reached the Philippines they were generally received by the natives in friendly fashion, as soon as they
When
made
it
clear that
8
30, 1565,
1
7 On April 27they were not Portuguese. landed at Cebu, where Magellan had been they
D.
I. I.,
2d
ii,
ser.,
ii,
Ibid., p.
116;
cf.
also
pp. 106-109. The Philip-
y Vidal,
pine Islands,
*
p. 83.
30 Fermin de Uncilla, i, p. "Felipe II y las Islas Filipinas," in Ciudad de Dios, xlvii (1898), pp. 186;
Montero y Vidal, Historia General

i,
202.
6 Robertson, loc. Philippine Islands,
de Filipinos,
4
p 30.
ser.,
ii,
cit.,
ii,
p.
D.
I.
I.,
2d
p.
141
The
pp.
151 The 108 f.

; ;
Philippine Islands, ii, pp. 89 f. 5 A. Robertson, "Legazpi and J. Philippine Colonization," in Annual Report of the American Historical Montero Association, 1907, i, p. 149
;
Montero y
7
Vidal,
i,
p. 31.
Robertson,
loc. cit.,
pp. 151
ii,
f.,
and
119;
references there.
8
The Philippine Islands,

i,
p.
Montero y Vidal,
p. 32.
228

1
given an amicable reception;
there, in the centre of the
archipelago, Legazpi determined to establish his headquarters for the time being, and the discovery by one of his followers of an image of the Saviour, doubtless left there by
the expedition of Magellan,
2
was taken by
all
hands to be a
In fact, the only serious misfortune highly favorable omen. which the adventurers had thus far encountered had been
the desertion during the voyage out, on
of Captain Alonso de Arellano with the
November 30, 1564, 3 patache San Lucas.
hurried on ahead of the rest to the Philippines, where he took aboard a cargo of cinnamon. He had then hastened
He had
back to Mexico,
credit for
hope of gaining for himself all the the undertaking; and it was doubtless partly with
in the
the idea of checkmating his designs, ae well as in compliance with the orders which had been given him at his departure, that Legazpi, on June 1, sent back his flagship, with Fray
Urdaneta on board, to report what 4 Urdaneta and Arellano plished.

another at court
in Spain,
tun!
ahead; been accom-
finally encountered one where the former succeeded in
establishing his case, while the latter was remanded to .Mexico to be put on trial for his desertion. ion afterwards
also returned to Mexico, and died there, at the 6 He w one of the noblesl age of seventy, on June 3, 1568. and most efficient clerics in the annals of the Spanish Empire
Urdaneta
beyond the seas, and deserves a large share of the credit for the enterprise which led to the conquest of the Philippines.
Cf. ante, Vol. HI, p, 184. The bertson, l<>r. eft., r>. 152. fort around whioh the settlement was grouped w.is dedicated to the 'name of Jesus' in honor of the discovery of
thin
1
of.
Haring,
'
Trade and Navigation,
p.
144.
J). I. I., 2d ser., ii, p. 222; The Philippine Islands, ii, pp. 105-107; Robertson, loc. dt., p. 151. H. H. Bancroft, History of Mexico,
ii,
imngo {Thr
I
.
/'
/-/"'"
Islands,
itself
it
ii,
pp. l-'" sailed Ban

led
The settlement
Miguel,
the D.
is /.
"because
8]
/.,
was was
his
ii,
;
600.
on
n":
I'
day [May
2d
of
ser.,
today the town of Cebu
D. /. /., 2d ser., pp. 222 f., note; Montero y Vidal, i, p. 33. Cf. also the Ufeof Urdaneta in the Bncieloptdia Vnivcrsal Ilustrada, lxv, pp. 1400 f., and
reference!
ti.
LEGAZPI IN THE PHILIPPINES
229
Meantime
in the archipelago
Legazpi and his followers
were wrestling with the usual problems incident to the occupation and settlement of newly acquired lands. He
maintaining discipline among his own men the example of Arellano had made many of them insubordinate, and severe punishments were necessary to hold
had some
;
difficulty in
them
to their allegiance.
There was
also, curiously
enough,
and expeditions to the neighborbut for the ing islands had to be organized to obtain them the natives phowed themselves friendly and willing most part
great scarcity of provisions,
;
to
supply the newcomers' needs.
Ships passed back and

1
forth several times in the course of the next three years be-
tween the archipelago and New Spain, and Legazpi was particularly rejoiced when, on August 30, 1568, two galleons appeared from Acapulco with troops, munitions, and They arrived, indeed, in the nick of time for in supplies.
;
the very next
month
a Portuguese squadron
came
across
from the Moluccas with the purpose of forcing the Spaniards After trying unsuccessfully to effect their to withdraw.
ends by persuasion, they had recourse to arms, attempting to blockade the port of Cebu and destroying the villages of those natives who had befriended the Spaniards. Nothing, however, was accomplished by these means, and after three
months the intruders
retired.
The Spaniards were
also
much
occupieo with the repulse of piratical attacks from the native At the same time they made corsairs of Borneo and Jolo.
steady progress with the exploration and conquest of the Two expeditions were larger islands of the archipelago.
sent south to
Mindanao, rather for the purpose of obtaining cinnamon than of making a settlement; and Panay, where
1
letters
cf.
ship left the Philippines to carry to Philip on July 1, 1568 The Philippine Islands, iii, pp. 29,
:
2 Accounts of this affair by Guido de Lavezares and Legazpi are given in The Philippine Islands, iii, pp. 30 f..
33.
44-46.
230
the Datives were generally friendly and willing to be in-
structed
in
the Christian faith, was brought under Spanish

in
domination
L569.
however, proved the problem of gainUntil it ing possession of the northern island of Luzon. in Spanish hands, the conquest of the should be definitely archipelago could not be regarded as complete; and in the
serious,
Much more
party of 120 Spaniards and a few native auxiliaries commanded by Martin de Goiti, Legaspi's campspring of L570
a
was sent out to reconnoitre. 2 Legazpi's grandson, 3 Juan de Salcedo, who had come out from Mexico in 1567, at the age of eighteen, and whose gallantry was afterwards
mast
rr.
to give
him the name
of 'Cort6s of the Philippines,' also
accompanied the expedition. Guided by a Moslem pilot, they reached Manila Bay, and at once perceived its advanthey were also received at ces for the founding of a city first with great friendliness by the two local rulers, Soliman
;
and Lacandola.
ous.
As soon
security
named, however, proved treachernewcomers were lulled into a sense of he attacked them unawares, but fortunately the
first
The
as the
Spaniards were able to beat him
off,
ing the offensive, to capture a fort In the course of these operations evidence Dear by.
and afterwards, assumwhich he had erected
was
found that the natives had been aided in their resistance by Since it was obvious that the task of conthe Portuguese. 4
would demand large reinforcements, the ( Vbu. Spaniards after some further reconnoitring returned to During their absence a letter hud been received from Spain,
quering
Luzon
>M
'Tli
of the
/i/..
Vi'tol.
i,
p. 36.
nut.-;
it
Afonten V Vidal.
i,
p. 34,
makes
ird
oonqu
in
contemporary aooounl inonymoua.

the Archivo del Bibtidpp,
1
1568.
printed
Filipino,
-Irui.iti.
iv.
:7.
mil,
in
in
.
Tht
Philii
Inlands,
iii,
'At least bo Montero y Vidnl. i, in p '{<>; I <:m find no evidence of it the official contemporary account aa given in The Philippine Islands, iii,
pp. 78
104.
in.
pp.
HI
Bo Tht Philippine Inlands,
p. 73,
MANILA
bringing the royal confirmation of Legazpi's
1
231
title of
governor
and captain-general, and establishing his authority in his He was occupied at the moment with the new domain. of a city at Cebu, and with the conversion of the founding natives there but the conquest of Luzon was of still greater importance, and so an expedition, under Legazpi's command, consisting of twenty-seven vessels, large and small, carrying 230 arquebusiers, was speedily organized, and
;
left
on Easter Monday, April 16, 1571. After touching at Masbate and Mindoro on the way, Legazpi 2 When the natives knew that reached Manila on May 16.
for
the
north
the governor had come with his entire force to settle the land, 3 but Legazpi soon they burnt their villages and took flight
;
succeeded in getting in touch with them, and on discovering that he proposed to treat them well if they would recognize
his authority, the majority soon decided to give
him
their
rajah Soliman, indeed, continued to stir allegiance. up trouble, but Goiti and Salcedo put down every insurrection. Meantime, on June 3, Legazpi "gave the title of city
to this colony of Manila,"
The
whose name he left unchanged 4 and on the twenty-fourth he formally erected it into a
;
municipality
after
the
traditional
cabildo, alcaldes, alguaciles,
and
Spanish pattern with moreover he anregidores

;
nounced that
accordance with his Majesty's desire, he would give lands and repartimientos to those who wished to 5 settle there. In the course of the next year, Goiti and
in
Salcedo brought most of the rest of the island under subjection. The Augustinians labored hard at the task of converting the natives, while Legazpi was chiefly occupied with the important matter of establishing and regulating com1
The
1
The Philippine Islands, iii, pp. 62-66. letter is dated at Madrid, Augaccount
in
Philippine Islands,
3 4
iii,
p. 153.
Ibid., p. 153. Ibid., pp. 173 Ibid., p. 155.

f.
ust 14, 1569.
Contemporary
The
232
mercial relations with the Chinese,

large
whom
he had found
in
numbers od
his arrival,
anxious to get
away from the Portuguese.
and whose trade he was most He died on

both by the natives
August and by
20, 1572, universally respected

his
people, one of the most attractive of Spanish empire builders, whose preference for peaceful rather than warlike methods stands out in agreeable contrast to the
policies of
own
most of the conquistadores in the New World. the death of Legazpi the government of the Philippines devolved upon his faithful lieutenant and camp-master,
On
(Juido de Lavezares, who had first visited the archipelago with Villalobos twenty-nine years before, and who had been
acting as governor of
Luzon.
Cebu while Legazpi was conquering Further progress was made in the conquest of the
small islands during the three years of his rule, but the most notable events of that period occurred in connection with hie
The Spaniards were convinced dealings with the Chinese. 2 that China possessed fabulous wealth; they therefore facilitate their own trade with it, to strove their hardest to
the prejudice of the Portuguese, who naturally did their utmost to prevent them. In an account of the Philippines
which Lavezares sent back
to Philip
(
from Manila on June 29,
1573, he writes that "last year

city to trade,
Ihinese vessels
came
to this
them not to tea) and commit other depredations, so that these people wonder no1 a little if this be true. As the reatment accorded to the Chinese neutralizes these reports, more vessels came 3 Even this year than last, and each year more will come."
t
and told us how the Portuguese had asked trade with us, because we were robbers and came
dfl
Bbforga,
II.
i.
.i
The Philippine
Stanley, pp.
p. 70.
-'l
i,
lf.
;
print"'! in Archivo del Biblidfilo Filipino,

i
bind*,
ir
ii
Men
the
lnl,
'
pp. 47-80. Thi Philippine Islands,

also
iii,
p.
182.
carta-relaci&n
written
by
is
Domingo de
Salazar in 1590, which
Cesareo Fernandea Armada Espahola, iii, pp. 69 f.

(
'f-
Duro,
LAVEZARES AND LI-MA-HONG

more important than the governor's
233
direct efforts to encour-
age commercial relations between the Philippines and the Celestial Empire were the services which he rendered to
both by his defeat of the famous pirate Li-Ma-Hong.
This
savage corsair, Chinese Emperor that he no longer felt safe on the shores of Asia, had determined to found an empire of his own in the
Philippines,
who had made
so
much
trouble for the
and
in
with a huge
colonists.
1
fleet
November, 1574, he appeared off Manila and an army of soldiers and prospective
by far the best
had, was absent
soldier that the Spaniards with a large force, on an expedition farther north against Yigan, and the pirate's first assaults on Manila were only repulsed with great difficulty.
Salcedo,
at the time,
But before Li-Ma-Hong could return to the attack with larger forces, Salcedo got back, and with his aid Lavezares defeated the invader, this time decisively, so that Li-MaHong, abandoning
himself
in his efforts against Manila, sailed
away
to the northward, in the
hope
of establishing a base for
Pangasinan.
Salcedo, however,
pursued him
with a
fleet,
besieged him
in the fortification that he
had
erected on the shore, and finally (August 3, 1575) completely routed his forces, so that the pirate, after murdering most of his men that remained alive, took flight, half
famished, in a small canoe, and never ventured to molest the Spaniards again. It was a notable triumph, which
greatly enhanced the reputation of Spain in the Orient, and a fitting culmination of the career of Juan de Salcedo,
to
the victory was chiefly due. He died March 11, 1576, of a fever, on his encomienda in Luzon, at the early age of twenty-seven, a striking exception to that
decline of the fighting prowess of the individual Spaniard is generally observable in the period of Philip II,
1
whom
which
Fern&ndez Duro, Armada Espahola,
iii,
p. 56.
234

of such
1
and was
ish
ominous portent
for the future of the
Span-
Empire.
In August, 1575, Lavezares resigned his functions to Francisco de Sande, alcalde of the audiencia of Mexico, who had
and
in
been sent out by the crown as governor of the Philippines, six other royal representatives succeeded him in turn
that office before the death of Philip II.
2
We
have no
-pace to go into the individual
achievements of each of these
men, but a few general remarks may not be out of place. Their tenure of office was usually quite short, on the average
less
than four years, considerably less than the actual, if not legal term of the viceroys of New Spain and of New Castile and its shortness is but one more of the innumerable
;
evidences of Philip's perpetual fear lest his representatives in dominions so remote would tend, if allowed to remain long
at their posts, to get out of hand,
their
and
strike out along lines of
own.
There
is
also a significant alternation of the
man of action and the constitutional administrator, of the soldier and the letrado, which may be taken as an evidence
that Philip now regarded the conquest as virtually complete, and that consequently, in the Philippines as in the New
World, he was tending to replace the conquistadores with men Che fact of Less daring and greater dependence on himself.
that he
became sovereign of Portugal and her dominions in 1580 relieved him from the fear of attack from his original
Santiago de Vera, was de facto governor Damariflas was the Philippines. assassinated by the Chinese in October, 1603, and his son Luis took charge mini June 11, 1595, when a new governor. Antonio do Morga, arrived fn.ru Morna, in turn, was succeeded Spain. June I, L600) by Train iseo Tello de
of
1 Mi.m.-p. y \ i.i.'il, i, pp. 70-79; Fern&ndet Duro, Armada K*i><i?iola, ".". iii. pp 60. I'll' was followed in April, L680, Qonxmlo Ilonquillo de Peflalosa, l.y who died in March, 1583. In May,
16H4.
p.
10,
tin-
fii>t
audieneia
(cf.
Wlow,
'2'.l[>)
Pere
arrived, and lasted till May, whoa a new governor, Qdmee Dasmaru me nut with an
it*
i.f
Quanta, who held office till May 8, 1598, when the audiencia was reestablished
vr
period
for
suppression. During the the tudieneU its president,
Cf.
01.
A.
de
pp.
Morga,
op.
cit.,
THE AUDIENCIA OF MANILA

rivals in the Orient.
235
from English and not become serious until after Dutch adventurers, which did his death, he and his representatives were henceforth free to Save
for the peril
devote themselves wholly to the problem of dealing with the natives, and with their neighbors in the adjacent islands
and
in
China and Japan.
Another noteworthy evidence,
likewise paralleled in the
New
World, that the era of con-
quest was regarded as past, and that of assimilation to the Spanish Empire begun, was the establishment, in May, 1583, 1 It was set up as a of the first royal ar liencia of Manila. result of advice to Philip from Gonzalo Ronquillo, who had been sent out as governor to replace Sande in 1580, and died it was composed of a in the Philippines in March, 1583 three oidores, and an attorney-general, but it led president,
;
a very checkered existence in

1590,
its
early years.
of the
In
May,
Gomez Perez Dasmarinas, one
most notable
governors the Philippines ever had, brought out with him a 3 decree for its suppression, but after his murder in 1593 it was set up again, and continued, without interruption, till
from the archbishop of Manila, written in 1624, assures us that the reason for its reestablishment was the king's fear "lest in regions so remote the governors might
1898.
letter
and there can be little doubt that he The ups and downs of the early history told the truth. at Manila were also closely connected with of the audiencia
become too absolute,"
Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias, The Philippine ii, tit. xv, ley xi vi, pp. 35-44. Islands, v, pp. 274-318 ' Montero y Vidal, i, pp. 88-94; C. H. Cunningham, The Audiencia in the Spanish Colonies as Illustrated by
1
lib.
4 The date of the decree for its reestablishment as given in The Philippine Islands, ix, pp. 189-192, is November in the margin of the Recopi26, 1595 lacidn de Leyes de las Indias, lib. ii, tit. xv, ley xi, it is given as May 25,
;
the
5
Audiencia of
Manila (Berkeley,
1596.
raised,
Ibid.,
5
1919), pp. 48-55.
The number of at the same
the oidores was time, to four.

p.
The decree
Cf.
1589.
pp.
op.
is dated August 9, The Philippine Islands, vii, 141-172, 208-211; Cunningham,
and Cunningham, p. 78. The Philippine Islands, ix,
191,
note 28.
cit.,
p. 71.
236
the development of the relationship between the Philippines and the viceroyalty of New Spain. The authorities at Mexico
a
never ceased to look upon the archipelago as forming
part of their
own domain, and

it
resented any measure which
tended to give
considered
independence.
the
The audiencia
such
at
Manila
independence and with that of New Spain, so that the respects coequal two bodies regarded one another with hostility from the
itself
symbol
of
in all
vi
tv
first.
the side of exploration and relations with the adjacent Oriental powers, the last twenty-five years of the reign of the
On
Prudent King witnessed numerous proofs of the mounting In the Philippines themprestige of Spain in the Far East.
selves the
most
significant event of these years
was the
attempt to conquer and subdue the Moros of Mindanao, who had not yet acknowledged the authority of the Spanish crown. This task was undertaken in 1506 by a captain
named Esteban Rodriguez de Figueroa, as a private enterprise at his own expense the king in return gave him the title
;
of governor,
and
full
possession of the island for two lifetimes,
2 He left Iloilo provided he could accomplish his purpose. in April with a force of 214 men. and landed at Ulana Bay,
where he was generally well received

attempting to penetrate inland, he
l>\
natives; but on
into an
was
slain.
As
his
ambush and Juan de Jara, was unable camp-master,

fell
to carry
through the conquest without reinforcements, the government at Manila sent nut Juan de Honquillo with a
force
.f
loo
men
to help him.
Meantime
the
Moros made
every preparation to
island of
hostile to the
1
resist, ami sought aid from the small farther south, whose inhabitants had been Ternate
Spaniards since the days of Magellan.

cit
i,
,
Hut
iii,
<
tanningham, op.
|.p. c7
70.
nindea
p. 66,
Dun.,
Armada BtpoHokti
there.
tdal,
108;
Per-
and
referei
DEFEATS AND VICTORIES
237
Ronquillo defeated the ships that were bringing over the enemy contingent, and was well on his way to the subjugation of
Mindanao, when he unaccountably lost heart, and, availing himself of an authorization received from Manila before the government there had been fully apprised of the victories he had won, abandoned his post and withdrew with
all
his troops.
Though he was
officially
acquitted
by
court martial on his return, the consequences of his conduct were lamentable in the extreme. It encouraged the Moros
and
also the natives of the adjacent island of Jolo, all of
whom
were on the point of submitting to Spain, to persist in their struggle to maintain independence, and necessitated a number of subsequent expeditions and the loss of many lives, to complete the conquest of Mindanao during the ensuing
2
years.
impressive were the demonstrations of Spanish power in the lands and islands beyond the limits of the Many of these were made possible by embasarchipelago.
sies
More
from native rulers to beg support against hated
rivals,
the
same
sort of situation as the Spaniards often utilized
to their
World.
against Span; h expedition to that island, and the recognition of 3 Spanish authority by the ruler whom it restored to power.
own advantage in North Africa and in the New Thus an appeal from the king of Borneo for aid a brother who had dethroned him led, in 1578, to a
Requests for support from the king of Cambodia against
enemy, the king of Siam, brought Spanish troops to the mainland in 1596, and again in 1598; but though they greatly impressed the natives by their valor, they gained no
his
Montero y Vidal, i, pp. 108-115. *Ibid., pp. 139 ff., passim. 3 Cf. contemporary accounts in The
1
ruler was more dethroned by
restored
apparently
his
once
Philippine
Montero y
Islands, iv, pp. 148-303 The Vidal, i, pp. 82-84.

;
Portuguese aid, in reinstated again

iards.
brother, with 1581, only to be the by Span-
'JivS

efforts
full
1 Constant permanent advantage. subjugate the Moluccas and gain
were also made to
control of the spice
These began with a large expedition sent out at but the climate, the consistent Philip's command in 1582 of the inhabitants of Ternate, and the tradition of opposition
trade.
;
Portuguese hostility, which was kept alive till long after the annexation and evinced itself in native conspiracies and plots
stirred
up by Portuguese agency, prevented the full realizaand caused the deaths of many gallant men; moreover the reign was hardly over 2 before the Dutch appeared to challenge the Spanish claims.' With Japan there was an inconclusive and somewhat ridiction of these projects in Philip's day,
ulous exchange of communications.
The Japanese emperor
demanded that the Spaniards
in the Philippines unreservedly themselves to be his vassals, and was with diffiacknowledge culty persuaded that they had no intention of so doing.
The Spaniards
(
Ihristianity
Manila were equally determine^ to bring to Japan, and despatched a number of Franat
;
ciscan friars for that purpose
but as both sides were resolved

3
to maintain trade relations with one another, their political
and
All
religious divergencies
did not lead to
any
fighting.
these items go to prove that the Philippines had now become a solid outpost of the power oi Spi in in the Pacific.
them was no longer in any doubt. They were henceforth to be a base whence Further expeditions
Her
ability to hold
could be sent forth, and whither could repair for aid.

I
1
all
Spaniards
in
the Orient
hiring
all
the period of conquest and colonization the
work
it
onverting the Datives went steadily forward.

1
Indeed,
pp. 90-98.
tin-
M
121;
'i.
Vi.lal.
i,
pp.
101-105,
Munt.ru y
\ did,
fur
Yidal.
i,
IIS
PernAndM
iii,
Duo,
i.
Armada
01
i, l>
example,
r.-mnanU
in 1596.
pp
I >
1
L36 150.
of the expedition of
L86,
Mendafla
Vldal,
1
r-
pp. 8.5-88, 98; \rma<ln fftjmrflftfa,
and Montero y Vidal,
108.
p.
64
f.
MISSIONARIES IN THE ORIENT
239
would probably be safe to say that the missionary activities of the early Spaniards in the Philippines were even more
vigorous and extensive than those of their compatriots in the New World. The Augustinians, as we have seen, were the
first in
the
2
field,
and down to 1577 had

first
it all
1
;
to themselves.
In that year the

Jesuits
;
Franciscans arrived
in 1581 the first

3
and six years later, the first party of Dominicans. There was naturally keen rivalry among the different orders
in the Philippines
for the glory of
making the largest number of converts, not and in the adjacent islands, but also only in China, which was visited by the Augustinians in 1575 and by the Dominicans in 1590 but the Jesuits resented the arrival of these newcomers as an invasion of their own domain, and in 1595 succeeded in putting a stop to it. They
;
managed to limit the monastic rivalries in the Philippines by having each of the different regions in the archialso
moreover, they perpelago allotted to a separate order suaded their general, Aquaviva, to erect the Philippines into a 'vice-province,' and to place one of the ablest of their
;
Antonio Sedefio, at the head of it. 4 In the PhilipIts mempines the society might be seen at its very best. bers showed none of the unscrupulousness that gained them
leaders,
evil name in Europe they devoted themselves effectively and wnole-heartedly to the accomplishment of a noble task. They were not satisfied with merely eliciting from the natives formal acceptance of a faith which they did not comprehend.
an
They sought
to instruct
them not only
to understand the
tenets of the Christian religion, but also to live cleaner

"Entrada
* 5
and
6
better lives, and to practise the arts of a higher civilization.

1
Cf.
anonymous
de
la
Ibid., pp.
76
f.,
90, 107.
Seraphica Religion de nuestro P. S. Francisco en las Islas Philipinas" in Archivo del Biblidfilo Filipino, i, no. 3. 2 The Philippine Islands, iv, p. 316, note 46 Montero y Vidal, i, p. 85, note.
;
the viceroys of Mexico is said to have remarked that "in every friar in the Philippines the king has a captain-general and an entire army." Jose Burniol, History of the Philippines
of
One
Ibid., p. 89.
(Manila, 1912), p. 85.
240

progress of the archipelago during the last
The
two decades
of the sixteenth century
was
economic point of view.

fettered
(
and rapid from the The era of restrictions such as had

also steady
'atholic
Spanish-American commerce since the time of the Kings did not become fully operative in the Philip-
pines until the seventeenth century, though the direct trade of the archipelago with South America was apparently for-
bidden
while three years later that with Mexico was limited to two ships a year, neither to exceed 300 tons
Itefore 1590,
burden, a foretaste of what was to come. 1

ranos,
Corsarios Lute-
the ubiquitous pest of the Spaniards in America, were mostly out of the picture here. A richly laden Manila galleon was captured, indeed, off the western coast of Mexico,
in
November, 1587, by Thomas Cavendish, who. after disposing of his booty and burning his prize, continued calmly
on across the Pacific, through the Philippines, and eluded 2 but with this not ible excepattempts to intercept him
;
all
tion,
the archipelago in this period
was
practically undis-
turbed by European sea-rovers. The colonists, moreover, were determined to prevent their happy lot from being ruined
king to consent thai a tenth, instead of the accustomed fifth, of the gold collected in the Philippines be appropriated by the
t
by royal exactions.
In ]~>V) they persuaded
!:<
'Town, and that the natives be exempt from all payment. 3 They were also desirous of uprooting the Portuguese tradition
enslaving the Filipinos, and their representations procured a royal order that no one be permitted to make new slaves, that the children of all existing slaves be born free,
(1
|"
and thai any -lave should be

at a price to
HnririK.
purchase his freedom be fixed by the governor and the bishop. 4

.-ill
owed
to
Tradt
life
and
Navigation,
in
mffironow there.
The Spaniards
91.
p, vi,
called
pp
f.
h-
of
Cavendish
the
V of Xational Biography,
and
him 'Cm. lis.' 'Montero y Vidal, i. p. Montero y Vidal. i, The Philippine Islands,
'
92;
pp.
also
157-
PROSPERITY OF THE PHILIPPINES
241
Altogether one derives the impression that at the end of the reign of the Prudent King the Philippines were 1 There had been none of the both prosperous and happy.
revolting slaughter at the time of the conquest which stained The the institution of Spanish rule in Mexico and Peru.
advance
commerce and civilization had been easier and more rapid. Natives and colonists were generally content, and as yet virtually undisturbed by the advent of European The archipelago had been acquired with far less rivals. effort than the American lands, and it appeared that correspondingly little work would be necessary to hold it and to
of
European civilization. It exemexistence of plifies the contrast between the slacker, easier life of the America of the Orient, and the more strenuous today, and makes a pleasing exception to the generally far less fortunate conditions which obtained in the rest of the
raise
it
to the standards of
Spanish Empire at the time of Philip's death.

and vii, pp. 141-172. Manila was erected into an episcopal see by Pope Gregory XIII in 1581, and raised
233,
to the rank 1595. Three
of
an
other
archbishopric in bishoprics were
founded in the Philippines before the death of Philip II. Cf. Gams, Series Episcoporum, pp. 113-115. Fermfn de Uncilla in Ciudad de Dios, xlvii (1898), pp. 201 f.
'
242

It Beems unnecessary to enumerate again those standard sources and Becondary authorities on the Spaniards in America and the Pacific
which have been listed in the bibliographical notes to Chapters \.\\ II-XXX in Volume III of the present work. The following, however, which are of special interest for the period under review,
may
be added here.
principal contemporary accounts of the struggle " various between fche Spanish and French in Florida Relaciones," " " and " Cartas " of Menendez de Aviles, the Memorialea the " Memorial of Gonzalo Soils de Hera's, and the " Vida y Hechos de " are to be Pero Menendez de Aviles by Bartolome' Barrientos in Eugenio Ruidfaz y Caravia's La Florida, su Conquisia y found Colonization por Pedro Menendez de Aviles (Madrid, 1893, 2 vols.), and in Genaro Garcfa's Dos Antiguas Relaciones de la Florida Mexico, but the)' have been so carefully analyzed and compared by the 1902) late Woodbury Lowery on pp. v-xv of his Spanish Settlements within
Sources.
The
the Present Limits of the
United States, Florida, 1562-1574
(New York,
scarcely seems worth while to discuss them here. The most important original materials that have been published since
1905), that
it
tr. and ed. Papers-, vol. Priestley (Deland, Florida, 1928), and Colonial Records of Spanish Florida, tr. and ed. Jeannette Thurber Connor (Deland, 1925-30, the first deals with the unlucky expedition of 1559-61, and 2 vols.) the second contains some material on Menendez d< Aviles during the
Woodbury Lowery wrote

I.
are
The Luna
EL
last four years of his life.
The Dcpcches
of
M. de Fuiirquevaux,
ed.
Cedestin Douais (Paris, 1896-1904, 3 vols.), are of capital importance In South for the story of the reception of the news in Europe.
America Pedro Sarmiento de Gamboa's lli.-tory of the Incas and Baltasar de Ocampo's Execution of the Inca Tupac Amaru are useful
for the history of
Peru; both were admirably edited,
in translation,
with DOtee and an introduction, by Sir Clements R. Markham for the Hakluyt Society in 1907. Markham translated Ocampo's work from
a manuscript in the British
Museum, and Sarmiento's from
the
first
edition of the text, published with introduction and notes by Richard :n at Berlin in 1906. Roberto I.evillicr's La Audiencia de
Choreas,
for
(Madrid. 1918),
Correspondent in de Presidentes y Oidores, torn, is a notable collection of documents, and
i,
1561-79
valuable
is
many other purposes besides that indicated by its title; and his Audiencia de Lima, torn, i, 1549-64 (Madrid, 1922), is also useful. The Relaciones de los Vireyes y Audiencias que han gobernado el Peru
243
(Lima and Madrid. 1867-72, 3 vols.) and Ricardo Beltran y R6zpide's Memorias o Relaciones que escribieron los Virreyes del Peru, torn, i (Madrid, 1921), are likewise indispensable for the matThe most important sources for the ters with which they deal. of the Philippines in this period are to be found in volumes iihistory edd. Emma Helen ix, xv, xvi, of The Philippine Islands, 1493-1898, in volumes Blair and J. A. Robertson (Cleveland, 1903-09, 55 vols.) and in the Archivo del Bibliofilo iii of the D. I. 1., 2d series; ii and Filipino, Recopilacion de Documentos, ed. W. E. Retana (Madrid, 1895-1905, 5 vols.). Most of what is given in Spanish in the last two of these collections appears in translation in the first, and a great deal more besides, particularly on constitutional, economic, and religious conditions, and the prefaces are also valuable; still it is often worth while to examine the originals. The standard contemporary history of the period is that of Antonio de Morga, Sucesos de las Islas Filipinas (Mexico, 1609; later edited by Jose Rizal, Paris, 1890, and
Coleccion de las
E. Retana, Madrid, 1909). This is too brief to be of much value I have before the death of Legazpi after that it is indispensable. a used the translation of H. E. J. Stanley (Hakluyt Society, 1868)
W.
appeared in The Philippine Islands, 1493-1898, The Discovery of the Solomon Islands by xv, xvi (Cleveland, 1904). Alvaro de Mendana in 1568, edd. Lord Amherst of Hackney and Basil Thomson (Hakluyt Society, 2d series, no. vii, London, 1901, 2 vols.), is a useful translation of original Spanish narratives of Mendafia's expedition; and Zelia NuttaU's New Light on Drake (same series, no. xxxiv, 1914), Joan de Castellanos's Discurso de el Capitdn Francisco Draque, ed. Angel Gonzalez Palencia (Madrid, 1921), and Martin del Barco Centenera's heroic poem Argentina y Conquista del Rio de la
later
translation
Juan Maria GutieBuenos Aires, 1912), show the attitude of the Spaniard of Philip's day toward the English sea-rovers. The two volumes of Woodbury Lowery, The SpanLater Works.
Plata, in twenty-eight cantos (Lisbon, 1602; edd.
rrez
and Enrique
Pefia,
ish Settlements within the Present Limits of the
United States,
1513-
1561
(New York,
1901),
and The Spanish
Settlements within the Present
Limits of the United States, Florida, 1562-1574 (New York, 1905), supersede everything (including Parkman) that was previously written on the subject, and are destined to remain the standard authority
for
many years to come. For South America, volumes ii and iii of Diego Barros .Arana's Historia Jeneral de Chile (Santiago de Chile, a 1884-1902), Ricardo Levene's Lecciones de Historia Argentina, 4 ed., i
tina,
(Buenos Aires, 1919), the Manual de Historia de la Civilizacion Argenordenado por R. D. Carbia, i (Buenos Aires, 1917), and H. C.
244
are
Lea's The Inquisition in the Spanish Dependencies (New York, 1908) all standard works. Useful monographs of a more special nature
are Paul Groussac,
Mendoza y Garay, Las Dos Fundaciones

;
Aires, 1636-1680, 2 ed.
Los Llmites
1892)
;
de,
la
de Buenos (Buenos Aires, 1916) Alejandro Audibert, Antigua Provincia del Paraguay (Buenos Aires,
SpanishEnrique Rufz Guinazu, La Magistratura Indiana (Buenos Aires, 1916) V. G. Quesada, La Vida Intelectual en la America Espahola durante los Siglo* A 17. XVII. y XVIII (Buenos Aires, 1910); Felipe Barreda y Laos, Vida Intelectual de la Colonia (Lima, 1909) J. T. Medina, El Piloto Juan Ferndndez (Santiago de Chile, 1918) and Georg Friederici, Alvaro de Mendana: Die Entdeckung der Inseln des Salomo (Stuttgart, The only modern work on the Philippines which deserves 1925).
Lillian Estelle Fisher, Viceregal Administration in the
American
Colonies
(Berkeley,
California,
1926);
serious consideration
is
the
Historia General de Filipinas by Jose*
Montero y Vidal (Madrid, 1887-95, 3 vols.). Many of its statements are unsupported by any trustworthy evidence, and it is very careless
matters of chronology with these reservations, however, it may be used to considerable advantage. The names of many other works of too special a nature to be listed here will be found at the appropriate places in the footnotes.
in
;
40
CHAPTER XXXIV
SPAIN IN WESTERN EUROPE,
1559-78
two story of Spain's foreign policy during the first around the decades of the reign of Philip II revolves chiefly
The
development
of her relations
while the course of
withJEngland and with_Jxance, her dealings with these two nations is

f
at all times powerfully affected by the fluctuations of the struggle for the maintenance of SpanisiL.jaithQritîn_jfche
Netherlands.
The Low
Countries,
as has
already been
Western Europe during the I observed, were second half of the sixteenth century and though no part of
the focal point of
;
them attained recognized independence till long after the to period covered by the present chapter, it will be clearer them in connection with Spain's foreign affairs than treat of to consider them, where they perhaps more logically belong,
as a part of the internal problems of the Spanish Empire. that is, the Taking the period in question as a whole
twenty years that elapsed between the return of Philip to Spain in 1559, and the assumption by Cardinal Granvelle
of the post of chief minister in 1579
it is fair
to say that
the dominant principle of the Spanish monarch's foreign the policy was to avoid aggressive action, and to preserve
he was content to maintain that attitude of 'sturdy def ensiveness which had been recommended to him by his father. In matters of religion, So deep there was indeed a somewhat different tale to tell.
status quo
;
politically speaking,
'
was the
offered
king's detestation of heresy that
an opportunity to suppress
245
it,
whenever he was he found it next to
246

;
1559-78
and so close was the fusion of impossible to hold his hand religion and politics in the period under review, that a blow
for the faith for the
was often
difficult to distinguish
from
move
aggrandizement
of Spain.
But on the whole, oaring
the
He
lish
half of his reign, Philip did not play the aggressor. asked nothing better than to leave his French and Engfirst
trouble for
neighbors alone, provided they would forbear to breed him and to imperil Catholicism by concessions
Certainly
heretics.
he contemplated no further con-
quests at their expense. There were of course

esting to observe, as the
many
ebbs and flows.
It
is
inter-
how
t
closely those ebbs
character of
ries.
\\
panorama itself, and flows corresponded with the the successive administrations of the Low Coun-
gradually unfolds
Spain's relations with
hen Philip's representatives there were conciliatory, England and France, if not cordial,
were at least tolerable

in
arms, there were echoes of the conflict both in
in Paris.
We
shall
whenever the Netherlanders were up London and therefore do well to begin our investiga;
tion of this complicated period with an examination of the
state in which Philip
left his
Burgundian dominions when he
departed for Spain in 1559.

preliminary observations are indispensable in order to enable the modern reader to envisage the problem of these Burgundian territories as it presented itself to the Spanish
long;
extent.
in
Two
and the
first
is
is
So Largely
concerned with their geographical the interesl of the period concentrated

is
the
Low
which
Countries, thai one

Philip
likely to forget
thai the
landtori
had
inherited
from
his
Burgundian
deluded not only the seventeen provinces of the Netherlands, corresponding roughly to modern Belgium
of
and Holland, bul also the Free County
Burgundy
to the
THE NETHERLANDS AND FRANCHE COMTE

southward.
247
The two
blocks of territory were separated
by
many miles, and a journey between their respective capitals, in the sixteenth century, occupied an average of fourteen or The administrations of the two holdings had fifteen days. drifted steadily apart under the Emperor, and were now, for
1
all
practical purposes, separate.
It is true that the
monarch's
representative in the
Low
Spanish Countries was also in

;
theory chief ruler under the crown of Franche Comte but as that representative continued to reside in Brussels and
never visited Besancon or Dole, his practical importance in the county was almost nil, and his functions passed to the 2 On the other hand, one cannot royal agents on the ground.
afford to lose all sight of the southern holding while one
more dramatic events in the Netherlands. If administratively speaking they had now, for all practical purposes, fallen apart, they had their roots in a common past. Many of the great houses whose scions were to play
studies the
prominent
roles in the approaching struggle in the Low Countries traced their origins back to Franche Comte. The Granvelles came from Besangon, and William the Silent
inherited the
Orange from that of the foremost family in the county, whose last direct descendant was his elder cousin, Rene, slain before St. Dizier in 1544. Moreover, Franche Comte was an indispensable link, a military
of
name
route for the passage of Spanish troops to the seat of trouble in the Netherlands and it was, finally, a reservoir from which Philip was able to draw both funds and supplies
;
wherewith to put down the rebellion in the North. Though we shall hear of it infrequently in the succeeding pages, we cannot afford to forget its existence.
In the second place
it
is
essential that the reader

*
be
iii,
1 Lucien Febvre, Philippe II et la Franche-Comti (Paris, 1911), pp. 69-71.
Ibid.,
f.
pp.
71-75
Forneron,
pp. 390
248
1559-78
reminded that the only picture Europe which was available
of a Spanish as
a
dependency in model and guide for
Philip II at the time that lie took over the reins of governhis father was the picture of the Spanish dependencies in the Mediterranean and in Italy. The only
ment from
overseas possessions which Spain had thus far held in Europe were the Balearic's, Sicily, Sardinia. Naples, and Milan, the
three of which had been acquired by the realms of the crown of Aragon before the days of their union with Castile,
first
the fourth at least partially so, while the fifth had fallen in 1 The methods by which during the period of Charles V.
they had been administered varied somewhat, of course, in detail, according to local conditions and traditions;'- but,
1
mutatis mutandis, one
may
safely say that the guiding prin-
ciple had been increasingly, throughout the list, that of tinestablishment and increase of monarchical authority, at the
expense of every local custom or institution which ran The application of that principle, moreover, counter to it.
had been considerably intensified since the union of the crowms. It was an integral part of the process of CastilianiaIt was ing Italy to which reference has already been made.
the essence of the political atmosphere
life
in
which Philip's
in dealing with
bow, Burgundian dominions, he could possibly have been The experience of the next expected to follow any other. to prove thai the Net hcrlanders century was conclusively
it
was lived; and
is
difficult to see
his
would not submit

tries
to
what the Italian- had been willing to
put up with, that the geographical position of the
bow Counany
of
made them
far
harder to handle than
the
of
Mediterranean dependencies, and. above all, that the pow< v Protestantism in the North destroyed every remaining
1
Cf
a<it'.
'The
course
Vol III. pp. 268-272. traditions of Milan wen- of rather Imperial than Spanish;
it
(.uui'.t
same
class
be regarded as quite in the with Sii-ily, Sardinia, and
Naples.
THE ITALIAN ADMINISTRATIVE TRADITION
249
ground for regarding them as parallel cases. But when we consider the task which the Emperor had bequeathed to Philip and the nature of the instructions which he had left
behind, we can scarcely be surprised that the Spanish monarch at the moment of his accession was practically blind to
the
is,
first
two
of these considerations
as for the third, that
Low Countries, it the increasing power but constituted in his eyes another and most cogent reason
of heresy in the
for following the traditional policy of absolutism
and supThere can be no reasonable doubt that the image pression. of Spain's Mediterranean and Italian dependencies, particularly Naples and Milan, in the state in which they had
been handed over to him by his father, exercised a powerful influence in the determination of Philip's policy and methods
regard to the Netherlands ; and that consideration should serve at least to mitigate the severity of the judgments we pass upon him, when we look back upon the tragic history
in
of
Spain in the
Low
Countries from the vantage ground of
the knowledge and experience of the twentieth century.
On
of his
his departure for Spain, Philip confided the regency
Burgundian dominions, which Mary of Hungary had in 1555, to his half-sister, Margaret of Parma, then in her thirty-eighth year. She was the illegitimate
laid
down
child of the
Emperor Charles
and the
by the daughter
;
of a cloth-
weaver
of Flanders,
first
been spent in the
Low
Countries
eleven years of her life had but in 1533 she had been
sent off to Italy to be married,
(February 29, 1536) to Alessandro de' Medici, and then, after his assassination a few months later, to Ottavio Farnese, the grandson of Pope
first
Paul
III. By these two unions she had become deeply involved in Italian politics, and particularly in the interminable questions arising out of the conflicting claims to
250
SPAIN IN
WESTERN EUROPE,
1559-78
Parma and Piacenza.

France
in
the recent
Her husband had allied himself with war in order to enforce what he regarded
officially reconciled
aa his rights there,
and though
with the
Hapsburgs
regent in
in 1556,
was
one of the reasons

the
why
by no means satisfied ^ indeed Philip had selected Margaret as his

still
Low
Countries was his belief that her desire to
obtain
full
realization of her husband's territorial ambitions
would induce her to place herself unreservedly at the At the time that disposal of the government at Madrid. she took office there her point of view was do Longer native
in Italy
1
but foreign.
She was,
the king.
in fact, a living
She had even forgotten how to write French. and present reminder of many of
the characteristics of which the inhabitants complained in Her intellectual and administrative gifts were
neither attractive nor brilliant, she
by no means remarkable.
but
able for one
Hard-working and methodical, was not compar-
moment
with either of her two great predei
sors.
hands.
But the power was by DO means exclusively in the regent's Officially, indeed, she was invested with all the
authority inherent in the king himself; but ecrel instructions obliged her, in all matters of importance, b> take the
advice of
committee
of three persons, oi
whom by
far the
important was (iranvelle; Convulta, by which this special committee boob came
nwt
the Spanish
name,
to
the
be
ex*
known,
:
is
t<>
at
once indicative of the work which

a
it
was
were
perform and
significant
trio
comment
composed
still
B
it
Philip's
all
\va\
.i
doing things.
at
The
official
that
members
theory
of the old Council of State, which

least,
remained, in
the regent; advisory body But practically the outwardly nothing had been changed.
the
of
V.,1
ili.
III
p.
880.
'..
Cf. also
Rarhfdhl, Margarelha von Parma, pp.

17
ff.
PfawoM,
pp.
Ud
P.
Pirenne,
iii,
pp. 383
ff.
PHILIP
AND MARGARET OF PARMA
251
Consulta usurped all the functions of the Council, whose other three members, Egmont, Orange, and Glajon, were simply elbowed aside, until they became, by the force of
events,
plan, in other words,
of the
the leaders of the national opposition. Philip's was to Hispanicize the government
Low
avoid
revolution.
Countries by stealth, in order, if possible, to He was determined to subvert their

liberties,
most cherished
both
political
and
religious,
to
reduce them to a state of subjection to the home government comparable to that of the Spanish dependencies in Italy
;
but he desired, if possible, to achieve his end without a fight. He hoped to conceal the true meaning of his policy from the
watchful eyes of the Netherlander themselves, by leaving
the outward fabric of their ancient form of government
untouched, and accomplish his

1
own ends by working under
ground.
was an impossible programme, as the sequel was to show. The differences between Philip and his subjects were
It
deep seated, at least in those portions of his Burgundian dominions where religious grievances were superadded
far too
be settled otherwise than by the arbitrament of war but revolution did not really break out during the regency of Margaret of Parma. The period of her rule was that of indispensable preparation for the scenes of bloodshed
to political, to
;
that were to follow
viewed by
itself,
is
A serving peace. able to the fact that Philip, at Margaret's advice, made certain reluctant concessions to the popular demands. He
permanently abiding by them but as it immediately became evident that the Netherlander could
but the outstanding fact of it, when that the government succeeded in prelarge measure of this success was attribut;
had no intention
of
1 E. Gossart, L' Etablissement du regime espagnol dans Pirenne, iii, pp. 384 ft.
les
Pays-Bas, pp. 25
ff
252
SPAIN IN
WESTERN EUROPE,
1559-78
not be hoodwinked into passive acquiescence in his policy of Hispanicization, there was no other alternative if he was
not prepared to fight. The first of these concessions was the sanctioning of the departure of the last detachment of
the detested Spanish tercios (January 10, 1561); another was his decision, three years later, to recall Granvelle, whom the opposition regarded as the source of all their woes with;
out his support, the Netherlanders w ere convinced that the much more pliant Margaret could be induced to grant them
r
their desires.
this
(
That
Philip
was
willing to grant as
much
as
an evidence of the predominance at the time of Ruy iumez and the peace party in the Royal Council at Madrid 2
is
;
but there were other points on which the king showed himcomplaisant, and it is significant that it was in matters religious that his hostility to compromise was most
self less
did the 'placards,' or edicts, against all forms of heresy, a legacy from the days of his fat er, increase in severity and scope there were also ominous innovations.
manifest.
1
Not only
1559, before his departure for Spain, he had obtained from Pope Paul IV a bull erecting fourteen new
In
May,
bishoprics in the Netherlands over

ones.
and above
to these bishoprics
'int-
The
right of
vested in the king,
was appointment who would obviou>K nominate with a

moreover the measure had an important
view to his
own
ends, and regardless of the claims of the

;
Burgundian nobles
bearing upon the political situation, for the new prelates would all have seats in tin- States-( leneral, and constitute
thr nucleus of a monarchical party there.
Mission after
new
<
mission was despatched to Madrid to protest against tins departure, and, above all, to demand the removal of
rranvelle,
1
who was popularly supposed

; .
to be responsible
de
pp. 36 ff. Phflippton, Knrdinnl (irtinrrlla, pp. 11 1 'Pimm*, iii. p. 409. The Dokl of
Gossart,
VmUMiMtmmd,
Alva was furious at the king's leniency.

Cf.
i,
Corratpondance
Philippe
II,
p. 272.
OUTBREAKS
for it
;
EST
THE NETHERLANDS
253
retire,'
the
but though Philip in 1564 'permitted the Cardinal to new bishoprics continued without change. 1
The bitterness caused by Philip's religious policy was much increased by the fact that at the very time that he
succeeded his father the guidance of the heretical party in
the Netherlands passed from Lutheran to Calvinist hands. The doctrines of the Genevan reformer had made their first
appearance in the
Low
of the Emperor's reign.

;
Countries during the closing decades They slipped in at first almost
unperceived but once they had got a foothold, they gained ground with astonishing rapidity. They were eagerly seized upon by the urban capitalistic centres, to which the
implications of Calvin's economic teachings were particularly the progress of the French Huguenots was welcome
;
before long the more passive Lutherans were simply elbowed aside, and the programme of the heretics in the Netherlands became aggressively mili-
another element in their favor
(i
tant.
in the
town
In October, 1561, there was an heretical outbreak of Valenciennes, which required the use of regular
it
troops to put
until the
down
and from that time onward the
dis-
content, though sometimes
day (April
the regent
'Beg.rars,'
when
latent, grew steadily stronger 1566) of the famous interview with the petitioners were given the name of
5,
come.
which was to be their rallying cry for years to Margaret, on this occasion, showed that she appre-
and the need of comShe promised to present to the king the requests of promise. his subjects, and to moderate, pending his reply, the severity
ciated the seriousness of the crisis
of the 'placards.'
3
For a moment
;
it
seemed possible that
Philip would
but the prospect of royal concessions, instead of allaying the excitement in the Netherlands,
also yield
1
>Pire Pirenne, ' 'Pire Pirenne,
iii,
iii,
pp. 397 ff. pp. 357, 411-425.
'
Pirenne,
iii,
pp. 439
ff.
254
1559-78
served only to augment it. congregations, and lashed

against
Preachers harangued excited
them
the
existing
regime.
paroxysms of rage There were outbursts of
into
ioonoclasm and desecrations of churches. 1
Before long it became evident that some of the revolutionists would not
be content with liberty to exercise their own faith, but were even intent on the destruction of Catholicism. Such a
programme as this was, of course, totally inadmissible, even to the somewhat temporizing nature of the regent at the
;
news of the revolt of the iconoclasts she nominated the Count of Mansfeld as governor of Brussels, placed herself under his protection, and soon succeeded, with his help, in
first
2 regiments of soldiers in the Empire. There was fighting, in the first three months of 1567, outside Antwerp and Valenciennes, and the government was every-
collecting
several
where victorious. 3
Margaret was
alive to the
danger of
pushing her triumph too far. She fully realized that the rebels were too much in earnest to be permanently discouraged by a few
trifling reverses
;
and she wrote to Philip
urging him to seize the moment of his victory as the psychological opportunity to be generous to the defeated foe. 4
But
Philip had
.ious concessions
no intention of taking her advice. His had been bui temper uv and reluctant
;
he w&s re.-olved that the liberties of the Netherlands should
rushed under the heel of Spain, and above all that every The events of the vestige of heresy should be obliterated.
that
years of Margaret's regency had convinced him these ends could not be attained by subterfuge and
lie
it,
deceit, as
deplored
1
had originally hoped, and that, much as he He had, strong measures were indispensable.
ton Parma,
'
Rartifahl,
Margarctha
Cinfwart,
Bernardino
loriot,
lit),
i,
dc
Mcndoza
Comen-
pp. pp.
1
lSjfT.;
4!
iT
L' Etabliaaement,
fT.
caps, xv, xvi.

i,
Kcrvyn de Lettenhove, Lea Hugueet lea
Rachfohl
pp. 206
nola
Oueux,
pp. 468
f.
POLICY OF MARGARET OF PARMA

in fact,
255
taken the
first of
these measures in the

of
autumn
of
1566,
when he ordered the Duke
Alva to repair to Lom-
bardy and conduct to the Low Countries the Spanish troops 1 On the 9th of the followwhich were concentrating there.
ing August the vanguard of his tercios arrived in Brussels, and four months later the regent departed for Italy, leaving 2 the terrible Duke as her successor in title as well as in fact.
contrasted with the regencies of the Emperor's day, the rule of Margaret of Parma seems a troublous period, and it certainly saw the sowing of the seeds of future mis-
When
but compared with that of the Duke of Alva which followed, it appears as a time of tranquillity and peace. Such at least was the light in which contemporaries regarded Save for the few who knew the whole story, the domiit.
eries
;
nant fact of the situation was that, though Philip had been offered grievous provocation, he had not yet really shown
his teeth. It served to strengthen the impression, already
prevalent
among
his fellow sovereigns, that,
if
possible, the
Spanish monarch was determined
to avoid war.
course of the relations between Spain and France during these same years (1559-67) is difficult to characterize So complicated were the issues involved, so in brief space.
The
bewildering the interaction of religious and political motives, so numerous the dramatis personae, and so quick the shifts of
scene, that consistency in the following out of
any
logical
policy practically out of the question for either of the two courts. The situation, in other words, was such as
was
an admirable opportunity for the exercise of Renewal of the his talents for concealment and intrigue.
offered Philip
1
Alva's
first
1,
commission was dated
December
January
1566, and was replaced on 31, 1567, by a much more
Correspondance de Phirigorous one. lippe II, ii, pp. 600-602, 619-622.

2 Pirenne, iii, pp. 460 f. iv, p. 8 Rachfahl, op. cit., pp. 258-267.
; ;
256
1559-78
Hapsburg-Valois conflict as it had been in the Emperor's day was now out of the question the disrupted state of France rendered it impossible for her to wage it, and unneces;
The real question in the sary for Spain to undertake it. eyes of the Spanish government was how much profit could
\
be made, by diplomacy and
craft,
out of the
civil
and
reli-
gious struggle on the soil of its ancient foe. As befitted long-standing enemies who had but recently made peace, the rulers of France and Spain were deeply distrustful of
cisely
to be preinformed about the ongoings at the other's court, and

if
one another.
Each was determined
anxious,
possible, to exert influence in the other's councils.
The method used by
Philip to attain these ends in France was a far-reaching system of political espionage, first installed by the Duke of Alva when he repaired to Paris, after the treaty
of
to Elizabeth of Valois,
Cateau-Cambr6sis, to represent his master at his marriage and later developed and perfected by
Thomas Perrenot de Chantonnay, the younger brother of Cardinal Granvelle, who was the ambassador of the Prudent
from August, 1559, to February, 1564. On the other side, the queen-mother, Catharine de' Medici, who, after the death of Henry II in July, 1559, gave the French government such measure of continuity as it was to
King
at Paris
possess for thirty years to come, expected that her daughter Elizabeth, who was finally sent south to her Spanish husband
in the winter of 1559-60,
would soon have his full confidence, and send home all she learned; it was also hoped that she would be able to influence him in a way favorable to France.
on her departure, was furnished with a magnificent wardrobe and all manner of appliances for increasing
'1
lie
princess,
her charms and rendering her attractive to Philip;

1 C. S. P.. Foreign, 1668-59, p. 442; Forneron, d .\fonluc, p. 483.
but
ill
i,
pp. 218, 290; Courteault, Blaiae
SPAIN
AND FRANCE,
1559-60
257
these carefully laid plans of the queen-mother were brought to naught by the attack of small pox which Elizabeth suffered
it impossible shortly after her arrival, and which rendered for her husband to have anything to do with her for several
months
to come.
When
at last Elizabeth got well,
up her duties as queen of Spain, it was expected to forget the land of her birth and become solely devoted to that of her adoption. Such a shift of allegiance cost her many a pang, and rendered but under the circumstances in which her mother furious 2 At the she found herself, there was no possible escape.
able to take
clear to her that she
;
and was was made
outset, then, everything
seemed to promise that the power which Philip would be able to exercise in France would far outweigh any influence which the French government might
be able to exert in Spain. Only in the Low Countries was the Spanish power really vulnerable, and the possibilities of
that region were as yet unrevealed.
During the
brief reign of Francis II (July,
1559-Decemin the
ber, 1560) the
queen-mother was temporarily
back-
ground, and the government was controlled by the two uncles of the king's wife, Mary queen of Scots Francis, In matters Lorraine. Duke of Guise, and the cardinal of
religious their policy
was wholly
in accord with the views of
but he cherished a grudge against them because 3 of their achievements in the recent war, and he was in mortal terror lest they should manage to effect a permanent union
Philip II
;
of
France and Scotland.
He
did not venture to express his
views openly, for opposition to the Guises would mean dalliance with heretics but there can be no doubt that
;
during the year which succeeded the treaty of CateauCambresis there were several occasions on which he secretly
1
Forneron,
i,
pp. 217
ff.,
and
refer-
ences there.
* Ibid., i, pp. 221, references there. a Cf. ante, pp. 11 f

.
315-318,
and
258
SPAIN IN
WESTERN EUROPE,
1559-78
hoped
John Knox, the Lords of the Conin England, gregation, and of those who supported them and it is certain that he was greatly relieved by the news of
for the success of
the conclusion of the treaty of Edinburgh (July 5, 1560), whose object was to prevent the annexation of Scotland to
however, the whole situation was suddenly changed by the death (December 5, 1560) of Francis II, the consequent elimination of tin ( buses from the
France.
1
Six
months
later,
as regent for Charles IX.
government, and the return thither of Catharine de' Medici Philip's fears for Scotland were
entirely allayed;
now
but
the peril of Protestant gm, to
which the queen-mother showed herself alarmingly tolerant. loomed larger than ever before. And it was not merely by
the danger that heresy might become definitely established and recognized in France, intolerable though that would be.
There was also every prosthat Philip's fears were roused. pect that the contagion would infect his own lominions in
the Netherlands and threaten
the subversion of his
own
authority there.
As
early as August 9,
1560, while the

in
Guises and
their policy of peace
were
still
the saddle,
Granvelle had written (ionzalo Perez that with things in the state in which they were in France, it was a miracle that
matters were no worse
in
the
Low Countries; 8 what then
be expected with Catharine de' Medici in power? Obviously at all cost- the Reformation must be put down, land from the beginning of the year of 1561 Philip bent all
was
t<.
his effort- to that end.
of bribery
however, took the form of a vast campaign and intrigue; on no accounl did Philip propose At he outset he attempted to be dragged into open war. turn against Catharine de' Medici a project which she had
These
effort-,
Fom<Ton.
t
i.
.
pp, 122
fT
(
224
vii,
ff.,
and
177.
i.
'
Corrcspondancc
I'M.
d*
Philippe
U'
refprrnrv>n
li-r>-
Froude
pp
p.
I'M
304
211
PHILIP
AND ANTHONY OF BOURBON

:
259
once favored for the purpose of embarrassing him

a plan to prevail
namely,
upon him
to give
up
to
Anthony
of
Bourbon
the Spanish portion of Navarre.
There had been, as we
have already seen, some doubts as to the legitimacy of the methods by which Spain had acquired that territory in the * the emperor's instrucdays of Ferdinand the Catholic tions and 'political testament' contained passages which
' ;
'
might be interpreted to indicate that he had conscientious 2 there was a possibility that scruples about retaining it
;
Bourbon's case was, at Philip might take the same view. least, sufficiently strong to put the Spanish king in a very embarrassing position if he refused to give it consideration
;
and it was in the hope of causing him such embarrassment But Philip utilized the situathat Catharine supported it. He knew that Bourbon was both tion to his own advantage. vacillating and imprudent, and that his Protestantism was
no proof against his desire for personal aggrandizement; and for the next two years he negotiated with him, tantalizing him with offers, not indeed of Navarre, but of Sardinia,
of Tunis,
and even
of the Balearics in lieu of
it,
in the
hope
of to take vigorous measures for the defence 3 These projects were all suddenly of Catholicism in France. terminated by Bourbon's death, October 26, 1563, as a result but the fact that of wovnds received at the siege of Rouen
;
inducing him
had consented to 'receive instruction in the Roman Catholic faith, from a teacher recommended 4 to him by Jesuits, and that in the following May he had published a proclamation expelling all Huguenots from
before March, 1562, he
1
'
Cf
ante, Vol. II, pp.

i,
345-347
also
Forneron,
i,
p. 260,
and references
iii,
Forneron,
there.
1
.
pp. 230-233,
Ill,
and references
;
there;
Giovanni
Michiel
i,
Alberi, Relazioni, serie
(1561) in pp. 435 f.

;
pp. 406 ff. V., ii, pp. 360 f. Laiglesia, Estudios, i, p. 117; Archiv f&r dsterreichische Geschichte, xciii, pp.
;
Cf ante, Vol. Armstrong, Charles
Michele Soriano
145; pp. 131
4
(1562),
ibid.,
iv,
p.
J.
W. Thompson, Wars
f.,
and references Thompson, p. 132.
of Religion, there.
237
ff.
260
1

gives reason for believing that
if
1559-78
the unworthy sovereign of French Navarre had continued to live, he might well have become a pensioner of the king of Spain.
Paris,
Another
affair,
which began
in 1562,
it
and continued
for
several years to come,
though
ultimately effected little
save to augment the suspicion and distrust of Catharine de' Medici toward the Spanish government, is too characteristic
of the
methods of Philip II to be entirely omitted. This was the attempt of the Prudent King to take advantage, for his own purposes and for the advancement of Catholicism, of
the vanity and sensitiveness of Blaise de Monluc. That gallant but unmanageable old soldier, "the real creator of
had been deeply aggrieved by the inadequate fashion in which his services to the French crown had been rewarded. He was also convinced or at least that the position of the church was to be pretended gravely imperilled by the policy of toleration of heresy on which the queen-mother had embarked. In October, 1562, the rumor was current that he was planning to deliver the whole of Guienne into the hands of the king of Spain. 2 The person who was doubtless responsible for turning his thoughts in this direction was a certain Captain Felipe de Bardaxi,
the French infantry,"
sition in 1558,
as a heretic l>\ the Spanish Inquibut had escaped to France and got employment in the army of Monluc. His valor and skill won him
who had been condemned
the confidence of his new chief, with whose character and cupidity he soon became acquainted, and it occurred to him
nake use of the situation in which he found himself for
the advantage of Spain, and as
Of his
3
own
P.,
fortunes.
opportunity, for this
a means to the rehabilitation was prompt to profit by the Philip was just the kind of undertaking that
no.
107.
C.
S.
Lfl
Porno*,
1562.
471. 483;
it.
C. 8. P., Foreign, 15fi2. DO.

9.
ff.
ect.
1
( 'ourteault,
Blaise de Monluc, pp.
'
Courteault, pp. 4X4
-1
BLAISE DE
MONLUC AND BARDAXI
261
appealed to him. Its conduct was placed in the hands of Bardaxi's cousin, Juan, one of the army of secret spies which
King maintained in France and it is characteristic of Philip's methods of procedure that his regular ambassador at Paris, Chantonnay, was kept totally in the dark in regard to the whole affair. Though no document has been found to prove it, there can be little doubt that Monluc became a pensionary of the Spanish monarch from the very moment that his attitude was known. He had a secret interview with Juan de Bardaxi at Toulouse in February,
;
the Prudent
sent Philip a long memorial dilating on the many advantages that would ensue from Spanish intervention in
1564.
He
Southwestern France, and Philip replied with an elaborate letter in which he begged Monluc to continue to inform him,
Damville, the new governor of Languedoc, could not possibly be induced to participate in a Catholic
and to see
2
if
uprising.
At
this juncture proceedings
were suddenly
inter-
rupted by a summons to Monluc to return to Paris to face accusations of treasonable correspondence, put forward by
the secret agents of Catharine de'
Medici. Quite chardenied all the charges that had been acteristically, flatly made, nay, even demanded that his traducers be punished,
he
and Catharine, who had

a publ
;
many
it
scandal, thought
to
reasons for wishing to avoid wiser, under all the circum-
She even consented to go the motions of a trial of the chief of his accusers. through
stances,
accept his word.
Meantime Monluc shamelessly continued his correspondence with Philip and Bardaxi, and in a letter to the last named, written October 27, 1564, put forward the plan of a meeting between the Spanish monarch and Catharine for the discussion of a joint
programme
for the suppression of heresy in
France.
1
Such was the

i,
first
suggestion of the famous inter2
Forneron,
p. 299.
Courteault, pp. 486, 488, note
1.
262
1559-78
view which was to take place, June 14-July

1
4,
1565, at
Bayonne.
The
idea of such an interview
had been cherished by the
queen-mother ever since her daughter Elizabeth had been 2 If she could induce the sent south to marry Philip II.
Spanish monarch to pay her a formal visit on French soil, it would proclaim to the world that her authority was firmly established, and that she was regarded as a real bulwark
Roman Catholic church. It was doubtless these very same considerations that determined Philip not to go, and his resolve was confirmed at the last moment by a report that reached him of a threatened renewal of the ancient alliance between the government of France and the infidel
of the
Turk.
On
the other hand, the queen-mother's invitation
offered
lect, to
him an opportunity, which he could ill afford to negextend his own influence in French affairs he there;
fore sent his wife Elizabeth
sent
It
him at was a strong combination.
and the Duke of Alva to reprethe interview which Catharine had proposed.
The queen-mother's
passion-
would induce her to do everyto please her daughter Elisabeth, who had thing possible now become so completely Hispanicized that there was no danger that she would be too complaisant. Alva had
ate devotion to her children
already proved himself equally compel enl

intrigue,
at
bullying and
and knew
4
well
which method to
select in order to
al-
attain his ends.
The
instructions they received dealt

affairs of religion.
most exclusively with the

propose
a
They were
of
all
to
'holy alliance' of the two governments againsl
their heretical subject-
and the elimination

'Exoerptt
90.
ministers
Courteault,
M:in>'j..i in
i'p
lb7
iv.i
from
Alva's
letters
to
i.
Lavine,
p.
vi, l, p.
rncron,
i,
32]
Briofa
Mnn-ks,
in tre printed Philip ftppendil d, pp. 418-421.
Foroeron,
ammenkunjt von liayonne, pp.

169
ff.
THE INTERVIEW OF BAYONNE
263
and counsellors who would not do their utmost to advance

the faith.
1
Catharine, on her side,
came
to
primarily political and dynastic. the preservation of her own authority, and that of her chil-
Bayonne with objects Her only real interest was

of the
dren
who should succeed

of attaining this
her
and one
most obvious
methods
ties
end was to strengthen the family the Valois and the Spanish Hapsburgs. She between
wished to marry her daughter Margaret to Don Carlos, and her son, the future Henry III, to Philip's younger sister
Dona Juana,
the
widow
of Prince
John
of Portugal.
But
The state neither of these schemes appealed to Philip II. of Don Carlos's health was a sufficient reason for refusing, at
that juncture, to consider
any marriage
for
him
in case
he
should get well there were other princesses

far better
matches
for
who would make him than Margaret de Valois. There
were also numerous objections, particularly in the matter of the dowry, to the union which the queen-mother proposed between Henry of Anjou and Dona Juana; and, finally,
Philip
was convinced that
his
own
position
was
so strong,
and that of Catharine, comparatively speaking, so weak, that he could well afford to insist on the 'Holy League'
which he had so closely at heart, without making any con2 cessions whatever in return. The Prudent King, moreover,
had by this time completed all his arrangements for keeping secret watch on Catharine and checking the results. Mon-
was at Bayonne, and in close touch with Alva so also was the new Spanish ambassador, Francisco de Alava, who had replaced Chantonnay in February, 1564, and had by
luc
;
The
is
Mariejol in Lavisae, vi, 1, pp. 90 f. best monograph on the interview still that of Erich Marcks, Die Zusammenkunft von Bayonne (Strasburg, Francois Combes, Ventre1889).
vue de
Bayonne
et
la
Saint-Barthelemy
(Paris,
question de la 1882), prints
some
i
interesting at Simancas.
documents preserved
pp. 194
ff.
Marcks, op.
cit,,
264
this
1559-78
time perfected the system of spies and underground
1 information which had been initiated by his predecessor. But Catharine was both wily and obstinate. She pretended
to be
amazed that
Philip should be so disturbed
by the
state
of religion in Prance; she was profuse in her promises to take vigorous measures against heresy as soon as it could be demonstrated that such measures were needed; but it was
impossible to pin her down to any definite engagement to Whenever Alva sought to bring act at a specified time.
the conversation to this point, she skilfully shifted it over Two w eeks of diplomatic to her own dynastic projects. had no other result than to convince each thrust and parry
r
party that the other was not to be trusted.
There were,
indeed, a number of affecting interviews, and suitable ex2 and these outward evichanges of courtesies and honors;
in the
dences of cordiality, coupled with a series of violent edict.-, ensuing wreeks, against the printers of Protestant
3
books,
made such an impression upon tin uninformed mass of the Huguenots, that a legend arose, which has not been wholly eradicated today, that the project which bore fruit seven years later on St. Bartholomew's day
at
originated
Bayonne.
But the
4
principals
at
the con-
ference were
not deceived.
Philip and
Catharine were
really further apart at the

SO
end of the interview from which had been hoped, than they had been when it much
events which took place
in
began.
the succeeding month-, neither of them, apparently, in any way connected with the
ForCourteault, pp. 483, 486 ff. neron, i, pp. 849 ff. Mirrka, pp. 192 ff. * Forneron, i, pp. 33<> f 4 The letter of Philip to Cardinal Pacheco at Rome (August 24, 1565),
1
;
Two
Combes's L'entrevue de Bayonne, might

be taken to indicate that the Spanish king deluded himself into thinking that he had got something out of the itt view for a couple of months after its but he cannot have deceived close;
t
which
is
printed on pp. 3949 of F.
himself
much
longer.
EXPEDITIONS TO FLORIDA
265
conference at Bayonne, are significant indications of the way in which the wind was blowing. The first, which has
need only be mentioned here, namely, the massacre, by Pedro Menendez de Aviles, in September, 1565, of the French Protestant colony on
been already described in
detail,
the shores of Florida.
The patent
or asiento authorizing
2
Menendez
of it
to undertake the expedition which produced this
tragic result
was dated March

is
20, 1565,
and the
first
rumor
which reached France
to be found in a letter written
just
two weeks later to Charles IX by Saint-Sulpice, his ambassador at Madrid, to tell him that it had been decided
to send
Menendez
to the shores of Florida with a good fleet
and 600 men to
fight the
It is true that the fleet
French and put them to death. 3 did not actually set sail until June 29,
at
;
when the conference
but the plan of had even been arranged
4 Bayonne was practically over sending it had been devised before the meeting
;
and though Spanish slowness delayed Menendez's departure until the meeting had been in session for a fortnight, the two events are to be regarded as entirely separate. There were justifications for the masin Spanish eyes at least, other than the mere fact sacre, that Ribaut and his companions were heretics for the Frenchmen were also trespassers on land that was indubi;
tably Spanish under the bull of Alexander VI and the treaty of Tordesillas but naturally this line of reasoning found no adherents among the Huguenots, who clamored loudly for revenge when the news was known. Catharine pro;
tested
and demanded reparation
but Philip's position was
too strong to
1
make
it
possible for her, officially at least, to

E. G. Bourne, Spain in America, 180 ff., and references there. Forneron, i, p. 340, wrongly puts the date of Menendez's departure in May.
pp.
4
Cf. supra, pp. 169-173.
1 *
Jean Cabie, , Ebrard, Seigneur de Saint-Sulpice, p. 364; cf. C. S. P., Foreign, 1564-65, no. 1168, sect. 4.
D. E.
I. I., xxiii,
pp 242-258. Ambassade de
266

1
1559-78
translate her words into deeds.
obtained
it
If vengeance was to be would have to be through private means.
Vengeance
suggests the
for the slaughter of Ribaut's colony naturally
Dominique de Gourgues, who sailed on his own responsibility from Bordeaux on August 2, 1567, accomplished his end, and was back in France on the sixth
of
of the
name
following June;
the story of that enterprise has
2 For the present we are chiefly already been fully told. concerned with another expedition, which departed from the
same port almost exactly one year earlier, and is generally understood to have been a retort to the Florida massacre this was the famous seizure of the Portuguese island of Madeira by Captain Peyrot de Monluc. 3 This restless
;
second son of Blaise de Monluc, found life empty and tiresome in France after the termination of the First
fighter, the
Civil
War by
He
longed to distinguish himself

there
the Pacification of Amboise (March, 1563). by some notable feat of

of his going as far as
arms, and cherished plans for a descent on the Portuguese in

Africa
car.
4
;
was even talk
Madagas-
him
Coligny, in his capacity of admiral of France, gave hearty support, in spite of Peyrot's sturdy Catholicism
;
but the king and the queen-mother were far more cautious, and it was not until the news of the Florida massacre had
been received that Peyrot stood any real chance of being allowed to put to sea. It seems doubtful, in fact, if he had
'Antoine, Marquis Da Prat, Elisa206-208; Forneron, i, Fourquevaux, Dipichcs, p. 341; ed. Douais, i, nos. 4 7, L5, 16, 19, 21, 23-26, 28, 29, 38, 43, 47. Fourquevaux's complaints of Spanish "longueur de ncpondre mix articles pai moy presentez" are very significant. Il<hoped to get something out of Eboli, but was toll "quo ['ordinaire de ceste court est de proceder lentcment <n toutes chores." Dtptchea, i, p. 116.
beth de Valois, pp.
*
Cf. E. Falgairolle,
l'tlc
"
Une
i/
expedition
fmncaise a
in
do Maderc en 1566,"
moires, 1894,
Academic de Nimes
P. Gaffarel, "Peyrot 67-95; Monluc," in Ran* hiatoriqur, ix, pp. 495-497. 273 -332; Courteault, pp. 4 GafTard in Revue historique, ix, ff. In the spring of 1566 there pp. 291 was a prospect that he would be sent
pp.
to the Baltic to aid

of
Denmark
;
Cf. tupra, pp. 177
f.
cden doned.
King Frederick II against King Eric XIV of but the plan was soon abanIbid., pp. 300-304.
PEYROT DE MONLUC AT MADEIRA

jj
267
any
definite idea of
where he was going before
April, 1566
but his plans took shape rapidly in the succeeding weeks,

possibly as a result of the representations of two members of a family named Menin, well known in Guienne, one of whom
had suffered on the sea at the hands of the Portuguese, while the other had been taken prisoner by the Spaniards in
Florida,
his tale
and brought back by them to Madrid, where he told to the French ambassador, Fourquevaux. It would
seem natural to trace the connection which indubitably existed between the Florida massacre and the expedition of
1 At any rate, Peyrot to the activities of these Menins. Peyrot's plans were sufficiently well known, in the weeks
before he set
sail,
to elicit vigorous protests

2
from the Por-
It would appear that tuguese and Spanish ambassadors. he had made private arrangements to be joined, directly after he left Bordeaux, by a squadron of sixteen English
vessels, which, together
with the seven that he furnished

to twenty-three. 3
himself, brought his
armament up
Cruis;
ing southward, the expedition encountered violent storms when it came in sight of Madeira it was short of water and
supplies
;
solely with the idea of replenishing its stock it
4 But the inhabitants, doubtless because put into the port. of the rumors of the expedition which had been circulated for
months
tion to conquer the island.
it was Peyrot's intenWithout the slightest warning they launched a furious attack, and though Peyrot had,
before,
were convinced that
Du
f
.
Prat,
in
op.
cit.,
pp.
430-433
ix,
Whether Elizabeth knew anything

the matter, even unofficially,
of
Gaffarel
Revue historique,
in
pp.
ix,
may
well
293
2
Gaffarel
Revue
historique,
pp.
3
299
f.
be doubted, and it is worth noting that all the contemporary English accounts of the expedition speak of it as a purely
affair. Cf. C. S. P., Foreign, 1566-68, nos. 786, 810, 822, 824, 827, C. S. P., Domestic, 843, 852, 859; 1547-80, p. 287. * Gaffarel, loc. cit., pp. 312-314,
at least that sixteen English vessels participated in the expedition (Gaffarel, loc. cit., p. 313), and, unless their meeting with Peyrot
It is certain
French
was purely
accidental,
some
be
sort
of
prearrangement
must
assumed.
268
1559-78
promised the French government before his departure th.it he would never play the aggressor, he felt amply justified in defending himself. On the water the
apparently,
combat was speedily terminated in favor of the invaders; the land righting which ensued took somewhat longer, but ended with the same result. There was much bloodshed and wantonness, and Peyrot himself was numbered among
the slain, but the close of the
day found
his
comrades who
survived him in undisputed possession of the island of Madeira. They did not, however, remain there long. As
Peyrot had kept his ultimate objective secret, there were naturally all sorts of different opinions as to what should be
done next. on a large

ernment.
desired to attempt conquest and piracy but feared the displeasure of the home govscale, Those who preferred to remain at Madeira were
Many
in terror of the
final
Portugal and the result was that after a few weeks the invaders evacuated
vengeance
of the king of
the island and returned to Europe. 1 The w hole affair had been utterly haphazard, and typical of the maritime enterprises of that day and generation. There was a terrible explosion of wrath at Lisbon when the
r
first
news
of Peyrot's conquest
came
in.
The government
the lives of the
prepared to take
summary vengeance, and
French and English residents in the Portuguese capital were 2 in grave danger. But Catharine was prompt to disavow the news thai his expedition had voluntarily dePeyrot;
parted from Madeira helped to mollify the Portugue before the end of the year all the excitement had blown over.
of mosl interesl for our purpose is the attitude of towards the whole affair. Officially it was none of Philip his busin. The harm had been actually done to Portugal
is
faffarel,
loe.
What
To ibow
good,
thai
they
314 316. pp, oourage was still two Flemish captured

iii.,
their
barquea and the way.

'
two
;U7
f.
Biscayan
ships
on
Ibid., pp.
PHILIP and
not to
AND PEYROT DE MONLUC

;
269
moreover, there was every reason to believe that Peyrot's ultimate objective had been in Portuguese and not in Spanish waters, and yet Philip took the matter up with the French government just as vigorously
Spain
1 In so far as he himself had been the injured one. as an act of vengeance Peyrot's expedition could be regarded and it is fair to add that the numfor the Florida massacre bers and cruelty of Menendez's Portuguese followers on that
as
if
of Spain was be further added may perhaps warranted that a Madeira in French and English hands would have constituted a menace to his treasure fleets which Philip could
occasion lent color to such a view

in resenting
it.
the king
It
not have been expected to ignore. Yet is it not also reasonable to regard the vigor with which the Prudent King espoused the quarrel of his western neighbor as an earnest of
the project, already half formed in his mind, to extend his influence over the destinies of the Portuguese empire, as a
foreshadowing, in fact, of the events of 1578-81 ? So the year 1566 passed off without an open rupture between France and Spain. In view of the number and bitterness of the issues between them,
it
it is
really
remarkable that
should have been avoided, and a tribute to the firmness of the determination of both Philip and Catharine to keep the And now new causes of irritation appeared to compeace.
plicate
situation
already
difficult
enough.
The new
Spanish ambassador Alava was most offensive to the queenmother so perfect was the network of spies at his command
;
that she
felt herself
caught like a bird in the fowler's snares.
His insolence in demanding apology and reparation for piracies which she had not sanctioned became more intolerable from
1
day
to
day
worst of
all,
he was obviously drawis
318 f. Fourquevaux's description of the way in which the news was received by the
Gaffarel, loc.
tit.,
pp.
Spanish court i, pp. 136 f.
given in his Depiches,
270
SPAIN IN
WESTERN EUROPE,
1559-78
ing closer to the Guises, and laying the foundations of the League which a decade later was to disrupt France.
1
When
it
became known that the Duke
of
Alva was to be
despatched to the Netherlands, the Huguenots demanded The Calvinist alliance which Philip that war be declared.
feared BO
much seemed about
to be established
6000 Swiss
But despite troops were raised for the defence of Fiance. these provocations and inducements, Catharine could all
not bring herself to the point of fighting. The fate of the Protestant rebels in the Low Countries was a matter of pro-
found indifference to her, provided her own authority could be firmly maintained in France, and for the moment she was
persuaded that this end could be best secured by keeping peace with Spain; indeed she actually furnished provisions
for Alva's tercios as
they passed north, just beyond her east-
ern frontiers, in the

take, as the sequel
summer
was
of 1567.
It
was a bad mis-
to show.
Catharine's difficulties
and complications, already great, were to become vastly greater as soon as the new regime was definitely established
in
the
Low
Countries.
The
sent
bis
relations of Philip
II
and Queen Elizabeth

just
of
Eng-
land, during the period we have
been considering, pre-
striking points, both of similarity and difference, to contemporaneous dealings with Catharine de' Medici.
In
both cases there
is
long and
varied
list
of
mutual
gravamina, both political and religious, and it the same time a firm determination on the part of both sovereigns thai peace must at all though for very different reasoncosts
is
be preserved.
In both cases the course of events
intimately bound up with the development of the revolt

1
in
Fornerun. i, pp. .140 f. Mariejol in Lavisse, vi,
and
1, p.
also
94.
Thompson, Mora
of Religion, p. 304, note.
PHILIP
the
AND ELIZABETH OF ENGLAND
271
Low
Countries, /fn both cases Philip had to do with

far
rulers
who were
more ready than he
to sacrifice religion
the other hand, the fact that England had now officially gone over to Protestantism, and that she was for the most part internally at peace and united, constituted
to politics.
difficulties
On
for the Spanish monarch in his dealings with Elizabeth which did not obtain in his relations with Queen Catharine de' Medici. There was no longer any marriage tie to unite the Tudors and the Hapsburgs. Philip's spy
system could not work so effectively across the Channel as

it
did in France.
And
finally,
though Philip was slow to
discover
it, the lapse of time was conclusively to prove that the queen of England, though capable of the most tortuous
diplomacy to secure her immediate ends, had a policy and a programme far more patriotic and consistent than the dynastic strivings of
in fact,
by
far the abler
the queen-mother of France, that she was, woman, who was destined in the end
foe.
to be Spain's
most dangerous
At the outset the prospects for friendly relations between England and Spam could scarcely have been worse. Not only had the new queen insulted Philip by refusing his she had scandalized him by daring to proffer of marriage abandon Rome and
;
"
mould new mode

of his heart
of old Christianity
"
;
from the bottom
Yet on the other hand, it undertake her chastisement himself.

time being, was
he longed to have her punished. was obvious that he could not
His mind, for the set, as we have already seen, on keeping the peace, and getting back to Spain clearly under all the circumstances it was a case for temporizing. So in the spring
;
of 1559, before
1
he
left
the
(tr.
Low
Countries for the last time,

vii,
Camoens, Lusiads
R. F. Burton), canto
stanza
5.
272
1559-78
Philip installed in
London
new ambassador, Alvaro
della
Quadra, bishop
of A.quila, bold, skilful, and unscrupulous, with instructions to watch events and report frequently. His first letter, May 10, 1559, to the Duke of Alva, closes
1
:
with the following significant sentence

is
"Religion here
now
simply a question of policy, and in a hundred thousand 2 ways they let us see that they neither love nor fear us."
Philip's determination to proceed cautiously in England,
of his
and to make sure
ground before taking any
definite
steps to punish the enormities of the queen, received ample

justification in the following July.
The sudden death
of
King Henry II brought his son Francis II to the throne of France, and Francis was married to Mary queen of Scots. France and Scotland were thus united more closely than ever In addition to being before; but that was by no means all. queen of Scotland and of France, Mary was also, in case
the throne of England;
Catholics, she
at
Elizabeth should die without issue, the lawful heiress of nay more, in the eyes of all true
that very moment, for
was actually the rightful queen of England it was a motto of the Counterreign.
Reformation that no heretic should be allowed to

All these
Philip II.
tion,
circumstances powerfully affected the position of If, as the lay champion of the Counter-Reforma-
ho supported Mary and Francis in an attempt to dethrone Elizabeth, lie would be contribul ing enormously to the political aggrandizemenl of the Valoia monarchy, of which,
chough he had
jusl
made peace
with
it,
he continued to be
Much as he was offended deeply jealous and distrustful. by the conduct of the English queen, he could not afford to Rather it might even be a give vent to his indignation.
case of his being obliged
to
lend
for
covert
support to that
C.
33,
8.
30,
Spanith, L668 87, boo. (û:i<ir:i had been in London

P.,
before, of bia predeoeeeot the

'Ibid., no.
some time
M one of the stall

Count
of Foria.
SPAIN
AND ENGLAND,
1559-60
273
detestable heretic, in order to ward off the political peril of the absorption of the whole of Great Britain by France. 1
This complexity of circumstances furnishes the key to the story of the relations of Philip to Elizabeth down to the
December, 1560, when the death of Francis II broke up the Franco-Scottish alliance and liberated England from a truly deadly peril. Throughout those crucial eightof
month
inaction.
een months the policy of Elizabeth was that of masterly She played the Hapsburgs off against the Valois, and vice versa she coquetted with the Scottish Protestants
;
she committed herself to no one, and grew steadily stronger through the rivalries of her various foes. Philip, during the
same period, was also inactive, but to far less good purpose than was the queen of England he never got the lead out
;
sought to bind her to the house of Hapsburg by proposing that she should marry one of his cousins, the Archdukes Ferdinand and Charles of Austria. 2 He
of her
hand.
He
with a scheme of sending a Spanish force into Scotland on the plea of the necessity of suppressing heresy there,
flirted
but really, of course, to keep watch on the French, and then, after the French were disposed of, to aid and abet a rising of
the English Catholics. 3
listen to
the pleas of
But nothing would induce him to Quadra that he interfere boldly and
vigorously in England, or to his assurances that so good a chance would never come again. 4 Doubtless the Spanish
ambassador overstated his case. removed by the death of Francis

practically immobilized.
l
Until the Valois peril was

II, Philip
was, of necessity,
is
The
the
really extraordinary thing

'C. S. P., 26, 28, 29, 30.
3
A.
O.
Meyer,
England
and
Spanish,
1558-67,
. ;
nos.
Catholic Church under Queen Elizabeth, p. 58, even speaks of Spain in this period as "the ally of the English, and therefore also of the Scotch, Reformation."
A. Teulet, Froude, vii, pp. 191 ff Relations politiques de la France et de I'Espagne avec l'cosse, ii, pp. 52-142,
passim. C. S. P., Spanish, 1558-67, no. 91.
274
thai
1559-78
midsummer, 1561, with the return of the queen of Scots, widowed but independent, to her native land, the habit of inaction had become so fixed
that danger
in
when
was passed
with the Spanish king; that he could not avail himself of the Once more Quadra fact that his hands were no longer tied.
urged him to
strike,
to grant vigorous support to to France,
Mary
stir
tell
Stuart, since she
was no longer bound
and to
up
a Catholic rising in England.
He
even ventured to
all
all
Philip that the English Romanists had "lost complain bitterly that through their placing
hope, and
their confi-
dence in your Majesty and trusting to you entirely, they have l failed to avail themselves of the friendship of the French."
But
it
was
all in
vain.
;
Nothing would induce the Prudent
the most he would do was to play with King a project for definitely binding the queen of Scots to the Hapsburgs by arranging a marriage between her and Don
to risk a fight
Whether, in view of the state of the prince's health, had any real intention of carrying through this projPhilip but Quadra flung himself into ect may well be doubted
Carlos.
;
the negotiations for it with such feverish energy that the strain they entailed proved too much for his constitution,
and
August, 1563, he died. There is no point in following the course of Philip's policy with respect to the internal affairs of England during the
in
next few years; it is a tale of promises and projects unfulfilled, of endless procrastination, and complete ineffectiveMore than ever he was convinced that, no matter ness.
what provocation was
offered bim, be could not
under any
circumstances afford to appeal to arms; and the character and instructions 4 of his next ambas.-adnr, l)iego Guzman
de Silva, who was sent to replace Quadra at London after

1
C. 8,
8panith, 1558-67, no. 150.
'
4
Ibid., nos. 215. 216, 218, 230, 239.
Ibid., no. 240. Ibid., nos. 244, 248.
ENGLAND AND THE NETHERLANDS

an interval of
it.
275
six
months, are the best possible evidence of
The new Spanish representative was a far gentler person than his two predecessors it has been well said of him, moreover, that he came not to impose a policy, but to ask
;
1 for a redress of grievances.
Some
of these
were standard
topics of complaint
tion, such
which had to do with the internal situa-
matter of the very mild disabilities of the English Catholics, and are of little interest for but there were two others of much wider import us here which powerfully affected the development of the Spanish
as, for instance, the
;
Empire, and therefore demand at least passing consideration. The first of these was the embargo which England had laid
on the products of the Low Countries menace of the Elizabethan pirates.
the second was the
The
distrust
in the Netherlands,
between England and and the sympathy
Philip's
government
of the English Prot-
estants for the cause of the rebels there,
to manifest itself in a series of restrictive
had already begun enactments and
counter-enactments which had practically brought to a standstill the anciently established and mutually indispensable
commercial relations
of
the two
countries.
The
Netherlander were unquestionably the side that suffered most, for without English wool their manufactures were c ruined, whereas England had various alternative outlets for her raw material and goods moreover, many of the Flem;
ings had already taken refuge across the Channel, and had been liberally aided by Elizabeth in setting up their industries in England. Hitherto Philip had answered every one of Elizabeth's prohibitions with some kind of retaliatory
C. S. P., Spanish, 1558-67, introduction, p. li. 2 Statutes of the Realm, 5 Elizabeth, cap. 7, and 8 Elizabeth, cap. 3, 6;
J>Vill iaiu
1
Modern
i,
(Cambridge, 1912), C. S. P., Spanish, 1558-67, an excellent picture of no. 248, gives the situation as seen through Philip's
p
.
Times
25.
English
Cunningham, The Growth of Industry and Commerce~~in
eyes.
276
act;

but
1559-78
now he was convinced that he was
getting the
worst of the argument, and he ordered Guzman to arrange in the "for the conference to settle the whole question
. . .
friendly spirit anciently existing between the
two countries
no hurry to
and
their
rulers."
But the queen was
in
Difficult though the situation was, she was far less worried by it than was Philip and she knew enough of the character of the Spanish king to realize that a
accept the suggestion.
conference was bound to be useless unless she was prepared to grant more than she gained. To ruin the commerce of the
I |
Low Countries
was, after
all,
one
of the
most
effective
ways of
holding the Spanish power
in
check there; andshehad already
plainly perceived that unless it was held in check the safety And so Guzman was put of England would be endangered.
off
with excuses, and the situation went from bad to worse. If Philip was powerless to remedy the conditions that had
arisen with regard to the commercial relations of the Nether-
lands and England, he was somewhal better prepared to The naval oppose the activities of the English sea-rovers.
enthusiasm of Tudor England, carefully nurtured by Henry VII and Henry VIII, was now beginning to reach its full
fruition;
and in view of the strained relations, political, commercial, and religious, between the English and Spanish
governments,
it
naturally manifested
itself
at
the expense
in
of the subjects of the Prudent King. the Channel Were no longer the exception
Piratical seizures
but the
rule.
Single galleons plying between Antwerp and Cadiz were
an easy prey. 8
outi
.
Elizabeth gave op official sanction to these but on the other hand she carefully avoided
putting
Btop to them.
The
rovers, moreover, were
now
w
1
I
P.,
Spanish, 1568-67, no. 248,

viii,
P.,
8poni$h,
1558-07,
f.,
ftou.de,
\iii,
pp. 4.58
an<l
no. 249; refertaoM
road*,
3.
pp, 449 (T. ign, 1601 82, no. 324;
than.
THE ENGLISH SEA-ROVERS

venturing out into more distant waters.
277 In June, 1563,
Seville, reported to Chaloner, Queen Elizabeth's ambassador at Madrid, a characteristic occurrence. A Spanish vessel, homeward bound from Porto Rico, met with two small ships,
Hugh Tipton, an Englishman resident at

Thomas
Sir
whose crews " killed two or three of her men, and hurt divers, and robbed them of 3000 pieces of money, ten chests of sugar,
200 great hides, and
.
all
their ordnance, cables,

pilot of the
and anchors.
They
carried
away the
Tipton was confident that

English goods here will
Spanish ship." do more hurt, all the they be embargoed," and assured his
"if
Spanish friends "that they were Scots and Frenchmen, and
some Englishmen among them, a

together to go a robbing."
1
sort of thieves gathered Scores of other similar in-
stances are recorded in the correspondence of the time. And that was by no means all. It was in October, 1562, that Sir John Hawkins made his first voyage to the West African
coast in search of negro slaves, of
whom,
after plundering a
number
of
ber, together
Portuguese vessels, he obtained a goodly numwith rich merchandise. With this booty he
crossed over to the

hides, ginger, sugar,
this treasure
With the greater part of pearls. he himself returned to England, but two of his
West and
Indies,
where he exchanged
it
for
vessels
there.
he despatched to Seville to dispose of their cargoes Naturally Philip did not relish this daring infringe-
ment
of his
the ships which
and their
monopoly of the trade of the New World Hawkins had sent to Seville were seized cargoes confiscated, and their crews only escaped
;
imprisonment by flight. Hawkins's efforts to recover his and the episode led directly on property were unavailing to his much more famous expedition in the year 1565, in
1
C.
Cf.
Chaloner had been sent as ambassador to Spain in
S. P., Foreign, also infra, p. 279.
1563,
no.
944.
October, 1561. Though popular there, he was unable to settle outstanding

disputes,
and was
recalled in 1564.
278
1559-78
which he visited not only West Africa and the Caribbean, but also the French colony on the shores of Florida, and the
coast of
Newfoundland on
his
way homo.
it
His relations to
first
the Spaniards, uncordial, to put

1
mildly, during his
venture, became openly and avowedly
hostile during his
second.
Such escapades as these were quite undreamed of in the philosophy of Philip II. Their irregularity, their utter
lawlessness, the evident delight
which they afforded

his
their
perpetrators, were utterly abhorrent to his formal,
slaw-
moving mind.
tion.
But he was not without

in
Boycotts and embargoes, indeed,

the
means of retaliawould obviously

possessed
avail
a
[chara cteristically Spanish as the In the latter part of the sea-rovers were English. piracies of the Emperor's reign, the Holy Office had been instructed
to use special vigilance at the seaports, doubtless in order to
him nothing, but weapon of defence as
Inquisition; he
prevent heretics and heretical books from seeping into the realm. 2 Its minions were fully informed in regard to the
arrival
and departure of every foreign
ship,
and they
utilized
to
supereminence' invoke the aid of all the
the
'
of the institution
which they served

Et&
local authorities in
the accomplishthat, of
ment
of their allotted task.
The
resni
from the
very beginning of the reign, a goodly
number
found their
way
into Spanish prisons,
Englishmen where 'hey were not
Idom
bq cruelly treated that
they died.
in
The
fate of the
crews of certain English ships captured

braltar in
the harbor of Gi-
November,
forty
L563,
Two hundred and

occasion, and
may be cited as an example. men had been incarcerated on that
the studiously deliberate investigation the whole affair had been concluded, there were but eighty of
1
when
J.
pp
HI
A. WillimiiHon, Sir Jnhn Hmrkina, 116
Leu,
Inquisition
f.;
I
of
Spam,
-U9
f.
iii,
|.p
505
row!.-, viii, pp.
PHILIP
left alive
AND THE SEA-ROVERS

The
situation, of course,
279
to be sent home. 1
was
vastly worse in the exaggerated reports that found their way back to London, but it certainly was such as
befitted less a state of formal peace than one of war. When, in January, 1564, the climax was reached with a definite
made
order from Philip for the arrest of every English ship in 2 Spanish harbors, together with their crews and owners,
it
was
really
remarkable that
hostilities
were not openly
declared.
safe.
Both
ill
But, as usual, both sovereigns preferred to play of them had their hands full of other things, and
;
and so the settlement of outwas placed in the hands of a commission standing disputes of plenipotentiaries which met at Bruges in the early part of
could
afford to risk a fight
3 1566, but totally failed to accomplish its purpose.
One
year later, in the
summer
of 1567, just as the period
review was drawing to a
close,
under an event occurred in Plym outh
Harbor, far more indicative of the way the wind was really blowing than any effort to settle existing Anglo-Spanish
difficulties at
a council table
a foreshadowing, in fact,
of
what was
to occur in that self-same harbor in the
summer
of 1.588.
Sir
John Hawkins was
there, getting ready for a
new expedition
flyinp-
to the Indies, in reckless defiance of the
protests of Philip's ambassador,
when seven Spanish
ships,
the flag of Castile, entered the port. There was no reason to think that they had come with any hostile intent, though their failure to salute the queen's ships was certainly
discourteous
;
but Hawkins. promptly
fired into
them, forced
1 C. 5. P., Foreign, 1563, nos. 1424, 1465, 1483, 1488, 1508, 1525, 1526, 1541, 1561; 1564-65, nos. 21, 22, 59, 87, 179, 226, 342, 376, 505, 552, 595, 611, 641, 900; letter of Guzman to Philip, June 5, 1564, calendared in J. Paz, Catdlogo, p. 121, no. 439; Froude, viii, p. 446; supra, p. 112. 2 C. S. P., Foreign, 1564-65, no. 80.
of peace "by of all kindes
English sailors considered the breaking ymbargo" that "which

of defiances is most and of least reputation." Richard Hawkins, in The Hawkins'
reproved,
Sir
Markham, p. 318. 3 C. S. P., Spanish, 1558-67, p. 417, note.

Voyages, ed.
/
2sd
SPAIN IN
WESTERN EUROPE,
and refused
1
1559-78
them
to lower their colors,
to listen to their
com-
and Elizabeth were determined

sible to
However much Phil ip mander's subsequent expostulations. to avoid war, it was imposquench the
stage
is
spirit
that was ultimately to force their
hands.
now set and the chief characters placed for drama that was to be enacted in Western Europe in the ensuing thirty years. Peace had been kept, chiefly because Philip was resolved that it should be kept but tliere was more than enough incendiary material in the Netherlands, in France, and in England, to feed a tremendous conIn the next act of the play, the Spanish monflagration. arch becomes somewhat more aggressive; the flames of war The
the great
:
Low Countries; and the relations of with France and with England proceed from bad to Spain worse.
burst forth in the
This next act lasts from 1567 to 1573, and is epitomised in the name of Philip's new regent in the Netherlands during
m
those years: Fernando Alvarez de Toledo, better known His appointment itself was adequate as the Duke of Alva.
evidence, for those
who knew
the facts, that Philip
was done
his habit,
with making concessions there.

tried his best to conceal his
The
king, as
was
hand, and to
that the policy of the days of Margaret of tinue unchanged but no one familiar with Alva's character
;
make men think Parma was to con-
and pasi record could have had any real doubts that he was being sent to the Netherlands for the purpose of lispanicizing them, both politically :md religiously to an extent that
1
,
had Dever been contemplated before: of erecting them,

, into
a
in
regular presidio,
Hawkins,
needless
whence the Spanish monarchy,

in
pp.
'J. K. Williamson, Sir John i" I' 132 138 perhapi
add that Hawkins was reprimanded

cmnlnc!
\>\
t)ir<
for bis
ijuccn.
ALVA IN THE LOW COUNTRIES
281
undisturbed by further revolt, could assert its predominance 1 Moreover, there over England, Fiance, and the Empire. could be no real question that the methods by which this of reresult was to be attained were to be primarily those
That Alva had made his reputation pression and violence. that he as a soldier proclaimed as much, as did also the fact
Hapsburg representatives in the Countries who was not related by blood to the royal family. were directly And, finally, his own character and antecedents whom he was sent to to those of the people over the
was the
first
of the
Low
opposite
the typical Castilian grandee, proud, intolerthe scions of traders and ant, and disdainful; they were and boisterous. He had artisans, hard-working, democratic, not forgotten how at the age of twelve he had seen his own in the country insulted and impoverished by the Flemings 2 for years for an opporhe had waited train of Chievres
rule.
He was
tunity for revenge.
two
of his strongest
fact Waiting and remembering were in They made him a fit instrument points.
3
of the policy of Philip II.
For a
full
month
after his arrival in the

It
;
Low
it
;
Countries the
in order to
it is
new regent held
his hand.
may have
more
been in compliance
with the royal instructions likely make absolutely sure of ultimate success
was
certain
that
with during the interval the whole population was oppressed the conviction that some terrible and mysterious catastrophe
was impending. 4
rebel leaders,
Then suddenly, beginning on September

fall.
9,
1567, the blows began to
On that day the two

of
chief
Egmont and Hoorn, were arrested

pp.
at Brussels.
V Etablissement
pp. 79-81.
1
.
Pirenne,
iv,
Gossart,
espagnol,
du
regime
Cf. ante, Vol. Ill, pp. 26-33. Cf the account of his first interview
Alva is given in the Contribution al Estudio de la persona del III Duque de Alba (Madrid, 1919), the discourse by his descendant the Duque de Berwick y de Alba upon his entry into the
R. A. H.
*
with Margaret of Parma. August 26, 1567, in Correspondance de Philippe II, A more favorable picture i, pp. 566 f.
Pirenne,
iv, p.
Gossart, pp. 83
ff
282

later,
1559-78
Twelve days
when
the news had readied Spain, their
representative there, the Baron de Montigny, who had been hilled into security by the false promises of Philip, was like1 wise seized and confined in the alcazar of Segovia.
At the
famous
of
Bame time there was

i
set
Blood a
Council of Troubles
up better
in the Netherlands the
known
as
the
Council
body of seven, dominated by three Spaniards, whose function it was to prepare the sentences of those whom It superthe government had decided to have punished. seded all other courts and jurisdictions; it overrode all like the privileges and liberties, both personal and national
;
Revolutionary Tribunal of 1793,

the altar of raison
d'etat.
it
sacrificed everything
4,
on
On January
1568, 84 persons
were executed, on February 20-21, 108, on March 20, 55.1 All the property of the victims was forfeited to the crown
;
it
was intended that the new policy

itself
of blood should
more
than justify
as a financial measure.
On
.June 5, L568,
the climax was reached with the execution of
Egmont and Hoorn in the public square in Brussels. Though their countrymen were too terrified, too dumfounded to protest at the
had the merit of making the issue clear.1 After that there could be no doubt that the day of comtwo irreconcilable *t promises and palliations was passed,
time, the event
bl
stems were confronting one another, and that one or the other must ultimately succumb. Meantime William of Orange, more cautious than Egmont
Hoorn, had escaped the clutches of A! a, and was The organizing an army of resistance in the Northeast.
and
i.
1 II, de Philip]" Corresporuiancc pp. T>~ : 575, 57R f., 681. ' T\contemporary estimates of tl,.total Dumh r ..f Alva's victims in tht untries vary from 9000 <> sens clear thai thefirsl figure ia far pearst thn tnith thnn the
WOOnd.
Cf.
Pinime,
iv,
p.
10,
Di
Hue
fie. tin-',
Annalrs
(Amsterdam,
The- standard p. 13. Protestant aooount of the tragedy is that >>f Motley, Msr nf the Dutch fi part
iii.
1658), p. 60. ' Pirenne, iv,
ALVA'S FIRST MEASURES
283
Lutherans of the Empire gave him considerable support. French and English Calvinists rallied to his standard. It
was evident that there was plenty of sympathy for his cause in the neighboring lands, even though the policies of their governments might not permit formal expression of it. But Orange on the battle field was far inferior to Orange at the
council table.
His
forces, led
by
his heroic brother, Louis,
count of Nassau, were successively defeated by Alva's veterans at Dahlen (April, 1568) and Jemgum (July 21) ; by November the rebel army had been virtually dispersed,
and Orange himself had taken refuge in Picardy. 1 Then Alva was convinced that he had triumphantly and permanently finished the work he had been sent to do. The people, so he assured the king, were the easiest to govern in the world,
if
one only knew
how
to treat them.
3
himself erected at
Antwerp
and at
He had statues of He even venBrussels.
tured to send 1500 horsemen into France to aid Catharine

de'
Medici against the Huguenots, and to reply to the
piracies of the English in the
Channel by arresting
Countries.
to
It
;
all
the
subjects of Elizabeth in the

if
Low
looked as
instead of
the
dream
of Philip
was about
come true
constituting a danger point to Spain and a vantage ground to her foes, the Netherlands promised soon to become a mighty fortress from which he could overawe the entire North of
Europe.
The king indeed was
less fully
convinced than was
his representative of the

of the policy of severity.
in
advantage
of indefinite prolongation
Since February, 1569, he had been favor of granting a general pardon, but it was not until seventeen months later that Alva could be brought to con1
This
story
is
told
iii
in
detail
on
ii,
Correspondance
de
Philippe
II,
pp. 213-447 of vol.
of F. Rachfahl's
p. 79.
3
Wilhelm von Oranien und der niederlandische Aufstand, the most recent and exhaustive treatment of the subject.
For a description of this see Gossart, L'^tablissement, pp. 117 f.
284
sent to
it

;
1559-78
was so
its
full of
moreover, when the pardon was finally issued, exceptions, both general and specific, that
to a fresh proscription.
:
it it
virtually
amounted
it
One example
of
operation will suffice
the day on which
was
precisely three months after put forth that Montigny, who had
it
was
Spanish prison since September, 1567, was 1 secretly strangled in the castle of Simancas. But Alva's conception of his task in the Netherlands was
languished in his
not solely one of torture and massacres. He proposed to prevent the recurrence of 'troubles' in the future by radical
.
alteration of the constitution of the
Low
Countries, which
should convert them into a docile dependency of the Spanish crown after the pattern of Naples and Milan. Absolute
extirpation of heresy was, of course, the indispensable preliminary to this. The new bishoprics, provided in Xjip9,
were now
vinists.
fully organized
and
set up,
and
their occupants
charged with the duty of hunting out Lutherans and Cal-
Alva was delighted to have them employed

it
in this
fashion, for
tallied
its
church to lend
with his conception of the duty of the 2 At the same full support to the stute.
time every effort was made to Hispanicize the government, and to abrogate or nullify local privileges and liberties. Alva
proposed to bring everything to the feet of his master. It was observed that when a vacancy occurred in any of the councils he did not hurry to fill it. His plan, as he explained
in
:i
letter to the
until,
king,
was
to
let
the unoccupied places
accumulate
:it
by providing
for a large qui iber of
them
tration en bloc;
'Pire&ne,
5
once, he could Hispanici/.e the personnel of the adminis''under the system of successive nominaiv,
pp.
16
f.
Gossart,
L'StdbUuement, p. 8
17 f. As another iv, pp. mi of preventing heresy, mntriculsstion lit foreign universities was forand there was even talk of bidden
I'ircniif,
;
founding colleges for Spaniards at the universities of Louvain and Douai, ami fur Flemings at S:il.imanca and Alruld. Correspondance du Canhtmi d< OranvtUe, ed. Piot, hr, pp. 86 f
.
ALVA'S FINANCIAL POLICY

tions," so
285
he wrote to Philip, "those who remain corrupt those who come in, just as happens when one throws a flask 1 Most fundamental of good wine into a cask of vinegar."
of
all,
however, was his financial policy.

in
To have
the Span-
ish monarchy any sense dependent for its revenues, as it still was in the Low Countries, on the vote of the national
assembly, was to Alva's mind intolerable.

approval, he
With
Philip's full
now proposed
to
remedy
this defect in char-
acteristic Spanish fashion by forcing the Estates to sanction the permanent establishment in the Netherlands of an
alcabala or tax
on sales, at the rate of five per cent on real and ten per cent on personal property. There was also to be a single impost, at the rate of one per cent, levied once and for all on all property in the land. The Estates were
summoned to
exactions,
tion
Brussels on
all
March
21, 1569, to consent to these
and
were brought into play
the resources of treachery and intimidain order to bend them to the

of the
royal will.
protests,
The levy
hundredth penny,
after
many
2
was
finally sanctioned and at once put into operait
tion
by February, 1571,
alcabala,
had yielded 3,300,000
florins.
To the
on the other hand, the deputies were reNot only would its establishment solved not to submit. mean the subversion of their most cherished liberties they also clearly perceived, what Philip and Alva were unable to
;
comprehend, that it ultimately spelt economic ruin, that the measure which the king and his adviser had adopted as the
replenish the royal exchequer was really only They finally killing the goose that laid the golden eggs. succeeded in inducing Alva to accept for a period of two
shortest
way to
years (August 13, 1569-August 13, 1571) a lump sum of 2,000,000 florins per annum in lieu of the alcabala, which
1
p.
Correspondance de Philippe II, ii, 360; Pirenne, iv, pp. 18 f., and other
2 Pirenne, ences there,
iv,
pp. 20-23, and refer-
references there.
286

all.
1559-78
they dreaded most of
When
that period had expired,
the Duke refused to consider the prolongation of it, and 1 Therewithin a few weeks the alcabala was in full swing. upon ensued a scene of wild confusion. The business world
Merchants left the country was paralyzed. Contracts were cancelled right and left. Rents
sixth of their former value.
hit that
in
fell
swarms.
to one-
The
textile industry
was so hard
Alva could not find enough blue cloth in all Brussels and Antwerp to enable him to renew the furnishings of his own palace. But he was absolutely deaf to any kind of
remonstrance.
He would
not listen to the advice of his
own clergy, or of Francisco de Alava, the Spanish ambassador at Paris, when they warned him of the dangers of the As for the rage of the masses, he course he was pursuing.
felt
sure that
2
it
could
lie
safely ignored.
"This people,"
so he once wrote to Philip, "is always such as Julius Caesar
depicted
it."
Before
we take up
the course of the revolution which
Alva's brutality and ineptitude unchained in the Netherlands in the spring of 1572, it is essentia i<> consider the
1
effect of his presence in the
Low
Countries on the relations
of
Spain to France and to England.

It is
easy enough to see. after the Lapse of three centurii and a half, that one of Philips gravest errors was his failure to realize that the England of Queen Elizabeth constituted
a far mop' serious menace to the integrity of the Spanish
'
Pircnne,
iv,
p.
23;
Corrcxpondnnrr
ed.
Piot,
du.
Cardinal
93.
de
Granvelle,
iv, p.
'
Corretponaance df
;
'
.
pp. 2<)fl f. dinaldU iv, pp. LQO, L20| ii' / .'/ Gossart, 806; manf, pp. 211 fT.. 2'.l7 ff. Alva doubtless refers t<> Caesar's characterization of the Gaule
1
.
PhUippi 11. ii, Correapi'iulmirr du Cur-
prone to sedition, yet inconstant in I)< Btlio GalllCO, lib. iv, cap. adversity. " intirinit.itctn Gallorum 5: quod sunt in consiliis capie&difl mobiles, et
. .
.
op. 19:
lib. iii. Dovia plerumQue rebus student " minime reaistens ad mollis ealamitates perferendaa mens eorutn est" also lib. iii, caps. 1, 10.
"
FRANCE AND ENGLAND

Empire than did the France
287
of the last three Valois kings.
We think of the former as passing through one of the most notable periods of its history, united at home under one of the greatest sovereigns of all time, reaching out to lay the foundations of a far-flung colonial and commercial empire,
inevitably
destined,
for
reasons
political,
religious,
and
in
come into violent collision with Spain, both the Old World and in the New. We think of the latter
economic, to
internally disrupted
factions,
as
by
civil
and
religious strife, a prey to
without any consistent policy either at
home
or
it
abroad.
But when we come

itself to
to consider the situation as
presented
a loss for reasons to explain
the Spanish monarch, we shall not be at why he continued so long to
underestimate England and to exaggerate the danger from France. The latter, in the first place, was the hereditary
foe,
the constant enemy, for over sixty years past, not only
in
the Old World but also in the
New. 1
Secondly,
it
inter-
vened between Spain and the Low Countries, and constituted an annoying barrier to communication between them.
Thirdly,
less
its
marked
recent tendency towards Protestantism, though than that of England, was probably even more
;
for it was perilously close to his own alarming to Philip borders, and he could not endure the idea of having a heretic
on his
England, on the other hand, seemed much more remote, and principally occupied with its own affairs. It had, moreover, been recently Spain's ally against France
flank.
Philip
had even cherished hopes of bringing it permanently under Hapsburg control. So rapid had been the oscillations
of its religious policy
during the previous half-century that its re-Catholicization did not seem by any means out complete of the question. Spain had not "yet learned to think of
Elizabeth's government as strong, nor of the Elizabethan
1
Cf. ante, Vol. Ill, pp. 525
f.,
631, 634
f.
2^S
SPAIN IN
WESTERN EUROPE,
l
1559-78
settlement in England as stable."
The
exploit s of the
English sea-rovers were regarded by the Spaniards more in the light of the irritating pranks of an extremely naughty boy than as the first evidences of the upcoming of the greatest
naval power of modern times.
Before 1568,
when the
attention of Queen Elizabeth's government was primarily focussed on the affairs of Scotland, there had been, perhaps, some real basis for this point of view ; but with the defeat
and
tion
flight to
England
of
Mary queen
of Scots, the situa-
had
entirely changed.
Elizabeth began to consid er the
problem presented by the Netherlands far more seriously 1an ever before. New voices, like that of Sir 1 VValsingham, were beginning to make themselves heard in her 2 councils, and causing her to consider the probable conse-
\quences
jthe
of Alva's obvious intention to erect
them
into a
Spanish presidio.
We
discern the
first f
aintjglimm erings of
new era in English foreign policy, whicTTwHs to bear fruit in the defeat of the Spanish Armada. 'ultimately
of a
dawn
But
Philip
was
still
determined to adhere,
if
possible, to
the policy of 'sturdy defensiveness' in his foreign relations which had been commended to him by his father. If the
Tudor and Valois monarchs would only leave Alva to carry out undisturbed in the Netherlands the new programme which he had been sent there to initiate, he had as yet no intention of making trouble for them. But the Duke soon became aware that his doings in the Low Countries were
arousing deep hostility on both sides of the Channel.
over, like his
More-
was at first inclined to Madrid, believe that he was in considerably more danger from Prance than from England. William of Orange and his brother
master
in
lie
Louis were
J.
Policy,
I:
i,
in
close touch with

Growth
of
the leaders of the French

'
y,
BritUh
Conyers Road, Mr. Secretary Wali,
p. 163.
gingham,
pp. 64
ff.
DANGER FROM FRANCE

Huguenots.
peace of
289
There were rumors that Conde had made the Longjumeau (March 23, 1568), which had termi-
nated so unexpectedly the so-called Second Civil War, in order to be free to interfere in the Low Countries and it
;
months later that William signed a secret with Conde and Coligny in which they promised each treaty other mutual assistance, offensive and defensive, until they should have gained their ends. 1 The Third Civil War in France broke out, it is true, directly afterwards, and the
was only
five
Catholics
won
impressive victories at Jarnac (March 13,

;
but their 1569) and at Moncontour (October 3, 1569) Protestant foes refused to be discouraged, and at the peace of St. Germain-en-Laye (August 8, 1570) obtained important
concessions
for
their
faith.
Still
more alarming
to
the
Duke
puppet
of
of Charles
Alva was the palpably anti-Spanish attitude IX, who, after having remained for ten years a
mother's hands, was
in his
now beginning
to
demand
a share in the direction of affairs.
Louis of Nassau had
two conferences with him in July, 1571, in which he besought him to intervene to deliver the Low Countries from their Spanish oppressors, and the king gave him most encouraging Even Catharine for the moment seemed to have replies. succumbed to the anti-Spanish trend. She had been much
irritated
by
Philip's refusal,
after the death
(October
3,
1568) of Elizabeth of Valois, to

latter's
wed
as his fourth wife the
She was at present planning to marry Margaret to Henry of Navarre, and her son, Henry of Anjou, was seeking the hand of the queen of England. Finally, there were mysterious activities in the har-
younger
sister,
Margaret.
bors of Nantes and Bordeaux.
Ships were being prepared. one seemed to know exactly what was to be done with them, but Alva was persuaded that they were destined for
No
Martejol in Lavisse,
vi, 1,
pp. 99
f.,
105, 109.
290
SPAIN IN
WESTERN EUROPE,
1559-78
some enterprise which boded ill for his master. Even the Dews of Don John's great victory at Lepanto (October 7, 1571) did not serve to frighten the French into an abandonment of their anti-Spanish attitude. The Duke was convinced that a blow would soon be struck, and struck in all
probability at Spain in the Netherlands.
1
The prospect
of English hostility,
on the other hand, he
affected, at first, to regard as far less serious.
He
realized
master, loved to temporize. He recognized her natural reluctance to countenance any revolt against monarchical authority, even though the monarch
that Elizabeth, like his
own
question might be her bitterest foe. He knew that she was well aware that the maintenance of the wool trade bein
tween England and the Low Countries was wellnigh indispensable to both. He was glad to learn that she had assured
the Spanish ambassador, in August, 1568, that she was 2 There delighted at the news of his victory over the rebels.
were, of course, a host of other bits of evidence which pointed in the opposite direction. In October, 1567, only two
months
sail
Alva had readied Brussels, Hawkins had set on another freebooting expedition into American waters,
after
his
th<
3
which
was destined to eclipse all nences. We have already described

to
previous impertitreatment accorded
Dr.
John Man, the English ambassador
demand that he be permitted to can service performed at his house without tear of interference by the Holy Inquisition; never again was Elizabeth to have an official resident representative at the court of the
cause of his
Madrid, behave the Angliat
Prudent King/
1
Then,
in
December. L568, had ensued the
M&riejol
U"
Spanith,
!
Froude, IMS
i
T.avisse, vi, 1, pp. IllPirenne, to, p. 29. ix. C S. P., pp. ;ui f.
in
;
Williamson,
.Sir
John
Hawkint,
79
Si
i">
86,
37.
4.
r
>
;
pp. MSff.; Froudo, ix, pp. 358-362. ' Cf. ante, pp. 79 f. Envoys extrnor<)inary, how e ver, continued ooc**ion.-illy
<
Ben on
f.
Franeit
Dralb*,
t<>
sent,
as,
in
e.g.,
Sir
Henry
pp. 95
'ihluim,
who was
Spain on special
DANGER FROM ENGLAND

seizure
291
by the English government of a fleet of Spanish bound for the Low Countries, which had sought refuge in Plymouth and Southampton from the Alva was prompt to retort with the pirates of the Channel.
treasure ships
counter-seizure of
all
and the
in
arrest of the English residents there
English property in the Netherlands, and Elizabeth

;
new and ambassador to London, Guerau de very aggressive Spanish Spes, whom Philip had despatched in the previous August
turn retaliated by imprisoning in his house the
more complaisant Guzman de Silva. 1 By midsummer, 1569, however, the tension had slackened again and, as an evidence of her hope and belief that peace could be preserved, Elizabeth restored the Spanish ambassador to
to replace the
2
liberty.
There appeared,
in other words, to
;
or system to her aggressions
be no sequence most of them might even have
been charitably construed rather as the acts of lawless individuals than of the English government. To Alva's formal
mind they were,
doubly abhorrent, but as yet they did not seem to him to indicate the existence of any settled policy of war. Without question they
merited condign punishment but it seemed likely that such punishment could be administered quite as effectively and
;
for that very reason,
hostilities
intrigue than by and avowed. 3 open The consequence was that the next two years of English history (November, 1569, to December, 1571) witness a
missions for the queen in 1570 and in
1575. 1 C. S. P., Spanish, 1568-79, nos. 68, 70; Froude, ix, pp. 366-376. The
much more cheaply by conspiracy and
between Alva and correspondence Guerau de Spes is printed in full in vols, v and vi of Kervyn de Lettenhove's Relations politiques des PaysBas et de VAnaleterre. Cf. also C. Read, "Queen Elizabeth's Seizure of
the
Duke
Journal of Modern History, v (1933), pp. 443-464. 2 Froude, ix, p. 475. 'An excellent account of the ebbs and flows of Anglo-Spanish relations in these years is to be found in vol. i, chap, i, of P. O. von Tome's Don Juan d'Autriche. A briefer one is given in chapter vi of E. Gossart's L'lHtablissement du regime espagnol.
of Alva's Pay-Ships," in the
292
SPAIN IN
WESTERN EUROPE,
1559-78
scries of Catholic plots against the
ment, of
all
of
which Philip
Queen and the governand Alva were cognizant and to
sonic of which they lent active encouragement.
The
situa-
tion in England was highly favorable to such attempts. The Romanists were discontented owing to the enforcement The captive Scottish queen furnished of the penal laws. an excellent rallying cry. Guerau de Spes was in London But even with all these advantages, and to pull the wires.
the conviction that they were fully justified in any means that they might use to effect the deposition of an heretical queen, Philip and Alva acted neither effectively
also
/
unison; and their slackness was a grievous disappointment both to (iuerau de Spes and to the English
nor
in
Catholics.
1
anxious for
ter
The king throughout was apparently more 2 The latvigorous action than was the Duke.
was primarily interested in the recovery of his treasure ships by negotiation, and did not wish to risk it by getting involved with aristocratic conspiracies in which he had little Not until the Northern Earls should prove their metfaith. tle by liberating Mary queen of Scots from captivity would 3 he consent to send them support and as they were unable
;
to
at
accomplish
this,
an opportunity which,
if
vigorously seized
the outset, might have yielded good results,

slip
was
Buffered
Pope Pius V by unimproved. launched a bull of excommunication againsl Elizabeth, and Strove to induce Philip and Alva to undertake the execution
On February
25, lf>70,
of
it. De Spes and the English Catholics wci\ fully convinced that, with aid from across the Channel, their sued -null but both the king and his representative in the Low Countries continued to hang back. They complained,
;
with some justice, that they had not been consulted beioie;
f.
'
TOrne,
"/' cit., i,
pp. 42
f.
Ibid., p. 87.
PLOTS AGAINST ELIZABETH

hand
in regard to the bull, or
;
293
it
even notified that
was
to be
put forth
nothing would induce them to follow

1
it
up with a
vigorous attack.
some respects the most favorable that had yet occurred was presented by the machinations of the Duke de Spes and the of Norfolk and of the papal agent Ridolfi English Catholics were more urgent than ever the captive Mary "committed her cause to Spain." This time Philip was persuaded that the moment had come to strike. 2 On Saturday, July 7, 1571, there was held in Madrid a famous meeting of the Consejo, in which it was decided that Elizabeth must be assassinated, and ways and means were discussed. Orders also were despatched to Alva to have a fleet and an army in readiness, that he might be able to invade 3 at the critical juncture. But the Duke was more cautious
tunity
In the winter of 1570-71 a third oppor-
in
than ever with regard to England at the very moment that his master had grown more bold. He was worried by rumors
that reached
intimacy of certain malcontents of the maritime provinces of the Netherlands with the English he was impressed with the ease with which the privateers
of the
;
him
of Elizabeth had weathered the previous storms. the assassination of the queen could be actually accomplished, he agreed that an invasion should be attempted
government
If
forthwith
to
4
until that event, he insisted,
it
would be perilous
move, and his hesitation made on the mind of the king. Neither the resolutions of the
a profound impression
Spanish war council nor the pleadings of Spes could induce he placed the conPhilip to give the word for an invasion
;
duct of his policy with regard to England entirely, for the moment, in Alva's hands. And so the year 1571 ended
'Torne, op.
2
there
tit., i, pp. 93-96. i, pp. 101-i08, and references A. O. Meyer, op. cit., pp. 236 f 'Torne, i, pp. 109-113, and refer-
Tome,
;
ences there; Froude, x, pp. 250-259; Marie Stuart, 3 e ed., ii, Mignet,
p. 145.
*
Torne,
i,
pp. 113
f.
294

Elizabeth
1559-78
with nothing accomplished.
was not
assassi-
nated, and England remained uninvaded. From their comfortable conviction that the Netherlander
would never venture to
revolt,
and from
their hesitant
machinations against the governments of England and of France, Philip and Alva were suddenly aroused by the astonishing news that on April 1, 1572, the town of Brill, at
the
mouth
of the
Meuse, had been seized and occupied by the

of the Sea.'
*
famous 'Beggars
Broadly speaking, this disaster was

to the
in large
measure due
same
error of
judgment that had given the keynote
to the foreign policy of Philip during the five preceding
years
namely, his tendency to overestimate the danger from France and to underestimate that from England. So
:
preoccupied had been the Duke with the perils of invasion from the southwest that he failed to keep track of what had
been happening
in the ports of
Holland and Zealand.
The
inhabitants of these seacoast towns were

terest of his enemies.
among
the bit-
His character and his programme, political, economic, and religious, were utterly detestable to them. Their own native independence and disregard for
authority were stimulated by the example of the English privateers, with whom, ever since 1568, they had been in-
even Queen Elizabeth had been creasingly closely in touch induced to grant them covert encouragement and support,
;
an.
2 At they possessed what amounted to a base at Dover. the outset the Duke had practically ignored them. Later on, m 1571, as we have already seen, he began to take the matI
ter
Bomewhal more
iv,
seriously;
Oeyl, 77.. (1655-1609),
in
he entered into negotiations

in Bijdragen voor Ywlirlandachc Geschiedenis, derde recks, ix, p. 251 (1896).
'Pirenne, U ../ //..

P- 116.
1
p.
'-'<
I'.
Knglund (1568-72),"
Netherlands
P.
J.
Blok,
"De Watergeusen
THE CAPTURE OF BRILL
295
with Elizabeth on the subject, at the very moment that he was plotting for her assassination, with the result that in
the end of February, 1572, the chief of the
Dutch
pirates,
William de La Marck, sometimes known as the Sire de 1 The news of his Lumey, was ordered to leave the realm.
felt
he expulsion relieved Alva's worst fears for the moment confident that such danger as there had been from Eng; ;
land was now at least temporarily past he reverted once more to the problem presented by the situation in France. But the future was to prove that his calculations were entirely
wrong.
Precisely
how
far the
government
of Eliza-
beth was implicated in the events that followed the expulsion of La Marck will probably never be known but the
;
available
so
documents make possible the hypothesis that she

official
timed her
it
compliance with Alva's request as to
convert
into the first effective

2
blow against his govern-
At any rate, La Marck had no sooner quitted Dover than he swooped down on a convoy of Spanish traders which was approaching the narrows of the Channel, seized two of the largest vessels, and flung their
ment
in the Netherlands.
crews overboard.
few days later he appeared off Brill, which he captured, as we have seen, with the utmost ease. 3
f
">
VAnd the
signal
captu re of Brill was only a beginning, merely the r the unch aining of the forcesôf revolution. During
the next ten days four other seaport towns rose in sympathetic revolt against the Spanish authorities particularly important was the accession of Flushin g to the ranks of the
;
insurgents, for
it controlled the mouth of the Scheldt, and was therefore the key to Antwerp. So horrible were the excesses committed by the rebels 4 that at first William of
1
Froude,
x,
Ibid., cited.
'
p.
pp. 371-373. 373, and document there

f.
Ibid., pp.
373
* Cf. Hubert Meuffels, Les Martyrs de Gorcum (Paris, 1908), in the series Les Saints. On the seizure of Rotterdam by the Spaniards and the ensuing
296

to
;
1559-78
Orange hesitated
but his hand was recognize them the march of events, and by the urgency ultimately forced by of his councillors, one of whom even ventured to issue, with-
out showing it to him, a manifesto in his name, in which William assumed the title of stadtholder or representative
Majesty in Holland, Zealand, Friesland, and Utrecht, and called on all men to bear aid in the revolution. Louis of Nassau and his Huguenot allies were prompt to utilize the
of his
1
situation for their
own advantage
in the latter part of
May
they seized
Mons and
Valenciennes.
;
Alva at Brussels was
at his wit's end
which way to turn but, still believing that the most serious danger was that from France, he turned his
face to the southwest,
and
in the latter part of July sat
down
before
Mons, while
his son,
to pieces a force of
its relief.
4000
Don Fadrique, defeated and cut men which had been despatched to
Needless to add, the rapidity of the progress of the Northern revolt, already spectacular, was now still further increased one town after another declared for the
;
insurgents.
In Zealand only Middleburg held out for the
2 Spaniards; in Holland, only Amsterdam and Schoonhoven. The revolution even penetrated into Friesland and Gelder-
land.
Then suddenly,
uation
front of
St.
in the twinkling of an eye, the entire sit-
changed.
On September
sur<'
5,
while he was
of the
still
in of
Mons, Alva received
news
massacre
Bartholomew twelve days before. Catharine had reShe had made away with versed her policy once more. and most of the rest of the Protestant chiefs, toColigny
3 gether with several thousands of their adherents.
All the
sack
:(:>!
DULMaOTe, tee Hirnardino de
I'ironne, iv, p. 32.
Mendoia,
Motley,
1
Com
p. A~>^.
ii.
cup. vii; and references then-,

iil>.
v,
'Full accounts of the copious literature on the massacre are to be found

In Thompson, of Religion, p. 452, note, and in Pastor, xix, pp. 482-512, notes. Modern scholarship has fully
I'irrnt)'-.
iv,
/'
p.
si
31;
Bervyn
intditt
p. 166.
dt
Wan
eohove,
<i
Vhistc
lentt
rilntifs
tin
A VI*
Me,
MASSACRE OF
long-laid plans of
ST.
BARTHOLOMEW
297
Orange and his brother for securing the Huguenots for their cause were knocked on 1 Alva had been saved the head, at least for the time being. in his extremity by what had happened in the very country whence he and his master had apprehended their gravest peril.
support of the
The report of the massacre naturally spread consternation among the Protestant states of Europe. Philip is to have laughed when he heard the news, 2 which reported
with processions and rejoicings. 3 The defensive league which had been created between the governments of Elizabeth and Charles IX by the treaty of
was celebrated at
Rome
was now succeeded in England by preparations for war never had the Counter-Reformation seemed so menacing before. But the panic was excesThe massacre was not an sive, as the sequel was to show. indication of any settled policy on the part of Catharine de' Medici it was but a crowning demonstration, if such were
Blois in the previous April
;
needed, that she could not be trusted to follow one.
Dis-
embarrassed of Coligny, whose ascendancy she could not abide, she made peace offerings to his coreligionists, both at
home and abroad. 4

with
4
As was natural under the circumstances,

with the consequence that for some practically eliminated as an
of her neighbors
of
these peace offerings were either flatly rejected or else treated

jufc
ifiable distrust,
months
to
come France was
international force.
tion to attack her,
None
and none
was in a condithem would venture to accept
her alliance.
disproved the old idea been long premeditated.
1
that
it
had
Orange himself characterized the massacre as a "coup de massue." 1 So at least says Froude, x, p. 409,
but I can find no contemporary evidence to prove it. Cf. also Antonio
Benitez de Lugo, "Contento y Regocijo de Felipe II por la Matanza de loa Hugonotes," in Revista de Espaha, cxxxv (1891), pp. 356-372, 416-433. 3 Pastor, xix, pp. 499-507. 4 Forneron, ii, pp. 341-346.
298
1559-78
For Alva, of course, the massacre meant that his southwestern frontier was temporarily safe. Mons capitulated
on September 21/ and the Duke was free once more to return into the North, and deal with the revolt that was
gathering headway there.
flood of his
But before
rebels,
letting loose the full
vengeance on the
he determined, with
of their last
characteristic caution, to deprive
them
hope
of
the continuance of the English aid which had proved so inhere again he gave tardy dispensable to them in the past proof of his dawning realization of the latent perils of the
;
hostility of Britain.
justification
and
also
Outwardly he seemed to have ample an excellent opportunity for casting
the gauntlet before the government of Queen Elizabeth. Ten months before she had mortally offended Philip by ordering his ambassador, Guerau de Spes, to take his de2 She had secretly supported the parture within four days. rebels in the Low Countries. And now her loss of the
down
French alliance made her presumably less able to resist Spanish attack. If the massacre of St. Bartholomew could
:i
only be completed by the subversion of English Protestantism, it seemed that the triumph of the Counter-Reformation
would be achieved.
Yet, just at the very
moment
3
that
men expected him
to declare war, the

a treat}
Duke
of
Alva moved
His
first
heaven and earth to obtain
of peace.
duty and desire was to crush the Sea Beggars; and the surest way to do that was to cut off the help they got from England.
Certainly
it
was no time
advantage Bartholomew
to
of
undertake a crusade;
Englishmen's horror of them with the
and references
there.
better, far better, take
the massacre of St.

On
to impress
the extraordinarily lenient treat-
pp. 117
*
f.,
hi. ni
and
of it- K.irrison cf. P'roude, x, p. 424, Foraeron, ii. pp. 344 f., mid refertl
Cf
his letter to Philip of

(
March
157..
ii,
in
'i>rrespondance de Philippe II,
ences
pp. 320-322.
'Turin',
Don
Juan
d'Autriche,
i,
WAR
IN
THE NETHERLANDS
299
And so, with the reluctant superior moderation of Spain. of his master, Alva went to work to secure a settleapproval
ment
of all outstanding difficulties with the English governit
ment, and obtained

so-called
at last on
March
,
15,
1573
by the
Convention of Nimwegen providing for the reestablishment of commercial intercourse between England and
Low Countries for a period of two years, for the abandonment by each of the rebels against the government of the 1 other, and for the repression of the pirates in the Channel. At last the Duke was free to wreak his vengeance on the Beggars without fear of interference from without.
the
There
here
:
no need to recount the story of that vengeance the sack of Mechlin, the massacre at Zutphen, the
is
heroic resistance of
Haarlem, and the comparatively lenient terms, whose good effect was forthwith destroyed by the first of those mutinies of Philip's unpaid soldiery which were
destined to play havoc with the Spaniards in the Low Coun2 tries. On this occasion the Netherlanders were goaded into
a last desperate resistance
their conquerors,
by the outrages committed by

persist in
it
and they were encouraged to
by the fact that the discipline of Alva's tercios had utterly broken down. The town of Alkmaar defied all the efforts of
Don Fadrique
to take
it.
The Spanish
3
fleet suffered a sig-
Zuyder Zee, and the Spanish garrison succeeded in maintaining itself in Middleburg, the barely 4 As last outpost in Zealand that remained in Alva's hands.
nificant defeat in the
long as the
Duke had continued

Now,
to be victorious, Philip
was
determined to maintain him in

requests for recall.
1
despite Alva's repeated that it seemed to have however,

office,
2 3
Kervyn de Lettenhove, Relations politiques des Pays-Bos et de V Angleterre, vi,
Pirenne,
iv,
pp. 40-44.
Bernardino
Pirenne,
de
Mendoza,
Comen-
p.
ii,
680; pp. 318
introduction, p. xii, and text, Correspondance de Philippe II,

f.
;
tarios, lib. x, caps, iv, v.

4
iv, p. 44.
Read,
Walsingham,
i,
p. 308.
300
lioon
1660 78
demonstrated that no amount of bloodshed or expense could avail to quell the revolt, he began to consider the
On October 15, 1573, he notified advisability of a change. the Duke of his intention to supersede him; a month later,
Hon
Luis de Requesens, who had been appointed his BUObefore the year was over M>r, arrived in the Netherlands
;
Alva had departed for Spain.
He
carried with him, need-
less to add, the execrations of the entire population which he had bo outrageously misruled. The chief result of his term of office had been to identify the government of Spain which he represented with the most intolerable of tyrannies
in
the Netherlandish
mind
indeed, he
inevitable the ruin of the Spanish
had made ultimately Empire in Northern Eu-
Yet as even the Devil should be given his due, so it is rope. 2 but fair that two points should be noted in Alva's favor. The first is the clearness of his perception, in the latter
months
of his rule, of the

;
Lands from England heeded by the king, it was not impossible that the defeat of The second the Spanish Armada might have been avoided.
thai the worst
dangers to Spain in the Netherhad his views in this matter been
and most disastrous of his mistakes w

of the Spanish
virtually forced
upon him by the emptiness
In Philip's inability to give his tercios then- reguEtsury. lar pay lay the basic reason for that long .-cries of atrocious mutinies, which, initiated in Alva's time, reached its horrible
culmination in tb' Spanish Fury' a) Antwerp in lo7i>. Ths fad that the Spanish government was determined to make
the
tion
1
Low Countries pay

was what
finally
iv, pp. 44 f. CoMtrihur.idn al
'lit
the costs of their
own
Hispaniciza1
unchained the forces of revolution.'

'It
Iins
in
1
Pirenne,
Kntudin
\kii>i,
Duque da Berwick
191
di W'i, l>y the y de Alio (Madrid,
J
;
been well said hat the sending the Dukfl to the Netherlanda tree nol much that be might punish ndx-ls as that ho n impoae new taxes. Nevertheless, with all his exactions it had been necessary
mIijcM
REQUESENS
301
The primary cause of it, in other words, was economic, though it was to need the additional impetus of Calvinism to The blighting alcabala, give it victory in the Northeast.
with
its
cancer that
various developments and ramifications, proved a was destined to eat away the very vitals of the
Spanish Empire.
Luis de Requesens, whom the king, after long hesitation, had selected to succeed Alva in the Low Countries, was of
ancient Castilian lineage, and the son of a favorite tutor of
v
boyhood days. He had already been ambassador to Rome and governor of Milan, when, at the age of fortyHe was in failsix, he was despatched to the Netherlands. health at the time of his appointment, and did his utmost ing to induce the king to confer it upon someone else but was obdurate, for he discerned in Requesens a man Philip who would continue unabated the policy of Hispanicizing the Netherlands to which he had now committed himself "a reliable man, who would tolerate no diminution of the authority of the crown." The methods by which Requesens
Philip's
;
-
proposed to attain his ends were certainly
much gentler than those of his predecessor, though things so fell out that he never got a fair chance to apply them but the fundamental
;
on which the Spanish administration was based principl remained in all essentials, exactly what they had been
>s
before.
As
far as relations
with France and with England are con-
cerned, the period of the rule of Requesens is singularly empty no event of decisive importance in international
;
between
1567
and 1572
to
send
on
all
8,000,000 florins from Spain. this, cf. Pirenne, iv, p. 45, note references there.
On
1,
and
Fatio, "La Vie de Don Luis de Requesens," in B. H., vi (1904), pp. 210213; F. Barado y Font, D. Luis de
Pirenne,
iv,
pp. 47-49;
A. Morel-
Requesens y la Politico, Espaflola en los Paises Bajos (Madrid. 1906).
302
a Hairs
SPAIN IN
WESTERN EUROPE,
1559-78
occurred during his tenure of
taking a breathing spell after Alva,
office. Europe was and before the still more
arduous years that were to follow. The effects of the massacre of St. Bartholomew continued to dislocate the
and nullify the international influence of At home she was disturbed by "factions, edicts, and Estates" abroad she was much preoccupied with the
foreign
policy
France.
unusual problem of getting an errant king back from Poland. With England Spain had inherited a temporary
understanding, owing to the efforts of the Duke of Alva in 1573 and though neither party observed it with perfect
;
and there were consequently complaints and recriminations on both sides, there was never any real prospect of serious trouble. Both Philip and Elizabeth were content
loyalty,
1
.
for the
quo.
time being, with the maintenance of the status We turn, therefore, to the progress of events in the
Netherlands themselves.
Requesens was convinced that the sole possible way to win back the Low Countries to their allegiance was to proclaim a general pardon for past offences, and to rescind the most unpopular measures such as the imposition of the
tenth
which penny
had recently been enacted by
the
But Alva, who stayed on in Brusgovernment sels for a month after Requesens's arrival, had no use whatof Philip II.
ever for such a policy as this. On his return to Spain he laid his views before the kin^;, who had previously accepted the ideas of his successor, and the natural result was a long
iod of hesitation.
Not
till
March
10,
1")74, did
Philip
Read, W'al.singham, i, pp. 300 fT. be said that in the autumn of l.'.TI Pedro M'-ni'n'li-z da Avilrs. of Florida fame, whs given command of an expedition which had been prepared a Hantander for the invasion of England; but tha plague p rev ented it from
1
It is to
over suiting and carried off Meu6nde. Cf. Archivo Histdrico ii, Expafiol, v. p. Apparently the affair created I little or no interest at the time; can find no mention of it in the con-
temporary documents.
MUTINIES IN THE NETHERLANDS
303
1
send his royal permission to proclaim the general pardon.
Meantime Requesens was obliged, much against his will, to continue the war against the rebels which had been bequeathed to him by his predecessor, and thereby convinced men, quite erroneously, that he was fully as blood-thirsty The course of the struggle was as Alva had been before him. The surrender of Middleburg to the at first inconclusive.
Prince of Orange (February 18, 1574) deprived the Spaniards but this reverse was of their last stronghold in Zealand
;
by the crushing defeat (April 14) fully compensated inflicted by Sancho de Avila and some 8000 Spaniards at Mook, near Grave, in the valley of the Meuse, on an army
for
of
German mercenaries which Louis

;
of
Nassau was bringfield
ing to his brother's aid

of battle.
Louis himself met death on the
The
effect of this victory,
however, was neutral-
ized in turn
diery
who
by the disgraceful conduct of the Spanish solhad won it. Furious at their failure to get their
regular pay, they determined to recoup themselves
by the
plundering of Antwerp, and as

reestablish discipline
2
it
was
utterly impossible to
by
force,
negotiate with the mutineers in
Requesens was obliged to order to save Antwerp from
being sacked.
All this, of course, reacted
on his own policy of conciliation. When general } ardon at Brussels on June 5, and followed this two
:
most unfavorably he proclaimed the
days later by an offer to abolish the alcabala in return for a

generous subsidy, his concessions fell painfully flat. No one seemed to care to take advantage of them men inter;
preted them, rather, as a confession of weakness on the part of the government, and derived from them encouragement to
persist in their rebellion.
1
One
of Requesens's chief counseldance de Philippe II, iii, pp. 55-67 Motley, Rise of the Dutch Republic, ii, pp. 543-550.
;
iii,
de Correspondence Philippe II, pp. 33-37 Pirenne, iv, pp. 50

;
ff.
1
Pirenne,
iv,
pp. 51-53
Correspon-
304
lors

went so far as to
tell
1559-78
him bluntly that "one can not do
in
the Netherlands what one does in Naples and Milan." l The falsity of the parallel on which Philip had based his
policy in the
licly
Low
Countries was
now
mercilessly and pub-
exposed.
Meantime, on October 3, 1574, there had occurred the relie f_of Ley den by the cutting of the dykes. It was in some
most brilliant achievement of the entire war, and a crowning demonstration of the fact that although the Spaniards might still be invincible in a land battle, 'hey had
respects the
not learned
the possibilities of utilizing the sen. 2 This event, together with the parlous state of Requesens's finances, led to a fresh effort to secure peace by negotiation
all
j
at the so-called conferences of Breda in
February, 1575 but the commissioners would not trust one another without
the giving of guarantees which neither side was disposed to concede, and the question oi toleration for Calvinism proved
an insurmountable stumblingblock to agreement. 3 In the following summer and autumn the hopes of the Spaniards were raised by a temporary return of fortune on the field of
They possessed themselves of all the islands between the northern outlet of the Scheldt and the Meuse and thus
battle.
4 separated Zealand from Holland.
no means discouraged by
at the very
this reverse;
it
But the rebels were by quite the contrary,

place, the Estates of
to
moment
that
was taking
Holland and Zealand took the decisive step of censing

put
1
forth their edict-
m
II.
the
iii,
name
equal
of Philip II.
Hitherto
Correapondance de Philipi"
p. 119.
*
Correspondance de Philippe II.

in'
1
,
iii,
pp.
fay
171
ff.
Robed
I'riiin,
The
and Relief of Leyden, translated Elisabeth Trevelyan (Th' Hague, 1927) Professor G. M. I'r<\.lyan, in his introduction to thi* l*>ok, declares that the railed of Leyden Haims "an
place with the Defeat of the as having given the derisive cheek to the conquest of Europe by the Spanish Monarchy and by the Catholic Reaction. Leyden was the first event to st<-m the tide." Pin-tm<\ iv, pp. 57 f
Armada
Ibid., pp.
58
f.
DEATH OF REQUESENS
305
they had preserved the fiction of loyalty to the Spanish monarch, and maintained that their rebellion had been
now directed solely against the representatives he sent out resolved to have done with shams and offer their sovthey
;
But for the time being it was one to accept it. Neither Elizaany beth of England nor Henry III of France was willing to take
ereignty to
some other
prince.
impossible to induce
the risk of openly defying the government of Spain. 1 Such was the perilous state of affairs in the Low Countries
when on March 5, 1576, Requesens died of a fever. He had never had an opportunity to carry out his own ideas even if
;
he had,
it
would probably have been too
late.
So destitute
was he at the time
of his death, that his funeral
had
to be
postponed for several days because of the impossibility of finding money to pay the expenses of it.
was the first time that a royal governor of the Low Countries had died in harness, the first time that the continuity of the Spanish regime had been broken eight months
It
;
elapsed before Requesens's successor could be appointed and reach his post. For Philip that interim was one long
agony
of suspense.
ity in the
of Stat^
composed,
its
The only representative of his authorNetherlands that was left standing was the Council
it is
true,
exclusively of Catholics
officially loyal to the Spanish crown, but also convinced,
Roda, that Philip's policy had been and must be radically changed if the Low utterly wrong, Countries were to be preserved. With such half-hearted officials on the spot, it was clear that the king was for the
save for
secretary,
time being powerless
it was also equally obvious that a golden opportunity was thereby offered to the rebels to
;
iii,
Motley, Rise of the Dutch Republic, pp. 42-47.
Pirenne,
iv,
p.
60,
and references
there.
300

;
1559-78
strengthen their position
and under the able leadership
of
William of Orange they were prompt to take advantage of it. In any history of the Low Countries, the events which
occurred between the death of Requesens and the arrival of his successor are of capital importance, and must needs
be recounted in detail; here
it
must
suffice to
summarize
them
tercios
sels,
in
brief.
Another furious mutiny

;
broke out in the summer of 1576
it
of the Spanish centred in Brus-
and was caused,
like its predecessors,
by the
deter-
mination of Philip's soldiers to obtain, at the expense of the inhabitants on whom they were quartered, the pay which
the royal treasury was unable to afford. This mutiny put all the Catholic southwestern districts up in arms, and gave William of Orange the chance to bring forward a plan for
1
seventeen provinces in a common effort t( Hitherto he had tried to effect hit expel the Spaniards. ends through Holland and Zealand, backed by the support
the unjon of
all
it
England and of France now for the moment, at least, was evident that foreign aid was not forthcoming, an( without it Holland and Zealand were powerless by themof
;
Only by a united movement of all the Netherlands could he hope to accomplish his purpose, and, with the instinct of the statesman, he seized the psychological moment
selves.
After vainly attempting to persuade the Council of act. State to see the justice of his cause and to lend him its support, he succeeded, on September 4, in arresting the most
refractory of its members, thereby removing it from Spanish 2 control and hurling defiance at the government of Madrid.
Before the month was over, a meeting of the States-General of the Low Countries was assembled at Brussels, on the
invitation of the Estates of Brabant, and the departure of
Pirenne, pp. 78-81.
*
1
iv,
pp. 06
p.
f.
Motley,
Motley,
iii,
P. Geyl, pp. 90-9,1; Netherlands, p. 146.
Revolt
of
the
I'lrunne,
iv,
73;
iii,
THE PACIFICATION OF GHENT

1
307
Realizthe Spanish soldiers was unanimously demanded. that there was no chance of Philip's voluntary compliing
ance with this request, the Estates promptly took steps
towards the raising of a national army. In carrying out these measures there were collisions with the royal troops,
which culminated, on November
another 'Spanish Fury' at Antwerp, more terrible by far than any of its predover 7000 were killed, and there was an orgy of ecessors
4,
in
and rapine. 2 The news of it naturally made the it caused the religious difrebels more desperate than ever ferences between the Catholic Southwest and the Protestant Northeast to dwindle into temporary insignificance, in compillage
;
parison to the unanimous determination to shake off the yoke of Spain. On November 8, there was solemnly pro-
claimed in the city that bears its name the instrument known It provided for an to history as the Pacification of Ghent. armed alliance ofUatholics and Protestants to expel the
\l
Spanish troops, for the subsequent convocation of the StatesGeneral to settle the question of religion, for the suspension of the 'placards' and other edicts against heresy, for the
liberation of prisoners
condemned by the Council

in the
3
of Blood,
and
tries
for the restoration of confiscated property to its lawful
owners.
Never had the Spanish authority
Low Coun-
be^n challenged in such fashion before. Meantime Philip had been anxiously considering the He was still convinced question of Requesens's successor.
that he
must continue to conciliate, and the exigencies of the situation and the advice of his Council all pointed to his half-brother Don John of Austria as the obvious man for the vacant place. The fame that he had won at Lepanto was
still
1
fresh in men's
minds
his
de
charming personality could

3
Pirenne, iv, pp. 75 ff. 78 Ibid., p. Correspondence Philippe II, v, pp. 19-22.
2
;
iii,
Pirenne, iv, pp. 124r-127.
pp.
79-81;
Motley,
308

effect
1559-78
be counted upon to
be was not, like Alva or unlike them, also, he Requeaens, an unmitigated Castilian would satisfy the oft-expressed desire of the Net herlanders
; ;
much
that the royal representative in the

1
Low Countries
should
have royal blood in his veins. As far back as 1574 Requesens had advised Philip to send him there, and the But Philip, Council at Madrid had been of the same mind.
as usual,
had been doubtful and
hesitant.
He was
pro-
foundly jealous of his half-brother,
whose
brilliant achieve-
ments and far-reaching schemes
for the future aroused his
deepest suspicions. He could not rid himself of the idea that Don John was possessed with the desire to carve out for himself an independent realm, and aspired to renounce
all
allegiance to Spain.
Now, however,
in
view of the
crisis
with which he was confronted in 1576, Philip was forced to
admit that Don John was the
sole possible solution.
On
1
it
April 8 he wrote to his half-brother, who was in Naples, thai was his desire that he "should take wings and fly to 1n-
Low
tions
Countries," and that
in
order to save
tie
delay of
full
;i
journey to Spain for a preliminary interview,
instruc-
would be sent forward

2
to inert
him
as he passed north
through Lombardy.
But Don John was by no meanto comply with the command. The task of bringing order out of chaos in royal the Netherlands did not appeal to him in the least. His mind at that moment was filled with a daring scheme for inwith
vading England, dethroning Elizabeth, and replacing her Mary Stuart whom he hoped to make his wife and he
,
had no intention
of proceeding to the
bow
'ountriea until he
had obtained
i
Philip's formal consent

K4;
to the prosecution of
ii.
Pinnae,
iv,
p.
Btbiinf-Mu-
'Stirling-Maxwell,
pp.
ii. f.
well,
'!
Don John of s\iistria, passim; 'jrne, Don Juan d'Autriche, ii, pp,
Tome,
ii,
pp,
.;
p.
fr-12.
DON JOHN OF AUSTRIA

1
309
that magnificent plan. For this purpose it was necessary to return to Castile, and he did so, arriving at Madrid in early September, in defiance of the king's order to go direct
from Naples to the Netherlands.
Philip, of course,
gave
him the permission he desired, though it was hedged about 2 he then prowith numerous conditions and reservations ceeded to emphasize the instructions that had been drawn up for the guidance of Don John in the Low Countries. Conciliation was everywhere to be the keynote. In order to maintain true religion and the authority of the Spanish crown, Philip was now prepared to surrender on every other to remove the Spanish troops, to rescind all point at issue innovations that had been set up since the arrival of the
;
:
Duke
ment
of Alva,
and to leave the administration
of the govern-
as far as possible in the
themselves.
Not only
in essentials
hands of the Netherlanders but in details was Don

;
John adjured to take the utmost care not to give offence he was to speak French, not Spanish, and to avoid selecting 3 his mistresses from among the principal families of the land.
In order to dissipate any possible idea that he intended to follow a policy of compulsory Castilianization, it was decided
that he should enter his
new dominions by
traversing France
on horseback, disguised as the servant of his only attendant,

Ottavio Gonzaga, the son of the old viceroy of Milan. It was on the evening of November 3, 1576, that the pair
finally crossed the frontier into
before the 'Spanish Fury' at the signature of the Pacification of Ghent. 4

It
one short day Luxemburg Antwerp and only five before
would scarcely have been possible to arrive at a more inopportune moment, and it was but a few days before Don
1
On
188;
*
ii,
the details, see pp. 60-109.

ii,
Tome,
i,
pp. 161-
Ibid., there.
pp. 46
ff .,
and references
Correspondance de Philippe II, pp. 450-464; Tome, ii, pp. 47-51. 4 Pirenne, iv, p. 83.
iv,
310

full
1559-78
John discovered the
measure
of his impotence.
revelation of his identity failed to procure
him
respect.
The The
Bpectacle of the unrestrained licentiousness of his
Barbara Blomberg, who had been living

for the previous twenty-five years,
1
in the
mother, Netherlands
served to remind
that he was
local
bustard, even
if
also the son of a king.
men The
authorities,
whom
On
whose existence he recognized and with he attempted to negotiate, showed that their sym-
pathies were rather with the States-General than with him.

until the Spanish were sent away no talk of conciliation was possible troops ami within two months of his arrival he wrote to Philip to
;
every hand he met the same reply
Bay that a rupture was inevitable, and that he must have more men and funds. 2 On the other hand, he could not bear
to relinquish his
schemes
for the invasion of

;
which he was assured of papal support labor to win peace in the Low Countries,
iiiipht
England, and he continued

in order that
in
to
he
use the troops that would thereby be released for the 3 prosecution of the great plan on which his heart was set.
Meantime
to
in
appear.
the camp of the rebels the inevitable The statesmanship of Orange, with
the
'
rifts
began
united ac-
tion as its constant

in
watchword, had produced great things

.t
Spanish Fury' calmer days that folAntwerp. lowed, the effects of the particularistic aims of the different
;it
the heat of the universal resentment
Xow, however,
all,
in the
provinces, and, above
of
the greal
gulf
between the
tholic Southwest and the Protestant
Northeast, inevi-
tably
made themselves
felt.
By
the beginning of .January,
L577, the rebels were gradually dividing into

alike, indeed, in the
two groups,
for the with-
Unanimity
pp.
Of their
demand
iv,
drawal
1
of th(
Spanish soldiery, but differing in that one of

tilomberg,
I'.
Em,
Unrlnira
Pirsnne,
dt
p.
87;
Correspondance
31-74.
Philippt II, v, pp. 89 Torn.-, ii, pp. 110 113.
THE PERPETUAL EDICT
311
them, which had its chief strength in the Southwest, regarded that removal as a preliminary to the reestablishment
Catholicism and reconciliation with Spain, while the other, inspired by Orange, and chiefly recruited from Holof
land and Zealand, cherished plans for the establishment of Protestantism and the overthrow of the authority of Philip
II.
Don John was enough
of a
statesman to discern that
the widening of this breach was essential to the success of his own plans, and that the surest way to widen it was
On February 12, therefore, by an through concessions instrument which has always borne the singularly inappropriate title of the Perpetual Edic t, he formally agreed to the
majority of the Netherlanders' demands, and especially to the departure within twenty days of the Spanish troops. 1
But
in the arranging of the details of that departure all his

It
had been his purpose to remove them by sea, in order, no doubt, to use them against England but this could scarcely be done without their passing through Holland and Zealand, where all the seaports were, and Holland and Zealand obstinately refused to permit them to traverse their territory. 2 The upshot of the matter was that in the month of April the Spanish and troops departed to the southward by land for Italy
hopes were dashed.
; ;
Don
of
John, his
grand project
all
scattered to the four winds
heaven, wrote Philip to beg on bended knees to be
recalled.
The
king, however, paid no heed to his desires

of "weariness,
eighteen
months more
thirty-three were all

1
.
and death" 3 at the age of indeed, as Don John had foreseen,

the removal of his troops would that they were intended to deliver the Scottish Queen." 3 The phrase is that of his secretary de cf. Escovedo; Correspondance
lest
Pirenne, iv, pp. 90 f Pirenne, iv, p. 91 Seeley, Growth of British Policy, i, pp. 157 ff Read,
*
;
.
mean
Walsingham,
ii,
ii,
pp. 355-358
Tome,
pp.
also
Apparently Elizabeth warned Don John "that she feared

ff.
114
Philippe II, v, p. 187.
312
SPAIN IN
WESTERN EUROPE,
loft
1559-78
that were destined to be

brief
to him.
The
history of this
phase
is
complicated and not particularly important,

the attitude of the outside powers is contherefore hurry as rapidly as possible over
Bave
in BO far ae
;
cerned
we must
the internal history of the revolt and the attempts that were made to suppress it. The keynote of the period is increasing
distrustfulness between
effect of the concessions
he had
Don John and made in
the rebels.
All the
the Perpetual Edict
to have been forgotten in the unseemly quarrel over method of the departure of the Spanish troops. He was formally welcomed at Brussels, indeed, according to
med
the
May 12, 1577; but the StatesGeneral only recognized his official title by a majority of one vote; each side seemed convinced that the other was
1
the ancient ceremonial, on
meditating treachery.
did
So alarmed for
that
Don John become

finally,
his personal safety he soon retired from Brussels,

}
and
of
on July 24, possessed himself, by a toup-de~main Xamur; thence he wrote desperately to Philip to assure
that
a
peaceful solution to his difficulties was impossible, that the Spanish troops must forthwith be sent back, 2 in order to enable him to seize the offensive. It took a
him and
long time, as usual, to persuade the Prudent King to reverse

his policy, but finally
it
was done
in
early
December
the
vanguard of the tereioa began to file back into Luxemburg, where Don John welcomed them with open arms. The
only
-
way
by
in
which he could now retrieve

military
his fallen fortuneit

;
January
31, 15ZB, at the rebel- delivered itself into his hands
knew victory, Gembloux, near Xamur.

and
he
in a
and
on
of
the
army
fashion which
plainly demonstrated that,

1
however antiquated the Spanish

of
I'in-tiiif.
r.i'.
iv.
08.
to
The
lettX
QoxtMca
from
writtrn
1'.77.
i
Antonio Etna, Mmssols on May

it
found in the ('orr<x)iiitr<lnnri ri, v, pp. 379 f

.
;>pr.
/.
Philippe
11,
v,
vory Ognific&nt;
may
lx>
pp.
IS.'
is.",.
DEATH OF DON JOHN

methods
of
313
master on the
governing, the Spanish army still remained 1 battlefield. It was a rout rather than a fight.
There were few
slain but a multitude of runaways, and an enormous amount of munitions and supplies was destroyed. But Don John had not enough troops to enable him to follow
up
advantage and strike direct at Brussels. He had to content himself with gathering in some minor cities to the
his
William of Orange reconstituted the rebel party, and provided for it, as we shall soon He see, the immediate prospect of effective foreign aid.
south.
skill
Meantime the
of
utterly refused to be discouraged,
and under
his inspiration
army soon began to gather itself again. The lesson of these events was not lost on Don John. Even his victhe rebel
tories
on the
field of battle
his foes.
His dreams of come an object of suspicion
seemed but to serve to reanimate He had beglory had vanished.

to the master
;
whom
he had
but reluctantly consented to serve his health was ruined, and he was in despair. Death came to his rescue at last,
on October
1,
1578, in his
camp
at
2 Bouges near Namur.
We revert to the story of the relations of Spain to France and England, and more especially to their effects on the
situation in the Netherlands.
Under Requesens,
as
we have
already seen, these matters subside into insignificance, but under Don John they return to the centre of the stage in;
deed,
it
would probably be
safe to say that the chief im-
portance of the brief rule of Philip's half-brother in the Low Countries was that it brought once more into view the ulti-
mate
1
possibility of foreign intervention.

;
The widespread
ed. L. P. 1875) in Collection
iv, pp. 115 f. Stirlingpp. 291-294. Stirling-Maxwell, ii, pp. 312-339; Pirenne, iv, p. 123; cf. also the summary of the letter of Francisco Dorante, Don John's confessor, announcing his
Pirenne,
Maxwell,
2
ii,
death to the king, on pp. 129-133 of Les bibliotheques de Madrid et de VEscurial:

notices
et
extraits,
Gachard
(Brussels,
des Chroniques Beiges.
314
SPAIN IN
WESTERN EUROPE,
of
1559-78
fame and ambitious projects

this inevitable.
It
Don John
really rendered
view of the commercial treaty of 1573, and of Don John's own designs against the government of
was natural,
in
Queen Elisabeth, that the question of Spain's relations with England should come prominently to the fore. It was a Elizabeth was still sordid tale of plot and counterplot. far from converted to the view of the more radical of her
1
counsellors that she should take a vigorous stand in favor
the other hand she was fully alive to the necessity of keeping close watch on the situation in the Low
of the rebels.
On
Countries, and also of forestalling any independent intervention on the part of France. Messengers more or
1
secret
had passed to and

2
fro
between her and
grange, to be
treated, each in turn, as the exigencies of the
moment
should
dictate
but, save for promises of a loan, and one downright cash payment of 20,000, the queen of England had insisted
;
on keeping her hands free. With Don John also she mained outwardly friendly, though she had surprisingly
information
in
refull
regard
to his designs against
her throne:
of the presence of <m rtain suspicious John's court, he wrote her (March 7, persons about Don 1577) a letter of explanation, which, de pite the raised eyebrows of her counsellors, she professed to accept with good
4
when she complained
grace.
little
eml
from Sir Philip of 'condolence and congratulation' on the recent The undercurrent of Bjpj change of rulers in the Kni|>ir
ing and reporting continued indeed unabated on both en<
Don John received a friendly visit Sidney, homeward hound from his formal
later
but after the departure of the Spanish troops, and the con1
Tdrne, f
f
ii.
pp. 60
ft.,
passim.
i.
1332,
1866;
riun-
Stirling-Maxwell,
ii,
pp
1
'
Bmd, WnUinaham.
a
t
/'
.
pp,
339 ff.
Ni
Maxwell,
ii,
pp. 228
f.
'
/,'.
L678 77.
DM
ENGLAND AND FRANCE

sequent probability that her
secure,
it
315
own throne would remain
became increasingly plain that Elizabeth was not Of Orange and his adherents, yet prepared to take sides. She was as of all other rebels, she entirely disapproved.
ready to
make use
necessary to do so, shores, and she certainly did not propose to have them become the cat's paw of France but as neither of these two
;
should be absolutely in order to enable her to defend her own

of
them, in case
it
contingencies seemed imminent, Elizabeth relapsed into

the old congenial
in the Low story of Countries during this period is also inconclusive for the time being, though ominous for the future it centres from
The
marking time. the relations of France to Spain
game
of
first
to last
around the person of the
last of the Valois, the
younger brother of Henry III, the Duke of Alencon and 2 In the early spring of 1576 this wretched scion of Anjou.
prominence by successfully leading a party of 'Malcontents' in France, and extorting from the crown terms highly favorable to the Huguenots by the
royalty
into
had burst
celebrated peace of Monsieur (April 27) it was on this occasion that he received the duchy of Anjou as a part of his
;
of
reward, and thereafter he was generally known as the Duke Anjou, without the title of Alengon which he had borne
before.
Since he had struck such a shrewd blow for the
new
faith in France, it
was but natural that he should
attract
On May 6, 1576, two months after the death of Requesens, a document 3 was drawn up, under Orange's direction, stating the terms under
the favorable attention of Orange.
1 Her letters to the States, during this period, which are printed in extenso in Kervyn de Lettenhove's Relations
entre
le
Due
d' Anjou
et
les
Pays-Bas
politiques, ix, x,
and xi, are a faithful mirror of her 'masterly inactivity.' 2 The principal source for the dealings of the Duke with the Low Countries is the Documents concernant les relations
(1576-1584), edd. P. L. Muller and Alphonse Diegerick in nos. 51, 55, 57, 60, and 61 of the nieuwe serie of the Werken of the Historisch Genootschap of Utrecht. 3 Cf Kervyn de Lettenhove, Les Huguenots et les Gueux, iv, pp. 50-54.
.
316
SPA IX IN
of
WESTERN EUROPE,
1559-78
which the Estates
accept Anjoii as their count

perils of
Holland ami Zealand were willing to and hereditary sovereign. For
some time the Duke hesitated.
He was
;
fully alive to the

;
any enterprise against the government of Philip II he had no real love for Protestantism he dreaded the disapproval of Queen Elizabeth,
1572,
to
whom
he had aspired, since
But the consequences of the 'Spanish Fury' Antwerp were a telling argument for immediate action; from that moment, as has bean well said,
his
make
wife.
at
Countries as his certain prey. His secret agents began to flood the Netherlands, and, on October 19, a correspondence began between him and tin
the
rebels
his death.
the
Duke "regarded
Low
"
which was practically uninterrupted until the day ol 2 It is unnecessary to follow all the ebbs and
governorship of Don John. The main things they proved were the inadequacy of Anjou's abilities and the shallowness of his character; at one moment,
flows during the
indeed, he
came near
to being utilized as an
3
opponent
of
Orange to checkmate him at every turn. Not yet did he make war against Spain in the Netherlands, as w Later the case.
.
to the advantage of Spain.
Elizabeth did her best
with her approval,

so herself,
in
and
in
some
order to save her the trouble of doing faint hope of winning her hand for
;
the present she seemed bent on keeping him out of them 4 It looked, in fact, as if the ancienl jealousies altogether.
of
Prance and England might come to the rescue of the Spanish Empire once more, ami at a time when its leaders
were
tar less
competent than
so.
in earlier
days.
Hut
it
was
not
destined to be
1
The
i.
period of
Don John was

'
not to
cli
Read,
/'
!
n,
pp,
I7fi.
KM
Pirmma,
For
i
iv, p. 119.
210.
1
In'
moment
<
she supported thi

f
enlrr
i.
!>.
ff.
rnncmiant leu rtlationt (TAnjou >l U Payn-Hru,
Calvinial
Count Palatine, John Caaimir,

f.
against him.
I'ircnne, iv, pp. L18
pp. 9
THE DUKE OF ANJOU
317
without witnessing the definite achievement of one more stage, slight, perhaps, in itself, but significant in its implications for the future, along the road to foreign military
intervention against Spain in the Netherlands. Fear that, unless they came to terms with him themselves, he might be betrayed into doing harm to their cause, led the States-
General, under Orange's guidance, on August 13, 1578, to put their signature to a definite treaty with Anjou. The Duke w as to maintain in the Netherlands, at his own exr
pense, an
army
of
10,000 foot and 2000 horse for three

title of
'
months
ties
he was to take the

the
Defender
of the Liber-
Low Countries' against the tyranny of the and their adherents but he was, for the time Spaniards If Philip should being, to bear no part in their government.
of
;
be deposed, the Estates promised to place him first in the line of succession. If they should make peace with the king
they would recognize their great indebtedness to 1 him, and rew ard him accordingly.
of Spain,
r
After such a long and complicated tale as this chapter has had to tell, it may be worth while to devote a couple of
paragraphs to a summary of results, more especially as the attention of the reader in the ensuing pages is to be invited
to the
The
faction
tate of affairs in a very different corner of Europe. outstanding fact had been the progress of dissatis-
and revolt
in the Netherlands.
them,
much
against his will, from a
Philip had accepted sense of filial duty, and
in flat defiance of
the most obvious dictates of racial, geoexpediency.
graphical,
and
political
He had
alternately ^
/
tried terrorism
both.
1
conciliation, and had miserably failed in Revolution had broken out and was progressing, and
and
Documents concernant
les
relations
entre le
Due
d'
Anjou,
et
les
Pays-Bos,
i,
pp. 408-414.
318
1559-78
was attracting the favorable attention of Prance and England, not bo much because of any sympathetic comprehension oo their parte of the aims of the revolution itself, as
because of the opportunity it offered them to pnt a spoke in France was much" less menacing than the wheel of Spain.
she had been twenty years before,
ing Philip under
a
when she had been
fight-
strong and powerful king and supported by the see of Home; on the other hand, though she might now be internally weak and disrupted, she possessed an
opportunity to strike at Spain in the Low (\>untri< s which had not been available for her in the days of Henry II, and
the tradition of hostility between the
situation
was by no means yet extinct. was infinitely worse. A score of years earlier Philip had been king consort there, the husband of a queen who gloried in the fact that it had been vouchsafed to her to Now he had restore her errant subjects to the see of Koine.
Valois
Hapsburgs and the With England the
been thrust forth, rebuffed, and insulted by the heretic government established after the death of Mary Tudor, and was regarded as an open enemy by the mercantile and seafaring
e eautious lady portion of the population, however much who occupied the English throne might choose to preserve. the appearances of friendship. But here too the ancient in this case their operation was traditions came in though
!
the reverse of that

issue as
it
in
the case of France

itself
to
cloud the
presented
for
to
Philip's mind.
The Anglo-
Spanish tradition, Dearly a century past, had on the whole been one of amity and alliance, and Philip, who far more .-dive to the significance of historical precedent than
to inherent probabilities for the future, could not bring
self to
him-
believe that the old ties would be easily snapped.
He
underestimated than he overestimated the more open menace from the Valois.
the latent peril
from the Tudors even more
EUROPE AT THE. END OF
1578
319
A
still
brief glance over the rest of
clearer the picture as Philip
Europe will serve to make saw it in the last months of
Save for the 'plague spot' in the Netherattendant vexations, his outlook was exceedThe Counter-Reformation had run its first ingly bright. course indeed, the elements were all at hand triumphant
the year 1578.
its
lands and
which were soon to produce a fresh recrudescence of it. Spain and the 'rechristianized' papacy were once more
moving hand
in
hand
conflicts of jurisdiction,
there might be minor squabbles and but there could be no doubt that
Rome now
looked to Madrid for support and guidance, and
champion, in a manner and to an extent The imperial throne, after that she had never done before.
to Philip as her lay
two occupants who had tended to be disagreeably lenient to

heretics,
was now held once more by a
fanatical Catholic,
-4?
and Spain's Italian possessions were generally in good order. The navy of the Turks had been laid low at Lepanto, and Spanish maritime supremacy erected in its place. The
Philippines had been conquered and annexed, and the Spanish-American colonial regime was operating satisfactorily, according to the standards of that day and generation. And
midsummer, 1578, two short months before the death of Don John of Austria, it so happened that an opportunity had suddenly presented itself to gain for the Spanish monarchy an extension of territory which would cause its an extenpredecessors to seem but puny in comparison sion, which, if obtained, would make the Spanish Empire by far the largest that the world had ever seen. The winning of this great prize occupied most of the next few years of the life of Philip II. Its successful accomplishment carried him
finally, in
to the climax of his
power, and will demand our attention
during the ensuing chapter.
320
SPAIN IN
WESTERN EUROPE,
1559-78
See notes at the end of Chapters XXIV and XXXI, and add Sources. In addition to the D. I. E. (in which the items con-
cerning the Low Countries during the period of Philip II are well analyzed by Theodoor Bussemaker on pp. 356-442 of the ninth volume of the third series of Bijdragen voor Vaderlandsche Geschiedenis, The Hague, 1896), the Calendars of State Papers, Foreign, and Spanish, and other standard sources, the following more special collections may the Correspondance de Marguerite d'Autriche avec be mentioned II (1559-65), ed. L. P. Gachard (Brussels, 1867-81, 3 vols.), Philippe
:
continued by J. S. Theissen in the Publications of the Historisch Genootschap of Utrecht (i, 1565-67, = troisieme serie, xlvii, 1925, of the Correspondance de Philippe II sur let affaires the Publications) des Pays-Bas (to 1577), ed. L. P. Gachard (Brussels, 1848-79. 5 vols.) the Correspondance du Cardinal de Granvelle, 1565-1586, edd. Edmond Poullet and Charles Piot (Brussels, 1877-96, 12 vols.), in Collection de Chroniques Beiges; Documents concernant les relations entre le Due d'Anjou et les Pays-Bas, edd. P. L. Muller and Alphonse Diegerick, in vols. 51, 55, 57, 60, and 61 of the nieuwe serie of the Werken van het Historisch Genootschap gevestigd te Utrecht (Utrecht, The Hague, and
; ;
Amsterdam, 1889-99) Apuntamientos para la historia del Rev don Felipe Segundo de Espana, por lo tocante & sus n Iaciones con la Reina Isabel de Inglaterra, desde el ano de 1558 hasta el de 1576," ed.
;
"
Toma\s (ionzalez,
tions politiques des
in
Pays-Bas
R. A. H., Memorias, vii, pp. 249-467; the Relaet de V Angleterre sous le rigne de Philippe
B.
in
II (to 1579), ed.

1882-1900, 11
J.
M.
C, Baron Kervyn de Lettenhove
(Brussels,
vols.),
Politiques de la France et ed. Alexandre Teulet (Paris, 1862, 5 vols.) th< Ambassade en de Jean Ebrard, Seigneur de Saint-Sulpice, de 1562 a 1565, ed.
; ;
Collection de Chroniques Beiges; Relations de I'Espagne avec VEcosse au XVI' xiecle,
Espagne
Edmond
Cable" fAlbi, 1903) and the Dipcches de M. de Fourquevaux, ambassmkur du Roi Charles IX en Espagur, 1566 1572, ed. Celestin Douais (Paris, 1896-1904, 3 vols.). The ('ntdlogo de Documentor
Espafwles exislentes en
jeros de Paris
el
Archivo
del
and it is particularly rich in li.-t-;; The " Conicnmaterial on the field covered by the present chapter. I"- Pai'-es-Hajos, dosdo el ano tarios do lo -ucodido en las Guerrai de de l")t7 hasta el de 1577," by Bernardino do Mondoza, is a vivid rui tive of the military events of those in which the author took an
active part Be kept a careful diary of hi- experiences, and ba hi- book thereon. The first Spanish edition was published at Madrid in 1592, the year after his retirement from the post of ambassador at
by Julian Paz (cf. most important papers which it
sujirn, p. 70) tfives
Minieterio de Xegocios Extran* summaries of the
Paris.
321
in B.
The most convenient Spanish
edition
is
A. E., His-
toriadores de Sucesos Particulares, ii, pp. 389-560, and there is an excellent French translation (Brussels, 1860-63, 2 vols.) in the Collection de
de Belgique. great difficulty of the task of envisaging the history of this period as seen by Philip II is that nearly all the standard books about it have been written from the viewpoint of his enemies.
memoires Later Works.
The
relatifs a Vhistoire
the Spanish side

di
In the seventeenth century, indeed, a number of works appeared on such as Cardinal Guido Bentivoglio's Delia Guerra
Fiandra (Cologne, or Rome, 1632-39, 3 vols.) and Famiano Strada's Bello Belgico (Rome, 1632-47). Both these books were widely read at the time, and were translated, wholly or in part, into English and other languages, but by the nineteenth century they had been wellnigh forgotten, and were principally replaced by such strongly Protestant classics as J. A. Froude's History of England (London, 1856-70, 12 vols.) and J. L. Motley's Rise of the Dutch Republic (New
De
'
'
York, 1856, 3 vols.). The best of the more recent works, however, are not so biassed as these Henri Pirenne's Histoire de Belgique, vols, iii and iv (Brussels, 1907, 1911), Ernest Gossart's L' Etablissement du regime espagnol dans les Pays- B as (Brussels, 1905) and his Domination Espagnole dans les Pays-Bas (Brussels, 1906), and J. H. Mariejol
:
(Paris, 1911), are all notPieter Geyl, The Revolt of the Netherlands {1555-1609) (London, 1932), is the most recent presentation of the subject. Among the monographs of a more special
1
in Lavisse, Histoire de France, vol. vi, pt. able for their accuracy and detachment.
have found most useful are Felix Rachfahl, Margaretha J. M. B. C, Baron Kervyn Leipzig, 1898) de Lettenhove, Les Huguenots et les Gueux (Bruges, 1883-85, 6 vols.) Paul Courteault, Blaise de Monluc, historien (Paris, 1908), which contains a useful bibliography on pp. xxi-xlviii Edmond Falgairolle, Une expedition francaise a Pile de Madere en 1566," in Acad6mie de
nature that
I
von
Parma (Munich and
'
Nlmes, Memoires, vii s6rie, xvii (1894), pp. 67-95; Conyers Read, Mr. Secretary Walsingham and the Policy of Queen Elizabeth (Oxford,
P. O. von Torne, Don Juan d'Autriche et les projets de 1925, 3 vols.) A. O. Meyer, conquete de V Angleterre (Helsingfors, 1915-28, 2 vols.) England and the Catholic Church under Elizabeth, translated by J. R.
; ;
McKee (London,
and R. Lechat, Les refugies anglais dans les 1916) Pays-Bas espagnols durant le regne d' Elisabeth (Lou vain, 1914) this last book is now difficult to obtain, but summaries of its earlier portions
;
be found in the Annuaire of the University of Louvain, Numerous other works of a 1912, pp. 448-464. more special nature are cited, in appropriate places, in the foot(to 1580)
may
1911, pp. 479-484;

notes.
CHAPTER XXXV
THE ANNEXATION OF PORTUGAL
We
to
have several times remarked that Philip, in obedience the wishes of his father, had made it the object of his
twenty years of his reign rather to inheritance than to attempt to enlarge it. Whatfirst
it is
policy during the
guard his
ever his methods,
impossible to deny that the struggle which he was carrying on in the Netherlands and its atall
;
tendant quarrels with England and with France were
of them, in his eyes, of a distinctly defensive character
he was but putting down rebels and those who aided and abetted them. Even Lepanto, if envisaged historically, could scarcely be regarded as an aggression moreover, the
;
benefits of the victory were shared
The Europe. had achieved

tion of
by the whole of Western sole real extensions of territory that Spain

the
enlargements of his
first half of Philip b rule were the American possessions and the acquisithe Philippines, and these had not been won at the
in
expense of any European power

heathen.
they were -imply the logical
fulfilment of Spain's high destiny to carry the Cross to the
157S Philip could honestly maintain that lie had played a strictly defec _ ame. This predominantly defensive character of the king's
to
Down
the year
political
of hit
programme was accurately reflected in the choice most intimate advisers. The Emperor, it will be
lefl
remembered, had
d<
him
full
account of the merits and
of
his
various counsellors,
322
and
had warned him

full
against the danger of giving
any one of them
sway
but,
THE PRINCE OF EBOLI

down
to his death in July, 1573,
it
323
was Ruy Gomez da Silva, Philip's confidence more than any one else, and Eboli's policy was in general that of the maintenance of the status quo. Ruy Gomez was of an ancient Portuguese house, and had come to Spain, while yet a child, in the train of the Empress Isabella. At her desire he had been detailed to the household of the baby Prince Philip; he had helped to dress and to undress the heir to he had accompanied him wherever he went, the throne and usually slept in his room there naturally grew up the
Prince of Eboli,
who enjoyed
clo sest
intim acy between them. 1

of the
In 1553, as a further
mark
royal favor, he was permitted to contract marriage with Anna, the daughter of the Prince of Melito, of the great house of Mendoza as the bride, however, was
;
than thirteen years old at the time of the wedding, she was separated from her husband, in accordance with the common custom of the time not till the end of 1559,
less
;
when
Silva
came back with
Philip from the Netherlands,
did the pair live together as man 2 children in the next twelve years.
and
wife.
They had ten
It was but natural, then, that on Philip's return to Spain the -Princeôf Eboli should become his principal adviser. 3
Of his absolute devotion to the king there could be no doubt. Their vifiws_im the conduct of the government coincided.
.
"Ruy Gomez and
[his]
faction
rule all alone,"
wrote
an English observer in 1563; he "does more than all" the 4 Until 1567 the Duke of rest, reported another in 1565.
1 Muro, La Princesa de Eboli, pp. 23-25; Forneron, i, pp. 235 f. 1 Muro, pp. 18-32. She wa3 the granddaughter of the Count of Melito, who was viceroy of Valencia under Charles V. Cf. ante, Vol. Ill, pp. 106112. She was second cousin to Diego Hurtado de Mendoza, the famous statesman and author, to Antonio de
Mendoza, the first viceroy of New Spain, and to Bernardino de Mendoza ambassador. Vol. the lvi the of D. I. E. contains numerous documents concerning her career. 3 Michele Soriano (1559) in Alberi, Relazioni, serie i, iii, p. 381. * C. S. P., Foreign, 1563, no. 1192; 1564-65, no. 1629.
324
Alva might possibly have maintained that he headed a war party in the Council in opposition to him but when in that
;
year the
Duke was
sent off to the Netherlands, the ascend1
Hu\ ancy of Eboli became more obvious than ever. G6mez was in fact the only minister the king ever had who was really permitted to exercise any measure of independent authority.
establishment of his
s it
But Eboli was not
satisfied
with the
on, after his death, to those
own preeminence; he who shared

First
it
laid his plans to
his
views on
the conduct of the government.
was
his creature
the secretary Francisco de Eraso, whose career
was
ulti-
mately ruined by his peculations.

it
Then
for a brief space
was
'anlinal Espinosa,
whose insolence mounted
so high
meeting by and died the next day. bed, de Fresneda, bishop of Cuenca, and confessor to was another of the same school. 2 But by r ar
that he
was insulted
his
in full Council
the king,
went home to
Bernardo
the
kirn:,
the most
famous and ablest

nearest
to
of
them
:t
all,
and the one who came
succeeding to
in
on Eboli's death
the place which became vacant 1573, was the fascinating AntonioJ^&rez,
the illegitimate son of Gonzalo Perez, archdeacon of Septil-
veda,
who had been recommended by him

This Perez was born
patent
favorite of
1
the
Emperor and was
to Philip II.
in
l.">:; 1,
and
eight years later received
of legitima cy
from Charles V.
He was
given an
excellent education, both a1 Aleala
and beyond the Pyrenees, and was early associated with the work of the government, where his keen intelligence, Wealth of expedients, and almost
unlimited capacity for hard work soon won him favorable
.<
/'
.'
LM6-48.IXM
J.i'i f.
L,
L810, p
On
July
29,
aooording
a
to
ftftuo,
'.2l(>9. a
ad ntferanoMin
86, not)
'
ron,
1
I
i,
pp
Mignet, Anton
LI.
/'
el
Philippi
onmm,
pp.
ind
II, p.
n-fi-ronrvs th*f*.
RISE OF ANTONIO PEREZ

attention.
325
upon him more and more did he instil into him his ideas; more and more obvious did it daily become that it was Perez who was destined ultimately to fill his place and continue his Philip had been thoroughly won over to him by policy.
did Eboli depend
;
More and more
the time that Eboli died.
Men
;
marvelled at the
way
in
which the young upstart was suffered to beard the Duke of Alva at the royal dining table and the canny ones took note of the fact that it was Perez who decided, when the despatches of the day were deciphered, what matters were to be communicated to the Council, and what matters were to
be reserved for the king. It was also by Perez that the evil custom of the sale of public offices, which had rapidly increased since the days of the Emperor, was for the first
he was intrusted time erected into an established system with the distribution of the plums, and was liberally re;
warded by the
recipients.
2
made him enemies.
So rapid a rise not unnaturally After he had been in the saddle two
or three years, the elements
destined to effect his

a
began to combine which were overthrow, and ultimately to give

development
of
new and
totally unexpected trend to the
the Spanish Empire.
The events which

the coj fidant of
1,
led to the
murder
it
of
Juan de Escovedo,
Don John
effects
of Austria,
1578, and the
which
on the night of March produced, have been re-
counted
case
many
times, in different ways,

is
by many
different
historians.
;
There
no lack
is
;
of material bearing
on the
story
the sole real difficulty

is
what
to believe.
4
The
that
told
by (Mignet3 Gachard,
* *
and Forneron, 5 and

74
ff.
'Juan Beneyto Perez, Los medios de Cultura y la Centralization bajo Felipe II (Madrid, 1927), pp. 93, 109. 1 Mignet, Antonio Perez et Philippe II,
PP-llf.
Ibid., pp.
Don
3.
Carlos
et
Philippe II, p. 207,

iii,
note
6
Histoire de Philippe II,
pp. 52
ff .
326
received the most general acceptance until the latter part of the nineteenth century, lays the original blame at the
door of the Princess of Eboli.
It represents her as having been the mistress of Philip, as well as the wife of his chief minister; it emphasizes the fact that one, at least, of the
she had supposedly borne to her husband was strikingly like the king; it then goes on to point out (what
children
no one, except Froude, denies) that after the death of her husband she also became the mistress of Pe>ez, whom she
vastly preferred to Philip, that their liaison was discovered one day in dramatic fashion by Escovedo, and that P6rez
felt it
necessary to have
him made away with
in order to
it
prevent him from reporting the facts to the king. Finally describes how Perez, by a diabolically clever series of
reports and insinuations, so succeeded in poisoning Philip's ear against Escovedo, that he ultimately obtained a formal written order to have him assassinal id, thus confalse
verting
into
what had been a grave
peril to his
;
own
position
for he now had evidence an actual strengthening of it which he could hold in terrorem over the king, if ever the
latter should
abandon him. But other them Ranke, Froude, and eminent historians, among Lafuente, have rightly pointed out thai H was not very likely that a woman who had become the mother of ten children
seem inclined
to
black patch within the space of twelve years, and wore 2 her right eye. should have been capable of eomr
:t
the allegiance both of the king and of his chief minister. They also emphasize the fact that the cir-
manding
cumstances under which Perez was subsequently to write

l
Cf doeomenta in
.
AntontK
i, j. i-
/.
.'I.
Pidal, Philippe II, royaumt </' Araoon,
'Froude (The SpanUh Story
Armada and
pp.
19,
is
other
Historical
of th? Essays,
.-15.
good reproduction of her portrait by BctoahM Coallo forms the frontispiece to Muro's Princtsa de Eholi.
'A
118 f.) is particularly eiolenl denunciation of Mignct's views; of. also Muro, La Princesa de tSbcii, pp. 249 f.
bii
THE MURDER OF ESCOVEDO

his Relaciones
327
make it difficult to put faith in their veracity but they are confronted, in turn, with the serious difficulty of explaining the reasons for the murder of Escovedo. In
;
became jealous of Escovedo's prominence at the court, and so worked on Philip's dread of his influence with Don John that he finally persuaded the king to give orders to have him put out of the way, and this is perhaps the least improb* able solution at any rate the deed was done six armed men, all hirelings of Perez, lay in wait for Escovedo in the streets of Madrid at night, killed him with a single thrust,
general, they take the line that Perez suddenly
;
Cf. here M. A. S. Hume, "El Enigma de Antonio Perez," in his

l
"Un Dramma
Filippo
II,"
politico alia corte di in the Nuova Rivista
Espanoles
Ingleses,
pp.
and A. Lang, "The
Murder
167-203 of Es;
Storica, viii (1924), pp. 264-303, 442, to which further reference
416will
covedo," in his Historical Mysteries, 32-54. pp. Major Hume's theory is that Philip, for political reasons, ordered Escovedo's assassination in the autumn of 1577 that, before it could be accomplished, he ceased to desire it, but neglected to countermand the order, and that Perez, six months anxious for later, when he became private reasons to get rid of Escovedo, made use of the royal command, which Philip no longer wished fulfilled, to shield him from the consequences of his crime. P. O. von Tome's Don Juan d'Autriche et les projets de conquSte de I'Angleterre, ii, pp. 173-176, is also ^vell worth reading on the murder of Escovedo. Torne steers clear of any investigation of the relations of Philip and Perez to the Princess of Eboli, but he emphasizes the fact "que l'hostilite de Perez envers son collegue etait de date assez recente," and later, that "le malheureux a su quelque chose qui etait desagreable pour Perez, et c'est evidemment cette connaissance fatale de faits dont, le cas echeant, il pourrait se servir pour nuire a celui-ci, qui a fini par perdre notre secretaire si malencontreux. L'expose que Mignet donne sur cette question nous semble tout a fait concluant." Cf. also Angela Valente,
;
be
made on
p. 346.
books have been recently pubby Jose Fernandez Montana, De Cdmo Felipe II no mand6 matar a Escobedo, the other, in 1929, by Louis Bertrand, Philippe II, une tenebreuse affaire, which bring forward a number of arguments to show that the king was guiltless of complicity in the assassination of Escovedo. It is true that it is possible to throw doubt on the authenticity of the famous marginal annotation in Philip's hand (printed in Pidal, Philippe II, Antonio Perez, et le royaume d'Aragon, i, pp. 358, 360) on which the strongest evidence
lished, one, in 1910,
Two
the king's guilt rests; it is also undeniable that it is possible to read a variety of different meanings into it On the (cf. Bertrand, pp. 89 f.). other hand, to maintain that Philip was morally incapable of such an act and this after all is the fundamental contention both of Fernandez Montana and of Bertrand seems to us absurd. (Cf. G. Muro, Vida de la Princesa de The absence of conEboli, pp. 74 f.) clusive evidence of his guilt would doubtless make it impossible to convict him today in a court of law but it is certainly difficult to believe that he was wholly innocent.
of
:i

their
and reaped
promised reward.
1
The
position of the
king's minister
now seemed
established beyond the possi-
bility of further challenge.
But the inevitable jealousies were speedily aroused.
No
one was particularly anxious to avenge Escovedo, 2 but many coveted for themselves the place that Perez had obtained,
and resolved to
depriving him of
aspiring rivals
utilize
3
it.
the situation for the purpose of Perhaps the most dangerous of these
;
was the crafty Mateo Vazquez de Leca a miserable orphan of Seville, who had made a name for himself as an informer, and subsequently became one of the 4 secretaries of the famous Junta de Noche; he convinced
himself that, by insinuating that Perez had persuaded Philip to sanction the murder of Escovedo under false
pretences, he
influence
it
would ultimately be able to undermine the and position of the minister with the king. But
was a long time, as usual, before Philip could be induced and the blow finally fell when it was leasl expected. All through the spring and early summer of 1579 he conto act,
tinued to assure Perez of his confidence and friendship; on the night of July 28 he labored with him o\ er sundry papers
until ten o'clock,
and ordered him to return
for further
work
An hour after he had left the on the following morning. Perez was arrested and taken to the house of one of king,
the royal alcaldes.
who had gone out with

Perez's
Shortly afterward- the Princess of Eboli, the intention of passing the night at
made haste
house, was informed of what had happened, and to return to her own home, to find the royal
She was speedily sent alguacUes awaiting her at her door. off to the Torre de Pinto, three Leagues south of Madrid,
>Mi| 'Save possibly
tht picture infra, p. 576.
99.
hi*
son,
who comes
lutr;
cf.
MiKncf. pp. 424-430. Forneron, iii, p. 263, and rafan
ten
years
there.
ARREST OF ANTONIO PEREZ
329
where she suffered so cruelly that she finally obtained permission to repair to her own castle of Pastrana and remain
a prisoner there.
1
Philip
careful
had not struck in this dramatic fashion without preparation and forethought. The arrest of Perez
;
was more than the end of a ministry it marks the termi nation of awhole policy and system of government, which
for lack of a better Jiame
we may
call
the Eboli system.
we have already had been the maintenance of the status quo jxnnted out, it was the principle which Charles V had recommended toChet/ Philip in his instructions it was the principle which Eboli, under Philip's guidance, had developed; it was the princiNow it was to ple which Perez had inherited from Eboli. and exchanged for a different policy, more be thrown over This exchange positive, more adventurous, more imperial. its consequences, moreover, mark a deep dividing line, and not only in the reign of Philip II, but also in the whole
The
essential principle of that system, as
;
history of the development of the Spanish
sense
Empire in a was the beginning of the push over the precipice. We have summarized the unedifying stoiy of the personal jealousies and secret intrigues which furnished the background for it as seen from Madrid now we can turn to the far more significant task of seeking to discover what the deeper reasons for it were. The murder of Escovedo was by no means the only, or even the most important, cause, of
;
it
the ruin of Antonio Perez.
Just at the time

their
we have been recounting reached
when the events climax, a new oppor-
jtunity_for imperial aggrandizement
had presented itself to Philip, which he was determined to embrace, and which he was convinced from the outset would render indispensable
1
D.
I. E.,
70-73,
and
i, pp. 95 f. vii, pp. 268 references there.

;
f.
Mignet, pp. 133-135
Forneron,
iii,
pp.
330
to

service- of a
him the
of
man
of
much
larger vision than the
lover of the Princess of Eboli.
Exactly one year after the
Escovedo, and four months previous to the arrest of Perez. Philip had written to Rome to call Cardinal Gran-
murder
velle of
across to Spain to bear aid in

of Portugal.
the tremendous task
It was not without annexing the empire that he was unable to find a Spaniard to help significance
him
in
We
the solution of a problem so exclusively Iberian. 1 have not encountered Cardinal Granvelle since the
early days of
Margaret of Parma and the Consulhi in the whence it will be remembered that he had been Netherlands,
given permission to 'retire' in the year 1564. The next twenty-one months he spent in his native city of Besan<;on in Franche Comtek, vainly striving to busy himself with the
patronage of letters and

for
lajcjc
art,
and
really eating his heart out

free si'o\n-
of a political office in
which he could give
to his talents for ruling men.'of Philip,
rather reluctant
command
and the
call of
the conclave for the choice of a
successor to Pope Pius IV, gave him an excuse for departing for Rome in the last days of 1">65. The election of Pius V
took place while he was on his way there but after his arrival he found useful and honorable employment in connection with the preparations for the great effort against the Turk which was to culminate so gloriously at Lepanto;
no
Bhare of the credil for thai greal victory belongs, in From Rome, in April, L571, he was sent to fact, to him. Xapli- to assume the office of viceroy left vi 'ant by the
Miiall
I
;
Mike of Alcala and there, during the next four he wrestled manfully with the proverbially various year.-, and vexatious problems associated with the administration ol
death of the
that
1
moat
am
difficult
of Spain's Italian dependencies.

86.
'
When
<
Cf.
Martin PhflippsOD, Kfl IftfM*

/'/.</,/>/<
//.
Kiiniinnl
Hc/i
rtal
<
'rum
ltd,
pp.
'inttUa
span
cfun
[1678
L3
16
SUMMONING OF GRANVELLE
in
331
May,
1572, a
new conclave was
called at
Rome
to elect
a successor to Pius V, he hastened thither, and within nineteen hours of his arrival brought about the unanimous choice
of
Gregory XIII.
One
reason, indeed,
why
Granvelle was
so successful in Naples during the next three years
because his services to the

cooperation in a
new
pontiff
was him amity and gave
quarter in which, according to the Neapolithere had always been hostility and distrust. 1 tan tradition, His friendship with Gregory, moreover, was of the utmost
value to
to
him when
Rome
to give help
ambassador.
he was sent back and advice to the resident Spanish So high did he stand in the confidence of the
in the spring of 1575
all
Pope that he soon took precedence over
the rest of
Philip's representatives on the ground. The king was forced to recognize the value of his services and the wisdom of his
had never done before, and asked his opinion 2 with increasing frequency and insistence. Granvelle was at this time some sixty years old. 3 His character had been tested by prosperity and adversity, and his knowledge of mankind had been ripened by experience. He had been brought up to believe that the incontestable supremacy of the house of Hapsburg was a cornerstone of
counsels as he
the development of Europe, indeed, almost an essential to the maintenance of civilization, and he never wavered in
that faith.
ness for ruling, he never
characteristic was a fonddreamed of trying to exercise it the advancement of his Hapsburg master of his
If his
;
own dominant
except for
loyalty to the
dynasty there could be absolutely no doubt. That the supremacy of the Hapsburgs should have become
of recent years so inseparably associated
1
with Spain was

20,
Philippson, Kardinal Granvella, pp.

Ibid.,
Countries.
3
21
f.
2
He was born August

3.
1517.
He was a violent pp. 24 f. opponent of Alva's policy in the Low
Philippson, p.
332
doubtless
in
TIIK
ANNEXATION OF PORTUGAL
misfortune.
in
his ryes a
it
ferred the picture as

reign,
in
was
prethe early part of the Emperor's
He would have
with the centre of gravity north of the Pyrenees; view of his origin, that could scarcely have been other-
wise.
Hut
it
was not
in
Granvelle's nature to waste time
and energy in vain efforts to alter established facts. Fate had decreed that the policy of the house of Hapsburg should he directed, for the time being at least, from Madrid
from Madrid and the Escorial it was therefore necessary to take orders. The most he could permit himself to do was to caution his sovereign against the
and the Escorial;
dangers of too rapid an Hispanicizat ion of the principles and
Now. personnel of the government of the Low Countries. however, in midsummer, 1578, an event had occurred which
threw the
the
the Netherlands, hitherto all-prominent, the centre of interesl was to shift from into the background
affairs of
;
Low
act in
Countries to the Spanish peninsula the great drama of Austriae est imperan
it
'
The
next
<>rhi
universe
was the irony of was to be performed on Iberian soil, and the Burgundian ('.ranvclle. who had proved fate that
the Netherinsufficiently Spanish to satisfy his sovereign in should have been selected, to the exclusion of aspiring lands,
Spanish rivals, to hear aid in the gathering in of the PortuWas it because twenty years of the guese inheritance Eboli system had exterminated the generation of great
empire builders
in
Spain
that
Philip
for vasl
found
it
necessary,
now
that
fresh
to
opportunity
expansi
suddenly
ealed
itself,
bury
all
his inherited
foreigners,
and
'.'
to call in, to help
him grasp
prejudices against a chief minister it

.
from outside
r.
ii
:>.l
.in
Interesting
paragraph
Ingi
in
inn
>>ut
Laview, yi, L,pp.206f., how in 1578 Philip rodry in

lii.M
<iral-
and with England, with with the rebels in the Low Counti In order thai he might oonosntrata lii resources on Portugal.
I
CASTILE
AND PORTUGAL
333
the attainment in the .twelfth century of independent national existence by the kingdom of Portugal, the sovereigns of Castile had persistently striven to reannex
since
jt.
Ever
During the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries they sought, for the most part, to gain their end by war but the battle of Aljubarrota was a lesson not easily forgotten, and from 1385 onward they generally preferred to have recourse
;
to the pleasanter
method
of marriage.
John
II of Castile
married a Portuguese princess, who became the mother of Isabella the Catholic. Isabella, the eldest daughter of the Catholic Kings, married Affonso, the son of King John II
of Portugal,
and
after his death in 1491, his cousin
King
the Fortunate; after her death in 1498, Emmanuel married her younger sister Maria, and after Maria's death in 1517, he took as his third wife her niece Eleanor,
the sister of Charles V.
Emmanuel
Charles V's wife was his
first
cousin Isabella of Portugal, the daughter of Emmanuel of Portugal and of his second wife Maria and Philip IPs first
;
wife
was
also his
own
first
cousin, Maria, the daughter of his
But despite
aunt Catharine and of the Portuguese King John III. all these efforts to unite the two dynasties, a
Portuguese heir, with an unimpeachable title, had hitherto been invariably on hand to keep all Castilian claimants from
the Lusitanian throne.
the reign of Philip II

of his sister
it
During the first twenty years of was his nephew Sebastian, the son
Joanna and of his first wife's brother John, that blocked the hopes of the Prudent King for a reannexation of the western realm.
There can be no doubt that the ambitions of the Castilian
sovereigns to gain control of the destinies of Portugal were enhanced by the speed at which the value of the prize increased before their eyes. Portugal in the days of Alju-
barrotta had been but a
little strip
along the west coast
334

Peninsula
;
of the Iberian
it
now,
in the
days of Philip
II,
1
mighty empires The genius of Henry the Navigator had furnished the inspiration; the capture (1415) of Ceut a- across the Strait of
Gibraltar gave
a
had become one
of the
of the world.
starting point
by the time that Columbus
had discovered the

they had slowly
World, the Portuguese had occupied the Azores, the Madeira group, and the Cape Verde Islands
felt their
New
way dow
n the
west coast of Africa,

;
establishing trading posts as they went they had rounded the Cape of Good Hope and reached Algoa Bay in 14sti. In
the next two decades their advance was more rapid
still.
have already spoken of Cabral and Brazil, and of the Tordesillas Line by which Portugal was 2 given title to it, but that, in the eyes of the Portuguese
of his discovery of
We
of that day,
after
all,
was only
a subsidiary affair;
the Spaniards,
desired
Islands.
was
had got ahead of them in the West; what they id the Spice to find an eastern route to India
;
In
addition
to
circumnavigating
the
("ape
of
Good Hope, they had begun

of getting to the East
to investigate the possibilities

1
In 188, Pedro da by the Red Sea. Covilham had crossed from Aden to 'am.noiv, whence he had passed on to Calicut and Goa, and thence recrossed Then in 197 cam! the greal voyage to Sofala in Africa.
(
1
of
Vasco da Grama, the reaping of the fruits that had been -own by undaunted predecessors. Rounding the ("ape of
in
Good Hope
November
of thai
still
Coast of Africa, covering the
year he passed up the east unexplored stretch between

its
AlgOS Bay and Sofala and completing

'The eventi reoorded
fcinr in
circumnavigation.
i,
the
next
paragraphi ure
ii'li"!
peupfoi
euro pte nt,
Portugal
19
:in
ri
well known thai rth while to Rive
Eapagne (Paria and Brueeele, and it contains (pp. )<7 117

inirable
ad-
reference! fox
,,f
Dote*. nta
(, n,.
in
tin'
them in footl-*t modern no-
that
'/-
nf
Chariee de
I.
Lannoy
in
xil,
and
//
'
H. nn.in
vender
/'. j-
in
/hi
den. !>.
their
il.
Liate dee ouvragee ooneult for the guidance <>f those who wi.sh I" puraue the eubject further Cf. ante, Vol. II, pp. 202-204, 212 1
"
THE PORTUGUESE IN AFRICA AND INDIA
335
Then, from Melinde, where he obtained a pilot, he crossed in twenty-three days to the Malabar Coast near Calicut,
where the jealousy of the Arab traders already established on the spot prevented his being given the most cordial of thence he passed north to Cananore and Goa, receptions
;
and
of
finally got
home
epics,
to Lisbon in September, 1499.
It
was
a magnificent achievement,
and a
it
fit
subject for the greatest
Portuguese
but
if
extent of
its possibilities,
it
was to be utilized to the full was essential to follow it up.
The
unfriendliness of the rajah of Calicut promised to spell the ruin of the great scheme on which the Portuguese
sovereigns
seize the
had already staked their fortunes, namely, to monopoly of the commerce of the Eastern Seas, and to prevent all others from navigating thereon and the lesson was reenforced by the experience of Pedro Alvares Cabral, who, after touching at Brazil (April, 1500), had also made his way to Calicut. In his case there had been far more than latent hostility there actual fighting had taken The inference was obvious. A great military place. demonstration was imperative, and in February, 1502, Vasco da Gama was again sent out to make it. Quiloa on the East African coast and Calicut in India were successRival fleets were burnt and their crews fully bombarded. tortured. Cochin, Quilon, and Cananore were forced at
;
;
the cannon's
mouth
to renounce
all
commercial relations
except with the Portuguese. Such action was not merely

of
an affront to the rulers

;
East Africa and the Malabar Coast

all
it
was a challenge
hitherto.
to
those
who had traded with them
The
interests of the sultan of

of the
merchants of
Hostilities
Egypt were affected, as were those Arabia and even of the republic of
far larger scale
Venice.
in the
on a
were inevitable
prepared for
near future
and
in order to
be
fully
336

Bent out, in the spring of 1505, a
fleet
them King Emmanuel

of
twenty
ships, with 1500 soldiers.
Command was
given
to an experienced soldier, Francisco de Almeida,
who was
granted the
office for
title of
three years.
viceroy of the Indies and was to hold Those three years were filled with
wellnigh uninterrupted fighting against African and Asiatic Almeida was almost uniformly successful; so much foes.
when his term of office had expired, refused to yield his authority to Affonso de Albuquerque, he who had been sent out to take his place. Not till after he
so, in fact, that in 150S,
had established the supremacy
of Portugal in India by the Egyptian fleet in February, 1509, in a great defeating battle off Diu, did he consent to hand over his authority to
his
Albuquerque was the greatest of all the Less cautious than Almeida, Portuguese empire builders. he believed that his country was destined to be the mistress of the East, and he was convinced that in order to hold tinsuccessor.
Indian Ocean
it
was
it.
essential to obtain undisputed possession
of all its principal ports,

trolled access to
He put
and especially of those which conthis idea into practice on his
voyage out to India. As he passed up tin East African coast, he discovered Madagascar, which had hitherto been unperceived; in August, 1507, he seized the island of
Ormuz in the Bocotra, and constructed a fort there. but iti February, next year he took but could not hold
;
1510, he possessed himself of Qoa, and made it the chief r.iitrc "i Portuguese power in the Bast. The following which he seized, thus gain* year he went on to Malacca, ing control of the access to the Spice Islands;
thereafter
he returned
put
the
to
the
Malabar Coast, and

the edifice
establishing
later
of his
in
March, 1515,
power
in
cap-.-tone on
former achievethe
ment*
by
definitely
the
Portuguese
at
(loa,
Ormuz.
Nine
months
he died
AFFONSO DE ALBUQUERQUE
heart of the great empire whose chief founder he
to be.
337
may
claim
None of the viceroys who succeeded Albuquerque during but the next sixty years was anywhere nearly his equal
;
their average level
was
distinctly high,
solidifying
and under them

the
the
work
of
extending and
steadily
establishments
particularly
progressed.
Various
to
efforts,
Portuguese not
Africa
;
successful,
were
made
explore
enough was discovered of Abyssinia to put an end to the famous myth of Prester John, which had been generally
believed in Europe for centuries past. Portuguese navigators also penetrated to the heads of the Red Sea and the
Persian Gulf
it
as to the color
dispelled.
was by them that the persistent delusions of the former were finally and definitely
still
More notable
were their achievements
in
the Far East.
In the years after Albuquerque's seizure of
Malacca the Portuguese circumnavigated Sumatra, passed on to Java, Amboina, and the Moluccas, visited New Guinea and Borneo, and, in all probability, touched the
northern coast of Australia.
They
also followed
up the
shores of Asia to the northward.
In 1518 they were at
to
Canton, and in the next three years they sent ambassadors Nanking and Peking. In 1542 they landed in Japan, and t3ven years later St. Francis Xavier began his efforts
to establish the Christian religion there.
But while the con-
version of the natives
was one
of the chief objects of these
early builders of the Portuguese empire, they did not attack the problem in quite the same way as did the Spaniards in
the
New
World.
Official
Christianization
was
in
their
eyes indispensable for every one with whom they proposed to do business, in other words, for those who lived in or near
the great centres of Portuguese power on the coast. No deviation or backsliding was tolerated, hence the cruel
338
persecutions which got the Portuguese such an evil name in On the other hand, they made little the days to conic.
provide for the instruction of those that they had brought into the fold, and they scarcely troubled themselves at all about the natives of the back country. This
effort to
policy
religious expression of the fundamental the Portuguese Empire as an empire for conception Provided its founders trading purposes and little more.
of
was but the
were conceded the monopoly of the commerce of the lands and the seas that fell within their line of demarcation, they
were not, for the most part, anxious to assume further The }' made few serious attempts to peneresponsibilities.
1
on whose shores they had had no idea of forcing the They local rulers and their peoples to acknowledge themselves subjects of their own home government in the way that the Spaniards had done in the New World paymenl o\' a tribute
trate into the interior of the lands
established themselves.
was the utmost that they demanded. They trusted to a vast chain of coastal fortresses and trading posts to enable them to keep the commerce of the Orient exclusively in their hands, and with that they were content. These scattered holdings were divided for purposes of
administration into seven differenl
provinces, comprising the so-called Eatado da India, and b1 retching around together
in
magnificent succession from the ('ape of

1
Good Mope
to
Japan.
i
The
viceroy,
who
resided
at
Goa, had practically
absolute power under the crown;

Cf. lifiv J. Siisiroz Ini-lan, (hurra a\
pp.
Anexidn en Portugal, ii, Gioan Francesco Morosini

,
170 f. il.VMi in
he is correctlj described On fills. 288 v 289 the author gives nummary of the annual revenues ol
it
t
lie
kinn,
amounting
this
to
2, 050,
000
UU-ri, /.' eerie l,V, pp. 298 311. B. M., Add. Me. 29,444, fole. 276-289, " is an Italian Discorso ill Portogallo," describing the country and its depends fit it the time of Sebaatian;
Possiede il Re Sebastiano ix-gins Portogallo P di qaeeto Dombre

.
"
ill
.
Portugal and ducati 1,000,000 Alganre provided the Atlantic inlands, 200,000; only; InIndian and African possessions. with unposte on the spice trade and other commerce, 1,450,000.
ducats.
t
Of
sum
."
THE PORTUGUESE EMPIRE

by a contemporary writer
India."
as the "true king
339
and God
of
All the local authorities were responsible to him; the residencia which he was obliged to undergo at the expiration of his term of office was really a farce, for the
consequences of making a complaint were likely to be so The serious that it was the part of wisdom to refrain.
entire
suit
system was honeycombed with corruption. The purof wealth was the universal aim, and every other con-
sideration
was
sacrificed to
it.
Bribery became so
common
ceased to be regarded as a crime. If there was no way of attaining the desired end, it was always possible to leave the native trader unpaid.
that
it
other
These conditions had their inevitable reaction on Portugal In the first place, the colonial establishment which herself.
she was attempting to maintain was greatly in excess of her the call for sailors and soldiers denuded the capabilities
;
countryside and brought agriculture and pasturage to a standstill. The desire to participate in the trade of the
Orient contributed in another
results.
way
to produce the
same
Every one was determined to get to Lisbon, which was the centre of it the population of the capital increased by leaps and bounds, and its luxury and wealth were the marvel of all beholders. But this outward splendor failed to conceal from the keener minds the unsoundness of the foundation on which it rested. The country was flooded with African slaves, and manual labor was more and more
;
despised.
had been drained away across the seas; the army that was left at home was scarcely worthy of the name. Finally, King Sebastian, last scion of the house of Avis, was the despair of all who still hoped to escape Castilian bondage. He had succeeded his grandfather John III in 1557, at the age of three, but from his childhood onward "he had lacked the greatest blessing
best blood in the nation
The
340
that
a

ruler can have,
namely
a
l
wise
man
at his side in
whom
king.
he could put his
trust.''
Though by no means
a
destitute of fine qualities, he
was
perfectly impracticable
in
Leaving the government
largely
the hands of
others, he disciplined himself
by rigorous military training and the severest forms of asceticism. The sole national
enterprise which could evoke his enthusiasm was the project of a crusade against the infidels of Morocco; moreover, as
arrange a marriage for him proved unavailing, there was no hope of an heir to take his place. 2
all
efforts to
It
will
be readily believed that Philip,
who
on the accuracy and completeness
of his information
prided himself on the
course of events in every corner of Kurope, had kept in intimate touch with everything that had occurred in Portugal since his return to Spain in 1559. The closeness of the
Madrid gave and the Portugn origin of the Prince of Eboli furnished him abundant means; but the instrument which he chiefly made use of for the
relationships between the courts of Lisbon and
him an
excellent excuse for doing this,
purpose was his Portuguese counsellor, Cristobal de
Moura.
in
Moura had come
to Spain
in
L554, at
the age of sixteen,
the train of the Princess Joanna, the '^ter of Philip and the mother of Sebastian, after the death of her husband
Like his compatriot Eboli, John, the son of King; John III. he had risen rapidly in the favor of the Spanish monarch
he
WM
made
a
knight of Calatrava and later of Alcantara,

posts about the COUrl
do
;
and given
1
variety of important
8tb
I>rli
'
10.
Jeronimn Frnnr-hi di Conostaggio, uniom il.l Regno 't> Portogalln alia r Qenoa, i~> s >), fol. Tha lataal biography ia by Aiitero
-
gueiredo (6th ad., Lisbon, Lfl *Cf. Diogo BarboM Maehadoi Mopara a Historic and Jose, Conde de 8& Ebfamede, Dow tn et Philippe 11 (Pari*, l^ Original material on the variou8 off.
Antero
made t" trrangc a maariagc fur Srbaatian will be found in the B. M., Add.
Mas. 28,403-28,407.
comprrh.wl,.m
<j
c.overno
del
Rcy D.
SEBASTIAN OF PORTUGAL
but, as the years
341
went on, it became increasingly obvious that his principal sphere of usefulness would be in connection with the developments in his native land. In the autumn
1565 he was sent thither to discover the truth of reports which had reached Madrid to the effect that Sebastian was
of
He was also very useful in helping to sexually impotent. settle various differences which had arisen between those
who were managing
Sebastian's
grandmother Catharine, his great-uncle Cardinal Henry, and his cousin Antonio, the and he kept Philip fully informed of all prior of Crato the successive proposals which were made for Sebastian's
his
;
minority
the government of Portugal during
policy of the Prudent King all through He was deterthis early period was perfectly consistent. to possess himself of the Porminedj when the time came,
marriage.
The
tuguese inheritance. On the other hand, he had no intention of hurrying the inevitable, or of putting in his claims His sole object for the present before his rights were clear.
that was going on, to be certain that nothing was done to the prejudice of his own lawful interests.
was and
to keep himself fully apprised of
all
It
was Sebastian's enthusiasm

;
for crusading that
matters to the final crisis

of the
for the conquest
Moors
across the Strait of
brought and conversion Gibraltar became, as he

life.
grew up, the one absorbing passion of his

a reconnoitring expedition to
He made
Morocco in 1574, and would doubtless have started campaigning there and then, had it not been for the opposition of his grandmother Catharine
home, and the refusal of his uncle Philip to furnish him with the support for which he asked. On his return to Portugal he at once set about making ready for a renewal of the attempt. In December, 1576, there was held the
at
1
Danvila y Burguero, Cristobal de Moura, pp. 109-133.
342
famous interview between him and the Prudent King at

the monastery of ( ruadalupe in Estremadura, rich in crusading traditions and in memories of the battle on the Salado.
Once more Sebastian begged

and the
latter did his
for
li
is
uncle's cooperation,
his
utmost to dissuade
1
nephew from
his intended enterprise, or at least
from taking
command
of
the expedition himself.

to counsels of caution
his
;
But Sebastian refused

15,
to listen
he went back to Lisbon and continued

1578) of his
to
preparations.
The death (February

influence,
grandmother Catharine served

a
principal
restraining
remove what had been and the remonstrances
of Philip's
new ambassador, Juan de Silva, were impatiently waved aside. The situation in Morocco, indeed, was The Turkish certainly such as augured well for his projects.
suzerainty there had not been established in any >u<-h fashion as at Tunis or at Algiers. The throne was disputed
between
number
(
of
hostile
claimants,
non
of
whom
bore any love to
'onstant inople, though

aid in effecting the
some were not too

dethronement of a
Abd-Allah
the legitimate sovereign, Abouhad been sustaining an unequal Mohammed, contesl against his two uncles, Abd-el-Malek and Abu-elAbbas, who were supported against him by the Porte. So
rival.
proud hated
to solicit
its
Since
L573
well
hal they succeeded that Mohammed, utter several vain efforts to gather his adherents ami induce them to
1
Then-
is
reason to think thai this
waa originally arranged by Sebulunsellors, who were themin in '1 (< him to :il>:tii<li>n salt ea Mint hi* his but project, hoped "unkle the Kinge oi Bpayne by his autoritie and experience might diewade Urn from tl chargeable sad daungeroui an enterprise." Cf.
interview
1
-
1 1
.-
1 1 > l
back t" Portugal believing tli.a waa going to lu-1 1 him; at Bernardo da Cms, Chronica, caps. xxxvi I, and Coneetaggio, paMi'm; hln. The Duke <>f Alva 13vff. and the Marquis de los V61es, who were present :it the interview, wen
wenl
hi*
uncle
oi
100 f. i. Angjeterre, pp. no trustworthy evidence thai Philip gave Bebastian any real encouragement, though thl ippanntlj
Then
is
the opinion that Philip oould not possibly persuade Sebattian to give up hia expedition, bu1 thai In- might try to g'-t it postponed to another year. istries, Ingleterre, i, pp. ~2'.i f.
SEBASTIAN AND MOROCCO
343
a stand, had passed over to Spain to get the aid of Philip II in the recovery of his dominions. During the
spring of the year 1577, he and his victorious kinsmen across the Strait bid against one another for the friendship of the
make
Spanish monarch; but Philip, who was fully alive to the perils of North African campaigning, was determined from the outset not to support the dispossessed claimant. Despite
the fact that his enemies were, ostensibly at least, in alliance with the Porte, he felt that it was safer to let them alone,
and urged Sebastian to follow his example. But the remained deaf to Philip's advice. His Portuguese king crusading ardor was deeply stirred. The fact that the actual rulers of Morocco were supported by Constantinople was in his eyes an added reason for attacking them, and the prom1
ise of
Mohammed
that, in case he
was
successful,
he would
turn over the port of Arzila to his Christian allies, did the rest. Sebastian threw himself heart and soul into preparations for an expedition in the following spring.
He was
undismayed by the difficulty of finding soldiers to accompany him and of collecting the necessary funds. He applied to Philip for help, and obtained a certain amount of munitions
and supplies; nothing, however, would induce the Prudent monarch to furnish the detachment of troops which
;
was requested the state of affairs in the Low Countries was made an excuse. Until the last moment Philip continued to urge, through his ambassador, Silva, that the enterprise be abandoned, or, at least, that Sebastian himself
should not take part in

foresaw, in disaster, he
it
in
person
if
it
ended, as he
not be laid at his

1
was determined that the fault should 2 door. But Sebastian continued to ignore
i,
note
2
Castries, 1, 341.
Angleterre,
counsellor
pp.
191,
advocating a policy of conciliation in

the
Low
Countries,
was
also
sent to
Philip's
Benito
Arias
Montano,
who had
previously
been
Lisbon in February, 1578, at once to remonstrate against the North African
344

In Juno, 1578, he finally got his
his uncle's remonstrances.
army together
Italians,
a motley horde of some 20,000 Portuguese, and Germans; on the 25th, amid magnificent
ceremonies, the expedition left Lisbon. After a five days' wait :it Cadiz it landed at Arzila, where Mohammed, who
had gone on ahead
to make preparations, was awaiting it with but an insignificant portion of the troops that he had
promised to provide.
story of the next few weeks is briefly told. JThe rashness of Sabastian was only equalled by his ineptitude. He took no pains to establish his base on the coast, or to
The
guard his lines of communications. Insulting messages which reached him from his enemies confirmed him in his
determination to seek them out wherever they were, no He declared that he wished to "conmatter what the risk.
quer with peril"

it
to cowardice.
any one advised caution he attributed The taunts of his foes made him abandon
if
the strong position which he occupied near the coast, and advance inland across a stream which was spanned by a no sooner had he reached tl e other side than single bridge
;
squadron of the enemy's cavalry circled around behind him and cut off all retreat. Finally, Oil August 4, 1578, the hostile armies encountered one another on the great plain of
a
AJcazar-el-Kebir.
During the
first
momenta
of the conflict
one of the two rival uncles of the
infidel pretender, who had been seriously ill for weeks before, died in the litter in which bnt the fact was so well he had been brought to the light
;
Concealed and the plan

laid
of the battle had been so carefully

in
thai
the Christians were

the
k<m|
hftblo
headlong retreat
Arias
d*
before
y
in
expedition, and to extend nnmc <>f the Spaniah kinR.

illi
Muni"'* Oliver,
UotUano
"No
PoUUea
xli,
Felipe II "> Flandet (Madrid,

B.,
iii,
ii. pen tamo* dc lot 'uicioi ravomblee ; Felipe II muy tenidoe en euente dee* d< Cf. Luis puea rquivix."
.
aUo D. I. L027), pp. 303 -UJ; 127 418, and Fonteron, pp. pp< 871 ^77.
BATTLE OF ALCAZAR-EL-KEBIR
345
the fact was known. A panic seized Sebastian's forces within two hours they were scattered in ignoble flight. Many were cut down by the weapons of their pursuing foes
more were drowned
in the river that barred their retreat,
in all probability, Sebastian himself, who, the Portuguese for a long time refused to believe his though death, was never seen alive again his protege, Mohammed, also perished in the waves. Mohammed's surviving uncle,
among them,
all the fruits of the victory and established his dynasty in Morocco in such fashion that it was not to be challenged for years. So weary were the Christians
Abu-el-Abbas, gathered in
of
North African campaigning that there were numbered among those who came to congratulate him on the establishment of his authority, if we may believe the contemporary Moorish chronicle, both representatives of Philip II and also
of the
1 regency in Lisbon. The sad news reached the Portuguese capital on August 2 and eleven days later Sebastian's great-uncle, the 17,
Cardinal Henry, the last male scion of the house of Avis whose descent was unquestionably free from the taint of
was proclaimed king but as he was then in his sixty-seventh year and bound by his clerical vows of celibacy, it was obvious that his reign could be only th'e briefest of
illegitimacy,
; 1 The best contemporary published accounts of the battle of Alcazar-elKebir are those in Conestaggio, fols. 25-50, and in Bernardo da Cruz, caps.
Adriano Anthero, (Lisbon, 1918); Falsos D. Sebastiao," in his Os Falsos Principes (Porto, 1927), pp. 87-
"08
141.
Ixvi-lxx; cf. also Castries, Angleterre, i, pp. 329-338. The best modern ones
those of Suarez Inclan Durand-Lapie. On the various pretenders who took advantage of the popular belief that Sebastian was not dead to impersonate him, cf. Victor de Heaulme, Dom Sebastien et les
are,
perhaps,
and
2 Danvila y Burguero, p. 328. Philip got the news five days earlier, and, at least outwardly, showed great grief. Cf. D. I. E., vii, pp. 229-234; Castries, and S. I., i, Angleterre, i, p. 304 pp. 28 f. He also wrote to the Marquis
;
of
Santa Cruz on August
13,
com-
manding him
to bear aid to the Portu-
mysteres de la bataille d'Alcaâr (Paris, 1854) Miguel d'Antas, Les faux Don Stbastien (Paris, 1866) J. L. d'Aze;
guese in North^ Africa; cf. Altolaguirre Alvaro de Duvale, Bazdn, p.
vedo,
262.
Evocluc&o
do
Sebastianismo
346
1

The opportunity,
:
stop-gaps.
in
other words, which Philip
and
his predecessors
have actually arrived

of the
had long desired Beemed now at last to for the Spanish monarch, as the son
daughter of Emmanuel
Empress
Isabella, the eldest
the Fortunate, had unquestionably the besl legal right to the Portuguese throne as soon as 'animal Henry should die.
(
But there were many
rival claimants.'-
First of all there
was
Antonio, the illegitimate son, by a converted Jewess, <>i Louis, the brother of Cardinal Henry and the Empress
Isabella.
St.
Antonio had entered the order

of
of the
Knights
of
John
Malta and was prior
of the rich
commandery
of
Crato; he had accompanied Sebastian to North Africa, and was for the moment a prisoner in the hands of the Moors, but he finally escaped in the autumn of 1")7*). and was to be a
thorn in the side of the Prudent King for
come. 3
many years to More immediately dangerous was Catharine, the

of
younger daughter Edward, a woman
Cardinal
of high abilities
Henry's younger brother and ambition; but her
worthless husband, the Duke of Braganza, was ultimately to ruin her chances, and her son. the Duke of Barcelos, w in the hands of the king of Spain.'' There were also thn
other candidates from abroad

J.
'
Ranuccio Farnese, the son
of
M. Ruhio,
f.
/'.///-
//
;/
Portugal,
pp. 112
Conestaggio,
tola.
'Bernardo
da
SO v (T. Cruz. cap.
Ixxxii
Paul Durand-Lapie, in Renu d'htatoin diplomatique, xviii, pp JT.'t 281. Angola Valcnte, in the monograph sited on p. 827, note 1, maintains that a principal cause for tin' imprisonment of Perez of the Piluuwe of I'.l.oli wae their conduct in connection with the affairs of Portugal. She represen ts the Princess as being loss the lover than
1 .'
Bologna, chaplain t<> Philip II. to Cardinal Farneoe, of October 17, 1579, to show that the Princess wished to marry her daughter to the son of the Duke of Braganza, and therefore
reganl
rovealerl to the Duke Philip's plans in to Portugal, which had I"
to her
communicated
may
his
well
!><
much
<
trillion
Certainly threads of tin- Portuguese
by P6re. There truth in this eonPeres had all

project
his
in
hands
to
the
day
of
am
with
all
so conversant
its
was
he, in fact,
the rh.ni. of I'r'-rez ("nella lista <li boIoto che pagavano al eegre tario regale suoi illeciti ve.|.,\a 'li la favori,
i
details, that
he was referred to ah
Ruigomea oocupa il primo poato"); and she cites a letter from fliovanni 'li
the as 'el Court Portugues.' here also Muro, La Prinrcxa it. Bboli, p. 180
THE PORTUGUESE SUCCESSION
347
of
Alexander of Parma, whose mother, Maria, was a sister Catharine of Braganza Emanuel Philibert, duke of
;
the son of Cardinal Henry's elder sister 1 Beatrice and, finally, Catharine de' Medici, who claimed descent from the mediaeval Portuguese King Affonso III
Savoy,
who was
;
and his repudiated wife, Matilda, Countess of Boulogne. None of these, however, had any idea of seriously prosecuting
they only put them forward in the hope of exfrom the Spanish king counter-concessions which torting 2 So might prove useful to them in Italy and elsewhere. in fact, during the first weeks of Cardinal strong Henry's
their claims
;
rule,
to cherish
did Philip believe his position to be, that he began hopes of gaining his ends without a fight.
depended, of course, on the attitude of the Portuguese themselves, and Philip spared no pains to turn it in
Foreseeing the probable outcome of Sebastian's expedition, he had taken his first measures before his nephew's death thereafter he redoubled his efforts. Legists,
his favor.
;
Much
theologians, and professors were drafted from to demonstrate the justice of his cause. 3
all
over Europe
Letters
were
written to Lisbon and the other principal cities of Portugal to express his sorrow at the death of Sebastian, to remind
house of Avis, and to 4 But he found profess Lis affection for the Portuguese.
the most efficient instrument for the attainment of his ends
in Cristobal
them
of his close relationship to the
de Moura.
Moura was convinced
that the sole
possible salvation for Portugal lay in reunion with Castile.

and purposes of see Arturo Segre and Pietro Egidi, Emanuele Filiberto (Turin, 1928), ii, pp. 271-273, 277.
the
^n
!
claims
E.g.,
la
Emanuel
Madrid, Library of the R.

,
A-
Philibert,
a H., est. 27, gr. 3 80,
fols.
11
f.,
"Carta
Durand-Lapie,
Philippson,
-
278; P- 87
5
loc. oil., pp. 275Kardinal Granvella,
de Lisboa," March 14, 1579; printed from a manuscript at the Escorial in D. I. E., vii, pp. 238B. 240; English translation, M., Cotton Ms. Nero B. I, fol. 188, printed
a
ciudad
Durand-Lapie,
pp. 383-386.
p.
278;
D.
I.
E.,
xli,
(in part) pp. 340 f.
in
Castries,
Angleterre,
i,
348
His intimate knowledge of his native land told him where and how the most effective blows could be struck, and he
was furnished with an abundance of money, most of which be used to gain popularity for his master by ransoming the the prisoners who had been captured at Alcazar-el-Kebir
;
rest of
it
he distributed
to
in regard
in well placed bribes. The evidence the measure of success which these efforts
attained
is
they counted for much.

edly
most contradictory, but it seems probable that At the outset there was undoubtopposition;
to
for
much
the age-long struggle of the
Portuguese
foes;
maintain
their
independence made them
naturally regard the Castilians in the light of hereditary
"rather would we become Frenchmen, Englishmen, or even Turks than Spaniards," said the Portuguese ambassador
1579.
2
in
Madrid to the Venetian envoy Morosini in February, But in the ensuing months the tide began to turn
In
the other way.

just got
November Antonio
his captivity in
to
of Grato,
who had
back from
North
is
Africa, wrote in
deep discouragement Gouard, that "the king of Castile

the Portuguese;
solution."
3
the
French
ambassador, Saintcertain to reign over

to this
all
of
them have been won over
February, L580, the writer of the Fugger news letters from Lisbon declared that "the struggle cannot long, for all the besl people here are in favor of
in
.
And
Spain, hut dare not let it be Been. Spain appears here with his army he will
.
.
.
When
le
the King of
better received
than he expects. I fancy the authorities set up in thia have an understanding with the Spaniards. I hi country no doubt thai Spain will take possession of Portugal, af
. .
fitting.
hope that then there

4
will
be better government
and better business."

1
Dnnviln y
Burguero,
rit.,
Cristobal de
Philippson, op.
p. 89.
Forneron, iii, p. 99. \ '/.,,. ws-Li tli m, second pp. 37 f.

.
'
HENRY THE KING-CARDINAL

Meantime,
in
349
the winter of 1578-79,
it
became evident
that the Portuguese problem, though apparently exclusively Iberian, could not be solved without affecting the course
European politics beyond the Pyrenees. So mighty were Philip and Spain that any further increase of their power was bound to be regarded with dread by the other European states, all of which were eagerly looking for an excuse which would justify their interference in opposition to the Prudent King. Such an excuse was finally furnished by the news
of
that Cardinal Henry, who, though at first anxious to prevent the succession of the Spanish monarch, was by no means
wholly friendly to any of the other pretenders, had resolved to seek dispensation at Rome from his vows of clerical
hope that he might possibly be able himself an heir though this was regarded in Madrid as produce practically out of the question, it was also apparently
celibacy, in the
to
;
believed there that, in case the dispensation were secured, it was possible that the aged claimant might be provided
was determined to prevent, if possible, the granting of this dispensation, and sent envoys to Rome to effect that end. Pope Gregory was thus placed in an exceedingly awkward position. 2 It had
rate Philip
with a pregnant wife. 1
At any
been his hope to keep entirely out of this difficult Portuguese affair, for he was unable to determine which side he hoped
would win.
On
of Spain, already excessive, still further
the one hand, he dreaded to see the power enhanced on the

;
other,
he was reluctant to offend Philip
II,
whose support
3
was essential to his policy in other parts

situation
of
Europe.
The
did
1
their
was further complicated by the French, who utmost to advance the granting of Cardinal
da
p.
Bernardo
C. de
C,
ii,
515
Cruz, cap. xcviii Philippson, pp.

;
Philippson, pp. 90-93.
Philippson
remarks upon the policy of the Jesuits

in supporting the pretensions of Philip II in order to secure his favor.
88
1
f.
Pastor, xix, pp. 358
f.
350
Henry's
the
fact

was also it dispensation; that the term of the clerical
1
much
affected
in
subsidy
by Spam,
in 1570, and that Gregory indispensable to Philip, expired refused to renew it; indeed, the Pope persisted obstinately
in his refusal until
November
(',
1T>N1,
in
hope
of securing Philip's support
when he yielded in the the affairs of England.

policy
of
The Prudent King's contemporaneous
seeking
the Neapolitan exequatur,* peace with the infidel, the status of and a host of other traditional points of difference between Rome and Madrid became involved in the problem; but
though he showed himself willing to yield on a number of minor details, adhered rigidly to all his chief contentions and nothing would induce him to hear of a plan, which wag
Philip,
;
to place the put forward at one stage of the proceedings, final decision of the whole Portuguese question in the hands
of the Pope.
4
Such then was the situation of Spain's foreign and internal 1579, to c;ill affairs which determined Philip, on March Cardinal Granvelle from Rome to the position whence he h:id
:->(),
of the Princess already determined to dismiss the lover d by Perez himThe tone of the letter, counter Eboli. which summoned iranvelle is very urgent; "I need your
self,
(
The sooner you come person and your help," so it runs; 5 the happier 1 shall be." Granvelle, when he firsl received it, was in some doubt if it would be wise for him to accept. He had never been popular with Castilians, and he was by
no means certain exactly how Philip intended bo utilize him but personal ambition and loyalty to the house of Hapsburg decided the issue, and on April 20 he wrote to the king that
;
H. Lfonudon,
p.
/<.
eit.,
PMUppaon,
,,
'
880;
p. 40. Pastor,
cf.
xix,
354, Pastor, xix, p. 362;
Forneron, ii>. Philippson, p. 95; pp. 101 f.; Pastor, xix. pp. 358-361. Philippaon, ]>. 62; Correepondanee
'
and
p. 472,
du
Cardinal
f.
dt
Granvelle,
<<!.
I'i"'.
below.
v >i. PP- 352
GRANVELLE IN SPAIN
he would soon be on his
351
with Juan de Idiaquez, continuer of his work Idiaquez was thirty-nine years old at the time, and had been called home from the Spanish
;
1 way to Madrid. In Genoa he met who was to be the companion and
embassy at Venice
to bear aid to the cardinal in the
accom-
plishment of the great task that awaited him. Such were the delays of travelling in those days that it was not until
July 8 that the pair reached Barcelona, whence they were ordered to proceed at once to the Escorial. 2 When word
reached Philip that they had actually landed, he made haste, as we have already seen, to dispose of Perez and the
Princess of Eboli, on July 28-29; a few days later he received the cardinal "as a deliverer" at San Lorenzo. 3
The
last vestiges of the old defensive
been destroyed.
able, energetic,
Eboli peace party had was to have the priceless aid of an Philip and aggressive statesman in the launching of
his
new
policy of imperialism.
It naturally took Granvelle some months to get used to the details of his new office. Moreover, he was particularly careful to seek to give the appearance of keeping his hands
off
Portuguese
affairs, in
of the
Spaniards,
who
order to avoid rousing the jealousy could not understand why Philip had
selected a
Burgundian as his principal adviser. Not until matters came to a crisis with the death of Cardinal Henry
in the following year did the new minister take the lead in the question of the hour the last five months of 1579 were
;
really a period of preparation for the moment when decisive 4 action should become necessary. Ostensibly they were rilled with a of opposing factions around the throne struggle
of
Rome had by
1
Cardinal Henry, whose hopes of a dispensation from this time vanished, and who was consequently
3 *
Telle,
1
Correspondence du Cardinal de Graned. Piot, vii, pp. 376 f. Philippson, pp. 67-69.
Ibid., pp. 69-71.
j^., p
12 i.
352
faced with the problem of deciding to which of the rival candidates lor the succession he should lend the advantage
of his
own
moned
claims.
1
In the preceding April he had sumthe Portuguese Cortes to Lisbon, to select eleven
support.
judges to pronounce upon the validity of the conflicting

natural, Philip replied by assembling another body of legal lights at Madrid to give their verdict on the same question. 2 The Portuguese body decided in favor of Don Antonio, of whose legitimacy, despite all the
As was
evidence to the contrary, they professed themselves satisfied but Cardinal Henry, who bore no love to the prior of Crato,
and whose
hostility to
him was
further enhanced
II,
by the
representations of the envoys of Philip

this verdict,
refused to accept
and banished Antonio from his court. 3 The Spanish jury, as had been inevitable from the first, gave its decision in favor of the claims of the Prudent King. During
the early autumn, the sentiments of Cardinal Henry vee steadily more and more in the direction of the Spanish
candidacy.
The
influence of his Jesuit confessor,
who had
been won over to Philip's cause, counted for much, as did the rumors which reached him of the military preparations which the Spaniards were making to enforce their claims,
Hut tin partisans of Antonio necessary, by the sword. wen- loud in their disapproval, and finally in the end of October Cardinal Henry, who felt that his days were now
if
4
numbered, and was desirous above

and
to
all
of
having the matter

'ortcs
to
peacefully settled before he died, took the advice of the Pop'',
once
more
in
summoned
the
Portuguese
Almeirim, 6 all concerned.

L680,
1
the hope of arriving at a solution satisfactory
When
came
145.
the
p. 1
cardinal
i'>c.
the assembly .mi strongly

*
I
met on January
for
9,
the
claims of
cvi
cviii;
I>ur:mil-Lft|>i<\
*
cit., p.
Bernardo da Cruz, caps,

p. 288.
I>,
"inind-Lapio.
'Ibid., p. 284.
Ibid., p. 288.
PHILIP
Philip II
1
;
AND THE KIXG-CARDIXAL

and
353
also the majority over by his bribes. of the nobility, But the representatives of the people, still unable to endure
most
of the clergy agreed,
whom Moura had won
the thought of subjection to a Spanish monarch, begged
own successor, and promised one he should select, provided only he should to accept any and when Henry refused, they produced be a Portuguese historical precedents to prove that, on the extinction of the
the cardinal to nominate his
;
male
line of
Portuguese kings,
it
belonged to the Cortes to

2
settle the succession to the throne.
Apparently they
still
desired that the choice should
fall
on Antonio, who was
in
hiding at the time,
but whose claims were so strong that Philip offered him an annual pension of 50,000 ducats and 3 if he would renounce them. a governorship Finally, on
January 31, 1580, the event that had been so long expected occurred, and the old king-cardinal died after a reign of one He left behind him a vear, five months, and five davs.
regency of five members to govern the realm until his Of the five, three were already successor should be chosen.
won over
to the support of Philip,
and though they did not
dare openly proclaim their position for fear of arousing the popular wrath, they saw to it that nothing effective was
accomplished towards putting the kingdom in a state of defence .gainst him. 4
and disruption of the government of had given Philip time to prepare his forces for the Portugal trial of strength which now seemed inevitable and it was
irresolution
;
The
in
the acceleration of these
preparations that
Granvelle
rendered his
minister
The king's new first and greatest service. had seen from the outset how essential it was to
Henry should
;
be ready to invade as soon as Cardinal

'Philippson, pp. 116 f. ' Durand-Lapie, pp. 288 * Ibid., p. 290.
4
die,
Philippson, pp. 120-123; DurandDanvila y BurLapie, pp. 291-293 guero, Cristobal de Moura, pp. 545-566.
354
before opposition could be organised, and had busied himself 1 with the task of making preparations to that end. First of
he attacked the problem of the Spanish national finances, which had been left in sorry condition by the administration
all
of
Antonio Perez.
Not only was the
burdened by enormous debts; Castiliao grandees were in league with the foreign bankers
to
empty, it was peculation was rife; the

treasury-
cheat
tin*
justly due
to
it,
government out of the revenues that were and the prospects for the future were even
All this
darker than the existing conditions. 2
was
gall
and
his
wormwood
to (Jranvelle,
who
lost
no time
in
telling
worries to the king; but although Philip admitted the facts, he could not be induced to take any effective measures
for reform.
Money must somehow be found

to
to
pay
for the
of
army, and
;
supply Moura
it
in
Portugal with the means
bribery or the curtailment
but
was
by the stopping of corruption The of expenses in other directions/

of
of
not bo be
only method which Philip comprehended was that of further
mortgaging the future; and (iranvelle, whose knowledge the principles of sound finance was as much in advance
his times as that of his
been deeply east down

financial
his
faitfi
master was behind them, must have at the prospect. Not even il
ould avail to
'
discouragements, however,
in
shake
fully
the
necessity
for
preparedness.
He
realized that foreign influences hostile to Spain were already

at
work
in
-
Portugal, and that the only
way
to
make
certain
was
to be
ready to Btrike both by land and

arrive.
la
-""ii
1
afl
the fitting
moment should
123,
:irul
Numerous
mny
los
eft"'
Philippson, pp. 121

f.
rofor-
nor
tierra
abundant?,
baatimientoi
rm
de
fnnrooo
infra, p
proveer
438, note 2.
M
rl
Bgerton
I
Mi
R<v
major
122, fol. 92 v: ('ritludico en ((
tiompo
ezeroito
aa
da
mas
traliajD y
jjasto <|tio
provincial
tuviero,
EapaJIa oon an ntraa porqufl f>n no
(iii, p. 106) says "Plu mi ducat n'esl envoye mix Pays-Ba*," bu1 he does no1 state his authority. k Philippaon, pp 122 126.
tatoa." irneron
GRANVELLE AND PORTUGAL
355
were made by the foreign representatives at Madrid to persuade the Spanish government that there would be no
occasion for fighting of these the majority particularly those of France were intended to lull Philip into a false sense of security and thereby give the Portuguese a chance
x the Holy See, on the other hand, prepare to resist him 2 exhorted Philip to submit the case to papal arbitration. Until the death of Cardinal Henry these efforts had had
to
effect, and despite all the energy of Philip's new minister the military preparations had advanced but slowly.
some
But after January, 1580, when the crisis became imminent and Granvelle's position and influence were
securely
established, a gratifying change took place.
ately succeeding
In the immedi-
months the Castilian nobles displayed real and began to raise little armies at their own patriotism
expense,
funds.
nation.
3
while the cities contributed troops,
The Portuguese
choice of a
all.
enterprise
ships, and was supported by the
problem of
at
commander-in-chief was the hardest Public opinion demanded the Duke of Alva, who, though he had been sent into retirement on his estates
The
Uceda after his return from the Low Countries in 1573, was universally conceded to be the best soldier in Spain but Philip's resentment against him was still so deep that
it
he would have got the place without the intervention of Granvelle. So effective, however, was the
is
doubtful
if
cardinal in finding
differences that
4
means
of
accommodating the various
still
kept the king and the proud
Duke
at
odds, that on February 22, 1580, Alva received his appoint1
Leonardon,
p. 42. Pastor, xix, pp. 358 Phihppson, p. 126.
f.
drique.
Ci.
D.
I.
E.,
vii,
Documentos
sobre
pp. 464-524, las causa9 que
dieron motivo & la prision de D. Fahijo del Duque de Alba, y tambien a la del mismo Duque" (1578) S. I., i, pp. 89-92.
356

to
It was invading force. further decided that Philip and his family should accompany the army to the Portuguese frontier, in order that he might
ment
the
command
of
the
appear
t
in his
for
him
new kingdom the moment that it should seem to do so; on March 4 he left Madrid on his
Fearing the machinations of the other Europe, he refused permission to their representatives to accompany him, and insisted that they should
way
to
Guadalupe.
sovereigns of
2 stay on at the capital, where Granvelle remaii -l in charge. Three months more, however, were to elapse before Alva
led his
army
was
tion.
filled
intervening time with plots and intrigues, and Spanish hopes that
across the frontier.
all
The
Philip after
At
first
might possibly be recognized without opposithere seemed some reason to believe that this
left
would be the case. The five regents were generally useful to the cause
three of them, as
to
of the
we have already seen, him by bribes; they pretended to organize an army of resistance in order to satisfy the malcontents, and at the same time sowed disorder in the realm, so as to make SUCfa resistance impossible.' Queen Elizabeth, who had been
1
by Cardinal Henry Prudent King had een won ovef
asked by the Portuguese for help against the Spaniards, gave honeyed words but did nothing such an adventure was
;
and parsimonious mind. French opposition promised to be more dangerbut for a time it was largely nullified by indecision ous; :i- t<> whether Antonio or the Duke of Braganza would he
far too to
remote
appeal to her practical
'
the better candidate to support

1
,''
and by fears of the possible

4
l>
xxxii.
pp.
1")
17.
Tho
.
Forncron.
iii.
up.
107-109.
pp.
formal oommiHion ai <:o >t;iin-K<-inT.il .ri n >< in dated June 12, 1880, in l> I L51 LOO, and in 8. L,
i
references _".ti 296.
there;
p.
Durand-Lspie,
163;
.
Philippaon,
C. Read, Wat?
ii.
p]
1 1
ainyhnm,
ii,
p. 42.
Philippaon,
Ibid.,
p.
pp
!."
Ml
p.
'
Leonardon, pp. 43 f
176;
Leonardos,
44;
Durand-Lapie,
p. _'!*9.
EUROPE AND THE PORTUGUESE QUESTION

results of the
357
Huguenot capture
of
Cahors (May 31, 1580).

the opposition of the
More
Pope,
serious for the
moment was
who was now resolved that his rights as supreme arbiter in a case of disputed succession should be formally recognized he decided to send a legate, Cardinal Alessandro
;
1 Riario, to Portugal for the purpose of asserting them.
But
the difficulties and dangers of the journey were such that Riario did not reach Barcelona until June 12 we shall note
;
fared from that point. 2 As far, then, as the outside powers were concerned, the situation in the early months of 1580 was not unfavorable
a little later
to Philip.
how he
All of them, for different reasons
and
in different
degrees, disliked the prospective enlargement of the dominions of the Spanish king, but none of them was actually in a position to give practical effect to its feelings. In Portugal,
however, it became obvious, as the spring wore on, that it would be impossible for Philip to enter upon his new inheritance without some use of military force. 3 He promised all
sorts of concessions
to the Portuguese,
in
regard to the
maintenance of their independent institutions and officials, as soon as he should be recognized as king. All the immetained
morial principles of Spanish separatism were to be mainanother entity was to be added to the Spanish
;
Empire but there was to be no merging of the new body the old. 4 Moura and the other Spanish representatives
in
in
Portugal surpassed themselves in the energy and skill they exhibited in their efforts to win over the Portuguese to the
cause of their master
;
and Philip kept postponing, against

2
3 4
xix,
'Philippson, pp. 164-166; Pastor, The instructions to pp. 359 f. Riario (April 14 and 18, 1580) are sum-
Infra, p. 364.
marized in Ricardo de Hinojosa, Los Despachos de la Diplomacia Poniificia en Espana, i (Madrid, 1896), pp. 279285.
Philippson, p. 168. Bernardo da Cruz, cap. ci, "Como de Castella buscou todos os meos pera escusar guerras com Portugal."
elrei
358

fche
Granvelle's advice,
day
of the invasion for

in
which every
preparation was
now complete,
of their
the hope that the Portufree will.

1
guese would accept him

oegotiations
I
own
Thoro were
five regents at but nothing came early April, 8 of them. Philip would not submit his claims to arbitration, as the regents desired, even with what amounted to a
with
representatives of
the
rliadalupe in Late
March and
preliminary assurance that the verdict would be given in his favor he stood out for the form as well as the substance,
;
and insisted that

to call
his rights
3
them
in question.
it was useless was incompreSuch an attitude
were so clear that
hensible to those
who
still
opposed him.
in late April
It
acouraged
them
(
to prepare for resistance;
and
May
the
French
Seigneur de SaintMadrid, rouard, redoubled his exertions to bring about the interven4 tion of his master against the Spanish king. By this time
it
ambassador at
the
had become evident that
if
resistance wer
actually to be
offered the official leader of
it
must be Don Antonio.
He
had now issued from his place

in
of concealment, so that his
was generally known; he had a gallant presence manner, and ability to amuse popular enthusiasm, and his bastardy, of which irrefutable proof had been recently
the realm
brought to
light, did Q01 trouble his partisans in the lea Bis sole possible rival, the Duke of Braganza, derived all his claims from liis wife; he was, moreover, the last man in the
an uphill battle. A.s Boon as he saw thai the cards were going againsl him, he began haggling with Philip
world to
fight
over the price thai should be paid him

ciation of his rights,
in
return for
renun-
with
and apparently was ultimately satisfied Golden Fleece. Antonio, on the other hand, was unwilling to accept the offers which were made
a
collar of the
Danvilay Bargoeco, pp. 606fl

PMlipjMOIl, p
Phflipjwon,
.
pp.
172
f.
Guy
de
BromonrJ d'Ara, Jeande Vivonne

f.
(Parii,
Durand-Lapie, pp. 294
1884;
THE EVE OF INVASION

him through Moura.
359
The Spanish monarch bid higher and
Antonio would be satisfied with nothing short of the post of Philip's representative in Portugal and the right to nominate the chief officials in
Portuguese dominions beyond the sea with what amounted, in fact, to recognition as a sort of second king and this Philip refused to grant. Antonio made
;
higher for his submission, but
the
capital for
himself at
to
home out
;
of the failure of the

it
bribe
him
1
henceforth
Spanish monarch was inevitable that he should
become the standard-bearer

pendence.
of the cause of national inde-
On
If
April 16 Philip sent the Portuguese an ultimatum.
they would recognize him officially as their lawful king within twenty days, he would keep all his previous pledges to them; if not, they must be prepared to feel the full weight of his displeasure and vengeance. At the expiration of the appointed time, he ordered his army to concentrate on the Portuguese frontier near The
Badajoz.
sent on their contingents. Spanish veterans of the Sicilian, Neapolitan,

cities
tercios,
Castilian
By
ship
came
and Lombard
a large force of Valencians, three coronelias of Italian infantry, and a strong regiment of Germans. The whole
army counted some 35,000

2 pieces of artillery.
The Duke
at
infantry, 2100 cavalry, and 136 of Alva was most graciously

;
received
by Philip
Merida
the monarch repressed any
feelings of personal
in
resentment that he continued to cherish, order to give his commander-in-chief the advantage of
appearing to enjoy the full confidence of his king. A fleet was also collected in the harbor of Cadiz under the Marquis of Santa Cruz; its assigned function was to sail around -ape St. Vincent, capturing such ports as it could on the
;
Danvila y Burguero pp. 587-589.
xxxiv on kxxiv, pp.
%*7 f 287-304;
V Isidro
E> 2\/Velazquez
Salmantino, La Entrada que en el Reino de PoHugal hiz Don Phili PP e Li9 ( on, 1583), fols. 31-35.
360
way,

and
cooperate
with
the
army
of
invasion against
Lisbon.
The Spanish
of
representatives
at
the Portuguese
capital were recalled
and made their preparations to depart,
though most
until
after
them did not actually leave the country 1 A final attempt of the invasion had begun.
I
a peaceful solution failed miserably, regents to find and on May 21 the king and his whole court transfer!.. 2 A league thence, at Cantillana. to
the
themselves
Badajoz.
camp, where they * and queen, the Cardinalreviewed, on June 13, by the king 3 Archduke Albert of Austria, and the commander-in-chief.
Alva assembled his legions
in a great
The proximity
Villa Vigosa
of so great a force caused the Portuguese 4 18 without resistance. fortress of Elvas to yield on June
the 22d.
was occupied by an advanced detachment on On June 27 the main army broke camp and, under
6
battle array. the eyes of the king, crossed the frontier in 7 Had Philip followed Granvelle's advice, and struck two
months
;
was furnished by
he might well have encountered no resistance a chance, as it was his delays had given his opponents at all Most of the impetus to prepare. though an inadequate one, of the masses, the monks. zeal the
earlier,
patriotic
and direction and the Lower clergy, but the encouragement ance also counted of the king oi f the representatives much. Saint-Gouard was rude and defiant toward Philip, wheo the an d openly urged his master to declare war; Prudent King refused to receive him. he math' ostentatiottl
I
to depart, thus threatening a breach î diplopreparations to Efforts also were made at Paris matic relations."
iphflippaoa. pp. 158 ,.. 598 rSSppSon.p 170
,
f.i
D.-mvil.!
Bur K u,ro.
VelA.quei 42 v; S I
B.
I.,
i.
BalmanUno,
.
StUrada,
cU.,
p.
ty
107.
,,
232 236.
lac.
Hlano GonUe..
p.
Tagebwh,
pp.
20;
*
I
,,,.
BMf.
Butsono,
Siei.;
...
..In
pp. 236-239. Luwota. pp. 27 f. 'Phihppn, p. Philippson. pp. 169
ud.
Central
Portugal
OCEA
THE PRIOR OF CRATO

secure the cooperation of
361
of the
Queen Elizabeth on behalf
Portuguese; a French ship which arrived at Plymouth, having on board a thousand arquebuses and a quantity of powder intended for Portugal, was permitted to depart
without hindrance. 1
More
useful
still
to the
Portuguese
cause was the action of Jean Pierre de Abbadie, the French secret agent in Portugal itself, and of Pierre Dor, the French
In cooperation with the papal nuncio Frumento, they labored to check a last movement on the part of some of the n; riots to transfer their allegiance to the
consul at Lisbon.
Duke
of
Braganza.
;
The
latter,
they insisted, had better be
completely ignored only by concentrating on the prior of Crato was there any chance of success Dor even went off
;
to
France to get aid

levies
for
Antonio's
collect.
If,
cause.
Meantime
likely,
sporadic
began
to
as
seems
Antonio's adherents were in the minority, they were more vocal and more active than the partisans of the Spanish
king.
few,
There were boasts that Philip's foreign soldiers were and that the Portuguese had defeated the Castilians
before
and had no doubt
of their ability to
necessary, they were prepared to call
do so again if in the Moors from

;
North Africa to their rescue. But it was not until news came of the surrender of Elvas that the friends of Antonio
took the decisive step of proclaiming him to be their lawful On June 18 the bishop of La Guarda pronounced a king.
vehement discourse at Santarem, urging

him.
all
men
to support
On the following day the popular enthusiasm had reached such a height that it was felt safe to hold a solemn service of recognition in the church ; Frumento was present
to lend to the
1
ceremony the approbation

p.
of the
Holy
See.
D.
;
I.
E.,
xci,
488
C.
S.
P.,
mond
122.
3
d'Ara,
Jean de Vivonne, pp. 120-
Spanish, 1580-86, p. 35 (June 11, 1580) Philippson, p. 174. 1 Philippson, p. 172; Guy de Bre-
Philippaon, p. 172.
362

monarch proceeded
to
Thereafter the new
Lisbon;
and
despite the obvious disapproval of the upper nobility, he a1 nncr showed his mettle by ordering tho five regents
out of the town of Setubal, where they had taken refuge, and which they had plotted to hand over to the Spanish
fleet.
1
In the
it-
meantime the Spanish army under Alva continued practically unobstructed advance into Portugal, while
Olivenza,
the
2
Philip and his wife remained behind at Badajoz.

like
Elvas,
surrendered
without
fight.
In
first
days of July the Duke and his forces were before Estremoz, where Moura, who could no longer remain safely it. Portugal
and was making the best of
his
way back
to Spain,
brought
them precious information
The Spanish
sion of LagOS
lished
bal.
fleet left
kingdom." Cadiz on July 8 and soon got pose
of the state of the
and other places near by. communication with Alva and

resistance.
4
A
his
little later
it
estab-
arm
before Setua
On
July 18 that strong fortress surrendered after
nominal
There
was
much
plundering
and
cruelty to the defenceless
suburbs of the town

offender-, and Alva,
inhabitants, particularly in the the Italians apparent 1\ wore the w

prebe-
vent
such thing-,
who had been ordered by Philip to caused some of the guiltiest to be
headed.''
of
From Setubal
there Were three possible niel hods
advancing on Lisbon: (1) to turn northward and en TagUS where it narn>w- at Santarem; (2) to m directly for Almada. opposite Lisbon, and be carried over by
the
the fleet;
a,
,
and
pp. pp.
'
(3)
178
P
to sail
I
.
around
J
to Cascaes,
I
.
we-l
D.
I.
of the
178;
D.invila
i.
S.
i.
|
pp
IV
pp. 273
f.;
xxxii.
pp
'/..
i
.
Damil
Prior do Crato, pp. 6 16; Lapie,

.ii.
.
Duraadtown
sec
of
toil
Vol
I.
Laaaota. Coneetaggio, folB. 1 49 fT. Taoebuch, pp. 28 f. Vel II Gonsalei, lor. etfc, j>. 100 p 16 I., >. pp.305 342; Mtolaguirre y o dt Basdn, pp. 06 1<"
; ;
Dim
D.
I.
/:..
xxxii. pp. L'Hof.
ALVA INVADES PORTUGAL

capital,
363
was abandoned because of the bad roads and the distance involved, and because the army would necessarily lose the support of the The second was judged too dangerous because of the fleet. batteries on the opposite shore. The third was accordingly
and attack
it
from
there.
The
first
adopted, with a feint to the north to make the enemy believe 2 that the Spaniards intended to cross at Santarem. The enterprise was not free from peril, for the coast near Cascaes
was so high and
difficult
3
prevented with ease,

popular mind.
that a landing could have been and a reverse at that moment and in
that place would have had an enormous effect

izing their opportunity,
upon the
of real-
But the Portuguese were incapable and the disembarkation was
effected
without striking a blow. The neighboring fortresses soon fell in succession, and the prisoners captured were treated with pitiless severity. Diogo de Menezes, Antonio's gen-
one of the most important families in the land, was condemned to a traitor's death the same fate was decreed for the alcalde of Cascaes the common
eral-in-chief, a scion of
; ;
and Philip formally of it all. It has been well said that Alva approved reckoned quite as much on the terror of his hangman as on
soldiers
were
sent
to
the
galleys,
the power of his armies, as he approached the Portuguese

capital.
Duke's army naturally had an immediate reaction, highly favorable to Spain, on her diplomatic
of the
relations with the other
his
it
The advance
European
states.
Granvelle did
;
utmost to delay the mission of the papal legate Riario must have given him grim satisfaction to be able to utilize
H. Gonzalez,
S.
I.,
i,
p. 110.
ff.
;
serie
pp. 344
J.
H. Gonzalez,
Felipe II
;
pp.
110-112;
M. Rubio,
.
y Portugal, pp. 279 ff ' Conestaggio, fols. 157

p.
ff.
Lassota,
30
Morosini in Alberi, Relazioni,
f. Philippson, pp. 352-377. 4 D. I. E., xxxii, pp. 368 f. xxxv, pp. 65-69 Philippson, p. 179 Durand300 f. Lapie, pp. 5 Philippson, pp. 179-185.
i,
;
v,
pp.
307
pp. 178
f.
S.
I., i,
364
the very same Spanish slowness, which had so often caused him misery in the past, for the actual furtherance of the ends he had in view. Riario was held at Barcelona by illness until June 21. Sumptuous entertainments were arranged for him at every town through which he had to pass on his way from Barcelona to Castile; not till the middle
of July did
he reach the Portuguese
frontier.
By
that time,
of course, all thoughts of a peaceful solution at the arbitration of the
Pope had been abandoned.
Antonio had now
been formally recognized by the Portuguese as their king, and ( iranvelle lost no time in informing Riario that the only sure method by which further effusion of blood could be
prevented was to persuade the nation to give
to Philip.
its
allegiance
the Count
(
representative at the Vatican, of Olivares, laid the same considerations before
The new Spanish
had taken
liegory XIII, and with such good effect that Frumento, who sides with Antonio, was recalled, while Riario was
in case
commanded,
Antonio did not abandon his 'usurped
claim' to the disputed throne, to leave Portugal and take up his permanent residence at the court of Spain. Gregory had thus been converted, in a few weeks, from a potential arbiter of the Portuguese succession into an obedient instru-
Prudent King. 2 French machinaA tions against Spain were also checked at the same time. new Spanish ambassador, de Tassis, was dispatched to Paris on the death of his predecessor, Vargas, to deal with the
ment
of the policy of the
Bituation
soon found that Henry III and hifl mother w.rc BO much discouraged by the news of the advance
there.
He
of Alva's
army
interfering,
1
was no longer any chance of their unless they should be supported by Qu

that there
a careful analysis of the changes Gregory's policy. Cf. p. 609, infra.
in
Hinojosa, pp. 286 f. F'hilippson. p. 182; 9. I., ii, pp. 161vur, TOrne, PtoUmie Gallio L66 P. 11. lsingfors. 1907), pp. 181-185, gives
1
THE BRIDGE OF ALCANTARA

Elizabeth.
1
365
But
this
was quite out
of the question.
The
Portuguese representative in London, Antonio de Castillo, had by this time gone over completely to the side of Spain,
and cooperated with his Spanish colleague, Bernardino de Mendoza, to thwart the efforts of the special envoy Joao Rodrigues de Sousa, whom Antonio had sent to ask Elizanot even permitted to have access to her. and she openly declared, in the early part of August, 2 that she now regarded Philip as the actual ruler of Portugal.
beth's aid.
He was
Meantime,
in Portugal itself, the military verdict
was
finally delivered in the latter part of the same month, in favor of the Prudent King. While Alva had been advancing
from Cascaes on Lisbon, the Spanish grandees whose domains lay close to the Portuguese border had invaded the realm
with another
raised at their
army of some 30,000 men, which they had own expense. Before the end of August they
gained possession of all the principal cities in the southern 3 Their advance relieved the Duke of part of the kingdom.
all
secret negotiations in
efforts to bribe
the anxiety lest he should be attacked from behind which he had continued his master's
;
Antonio into peaceful submission had by

;
this
time definitely failed 4 and on August 24, he advanced 5 to the bridge of Alcantara just outside Lisbon, where the
enemy Lad gathered a force of some eight or ten thousand men to defend the ravine that separated the invading army
from the capital.
They were
a mixed rabble, hurriedly
collected, monks, tradesmen, and artisans, "fitter to fight with words than with arms," and impotent to withstand the
Philippson, pp. 182 f Philippson, p. 183. S. I., i, pp. Philippson, p. 185 418-121 Rubio, pp. 301 f. * D. Peres, op. Rubio, pp. 287 f. cit-, pp. 80-85.
.
The bridge of Alcantara was on the spot now occupied by the Estacao
6
Alcantara Terra, opposite the Palacio Real das Necessidades, where the tiny Ribeira de Alcantara flows underground The site of the battle to the Tagus. was far nearer the bank of the river than it is today since that time an enormous amount, of made land has been filled in below.
;
366

1
On the 25th methodical :ittack of Alva's superior forces. forward Prospero Colonna with his Italian the Duke senl
arquebusiers "to open the ball" with an assault on the bridgehead, while Sancho de Avila led on his Span inn Is by
the side ridges to take the defenders on the flank.
Every-
thing was covered by a devastating artillery fire from the land and from the fleet, most of it directed against the bridge,
and the
thousand
rest
t
against
the houses of Lisbon.

fled,
After a brief
resistance,
he Portuguese broke and
of their
number
leaving fully i dead or wounded on the field;

:i
on the Spanish side the casualties numbered less than hundred. Antonio, who bore himself like a hero and was
wounded
on
a
in the forehead, strove gallantly but vainly to pally
finally, seeing that all was lost, he lea] horse with his follower, the \>unt of Vimioso,* and rode off up the TagUS to Santarem. At the same time the rem-
the fugitives;
nant of the Portuguese'
licet
8
made
haste to
rrender to the
Marquis
of
Santa
Jrue.
The outrages which had already got the Spanish such an ugly name :it Setubal had been continued
advanced on the
capital.
soldiery as they
Alva to permit his men to utmosl to prevent it, but without success.
Philip had expressly forbidden 4 plunder, and the Duke did his
"The
disordi
which
are
occurring here."
so
he
wrote to the king on

I
from Cascaes, " are such as never thought toe tor would h:tve believed possible among soldiers. have can to stop them, but without s\\<-<-<done everything
Augusl 6
I
for
disobedience and disrespect are

Philippeoa
in
rife,
and
it
is all
the faull
L85;
I
C.
da
C,
ii,
xxxii.
VJmioi
le
Etabio,
"Don
'l<-
Vhnioeo,
in
Portugal, de
Hittoria, 91
xvi
Conde
Felipe
II."
ReviMa
ifl
>h
(1927 28),
1> le C, ii, pp. 612 r,i4 pp. 463 459; C. S I' 1679-80, p 180; S, I. ii, pp. It Ooni&les, pp in 116 * D, I E xxxii. pp 160 162; pp. 61
;
xxxv,
72, Bl
CAPTURE OF LISBON
of the officers, for I assure
367
is
your Majesty that there
not a
colonel, a camp-master, a captain, nor any other commander who is doing his duty as he ought to do it, and that they
* At Lisought all to be suspended from their functions." bon it was much the same. The capital surrendered uncon-
on the evening of the battle of Alcantara, and had but Alva, every reason to expect merciful treatment he preserved the inner part of the city from harm, though
ditionally
;
was unable
suburbs. 2
to keep his men from working The king was apparently kept
this occasion, for
their will in the

in ignorance of
what had occurred on

of
he wrote to the Duke
Medina Sidonia on August 28 that Lisbon had surrendered without bloodshed or sack, as he had desired. 3 Unfortunately the evil example which his enemies had set him was followed by Antonio in the ensuing weeks. Though he had failed at Lisbon, the prior still had hopes of reconstituting
party in the North. He established himself at Coimbra, and sought to terrorize all men into joining him by his cruel maltreatment of those who refused. 4 Even Sancho de
his
*
Avila, the
tember, to
occurred.
who was sent, in late Sepdislodge him, was amazed when he found what had
butcher of Antwerp,'
all
'
In view of
the last phases of
was no wonder that the campaign, which virtually ended in

these things
it
October when Avila entered Oporto, evoked the bitterest hatreds on both sides. Most of Philip's earlier efforts to
conciliate the
ties
Portuguese were forgotten the ancient enmiwere revived, and Antonio began to become, to an extent that he had never been before, a national hero, and
;
1
D.
I.
D.
2
I. E xxxii, pp. E., xxxi, p. 296.
368
f.
Cf. also
J.
M. Rubio,
f.
no. 1579-80, Juan Foreign, 488; Beneyto Perez, Los Medios de Cultura
Felipe II y Portugal,
y
p.
la
Centralizacion
bajo
Felipe
II,
pp. 297
3
123.
f.)
D.
I.
E., xxvii, pp.

2.
ii,
370
157
f.
Cf. infra,
114
is
Forneron's account (iii, pp. of this phase of the campaign
p. 476,
4
note
grossly inaccurate.
S. I.,
pp. 71
ff.,
f.
C. S. P.,
368
the personification of the cause of escape from Castilian
bondage.
The correspondence
of Philip
with Alva and his other
representatives in Portugal during the months of September and October is an accurate reflection of all these things.
Instead of drastic
commands
to check the outrages of his
own
soldiery, the Prudent

of all
King
issued savage orders for

to resist him.
1
tin-
punishment
who continued
To make
leniency, he sent a number of Castilian judges into Portugal to carry with them, into a country where there could be no ties of kinship or friend-
sure that there
was no undue
ship, the full rigor of the Spanish law.
Above
all
he insisted
that Antonio should be taken, or at least that he should not be suffered to escape from the realm; 3 he offered a reward
of 80,000 ducats for his delivery alive or dead.
made
little
effort to carry
out the
But Alva He royal commands.
reform of the at Lisbon, busying himself with th administration of the city, and the ceremony of the solemn
remained
proclamation of his master as king of Portugal on Septem5 ber 12; and Antonio was given the opportunity to escape
Barred by a tempest from

sought refuge with
8
his
intended flight by sea, he

of
in Northern Portugal. his hour of need; and the prior, who was at his best when personal courage was needed, was successful, after monthi
few companions in the wild hills His friends there were loyal to him
of hair-breadth escapes, in getting passage in a

1
Dutch
ship
In a manifesto, published foul from Setubal to Calais. later at Leyden, 8 he give- Bome account of his advenyears
1
l:
Philippson,
/-'.,
xxxi, pp. 303 f. p. 188, and
*C. de C,
references
pp. 300
f.
ii,
pp.
615
f.
Rubio.
there.
*D. J. xxvii. pp. 371 f. 4 Antonio da Hemn, CincoLibroade

la
Durand-Lapie, pp. 304-306. He arrived there June 9, 1681. 'A small quarto of 79 pages:
veri ac legitimi iurxi quo planatio Serenitsimut Lusitaniae Rex Anloniut eiu* nominia primus nititur ad bdlum
Hitloria
de
p.
Philippson, p. 305.
fol. 136; Portugal, 187; Durand-Lapie,
ESCAPE OF ANTONIO
tures during that perilous time guise
:
369
in dis-
how he wandered
from one peasant's hut to another, often recognized, never betrayed how he spent whole days in the reeds yet with the water up to his chest, and how his wounds and his
;
illnesses often
made him
despair.
We may well believe that
the story lost nothing in the telling, but there is no reason to doubt that the main lines of it are true. Philip was so enraged when he learned that his prey had escaped that he
ordered the execution of Beatrice Gonzalez, the devoted woman to whose energy Antonio owed it that he was finally
got on board ship.
1
Nor did
;
Philip exaggerate the im-
to the day of his death the portance of Antonio's escape continued to breed trouble for Spain. He carried to prior
the sovereigns of northern Europe a highly colored account of the conquest of Portugal, and of the difficulty and cruelty
had been accomplished. He assured them all the ways in which they could satisfy their hatred of Philip would be to lend him their aid in an attempt to recover his throne. He converted what had
with which
it
that the most effective of
been originally an Iberian affair into a matter of vital interest to all the states of Europe, and linked the conquest which
carried the Spanish Empire to its greatest territorial extent with the forces which were to combine to effect its dissolution.
While Alva and his
tercios
were overrunning Portugal,
Philip had remained behind on Spanish soil at Badajoz. Astrologers had insisted that the year 1580 was certain to be unlucky, and Philip was not above listening to their prognostications. An epidemic of catarrh was also raging, and the king was stricken down by it. At one moment he was
Philippo Regi Castellae pro regni recuperatione inferendum. Leyden, Plantin,
1585.
1
Translations
into
English
and
year.
Dutch were published

Durand-Lapie,
in the
same
p. 306.
370

die, and when, finally, he was universally attributed to the recovery
convinced thai he was going to

did get well, his
audacity of his physician, Valles, "who ventured to purge him during a conjunction of the moon." l His wife, Anne of
Austria,
who had accompanied him
to
Badajoz, was
less
fortunate, for she died on October 26, 1580, at the age of 2 But thirty-one, and the whole court was plunged in grief. the need of Philip's presence in Portugal was so obvious that
was impossible for him to delay his departure long; on December 5 he left Badajoz for Elvas, with his kinsman, the Archduke Albert of Austria, whom he had practically 3 adopted as a son and who had recently been made a carit
dinal.
Only
for
small
in
number
of
ministers and
courtiers
accompanied him,
left
free
his
order that the more places should be 4 At Elvas he was Portuguese subjects.
received with appropriate ceremonies by three Portuguese b of the land. bishops and a number of the prominent nol
I
and he was convinced by their protestations of loyally that he would be universally welcome in his new kingdom. It was here at Kiwis thai the Braganzas, through a representative,
it
swore allegiance
also here that
to Philip as lawful king of Portugal
Philip conferred his first real favor on the Portuguese by abolishing the line of custom houses that 6 separated their country from Castile. Finally, it was from Elvas that tin- new king issued a summons to the Portn-
was
guese Cortes to meet in the following April at Thomar in order that the formal ceremony of recognizing him might
take place, and that the representatives of the three
dc
esti
I
I
ii.
p. 81fl
:
velle,
f.
;
ed.
Piot,
viii,
.
'!".:;-
In
E
189
/>././:.. vii,
si,
II
pp
p 232; D. Eecorial, Ma
Mi-..
n.
1677
|.
i
/'
\ii.
pp.
P
-
La Entrada en Portugal y on que tom6 del Reyno"; uevaa, Catdlogo, iii. p. 543 1. ii, p. 180; Philippson, p. lected in preference to ListxHi
i
lipe la
of.
194.
.
tad
I
Ram-
baud, Histoirt
Qfrntrale, v, p.
'
dinaldt Oran-
account of
tin-
peatilenoa.
CORTES OF THOMAR
might receive in return such favors as
1
371
should please him The usual delays prevented the assembly from to grant. and Philip, who left Elvas actually meeting until April 16 for the westward on February 28, spent the intervening
it
;
weeks to excellent purpose

the Portuguese.
2
in efforts to
win the affection
of
number
of favors
At the advice of Moura, he distributed a and dignities to the more important nobles
he took pains to dress and cut his beard after the Portuguese fashion, and forced the Castilians who accompanied
him
In the last days before his departure from Elvas, he gave audience to the papal legate, Riario, and received his assurance that the Pope had now come round
to
likewise.
to full approval of the
do
very solution
4
in
Portugal which he
a notable occa-
had been sent out to prevent.
The meeting
sion,
in describing
of the Cortes of
Thomar was
and the contemporary historians exhaust themselves 5 The the costumes and ceremonies of the day.
king solemnly swore before the three Portuguese archbishops of Braga, Lisbon, and Evora to observe all the laws, customs,
and privileges of the realm in the same form that they had been observed by his predecessors thereafter he received, one after the other, the oaths of fidelity of the nobles, clergy,
;
and representatives of the third estate. On the following day, with similar ceremonies, Philip's eldest surviving son,
Diego (born July
1
;
12, 1575,
died
en
November
el
21, 1582)
was
Alessandro Guerre di Portogallo (Venice, 1689), pp. 20-22.
Brandano,
2
3
208 Philippson, p. Historia delle

S. I.,
J.
ii,
The latter ends Las galas de los portugeses no fueron muchas, aunque las mas
juramento."
"
:
as follows
p. 165.
Beneyto Perez, Medios de Cul161-164.
tura, p. 122. 4 S. I., ii, pp.

5
Nac. Madrid, Ms. cc. 42, " fols. 169-173 Relacion de los sefiores y perlados y procuradores de las cibdades y villas llamadas al juramento," etc., etc. and " Relacion de lo sucedido
Cf. Bib.
:
;
de la casa de Verganza. El salio de Rojo y su Hijo de Blanco. Los castellanos fueron todos vestidos de Rajallana [a coarse gray d ." cloth] por mandado de su Mag Also B. M., Add. Ms. 20,932; Herrera, Cinco Libros, fols. 140-144; C. de C, S. I., ii, p. 167. ii, pp. 632-635
fueron
Duque
372
1 solemnly recognized as his father's heir and successor.
sweeping
act
partisans of
of pardon followed, from which some fifty Antonio were specifically excepted; 1 of these
the most prominent were Joao de Portugal, bishop of La Opinion naturally Guarda, and the Count of Vimioso.
differed
erosity of this course,
between Castilians and Portuguese as to the genbut we are at Least assured by Velaz-
in the succeeding period Philip succescancelled the exceptions, so that in the end the pardon sively was practically universal. We are also informed that he
quez Salmantino that
refused to listen to the advice, given by
some
of the
more
the ancient university of Coimbra on account 3 support of the cause of his rival.
rancorous of his Castilian followers, that he should suppn oi its ardent
Hut the proceedings of the Cortes of Thomar are by no

as
is
ans so significant for the purpose of the student of history the statement oi the principles on which Philip detertn
mined
-
govern
his
finally
issued
newly conquered realm this statement at Lisbon as a carta patente on

;
November 12, 1582. 4 The concessions contained in this document were really replies to the petitions of the Cortes 5 of Thomar in the preceding year; but the basis of them
was a
(
'fundamentals,' agreed upon between Henry and the Spanish representatives, the Ihike of Osuna and 'ri-tobal de Moura, at his court, a
set
of
Sardinal
short time before the cardinal's death,

in
favor of the right of Philip to

B
when he had decided succeed him on the Porintimate advisor throughout time; S I., ii, p. 166. declares todo el peso del Gobierno gravito riodo sobre Don Cristobal d
Silva.
ii,
I,ii, p. 168;
list
D.
is
I. E., xl.
pp. 400-
Philip's
all
The
of
names
f
:
given in Lasso ta,

I
.
Taoti'uch. pp. 46 pp. 399 f.

'
and D.
K.,
xl,
that on
this "
M
fol.
ra."
208; VeliaqtMl Salmantino. C. de C. S5-104; ii. 9. I., ii. pp. 166-169; 1 Rebello da Silva. ii. p. 622; Danvila Moura was Burguero, f
e,,nestaggii.,
j
;
Re hello da
p.
628, note;
147
Danvila y Kurguero, p. 677. 'Herrm. Cinco Libroi. foU. 149; C de C, ii. pp. 634 f.
TERMS OF ANNEXATION
373
1 tuguese throne. They summarize the basic principles on which Philip's administration of his new kingdom was hence-
forth to be founded.
the laws, privileges, and customs of the realm, Philip promised that he would never hold the Portuguese Cortes outside the kingdom, and that
Besides his oath to maintain
all
no legislation affecting Portugal should be permitted in any

2 He also gave assembly which met beyond its frontiers. his word that he would confer the office of viceroy or governor
only on Portuguese or on
all
members
of the royal family
that
tration should be given only to Portuguese

foreigners
;
greater and lesser offices of justice, finance, and adminisand never to
that
all
the ancient posts in the kingdom should
be maintained for Portuguese occupants, as they had been in the days of his predecessors, and that the same principles
should apply with regard to all other offices, great and small, on the land and on the sea, already existing or to be created in the future and that all garrisons stationed in Portugal
;
should be composed exclusively of Portuguese. He also agreed that the commerce of India and Guinea and of the
other Portuguese colonies, already discovered or to be discovered in the future, should be continued as at present and in no wise changed that the officials in charge of it
;
should continue to be Portuguese and should sail only in Portuguese ships that all gold and silver coined in Portugal
;
should be stamped with the arms of Portugal and with no other that all prelacies, abbeys, benefices, and other ecclesiastical preferments in the realm should be conferred only
;
on Portuguese, and that the same principle should govern

1
Cf. supra, p. 352;

ii,
Silva,
2
pp. 622
f.
f.
also Rebello da Danvila y Burfols.
guero, pp. 676
B. M., Add. Ms. 20,934, 137, "Privilegios que el
135 v-
Rey
Dom
Segundo de Castella jurou cumprir y manter a Portugal" (this document is not listed in Gayangos) Rebello da Herrera, fols. 147-149 Silva, ii, pp. 623-628.
Felipe
;
;
374
in
Till,
ANNEXATION OF PORTUGAL
regard
ies.
the office of inquisitor general, the commanderpensions, and functions of the Military Orders (in which
t<>
of
there was to be no innovation whatsoever), and the priory Crato and that there should be no tercias or other taxa;
payable by the Portuguese clergy to the state nor any He promised thai he request for hulls to permit the same.
tion
of any city, town, place, or within the realm to any one save to Portujurisdiction guese; that crown estates which had become vacant should
would not make any royal grant
not be absorbed into the royal domain, but should be regranted to some relative of the previous tenants or to some
other well-deserving Portuguese;

eigners, however,
Castilians and other for-
who were
at that
time resident
in
Portugal,
Portuguese kings, were not excluded from this privilege. Nobles were to come into the enjoyment of their moradias at the age of twelve, and Philip and his successors were to receive every year "two
or
of earlier
'
had been servants
hundred Portuguese servants who should also have their nmriulms" those who had not the privilege of nobility weir to serve in the armed forces of the kingdom. Philip also for himself and his successors, that whenever they promised,
;
they would not demand compulsory was the custom in Castile, but would follow the usages of Portugal; and that when his Majesty or his successors were outside the kingdom they should always have with them our prelate or other ecclesiastic, one
came
into
Portugal
3
entertainment
as
official nf finance,
oidores,
a
all
one secretary, one chief chancellor, and two of Portuguese birth, who should jointly comp<
Council of Portugal, with whose aid all the business of that realm should be transacted in the Portuguese lan1
>n
'
tnomdiaa,
'
living!
<>r
oourt
\
Porhigueza (Lisbon, 1790),

L96.
2
ii,
m
Figuemdo,
uriina
pp
.1
de
Synop
a
ii
it
ChronoloQ
toria
<i<> l
"No m tomen
casas
<lo
nposoir
jxir,,
PHILIP'S CONCESSIONS
1
TO THE PORTUGUESE
375
guage.
All chief civil magistracies
and other judicial positions
were to be filled from within the realm, as was at present the case, even though his Majesty should be absent, and the same
principle
justice
was to apply to all financial posts all matters of and finance were to be determined and carried out
;
within the realm as hitherto.
The
service in the royal
chapel at Lisbon was to be continued according to the cus-
tom
Portuguese were to be admitted to the offices of the royal household, "in accordance with the Burgundian custom," on the same basis with the Castilians
of previous reigns
;
and
his Majesty's subjects of other nations;
usually to
ladies.
the queen was have Portuguese women among her principal "For the benefit of the whole people of the kingfrontier
dom,"
customs between Castile and Portugal were to be abolished, and merchandise was to pass freely in
all
both directions as was done before the imposition of the 2 duties actually being levied at the time, and every facility
was to be given for the importation of Castilian grain into and Philip promised to give 300.000 cruzados, Portugal of which 120,000 were to go for the ransom of captives, 150,000 to be placed at the disposal of the chamber of Lisbon, and the rest to be used for the relief of the victims of
;
the pestilence. The king also agreed that in providing for the flee is of India, and the other squadrons required for the
defence of the realm, for the chastisement of corsairs, and for the security of the frontiers of Africa, he would, after consultation with the representatives of his new realm, take
such measures as should seem most wise, even if they involved the giving of aid by his other kingdoms, and great
increase of expense to his royal treasury.
1 On the Consejo de Portugal see Danvila y Collado, Poder Civil, ii, p. 438; Rebello da Silva, v, pp. 397 f. 2 I.e., under the law of January 23,
Finally,
though
lib.
ix,
it
1559 (Nueva Recopilacidn,

xxxi, ley 1), que se han
tit.
"Que
declara los derechos
secos entre Castilla
de pagar en los puertos y Portugal."
376
was recognized thai in view of the multitude of other realms which it had pleased God to give him, it would be impossible
Portuguese he promised to do his utmost to reside and that when no other more imthere as long as he could consideration intervened to prevent it, he would portant allow his son and heir to visit Portugal, in order that he
for Philip to live continually in Portugal as the
liked, yet
would have
might be brought up there

his future subjects.
1
in part,
and
get to
know and
love
it
TheM' certainly look like large concessions; and in general may be said that Philip continued to observe the most
in letter at least
if
important of them,
to the
not entirely
in spirit,
day beyond what he had promised, as in the establishment of B court of appeal at Oporto for the convenience of the northern
provinces."
It
of his death.
In
some particulars he even went
appears, however, that
in
1593 he restored
;
8 and be the frontier customs between Portugal and ( 'a-' le Count of Krireira enumerates several other infractions of the
;
privileges of
Thomar, among them being the occupation

4
of
It would the fortresses of Portugal by Castilian troops. have been too much to expect of the PriM that he King should even admit the possibility of any country being
worthy
of
comparison with
his
beloved
his
'
astile
in his choice
of officials to help
newly conquered realm, be generally selected those Portuguese who bad been notoriously Castilianized, like Moura; and he availed bimself of
be might semi a membei of his own family to represent him in Lisbon by selecting as his first appointee to that office the Archduke Albert of Austria, who
the stipulation that
mmente
/.
him govern
of
.t
Bancyto
In
f-.
/,'
de
C.
In,
ir,
lib.
p.
ix,
9'i;
tit.
of.
A
l'y
1.
I'ullura u Million il< 'dizaridn fMijo Fil i II. pp. 122 on th oom Bshrai P. Iro de Maris, Dialogot d* Vo
.
Lot
xxxi,
The
annual return from tb reckoned to be thirty eutnto$

.
'
'll
'
>a
de
II
1874
ibon, 167
Rettaurada Portugal pp. 30-38.
MAINTENANCE OF SEPARATISM
was
his cousin, his
377
nephew, his brother-in-law, and in later years his son-in-law. But it is difficult, save in the matter
of the customs, to find cases of direct violation of his pledge of 1582 that cannot
be plausibly excused as measures of
military necessity emergency. The first clear instance of the imposition of the Castilian tax came in 1636, during the reign of Philip IV and as a result of the policy of
or public
Olivares
and four years

in
later the revolution
broke out
which was to end
1668 with the acknowledgment by
Spain of Portuguese independence. The contrast between the policy of Philip the Prudent and that of the masterful
and ambitious minister
of his
grandson
is
very marked.
Olivares imposed the tax which brought on the catastrophe largely, without doubt, in order to satisfy the needs of the
moment
such
was ever
is
his
way
but perhaps
it is
not
entirely fanciful to see in his action
something more than
evidence that enough of the spirit of contemporary France had penetrated his mind to convince him that the principle of constitutional separatism, which,
merely that.
There
often remarked, underlay the whole fabric of the Spanish Empire, was no longer practicable or wise, and that
as
we have
some
sort of closer administrative union
between the
differ-
ent scattered states and colonies that composed it had become imperative. He had visions of doing something such
Bourbons did with the Spanish Empire in the eighteenth century, after some of its most burdensome limbs had been lopped off but he had not the ability to carry through his programme, and the experiment ended in disaster. 1 Philip II, on the other hand, was far too deeply imbued with
as the
;
the ancient traditions of his native land to think for one
moment
1
of
embarking on any such hazardous adventure as

its
On
the policy of Olivares and

see
results,
Martin A.
S.
Hume, The
Court of Philip IV. (New York and London, 1907), pp. 159-162.
378
this.

The
the constituprinciple of the maintenance of different states that composed the tional separatism of the
in
Spanish Empire
Europe had never been
violated,
from the
days of the little Pyrenean Christian realms in the early the gradual acquisiperiod of the Heconquest down through Italian dependencies, of the tion of the Mediterranean and
Netherlands and of Franche Comte
;
it
had even begun
to
permeate the administration of the Spanish New World. Now that at last Philip had obtained what he
Iberian probably coveted most, the sole portion of the peninsula which had escaped his forefathers, and whose
territories of the
had virtually been bequeathed to him by them as a duty, he never dreamed of depriving it of its own indewhich he pendent form of government. The concessions had made, partly no doubt in deference to the wishes of his new subjects, were fully in line with his own preconceived The ideas as to how his new territories should be managed. measure of autonomy which the Portuguese demanded and received was in some respects more complete than that of the. realms of the crown of Aragon, of the Mediterranean and
reacquisition
Italian states,
and
of the
Burgundian landsj notably
in
the
of Castilians from the governstipulations for the exclusion ment and the provisions against the Production of Castilian taxation; but that was merely the more perfect carry-
of the ing out of the oldest and most fundamental principle administration of the Spanish Empire. The terms on which
Portugal had finally been superadded to the vasl agglomeration of separate states, n<>\\ comprised in that huge and with the rnqsl Unwieldy organism, were fully in accord
1
ancienl traditions of
i
its
upbuilding.
the Portuguese, and declared that when he had the power in his hands !>. should have taken imuBures to fuse the two kingdoms.
Kr.'u.t.'.l
j,
Beaeyl
I.
maintains that
W> 1841., Philip* Castilian Mbdissatisfied
.,,!>
kutonomy
thai
:ii the be had
THE COLONIES ACKNOWLEDGE PHILIP

The acceptance
379
of Philip as the lawful sovereign of the different colonies of which the vast was Portuguese
empire
composed was effected, save for one notable exception, with an ease and absence of turmoil, which is perhaps chiefly
significant
demonstrating how slight were the changes which the advent of the new dynasty brought about, The concessions hitherto enumerated, which Philip had made in 1581, guaranteed that there should be no real alteration in
in
the methods or the personnel of the administration of the the colonies remained colonies of PorPortuguese empire
;
tugal,
which under Castilian rule continued to retain as
before the
monopoly
1
own
ports.
of their commerce for the benefit of its The Portuguese colonies for the most part
showed themselves utterly dynasty. What mattered it
indifferent
to
to
the
change of
their
them
to
what family
sovereign belonged, or whether he resided in Lisbon or in Madrid, in Cintra or in the Escorial? And, moreover, at
sight there seemed to be many positive advantages in becoming the subjects of the most powerful monarch on the
first
danger they hoped to be assured In Brazil, furthermore, there was a special consideration in favor of the recent change, for it would insure the peaceful termination of those boundary
;
face of the earth
in case of
of effective protection.
disputes1
between the Spanish and Portuguese colonies
in
dom and its dependencies. It was divided into four sections, of which one dealt with the affairs of Portugal itthe second with those of the self; Indies, West Africa, and Brazil; the third with those of the Military Orders
The only considerable reform in the central administration of the Portuguese colonies which was attempted by Philip II was the substitution in 1591 for the old and unsatisfactory office of the vedores da fazenda of a central Council of Finance (conselho da fazenda) to manage the revenues of the king-
and the islands of Madeira and the Azores; and the fourth with those of Morocco and the accounting. It was
a good move in the direction of much needed centralization, but it did not in 1604 it was in turn go far enough replaced by a Council of the Indies which extended its authority to matters civil, judicial, and religious, as well as financial. Cf. Lannoy and vander Linden, Histoire de V expansion coloniale, i, also Rebello da Silva. pp. 84-85 iii, pp. 280 f,
;
380
South America which had already begun to loom large as a
As things ultimately defor the future. possible danger were never realized. veloped these happy expectations
than a decade of the annexation of Portugal, had been broken the maritime and Spain's naval power seize commercial nations of Western Europe were swift to
Within
less
for the golden opportunity to dismember her vast empire which their own advantage, and the Portuguese colonies,
had most recently been broughl among those that suffered most
into the com! mation, were

;
instead of being protected.
out for attack. But the first they were specially singled results of this adverse development, which was ultimately not felt destined to obliterate all the favorable ones, were
until the very- last part of the reign of the Prudent King, later time. its full effects were not visible until a much
and
The
nourish during the years Portuguese empire continued to though the immediately following the Spanish conques storm clouds were beginning to gather thickly on the horizon.
It
how took Europe another long half century to realize to the been sapped; and down utterly Spain's vitality had
in
peace of Westphalia
bluff to perfection.
It
1648 her diplomats
pitfj
ed the
game
of
would be
futile to
course of events in
attempt any detailed narrative of the the different parts of the Portuguese
of Philip's occupation of empire during the seventeen years facts the Portuguese throne, but some of the outstanding
may be briefly summary which
set
down.
is
For the purposes
of
the short
omit possible here, we may Bafely thi coast of Africa; the Portuguese colonies on the wesl them in this period and to tendency was rather to negled
alone
1
We will concentrate instead on the Orient and od Brazil. with a glance at the fate of those scattered ten*
begin, then,
1
L.inncy and vandai Linden,
i,
p-
1'
IXDIA AND THE MOLUCCAS

tories,
381
extending from the Cape of Good Hope around to China and the Spice Islands of the Pacific, which acknowl-
edged the authority of the Portuguese viceroy at Goa. That office was held by six different incumbents between them, in accordance with the promises of Philip at the time of his accession, were of ancient Portuguese families, and the period of their rule is chiefly filled
;
1581 and 1598
all
of
with struggles with rebellious natives and Turkish pirates from Mombasa in East Africa to the Moluccas. 1 The new
was proclaimed without resistance at the church at Goa on September 3, 1581, 2 and from that time onward his representatives seemed wholly absorbed in extending the possessions of their new sovereign, and in
king's accession
defending what had already been acquired. In 1585 they attempted without success to utilize the rivalries of the
kings of Tidore and Ternate in order to regain possession of the fort which they had once possessed on the latter island
;
they beat off an attack on their establishment at Malacca by the king of Johore, and afterward destroyed the city of Johore and forced its ruler to flee for
but a
little later
his
At the same time they convincingly reasserted their authority over Mombasa and their East African establishments, an action which was made imperative by the imminent
life.
;
danger of a Turkish advance into that region
they also
erected a powerful fortress at Muscat to strengthen their 4 control over the entrance to the Persian Gulf. Perhaps the
most notable achievement

of Philip, in 1597, as
of the period
5
king of Ceylon.
lin,
5
was the proclamation Various uprisings by

(Ber-
1 F. C. Danvers, The Portuguese in India (London, 1894), ii, pp. 42-120; Rebello da Silva, iii, pp. 148-169.
Deutsch- und Englisch-Ostafrika 1899), pp. 142-162.
pp. 25 f. Cf. ante, Vol. Ill, pp. Danvers, ii, pp. 63 f., 70-73.
Danvers,
ii,
439
f.
Danvers,
ii,
pp.
68
f.
cf.
also J.
Strandes,
Die
Portugiesenzeit
von
Portuguese Ceylon see P. E. the Ceylon: Portuguese Era (Colombo, 1913-14, 2 vols.), and the Ribeiro's Ceilao same, History of (Colombo, 1909). The latter work contains a translation of most of Joao
Pieris,
On
;;s2

afi
Christianized
had given the At there. viceroys adequate excuse for vigorous interference They were the outset their efforts were most unsuccessful. who had previously driven from Kandy by a rebel Cingalese,
well as non-Christian natives
embraced Catholicism and been baptized with the name
of
Don
John.
This leader, who now styled
himself Wimala
Dharma, reverted to the

possession
of
religion of his fathers in order to
win
the support of the priesthood, and announced that he was in of the dalada, or sacred tooth of Buddha, which
was regarded as a proof

rest
of his right to the throne.
In the
the island,
however,
its
the
Portuguese
werq
8
more more
fortunate;
and when
lawful king,
May. permanent 1597, it was found that he had appointed King Philip to be The Spanish monarch's power extended nomihis heir. 2 save Kandy, where he had nally over the whole of the island
convert to Christianity, died at
in
who wae Colombo
been repulsed, and Jaffna, where the authority of a local There was a solemn ceremony of ruler was still recognized: the inhabitants, though recognition and allegiance, in which
1
lawi stoutly refusing to permit the introduction of Portuguese to their new master, and customs, promised absolute loyalty
native ones. On provided he would observe and respect the to make any concessions^ .ne point alone were they willing and religious orders were to h-ive full liberty to the
priests
preach
could.
the Catholic
faith
and make what converts they

cen
Such
is
the brighter side of the picture.
from
the standpoint of Philip and his representatives, and down the to the death of the Prudent King it was unquestionably
Ribdro'i
,
iU ,\
.
history,
of
oomplstod
Othfll
in
1685.
tn-iit-
of the
ol
ii.
Wtfiy
'I"'
Portuguese throughout apoitat* Don John.
th<
!>:>
lwen
>
Dm n,
Kaii'ly
ii,
i..
<1
pp. '.'7 f.. Ill f. ' 1'imvrrn, ii, p. 98.
remained a thorn
in thi
si<l>-
THE DUTCH
most prominent one signs had appeared
;
IN
THE ORIENT
383
of the
but before the reign ended, the first advent in the Orient of other
powers, whose presence was ultimately to spell ruin for the Spanish Empire in that part of the world. Five years after
Philip's recognition as king of Portugal,
by England. heartedly
Goa
with the Dutch,
who were supported
he was at open war

if
somewhat
half-
Reports of the rich cargo of the carrack San Filippe, which had been captured by Portuguese Sir Francis Drake, in June, 1587, on its way back from
to Lisbon, were not slow to reach Holland,
vinced her of the profits East * the existence of

;
and conthat could be derived from the Far a state of war with Spain, and the
Dutch ships in Spanish and Portuguese her ample excuse for invading the Oriental harbors, gave monopoly of her ancient foe. The States-General made
seizure in 1585 of all
matters
issuing a series of prohibitions against trade of all kinds with Spain or Portugal or with any lands or
difficult
by
which acknowledged the authority of their king but these prohibitions were never very strictly enforced, and
islands
it
was, moreover, easy to evade them by the device of sailing under a neutral flag. Precious information as to routes,
trade winds, quicksands, and the course of commerce were furnished by Jan Huygen van Linschoten, the son of a West Frisian ,-urgher, who had resided for two years in Lisbon,
and thirteen
in India.
Finally, in April, 1595, a
number
of
Dutch merchants provided the funds for the despatching of " four ships to the countries lying on the other side of the 2 The expedition was not entirely Cape of Good Hope." successful. It was detained for five months at Madagascar by storms and illness, sailed thence direct for Java, and on
June 22, 1596, reached Bantam.
inspired
1
The
2
natives, doubtless
hostile
by the Portuguese, gave the newcomers a

ii,
Danvers,
p.
66
infra, p. 520.
Danvers,
ii,
p. 106.
384
reception;

fighting ensued;
the Dutch captain, Cornells

to be ransomed.
Houtman, was captured and had

-els
Thence
of their
the invaders proceeded to the Moluccas,
where one
;
became unseaworthy and was abandoned the crews also were sadly reduced, and the survivors were lucky to get home with three ships in July, 1597. But though the cargo
to pay for the expense of they brought back was insufficient the expedition, it was more than adequate to demonstrate
the wealth of the Orient.
New
;
'companies' for similar
experiments were rapidly formed the year of Philip's death year
than twentytwo Dutch vessels sailed for the East Indies. Three yeanwere amallater, in March, 1601, these different companies
less
no
and
in the following
into | gamated, under government direction and support, and from that single body, the Dutch East India Company,
moment onward
in
the
Orient
the ruin of the Spanish-Portuguese monoply 2 became a certainty. Philip's ill-omened
he had Burgundian inheritance and the methods by which of which attempted to retain it were to have consequences he would never have dreamed.
The Count
thai Philip
of Ericeira, in his Portugal Restaurado, tells Ul the Duchess of Braganza, the offered to his
rival,
title of
whole Of Brazil and the
in king of it for her husband, return for their abandonment of all claim to the Portugu 3 Since Braganza was snband thai she refused.
throne,
[uently bought off

rv.
if
by
in
collar of the
a
Golden
Fleece," this
true, certainly
throws
curious light on the slight
importance attached
those days
by Europeans
to their
P.
.1.
thr \rthrrlands,
Th
in
Blok, History f the People of iii. pp. 271 f. India Company r.nR'.ioh
'I
the Portuguese and Dutch.

ii.
Dani
Rettaurwio.
108-110. *Hutoria dc
I'!'
Portugal
iii,
wan
in
lt'i'K)
and
.-nt.-nd
i.
16.
at nncc
into
active
competition
with
Bebello da Silva,
pp.
DEVELOPMENT OF BRAZIL
transatlantic possessions
;
385
and the
tale is particularly
amusin the
2
ing
when one
contrasts
it
with the action of the descendof
ants of that
same Duke and Duchess

1
Braganza
early part of the nineteenth century.

of Brazil that
The
descriptions
have come down to us from the time it passed into Spanish hands would indicate that it was a land which any ruler ought to have been proud to possess. The principal settlements were at Sao Salvador (now Bahia), Pernambuco, Olinda, and Sao Vicente. The first named
boasted a population of 800 inhabitants, of whom 100 and the whole enjoyed incomes of over 5000 cruzados; reconcavo, or coast line of the surrounding bay, some 2000,
exclusive of Indians
churches in the city around was covered with plantations. There were fiftyseven sugar works in the neighborhood, whose annual ex-
and negroes. There were sixty-two and district, and the country for miles
amounted to 2400 hogsheads, and oranges and lemons, cocoa and ginger, were grown in enormous quantities. Cattle raising was also extensive and successful. Horses and cows, sheep and goats were brought over from Europe and the Cape Verde Islands and flourished in their new home. The other settlements were somewhat smaller. There were various insect scourges and much disease. The morals of the community at large were not good, and the enormous imporport
In 1807-08 John VI (then regent) Portugal fled before the advancing armies of Napoleon to Brazil, which he found so much more attractive that it was only with great difficulty that he was forced, thirteen years later, to return. After his death in 1826 his son, the Emperor Pedro, attempted for
1
of
a short space to control, from its quondam colony, the destinies of the mother
country.
Heinrich Handelmann, Geschichte von Brasilien (Berlin, 1860)

. ;
Cf
Robert Southey, History of Brazil (London, 1810-19), i, pp. 316 ff., and R. G. Watson, Spanish and Portuguese South America during the Colonial Period (London, 1884), i, pp. 250 ff. the works of Gabriel Soares and Fernao Cardim (1584-85) summarized in F. A. de Varnhagen, Historia Geral do Brazil, 2d ed., i, pp. 357 ff. George Buchanan, De Sphaera (1584), lib. iii, vv. 560 ff. Carlos Franca, "Os Portugueses do seculo XVI e a Historia Natural do Brasil," in Revista de Historia, xv
in
; ; ;
the
manuscript
noticias
summarized
(1926), pp. 35-74, 81-128, 161-166.
386
tat ion

of
aegro
BlaveB
1
did
not
work altogether
to
the
advantage of the colony.

receives
is
agricultural
Yet the prevailing impression one of a happy and prosperous life, predominantly and pastoral in its interests, and far less
strenuous than that of the Spanish colonies farther wesV
ward.
The government
until about
the middle of the sixteenth
a number of century had been almost entirely in the hands of each of whom had been given a stretch captains-proprietors,
of coastline extending north
and south
for a distan< e of fifty
leagues,
and
the
land
indefinitely inland;
civil jurisdiction
therefrom Btretching exercised exclusive criminal and each
westward
be sent
home
within his captaincy, though appeals could 1 to Lisbon in case of capital punishment.
varied widely in Naturally the fortunes of these captaincies accordance with climatic conditions, fertility of the soil, and
the
al.ilit Lee
of the grantees
hut
six of
them
rere ultimately
Beginning with the converted into permanent settlements. of the captain* reign of John 111 (1521 57) the power
The local magisrestricted proprietors was considerably were trates whom they had hitherto nominated themselves
officials sent OUl gradually replaced by royally appointed measure of unity and from Lisbon. Finally, Ln 1549, BOme the cohesion was given to the scattered settlements by
Tome de Sousa, appointment of the first royal governor. all the authorities on with supreme supervisory power over He established himself at Halm,, which thei the ground.'
5
h.rth
hi.
became
a BOrt
of capital of the entire colony,
and did
to carry out
the elaborate instructions which had

pp. 319
lirasil,
Cf.
aaciJ
Paul
Leroy-Beaulieu,
H8),
i,
Di
f.
In
1903-04).
,
i,
ff.
J.
do
Ur
ed
Hio de von
I
pp. 52
' "..ir...
nt.Mi. pp.
n.i fT.
Boa
Handelmann,
tilien,
Geuchichle
York
and
London.
pp. 76-86.
ADMINISTRATION OF BRAZIL
387
been given him by the home government for the regulation of the conduct of the captains-proprietors. But as he had no
direct jurisdiction over
any one
of
them, his
x
;
efforts
and those
of his successors resulted rather in paralyzing local initiative
than in effecting healthy centralization

accession of Philip II Brazil
of different settlements
so that at the
was
still
rather a loose federation
than a single colony. not seem that the Prudent King or his successors It would effected any very serious change in the situation as they
found
it
in in
Parahyba
in 1597.
in
2
Three new captaincies were set up; 1585, Sergipe in 1589, and Rio Grande do Norte
1581.
certain
improvements, particularly the administration of justice, were introduced in the different captaincies, and various attempts were made to check
non-residence and decentralization and to establish an
hierarchy.
official
number
of
But the period

;
of the
Hapsburg
rule in Portugal
was too short and too disturbed to permit of much permanent and when Portugal regained its achievement in this line
independence in 1668, the government of Brazil was not essentially different from what it had been when the Spaniards
assumed
control.
The narrative history

II is largely
of Brazil during the period of Philip
the
that of conflicts with hostile powers, who, after Spanards had got possession of it, redoubled the efforts
which they had

selves footholds
made
on
its
in
Portuguese days to gain for themIt
attractive coasts.
was
in the
year
1555 that the
first
serious attempt in this direction
had been
made by a party of French Huguenots, sent out under Xicolas Durand de Villegagnon by Admiral Gaspard de Coligny to found what was proudly called 'La France
1
92
pp. In the middle of the sixteenth century the captains-proprietors were only rarely resident in their captaincies.
f.
Lannoy and vander Linden,
Handelmann, op. cit., pp. 120-127. Handelmann, op. cit., pp. 115 f. Lannoy and vander Linden, p. 93.
2
3
:^SN

'
what is now Rio de Janeiro, kept on good terms with the Indians, and were unmolested by the Portuguese for at least four years. But
Antarctique.'
They
established themselves at
He quarrelled Villegagnon proved a traitor to his employers. his command, returned to with the Huguenots, gave up meantime in 1558 the France) and went over to the Guises
;
Portuguese had sent out
new and vigorous governor, Men
de Sa, who nine years later (1567) completed the expulsion of 2 The French, however, were not willing to the intruders. claims to the place where relinquish without further effort all
and the accession they had gained such a promising foothold, of Philip to the Portuguese throne gave them an excellent
excuse for renewing their attempts. They established a of ousting them trading post at Parahyba, whence the task
was intrusted
Valdes, on his
in
way
1583 to Philip's admiral, Diego Flores back from a vain effort to secure contml
After some
of the Strait of Magellan.
deb
the work wa|
successfully
3
accomplished, and the French did not again venture to appear in South America until the seventeenth
century.
More troublesome by
far
were the incursions
of the
lish, who, though they had previously traded never gone there as enemies until the initiation
in Brazil,
Enghad
of the Spanish
regime.*
Their subsequent
expeditions thither were natu-
hostile nature rally of an increasingly maritime struggle of Spain the
and became
a pari
all ->ver
general the world.
and England
In December,
L582, Captain
of
Edward Fenton,
off
ostensibly
bound
to
for
the Strait
Magellao ami the

Santa
Ea
1
:,)(
anchor, with a small squadron,

"Le
Cf. Robert Bieard,
la
\\l* titteratun hrancsJsa |, in Jtouto d* Wrtnria. si (1922).

134,
i
Bfesti <lnnn
m*
BibttXO, lirnsil, pp. 121-129. ithey, i, pp. 850 302. 352. Captain William Ibid., p. Bawkina of Plymouth, father ol
Justin Winaor, JVomriMtfl vin, pp. 891 i, Hittory </

'
ol
John
Bl
uril
Hawkins,
made
ft
voyage
894;
early as 1630.
THE ENGLISH IN BRAZIL

Catalina Island.
389
His objects were apparently peaceful
contemporaneous exploits of Drake made the Spaniards suspicious and they proceeded to attack him.
but
the
An
inconclusive moonlight engagement followed, in which one of the Spanish ships was sunk, and the English finally 1 In 1586 another squadron, fitted escaped to the open sea.
out by George Clifford, Earl of Cumberland, and commanded by Captain Robert Widrington, entered the port of Bahia
Despite the sturdy defence of the place by the converted Indians of the adjoining country, who did notable things with their bows and
six
and remained there for
weeks.
arrows, the marauders succeeded in doing a considerable
amount of damage. 2 Five years later Thomas Cavendish made a rather futile attack on the town of Santos, burnt Sao Vicente, returned to Santos again, where he was treated even more roughly than before, and finally lost a large
portion of his
deeply
is
men in an attempt on Espirito Santo so was he cast down by this last repulse that he died, it
;
Most notable of all was the expedition commanded by Captain James Lancaster in 1594-95. Its objective was Pernambuco, where there happened to be a number of heavily laden East Indiamen. The place was taken and the booty captured but while Lancaster was loading his vessels for the voyage home he was constantly harassed by attacks from the Portuguese, who strove to cut off his water supply, floated fire-ships down the
said, of grief
;
on the voyage home. 3
river to dislodge
mouth
of this
of the
him, and, finally, established a battery at the harbor to prevent his escape. The destruction
work cost the English a considerable number of men, but their expedition finally got home in safety, and the wealth
Corbett, Drake and the Tudor pp. 356-360, and references there Watson, Spanish and Portuguese South America, i, p. 254; supra, p. 198.
J. S.
1
Xavy,
i,
i, pp. 356 f cf. pp. 359-364; Centenera, Argentina, cantos
Southey,
Ibid.,
Barco
xxvii.
xxviii.
390
it
THB ANNEXATION OF PORTUGAL

1
was unquestionably an incentive to the brought with it Both India Company. formation of the English East most dangerous potential Holland and England, Spain's taste of the possibilities a good enemies, had thus got before the colonial expansion at her expense commercial and
end
î Philip's reign.
Very
Philip's
fch e
different
was the story

the Azores.
of
the
power
in
Though
establishment of less valuable than
East
destined to give the Indies or Brazil, they were
all tin- resl of h.s Portuguese Prudent King more trouble than Their geographical location acquisitions put together. more the current of European poht.es
involved them in and they the Asiatic and American lands, intimately than of his dayi side till the end remained a thorn in Philip's the A/ores was sounded by \nd the first note of warning in tin of Crato, in league- with the efforts of his rival Antonio
French.
.
composed, the only one which was Sao Miguel, the Largesl of the group, and been occupied Qad immediately acknowledged Phil,,, 8 in importance and Terceira, the next by the Spaniards. ol of it* Loyalty to the cause aize gave convincing evidence
Of the nine islands
of
which the archipelago
is
Antonio, who, before
he
fled
from Portugal, had sent
thithei
the
one
to adherents, Cipriao de Figueiredo, the Francis, m0s1 of .he situation; he was aided by the almost unammoui friars while the localJesuits, againsl attempted to advance desire of the reel of the clergy, vainly
f
make
his
the cause of Spain."
The Spaniards
in
Sao Miguel
negle.
kn ded
the
""
'
'
"'
"
"&
'
by
to Asia'
[mdla - 1801 03.
Company
THE AZORES
391
the situation in Terceira until after Antonio's partisans had 1 gained full control there moreover, the Terceirans succeeded in persuading the inhabitants of the seven lesser
;
islands to follow their
Spanish king.
his best
When
example and take sides against the Antonio finally succeeded in getting
it
away from Portugal

hope
to France,
was reasonably
clear that
dominions was by gaining full control of the Azores and The establishing a base there. archipelago was a rendezvous for fleets from America and from the Orient 2 in more ways than one it was a focal
;
of recovering his
be bred for Philip of Antonio had carried the crown jewels of Spain. Portugal away with him; knowing the fondness of the queen of England for precious stones, and the enthusiasm of her sea-rovers for maritime adventure, he attempted to interest
point,
all
where
sorts of trouble could
Elizabeth in his cause. 3
ready for overt action.

to utilize the
list
But that wary lady was not yet Drake and Hawkins were anxious
a subscription
;
opportunity to the utmost;
was opened and many contributions were sent in but the royal approval was long withheld, and the small squadron which was finally permitted to sail never saw action
But Antonio had another string to While he had been negotiating with Queen Elizabei his agent, the Count of Vimioso, had been active in France, where he found a situation much more favorable to his master's Matters there had developed in plans. anti-Spanish fashion since 1578. The Huguenots were
his
against the Spaniards.
bow.
enthusiastic for Antonio's cause
the queen-mother's
own
claims to the Portuguese throne were enough to insure her
sympathy and support;

loid., u, pp. tista de Tassis,
2
another good
the
3
omen was
that on
?ii,"
"'
P 176, note
'
New
World."
i'ans,
called
Juan BauPhilip's ambassador at the Azores "the key to

179-183.
La Conquista
C. Fernandez Duro,
de las Azores p 9 Read, Walsingham, ii, pp. 55-57.
392
THE ANNEXATION OF PORTl'OAL

17.
August
L581,
the
Duke
of
Cambray, almosi from Parma. For the Bake of appearances

that
under
the
Alencon-Anjou had seized nose of Alexander of

it
was judged wise

ignorant of
all
King Henry
III
should remain
officially
plans to aid Antonio;
apprised of
hut as a matter of fact he was fully and desired that they he carried out. It them,
was
not. however, until the early

to start.
of
summer
It
of 1582 that the of
expedition was ready

sixty ships witli
was composed
some
upwards
of
6000 soldiers, beskle the crews,
under command
Catharine de' Medici's favorite general,
1 It left the port of Belle-Ile the condottiere Filippo Strozzi. on June It) and carried Antonio, Vimioso, and also an
efficienl
and perfidious Spanish spy, by the name
Vaez, whom the pretender, in the most loyal of his followers.

Philip
Miguel his innocence, believed to be

all
of
was
fully
informed of
ambassador
did
at Paris
was
Hia these preparations. a marvel of effieien v in the UB<
secret informers
and
was duly laid King as usual was determined

early
and everything he learned and before his master.' But the Prudent
spies,
In
May.
L581,
he
possible to avoid a fight. one despatched to the Azores

if
Amhrosio d'Aguiar Coutinho,
a
if
Portuguese who had bees

he
c
won over
to his service,
t<.
see
aid not persuade the
inhabitants of Terceira and the smaller islands to acknowlhut the effort completer/ edge the authority of Spain; 4 In the next two months two small fleets were sent failed.
out.
in
under Pedro de Valdes and Lope de Figueroa, primarily ordr to get in touch with the Eas1 Indian and Americni
fleets
which were due
at
the Azores
al that
time,
and prevenl
them from being persuaded

:,.!.
r.
to join with the rebel Terceira

<>
'
lot A
.
pp.
Ht
M
1
Duro,
f.
Conquiita
ii.
i>.
'
Cf. S. I., ii. p. 178. >' ' PP' 175-177.
lead
cites
orxMcon,
147,
though he
no evidence.
SANTA CRUZ SENT TO THE AZORES
393
secondly, for the purpose of continuing the attempts of Coutinho to win over Terceira without a fight and thirdly,
;
in case these efforts failed, to attack Terceira
by
force of
arms. Largely by good luck, the first of these objects was but the attempts to gain the second successfully attained
;
and third were miserable failures, and the defeat that Philip's forces sustained in their operations against the Terceirans 1 The encouraged the islanders to persist in their resistance.
to Lisbon,
accounts which the crestfallen commanders brought back 2 together ,\ith the news that kept pouring in of
convince the Prudent King that the Azores could never be won without a far greater military and naval effort than he
the progress of hostile preparations in France, sufficed to
had contemplated hitherto and he forthwith ordered the Marquis of Santa Cruz to be ready to sail in April, 1582, in 3 the hope that he might be able to anticipate the French.
;
The expedition did not get away till July 10 nor reach the Azores till the 21st, six days after the arrival of the enemy.
It
was, however, a far more imposing

It
predecessors.
was composed
of
two
armament than its galleons, the San
Martin and the San Mateo, nineteen galleys, and sixteen smaller boats, and carried, according to the official muster
roll,
something over 8000
soldiers.
It
seems
clear,
however,
actually
that tht
number
of ships
and
of fighting
men who
got to the Azores
was considerably less. 4 The French had already landed 1500 of their men at Pont a Delgada in Sao Miguel. They had successfully repulsed a sortie by the garrison of the castle, which they
were besieging when the Spaniards arrived.
Neither side
was apparently
in
;
any
hurry to begin to fight.

Duro, pp. 22
*
The French
392-394;
1 S. I., ii, pp. 183 ff. C. Fernandez Duro, Conquista, pp. 12 ff. 1 Fernandez Duro, pp. 199-209. 8. I., ii, pp. 200 f. Fernandez
;
f.,
234-251.
pp. 211-213, Fernandez Duro, pp. 23 f.

I.,
ii,
S.
394
had underestimated the size of the enemy's fleet; their commanders were at odds with one another, and they had never came hopes of the arrival of help from England which Santa Cruz was also expecting reinforcements, and for
;
was fired. Finally, at dawn mi Jury 26, the San Mateo, which had manoeuvred itself into an isolated position between the two fleets, was attacked
nearly a week scarcely a shot
at once; by several of the best French ships
an hour
later
the combat had become general, and lasted for rive hours. The Spaniards strove to grapple and board, while the French
tended
their guns general to trust to cannonading; but were not sufficiently powerful to enable them to do this with
in
success;
seamanship was inferior; and despite the fact that they had more ships, the Spaniards were ultimately Strozzi and Vimioso were killed; a number of victorious. the less ardent of the French commanders, and also Antoni
their
>,
two of "heir ships were Bought refuge in ignominious flight and four more fell into the hands of burned, four were sunk,
;
the victors
.Laths,
some 2000
of their sailors
and soldiers met
their
and upwards of 390 more, including seventy-six On the Spanish side the caballeros, were taken prisoners. losses were considerably less, amounting in all to 221 dead
n wounded, though the list included some of the It was a gallant and of the time. not.d soldiers and Bailors well fought battle.- ami Santa Cruz won universal praise for an enemy in a place where if he had so
and
:>::;
engaging
i,,rt
>
defeal
powerful he could not possibly have escaped;
bul nil
The
the
on
beet ennteuporary eathoriUee bat tli- an Coneetaggio, fols.
whioh
Henera'i
>>ko
de C. era chiefly baaed), the deapatcfa ol Btaaialaui F.-k-'IPoUafa

.
and C
pp. 228-252, and ..f Altolacuirra y Duvale. pp. 109 113,348-360. Conet" crudeliaaima taggio calls it a and Hen-era (Histona dl taglia,"
ambaaaadoi el Madrid, r The in Laaeota'i Taedmeh, pp. > 04. standard inodeni eooOD&tl are tin >. M Dun, La Cmauista of C.
I
Mundo, Li, p 488) eharacterieei it as "de laa mayoree <iue se han vwto en
el
marO
3
*
I
.
'
2fl2,
not*
Ibid.,
ii.
p. 247.
de las Azores, pp. 38-48, of S.
..
ii,
BATTLE IN THE AZORES

victory
395
was stained by
five
a deed of savage cruelty which he
perpetrated
officers
days
later.
Deaf to the murmurs of his
valiant foe/ he caused
and men, who cherished no rancor against their all the prisoners who had fallen into
cold blood.
sailors
his hands to be taken on shore and executed in The gentlemen were beheaded and the common
and
soldiers
master, and
to Philip.
2
hanged, "for the service of God, of the king our of the king of France," as he put it in his report
if
found
this
there be one
In the last six words of that quotation is to be the sole possible justification of
barbarous deed. Santa Cruz did not regard his opponents as honorable foes, but as lawless pirates who had gone off on a marauding expedition without the sanction of the
French government 3 they were therefore beyond the pale, and their execution was but ridding their king of a pack of
;
dangerous criminals.
the act as
it is
as hard for us today to palliate to exculpate Menendez de Aviles for his

It
is
slaughter of the followers of
Jean Ribaut
but the theory
was the same, namely, that by papal donation all land and water west of Europe belonged without exception to Spain, and to Portugal which had now
that really underlay both deeds
been annexed to Spain, and, consequently, that

fols.
all
foreigners
tutti
i
this point cf. Conestaggio, 239 v 240 r: "Questa sentenza parue crud lissima a tutti coloro che
On
che
comandino
impiccarsi
la vdirono, e
massime a' soldati Spagonde alcuni de soldati lasrispetti da parte diceuano, che non era bene fondata la sentenza, per non essere fra il Catolico e'l Cristianisnuoli,
ciati
.
Marchese] rispose [II prigioni. ... esser espresso ordine del Re Cristianissimo che fossero puniti nella vita tutti quei Francesi, che contra le cose del
Re
Catolico
pigliassero
l'armi
."
simo Re said*, ne inuiolata pace anzi guerra, ne coloro esser corsali ne ladri, ma valorosi soldati: E che se bene fra l'vna corona e l'altra si dissimulauano molte cose scusandosi il Re Cristianissimo hor con la Madre,
;
and so the sentence was executed. 2 D. I. E., vii, p. 356; Fernandez Duro, pp. 48-50 S. I., ii, pp. 252-255.
;
Pronunciavit esse ruptores foederum, Turbatores quietis publicae, fautores Rebellium Hispaniae Regis, Pyratas et
latrones, his in Decreto
.
"
enim ipsis verbis utitur Nero tam crudelis

.
nor col fratello, esser tutte fintioni di ma non lasciar per questo di principi eseerui publica guerra, le leggi della quale diceuano non esser si rigorose
;
non
3
fuisset." Fogelveder Tagebuch, p. 64.
in
Lassota,
Cf. ante, p. 392.
396
That so at their own peril. trespassed thereon did service to the king of Santa Cruz could describe the act as a Franc- only proves that he refused to believe that the French 1 The could officially sanction such intrusions.
who
government
protests of his
men showed
not underplainly that they did

its
stand his reasoning or accept

2
consequences; but we know that Philip approved, as he had of the massacre

logical
According to present-day standards, lie wafl but in passing judgment wholly and unquestionably wrong; on him and on his admiral it is but fair that we should bear of the times in which in mind the theories and
in
Florida.
principles
they lived.
If
ers,
Santa Cruz was barbarous
in his
treatment of his prison-
he was also neglectful of his opport unit ies to utilize to the It would seem obvioul full the victory that he had won. that he should have seized the moment when the inhabitant*
of Terceira
were dismayed at the rout of thei French allies for Spain, and to take possession of the island and hold it that his admiral had when he learned of the victory
-
Philip,
The king b so. won, was most anxious thai be should do on time; Santa Crul arrive message, however, did not returned to Lisbon, and his failure to complete the conquest to try again. of the archipelago encouraged Spam's enemies
Once more the
and pretender gained the sympathy and Henry III. Anothei Medici support of Catharine de'
tireless
in May. L583, under command of expedition was despatched Avmar de Jhaste, governor of Dieppe and first cousin of the Duke of Joyeuse, and in June Santa Jruz had to be sent back 4 This time the invaders made the islands to beat him off.
(
1
<
ftrninda Duro, La
Hr la*
I
Conqttttta
W-51
:m<l n-f.-rences
I.,
thm-.
Utolaguirw E.G Bourne.

,,,,
8.
8.
n, pp. 261-265.
I., ii.
PP- 271-326;
pp.
,
C Ferntod*
Altotajuim
lMf
187;
Duro.p P .69 88.366

B.X..H.P.
op.
r,t..
67;
C\
254
.
Duvale.
<i
116
n.
135.
wnindea Dure,
pp.
Archv
pp- 104.
w mi
SANTA CRUZ AND DE CHASTE
397
considerably less trouble than in 1582, though Terceira and

the lesser islands were not completely in Spanish hands until
the end of August the real importance of this second expedition against the Azores lies in the influence which it exerted
;
upon the future.
On
the one hand
its
reports, doubtless
grossly exaggerated, of the heroism of the islanders' resistance

to the Spaniards, caused all Philip's enemies to select the
archipelago as the most favorable place to attack him in the stormy years which were to follow. On the other, the belief, l current in Spain, that there had been an English contingent
in Chaste's force,
caused Philip's admirals to believe that they had beaten two enemies at once, and led them greatly to underestimate the naval resources of Queen Elizabeth.
We
shall revert to this
phase
of the story in
another place.
The Azores, at least, had been conquered in 1583, and with them the last stronghold of the independence of Portugal, and when Santa Cruz got back to Cadiz in the middle of September, 1583, he was received with enthusiasm by the 2 multitude and was heartily thanked by his sovereign. Not such was Philip's reception of the news of the
death of his old general, the
the Portuguese capital on
fighting
1
Duke
of Alva,
which occurred at
had been
finished,
December ll. 3 After the actual the king had no more use for him.
that he had beaten Englishmen as well as Frenchmen in 1583 does not appear, but it is evident from his famous letter to Philip of August 9, 1583 (cf. Altolaguirre y Duvale, pp. 400 f.), that he
This English contingent, if it was present at a.!, was not more than a couple of hundred soldiers; cf. Bib. Nat. Paris, Ms. 16,108, fol. 166; C. Fernandez Duro, La Conquista de las Azores, pp. 70, 454. The note to Forneron, iii, p. 160, is not convincing. It deals, of course, with the first expedition against the Azores (the quotation it gives is from piece 9 and not piece 5 of Ms. K. 1561 of the Archives Nationales), and it seems to show, if Philip read the information sent by Vaez, that he at least realized that there had been no English
ships in
Strozzi's
force,
and
not,
as
Forneron would have it, the reverse. Whether or not Santa Cruz believed
regarded an expedition against England as but a logical consequence of the conquest of the Azores. Cf. also below, p. 516. 2 S. Fernandez L, ii, pp. 322 f Duro, p. 93. The Cortes of Madrid, on receipt of the news of the victory, voted Philip the servicio extraordinario before he asked for it. Adas de las Cdrtes, vii, pp. 88-92 (August 22, 1583). 3 S. I., ii, pp. 267-270.
.
398
Since the

autumn
of
1580 he had withdrawn more and more
handed it over to others; on the authority from him and other hand, he refused all Alva's requests for permission to 1 all the Duke's services to the Prudent King retire.
he had organized and led the army that had conquered Portugal, Philip was unable and even the to forgive the past or forget his ancient grudge shocked when he gave open Portuguese were profoundly demonstration of his ingratitude by dining in public, in defiance of precedent and tradition, on the day following the
and
1 tespite to his father, despite the fact that
death of the greatest of his generals.
In the middle of February, 1583, Philip bade good-by to the kingdom which he had won, and in which he had resided for more than twenty-six months, and re1 urned to his beloved On the whole, be to leave. Spain, which he was never again on the work reason to look back with had
good
satisfaction
that he had accomplished since Cardinal Henry's death. The change from a generally defensive to a comparatively
at that time, and which aggressive policy, which he had made was exemplified by the calling of Cardinal Granvelie to the
to have been fully justified by post of chief minister. Beemed He had put the capstone on the the results it had produced. edifice that had been erected by Ferdinand and [sabella bj
under a single sceptre for the uniting the [berian Peninsula 3 Moreover he had first time since the days of the Visigoths.
done it,
aeiheioved to do,~with relatively little lighting;
com-
< Iranada and Navarre ired with the last twoconquesta of the peninsula had been by which the Spanish dominion the annexation of Portugal had been aim rounded
out,
'J.
M
I
Bubio, Felipe II y Portugal,

li,
Jos de Bigttenaa, antigua." dt la Orden de San Jtrdmmo
ed.,
>'
B
1
p 268.
i
Madrid, 1909).
a
la
p. 461.
perfeooion
RESFLTS OF THE CONQUEST OF PORTUGAL

bloodless.
399
From
was more remarkable
the imperial standpoint his achievement The acquisition of the Portustill.
territorial extent, so that
guese colonies carried the Spanish dominions to their greatest they now constituted the most
1
The Portuextensive empire that the world had ever seen. as we have already pointed out, were for the guese colonies,
Little effort had most part really only coastal trading posts. thus far been made to penetrate into the interior and subdue
the native inhabitants

to regard the lands in
it is, therefore, perhaps scarcely fair which the Portuguese had established
;
themselves as belonging to Portugal in the same sense that On the Spain's American possessions belonged to Spain.
other hand, the Portuguese
had a
far better claim to
them
been
than
any
other
European
nation.
;
They
had
unquestionably the first on the ground they had, moreover, at least in the eyes of all good Catholics, valid rights under
the papal bull of demarcation
if
we adopt
this
method
of
and the Tordesillas Line and measurement, and call all the
;
lands on the shores of which they Portuguese, the acquisition of
had established themselves

these
territories
by the
Prudent King caused the Spanish dominions to cover considerably more than half of the habitable surface of the globe.
When we
domain^
reflect
that eight and a half centuries earlier the
of Philip's predecessors had been restricted to an indeterminate patch of ground in the rocky fastnesses of the Asturias, we can not but marvel at the rapidity, the
grandeur, and most of

"
all
at the continuity of the developJuan de Solorzano Pereira, "Razones que se ofrecen para que el real y supremo Consejo de las Indias deba preceder al que llaman de Flandres" (1629), in his Obras Poslhumas (Madrid, 1776),
178 f. pp. Solorzano's
It
is
Una Monarquia la mas
enstendida,
y dilatada que se ha conocido en el mundo, pues comprehende en efecto otro mundo, ruuchas veces mayor que el que antes se havia descubierto, y poblado en Europa, Africa, y Asia, mediante el qual se puede hoy dar por todo el Orbe una vuelta en contorno, sin salir nunca de los terminos del feliz, y augusto Imperio de V. M."
characteristic
of
that he supports his statement with a large page and a half of references,
scholarship
400

that little
menl by which
kingdom had been extended southuntil at last it ward, eastward, westward, and eastward again, Measured by the extent could be said to encircle the earth. of the territory over which he theoretically held sway, Philip was the most powerful monarch that the world has ever
known.
1
unprecedented greatness was Spain's resourc 9, the signal for the beginning of decline. and of the principles <>! Spain's knowledge of economics tradisuccessful colonial administration, most of all Spain's in the world that she was of the work ions and her
But the attainment
of such
conception
destined to perform were not such as augured well for her and develop such gigantic ability permanently to retain
possessions.
Her empire had become

fall
so top-heavy that
it
weight. was almost inevitable that il should which her preponderance naturally aroused And the jealousy among her neighbors rendered what was inhe-vntly probable That jealousy, it is true, was of an absolute
its
with
own
certainty.
The rcconquest of the Iberian comparatively recenl origin. infidel had for the most part been accompeninsula from the and applause of Spain's neighbor! plished with the bles>ings The Mediterranean empire of the reahn> ->t t, the north. the crown of Aragon had been wOn in the thirteenth,
the fourteenth, and fifteenth centuries without provoking save Franc* active enmity of any of the European powers
French hostility was also the only serious menace to th

me
did not
people have wondered thai be

celebrate
liis
dc Mcsnnero
/;/
triumph by removing his capital from Madrid to Mainly thi latter was by far the more at trac ti ve, and vaetiy better
fitfc
Madrid,
thai
it
ays
p. 43 of hu (Madrid, 1881 1, would have been "alta-
Romanos on
i
[mpoUtica"
<li/.ar
f<>r
Philip
"dc-
su
capital
.
.
y
.
trnsla.l
the focus of a world empire. however, was not Philip's way; over, if he bed transferred his Portugal In- would have been in (rare dancer of losing Ramon imi "f tin' Brown of Aragon.
b,
al
.
medida i' pueblo conquietado hubiera dado entoncea por resulIn tado la inmediata ueparacion de ragoneea, 6 que el oui Ebro marcara, "mip ahora los Pin"
. .
el
limito del territorio espafiol."
ATTITUDE OF THE REST OF EUROPE

development
of
401
Spain under the Catholic kings. The treacheries of Ferdinand in his later years had certainly but down to served to put his neighbors on their guard
;
the accession of Charles
it is
safe to say that Spanish
expansion, both in the Old World and in the New, had proceeded without evoking any general sentiment of suspicion
or distrust
among
the rest of the European states.
Under
The union in one all was changed. and Trastamara dominions, and the Hapsburg uncovering of the resources of the Western Hemisphere, had combined to make the Spanish Empire appear for the first The unholy Francotime in the light of a universal menace. Turkish alliance and the calmness with which it was regarded
the Emperor, of course,
hand
of the
by the
rest of
Europe proclaimed as much
and England and
the papacy, both of which in the days of Ferdinand and Isabella had been rather pro-Spanish than pro-French in their
inclinations,
other side.
gave ominous signs of veering around to the The Emperor, as we have seen, had been acutely
conscious of the danger, and in the latter years of his reign had done his best to avert it by advising his son to follow a and down to the year 1578, policy of 'sturdy def ensiveness
'
save in his dealings with the infidel, Philip had generally acted upon his father's advice. Then, finally, there had
come
God-given opportunity for the annexation of Portugal and for the completion of the task which his ancestors had striven vainly to perform. To achieve it would
this
necessitate indeed
sturdy def ensiveness and the resumption of the comparatively aggressive. On the other hand, there was no question that Philip had the best
of
an abandonment
'
'
legal claim to
posed, if a fight. Last of

first
the Portuguese throne moreover, he prohe possibly could, to enforce that claim without
;
all,
he regarded the Portuguese question
and foremost as a cosa de Espana, a purely Iberian
i\
402
matter, in which his neighbors north of the Pyrenees were in no wise concerned, and in which he hoped and believed that they would not venture to interfere. But it was just in this
hope that he was doomed to disappointment. Had it not been for Portugal's colonial empire, the case might have
last
been otherwise, for Portugal herself was regarded by the rest but her possessions of Europe with comparative indifference in the Orient and in the Occident made her annexation by
;
Spain an affair of the whole world. Their acquisition by Philip threatened to give the Prudent King the same kind of monopoly in Brazil and in the East Indies that he already
claimed to possess in the Spanish dominions in Ann rica, and to do thus to enable him to control the trade of the globe just what sundry corsarios Luteranos Dutch, French, ami
were firmly resolved to prevent, and were striving English with might and main to persuade their respective govern-
support in pre renting. The struggle over the Azores, though the Prudent King had bi
official
ments to give them
ultimately successful there, was really of ominous signifiance. h& Boon as the official policy of Philip's neighbors to the north
of him, particularly of .England, should align itself with
tlic
activities of the sea-rovers
whom they still for the most part Continued to disavow, the advance ol the Spanish Empire
Was certain
territorial
to
be arrested, and the statel)
process
<.\i
its
aggrandizement, which
had
gone on
virtually
to be
unchecked since the beginnings of the Reconquest, succeeded by disintegration and decline.
403
As the subject treated in the foregoing chapter is presumably less known to most English-speaking readers than those dealt with in the rest of this volume, it has seemed worth while to append a somewhat fuller bibliographical note. The sources and literature on Antonio Pe>ez will be found at the end of Chapter XXXVIII. See notes at the end of Chapters II, XXVII, XXXI, XXXIV, and add In addition to such Manuscript Catalogues and Manuscripts. well known works as the various manuscript catalogues and indices of Gayangos, Morel-Fatio, Zarco Cuevas, and Julian Paz, described in the bibliographical n< te to Chapter XXXI, the Conde de Tovar
well
:
published a useful Catalog o dos Manuscritos Portugueses ou relativos a Portugal existentes no Museu Britdnico at Lisbon in 1932; but it
the
should be added that there are a number of important documents in Museum which escaped both the Conde de Tovar and Gayangos.
Two
of the most important imprinted manuscripts on the period in question are the Descripcion de las cosas sucedidas en los reinos de Portugal, desde la Jornada que el rey D. Sebastian hizo en Africa, hasta D. Felipe que el rey quedo universal y pacifico heredero
. . . .
by Diego Queipo de Sotomayor, which is to be found in the Biblioteca Nacional at Madrid, Ms. G. 161, and is described by Julian Suarez Inclan in his Gnerra de Anexion en Portugal, i, p. xviii, and p. 43, note, and the Comentario que trata de la infeliz Jornada que el
de
ellos,
Rey Don Sebastian hizo en
la
Berberia
el
a no de 1578
by
el
Capitan Luis
de Ojeda, also in the Biblioteca Nacional, Ms. pp. 21, fols. 1-87. The student should be warned that there are numerous manuscript chronicles
and accounts, usually
set
down
as
anonymous,
in the great libraries of
Madrid, Paris, and London, which turn out, on investigation, to be but copies, summaries, or translations of contemporary printed works. The manuscript volume in the British Museum numbered Egerton 522 (cf. Gayangos, i, p. 601, where the name 'Juan de Villegas' is
incorrectly stated to be appended to it) is a case in point it is nothing more nor less than a Spanish translation of the well known work of
;
the Genoese Jeronimo Franchi di Conestaggio entitled Dell' unione del regno di Portogallo alia Corona di Castiglia, first published at Genoa
in
1585
(cf.
below).
Printed Sources and Contemporary Chronicles. Volumes xxxiixxxv of the D. I. E. are devoted to the story of the annexation of
Portugal. Valuable material on it may also be found in Alberi's Relazioni degli Ambasciatori Veneti, serie i, v, and appendix volume
;
404
in the

Correapondana du
<
.ordinal de drancelle, ed. Piot, vols, viii-x,
xii
and
Les sources the Foreign, Spanish, and Venetian Calendars. im'ditcs de VkUtoire du Marat, ed. II. de Castries, and Negotiation* de la France dans le Levant, ed. E. Charriere, vols, iii, iv, are indisCesareo Fernandei pensable f<r the campaign of Alcazar-el-Kebir.
in
Duro published the most important documents on the conquest of the Asores on pp. 170-504 of his hook on that subject (Madrid, 1886), and the collection known as the Archivo dos Aeores (Ponta Delgada, The Fugger New1878- ) may also be used to good advantage. 156S-1605, ed. by Victor von Klarwill and tr. by Pauline de Letters,
1024), and the same, 2d series, tr. by L. S. R. Byrne shed much light on the sentiments of the Poi tuguese London, 1026), Of contemporary in regard to Philip's candidacy for the throne. accounts the most important are (1) Jeronimo Franchi di Conestaggio, Dell' unione del Regno di Portogallo alia Corona di Castiglia, first pub-
Chary (London,
I
Genoa in 1585; at least five more Italian editions, two in Latin translation, one in Spanish, four in French, and one in English appeared before 1642. Conestaggio afterwards became chaplain Some people to Philip III and archbishop of Capua and died in 1630.
lished in
have attributed his book to Juan de Silva, Count of Portalegre, the seem to he loyal friend and supporter of Philip If, '"it there does not enough evidence to justify this theory (cf. on this J. Surirez Inckiii. rra de Anexidn en Portugal, i, pp. xv-xvii). Conestaggio's book In his opening paragraph he state! covers the years 1578 to 1583. that he was himself present at the greater part, of the event- he deinformation in regard to the scribes, and had the most trustworthy furthermore, that he was free from the trammels which often not a native prevent the historian from telling the truth, since he was
:
of the Iberian
leaf of the British
tagghu
edidit
;
On the flypeninsula nor vassal of any king or prince. Museum copy of the edition ,f 5X0 there i- written, however, the following significant sentence: "Hier. Franchi Coi Qenuensis natione anno 15s.") in gratiam Serenissimi I;
1
unione libellum in lucem Philippi de Portugalliae cum regno Castellae in cuius composition.- Angelum auricularem (wi certo scivimUf
de eiusdem Conestagii familiaribua) habuit Christophorum a Moura, Speculum qui bene noverat quomodo Jupiter duxerai Junonem.
The book 1Reg. Castellae in usurp. Portug." ami was never popular in Portugal. (2) Bernardo tinctly pro-Spanish, da Crus, Chronica de elrei I). Seba ti&o, edited by A. Eferculano
tyrannidia Phil.
A. C Payva and fir<t published at Lisbon in 1837, subsequently, two volumes, in 1903. The author accompanied the expedition North Africa in 1578, but got hack and lived through 15K0; hii
in
u>
405
of Almeirim. (3) Isidro Veldzquez goes on to just before the Cortes La Entrada que en el Reino de Portugal hizo la S. C. R. M. of this very de Don Philippe, published at Lisbon in 1583 ; the author
Salmantino,
rare
King, glorification The Diarium of the Silesian Erich (4) Portuguese inheritance. Lassota of Steblau, edited by Reinhold Schottin from the manuscript a Portuguese in 1866 preserved at Bautzen and published at Halle
;
volume describes himself as "andante en Corte." It contains 160 small quarto folios, and relates what Vel&zquez regarded as "casos to Philip's formal entry dignos de cuento" from the death of Sebastian some interesting military data, but is chiefly a It gives into Lisbon. and an assertion of his right to the of the Prudent
translation of the Iberian section of the diary

in 1913.
was issued at Coimbra
Lassota joined the German contingent of Philip's army of invasion in Italy, landed at Cartagena, February 7, 1580, and served This book is described as for four years in Portugal and the Azores. a "fiel cronologia de sucesos y acontecimientos que presencio el autor." la Historia de Portugal y Con(5) Antonio de Herrera, Cinco Libros de los anos de 1582. y 1583. (Madrid, quista de las Islas de los Acores en This is largely based on Conestaggio (not, as Forneron, hi, 1591).
and most of it reappears in note, has it, Conestaggio on it) Herrera's Historia del Mundo and in Cabrera de C6rdoba's Historia For further information in regard to source de Felipe Segundo. Fernandez cf. J. Su&rez Inckin, op. cit., i, pp. i-xxiv, and C. material, La Conquista de las Azores en 1583 (Madrid, 1886). Duro, Later Works. Of the standard histories of Portugal those of L. A.
p. 92,
;
Rebello da Silva (Lisbon, 1860-71, 5 vols.), volumes
i,
ii,
and the
first
two chapters
of
volume
hi,
and
of
Fortunato de Almeida (Coimbra,
Historia de 1922-29, 6 vols.) deserve first mention; the collaborate has thus far 1928) Portugal edited by Damiao Peres (Barcelos,
only reached 1580 in three volumes

is
the fourth,
by
J.
M. de Queiroz
of examining Velloso, The best authority on the of the early pages of it in manuscript. story of the annexation, particularly from the military point of view,
expected shortly, and
have had the privilege
some
i
s still
1897-98, 2 vols.)
Julidn Sudrez Inckin, Guerra de Anexion en Portugal (Madrid, the most valuable monographs on the subject that
;
have been subsequently published are those of Francisco, Marques de Sousa Viterbo, O Prior do Crato e a Invasao Hespanhola de 1580 (1897), of Julidn Maria Rubio, Felipe II y Portugal (Madrid, 1927), and of Hilario Gonzalez, "Felipe II y la Conquista de Portugal," in the Boletin of the Real Academia de Bellas Artes y Ciencias Hist6ricas de Toledo, x (1928), pp. 93-116. Alfonso Danvila y Burguero's Cristobal de
Moura (Madrid,
1900),
Martin Philippson's Ein
406
Ministerium
Kardinal Granvella am spanischen utttcr Philipp II.: Hofe (Berlin. IS95), and Henri L6onardon's "Essai sur la politique franchise dans la question de la Succession de Portugal," in ficole des
Chartes.
Positions des theses,
1889, pp. 39-53, are
all
indispensable
for the political
and diplomatic aspects of the problem. Juan Caramuel Lobkowita, Philippus Prudens Lusitaniae, Algarbiae, Indiae, Brasilia?, Legit im us Rex demonstrate (Antwerp, 1639), is typical
of the
arguments
in
favor of the Spanish claim that continued to be
down to the revolution of 1640. Some indication of the enormous amount of literature on Sebastian, the false Sebastians, and
put forth
Paul Schastiattismo will be found in the footnotes to pp. 340 and 345. wrote an interesting account of the lif< of Antonio in Durand-Lapie
the
Revue
d'histoire
diplomatique for
1904-05
(xviii,
pp.
133- J
l">.
113-128, 243-260) under the title of "! Govirno roi d<Hrone" rfugi en France," and Damiao Peres, 15S0: do Prior do Crato (2d ed., Barcelos, 1929), is the most recent account C. Fermindez Duro's La Conquisto de las of his career in Portugal.
275-307, 612-640;
xix. pp.
ject;
Azores en 1583 (Madrid, 1886) is the standard authority on that subit has, moreover, an excellent bibliography and numerous documents. There is crying need for a modern work on the Portuguese colonies At present one has glean one's induring the Philippine period.
1
formation about them,

histories of Brazil
in
by
F.
from such books as the general A. de Yarnhagen and Heinrich Handelmann,

large part,
and the
Histoire de V expansion coloniale des peuples europeens
by
Charles de Lannoy and
Herman vandcr Linden.
BOOK
VIII
THE TURN OF THE TIDE
CHAPTER XXXVI
THE GOVERNMENT OF SPAIN UNDER PHILIP
The
reign of Philip II
II
was not a period

Save
of far reaching
institutional innovations.
for the remodelling of the
constitution
of
the kingdom of Aragon in
1593,
which
followed as an inevitable consequence of the suppression of the great rebellion stirred up there by Antonio Perez, the
Prudent King was content, in matters internal as well as

foreign, to preserve all the essential features of the
system which he had inherited from his predecessors. Maintenance and increase of the royal power were the dominant principles
throughout
;
yet, in theory at least, the institutional auton-
omy
of the
component parts
1
of the
Spanish Empire was
scrupulously preserved. Philip was too deeply imbued with the traditions of Spanish separatism to dream of erecting a centralized
government such as the Bourbons were to
bring with them across the Pyrenees in the early years of

book, De Titulis Philippi Regis Catholici, by Jacobus Mainoldus Galeratus of Cremona, which was published at Bologna in 1573, gives Philip's list of titles (fol. 9 v)
1
little
Austrii
as follows:
Catholicus
Siciliae,
Philippus Secundus, Rex Hispaniarum, Utriusque Hierusalem, Hungariae, DalSardiniae,
"
matiae,
Croatiae,
Corsicae,
Insularum Maioricarum, Canariae, Orani, Insularum Indiarum, Terrae Firmae, et Maris Oceani. Archidux Austriae. Dux Burgundiae, Mediolani, Lotharingiae, Brabantiae, Lemburgi, Lucemburgi, Geldriae, Athenarum, et Neopatriae. Marchio Sacri
Imperii, Oristani, et Gotiani. Barcinonis, Ruscinonis, CerHanretaniae, Flandriae, Artesiae, noniae, Hollandiae, Selandiae, Namurci, Zutpheni, Burgundiae, Habspurgi, et Dominus Cantabriae, MoTyrolis. linae, Frisiae, Mechliniae, Ultraiecti, et Gruningae." Full Transisalanae, explanations of the origins of all the titles are given on the succeeding pages. Cf. also Sir Robert Bruce Cotton, A Briefe Abstract of the Question of Precedency betweene England and Spain (London, 1642), and B. M., Harl. Ms. 1858.
Romani Comes
409
410
THE GOVERNMENT OF SPAIN On

the other hand his preference than a
'
the eighteenth century.

for Castile
-for
,
he was even more a Castilian
coupled with Spaniardfrom the wealth of the Indies, gave that part of his dominions that which a preponderance over the rest still greater than |ven the remodelling ,d attained in the Emperor's day. reference has jus1 of the constitution of Aragon, to which
it
} i;
the financial resources derived
been made, though

circumstances,
great
is
it
was rendered
possible
by
exceptional
in tinof
really to
be regarded as but a step
process
of
the progressive Cast ilianizat ion
the
Spanish Empire. Yet if the underlying principles remained the same, the methods of their application were somewhat changed and
;
the changes were chiefly

alities of Philip II
due to the differences

of Charles V.
in
the person-
and
The
fact that Philip
never
the peninsula after his return thither in L559 is of fundamental importance in the history of the internal govof the Empire; for he was thus able to
left
ernment
Spanish
an intensity concentrate on the details of administration with which had been quite out of the question for his perpetually
travelling father.
The
foreign
campaigns out that the imperial wasted, and he was fond of pointing victories under the command armies had won greater of the de Leyva, Colonna, and Pescara than under that
on energies which !harles had spent Philip believed to have been largely
(
Emperor
himself.
Such matter-,
in
r
in his
opinion, should be
boy
of twelve,
is
'And a north-central Caatfliao <""; Be he was rarely seen in Andalusia. m 1670 f<T the meeting wa! there, end he visit.-! de C, ii. die in the tame year on the other hand I oao
.
'
l. .:i0,
as a
not l*>me
out
'
by the accounts in the "Journal Voyages de Charles Quint" Souvermn* Collection de* Voyagt ,,!,! iachard and ,/,
<
pp,
ii,
find n<> evidence to nipporl On- rtatetint he wenl t.. t of Bratli (p 101 Almeria at this time, and
1
pp. Failde,
th<
bid., p.
75) that
<
h'-
accom-
150-151, or in Javier / </ Emperatriz Isahrl 'Madrid. 1917), pp 296 f. r Giovanni Micheli <l. >57) in Ubtn, H.i.: erie i. ii. p 388,
panied his mother*!
Tpse
to
Granada
THE KING
411
delegated to professional soldiers, always provided, of course,

that they kept as constantly and closely in touch with Madrid as distance and the difficulties of communication
would permit, and never deviated a hair's breadth from the instructions that he sent them. The time that Philip
1
saved from travel he spent in intimate and meticulous supervision of the internal administration of his Spanish
proposed to know and direct everything that concerned them. The accuracy and extent of his information were the wonder of his contemporaries. Elaborate
realms.
Usts
for
He
his secret agents sent him constant reports of conditions in every municipality and diocese, and existing 2 of the instruction given at the universities. He was far
;
and him
statistical tables
were perpetually being drawn up
better informed of the state of his revenues than
any
of his
ministers of finance.
If
had
his record
It
to himself.
by was part
heart.
any one applied to him for a place, he 3 Most of what he learned he kept
of his theory of political life that
the rank and
government servants should work in water-tight compartments, each keeping to his narrow an atmospath, ignorant of the activities of his colleagues phere of secrecy, and consequently of suspicion, pervaded Even the king's most intimate counsellors everything. were toL.1 only what Philip in his supreme wisdom decided that it was well for them to know. If, perchance, they should happen to learn more, the king was sure to hear of it, and they would be likely to lose their posts Antonio Perez is a
file
of the
case in point.
To
himself alone Philip reserved the stupen-
dous responsibility of
1
knowing and coordinating every2 J. Beneyto Perez, Los Medios de Cultura y la Centralization bajo Felipe II, pp. 75 ff 3 C. de C, ii, pp. 556-560; Ranke, Die Osmanen und die spanische Monardritte Auflage, p. 149. chie,
.
Philip's Italian subjects wished him to follow the example of his father in this regard. Cf. Bib. Nac. Madrid,
S. 28, Ms. 6413, fols. 1-11, al Rey Philipe exortandole
ir
"Discurso que deue
en persona a la gerra."
41 2
THE GOVERNMENT OF SPAIN

and then,
in his omniscience, of
making the
final
thing,
decision.
government are admiof the manner in which the great system rably illustrated by \ from the Catholic Kings and Charles councils, inherited under the which formed the heart of the Spanish Empire and modified during his house of Hapsburg, was enlarged
Philip's principles
and methods
of
^The
or Council Consejo de Estado,
of State, remained,
as in his father's day, officially exhaust the contemporary writers
at the head
of the
list,
and
their
themselves
in
descriptions of
'
its
canity and preeminence.
It dealt with
and international relations, foreign affairs

principal points Machiavelli refers." opinions to which considerably modified.
'with the
loss
of kingdoms and states, thrw gain" and just conservation so different from the evil objects
I
"
membership,
however, was
The non-Spanish
at
element, which in
the Emperor's day had been
tun*
now completely eliminated. After Phihpp preponderant, was in 1559 the Council was composed return to the peninsula when Granvelle entc almost exclusively of Castilians he did so bj * rtue of being presid it twenty years later, whose chief, together with th of the Council of Italy, was generally given resident of the Council of Castile, the number oi 8 Unlike the Council of Castile, ',.,, there. oi but depended, like the choice ite members was no1 fixed, km,. on the will of the the individuals that composed it, of action or It bad no rules or traditions deUberatio^nor
;
I
were the limits
of its
a,
competence
.,
strictly defined.
p
\m
.G.Wd
Lobo
Lmo
v,*,
o9
><
;,m,ufil
v;
m?
v ;
lîJ ^*-^*J K".k,. aw** ;

.
f<
-it
-i
THE COUNCIL OF STATE

was
it
413
attended
but apparently never meetings. He preferred to communicate with 2 through his secretaries, and to be informed of its deliberaofficially
its
it,
the president of
tions
by
a consulta. 3
He
still
further diminished
its
real
as a stage for his favorite game of off the heads of rival factions playing against one another.
efficiency
it
by using
was the chief scene of the struggles between Eboli and Alva, until the time of the latter's departure for the NetherIt
lands in 1567. 4
Its official
'
'
supereminence
over the other
exclusively Castilian membership gave the admirable opportunity of serving notice on his fellow sovereigns that the Spanish Empire was governed from Madrid but there, for practical purposes, its impor-
Councils and
its
king an
came to an end. If a really vital question of foreign policy was to be settled, it was Philip himself who made the decision. The Council might be made to seem, in the eyes
tance
of the masses, to share
the responsibility, but the shrewder
observers were not deceived.
Writing of
said:
it
in
Venetian
Federico
Badoero
"At the
1557, the court the
opinion about this Council is that it is not the source of such advice, deliberations, and performances as make for
the honor and for there advantage of the king seem to be no written rules or customs to produce order in
.
.
its
delibc rations or decisions,

;
nor
is
membership
is
in
it
either
convenient or dignified
and the
5
result
a decline in the
vitality of its discussions."
the Council of Castile, or Consejo Real, on the other hand, the picture is almost precisely reversed. Despite the
fact that it
legislative,
W ith
had been invested since 1480 with the supreme executive, and judicial power, under the crown,
Ibid., pp. 188-198; bens, pp. 150, 159 f.
>Lobo Laso de la Vega, ms. cited; Uounon-Loubens, p. 154.

ôunon-Loubens, p. 153. Kanke, Spanische Monarchic
P- 185.
Gounon-Louaerie
i,
Itl
Albferi,
Rdazioni,
iii,
p. 247.
414

president ranked next to the suffered a decline both in the number of its membership during the closing
its
within the realm, and that

1 monarch, it had and in the competence
Wanderjahre
of
the
Emperor's
his
reign.
So
fearful
was
his
Charles of a usurpation of
own authority during
allowed it to Spain, that he had he chosti dwindle from sixteen to eight or nine; moreover absolute obedihis councillors on the basis of loyalty and
many absences from
ence,
rather
8
than on that
This
policy,
initiative.
independent ability and coupled with the enormous

of
rcsuli ed
amount
in a
of
work with which the Council was charged,
even staggering accumulation of unfinished business; wen! before Philip returned to the peninsula the Cortes In 1551 thej insistent in their demands for a reform.
asked that the
number
of councillors
"since they are so old and
infirm at the
be augmented by ime of heir appointt t
ment that they cannot perform the work t h it is laid before of 8 In 1555 they begged for the establishment them." another sola in the Consejo, to deal with the most important
ûits.
and 1558 they requested that the councillors 5 In lf>n9-60 the] complained that be given larger salaries. increase in the duties of the Council had becoms
!
In 1555
the great
the occasion of excessive delays, and they reiterated
previous
membership, and for the creation of a special sala to hear cases of great importan Having to listen to these requests. Philip was well disposed and never to travel abroad, he had solved to reside in
demands
for an increased
no need to fear
his
.mmI
Spain the Council become too independent in affection for his oatin absence; and so deep was his to her, that he was so his sense of
lest
i .
high
duty
I-.
M.. Cotton
nr,i.. V-.
I
Nt-
v,-,,
f.
C.
vi.
ffll
Of.
III.
pp. 146
*Cort,s. t, pp. 634 f. Cort<*. v. pp. 632, 736. 'Cortet. v, p. 811.
Cert",
v. p.
497.
THE COUNCIL OF CASTILE
415
determined that she should have, under his constant supervision, the best administration which he was capable of
devising.
step towards the improvement of the existing conditions was to issue, as regent, just prior to his departure
His
first
England in the summer of 1554, the so-called ordinances of Corunna, defining more precisely the limits of the jurisdiction of the Council, and also investing it for the first time with the increasingly important function of censorship and
for
regulation of the press.
On
his return to the peninsula in
that the
1559 he immediately complied with the request of the Cortes number of councillors be increased from that time
;
onward
until the
end
of the reign there
were sixteen
of
them
the president. 2 In regard to the other matters in which the Cortes demanded reform, he showed himself
in addition to
complaisant. Not till the very last years of his life could he be brought to see that the same body could not reasonably be expected to act both as a supreme administrative council
less
and as the highest court
of the realm,
and to
initiate the
process, already long overdue, of dividing the
Consejo into each with a special function of its own. It separate salas, is commonly said that the division of the Council into four
separate chambers
III,
was postponed until the reign of Philip who reorganized it by a royal cedula of January 30,
3
;
but in justice to his father, it should be pointed out that orders to that effect were issued by the Prudent King
1608
almost exactly ten years before.

14
By pragmdticas of February
and
note
and
17, 1598,
Philip decreed, "in order to improve and
accelerate the despatch of business," that the president

five
1
other councillors should constitute a sala de gobierno for

3
leys
1
fol.
Xueva Recopilacidn, lib. ii, tit. iv, 31-49 Gounon-Loubens, p. 187. B. M., Cotton Ms. Vesp. C. VI, 6 v Nueva Recopilacidn, lib. ii,
; ;
Gounon-Loubens,
ii,
p.
189,
Danvila,
4
pp. 571
f.
Bib.
Nac.
Madrid,
and
89, sueltos 18.722 36
Msa. CC. 85 and 18,729i 7

.
tit. iv,
ley
1.
41G

;
and that the remaining execul Lvc and administrative affairs be split into three eleven membera of the Council should the first, with five members, being intrusted with sections demanded speedy action, with pleytos "public affairs which 1 while the other de mil y quinientos, and with residen&as" of three each, were to occupy themtwo, with a membership
:
The names of selves exclusively with matters of justice. sala were specifithe members who were to constitute each
cally set
down
in
the decree, and

instructions
in
there was
the usual
regard to hours and methods of procedure, and the spirit that should animi Whether or not these pragnuUicas w the members. from carried into effect is another question;
wealth of detailed
immediately
the fact that the ordinances of 1608
so closely resemble
On the other hand I. them, it looks as if they were not. Laso de la Vega, writing in 1G07, speaks of the Council
;
al
salas according to the pleasure being divided into five or six 3 from this one would infer that Philip I of the president rather than ordinance of 1598 was informal and permissive,
definite
the and authoritative, and that the presidents of -aw lit. In Council availed themselves of it or qo1 a- they Beems clear that Philip the Prudent learned, any case -curadores had so often before he died, the lesson which the /
L1
he practically took the whole attempted to teach him, though

of his lifetime in
the process.
In
it
is
for the law, view of his reverence for the church and somewhat surprising to find Philip at the beginnin
set by his fathei departing from the precedent, cleric to the presidency of the Council always appointing a
hia reign
w r
,
j
Cf. ante, Vol. III. p. 188,

.
and
ii,
infra,
iv
oonforme
Ubi
at.
62
.],-
la
Vega,
mi
vczoh
oitad:
w.vh,
el Preaidente loi In this reckoning Lobo LaBo doubtlew counted the Camara de Castilla. which was given sojmrato existence in l. of. infra, p. 418.
P\
iilKunas
PRESIDENTS OF THE COUNCIL

of Castile.
1
417
Juan de Vega, viceroy of Sicily, who was given the post on April 18, 1557, died December 19, 1558, and Cristobal Vaca de Castro, who had brought order out of
chaos in Peru,
three years;
filled in,
as an interim appointee, for the next
finally, in 1561, the office
was conferred on
Luis Hurtado de Mendoza, second Marquis of Mondejar, who had distinguished himself as a foe of the Comuneros
forty years before, and who had been president of the Council of the Indies from 1546 to 1559. It was doubtless 2 chiefly the universal prevalence of hate of the legists, and
his
own
desire to
show
his
sympathy with
his subjects'
wishes, that led Philip to case of
make
Mendoza he may that he now regarded the monarchy as so firmly established that it no longer had anything to fear from its ancient enemies the grandees. But the forces of tradition and
precedent were
these appointments. In the also have wished to serve notice
not
slow to
reassert
themselves.
After
Mendoza's retirement in 1563 Philip again gave the job to a cleric, Juan Rodriguez de Figueroa, and on his death in 1565 to a licentiate, Diego de Espinosa, who proved a miracle of and efficiency during his seven years of service of vigor
;
but one, the Count of Barajas were also either legists or clerics. 3 Their respect (1583-92), for precedent and routine was more agreeable to Philip than
Espinosa's four successors,
all
the
more modern methods advocated by such
Barajas, who ventured to send him a vigorous on the delays and confusion "which render intolerable the office of president of this Council. There is no order of
men as memorandum
precedence," he continued, "in the cases that

>Cf. ante, Vol. Ill, p. 146. Cf. C. de C, i, pp. 42
.
come before
it,
f.
.
"los
profesores de letras legales grandes dificultadores de lo politico," etc. Cf. Gil Gonzalez Davila, Teatro de
.
as
Grandezas de
la
Villa
de
Madrid
(Madrid, 1623), pp. 360-402, "Vidas de los Presidentes de Castilla"; and Bib. Nac. Madrid, Secci6n de Manuscritos, no. 10,923, torn. 38, pp. 193-198, "Breve, curiosa, y ajustada Noticia de los Presidentes de Castilla."
418
save the
memory of those councillors who have to deal with them ... so that it is necessary for all who have suits to be and struggle with tried to paoe up and down the courtyard
one another to get Dearer the door of the Council in the hope and before it thai they may be the next to be called do not called porteros, they though there are functionaries nor how to forewarn their advocates, know whom to call, and when they go to seek for them, they are either not to he cases go by f,.und, or else they arrive late, so that many It may possibly have been default for lack of a defence."
. .
.
'
remonstrance which induced Philip, in 1588, somewhat to lighten the burden of the Council's labors by definitely for the first time to the so-called giving separate existence established for the distribution of crown Cnmara de
this
Castilla,
and appointments both lay and clerical. Hitherto the Camara had been but a section of the Council now it became an independent body of four members, though
pensions, privileges,
to sii and the president of the Council always had the right 2 Hut save for this comparatively minor change vote there'
which was
1
really only the logical
consequence of what
i
hi?
B. M.. Add. 28, 181, fol. 236. Cf. ante, Vol. HI. PP- 148 f.; GounonDanvila, ii. pp. 432 434; CMigns Aniigt I. ..noons, p. 175; L089; I-ot>o Laso dc la Vena. ms. p.
^1 as qualifican los tervioiot, qualidadea, snenrinp. lufflcieinift, eapariencda, ooatumbrea, y virtudeede 1m personas que pretendan todo I" qual ani aii oonaulta proponiendoa e lea Key w>
exrclente y loable advert* Phelippe 2." con su prudenoia. 1, y cordura, dexando al

assi
mundo oxemplo
destn
nmw
"
cited
En
otraa dispoaiciones suyas, y romo aquei or que mientraa vini6 no perdio* memoria lo que aohrc oste oaao ol V su pa<lr. glorioso Emperador Carlos 1, dexo encomendado entre aquelkM
I
.ii
w
\
poi sua gradoa,

ol
f\
'i"ni
le
nombra
los
que
I
mas
sorvido y
pareOBB m:is con-
venient.
Suelen on apropoaito. . parte baaer diligent quien i.ani Nttiefaaeree de lai peraonaa la ardad ninguna proproveei 1<hi<1<no bavia da baaet riaion men, muy ouj preoedieee
-
<
:i
mente
porqua
de mii mane > >S 64 capitulos letra para espejo de su govierno, Ho wi aervacion, quietud, y aumonto monarchia, que tantus advertendae, utilidad .to plo, doctrine, y ovierno contienen con tan ohmlos quale* i y altos fundamentoa, scr ningun Principe del mundo para perfecto devria ygnorar ain pel tin pun to de la memoria mi
.1
haxerlo assi no ae si aaeguran la OOns<-icnria -lo todo puntO ni aun la opinion.
que
uti
>il>e quan necessari" virtuoso y oostante. a quien imitar
THE COUNCIL OF ITALY
419
father had done before him, Philip did nothing to remedy the existing situation in the Consejo down to the pragmdtica of 1598, by which he divided it into salas. 1 The spectacle
is
that the Council presents, down to the very end of the reign, that of a body of universal competence, under the king, in
matters legislative, administrative, and judicial, but so hopelessly ill-organized and overloaded with work, particularly on the judicial side, that efficiency in action was impossible. A new ramification of the great conciliar system was the 2 creation, in the year 1555, of a Council of Italy, distinct
Aragon. It seems clear that hitherto the Council of Aragon had exercised a certain measure of jurisdiction over the Mediterranean and Italian lands belonging to the Spanish crown. Certainly it had every historical justification for so doing, for all these lands save Milan had been conquered for the Spanish from the eastern
from that
of
Empire
kingdoms, and enjoyed some measure of consciousness of a common past. But the process of Castilianizing these
Mediterranean and Italian territories had now advanced so far that Charles and Philip felt justified in giving formal to it moreover they were probably not sorry to expression do something towards obliterating the memory of the mediaeval Aragonese Empire, whose animating spirit had been so different from that of the larger agglomeration in which it had been swallowed up and over which they now
;
held sway.
The new Consejo de Italia, whose organization was further perfected by Philip in an ordinance of the year 3 1579, resided at the court of Spain and was composed, at
"
Jtad
Bib Nac Madrid a >ecci6n de Manuscritos, CC. 85 and 89, iueltos 18,722" and 18.72JF. NaC Madrid H. 3, suelto iqtiL, 18,718", 'Institution del Consejo de
-
vT
manda que
Relation de la orden que su Magesegue en la division de
Italia
separandole
ii,
Real "
also
Lobo Laso de
p.
Cf. also Danvila,
de Aragon"; Vega, ms. cited. Gounonpp. 216 f.

del
la
'
357, following makes the date 1556. s Danvila, ii, p. 217.
Loubens,
Herrera,
420
TIIK
GOVERNMENT OF SPAIN
1
the end of the reign, of a president, the treasurer-general of 2 the realms of the crown of Aragon (the sole vestige of the
ancient Ara;oncse connection that
and
six regents, three of
was allowed to remain), them Spaniards, and three Italians, 3

;
one each from
Sicily, Naples, and Milan apparently the administration of Sardinia, like that of the Balearic Islands, was allowed to remain in the hands of the Council of Aragon. 4
The functions ment of Italy,

and grant
Majesty.
6
of the
'ouncil
were "to deal with the govern5
to
make
mercedea de Ventajos
to the soldiers
cities,
quartered there, to provide officers of justice for the

titles to
Only
in
magnates, all in consultation with this Council are the affairs of Italy ta
of
(
his
i
up."
The Council
of
Aragon, in the meantime, continued

'atalonia, Valencia.
It
to perform similar functions for Aragon,
and the islands
the Western Mediterranean.
was
of a president, who had the title of vice-chancellor, the treasurer-general of the realms of the crown of Aragon, who was not necessarily a native of any one of them, a
composed
six oidores,
two
;
of
Valencians
there
and other special remained constantly in attendance on the sovereign; hut whereas this had meant, under Charles, that it travelled
it
them Aragonese, two Catalans, and two were also a number of royal secretarial officials. As in the Emperor's day.
all
over Europe and got a cosmopolitan point of view, it resulted, under Philip, in its remaining almost perpetually
1
M*. Vcsp. c. VI, Preodente del el Principe de Melito duque de Fr.uif.ivilla." 2 Ibid. "el Condc de Chinohon." Lobo I-.'iH.. df la Vega, ma. cited B. M ottor He. Veep. ('. VI, fole. 6 v-7.
B.
ti
M., Cotton
:
dinia
in
comes into
time.
'
ie
picture buf
little
fol.
"(->
Tiepolo (1567) sayi "non e. cosa di molta importanee pr csser quasi deserta, e imports pitl I* AJberi, lielaspesa die il benefizio." ;iiini. eiia i. v. p. \-i7.
IMiilip'n
ie
same mss.
en
/.'
lioi Bit de Arag6n Valencia. <ido de Feli]>e II

;
>
'Grants
<l
of
additional
pay
I
(7*W
1914), p. xrviii Antonio Rellitttti BarnoAe y Berette, Hmtoria dt

;
< lirolamo nieantaogio). (1597) in AJberi, Rdazioni, appei p, 846.
.Cotton
Mh
Vesp C.V1J
celona. 1918-
).
iv,
2,
p.
18.
Bar-
THE COUNCIL OF THE ORDERS

at
ess
else.
421
Madrid
of
1
or the Escorial, subject to the Castilianization which is observable
same proceverywhere
The composition and functions of most of the other Councils Gabriel Lobo Laso de la Vega enumerates no less than eleven of them in all will be taken up in connection
with our examination of the special duties with which they were respectively charged. But it may not be amiss to insert
one brief word here about the Council of the Orders, of which no mention has been made since its inception in the days of
1
the Catholic Kings. The extent of its responsibilities and the amount of property which it controlled be
may judged than twenty-two of the eighty-eight corregimientos into which Castile was divided were placed wholly under its jurisdiction and withdrawn from that of the
by the fact that no
less
3 Consejo Real.
Its regular members were a president and four oidores, all of whom must be cavalleros limpios, and wear the garb of Santiago, Calatrava, or Alcantara. 4 It was to
determine
all suits
arising
on the lands
of the
;
Orders (the
certain
audiencias having no jurisdiction there) of the limpieza of all those on whom his
confer the honor of
;
to
make
Majesty proposed to 5 to punish comendamembership therein dores who violated their rules and to make recommendations 6 for all minor appointments and offices depending on them. One gathers from contemporary documents that the ancient dignity and prestige of the Castilian aristocracy had been
;
Lobo Laso de la Vega, ms. cited B. M., Cotton Ms. Vesp. C. VI, fol. 8 Riba y Garcia, El Consejo Supremo de Aragon, pp. xvii f. 1 Cf. ante, Vol. II, p. 117.
1
; ;
fol.
*B. M., Cotton Ms. Vesp. C. VI, 7 v; cf. C. de B., lib. v, cap. xi. *B. M., Cotton Ms. Vesp. C. VI,
5
fol. 7.
Agustin Alvarez de Toledo, "Dis-
Nacional, Madrid, Seccion Manuscritos, Q. 104, Ms. 5791, fols. 157-190: "Uno de los mayores mas proprios y principales cuydados deste Consejo ha de ser conservar la nobleza de Espafia, no consintiendo que se pierda ni manche ninguna casa ni familia por Livianas occasiones ." 6 B. M., Cotton Ms. Vesp. C. VI,
Historico
de
fol.
7 v.
curso sobre los Consejos," in Archivo
422

1
suffered to decline in the Emperor's day,

cil
and that the Coun-
Orders was expected to restore them. Nothing, of course, was to be done without consultation with the king, who, as chief of all three Orders, had a special interest in the
of the
work
of this Council, ''which

"
rest.
is less
universal than that of
any of the
The
history of the Castilian Cortes in the reign of the
Prudent Bong has usually been painted in doleful colors. It has been justly pointed out that the abstention of the nobles and clergy after 1538 had reduced the national assembly to a
single
chamber, composed
of thirty-six representatives of
eighteen different cities, chosen, usually by lot and sometimes in rotation, from certain privileged families or categoric,
the municipal magistracy, and in such fashion that royal interference and manipulation were easy to exercise should
the crown so desire.

ineffective
It
has also been
made
to
clear that their
procedure,
still
and their
further
failure
make
red:
sapped the vitality of the precede supply, Castilian Cortes that they made no use, for the assertion of their own privileges, of their traditional right to withhold
;
official
permitted
ancient
the recognition of a new sovereign, or of the heir to Moreover they the 8& -trio. throne, or to refuse to grant Philip, early in his reign, to subvert another
prerogative which the national assembly had E that of cessfully maintained in the Kmperor's day, namely,
laws passed in prerefusing to consenl to the revocation of

Alvarez de Toledo, ma. Aguatiii " cited; Mayonnanta por que no parese ..n-ih r.i.1,,11 no hit juato de
1
.
isal ion :m<l
que
la relajaaioc ible
de lot tiampoe passarial hago en eetoe

<-i>
Adas ilr Ins Cdrtrs, i, pp. The president of the Council of

wan
he
the the
introduccidn by
procedure of the Cortes see Tom&s Mufios to

<
also president of the Cortes;
bo!
lot
differantamenta.
beati
"
qualea se rata Medium tanuere

t
was
present
only
at
th<-
foi
opening session and when he had occa-
CI
Vol
ante,
|.|-
Vol.
II,
pp.
136 181, and
m to transmit to the procuration* proposil ions and mesaages of the king
III
LM
180.
On
the ..r|<an-
THE CORTES OF CASTILE

vious Cortes
:
423
"If
it
be
my
King
in 1555,
in the
"I
shall annul,
;
pleasure," declared the Prudent without the Cortes, the laws
I shall Cortes legislate by pragmdticas and I " laws by pragmdticas. 1 All this would seem to show that the functions of the national assembly had prac-
made
shall abolish
tically
dwindled to the voting of taxes, and that
it
exercised
that function solely in accordance with the will of the king. Yet there are certain other considerations which point to
the conclusion that this picture has been
somewhat over-
drawn.
the
first
Philip's attitude towards the Castilian Cortes, in
picious
was in some respects less hostile and susthan was that of his father. Despite the progressive
place,
Hispanization of his point of view, Charles's interests, during the greater part of his life, had been rather international than
Iberian.
to use
it,
He
wished to get his money without delay, and often for non-Spanish purposes, without being
;
bothered by petitions and discussions hence all but a very few of the fifteen meetings of the Castilian Cortes during his
reign were finished in less
it
than three months.
With
Philip
was a very
different story.
and Castilian. he was vastly wiser than the representatives of the nation, he was by no means averse to hearing their views. Indeed,
inantly Spanish
lie
His interests were predomThough he did not doubt that
rather iiked to dally in solitude
procuradores before he answered
them
over the petitions of the it was a most obvious

;
method
A-ere
of obtaining the information for
which he always
hungered.
Noncommittal
replies
or
point-blank refusals
indeed their usual fate, but at least Philip seemed to give

v,
Cortes,
p.
677.
Cf.
also
my
irticle
"Control by National Vssemblies of the Repeal of Legisin ation," the Melanges Bemont, 3p. 437-458 and ante. Vol. Ill, p. 169. 1 Though never in consultation with
;
on
my
of
the
procuradores
themselves.
the Cortes of 1570-71 asked him two or" three of their representatives, in order that they might inform him of the reasons for the petitions that had been preferred, he Actas de las unhesitatingly refused. Cdrtes, iii, pp. 363 f.
to listen to
When
424

careful consideration;
them
he did not answer the cuademo
till sixteen months after they had closed, nor that of the assembly of 1588-89 until three full years Doubtless this is largely to be ascribed after its dismissal.
of the Cortes of L583
to
his
' ;
incorrigible slowness;
certainly
it
was 'poor
busi-
ness
but
it
also
shows that he
felt his subjects' desires to
be
worthy
of attention.
Another
significant fact in the
same
connection
is the progressive lengthening of the sessionThe curlier ones were the Cortes under the Prudent King.
comparatively
bin those of brief, as in the Emperor's day and 1588, continued, with intermissions, for 1579, 1583, average of over two years, while the last one, which met at Madrid in the spring of 1592, was still in session when the
;
1 king died. Apparently Philip longed for the advice and consolation of the representatives of his people in the a
lanche of misfortune, both at home and abroad, witli which, 2 at the last, they had been overwhelmed togi her.
the procuradores were gratified by the changed attitude of the monarch, they were also determined to do their utn
If
to maintain
all
the vestiges that
still
remained
of the ancient
In this it was in< vitable that they parliamentary liberties. should encounter the opposition of the crown, for though
Philip
was anxious to be apprised
of his subjects' desires, he
was none the

in his
less firmly resolved to
keep
all
the real power
own hands. The principal barrier in the way of his having what his Tudor contemporaries called a 'tractable
parliament' was the poderes, or instructions to the curadores, by which the municipalities whom they represented attempted to prescribe their conduct in the ('or'
Danvila,
ii.
i.;..
836 334, :<17-350,

n<>
Then
in
ii
baaii
f>>r
the
theory 'ti.it the eeeeioni wen prolonged order to enable the king t<> u>-i man complained of the money. T
lengthened sessions in l">v>. on the ground >>f the expense to the cities and the procuradore$. Adas J<
!
la
J
<
'f.
6rU vii. pp. sii here Danvila,

.
f.
v, pp.
>yH 695.
THE PROCURADORES
and Philip strove his hardest, from the very beginning
reign, to convert these poderes into
425
of his
what today would be
called 'blanket powers.'
In 1560 he
commanded
the
cities
throne, they might be empowered to hold a regular session of the Cortes 1 at the opening of the Cortes of 1566 he forced the
;
to amplify the instructions to their delegates, so that in addition to recognizing Don Carlos as the heir to the
procuradores to swear that their poderes were "unlimited and " 2 unrestricted. In 1573 we find him sending instructions to
and theologians to use all their efforts to the same end (in this case he even appears to have to influence the voting in the ayuntamientos) 3 In attempted 1592 the same measures were still more intensively applied the king did not even shrink from employing the conlocal corregidores
effect
.
On such occasions, it is perhaps needless to add, the royal objects were always but the ultimately attained fact that the king was forced to have recourse to such
fessional.
;
methods in order to
spirit of
effect his
ends shows that the ancient
parliamentary independence was not by any means

extinguished.
wholly
futile,
Another
characteristic,
if
wholly
method by which the procuradores sought to keep alive the memories of a glorious past, was the vigorous maintenance of the time-honored struggle for precedence between 5 the delegates of In 1563 this Burgos and of Toledo.
virtually attained the proportions of a
fight,
rough-and-tumble and the king was obliged to intervene to restore

also contain
order.
The cuadernos
abundant evidence that the

all
procuradores were determined that

1
their ancient rights
ii, p. 280. de las Cortes, Danvila, ii, p. 320. Danvila, n, p. 357.
Danvila,
Adas
5
ii,
p. 13.
Spanish Kingdoms in the Later Middle Ages," in American Historical Review, X vi (1911), p. 482, note 29, and references there.
of the
6
Cf.
my
article,
"The Cortes
Adas
de las Cortes, p. 19.
426
even
and privileges Bhould be constantly reasserted in principle, if they were pitiably unable to effect their reestablishlncnt in practice.
They constantly complain
of the infringe-
ment
of their prerogatives
by the imposition of
new
taxes
of the royal patrimony without their conand they harp on the excessive number and exactions sent, 1 of the royal tax-collectors. They show their jealousy of the
and the alienation
way
which the Consejo de Castilla had usurped their legislative authority, and they demand that no new law or
in
made by the king session. They never hesitated of his own manner of thought
jiragnidtica
2
be
alone while the
lortes are
to tell Philip just

life
what they
In 1559,
fears of
and
of work.
alter the king's return
from the North, their old
Burgundian luxury, inherited from the Emperor's day,
ma
them protest against the expenses

3
of the royal court and
table,
"since there
is
in such matters
no inviolable law save

4
;
and the example which your Majesty is pleasi give" when further observance of their new sovereign's wa\
living relieved
their tune
them
of all fears in this regard, they chang

his
in
and begged
Majesty to take
less responsibility
to
o(
on
his
own shoulders
restrict Ins activities to the
the despatching of business, and conduct of foreign affairs and
iii, 400-402; pp. 17-19; vii, pp. 819 xi, pp. 513-515;
Actas de las Cortee, ii. pp. 301 35tV-358 v. pp. f. ix. pp 384 386;
;
oni.ii criado e
Magestad de c6mo por averse sin esta impuesto algunas nuevas rentas y derechos y hecho crescimiento
664. The p. petition of the cuaderno of 1571 "Por \<>* particularly significant: Id-yea de gloriosa memoria, predei sores ili- vueatra afageetad, eata ordexvi.
third
de otraa muchas en esto- Reynoa, se seguido tanta carga y cm en las cosas neceaaariaa para la vul; humana, que eran muy pocoa loi podian vi\ ir sin gran trabajo, por
lcs iivia
el dafio que con las dirhaa rentas Be avia recebido, que el provecho y socorro que dellas ae avH aacado." Actas, iii, pp. 356 f. Adas de lot ortes, v, pp. 762 f.;
<
nado y mandada por leycs heehaa 80 lortea, jue no ee crien ni oobren nue
(
ser
mayor
a
nritas.
tii
periu>s,
detection,
monad ai,
otroa tlibutOf part icularea ni gi-nerales, sin junta del Reyno en Cortee, y sin OtOrgamientO de In* proruradnre.H
del.
'
in.
oomo
ato
^
r.
del
OrdonnBettor !<> Don AJonao y an laa tfrtea I'mximas

r
la ley del
612
i,
vi,
v. pp. 311 pp. 529 531 xvi. pp. 638 f. pp. 810 f. J09; Actas de las C6rtu,
;
;
p.
*
tun.
passadas
se
liizo
relarion
vueatra
Cortm,
Habler, pp. v, p. 809.
18,
130
f.
THE CUADERNOS
427
war, which thereby would be more expeditiously decided. 1 And in theory at least, Philip made no objection to these
assertions
of
parliamentary power.
In 1569 there were
published at his command the Leyes del Reyno, 2 commonly cited as the Nueva Recopilacion, the seventh titulo of whose
book contains thirteen laws the first of them of the of Alfonso XI in which all the reign principal powers of the Cortes, in legislation and in finance, are specifically stated to be in force, and the privileges and methods of
sixth
theory and fact which had always characterized the government of Castile,
of her
election of the procuradores are fully described. illustration of the wide gulf between pretty
It gives a
fondness for recalling the memories of the past, and vainly attempting to weave them into the life of a totally
altered present.
The
attitude of the Castilian Cortes towards the course of
foreign affairs during the reign of the
naturally quite different from

his father,
what
it
and the obvious cause
of
Prudent King was in the time of the change was Philip's
had been
constant residence in the peninsula. Under the Emperor one of the chief worries of the procuradores had been his
preoccupation with non-Spanish matters, and they vigorously protested whenever they thought that he was sacrithose of the house of Hapsburg. 3 With the accession of Philip these fears were of course relieved. The national assembly generally approved of his
foreign policy, which until 1584 the reverse even in the
;
ficing their interests to
was successful rather than Netherlands, where in some respects
the strain
heaviest, the struggle could now be represented chiefly in the light of a religious war, and when it was a question of the suppression of heresy, the Castilian was
Actas de las Cortes, x, p. 501. See p. 455, infra.
was
Cf. ante. Vol. Ill, pp.
170-172
I'JS
never found wanting. At the end, of course, there was disaster everywhere, but the procuradores, like Philip, were
convinced that
it
was the hand

1
of
God
that caused
it.
They
could commiserate with their sovereign, but they did not venture to offer him advice. The fact that they ceased to
attempt to influence the course of foreign affairs left them the to these, and freer to occupy themselves with internal ones
;
matters economic, they devoted virtually their exclusive attention. Whether their knowledge of such
particularly to
affairs
was greater or
less
than that
is
it
of the king to wli

is
their petitions
were addressed
Certain
a
is.
question which
easier to
ask than to answer.
only, thai their viewpoint
was predominantly local, while his was perforce far more national and universal, and that both were tragically out of
touch with the modern policies and ideas which were beginning to take root in the more enlightened countries to the north of them.
the grievances of which the procuradores demanded the most oft repeated was he financial and economic redress, The procuration i were for the m< condition of the realm.
Of
all
lart
convinced,
it
at
leasl
in
the early pari of the reign, that
Spain had
her to be a really prosperous country, if only her natural resources were properly fostered, the royal exacin
tions limited,
and foreign competition restrained.

">."> i,'-'
"Though
and other
there exists
in
1
Spain/' so run- the eighty-fourth petition of
the Cortes of
"plenty
of iron, steel, wool, Bilk,
raw materials
of industry,
we
are so far behind other nut ions
m our capabilities of utilizing them that they are taken av to foreign realm-, wlere they are manufactured and whence
1
It
i.
trin-
tin
in
orocurador
and
went o far na to uKKc-Ht that if Philip would minpond nil "juntas y continual Kui-rrnn." it would t poeaihle t.. defend thf coaats against imiielll and j>ira
Lighten thitaxation. Arias

..
unendurable load
de
f-
of
xii,
las
Cdrtrs,
p. A is
pp. B40
FINANCIAL GRIEVANCES
they are sold back to us at exorbitant prices"
;
429
the procura-
dores therefore requested that these "necessary
and useful
arts" be introduced into Castile, distributed

pueblos,
sons,
among
the
and put
in charge of "practical
and
intelligent per-
should be encouraged by governmental privileges and exemptions as long as it should seem desirable." x Peti-
who
tions for the
maintenance and increase
of agriculture
and
pasturage, for the

fishing, for
enforcement of the laws about hunting and

be found
the restriction of luxury and costly raiment, and

2
for the limitation of the rates of interest, are to

in
;
and protests every one of the cuadernos of the reign the alienation of the patrimonio real, against the against sales of lands and patents of nobility, and against the imposition
of
new
taxes
and the
3
raising
of
the rates of the
encabezamiento and alcabala
quency as the years rolled by.
occurred with increasing freAs late as 1576 we find a

'
demand that the debts of the Emperor be promptly paid. 4 The taking of money out of the realm, as if we were Indians," was another fertile source of complaint; such action was directly in contravention of the laws of the
land,
but Philip,
like his father before
ous privileges to violate them, procuradores could not induce
him, sold numerand the petitions of the him to desist. 5 Another
matter on which he was more ready to listen to their demands was the annulment of the letters of naturalization which his
father
had granted to Englishmen, Flemings, and Genoese, "who came with their ships to the prejudice of the native Spaniards," and had got into their hands the carrying trade
Danvila, ii, p. 284 Colmeiro, ii, pp. 279 f. 1 Cortes, v, pp. 769 f., 818, 846-848, 864 Actas de las Cortes, i, p. 400 ii, p. 464; iii, pp. 34 f., 369; iv, pp. 464 f., 472-474, 476 f., 480 f., 495-497; vi, pp. 860 f. vii, pp. 832, 834 f. ix, pp. 393 f., 396 f., 448^50.
Cf.
;
Cortes, v, p.
809
;
Introd.,
iii,
pp.
;
368
f.
823
f. xi, pp. pp. 630, 668. 4 Actas de las Cortes, v, p. 73. 6 Actas de las Cortes, v, pp. 820 f. Cdrtes, xi, pp. 521-524, 535.
; ;
Actas de las Cortes, pp. 817, 820 f., 513-515, 543 f. xvi,
;
vii,
430
of the realm.
1
We
also find him, in 1588, agreeing to the of
absolute
prohibition
its
the
importation
of
foreign
silk,
because of
bad quality, and

from France. 2
of ''baubles, glassware, dolls,
knives, and other similar things of no use to
human
life"
In theory the king shared the conviction of his subjects that Spain was quite capable of In practice the immediate providing for her own needs. exigencies of the royal exchequer obliged him to violate or
in
which came
ignore
many
of
the
recommendations whose underlying
principles he fully approved.
Under such circumstances
it
was impossible
any consistent policy, and at the end of the reign there was wellnigh universal chaos. The
to follow
story of the duties on the Portuguese frontier affords a pretty At the beginning of the reign the proillustration of this. curadores demanded free trade in cloths with the western
kingdom, and a little later the abolition of the customs houses which had recently been established on the border
1580-81, Philip did not feel that he could afford to comply with these requests, and when at last he became king of Portugal, the ensuing
abolition of the duties
cial
Down to the time of the annexation in
was but temporary.
In 1593 his finan-
embarrassment caused him
to reestablish the
customs 00
a frontier which, politically speaking, had ceased to exi In the early years of the reign the procuradores were much
exercised over the lack of adequate coasl defences of the
Mediterranean shores
of Spain, the insecurity of

visits of
and the frequency of the

itesi
commei Moorish pirates. "The
commerce
of the
of the world," declare the procuradoi
"was that
of Flanders
Mediterranean Sea, which bore the trade
and Prance with Italy and Venetians, Sicilians, Neapolitans, and with all Greece, and Constantinople ton,
1
Cort.K. v, pp. H36-838. as de Uu Cdrles, xi, pp. 521-624.
Nutva Recopilacidn,
ley
* 1
lil>.
ix,
tit.
xxxi,
(January 30. 1559).
Cortes,
v,
pp.
703-765,
822;
cf.
Cf. supra, p. 376. note 3.
THE CORTES AND COAST DEFENCES

and
all
431
the
Morea and
all
and Spain with them. Turkish and Moorish corsairs are so much lords
their
Turkey, and of all them with Spain, All this has ceased, because now the
of the sea
that not a ship sails from the Levant that does not fall into hands and so great are the captures which they have
;
of Christian captives as of estates and goods, that the riches which the said Turks and Moors have won,
made, as well
and the great destruction and desolation which they have
made upon the

and number."
of the shore,
1
coast of Spain, are alike
beyond comparison
and sheep
battle
of
No one dared live within four or five leagues

for agriculture
and much land suitable
raising
was consequently wasted.
After
the
2
Lepanto, these complaints are less frequent, and, in the later years of the reign, there is less notice than one would
naturally expect of the depredations of the English sea-rovers doubtless the procuradores on the coasts of the Atlantic
;
time as powerless to prevent them as he had been to control the tempests which had comrealized that Philip
this
was by
The increase and prosperity of the Granadan Moriscos, "who neither go to war nor enter the church," 3 was another fertile source of
pleted the destruction of the
Armada.
the complaint, particularly in the latter part of the reign was well paved, before the death of the Prudent King, way
;
for the edict of expulsion of
September, 1609. But Castile's proverbial loyalty to the faith did not prevent her representatives from constantly protesting against the many abuses of
ecclesiastical jurisdiction.
1
Petitions against the

also
amount and
Cortes,
Adas
de
v, pp. las Cartes,
857
ii,
f.
Cf.
pp. 428,
453
at that time were probably the English and the French.

* Adas de las Cortes, xi, pp. 542 f. "erecen en tanto niimero, por ser gente que no va a la guerra, ni se cf. xvi, pp. 689meten en religion"
; ;
(.cuaderno of 1567, pets, xvi, xlix). 2 The fifty-ninth petition of the cuaderno of the Cortes of 1583-85
(Adas de las Cortes, vii, p. 830), for the authorization of privateering, speaks " of the losses inflicted by sea and land " by "the enemies of our holy Catholic faith" but the enemies most in mind
;
Cf. the report of Doctor Liebana (1582) in F. Janer, Condition Social de los Moriscos, p. 272.
693.
432
of the church are frequent, inalienability of the property down to the session of 1586, when repeated failure to gain the
ear of the king caused the procuradores temporarily to desist 1 Almost equally and the same demand occurs again in 1598.
numerous
by
are the protests against the abuse of the interdict the juczvs ecclesiasticos whenever the secular authorities
2 In 1588 and in attempted to defend their own jurisdiction. 1592 there are vigorous complaints against the excesses of the 3 in the first of these cases the king promised Inquisition;
of the protest makes it improvement, but the repetition 4 He showed just as evident that he did not keep his word. and the much zeal in defending the supereminence'
'
abuses
of his favorite tribunal at home, as he exhibited
in
the papacy to control if guarding against the attempts of from abroad. conIt is also evident that the procuradores were much
cerned over the decline of the pristine fighting fmalities which had characterized the Spaniards in mediaeval times, and
enabled them
in the
in
conquer
of foreign lands.
it
the Emperor's day to perform prodij In the fifteenth petition of

is
Orden pointed ou1 that the Military of Santiago, Calatrava, and Alcantara had been established that in these kingdoms in order to fight the Moors, but
the
(
Jortes of
1576
sine.'
the infidel had been expelled from the peninsula, the to a life of ease, and had Knights bad given themselves up of arms. They recommend that forgotten the profession
in
order
i
t<>
prevenl
CMr,
;
the further progn-> of this

.
evil,
the
Adai
pp
'If
Ins
i,
\\
ix
i:l
t;7;
rvi, pp.
...
I
627
>,
672 !. leuu delat

f .,
C&rtm,
i,
pp. 408
In
f.
I-
the
,,,1
I
i" tha
,(.
CortM
"
ol
Madrid
peciUy
rot
t..
I
ayud"
tninistrriH
l.riiiRinK Spain back to "la f.' catdtt obodioncia do 1m iglesia n. man a en la pura limpiesa e integridad y religion Que oonviene y so puede dete Aetaa </ lot C6rUa, i, pp. 22 f. '' '"* C&rtes, n, PI l< '" 6641 xvi. Lea, Th* ItupunK**
,
! k'UHi wtii'h bad del Santo Oficfc
(tic
of Spun,,
i,
Is."..
PUT* inr.uis of
THE CORTES AND MILITARY AFFAIRS
433
Orders be established on the frontiers of the Spanish territories in Africa, where the Knights should be obliged to
reside,
selves
and where those who especially distinguished themagainst the Moors should be rewarded with enco1
miendas.
cises
is
The
request, ten years earlier, that military exerof bull-fights,

2
and tournaments be introduced in place

;
another phase of the same story as are petitions that measures be taken for the improvement of the breed prompt
of horses.
3
The manners and customs
of the students at the
universities also
petition of the Cortes of

rector of Alcala
gave food for thought. 1558 4 makes
The seventy-third
it
evident that the
was powerless to repress the excesses of In 1598, the procuradores demand that the printyouth. ing and reading of obscene literature be forbidden. Apparently the representatives of the realm feared that Castile
was
no longer producing the type of manhood which had possible her glorious past.
made
Prudent King,
There was only one meeting, during the reign of the of any of the separate Cortes of the different
session of the Cortes of
realms of the crown of Aragon, and that was the famous Aragon at Tarazona in 1592, rendered
necessary by the 'troubles' stirred up the consideration of it will be reserved
by Antonio Perez;
till
a later chapter. There v ere, however, two meetings of the General Cortes of the eastern kingdoms in 1563 and in 1585, at Monzon,
to
which a few words must be devoted here.
The
fact that
there were but
two
sessions of this assembly in Philip's
reign, in contrast to six in that of his father (under
whom
there were also held five meetings of the separate Cortes of

1
Adas
Ibid.,
1 '
ii,
de las Cortes, v, pp. 33-35. p. 454.
Cortes,
Beneyto
;
v, pp. 772 f. Perez, Medios
cf.
also
J.
de
Cultura,
Cortes, v, pp.
iii,
850
f.
Actas de las
f.,
Cortes,
pp. 93, 161, 162
208-211
pp. 75-77. 3 Actas de las Cortes, xvi, p. 675.
xvi, p. 638.
434
the different kingdoms), is but another of the innumerable He proofs of the Prudent King's incorrigible Castilianism.
never visited his eastern realms save in order to get their formal recognition of an heir to the throne, or to obtain
donativos,
and
it
is
needless to add that the latter were
to the revenues which he significantly small in contrast derived from the Cortes of Castile. The constitutional
machinery of these Eastern assemblies, and the limitations which they were still able to impose upon his royal authority,
and, as we shall later see, he utilized the first opportunity to subvert them. It will be remembered that these General Cortes of the
must have been
gall
and wormwood to him
realms of the crown of Aragon were, in effect, merely a juxtaposition of the assemblies of the three eastern kingdo; each of which dealt separately with the affairs which immediately concerned
in
its
1
it,
and not seldom continued
its sittings
own capital alter the close of the jiint meeting But there is such a striking similarity in the Monzon. proceedings of all three that we are dispensed with the Like those of necessity of following them separately.
Castile, they
showed singularly
little interest
in
the course
of foreign affairs, despite the
fad that both
in
1563 and
1585 the proposiciun real was largely occupied with what had been accomplished abroad.- Local matters, particularly
impartial administration of justice ami the restraint of the excesses of the Inquisition, in which they righily
the
discerned a potential instrument of Castilianization as well 8 cares even f extirpation of heresy, were their principal
the ancienl
to
Kvil.1,
cosmopolitanism have vanished away.

p. 298,
of
the
It
county
of
Catalo
was quite
characteristic
ii.
483 f.; Corolmi C6rte* Catalans, pj
pp
and and
ante, \ "I I. IVIla, La
a&d
161
'.70.
Danvila, ii, pp. 297. 342; C'oroleu Palla, pp. 363 f ., 866 f. 'Danvila, ii. pp. 292, 296 f.. 299,
801, 880, 338.
THE CORTES OF ARAGON

of
435
them that
in 1563 the Cortes of
Monzon began by formally

some amplifications and
erecting into a law of the land, with
improvements, the provisions of the pragmdtica by which Philip, eight years before, had reconstituted the Council of
1 Matters legal Aragon and separated from it that of Italy. and constitutional, many of them of the most trivial practical
importance, were, as ever, the chief preoccupation of the stiff-necked Aragonese and even in maritime Catalonia and
;
Valencia, where enthusiasm
for trade
had generally taken
the precedence of insistence on the technicalities of the law,
evidence of a tendency in the same direction a dread of Castilianization was common to all three realms.
there
is
;
and economic, there is surprisingly little legislation or complaint. There is much more, as would be expected, in the session of 1585 than in that of 1563-64, but nothing comparable to what is to be found in the cuadernos
financial
of the
On matters
Cortes of Castile.
One
to
gets the impression that the
ancient rights and privileges of the eastern kingdoms were

still
sufficiently
vital
afford
considerable
protection
against the exactions of the crown.
Though they were
probably quite as well able to pay as Castile, Philip preferred to continue to impoverish the kingdom of his choice, rather than to take the trouble to fight the battles in Aragon,
and Valencia, which an attempt to secure a more equitable distribution of the burden of taxation would have
Catalonia,
necessitated.
Taken as a whole, the history of the different Spanish Cortes in the reign of the Prudent King is that of a series
keep alive the memory of the constituand privileges of an earlier age, which no longer had any place in the monarchical atmosphere of the sixteenth In practice, as we have seen, these efforts were century.
tional rights
1
of heroic efforts to
Danvila,
ii,
pp. 291
f.
436
In Castile Philip's power was so firmly inunavailing. trenched that in any difference of opinion with the procuror With the Cortes of the dores he emerged victorious.
always realms of the crown of Aragon, where the popular liberties were so much more strongly established, he followed, until
circumstances forced him to abandon it, the policy of avoidit would be a grave error to regard ing a decisive issue. Yet
the national assemblies of the Spanish
kingdoms
in
the
Their without significant reign of Philip II as wholly of the records give us the best picture at present available
They show the importance popular aspirations and desires. of keeping alive the forms of constitutional liberty, even If they fall far below though the animating spirit be lost. the Parliaments of Queen Elizabeth, they counted for mon
than
the
contemporary
Etats-Cu'ncrau.r.
Not
until
the
to
degenerate successors of Philip of royalty did the Cortes of the perform the functions from the picture. Spanish kingdoms disappear
'
the Prudent had cased
have made it :ss foregoing paragraphs will doub dear that the really fundamental problems of the reign of
The
Philip II
even though the king was unable to realize

We
it
wen- those of finance and economic conditions.
have
and therefore to investigate the state of the royal exchequer,

the ability of the king's subjects to replenish it. The body with the supreme authority under the crown
over the management of the royal finances, which Philip the Kmperinherited from hi- father, was officially known in
as wi day ae the Contadturia Mayor, and was composed, have seen, of two contadoret mayores and two contadorm
'b
may
,/,
cuentas, aided
still
by
eighl
or ten special
official-.'
In L564, while he was
Prince of Asturias, Philip enlarj

190
f.
'C'f. antr, Vol. Ill, pp.
THE ROYAL EXCHEQUER

it
437
by the addition of three letrados, "to hear and determine cases which should arise" in connection with the work of the contadores; and the organization was further perfected l There also by a royal ordinance of October 28, 1568.
all
official
appears, beginning with the year 1523, a body with the name of the Consejo de Hacienda. 2 Originally
of six persons, it is described, in the
composed
senior
middle of
Philip's reign,
as
of
consisting
of
a president, three of the
number
its
Consejo Real, and an unspecified contadores mayores de su magestad " obviously function was to bring the Council of Castile into closer
oidores "
of
the
touch with the problems of the exchequer. 3 Its relations to the Contaduria are defined in a pragmdtica of November 20, 4 1593, in which the Consejo de Hacienda was charged with
the general supervision of the entire financial system, with the task of drawing up estimates of receipts and expenses
ensuing year, and, as the former never equalled the with the cumulatively onerous and impossible duty latter, of inventing new sources of supply to the contadores was
for each
;
assigned the management of the details of -the collection of the different kinds of revenues, while the councillors con-
tinued to
sit
on
all
cases arising in connection therewith.
To
1
all
intents
and purposes the Hacienda and the Contaduria,

tit. vii,
Xueva Recopilacidn, lib. ix, tit. ii, ley 1; Gounon-Loubens, p. 275, and references there. B. M., Cotton Ms. Vesp. C. VI, fol. 8, describes this body as composed, in 1575-77, of two contadores mayores and twelve contadores.
2
ley 21 (1523, 1525)
C. Espejo,
"Sobre Organizacion de
la
Hacienda
Espaflola en el Siglo XVI," in Cultura Espahola, vi, pp. 403-428; vii, pp. 687-704; Danvila, ii, p. 435; GounonLoubens, pp. 276 f. * Nueva Recopilacidn, lib. ix, tit. ii,
ley 2.
nos. 1406, 1810
The statement
Ill,
of Laiglesia, referred
to in Vol.
ante, p.
191, that the
name
de Hacienda cannot properly be given to this body in the Emperor's day, is wrong. Cf. Simancas Mss., Consejo y Junta de Hacienda,
Consejo
Simancas Mss., Diversos de Castilla, " Espejo, El Interes del Dinero en los Reinos Esparioles," in
5
;
Archivo
i
legajo 9.
'
izes
Cortes, iv, p.
lib.
B. M., Ms. Vesp. C. VI, fol. 7v; 376; Nueva Recopilacidn, ix, tit. i, ley 14 (1524), and lib. ix,
Histdricas, (1911), pp. 506 f. Espejo characterthe councillors and the other of the treasury as "gente officials insuficiente e incapaz."
de
I nvestigaciones
438
though officially separate, were but closely interrelated division- of a single body, at the time of Philips death;
of Philip III, by which the two were fused in 1602, did little but legalize an existing definitely
and the pragmdtica

1
state of affairs.
But the Contaduria and the Hacienda were after

obedient instruments of
Philip's
t
all
but
own door
plain
at
that the
ho royal will; it was primarily at blame is to be laid for the dismal
financial history of the reign.
be
made
In justice to him, it should the outset that the situation which his
difficult
had bequeathed to him was beset with Certainly he himself had no knowledge of or
hither
finance.
interest
in
expected the money to be furnished by others. His treasury, in fact, was the only portion of the government service which he did not meticulously superintend it was
;
He
the exception that proves the rule. Moreover, in addition to the extent of his possessions and the expense inevitable to the maintaining of them, over and above the totally
disproportionate share of the burden o\ Spanish taxation which fell on Castile, he had been left with B debt generally estimated at 20,000,000 ducats/ What was even worse,
had set him a bad example of financial recklessD and mortgaging of the future. He had seen the borrowing of vast sums at high rates of interest from foreign bank'
his father
fk
had watched
'in of ji/rns,
development and extension of the evil and of the even more ruinous ractice of the
tin
i
-air of public offices. 4

!>mvil.'i.
'
On
the other hand he had inherited

que aoe vamos a visto de ojoo perui> y nc alcanao remedio: oon eata provision de dinero, temo que en otro mes do despacharemoa." Idiaquea to Graaralla,
<lu
î i i
.
ii,
ji.
573
CddiffOt
f.
Anh-
19
"
Bason
al
ilrzir
none mi Maflastad de jamas mparadoc im ampreadef

I
,
coaao para aaeistia an parsona, y no era tan UUgO, OOBK) Kan sidn los ministrop qna daspoea han aido nmpUadoa
.
January, L680, in Correspondanet Cardinal de Granvelle, ed. P

p
-'
'AnU,
'
Vol. III. pp. 1961.
nue han ronmimido DOOM ill <>ro, y herho poro pn Im entrafian mento
.
J.
Beneyto Perez, pp.
100
f..
and
refeTen oea there.
DIFFICULT FINANCIAL PROBLEMS

in Castile a national
439
theory at least, that
assembly which still maintained, in no new tax could lawfully be imposed
without
its
crown
of
consent, while the Cortes of the realms of the Aragon had practically succeeded in erecting that
theory into a fact.
The Castilian procuradores continued, the reign to vote him servicios, as they indeed, throughout had done ever since 1542, to the annual amount of 150
In 1570 they even added an extra 150 for the marriage of his Majesty to Anne of Austria, though the
cuentos.
procuradores of Granada roundly declared on this occasion that their constituents would not contribute, and that they 1 The realms of only voted in order that others might pay.
the crown of
Aragon contributed scattering
donativos.
But
these sums, as the sequel will show, were insignificant in
comparison with Philip's annual expenditures. Certainly the financial problems which Philip inherited were of the
hardest.
In view of the disasters which overwhelmed him
in later years,
Had
But
they could justly be described as insoluble. he succeeded in maintaining the status quo, or even an
it
approximation thereto,
his actual record
would be unfair to blame him.
was almost unbelievably worse than
that of his father before him.
Not only were
all
the ancient'
;
and most ruinous imposts maintained and increased many new ones were superadded, in defiance of the law of the land, and the tax-paying capacity of the realm was exhausted. In 1557 and again in 1592 the number of municipal offices
1
was increased
of the crown.
in order that
they might be sold for the profit
Important posts in the national government could also be obtained at a price, and the children of clerics
1
GounonDanvila, ii, p. 313; Loubens, p. 278, and references there. 2 Danvila, ii, pp. 298, 304, 336, 344. B. M., Cotton Ms. Vesp. C. VI, fola. SI v and 86 v: "Vale cada un afio a
su Mageatad los reynoa de Valencia, Aragon, y Cathalufia sin otros servicios que suelen hacer, 200,000 ducados eato no se cobre sino quando el Rey va a tener Cortes en loa dichos Reynos."
.
.
440

1
The juros, bought pat nits of legitimacy right and left. ami the sums borrowed at exorbitant rates from foreign
bankers, mounted by leaps and bounds;
Philip
on two occasions
to a declaration
was forced
he
to
make what amounted
of bankruptcy.
which
Mortgaging the future was the sole policy could comprehend always deluding himself
with the belief that the scales were bound to turn.

great victory which he confidently expected
But
the
never came,
and
in
the end he
left his
successor with a dt!>t four times
as great as that which his father had bequeathed to him.*
brief
summary
of the history of the successive financial
expedients which he adopted will serve to show the steps by
which an originally bad situation was suffered to get

nitely worse.
infi-
The process began even before his return to Castile. war with France and the papacy cost heavily; neither the
Netherlands nor the Italian dominions wen
The
him;
like his
father before him, he
was
able to help driven back on
In 1558 he took a step which the Castile and the Indies. Emperor had often considered, but never actually adopted,
namely, the extension by law of the cUcabala to New Spain and Mew Castile. 1 In the same year the export of Castilian wool was subjected for the first inie to a heavy duty {den <Ik>
t
ilt
luri(is)
in
1501
it
was calculated
to yield SO, 000 ducalin
and
in
1577, 150,000, of which 130,000 were pledged

J
advance
of
'J. ln'.tf.; n.n.yt.i Pins, pp. Antonio Sacriatan, liunicipalidadet <l<(âxtilla i/ Leon (Madrid, 1877), pp. M. 415-434; Bonn, SpanUnt
.)
('f.
1
su/ira,
in
p.
208;
and
<li<l
p.
till
10.
Actual
the
collection
Hablar, the
alcabala
Indies
not b
ix,
tit.
1574-76.
der Preitretolui IrrganQ de* 10. JakrhundsrU (Stuttgart, 1896). 101. pp. 1 The official fiK'iroa, as given in the arch BimanOM, are 70,734,415
i
Nueva
;
Recopilacidn,
lib.
Hablar, 735; Corte*, v, p. pp. 66, note 26, 119; Klein, The Simla, ami references there 46, p. various change-', the duties u
in
xxxii
ducats; rf, BimanOM Man., Consejo y Junta de IIa< i.-nda, Lagajo 380. The usual estimate (e.g., Hablar, p makes it 20,000,000 ducat* larger.
1
1566 at one and a half ducat* a bali
for exports to Flanders and tour di for Italy, France, Navarre, AragOS,
Valencia,
and Portugal.
NEW SOURCES
OF REVENUE
441
1 In 1559 a line of custom houses was (empenado enjuros). established on the frontiers of Portugal, which had hitherto
and duties at the rate of enjoyed free trade with Castile ten per cent were enforced on all exports and imports, as on 2 In the the confines of Aragon, Valencia, and Navarre.
;
same year Philip decreed that

in
all
gold, silver,
and quicksilver
;
3 he mines Spain should be turned over to the crown also bought back the diezmos de la mar, or customs revenues
Biscayan ports, from the Constable of Castile, to whose family they had been granted for over a hundred In 1561 they were calculated to years, and raised the rate.
of the
in 1577, 150,000. In these same be worth 48,000 ducats the royal monopoly of playing cards, which had been years
;
established, in theory at least,
from a much
;
earlier date,
was
for the first

5
53,000 ducats.
time rigidly enforced in 1577 it netted over And in 1564 all the salt pits of the realm
;
were incorporated into the royal domain thirteen years later they yielded the king's treasury an annual income of
250,000 ducats.
All these,
6
however, were but trifling beginnings. They have infringed the letter of the law of the land, but may Spain was so glad to get back her king that the Cortes
hardly
made
a complaint
indeed their protests did not

aunque hay pleyto en ." se ponen aqui 5 B. M., Cotton Ms. Vesp. C. VI, On the history of the royal fol. 86 v. monopoly of playing cards in Spain and
condestable,
ello,
1 B. M., Cotton Ms. Vesp. C. VI, 85 v; Vesp. C. VII, fols. 216 f. 2
fol.
mas todavia
ley
3
Xueva Recopilacion, lib. ix, tit. 1 Gounon-Loubens, p. 304. Xueva Recopilacion, lib. vi,
;
xxxi,
tit.
xiii,
4
ley 4 (January 10, 1559).
M., Cotton Ms. Vesp. C. VI, fol. 85; Vesp. C. VII, fols. 216 f. Simancas Mss., Diversos de Castilla, no. 1406; C. de C, i, p. 168. Apparently there was litigation about these diezmos de la mar. Cf. " Memorial de las Financas de Espafia en los afios 1560 y 1561," in Papiers d'etat du Cardinal de Granvelle, ed. Charles Weiss, vi, p. 161 "los diezmos de la mar que tenia el
; :
B.
the Indies cf. Jose Canga Argiielles, Diccionario de Hacienda (Madrid, 1833), Habler, p. 119, note 21; ii, p. 357; C. S. P., Foreign, Forneron, i, p. 247 1564-65, no. 1676 Recopilacidn de Leyes de las Indias, lib. viii, tit. xxiii,
; ;
ley xv.
B. M., Cotton Ms. Vesp. C. VI, 85 Espejo, "La Renta de Salinas," in R. A., tercera epoca, xxxix (1918), pp. 48 f.
6
fol.
442

1 violent until ten or fifteen years afterwards.
become
Never-
theless the year 1561 did not close without a fresh innovation,
immediately much more lucrative, though ultimately far more harmful, than any of Philip's previous ones. It will be remembered that under an arrangement inherited from
the Emperor's day. the cities of Castile had been paying in annually to the royal treasury a lump sum of 334 cuentos, called the ncabezamiento, in lieu of the crown's abandonment
t
of its right to the
terci-
and
alcabala.-
This encabezamiento
was already the largest item in the royal income, but Philip was determined that it must be still further increased.
Chiefly on the plea that it was the king's prerogative to raise the rate of the alcabala, whose abandonment by the
crown was the principal basis upon which the encabezamiento rested, he now proposed to the procurador> 8 an increase in
T
the latter which should bring

cuentos,
besides
certain
annual yield up to I5t. payments in kind; and the

its
procuradores accepted the arrangement in return for Philip's solemn promise to alienate no more of the royal domain ami
to
3 impose no new taxes.
The
repartition of the
payment
of this increased encabezamiento
among
the different Localities
was made
accordance with the results of a special investithe state of the population and the resources of the gation of
in
No pains were spared to make various parts of the realm. demands of the the apportionment as fair ae the excessh
crown would
and any community or individual was granted exemption from the encabi desired >it>> in return for direct payment of the terrms and 4 In 1561 Philip obtained from Pope Pius IV a alcabala.
permit,
who
-ii
tl
Iblsr, pp.
130, 122.
et'>f>
1
1
Cf. ante. Vol. HI, pp. 100

f
104
.
toason-Loubeaa,
p.
pp
and
Reinos tomaron a su cargo, encabecamiento general, las Rentas cf. Juan GutiArres, Opm dellofl"
(Lyons. 1730),
4
li,
regard
Arta* de Ian C6rtt. 308 Foi further details in to the "condiciones con que
iii.
Gounon-Loubens,
pp. 347-371. p. 285.
FURTHER INCREASE IN TAXATION
443
yearly subsidy (subsidio) of 300,000 ducats, increased in the following year to 420,000, for the preparation of a fleet to
fight the
Turk
x
;
and
in 1571 Pius
V permitted
same
plea, to collect for the royal coffers the tithe
him, on the due to the
church from the house in each parish which paid the highest tithe. This new tribute, called the excusado, yielded in 1577 the sum of 293,000 ducats. 2 In 1566 the almojarifazgos and other customs duties were greatly increased. It seems safe
to say that
of the state
between Philip's accession and 1573 the revenues

3
In 1571, and again in 1573, the representatives of the government informed the Cortes that the ordinary income of the realm for the ensuing five years had already been spent in advance, and that the outstanding debts were perilously near 50,4 some new and drastic method must forth000,000 ducats with be devised in order to meet the After existing situation. various proposals and counter-proposals had been made and had failed, Philip intervened (November 9, 1574) with
;
Much
approximately doubled. more, however, was still to come.
a proposal to the procuradores for a

in the
5
new and
its
greater increase
encabezamiento which should raise
annual yield to
ten months later (September 1395J cuentos; 1, 1575) he issued a royal decree all interest on state debts declaring
to
be found. 6
be su pended until new means of liquidating them could As these two drastic measures marked the
;
Pastor, xvi, pp. 359 f. The subsidy was granted at first for five years in 1562 the period was lengthened to ten.
1
1567,
The original grant, made July 15, was of the tithe of the third
house in value in each The parish. grant of May 21 1571, was for five years only; but it was continually renewed, and in 1757 was made perpetual. The papal nuncio assured Philip that the change from the third to the first house would double or treble the value of the grant. Canga
Diccionario de Hacienda, 454; Cddigos Antiguos, p. 915, notes 1, 2; Ricardo de Hinojosa, ley 1, Diplomacia Pontificia, i, p. 178, note; B. M., Cotton Ms. Vesp. C. VI, fol. 86. 3 Habler, p. 122.
Argiielles,
p.
i,
C&rtes, iii, pp. 21 f., iv, pp. 21-23, 283-287; Habler, p. 122. 5 Adas de las C&rtes, iv, pp. 300 f 6 For the text of the decree cf. B. M., Cotton Ms. Vesp. C. VI, fols. 142-156. See Adas de las C&rtes, iv, p. 411, for
Adas
de las
311-319;
444
with which the reign beginning of the utter bankruptcy while to follow the results of them in closed, it is worth
some
detail.
Let us begin with the encabezamiento.
The
procuradores
made
difficulties, of course,
but Philip was not to be denied.
He
that he every influence, lawful or unlawful, could bring to bear, and finally got the Cortes to sanction the But the actual collection of the funds proved to measure. As soon as the new rates had been a far harder matter.
exerted
1
be
cities exercised announced, a large majority of the Castilian the right which they indubitably possessed, of refusing to and reverting instead to the accept the encabezamiento, the government soon found that of the alcabala
payment the sums which
could derive from the places which had a elected to follow this method of procedure wen- often only a third, of the amount which it bad half, and sometimes only reckoned that it would gain. This fact, together with new rates evoked on every hand, caua d protests which the to diminish the total amount of the encabezain
it
Philip,
1577,
where miento to 1018| cumins, besides the payments in kind, fifteen cuentos in 1590, it remained, save for an increase of with this modification, Even until the end of the reign."
the the government had the utmost difficulty in persuading in place of the 'astilian cities to accept the encabezamiento and Torealcabala and tercias and Avila, Iranada, ( Jordova,
(
stood out against
it
till
the very
end.''
Philip
i .
had
ind
succeeded
in
more than
trebling the yield
the
lar:
the the various sources of the government revenue during

ann-.un. K neat to the Of. alw. Ballesteros. Hisiv. 2.
the story of procuradoret.

I
,
its
Acta, de las Cdrles, iv (see index thereof.

b.
v.
Encabezamiento
pp.
in
Kspana,
pp.
200
Habler,
125.
genera^. note 27.

p.
rfa del
Dinaro
lot
Ioceft.,Jp.497-fi01.
Uu document*
de
C&rtee, v adicwnal,
Gut.errei,
Opera,
MJ hi.
OAbler,
pp.
186 f., lad niVrences ubens. pp. 285 f
pp. 371-408. ' Habler. p. 126, note 35.
SUSPENSION OF PAYMENTS
445
course of his reign, but in so doing he had wellnigh exhausted the tax-paying capacity of his realm. The blighting effect of the alcabala, which was the chief basis on which the system
of taxation rested,
was
first
revealed in
its
fulness during the
reign of the
Prudent King.
payments, September
As
1,
for the decree of suspension of
1575, its first obvious effect
was
to cause a panic
among
all
those to
whom Philip owed money both at home and abroad, and to ruin Spanish credit in Europe. 1 There had been previous occasions, notably in 1557 and 1560, when he had been
unable to discharge his obligations, and many of the German bankers on whom his father had relied had already begun to
shy of investments in Spain but now the Genoese, who had hitherto stood by him, refused to lend him another ducat. For some time after the issuance of the decreto, Philip
fight
;
was utterly unable to borrow funds. At all costs he must take measures to reestablish his credit abroad and in 1577
;
he temporarily succeeded in so doing by the arrangement known as the medio general. 2 This consisted, in brief, of the
issuance of
new pledges
in place of the old ones, to all the
state's creditors,
juros,
from the foreign bankers to the holders of which the said creditors were promised their interest by
at varying rates out of the regular revenues of the crown. For the time being the expedient served the purpose for
which
it was intended, for Philip was thereby enabled to borrow money again but ultimately it left him worse off than before, for the sole principle that underlay it continued to be the same old vicious one of mortgaging the
;
future.
Larger and larger were the proportions of the government revenues that were drawn off from the treasury
loc.cit., p.
and others
'Ballesteros, iv, 2, p. 207; Espejo, 501; memorial of the Genoese in reply to Philip's decree,
B. M., Cotton Ms. Vesp. C. VI, fols. 157-164. 2 Espejo, loc. cit., p. 501 Habler, p. 126 Ballesteros, iv, 2, p. 207.
;
;
446

king's various creditors, smaller
;
by the
and smaller
his actual
receipts
and
finally in
1588 he reached the nadir of his
fortunes,
when instead
of the great victory to
which he had so
confidently looked forward as the sole means of relieving his embarrassments, came the news of the defeat of the Invincible
Armada.
It
had
1
10,000,000 ducats. that inability to meet the situation, and told the procuradores was the they must find means to help him out and the result
;
cost him, so he plainly told the Cortes, This time lie frankly admitted his own
first
imposition, in 1590, of the tax that
be known as the
m HUmes*
came subsequently to In the form that it was voted by
the procuradores in that year (Granada, Segovia, and Soria standing out) it consisted of a direct contribution of 8,000,000
ducats, the collection to be spread over a period of six year< but when the term had expired, and the amount had b< the rate of 500 cuentos paid in, it was prolonged, this time at 3 In theo.y the Prudent per annum, for four years more. of King, who died in 1598, should only have had the benefit
;
the
first
two
of these four years;
but the actual state of

-
on his accession, of the last two explained to the proeuradorea that the income Moreover even the had already been spent in advance. miUones did not save Philip from the necessity of issuing a
affairs is revealed
by the
fact thai his
hi,
second decree of suspension on November 29, 1596, and the was no longer object of this one, as has been justly remarked,
to reestablish the royal finances,
ing for,
which now were past praybut solely to get easier rates on the sums already
borrowed.'
The
CM,,,
x,
foregoing paragraphs will have
made
it
abundantly
there,
The Acton de las 127. 118 (June 9. 1588) puts tho eod of tho hxmud* which hrd Iff Ltoboa in tho Inttor half of Mny nnd of that hup tonii horhn y junta on
HAbler,
p.
p.
ll.l.lcr, p. 128.
1 1
U.-r, p. 129,
and references
502, note
'
I
-(j".
.1.1. r.
toe
eft., p.
1.
II
p. 129.
Flando."
nt ftftO.OOO dttOBtl
por
month
FINANCIAL RUIN
clear that the
447
most serious drain on the Spanish exchequer was the payment of the interest on the various crown debts
;
it
even exceeded the
'
'
extraordinario,
or
sums appropriated
for foreign
ent
ways
in
diplomacy and wars. There are all sorts of differwhich the total of it can be reckoned up, but in
clear that before the decreto of 1575
it amounted and at the end of
any case
it is
to at least one-third of the regular income,
the reign to two-thirds
x
;
in other words, at the

less
time of
Philip's death, considerably nues were actually at the disposal of the government. The rate of interest paid to the foreign bankers and other asentistas
than half
of the state reve-
steadily rose until
1575 by the decreto.
it was arbitrarily scaled down in Under the Emperor it probably varied
twenty per cent. In the first half of his son's was certainly far nearer the latter extreme than the reign, 2 former. After 1575, of course, the rates which the government consented to pay cannot any longer be taken as an index of the measure of its solvency. For this we must look to the number of individuals and of banking houses, both in Spain and abroad, whose trust in it had been rewarded by
five to
it
from
financial ruin.
consideration of the state of the royal exchequer under Philip II, it is natural to turn to that of the general
From our
economic conditions in Spain and a few words must be devoted at the outset to the much vexed question of the state of the population during the reign of the Prudent King. An abundance of material on the subject has come down to us,
;
for Philip
was even fonder than

Memoriales
his predecessors of taking
periodical censos de poblacion, both for his

Cf.
le
ow n private
r
infor-
Castilla, legajo 444; Habler, p. 130. 1 Cortes, v, p. 820 Espejo, loc. cit., PP. 411, 497. As early as 1566 the
;
la
Simancas Camara de
Mss.,
rate of exchange with Italy was already so high "que era una verguenza"; one
an
paid 422 maravedis instead of 350 for Italian ducat. Espejo, loc. tit.,
p. 490.
448
niation,

and
for
the purposes of royal taxation. These centuries in the archives of centos, buried for over two in Simancas, were discovered, and many of them published, named Gonzalez, and one of L829, by a painstaking scholar the most complete of them, taken in the year 1594, gives materials from which the entire population of Spain at that
date
is
lias
been
est
imated as 9,034,41c
This impressive
total
less
than
two-thirds of that usually given for the population
of
that <>t contemporary France; but it is twice as large as 2 it seem.Certainly England and Wales in the same period.'
the modem extraordinarily high in comparison with some of 3 its of the estimates, and in view of the reiterated complai
Cortes of the period about the depopulation of the rural 4 Yet further consideration incline! portions of the realm. one to believe that there are valid reasons for accepting it,
The density
;
only half that of the population of France, and but fifty-seven per cent of th it of England and Wales and the depopulation of the rural districts can he of urban concentration. adequately explained on the theory A further analysis of the figures of Gonzalez throws light
per square mile
is
on the
which the inhabitants were divided amonf Old and New Castile, the different portions of the realm. with the northwest provinces and tin ancient kingdom oi
way
in
Leon, are given

(
a total of 6,020,915,
with an average density
of over Bixty per square mile; Murcia and Andalusia of thirty-nine; Wagon. l,(if>li,7 .H), with an average density
. 1
Cento
<lr
y Parliitos dc In
Snjl<>
I'ublacion de las Pronndaa <l Corona de Castilln
As,
e.g.,
in
Adas
la
pp.
'
74Sf.;
chiffre
cf.
also
XVI.
ed.
.
Tomaa
QaaiAlea
!..
de
lea
de las C&rtet AllxTt Girard, population de

iii
I
especially pp. 90, 97, (Madrid, 183 (iounon-LouU-ns. pp. 388; \ P. Debar, "The History of Population and Battlement in Eurasia," in
pagne dana
temps modernea
modcrnr,
iv
1'
r},.stoirr
pp
tion
120
fii
136;
(1929).
<!<
pp.
la poi
the same,
"La
rdpartition
jraphicol Review, xx (1930), p. 121, and letter of June 12, 1080.

1
t'shor. iir
e.g., in Balleeteree, iv, 2, p. 144.
tempi in R< vue d'histoire < .,/,, xvii (1929), pp. 347
lea
Bapagne dans
As,
POPULATION OF SPAIN
449
378,710, Catalonia, 336,970, Valencia, 486,860, and Navarre, in Aragon there were 154,165 barely twenty-one souls to
;
These figures are, of course, primarily as evidence of yet another significant phase of that Castilianization of the Iberian peninsula to which we have so often referred but they also show that, within the limits of the
;
the square mile. 1
western kingdom, the inhabitants preferred the pasture lands of the north, and the cities of the central plateau, to the fertile valleys of the Guadiana and Guadalquivir. In other
words, they seem rather to confirm than to contradict what we can gather from other sources in regard to the decline of
nothing 3 Spanish realms so poor as in people. The reign of the Prudent King witnessed a new
Spanish agriculture. There is evidence that the population 2 declined in the closing years of the In 1597 a century. deputy in the Cortes declared that in were the
phase of
the age-long struggle between the rival interests of agriculture and pasturage in Spain. The various privileges which the Emperor had granted to the Mesta had sufficed
to establish
it
in a position of unquestioned
preponderance
for the rest of
the century.
confirm the existing recognized the futility of attempting to alter them there is a notable absence of petitions on the subject in the cuadernos of
;
had little to do save to and the Cortes apparently arrangements,

Philip
this reign, in
comparison with those

4
of the preceding
and
succeeding ones.
the state of the grazing interests remained, relatively speaking, happy under Philip II, that of the tillers of the soil became much worse. The petitions
if
But
of
the Cortes and the testimony of contemporaries bear wit*
These figures have been worked out by Professor A. P. Usher from the tables in Gonzalez, especially those on
Martin de Porras
Actas
de
1597. p. 540.
23,
of Burgos, August las Cortes, xv,
PP. 90, 97, 388. Uirard, in Revue d'histoire moderne, m, p. 430.
<BaUesteros, iv. 2, pp. Klein, The Mesta, pp. 331-337
154
f.
150

it
ness to
fields
at
every turn.
1
Year by year we learn
of fertile
in
real wealth "vanishing papers being abandoned, of ' the Cortes deplore the depopulation in 1593 and contracts" fashion that of these "richest realms in Europe, in such
;
because almost every year there is sterility and lack of food, of their number the laborers have faded away, and two-thirds 4 The causes of the decline were doubtless are missing." the Grananumerous. The departure of the Moriscos after
5 of Italy and da n rebellion, emigration to the Indies, the wars 6 scant crops the Low Countries, and a series of blights and for the decay; hutwere all, no doubt, partially responsible of the blam< there can be no question that the greater part The need of encourto be laid at the door of the government. as the reign aging agriculture became increasingly imperative were adopted to effect it were the means that progressed, but its immost inadequate. Philip could not be made to realize His attention was exclusively occupied with the portance. of the alcabala and the encabczamiento, increase of the
yield
to
conwhich the comparatively self-supporting farmer or ignored tributed little or nothing, and he generally refused
the petitions that were address- d to 7 Bad Btate of the tillers of the soil.
him for the relief of the The experiment, which
had been
in
tried
and
cultural products
failed before, of fixing the price of agria1 the request of the Cortei was
repeated
1668; but when,
eight years later, the procurations

<
had
-Hahlor. pp. 86f.J BdbtteTO* * 146 166; Ebrpejo, 2 p

.
iv,
ta
CWfa
xv. p. 749 AcUu de la* " fries hAcaai ciento (November 23. L698)
.
Valencia
i
wM obliged
to
import grain
Indies,
BallrtSoV iv, 2, p. 146. from Sicily. BeJJerteroe, It, 2, p 168. b bu C&rte,, xiii. p. 186.
The OmOm depopuletioi remedied, to . certain extent, at the Over r ,, of Spain. cxpenp< 12.000 .Wurian. (lalirian. and Chilian
Reyno do Nipole. y deed.-on tor. *. tod >" aft han'do Antes
y escomen.6
la
conquista del
.-
was
de ge nte de poblar lo uno, y "madas hahido fmra guerra para las quo ha cads del R que oendo mchas a 41 vuel afio, muy DOOM!son las que < f. p. 656. ibm. v-i.
families
iv. 2. p.
removed
153.
thither.
Ballestcros.
Bibkr,
p.
87.
AGRICULTURE AND PASTURAGE
451
discovered their mistake, and begged that the schedules be the rates were maintained and abolished, Philip refused
;
steadily increased until the end of the reign.

to
It is needless
add that the scarcity and consequent dearness of food became increasingly serious problems as the reign progressed. An eminent specialist has calculated that the price of wheat
Spain increased, during the sixteenth century, 456 per 2 To an extent, of course, cent, and that of wine 500 per cent.
in
it is
only fair to regard this rise as but a part of the general price revolution conxemporaneously in progress all over 3 Europe, but it was certainly far greater than it would have
been
if
been more wise.
the general financial policy of the government had It was the tragedy of the situation that
Philip's foreign loans deprived
Indies at the very
moment
Spain of the wealth of the she needed it most. After she
had brought it across the Atlantic it flowed through her as water through a sieve to profit other lands and she was left -_
;
without resources to meet the increased costs which the
achievements of her
own
empire-builders had been largely
instrumental in creating. On the side of industry and commerce the story is scarcely less depressing. Presumably the depopulation of
was counterbalanced to some extent by an increase in the si*e of the cities, and there have been those who have maintained that the decade 1550-60 was a thriving period for Spanish manufacture and trade. 4 But there can be no The question that the period as a whole saw a rapid decline.
the fields
procuradores
foreign
at
the
outset
in
demanded protection against
form of prohibitions of the competition admission into the realm of goods manufactured abroad, and
the
'Habler, p. 36;
P-
Ballesteros,
iv,
2,
147.
1
d'histoire
Espejo, Carestia, p. 125. * Cf. E. J. Hamilton, "En ie revolution economique la

:
periode
en Castille (1501-1650)," in Annates economique et sociale, iv (1932), pp. 140-149, 242-256. * Habler, pp. 66 f., and references
there.
monnaie
452
of the exportation of
raw material from Castile. They also the Castilians be given the opportunity to requested that with the newest and best methods of become
1
acquainted In theory Philip approved of this promanufacturing. 2 and gave orders for the carrying of it out; but
gramme,
of the royal exchequer before long the immediate needs before them. became so pressing that everything gave way
understand that no king can be really Philip could never 3 We have seen behind him. unless he has a wealthy nation he levied heavy exp that in order to get more revenue, he increased them in 1 hi duties on Castilian wool in 1558, and would 4 but in spite of these imposts, which one and 1566
rich
;
of to the native clothiers, woollen goods expect to find helpful made their appearance in foreign manufacture constantly result of the revocation of the pragnm; Spain, either as a or by virtue of special Licena I forbidding their importation, -ranted by *fce government to transgress the established laws The silk industry, winch in return for pecuniary rewards.
had been one of the
glories of
Granada, was by
this time
of the rentaa almost ruined by the progressive increases 8 of the rati which it had been subjected, while the raising after 1577 cramped all comthe eneabezamiento and alcabala 6 the only notable mercial activity within the realm was kept alive and
;
whose prosperity exception was Seville, the American increased by the trade with
ish
colonies.
most harmful to S] ectsof the deereto of 1575 were also whose loam abroad, for the foreign merchants
commerce
his inability to pay revenged Phfflp had declared contracts with the Spanish at least in part by cancelling their
.
themseh
iCartm,
i
.
v.
otq ,P n V' &$*>. I hut-, P- 9*n

j
pp.
t
849
f.;
Colmeiro.
BI.iU.t.
p. 85.
Una., p. 7.1. "' PP- 76 77

,h,r "
,
'
an ''
'
ma.w. p. 65. note 4. f p. 440. $upra, ftnd
POSTAL SERVICE
export houses.
financial
453
Every
left
effort the
king
made
to lighten his
of!
burdens
him, and also his subjects, worse
than before.
Amid
decay,
all
it is
these evidences of economic disintegration and refreshing to note that in one respect the Prudent
in
King was actually
advance
of his
He may be
justly called the first of
day and generation. modern sovereigns to
have established a postal service for the use of the general A correo for the despatch of royal letters and public. mandates throughout the different Hapsburg dominions in Europe had been organized and set up in the Emperor's day
under the direction of the de Tassis family, and there was another for the Indies administered by Lorenzo Galindez
de Carvajal. 1
Under
It
greatly expanded.
existing facilities were seems probable that the credit for
Philip
the
originating the idea of a postal service for general use belongs
who in the early years of the established a correo ordinario at Burgos but we may reign well believe that the king, with his passion for detailed
to
one Francisco de Cuevas,
information in regard to everything that was taking place all over Europe, did his utmost to forward and develop it.
In 1580, with the hearty support of Granvelle, there was established a fortnightly service for general use between
Rome Mid Madrid
the charge was two reales
(i.e.,
2
about
two-elevenths of a ducat) for every ounce of paper.
have several times remarked that Philip II was essenOf this his whole policy, both tially a law-loving man. and internal, affords convincing proof. Such acts foreign
as the free
We
sea-rovers were
1
and easy piracies and pillagings beyond his understanding.

-
of the English
Whenever he
and
Cf. Cayetano Alcazar, Historia del Correo en America (Madrid, 1920).
Ballesteros, iv, 2, pp. 192-195, references there.
454
to himself assumed the offensive he took meticulous pains the care with in the eyes of legal experts justify his actions his lawful rights to the he established and fortified
;
which
of his nephew Sebastian Portuguese throne on the death

is
of the perhaps the most striking

us.
1
many
instances of
it
that
have come down to
quality is even more He in his conduct of internal affairs. plainly observable his own most arbitrary acts on the ground that as
The same
justified
himself the ultimate source of all king by right divine he was law on the other hand, he was most insistent on the literal Like observance of existing legislation by everybody else. he was deterhis great-grandmother, Isabella the Catholic, mined that even-handed justice should always be available
;
to the
humblest
of his subjects.
He was
zealous for the
punishment
report
all
of every sort of violence
and crime.
He
filled
his realms with
innumerable agents, charged to detect
Indeed, the keym infringements of the laws. was strict and of his whole system of internal administration
constant surveillance.
If
was
laws were
fairly
-hserve the laws, it to Philip expected his subjects should know what thoM obviously essential that they l( but at the time of Ins accession this could not
;
expected of them.
The many
defects in the m<
enormous
during
of 1484, and the recent exi>tiim code, the Ordenanzas Reales number of new elements that had come into play
the
Emperor's
reign,
had
created
legal
chaos
in
tstile
and
assumed control. The Corl we have already Been, had been loud in then- complain!-. the as the year 1537 Charles had taken a1 leasl as
long before
Philip
early
fir-t
measures
for the
three of those to
drawing up of a new code. whom the work was intrusted all died before
i.
The
the end of hi, reign;
fourth was so busy

f.
in
'
the
Con
ii,
Of. ante, p. 347
Of. ante. Vol. III. pp. 173
Danvila,
THE CODES AND THE LAW COURTS

Real that he was unable to finish the task
completed, de Atienza, in close touch with the
1
;
455
and
it
was
finally
early in Philip's reign,
by the licentiate Bartolome also of the Consejo, and therefore presumably

king;.
was formally approved by a royal cedula of March 14, 1567, wherein it was specifically stated that it was to be exclusively used by all judges and
It
tribunals of the realm,
contradicted
at Alcala de
by the earlier codes
even though and

;
its
it
provisions were
first
was
published
Henaros on January 11, 1569. 2 It was principally composed of "laws made in Cortes," but it also included some 300 pragmdticas and cedulas issued on the royal authorBoth ity alone, as well as a few autos acordados del Consejo.
its
content and the method of
its
establishment as the law of
the land afford the plainest evidence that the king regarded himself as possessed of supreme legislative power, independent
of the national
assembly.
It
was by
far the
most important
legal compilation in
Spain since the days of the Partidas, continued, with periodical additions, to be the law of the land down to the publication of the Novisima Recopilaand
it
cion in 1805. 3
the realm remained under Philip, as it had been under his predecessors, the Royal Council of Castile. We have already examined the course o. its development during the reign here we need
judicial
The supreme
tribunal
of
only remark that the vast number
of
cases which were
permitted to come before
it afford additional proof of the fondness of the king for everything pertaining to the law,
and of his resolve, in so far as

Danvila,
2
it
it is
was humanly
possible, to
ii,
p. 403.
The work appeared
in
many
sub-
sequent editions
to 1777; our references are to the edition of 1640. The title, originally simply Leyes del Reyno, appears from 1581 as Recopiladon de las Leyes destos Reynos. The
down
usually cited, does not appear in the but is found in the royal cedula "las dichas leyes, y approval: nueva Recopilacion, y reduccion dellas."
title,
of
M. and M., ix, p. 252; Los Codigos Espaholes concordados y anotados, vii,
pp.
3
xv
f.
ii,
name Nueva
Recopilacion,
by which
Danvila,
pp. 404
f.
456
keep himself

in
close
touch
with
administration.
great
Next
below the
<>f
interpretation and Consejo came the four

its
regional eourta
the realm
the
Chancillerfaa of
and Granada, and the Audiencia of Galicia, and the much inherited from the days of the Catholic Kings, more recent Audiencia of Seville, established in 1556; ten set upafifth tribunal at Las Palmas in yean later
Valladolid
Philip
in the Canaries, whose inhabitants had hitherto resorted 1 The two of Granada. important cases to the Chancilleria
chancillerias continued
maintain their ancient preemi<>i nence over the more recent audiencias; "the greater part in the districts commit! Spain has recourse to them
to
The membership respectively to their charge." into four solas, inhei namely, sixteen oidorea, divided
of each,
alt. from the Emperor's day, does not seem to have been Prudent King; but a docuby any law in the reign of the a> ment of the eight* decade of the century di bribes each and four alcal composed of "twelve oidores, a president, and three alcahhs <l< hijosdalgo" all of them appointed by
3
the
president
of
the Council
of
Castile;
doubtless the
accumulation
the of suits necessitated a gradual increase in
number
of
the
magistrates.
The same document
to jurisdiction and procedure interesting details in regard as to the method of appeal it ta
particular^
enlightening
in the from the Chancilleria to the Sala de Mil y Quinientos latter not its and how the Consejo, and reveals exactly why could be made if the amounl name. No such appeal musl depi ke was less than WOOducats. Thcappellanl
iJftMM
,,.
H,r,,,laruU>, Lib.
,
|
iii,
tit.
,,,.!
iii.
there
might
be an appeal
C
.\
Th
M
of
ii.
the
Audienca
.
of the
in. ley
,.,,, U1
,,
ber 7. 1626, DU1 thew u BO thai n performed iUfuncti

..
'
Ui
Palm*, by cSduia
Audiencia of Seville.
>. lib. ui. tit
:
V*a-
B
v.
M
M
9
Ms. Vesp. O. Cotton

Cotton
Hnnvila.
thai
...
fol.
441
tha
fols. 9,
Ms. Vcsp. C. v*
more
imports
and
criminal
v, 10.
CHANCILLERlAS AND AUDIENCIAS

1500 doblas beforehand, and
if
457
the verdict of the higher
court went against him, he was obliged to pay one-third of the 1500 doblas to the Camara Real, another third to the judges who gave the verdict, and the rest to his opponent in
the suit.
1
There were certain very
definite limitations to
cognizance of any case arising out of the decrees of the Council of Trent, such matters being exclusively reserved for the Consejo Real
;
the jurisdiction of the chancillerias. By 1561 and 1568 they were forbidden to take
pragmdticas
of
and the seventy-fourth petition of the Cortes of Madrid in 1583 was erected into a law which inhibited them from concerning themselves with "lo que se huviere vendido" in
the Consejo de Hacienda. 2
The Audiencias of Galicia and of Seville were lesser The area of their jurisdiction was smaller, and
forbidden to deal with cases of hidalguia
their
;
bodies.
they were
in other respects
competence was virtually identical with that of the The former was composed of a regent, four in the latter the number of the oidores, and four alcaldes
chancellerias.
;
a Consejo de Navarra with full jurisdicobviously rather a court than a council tion over aH cases in that realm. It was arising
six.
oidores
was
We
also find
of a regent, six oidores,
and four
alcaldes,
composed and there was no
appeal from
its
decisions to the Sala de Mil
y Quinientos.
There
no evidence of any important alteration in the existing judicial arrangements in the eastern kingdoms down
is
to the time of the 'troubles' in
Aragon in 1591. Yet the composition and activities of the higher courts of the realm, important though they be, give a far less characteristic
'
picture of Philip's conception of

*
government than
lib.
ii,
fols.
M., Cotton Ms. Vesp. C. VI, 9, 9 v, 16 v. 15(1 doblas = 2000 ducats of 11 reals each (fol. 16 v).
Nueva Recopilacion,
tit.
ley 79.
*
fol.
B. M., Cotton Ms. Vesp. C. 9 v.
VI
458
the methods

by
which justice was administered
in
the
Here we find the most perfect exemplificamunicipalities. tion of his resolve that royally appointed officers should
carry the king's will into every corner of the realm, of his fondness for fusing administrative and judicial functions,
and
of his passion for
complete and accurate information
in
regard to everything that
was taking place throughout the
length and breadth of the Land.
The
heart of the whole

:
both dessystem was the corregidor and the residencies cribed, during his reign and shortly afterwards, with a wealth of detail, by two of the greatest of contemporary legists, Jeronimo Castillo de Bovadilla and .Juan de Soldrzano
Pereira,
who
gloried in tracing back the origins of both of

1
them to the days of the Ireation and of the ( rarden of Eden. The institution of the corny (lores was common to all the Iberian kingdoms, but it was so much more highly developed
(
i
'
in Castile
than elsewhere that

;i
it
will suffice
to
examine
it-
workings in the sixty-six realm was officially divided
corregimientos into which that

in
the reign of the Prudent King.

significant
The
land.
office
itself
underwent several
of
changes
in
Philip's day,
some
first
them
in
contravention of the law of the
place the appointment of the corregido which had hitherto remained in the hands of the crown,
In the
now
actually
made by the president of the Council

was due
to the
of
'astile.
According
to Castillo
de Bovadilla, this change (which had

popular outcry
"
;
gone into ctfict before L578)
but wt again>t the inefficiency of Borne of the appointees also take it as an evidence of the closeness with which may
Philip kept
in
touch with the Consejo Real.

its
It
was
obvi-
ously an advantage to have

It
li
.
members make
preliminarj
V]
lib.
i.
onj..
ii.
DO.
DO. 7.
3.
-'
cf.
B.
1(1.
M.
i,
Cotton
cap.
iii,
Mb. Vesp. C.
no. 4.
233, note J
fol.
'
C. de B Antt. Vol
,
lib. II.
ii.
cup
i
ht,
Lib
17.
not*
CORREGIDORES
investigations of the fitness of the candidates, while
459
it was, inconceivable that any final appointment should of course, be made of which the king did not approve. In the second
place,
it is
to be noted that the period of incumbency, long

it
since fixed at one year, with the provision that
might be
extended to two,
was
suffered gradually to prolong itself
beyond the legally established limit. Such prolongations had not been unknown in the Emperor's day 2 but under Philip they ceased to be the exception and became the rule.
;
The
corregidores continued, indeed, to be appointed for one;
but at the expiration of year periods, as the law required that time, the term was often extended for two, three, or
even more years, or until a successor were despatched, so that at the close of the reign it was not uncommon for
corregidores to
remain
in office for five years or longer.
The
Cortes heartily disliked the change, as productive of corruption and perversion of justice, and the procuradores vigorously
demanded that the laws be observed 4 but there is no evidence that any attention was paid to their complaints. The constant changes which the literal enforcement of the law would have demanded became increasingly repugnant
;
moreover, the shorter term which the Cortes desired gave the incumbent scant time in which to become hequainted with conditions in his corregimiento, or
to the
careworn king
effectively to
maintain the power of the crown. The corregidor, like the sovereign he represented
in the
district
1
committed to
lib.
his charge,
iii,
was
at once a judicial
and
Nueva Recopilacidn,
tit.
v,
ley 4.
1
Ante, Vol. Ill, p. 185. C. de B., lib. i, cap.
ii,
no.
13;
M., Cotton Ms. Vesp. C. VI (1561-67), fol. 62, "El Presidente del Consejo Real pone los corregidores en la Ciudad o Villa del Rey de tres en tree afios, o mas, o menos, como sirve y hasse su officio cada uno." This
cf.
B.
probably a chance average by a contemporary observer. * Actas de las Cdrtes, xii, p. 582 (August 27, 1593). 6 A corregidor could not be connected with the city of his jurisdiction by
is
or marriage. birth, residence, same rule applied to his tenientes

aXguaciles.
The
and
B. M., Cotton Ms. Vesp.
C. VI,
fol. 17.
460
administrative
office

officer.
In almost
all
the accounts of his
his
to which have conic down to us more space is devoted executive. an functions as a judge than to his duties as
"He
of the king," so runs a contemporepresents the person
his powers, may rary description of and for any sort of crime and mete out punishment condemn the guilty party to confiscation, or death, or the
sit
. . .
"and
in
judgment
in all tine to be paid to the Camara del Hey, and galleys, or a the such cases the corregidor has a free hand, even though The the realm.' accused be a titled lord or a noble of
corregidor, moreover,
class,
was generally selected from the
letrado
though corregidores de capo y espada were not unknown, and it would they were sometimes called) of the Cortes appear from the eighty-seventh petition
1571 that the procuradorc* preferred the Latter type, partic2 Tim corregidor's one, two for the frontier towns.' ularly to the or three tenientes, whom he himself appointed subject oftheConsejo Real,' were also invariably letrados]
'
(or sin letras,
approval
and
he W case the corregidor himself was no1 a legist, of his judicial functions obliged to relinquish the exercise the All this is an interesting jommenl on to his teniente.*
in
Spanish monarchs for the judicial side, law as essential their faith in the efficacy of the Roman and certainly the maintenance of civilised society;
predilection
of the
<>i,
to
ftd
had ever exhibited that predilecprevious Spanish sovereign Hut the picture cannol tion as plainly asthe Prudent King. administrabe complete without some accounl of the various the years went on, had tive functions which the corregidor, as
B.
M.
f
Cotton
16;
M^ VeipMba
Vi
f.,1.
C Qounon-LonbeM,
'
B.
M.. Cotton
-,
C.
VI'
fol.
tit.
'
16v;
Nueva Recojnlactdn,
-
lib. tt,
nn 20*
v. l.-v 10.
iActa.d.UCMm,m,VP Hi
Acftu
R.
dt
lot
-u, lit.,
ili,
pp. Mil. v 28) pel tit. v, ley 11.

vi.
i
" B Ub v Qounon-Loubnu,
l!
xiv>
n "'
'
"\vp. 308,
DUTIES OF THE CORREGIDOR

gradually been permitted
judicial ones,
461
to
superadd to his primarily

his office, in the latter half
It
and which carried
of the sixteenth century, to the climax of its prestige.
was with good reason that Castillo de Bovadilla describes him as being "with the exception of the sovereign, the highest x authority in the community which he governs." As ruler, under the king, of the district committed to his charge, the first duty of the corregidor was to see to the enforcement of all royal pragmdticas and decrees, and to maintain in all respects the authority of the crown. He was
to
make
himself acquainted with the local ordinances, to
enforce those that were good, and to see that unsuitable ones were revised or abolished, though he could not take action
to
regimiento?
municipal each year all the communities in his corregimiento, including the villas eximidas 3 to make sure that justice and good government were
conjunction
that
end
save
in
with
the
He was
expected to
visit
well maintained
4
;
to see that roads, walls, bridges, and other

5
public works were kept in good repair,
that the streets and
markets were kept clean, and that the district was well supplied with meat, fish, and other provisions, at reasonable
prices
and to prevent the unauthorized construction of 7 castles or other fortifications. He was to guard the royal from any encroachment on the part of the prerogatives
; 1 2
C. de B.,
lib.
i,
cap.
lib.
ii,
no. 31.
iii,
Xueva Recopilacion,
C. de B.,
lib.
tit.
vi,
ley 14; 155.

3
iii,
cap.
viii,
no.
the visita by that official was established and his successors were authorized to continue to perform that function without further notification. Cf. C.
These villas eximidas had been permitted to retain a larger measure of self-government than the other urban communities in the realm. But under Philip II the corregidor of the district, or his teniente, began to be employed as the agency for the maintenance of royal supervision over them. Once
the
visit
de B., lib. v, cap. x, nos. non-Loubens, p. 207.

4
5, 6,
Goutit.
Nueva
ley 6.
Recopilacidn,
iii, iii,
lib.
iii,
vi,
5
Ibid., lib.
Ibid., lib.
iii,
tit. vi,
tit. vi,
ley 18. ley 14 C. de B.,

;
lib.
7
cap. iii, no. 12. Nueva Recopilacion,
lib.
iii,
tit.
vi,
corregidor
villa
received instructions to eximida the principle of
ley 18.
462

and see to
it
clergy or ecclesiastical courts,

bull or indulgence
in
that no papal
the form and
was published in his corrcgimiento except manner prescribed by law.

1
The most
interesting and significant light on the position

in
which the corregidor actually occupied

mitted to his charge
to tlic aijuntamu nto.
efforts
is
the district com-
afforded
At
first
by the state of his relations glance it would seem that no

all
were spared to preserve
the high traditions of

his arrival, the corregi-
Castilian municipal
dor,
autonomy.
On
2 already taken oath before the Consejo Real, had to be sworn into office a second time by the local
who had
ayuntamiento, before being permitted to enter upon his 3 duties. Though the corregidor, or in his absence, his
teniente, alone possessed
A
the right to convene and adjourn
the ayunta)t(irntii, he had no vote there save in the case of an even division, and there are a Dumber of specific instances
during Philip's reign
in
which the Royal
'otincil
and the
chancillerias gave orders that the corregidores abide by the decisions of the ayuntamiento, 6 though no general legislation to this effect was ever enacted. Moreover, if the matter
under disCUSsioD
his
any way concerned his own discharge of functions, the corregidor was alwa\ e required to withdraw,
in
in his
leaving his tenienU

the right
to
stead
' ;
and the regidores reserved
meet privately if they desired to formulate 8 These and other complaints againsi him to the crown.
passages
that,
in
Castillo de
Bovadilla
make
it
perfectly clear
his
office,
whatever
the
powers
in
inherent
in
the
corregidor had no Legal right t"
dominate the
iii/ukI
Bui
tin1
it
is
also evident that,
the monarchical atmosphert
sixteenth century, the prestige of his royal appointment
'i
Reoojrilaci&n,
hi),
iii,
lit>.
iii.
tit. vi,
Ibid., lib.
/.,
iii,
lib. iii,
lit), iii, iii, iii,
'
/'.</
tit. vi,
iii.
-
ley
1.
/'"/
B
'
litiii,
(
cap.
-
vii,
no. 18.
Ibid
lib.
lb d
lit.
;t
vii,
dm. 11,14.
Ibid., lib.
cap. vii, no. 66. cap. viii, no. 172. cap. vii, no. 51. cap. vii, no. IS. cap. vii, no. 72.
POWERS OF THE CORREGIDOR
463
gave the corregidor an initial advantage in cases of conflict with the ayuntamiento which was nearly always sufficient to
He possessed extensive jurisdicover the persons and actions of the regidores, both during tion the meetings of the ayuntamiento and outside, and not seldom
turn the scale in his favor.
sent
them
to
prison
for
misconduct.
Whenever they
exercised their privilege of holding meetings in his absence,
the tendency of the government

a
was
to regard such action as
usurpation of authority
2
Castillo de Bovadilla
much
against
it.
The
right of the corregidor to bring
was very up any
matter that he chose for the consideration of the ayuntamiento gave him an invaluable initiative in the deliberations
of that
body
3
;
and the records
of the Cortes of the reign
furnish abundant evidence that, whatever the regulations

4
by
which he was theoretically bound, he not seldom acted in
He opposition to the wishes and decisions of the regidores. was not only the principal executive, but also the supreme and as the judge in the district committed to his charge
;
authority of the crown which he represented became increasingly potent, it was inevitable that he should continue, in
practice, to
usurp a steadily increasing proportion of the powers which under the law of the land still belonged to the When one remembers, in addition to all this, how concejos.
many
ol
the local offices were sold to the highest bidders, the

5
decline 01 the Castilian cities ceases to cause surprise.
It will be readily believed that if Philip was willing to let the ancient municipal liberties and privileges of his kingdom
become gradually weakened through the extension of the authority of the corregidores, he was also determined to make certain that the corregidores were zealous and just in the
1
C de B.,
Ibid., lib. Ibid., lib.
lib.
iii,
cap.
vii,
vii,
vii,
nos. 53-57,
pet.
5
29
f.).
{Adas
de
las
Cdrtes,
iv
64.65.
1 1
4
pp. 832
iii, iii,
cap. cap.
of
no. 51. no. 67.
E.g.,
Cortes
Madrid,
1579-82,
Danvila, ii, pp. 451-453 J. Beneyto Perez, Los Medios de Cultura, pp. 107110.
;
464
thai they performance of their duties, and, above all, remained implicitly obedient to the commands of the crown. For this double purpose the instrument at his disposal wa
Probably no other existing institution in Spain, save, possibly, the Inquisition, was dearer to Philip It seemed to be made expressly to promote the than this.
the residencies.
cardinal principles of Ins system of government
:
to secure
even-handed justice for each and every one of Ins subjects, to make certain that no royal official misconducted himself
from any way, or neglected or exceeded his instructions and detailed the crown, and to give the monarch constant information, duly attested and in writing, of everything that was occurring throughout the length and breadth of the
in
land.
We
have already examined the workings

few words
at
of
in
the
residencia, particularly that of the higher officials,
the
its
Indies.
may be added
here in regard to
ii
operation,
the lower rungs of the ladder,
Spain.
The Emperor, as we have already seen, had tended to He had been altogether too busy with internaneglect it.
tional
affairs,
and on Philip's accession there was crying

1
need of reform.
Under Charles
the
rei
a of
an out-
taken by a special ./'< going COrregidor had been usually residencia or pesquisidor, sent down for the purpose; aol
until he
had completed
or
a
his task,
which sometimes required
ten
enter upon year, could the new corregidor there it was his first duty to take the his office, and once 2 The Cortes resented this practice dencia of the juez. of it petitioning that the <nl interim jurisdicand
month-
complained
tion
of the juez
><<
residencia
!><
abolished, and thai
cot
on the expiration oJ corregidores be immediately appointed 3 this the term of the outgoing ones. Philip acceded to
Afrff. Vol. Ill,
pp. 185
v,
p. 2-1^
'-*.
i.
iv.
p.
436
f.
(Toledo,
I,
It.,
lit.,
cap.
no.
.'12;
pet.
-
55);
v,
pp. 511
(Madrid, 1651
inon-Loubens,
P ot &7)
THE RESIDE NCI A

request, at least in part
;
465
but the result was that for some
time to come only letrados were appointed as corregidores, displacing the corregidores de capa y espada whom the representatives of the nation in general preferred, and that
the
first
months
of their
term
of office
were almost exclusively
1 occupied with taking the residencias of their predecessors.
became so immediately obvious, that in 1564 the experiment was tried of sending out special juezes de residencia with all new corregidores, thus leaving
defects of this system
The
the latter free for the performance of their regular duties

in
1592
2
realm.
practice became general throughout the No sooner had the change been made than
this
the procuradores began to clamor for a return to the earlier system the remedy, in their eyes, had proved worse than
;
the disease.
juezes de residencia failed to

corregidores
There were numerous complaints that the fulfil their duties, that bad
off
got
scot
free,
while good ones were not

;
above all, given adequate recognition there were protests about the unnecessary expense. At the of the reign the cost of the residencias was borne beginning
for their services
4 by the crown, but as the years went on and the financial situation grew more and more precarious, Philip gradually
began to
shift the
shoulder-; of the residenciados,
burden from the royal treasury to the and ultimately to those of the
and when it came to paying heavily for whose value to themselves they were increasingly doubtful, it was not unnatural that the concejos should draw back. Even Castillo de Bovadilla was of one mind with the procuradores on this matter, and vigorously protested
community
itself
a process of
'C. de B.,
lib.
v,
ii,
cap.
p.
Adas de
las Cortes,
no. 33; i, 463 (Madrid,

nos. 33, 37;
(Madrid, 1566, pet. 66); xii, pp. 581 174 xiv, pp. (August 27, 1593)
;
f.
f.
1566, pet. 66). * C. de B., lib. v, cap. Gounon-Loubens, p. 250.

*
i,
(July 7, 1595). * C. de B., lib. v, cap.

5
i,
no. 251.
Ibid.
Adas
de las
Cdrtes,
ii,
pp. 463
f.
4(36

all
against the abuses of the juezes, above
they prolonged the Legal period of the in order to fill their own pockets. days
-
residencia thirty
1
the
way
in
which
But
Philip
refused to
make any change.
The very cumbersomeness,

appealed to him; was doubtless regrettable,
lf)(>4
the delays, of the system initiated in

if
it gave rise to corruption it but that, as he once said, was "simply one of those evils And it is but fair to add inevitable in all human affairs."
that there were
The prad
ice,
cases in which the system worked well. initiated at the close of the reign, of appoint lit;
many
ex-corregidores of
much
to
proven ability as juezes de residencia did the efficiency of the institution. improve There were a mult itude of meticulous regulations in regard
to
the conduct
of
residencia.
It
was duly proclaimed

5
beforehand, so that every one in the corregimiento might be given an opportunity to make complaints,' which could be
preferred during the whole period of the residencia, down to the latter part of the reign, when it was ordered that they
must be presented during the first twenty days of it. The or private examination of witnesses by the pe&quisa secreta,
1
jiu;
ih
residencia, occupied the
first
part of the proceedings.
The
corregidor provided the juez with a list of persons who might be expected to l>e; r him a grudge, and who therefor*
(
should be excluded from the pesquisa; but apparently somi of these persons were almost invariably summoned by the
on the principle that the truth could be more easily ertained from the enemies of the residenciado than fn
his friend-."
three
in
There was a list of standard questions, fortynumber, which were regularly to be put to thai
hl
lib.
da H da H
v,
op.
i.
ii"
v. ot>p.
i.
BO.
-<7.
tit
ii.
"
*
Xh'iu
.
H:
hi,
iii.
vii.
lib.
\.
OAp
nos.
B.. lil>. v. cap. i, oo Recopilacidn, lib. iii, tit. ad, auto 101, foL 26. C. de B., lib. v, cap. 1, nos. ttl-76.
'
de
11
CONDUCT OF THE RESIDENCIA

;
467
witnesses at the pesquisa they indicate the high measure of interest in the political and economic well-being of Philip's
the municipalities, and,
of bribery
still
more, the universal prevalence
and corruption. 1 At the end of the pesquisa the outgoing corregidor, who was required to remain at his post 2 during the whole period of the residencia, was apprised of
the charges preferred against him, and permitted to present
his
whereupon the juez de residencia rendered judgment. If the residenciado was found guilty, the almost invariable penalty was a fine. If it only amounted to 3000 maravedis or less, he was obliged to pay it before appealing to the Consejo Real; if more, payment was suspended,
defence,
provided good security could be found, pending the decision of the Consejo, to which a full report of the residencia was
3 No always sent within fifteen days of its completion. matter what its outcome, the case had to be reviewed by the highest court of the realm before the residenciado could be
reappointed to office, and in case the outgoing official had been found guilty by the juez de residencia, he always had the right to appear before the Consejo to plead his case on
that the Royal Council, with this addition to the multitude of its other responsibilities, had more
appeal.
4
No wonder
work on
its
hands than
it
could properly perform.

to the administration of the
We
begun
pass for a few

in
moments
Italian
dependencies, whose Castilianization, which had the Emperor's day, reached its climax in the
reign of his son.
The independent establishment

and most important step in
leyes 17, 20; no. 254.
'
of
the
Consejo de
Italia, to which reference has already

first
i,
been made,
this direclib.
constituted the
I
C.deB.,lib.
v, cap.
no. 260; supra,

lib.
iii,
C. de B.,
v.
tit.
i-
P-
439.
*
Nueva Recopilacidn, Nueva Recopilacidn,
tit.
vii,
Xueva Recopilacidn,
;
lib.
hi,
tit.
v,
'ey 23.
*
ley 12
lib. iii,
tit.
lib. iii, tit. vii,
ley 17.
vii,
468
tion

;
and
the course of the internal history of Sicily, Naples, Milan. and the names of their viceroys are further
1
Five of Philip's nine representatives in Sicily were of Castilian lineage so also were eight of the nine in Naples, and nine of the ten in Milan.
manifestations thereof.
;
was. of course, in Sicily that Philip encountered the most serious diffieulites in erecting the type of well ordered
It
despotism, managed from afar, which was so dear to his heart and it was with good reason that his biographer
;
Cabrera de Cordoba characterized the island

contra sus vireves."
'liberties'
l
as
"fatal
When
which
they had inherited from
the inhabitants, proud of the Norman and
Hohenstaufen times, rose in protest or revolted against the policies which Philip from Spain imposed upon his representatives at Palermo and Messina, the usual outcome was lh.it
monarch abandoned his viceroy and retired him; then another was sent out and the conflict began anew.' The
the
Sicilians
better equipped to wage Midi than were either the Neapolitans or tin Milanese.
1
wen
far
conflicts
Barons,
of their
clerics,
and
cities
were zealous
for the
maintenance
ancient
(
privileges; when the three orders were united in the viceroys had to use deceit and corruption in order lortes,
to obtain the donativos.*

1
Hut theviceri
1677 vares
3,
on their side, were

the
On
C.
Sardinia see
'I" <'..
i.
i>.
>
p.
280.
420, above. The taine view

1
When
Count
of
Oli-
was
welcomed
with
even earlier expression in Sdpio "Avrertimenti al Maro Antonio Colonna quando utdd Vice <li '..nun VenSirilia" (1577), in tnr to PalU co Milan, 1600 hi ii. 160 488, which begins: pp,
finds
di
Castro's
royal honors at Messina, the historian notes that he wan accompanied by his
predecessor,
Sir-ilia."
Buonfiglio tanso, Hiatoria Siciliana (Venice,

p 663.
"cosa Giuseppe
pin
veduta
in
C
161
"II Qoverno a B'loi

-
'Ii
Sirilia
lori
stato
fatale
1
I'm anno fin' all' anno Kanke enumer1671." the luoceMN mia(pp, 319 fortune! of Philip's vioei Joan de tieKike of Medina
flail'
i'
i
Via
pp
1
I.li Blasi, Sturm Cronoi LuogoU jno 'Ii Sit ilia, 3" ed. Palermo
'
.
r<
V|
1
L96
cit.,
Scipio
'li
Castro,
r
"Avvertimi
"
/'".
Ceh
the Marqtrft of
nn<l
nature
-lei
pp. 4. >7 47(1. de Sicilian!" and
Delia
f<>ra
1668 71;,
Marcantonio
c,,l,,nna
Pariamento";
"Delia Ranke, pp. -U"
81
SICILY
well
469
of justice
was largely in their hands, for they appointed the judges, most of whom held office for only two years, and naturally did everyarmed
for the fray.
The administration
thing in their power to please the king's representative in order to be continued at their posts the viceroys, moreover,
;
made good use

extinguish the
of letrados, of the typical Castilian variety, to
memory
of the ancient liberties of the realm.
There were also unending conflicts between the viceregal government and the Inquisition, which had won here for its
officials
in
immunities far beyond those which were permitted Spain herself. In 1577 the viceroy declared that there
were 25,000 familiars, and that they included all the nobles, 2 When one adds to these the rich men, and the criminals.
considerations
the
tinued to be rent
important fact that Sicily still conby a multitude of family feuds inherited
from
its
checkered past, and that the whole political struc-
ture, from the viceregal palace to the lowest of the courts, was honeycombed with corruption, one ceases to wonder
was in constant turmoil. 3 The real source of trouble was at Madrid and the Escorial, for no sort of government of which Philip approved would ever have been
that the island
tolerable to the liberty-loving Sicilians
is
the curious thing should not have afforded any King consistent support to his representatives on the ground\\ hether it was his preoccupation with other cares, or his
;
that the Prudent
haunting dread lest his representatives in his various dominions should get out of hand, it is difficult to say the fact remains that when complaints against his Sicilian viceroys
;
1
Ranke,
p. 314.
decision
See Lea, The Inquisition in the Spanish Dependencies, pp. 27-34. 3 Ranke, pp. 315 f. The judges had no other remuneration than the fees of the litigants, called candles, and was jocosely remarked that the it
most
light
went to him who could throw upon the case. Cf. also
Michele Soriano (1559) in Alberi, Relazioni, serie i, iii, p. 353: "la discordia invecchiata e come un' infermita velenosa sparsa per tutto il
corpo," etc.
470
reached the Consejo de Italia, they were on the whole

rather welcomed than the reverse.
For
Philip, as for his
father before him, Sicily constituted one of the most unceasing of minor cares
;
indeed, at certain crises of their Mediterit
ranean campaigns,
major one.
sufficient
But
as neither of
it
might have been characterized as a them was able to spend

its
time or energy on
ancient liberties,
completely to extirpate they preferred, as in so many other cas

is
to leave an unsatisfactory situation alone.
In Naples there
historical
a totally different tale to
tell.
Its
background, as
we have already had

it
;
occasion to
observe,
was
far
more favorable
to royal absolutism than
that of the island to the south of
the Seggi of the city of

' ;
Naples took the place of the ancient Neapolitan parliament the size of the revenues which it annually paid in to the crown,
and the rate
at
which they increased, are

2
significant indicaIts viceroys w<
tions of the extent of the royal power.
granted a measure of authority which was vouchsafed to ttO other representative of the Spanish crown beyond the limits
of the Iberian peninsula
8
;
and the very exceptional

if
fact
that their residenciat were seldom
ever taken
may
plausibly
be explained on the theory that their power was so firmly Etblished that nobody ventured to complain of them. Like their master at Madrid, they were surrounded by a
iefl
of councils
whose members did
their will.
Contem-
poraries remarked on the resemblance between the Consiglio de Santa Chiara and the Consejo Heal de Cast ilia.
Camera
dells
Sommaris
controlled matters relating to taa

Mb. Vesp. C. VI, fols. 86-89; V. C. VII, fols. 216 f. The sale of of nobility yielded a large inmme tO die crown. Girolamn Hamusio (1697)
Cf. nntr. Vol. II, p. 310, and references tl, Fiftwcpn 1561 and 1577 the revenue of Na[>l'" iji ears to have increased from 1,200,000 to i!,4(M>,fKH> durats. while that of Sirily remained unrhanKeil at B M.. CottOfl 1,000.000 durst*
'
'
in Albferi, Relationi,
J
appendioo, p. 817.
Ranke, pp. 340
f.
NAPLES
471
The Consiglio feudal tenures, and the royal patrimony. or papacy of doctors' as Lippomano called Collateral
it
'
'
it,
because
was the centre
of everything
was modelled
on the Spanish type of consulta which was so dear to Philip's
was composed of two Spaniards and two Italians, 1 The but one of the Italians was always at the king's court. was particularly successful in playing off government
heart
;
it
against one another, to its

of nobles, clergy,
own advantage,
;
the rival interests
and the third estate
and
it
had
at its
disposal a large standing army, always in readiness to sup-
Altogether the situation in Naples must have been far more satisfactory to Philip than that in any
press
revolts.
other of the Spanish dependencies overseas. The only really dark spot in the Neapolitan picture, as it presented itself in the eyes of the Prudent King, was the
danger lest his own authority and that of his viceroys might be threatened by the encroachments of the power of the Popes, who had claimed, since the eleventh century, to be
overlords of the realm.
at the beginning of the reign,
This danger was particularly acute owing to the events of the

It
pontificate of Paul IV.
prolonged itself during the sucover the publication of certain decrees of the Council of Trent extending the jurisdiction of
ceeding years in struggles
2
the clergy
over the laity, of which Philip wholly disapproved, and against which he waged constant war in all his dominions, and still more over the bull In coena Domini,
which limited the king's power to impose taxes upon the The obvious weapon which Philip clergy of his realms.
possessed against these dangers, and "the brightest jewel of
1
Ranke, pp. 335

ii,
f.
Girolamo LipRelazioni,
.
pomano
aerie
*
i(
(1576) in ii, pp. 276 i.
Alberi,
Bib. Nac. Madrid, Seccion de Manuscritos, Q. 135, Ms. 5972, fols. 41-61,
"Un'
e
la
numerous. Cf "Discorso Politico intorno al governo di Napoli di Incognito Autor," in

very
Who
were
altra causa de mali del Regno moltitudine de Preti, frati, e
Religiosi."
472
his
Neapolitan crown," was his right to withhold the royal exequatur, without which no papal decree could be published
within the kingdom; and a pragmatica of August 30, 1561, shows that the king proposed to make the fullest possible use of it, despite vigorous papal protests that the terms of his investiture did not permit him to do so. It became a
1
question,
in
other words,
whether the monarchy or
tin-
papacy should be able to win the majority of the Neapolitan! to its support, and the decision of this issin was highly
favorable
to
the
crown.
The
at
nobility,
many
of
wh<
domains had been acquired

were
in
the expense of the church,

rallied
mortal terror of being deprived of them, and

so also did the third estate,
who fei that the clerical exemptions from taxation demanded by the Pope would serve materially to increase their own burden-. As for the clergy, though on the one hand they wished to
loyally to the king;
emancipate themselves from the control of .he king, the\ dreaded, on the other, too much domination by the Pope. and Philip succeeded in manipulating these conflicting interests in such fashion that the
mass
of the Neapolitan clerics
gave
their allegiance In the crown.
The
influence of Car-
dinal (Iranvelle, both at Naples and :it Rome, and the that the papacy was so dependent on Spain at the time of
the
campaign
of
Lepanto,
were
both
potent
factors
in
determining the
issue. Thus the monarchy obtained wellunanimous national Buppori in it- struggle against the nigh papal pretensions, so that by the end of the reign there
\
practically nothing
left
of
them, save the privilege of annually
viceroy at Naples a presenl <>t a white palfrey on the feast <>i Saint Peter and Saint Paul. The pages in the preceding volume devoted to the adminPhilip's
istration of
1
receiving from
Milan
.{;(_' f.
in
the Emperor's day render

'
it
unneci
Rank*, pp.
Ranks,
p.
MILAN
for
473
us to do more, at this point, than to notice certain changes in the situation there which came to pass during Measured by modern standards it was the reign of his son.
On the other hand the fact doubtless a period of decline. remains that in the first half of the seventeenth century the
Milanese looked back with fond memories to the rule of the
Prudent King, and wished that he could be brought back 1 again to live till the end of the world.
The obvious explanation

different periods concerned.
in
of this
apparent paradox
lies in
the political situation in Western
Europe during the three Under the Emperor, and again
the Thirty Years' War, Milan was the scene of constant fighting, but the reign of Philip was a
the time
of
calmer interlude
when the
strife
was diverted
to other lands.
Charles's ordinances in regard to the duchy, as we have already had occasion to observe, were quite as liberal as
He the military exigencies of the moment would permit. defended the privileges of the Senate and the communes,
and when, under Philip, the military pressure had been removed, it would have been reasonable to expect an extension of these privileges.
But that was not the way
of the
Prudent King. His own authority and that of his viceroys must at all costs be preserved, and it is significant and characteristic of
him that he forthwith provided the
latter with a
consulta, in
which the generals of the local troops and the heads of the different tribunals were equally represented, and 2 their respective interests played off against one another.
He
attacked the rights of the Senate as vigorously as his had defended them, bitterly complaining that it exceeded its jurisdiction, and he arbitrarily deprived it of
father
many
1
of its ancient prerogatives.

is
Another accompanying
3
feature of the period

Ranke, p. 365.
a further decline of the liberties of the
Ibid., p. 364,
Ibid., p. 350.
474

consiglios
mmmunes, whose
steadily
diminished both
in
membership and in prestige. rule was Cremona, who not seldom refused to guarantee the Occasionally donatwot demanded by the viceregal agents. over that of her more complaisant her example prevailed
action until they learned neighbors, who postponed their what hers was to be, and it is incidentally worth noting thai
The only exception
to the
while the annual revenues from the royal treasury in Naples
1561 and 1577 from 1,200,000 apparently increased between ducats to 2,400,000 ducats, those in Milan remained constant
at 800,000.
l
encounopposition which the monarch occasionally was bul tered, in matters financial, from the municipalities with that which he met, at least dur
The
trifling
compared
of the Milanese archbishop* part of the reign, at the hands In so far as the public liberties within the duchy were preserved at all, it was indeed largely due to the conflict of the
highest
spiritual
of
and
this
temporal
struggle
authorities
there.
The
Carle
protagonist
was the
celebrated
Borromeo, nephew
of Pius
IV and hero
of the Counterat
in
Reformation, who the age of twenty-one, though he did not actually arrive
his archbishopric until 1566.
of the see of
was raised to the see of Milan in 1560,
Under him the pristine gloi Ambrose were revived. At the outset there
of his colliding with
seemed no prospect
ties;
the civil authori-
dud
Supervision the government

jurisdiction,
but when he began to occupy himself with'the con* <>f the laity, over whom he attempted to exercisi ienc\ comparable to that of ';ilvin over the
(
complained
thai
he was exceeding
hii
and open war was soon declared. The m a tremendous initial endency of Borromeo gave him
B.
fol.
360-363; Ranke, pp. Cotton M*. Veap. C. VI. Veip. C. VII, fol. 216.
>
M.. 87;
'
Ranke. pp. 358
f.
THE SPANISH ARMY
475
advantage, and he was fearless in his use of the power of excommunication but the viceroy was also strong in the
;
possession of military resources, a battle royal between them. 1

office
and for some years there was As long as Borromeo was in
the side that he represented was consistently victorious, and Philip's viceroy, the Duke of Alburquerque, was reduced to the extremity of seeking absolution at the hands of Pope Pius V. 2 But after Borromeo's death in 1584 the tide turned the other way. His successors were quite
of him, and when one of them proposed to excommunicate Juan Fernandez de Velasco, the ablest of all Philip's representatives in the Milanese, 3 the Pope not only refused to support him, but even gave orders that the excommunication be not pronounced. From that time
unworthy
authority
was
permanently
reestablished.
royal Though the
power
of the archbishop may have henceforth constituted an annoyance, it never 4 really threatened.
Philip's reign
ization of the
saw no important modification in the organSpanish army which he had inherited from his
father. The rebellion of the Granadan Moriscos (1567-71), which necessitated the recall of a number of veterans from
Italy to suppress
alistamie.ito for
it, showed the imperative need of a new the increase of the available forces within the
but it was not till 1590 that the plan for it was approved by the Consejo and put into active 5 operation. Twenty-three new tercios for service abroad were created
;
realm
by
'
Ranke pp. 352-354

123-1
PD
nrLlo
u"? 13
Lea, Inquisi-
ShinTZT.JT P Milan hnt

,
5 but th e papal and ua.n.\ episcopal

8
i t0 u be noted that PhmP fr T S h In ulaltlon ln
DeP end
R an ke,
p. 354.
ie *-
'See biographical sketch in Pedro de Mendoza, Origen de las DU}nidadeS SeglareS de yLeZ (Toledo, 1618), fols. 130v-131.
Salazar
CaSm
\
Ranke
dd
'^'iS f
f Q
'
r"j tLd &

the
,ory over the kin,.
iurisdic,ioM
rfeif
DanvUa
,
stM
g, .
M9
476

many
of these
and 1597, but Philip between L566

1
had only
those formed for the acquisitemporary existence, especially The plain fact of the matter was thai tion of Portugal.
he never really liked though Philip was obliged to use soldiers, 2 to pay his troops on time, were hem this, and his inability
1
;
the underlying reasons for the decay of the ancient military of Spain, which is one of the most significant spiril Lack of leadership was 8 phenomena of the period.
would doubtless a contributory cause of the decline. Philip the command of his army, like gladly have Castilianized material was not at hand. Alva eventhing else, but the was the last of the great Spanish soldiers of the Emperor's mistrusted the foreigners by day, and the Prudent King whom he was succeeded, particularly Alexander of Para Yet the terror of the infantry created by Gonsalvo continued to hold Europe in
its
grip
till
the end of the Thirty
its effiYears' War. The most eloquent testimonies to 4 but there is plenty time ciency were paid in the Emperor's in Philip's day and even later, of contemporaneous evidence,
;
that other nations
and the regarded it as urn onquerable, ranks it higher than any othei consensus of modern opinion down to the peace of Vervins in 1598. in
still
army
Europe
its
Doubtless
deficiencies
would have been sooner

won
the
revealed
iBaileateros, iv. 2. pp. 89 f. ApllMteroa, iv. 2, pp. *:< **. patently the outrage* of the Bpaniah largely dory in the Netherlands due. a* we have Been, to lack of
got
Philip'l artny such an ugly
pay
kingdom of Heaven u won, is. by fasting cm bread and Conestaggio (1685), fol. i.nv
conditions
in
had the soldiers murmured that they a kingdom fifty-eight da>s
reputation before 1680, that he determined, if possible, to prevent their recurrenoe when ha invaded Portugal. Cantillana of edict elaborate 1580: printed m B. [., U, J8) was put forth to effect OOnduOf of Alva's . had orosnsd the ,,,..
.voul.l
years of the .inpai reign and the mutinies of vta troops, eee two studies by Philippe backer, "L'orgamaation et la mt.iatic de I'armee espagnole aux Pays-tJaa nd "Lea mutiner.es niil.ta.reH I'uys-Bas a la fin du XV 1
the
later
in
University
,,,,.
of
;
Uuviun,
iv,
1907.
seem
Cf
389 :m Forneron,
1909 pp. 46.. pp. 42-44;

pp. 8U,
xnjra,
to
afford
ally
convinainf proof that it Yet arromplishecl nothing.
pp. 619 f. * Ballesteroa.
iv. 2,
HA
v*
THE SPANISH NAVY
477
in
had the campaigns which it fought in the Netherlands and Northern France been of larger size, so that considerations
strategy could have
of
come into play but rarely, if more than 40,000 men engaged. On land, at
;
ever,
least,
were
the
"
Spanish forces maintained their preeminence. 1 On the sea, of course, there was another tale to
the defeat of the
tell.
After
Armada
at least temporarily, paralyzed
the naval forces of the realm were, and if another fleet of fight;
ing ships
of
was constructed in the Spanish ports before the end the reign, 2 it was accomplished rather despite than because-
The fact is that Philip never, until too late, the importance for his comprehended, empire of the control of the sea, and neglected to take the most_
The petitions of the Cortes on the subject were largely The naval disregarded. activities of the northwestern which had been so ports,
it,
of the wishes of the king.
obvious measures to maintain
successfully revived
decline.
by
his father,
were suffered once more to
preferred to purchase or hire his ships in rather than to stimulate his own foreign lands, subjects to construct them at home. 4 He liked on the sea even fighting
The king
than on the land, and the economic possibilities of a strong navy never dawned on his horizon at all. There was
less
lamentable deficiency of sailors and sea-captains. No foreign* comparable to Andrea Doria entered the Spanish
also
Clonard, Historia Orgdnica de de Infanteria y Caballeria Espaiiolas, iv, p. 215, where the zenith of the military glory of Spain is put at the capture of Antwerp. See, however, the Adas de las Cortes on the unsatisfactory condition of the national defence in the later years of Philip's reign, particularly xii, p. 182; xv, pp. 64-68, 612-618. * Infra, p. 558. In the last days of Philip the Spanish naval forces, besides the northern squadrons operating against English, French, and Dutch,
las
1
Cf.
Armas
fleet' of eighty stationed in the Mediterranean, with their arsenal at and the 'heavy fleet,' Barcelona, twelve galleons at Lisbon and as many at Seville with the necessary complement of smaller vessels, for the protection of the trade to the East and
comprised the 'light

nearly
all
galleys,
West
3
Indies.
Agostino
Nani
i,
in Alberi, Relazioni, serie
v, p.
(1598) 488.
C.
Fernandez Duro, Armada Esiii,
panola,
4
pp. 173-182.
Ballesteros, iv, 2, p. 104.
17s

Bazan was the
last of
service during his reign, and Alvaro de
the old
of
Jastilian Bea-dogE
The dying-out
is
of the great race
empire-builders in Spain tragically than anywhere else

fall
>f
in
perhaps exemplified more the story of the decline and
her navy and her consequent loss of the
command
of
the sea.
If
he dearly loved to negotiate; his Philip hated to fight,

is
the greatest of all periods diplomacy. Firm foundations for

reign
in
its
the history of Spanish
triumph and prestige
had been
mosl
>f
laid
by the
Jatholic Kings, bu1 under the
Emperor
the important posts had been given to Flemings and Italians while the Spaniards were elbowed aside; in no branch of the government service was there a better excuse
for Philip to
pursue his favorite policy of
'ast iliani/.ation.
We may
well believe that he did not suffer the opportunity to
was -mi absolutely escape him; though the foreign element eliminated, all the really important ambassadors of the reign
were
of ancient
in
(
lastilian lineage,
and Spanish diplomacy

in
once more
Spanish hands.
The average
Level of his reprc-
France and inÊngland, Bentatives abroad, particularly the besi of them, such a- Alava and was exceedingly high
:
Bernardino de Mendoza,
si
Many
of
comparison with the names among the ambassadors of modem tit their method- were doubtless such as would 001 D
1
challenge
tolerate.! today.
They spied, and they plotted. Theystai rebellious troop insurrection- and even commanded had not yet hem hut the ethics of their
profession
bablished;
effective,
more they were really no worse, but merely than their rivals and contemporaries of other lands.
papb
"f
lr
\
Mmi-.-I-
p.
,[,-!, p,-.
iv.
2.
pp.
115
i..
FatH.,
in
11
[i
B'-rnaHinr.
n,
If
Mepdo ,"
7".
'
nfVMieM
thorp,
147.
SPANISH DIPLOMATS
479
To
and activities it was primarily due that the magnificent bluff of Spanish preponderance was so successtheir efforts
fully
maintained for a long half century after the Prudent
in his grave. < They furnished notable to be followed in the examples, succeeding generations by such men as the masterful Gondomar at the court of
King had been
James
and the haughty Penaranda at the Congress of Westphalia. Their achievements seem the more remarkable when we conI,
sider that they, like the

in difficulties
army and the navy, were perpetually because of the shortage of funds. Bernardino
to
pawn his jewels and his silver in the service of his master before finally returning from Paris to
Madrid. 1
de
Mendoza had
The
prevailing
visitors to the
impression of the majority of foreign Spain of Philip II was unquestionably that of
the power and prestige of the Roman Catholic church. There were clerics everywhere, and their influence seemed Yet it would be a grave error to conceive of all-pervasive.
expected reward his unswerving loyalty to the faith with virtual control of the church within his own dominions. His ideal was to have church and state maxcii hand in hand, both under his own guidance, and each lending to the other its indisto
King as 'priest-ridden' in the ordinary sense of the term his conception of the monarchy was far too exalted to permit of that, We have already had occasion to point out how zealous he was to defend his royal preroga ive against papal encroachments. Like many other strong monarchs in the history of Europe, he Rome
;
the government of the Prudent
pensable support. If we keep these fundamental ideas clearly in mind, it is easy to see the reason for Philip's well known predilection for
1
Ballesteros, iv, 2, p.
116;
Morel-Fatio,
loc. cit., p.
62.
4gQ
THK <;o\KRNMENT OF SPAIN

seemed to embody the main On the one hand it was the relentless
It
the Spanish Inquisition.

his principles of
life.
foe of heresy
fortified
and dangerous innovation;
on the other
it
In the latter part of the absolutism of the crown. had not been in a nourishing state. the Emperor's reign it not helped it, and the avaricious Charles's many absences had who had evaded his ieneral Hernando de Valdes, [nquisitor-( of the clergy, was perilshare of the forced loan demanded needed to on^- near disgrace. Something was desperately and that of the institution over whose
restore his prestige
activities be presided,
and
in
1557-68 that need was
at least
Protthe discovery of the two small temporarily supplied by

rtan1
to who* communities in Seville and Valladolid, The number of devoted himself in 1559. extirpation he and relaxed, was not very greal victims, both reconciled Bave for a few but the work was so thoroughly done that,
;
we hear nothing more of Spanish Protsporadic instances, of the reign: indeed the estantism .luring the remainder it served to of the whole episode was that chief
significance in its existence, tide the Inquisition over a danger point v of fuel to feed Hs flames. for lack to
Lt
when
But
At ,11 costs be musl mak* Valdes was not v,t satisfied. He also was mosl certain of the support of the Prudent King. a man who had desirous to feed fat an ancient grudge against been elevated to a post which ently and most unexpectedly de Carranza, Bince he had coveted for himself, Bartolome and Carranza, accordingly, was ,7 archbishop of Toledo, heretical used before the Suprema of having expressed on the Catechism. There wai opinions in his Commentaries Carranza was an Q01 the slightesl basis for the charge. church. That he had no lent advocate of reform within the
threatened
perish
iympathy with Protestantism

i
is
proved by
.
his career
...
En?
BM
pp. 78
lupro.
THE SPANISH CHURCH

land,
481
if we may believe his boast, he burnt, or drove from the realm 30,000 heretics, and reconciled,
where,
brought back 2,000,000 souls to the
faith.
But Valdes was
fortunate in being supported in his attack by Melchior Cano, 2 who enjoyed the unlimited confidence of the king, and he
finally
succeeded in poisoning Philip's ear against Carranza.

;
Not only did the king suffer the trial to proceed when the papacy intervened, he did his utmost to prevent the case from being sent to Rome. That it was sent there at last, after a
delay of seven years, that the final verdict was so much milder than the Inquisition desired, and that Valdes was
ultimately forced to resign his position, are, for our present the main fact that purposes, comparatively unimportant
;
demands our attention here
is
that the affair committed
Philip irrevocably to the cause of the
Holy
Office against all
who attacked
bulwark
of
its
both at home and abroad, as the strongest the omnipotence of the crown. From that time
it
'
supereminence was doubly assured, and it was utilized at will, not only for the extirpation of potential
enemies of the church, but for the suppression of political
unrest.
3
onward
'
The
it
influence of the church
was naturally predominant,

and
in
as
was
in all other Catholic countries during the age of the in
Counter-Reformation,
culture
education
learning,
in
and
in art.
The
universities were largely controlled
by
Jesuits and Dominicans, who regulated the subjects taught and the methods of teaching them. But it would be quite wrong to think of the reign of the Prudent King as a
On the contrary it is period of intellectual stagnation. characterized throughout by a burning interest in scholarLea, History of the Inquisition of Spain, ii, p. 49. Carranza had been sent to England with Philip in 1554,
1
ment
3
of
Roman
Catholicism,
par-
ticularly at Oxford, 2 Cf. ante, p. 58.
became confessor to Queen Mary, and labored earnestly for the reestablish-
Lea, Inquisition of Spain,
ii,
pp. 48-
90.
482
ahip;
it

ushers
of,
in,
even
it"
it
does not
last
to sop the cul1
mination
such things
That the golden age of Spanish literature. Bhould have been possible in an atmosphere of
clerical
unquestioned
one of a number of predominance, is bu1 no1 yel extinct, thai the convincing refutations of the theory, obscutendencies of the Romish church have always been That they should have occurred in an ago of rantist.and economic decline is hut another illustration of a
political
phenomenon observable
in
many
other countries,
at
main
other epochs, ever since the days of the
Roman
Empire,
The
development of intellectual greatest periods tended on the whole to follow rather than to coincide have
artistic
and
with those of the most notable political achievement. The greatest works of scholarship in the reign were proall of duced in the field of history, theology, and law nearly
;
them were of the ponderous, monumental type which was to sevenbecome prevalent throughout Western Europe in the In history the greatest names are those 6i teenth century.
Ambrosio de Morales (1513 91) and of Jeronimo de Zurita of official (1512-80). The former was appointed to the posl the work of Florian dfl chronicler in 1563, and continued in thelatterwaa secretary of the Inquisition, and
Ocampo;
L548 was elected the
first
a
coronisba of
Aragon by the unan-
imousvoteof the
1
in
Both are notable fortheir patient and the search and use of manuscripts and inscriptions,
I
!ortes.
for their daring rejection of
unproven legends
du
indeed
tl
may
II
be justly regarded as the founders

rior
of critical
historical
i"
In
[iterator
..nl-n
die
XVP
siecle." in B. H., xviii
mirr uiit.r ent rechl
da
dM
Regiarunj Philippa bemchende Volk

Philippeon,
I
I
pp. 97
100.
A mnriw summary
of the reprei
West-
h,
..-./
ll.n,r,ch
(.
in
pp II IV. (Berlin, the mflnrnro of

Pi
nish
literature
tbil
sive influence of the Spanish InquiBition on the literature of thu period u gnr by Philippton. op. eU., p. 375. l BaJlesteroa, iv, 2, pp. f *.f*** .! i> Dormer, Progrfotde la MutonM
"> 01
el
Mr
Matborea
i
Lm Ernvtoob
Reyno dr Aragon. v EIoqxos

tvfita (Sara K oasa, 168U).
evfaa
national*- franâi*- a la fin
SPANISH SCHOLARSHIP
483
And there were also a host of lesser scholarship in Spain. 1 On the borderline between history, theology, and lights. political science stands the imposing figure of the great Jesuit Juan de Mariana (1535-1624), whose work was largely done in the reign of the Prudent King, though most of it was
He was a paragon of and a master of Spanish prose. To characterize as learning, 2 'scientific' a history which begins with the statement that 'Tubal, the son of Japheth, was the first man that came to Spain" seems to us excessive but when Mariana deals with
published in that of his successor.
;
views become at least modern, contemporary not positively In his treatise De Rege revolutionary.
affairs his
if
et
Regis Institutione, which was published in 1599 with the sanction of the Spanish crown, he justified the slaughter of tyrants in extreme cases; and when Ravaillac, who was
popularly supposed to have been influenced by the book, Henry IV in 1610, it was burnt by the public executioner in Paris. 3 In theology the outstanding figures
assassinated
to reconcile the doctrine of predestination with the ideas of the freedom of the will then current in the church of Rome. are those of the Jesuits, Luis follower Francisco Suarez
Molina (1535-1600) and
his
(1548-1617),
who attempted
Suarez also earned an unenviable fame in England in the succeeding reign by his treatise against the oath of allegiance
which James
demanded of his subjects'. 4 And since theology and law marched hand in hand in the Spain of the
I
not surprising to find priests like Suarez distinguishing themselves also in the field of international
it is
Prudent King,
Many of these are mentioned in the bibliographical notes in the present and the preceding volume.
*
1905);
John
of
Laures,
The
Political
Economy
*
Juan de Mariana (New

iv,
2,
iv, 2, p. 321. Ticknor, History of Spanish Literature, 6th ed., iii, pp. 206-214 Georges
;
So Ballesteros,
York, 1928).
Ballesteros,
pp.
266,
Encyclopaedia Britannica, s. v. "Suarez."
14th
314; ed
'
Cirot,
Mariana
historien
(Bordeaux,
1X4
T11K
QOVBRNMBNT OF SPAIN
jurisprudence.
A notable precedent for their activities in this direction had been Bel them during the Emperor's reign by been the noble Dominican friar Francisco de Yitoria, who has "one of the precursors called, with but alight exaggeration, and his example was eagerly of the League of Nations" ( Jrotius owed much the writers of Philip's day. followed
1
by
in which Legibus ac Deo Legislators, of kings is refuted and the the theory of the divine right Balthazar ntial equality of all men is maintained. et Discipline MUUari BeUicis Ayala's De Jure el Officii* to mitigate the horrors of (1582) is a notable attempt writer of the day war.' Probably the most learned legal
to Suarez's Tractotou di
he has sometimes been
called
the
Spanish
Bartolus
was the Toledan, Diego de Covarrubiasy Leyva (1512-77). He wrote on the law at Salamanca. professor of canon Council of Trent and on many legal topics, but he was by
no means exclusively a scholar, for he held judicial posts and Burgos and Granada, was bishop of Ciudad Rodrigo
at
oi
rose to the presidency of the Council of Segovia, and finally

I
The ascendency
of the
church
is
also plainly discernible

\
o\ aetry and imaginativa throughout the reign in the realms de Avila. of San Juan The works of Santa Teresa prose. Luis de la Cruz, of Fray Luis de Leon, and of Fray de
Granada
any
or
of
and though
furnish perhaps the mosl striking examples of it; r greater than Fernando de Herrera, who was
t
them, cannol be classed
ae
he strictly religious poet,
attains his highest bucc<
when celebrating the triumph!

of the Christians in
mourning the defeats
warfare againal
by the Can* (1 Washington
;.
MTd
\
da
M:..l.iriaga,
Spain
edition
,
has
>x-en
iaeii.-l
Institution
of
wnli
and
reproduction Introduction by John Bnglilfa translation by J
<>f
the
first
Wertl
P.
Bull.
:k8.
BlaJn,
LITERATURE AND ART

the infidels.
1
485
these names, and many others besides, pale into insignificance in comparison with those of Cervantes and Lope de Vega, both of them realists of transcendent genall
But
ius,
carried the
wholly emancipated from ecclesiastical limitations, who fame of the Spanish story and the Spanish drama
throughout the four quarters of the globe. Neither of them can be said to belong to the age of Philip in quite the same
sense that Spenser
Elizabeth.
1591,
and Shakespeare belonged to that of Cervantes did not begin Don Quixote till after
first
and the
first
and the
work
of
part was not published till 1604 or 1605 Lope saw the light in the very year of
;
the death of the Prudent King.
Yet
it
was under
Philip II
that both
both at
men had the various experiences and adventures, home and abroad, which furnished the material for
Cervantes was wounded at
what they subsequently wrote.
Lepanto, suffered cruel captivity as a galley slave at Algiers, and collected taxes in La Mancha Lope served in the
;
Invincible
Armada.
Both knew
their country in the height
its decline, and they have immortalized its splendor and its tragedy, its comedy and its pathos, and, most of all, its unlimited variety, for the
of its glory as well as
on the threshold of
benefit of all the succeeding generations of
mankind. and painting, on the other hand, Architecture, sculpture, are almost totally dominated, during Philip's reign, by the
influence of the church of the Counter-Reformation.
king, as
The
already had occasion to observe, took a J interest in the fine arts and directed them the Escorial lively
;
we have
is
the mirror in which his tastes are
In architecture the leading figure

1
most accurately reflected. is that of Juan de Herrera

Cervantes died on Saturday, April
Henry Butler-Clarke, Spanish

(London, 1893), pp.
Lit-
erature
118-121.
del
Uerrera's best works are the Cancidn & Lepanto and the Perdida
1616, according to the new style; Shakespeare just ten days later, Tues23,
Don Sebastidn y su
Rey
day, April 23, old style.
Ejercito.
486
(1530?-97), a master of fche construction of edifices "conformable to the sombre thoughts of the monarch"; and it was largely as B result of his influence that the plateresque
of the stage in the almost completely disappeared in the reign Emperor's day, In sculpture and painting the tale is of the Prudent King.
style,
1
which had held the forefront
much
the same.
The names
of Philip's favorite artists, both
native and foreign, have been given in another place," and WB have also seen that they painted numerous portraits; but fond though the king was of pictures from real life, he cared
representations of sacred subjects, of the or ecstatic qualities exhibited in the works of contemplative
all
most of
his
for
most characteristic religious painter, Luis de Morales,

later
in
and
those of
Murillo.
One
curious
fact
is
of the Spaniards in the
paucity of pictures or sculptures showing the achievement! New World. Possibly it may indicate
that
contemporaries
a
did
in
not
regard
the
American
the Spanish Empire as conpart siderable as that which LB usually ascribed to them today, though the wealth of historical material about the American
possessions as playing
lands
side.
may
plausibly be adduced as evidence
on the Other
In
Its greatest
music the reign of Philip was veritably a golden age. name is that of Tomas Luis de Victoria (lob)
in
1613?), whose hymn- entitle him to a place with PalestrinA the forefront of the composers of the era of the Counter-
Reformation.'
Secular melodies were a/so

essential part
of a
'
;
much
in
vogue,
to
and
it
was an
all know how to play the guitar other activities of the time the power of the church remained
gentleman's education but in music ae in almost
transcendent.
1
'
Ballesteros, iv, Cf. ante, pp. 45
2.
f
pp. 432-435.
Ballestcros. iv,
Ibid., p. 486.
2,
pp. 484
f.
CONTRAST AND CONTRADICTION
487
at Spanish history is full of contrast and contradiction more than in the reign of Philip II. Regarded no period
from the modern standpoint,
in
which economic consider-
ations are so preponderant, the age of the Prudent King seems emphatically to be an age of decay yet even in its
;
last
and most tragic decade it produced men of genius whose names will survive forever. Certainly Philip did not stifle The most notable figures in Spain's the life of his people. military and political annals were indeed gone, but from their
ashes there had arisen a generation of
men
of letters
which
has seldom
been equalled
and never surpassed, and the

to follow close behind.
greatest of all painters
was
At the
that the sceptre of empire was slipping from her grasp, Spain won the crown of immortality in literature and
in art.
moment
488
THE GOVERNMENT OP SPAIN BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE
Practically all the printed material that lias been utilized in this chapter has been described in the bibliographical notes to Chapters V X. and XXIII. and in the Xote on the General Authorities at the beginning of this volume; the principal exceptions to this statement alios tie Cultura y la Centralizaeion are .hian Beneyto Perez, Los
bajo Felipe II (Madrid, 1927), Carlos Riba y Garcia, El Consejo Supremo de Aragon en el Ihinado de Felipe II (Valencia, 1914), and other lesser monographs which have been cited only once or twice
therefore seems appropriate to devote this note to a description of the most important manuscripts from which material has been drawn. Of these the greater part have been found in the Secci6n de ManuIt
scritos in the Biblioteca
Nacional at Madrid,
in the
Archivo Historico
Xacional, in the archives at Simancas, and in the British Museum. The most generally useful documents that I have found are as fol-
Agustfn Alvarez de Toledo, "Discurso sobre los Consejos, in the Archivo Historico Nacional, Q. 104, Ms. 5791, fols. 157-190, and also in the Biblioteca Nacional, Secci6n de Manuscritos, E. 31, Ms. 904, fols. 99-138, where it is entitled "El Govierno de Span" Alvarez de Toledo was a prominent licendado at the court and a nun de ( '., ii. p. ber of the Councils of Castile and of the Indies (cf. 54(i; iv, p. 332; B. M., Add. Ms. 28,344, fol. 317), and iii, pp. 445,
lows:
(1)
(
I
"
de
de
wrote his "Discurso" during the reign of Philip II. (2) The "RelacioO la orden (pie su Magestad manda que segue en la division de e|
Consejo Heal" (February, 1598) in the Biblioteca Nacional, Secci6n s6 and 18,729", Manuscritos, CC. 85 and 89, Bueltoa 18,722 Cahriel Lobo Laso (or Lasso) de la Vega (1559-1615), "Relac (3)
muy
puntual de todos
I"-
(pie residen
de ordinario en
Chancillerias q'ay en ni'imero de plazas y officiates que cada qua] de los referidos tiene y de h> (pie trata." in the Biblioteca Xacional, Secci6n de Manuscr
Q. 135, Ms. 5972, fols. 88 tic- at the court of Philip
a
1
Consejos Superiores y Tribunales Supremos la Corte d( Espafia, con las Audiencia Elspafia y en las [ndias Occidentales, con <l
19.
II
The author Berved mi various cap and Philip III, and was widely known
writer in prose ami verse (cf. .lame- Fitzmaurice-Kelly, Historia 7. Ilustrada, xxix, p. 941).
de
Ordenansae del Consexo de Hazienda, y Conttaduria maior Bacienda, y Conttaduria maior de Cuenttas, fechaa en 20 de
;
Noviembre de 1593," in the Biblioteca Xacional, Secci6n de Manu:. Mmost of this is printed in the A 6587, fols. 1-30
489
Recopilacion, lib. ix, tit. ii, ley 2. (5) The "Advertencias de Don Scipion de Castro a Marco Antonio Colona nombrado por Virrey de Sicilia," in the Archivo Historico Nacional, Q. 104, Ms. 5791, fols.
233-250
is
this
is
probably a translation from the Italian
the treatise
printed in that language in Comin Ventura's Thesoro Politico (Milan, On Scipio di Castro and his works see Ales1600-01), ii, pp. 450-483.
sio
p.
Narbone, Bibliografia Sicola (Palermo, 1850-55),

28
;
ii,
p.
388;
"
iv,
B. M., Catalogue of Printed Books, xvi,

di
col.
209.
(6)
The "Dis-
Governo ably written between 1667 and

corso Politico Intorno al
(prob1670), in the Biblioteca Nacional,
Napoli di Incogniti Autor
Seccion de Manuscritos, Q. 135, Ms. 5972, fols. 41-61. (7) Archivo General de Simancas, Diversos de Castilla, nos. 1227, 1406, 1760,
1810, which contain much useful financial information and advice from Philip's various agents. (8) British Museum, Cotton Ms. Vespasian C. VI (cf. Gayangos, Catalogue, i, pp. 683-686), especialty fols. 6-10, 15-23, 37-39, 62-63, 85-89, and 122-130, a contemporary relacion, presumably by a royal secretary, of the different phases of the political and economic institutions of Spain, and of the state of the It appears from internal evidence to have been writking's finances. ten between 1575 and 1577, and I have found it of the highest value. (9) British Museum, Cotton Ms. Vespasian C. VII (cf. Gayangos, Catalogue, pp.
679-681), "Acta inter Angliam et Hispaniam, 1516-1588," This is particularly valuable chiefly relating to the reign of Philip II. " for financial matters cf. my Note on the Finances of Philip II " in
;
R. H., lxxxi (1933). Numerous other manuscripts of too special a nature to be inserted here are cited in the appropriate places in the footnotes.
CHAPTER XXXVII
THE INVINCIBLE ARMADA
have already had occasion to observe that a change had been effected in the policy of Philip of
We
great
between the years 1578 and loso. The remnants of the old Eboli peace party, the summoning of Cardinal Granvelle from Rome, and the Vigorous prosecution
(
Spai dismissal of the Last
Spanish claims to the throne of Portugal were all symptoms of the fact that the Prudent King no longer proof the
posed merely to rest on the defensive, but was prepared ake the lead into his own hand. And this change did qo1
ind
its
sole expression in his dealings with the

it
Iberian peninsula;
problems of the was also reflected in his at titude t oward
England and fiance, and most of all in his treatment of the rebels of the Low Countries, which coniinued, for at leasl B
decade more, to be the local point of the international politics Save for the six ears of Alva's rule, the pf Western Europe"
keynote of Philip's policy there had hitherto, on the who been conciliation. His representatives od the ground may
not
-
always have been able to giv( effed to it, but that al least the line they were told to take. Now, however, Philip
had become convinced, part icularly by the news of the treaty which the rebels had made. August \'A, 1578, with the hike of
1
Anjou, thai
Belected
more vigorous action was imperative, unh

lust
;
Low Countries were to be for Don John

ctive
and
in
the successor
whom
his
>t'
Austria
he found
an aide and
of
instrument
for
the
acc.pinpli-lnn.iit
pur-
490
lLEXANDER OF PARMA
491
dexander of Parma, who was given the post, was born in tome on Augns*-*2f77 1545, the son of Ottavio Farnese and (I [argaret of Parma, the illegitimate daughter of Charles V, who was to be regent in the Netherlands from 1559 to 1567.
At the age
of eleven,
he became attached to the court of
Philip II in the Low Countries. Three years later he returned with the Prudent King to Spain, and was educated there with Don Carlos and Don John. But he never became
1
His character and outlook on life thoroughly Hispanicized. continued, to the end of his days, to be those of the Italian
soldier
and statesman
of the Renaissance.
He
followed the
precepts of Machiavelli's Prince, and also of Castiglione's Primarily a soldier, he did not hesitate to expose Cortegiano.
his
person on the battlefield, when by so doing he could reanimate the drooping spirits of his men, but he never pushed his courage to the point of foolhardiness, and had no
patience with those
who
did.
With
his military talents,
moreover, he united the qualities of true statesmanship.
He
knew when
gifts in
to fight
and when to
;
treat,
and possessed rare

he
offers a curiously
;
handling men
in this last respect
close parallel to his great rival,

less
William
of
Orange
if
he was
genial
and
friendly,
he
had
greater
dignity
and
distinction.
He
potential foes,
letters to
nor blinded himself to their virtues.
never underestimated the power of his In his
tempt and disdain

fully
the king one finds none of those expressions of confor the Netherlander which are so pain2
frequent in the correspondence of his predecessors. Last of all, he was firmly resolved to make a brilliant success
the great task to which Philip had called him, and of which, unlike Don John, he fully comprehended both the difficulties
in
and the importance.

1
He knew
2
that the eyes of Western

Correspondance
L.
van der Essen, Alexandre Farnese,
du
ix,
Cardinal
de
i.
pp. 1-82.
Granvelle, ed. Piot,
pp. 96, 122.
492
Europe were focussed upon him. He hoped to terminate, definitely and victoriously, the great contest which his Spanish predecessors had only embittered and prolonged.
1
The
situation in the
Low
Countries, at the time of his

for the
act
advent to power, was so ticklish that, least, it was obvious that he must
caution.
time being at with the utmost
The
military
power
of the rebels
had been greatly
increased by their treaty of the previous August with the Duke of Anjou, while the immediate prospect of the
annexation of Portugal rendered

gel
more troops from Spain.
impossible for Parma to Clearly he must hav< recourse

it
diplomacy and avoid war. Equally clear was the object which his diplomacy must seek to attain, namely, the reopening of the breach between the Protestant Northeast and the
to
Roman
had almost healed
Catholic Southwest, which the ineptitude of Don John union fait In forct to the h*ange motto.
(
;
he must oppose the classical Divide et imperd. The Btate affairs after the death of Don John was nol unfavorable
the attainment of this end.
oi
to
Few Protectants
to
or Catholic-
could be brought to give hearty suppOti
the policy of
toleration aci a means to political cooperation, enunciated in the draft for a religious peace which William of Orange had submitted to the Estates on July 10, L578; and the Protr
bant
minority
in
the Walloon provinces, urged on by the
Calviniste of Ghent, were
uow convinced
t
that,
by
little
forcingofthe pace, they could curry all hesout hwest ern provinces into the camp of the Reformation. An account of
t
!
attempt and failure to accomplish this, and of the futile intervention in the Low Jountries on their behalf of the firebrand
(
1
int
Palatine John Casimir,

:'
is
not necessary for our pur-
ee her<
suffice
ed,
it
to
say that by clever utilization of the

Motley, Riat of
tht
danet
II.
iTAUeeandri
pp. 17*.
f.
Pa nto Oaohard, pp.
U, pp. 336
f.,
376
f.,
Dutch 886-380.
I.
2&-2<<
Pirean*,
It,
THE UNION OF ARRAS

jealousies
493
and resentments
of the Catholic leaders in the rebel
army, which had been defeated by Don John at Gembloux, Farnese convinced most of the southwestern provinces that
the
"barbarous insolence and tyranny of the sectaries

"
exceeded that of the Spaniards, and paved the way for their acknowledgment, at the price of liberal concessions, of the
sovereignty of the Spanish king. The Union of Arras, coneluded January 6, 1579, between the deputies of the Estates
of Artois
a
and Hainault and the
city of Douai, "to bring
about
general reconciliation with the Catholic King, our natural " and sovereign, was the first triumph of his diplomacy, l and on May 17 following, in the instrument known as the
lord
peace
all
of _._.4rxaS)
2
the
terms
of
that
reconciliation
were
They demanded, in brief, the reestablishment of arranged. the autonomous privileges of the Netherlanders which
;
and his regents had attempted to subvert. The the government was to be carried foreigners were to depart
Philip
on by the Netherlanders themselves, and the king was to be short of represented only by a prince of the royal house
;
renouncing the sovereignty of the Spanish crown, it would have been impossible, politically speaking, for him to have
conceded anything more.
But
in reality the
peace of Arras
first
was a victory
accepted
for Philip in disguise.
In the
place
it
provided for the exclusive

it,
maintenance, in the provinces' that
of the Roman Catholic faith, and thereby made the breach with the Protestants of the Northeast. irreparable In the seco nd, by removing political grievances, at the same
time that
it
satisfied
the conservatives in religion,
it
caused
that
the latter to look to Spain as their champion in a they had never done before. And certainly Philip
1
way
had need
ii,
Actes
des
ii,
Iiltats
Generaux,
ed.
Gachard, spondance
Philippe
Corre454-460; d' Alexandre Farnese avec

pp.
2 Actes des 536.
Jiitats
Generaux,
pp. 522-
II, pp.
63-76.
494
of all the
advantages that it furnished him. On January the Union of Arras, there had 23, 1579, seventeen days after been Formed the Calvinisl Jounter-Union of Utrecht. This
(
of the Low Councomprised the seven northeastern provinces towns of Flanders and Brabant, of and the Protestant tries which the most important were Antwerp, Brussels, and
;
Its objects were the Ghent, soon cast in their lot with it. maintenance of the Reformed religion and enfranchisement T he Netherlands were no w from the sovereignty of Spain.
1
groups, ajL&xiuhp wa of the one in his efforts to henceforth to have the alliance with which he was heresubjugate the other. The problem after to be confronted in the Netherlands was doubtless hard
divided into two irreconcilably host
ile
enough, but he owed

^
it
to the
diplomacy
of
Alexander
of
Parma that The very
it
was not
infinitely worse.
fact that
Parma had shown such
efficiency
made
him an object
of suspicion to the Spanish the concentration of political and military authority dreaded He took advantage of the proin the hands of such a man.
king, for Philip
vision in the peace of Arras which stipulated that the royal
shouldb. representative in the Netherlands the administration of the Low withdraw
blood to
Countries from
of his
Parma, and place

ctlice that
it
<nee
in
more
in the
hands
mother
Margaret, who returned

she had laid
-"i,
the early
summer
of 1580 to the
down in 1567;* it should continue only to command the army. that her But Parma did not propose to be treated in such fashion as He knew that, under the existing circumstancethis.
would be
l
was the king's plan
fatal to separate the military
from the
political con-
Xetherlands, At Hrussels the Catholics outnumbered the Protestants but the hatred of the Spaniards was such that the latter got the power into their hands. Pirenne, iv, p. 161.
P. Geyl, Revolt of the
pp. 161-179.
The 179 f. Pipeline, iv, pp. 164, t treaty of Arras had given Parma pro viright to retain his position
sionaUy, for a period of
su month*,
Xfl
-a
j c:
.
'
CO
O
-a
to
>- ct*
sz
TO
=
TO
_
&-
co
-a
-^-
"^ ~to
<->
to ' in
00
*J
o iip, _
TO
TO
CD
o a
C3
_ o t
to
J=
C o
ZD
UJ
c=
re
f
aj
'
- *2i
^
oj
o =
-a
1= TO
.
a>
PARMA'S FIRST TRIUMPHS

trol,
495
and he was determined
to regain the latter.
He had
1
number
of painful interviews with his jealous mother,
but
expediency was so plainly on his side that she and Philip were ultimately obliged to give way. In December, 1581, the provisions of the peace of Arras were violated by his
an interesting evidence of the

while
official
reinstatement in the government of the Low Countries futility of the concessions it
vouchsafed to the Netherlander in comparison with the 2 solid advantages which it obtained for the king. Meantime,
plotted to regain political control, he continued his military preparations. Until May, 1579, when the peace of Arras was signed, he could still use foreign troops, and
Parma
though Spaniards were no longer available, he purchased the with their aid he captured services of some 30,000 Germans
;
the city of Maestricht on the Meuse, after a four months' This triumph was stained by outrages siege, on June 29.
reminiscent of those of the days of the Duke of Alva nevertheless, it caused several towns which had hitherto wavered
;
between the two camps to declare

3
for reconciliation with
In the succeeding months Parma was obliged, under Spain. the terms of the peace of Arras, to send off his foreign mer-
and create a new army out of the loyal Catholics on It was a puny force in comparison with the German levies whom he had been obliged to dismiss, and it failed miserably in an attempt to keep the Duke of Anjou from getting into the Netherlands and relieving Cambray. 4 But lack of support from France, and desire to visit Queen Elizabeth of England, prevented Anjou from pushing his advantage in October, 1581, he took his departure, and thus
cenaries
the ground.
gave Parma a chance to attack Tournai, the sole important

1
Correspondance
Pirenne,
.
du
Cardinal
de
Granvelle, ed. Piot, viii, pp. 364367.

iv, pp. 179 f. Correspondance d' Alexandre Farnese, pp. 106 f Pirenne, iv, p. 160.
*
;
Documents conDue d' Anjou et les Pays-Bas, ed. P. L. Muller and A. Diegerick, iv, pp. 163-180 Pirenne,
*
August
19,
1587.
cernant
les relations entre le
iv, p. 176,
496
city in the

Southwest which remained friendly to the Union of The place fell on November 30, 1581, and the
capitulation, in sharp contrast to the horrors Maestricht, arc a significant evidence of the fad
arid
Utrocht.
tonus of
enacted
that
its
at
Parma
the more enlightened outlook and policy
which he represented were now firmly in the saddle. The garrison was permitted to march out with the honors of war.
The
citizens, in return for a
levy of 200,000 florins, were
allowed to remain unmolested in their person and goods. Even the Protestants in Tournai were given leave to remain
there
if
they would
live
'without scandal,' which doubtless
meant without openly professing their faith, and those who would not submit to these conditions were permitted to sell
and depart. On the other hand, all demands for the maintenance of the Pacification of Ghenl were
their property
peremptorily refused. Parma did not propose to let Tournai be the instrument of mending the great breach which he had
been at such pains to
create.'
into the stormier years that were to follow
Before carrying the history of the revolt of the Netherlands we must take time
into the picture. The simplest to do this will be to retrace our steps for a bit and follow way the career of the Duke of Anjou, who had now become the
to
draw France and England

1
chief link
iet
ween the
rebels in the
how Counl ries and
th
outside powers from which they hoped to net support.
Since his treaty with the Estates
in
August,
hope.-
1578,
of
the
Duke had
done
little
to
justify
the
further
IStance to the rebels in the
how Countries which
he had
then held out.
Neither his brother nor his mother would
support him whole-heartedly. They were reluctant sanction anything which -avored of open defiance of the kinu
1
Pirenne.
iv,
pp. 181
f.
Cf. ante, p. 817.
THE DUKE OF ANJOU

of
in
497
Spain
moreover, they both of them had use for Anjou France, where his mediation (November 26, 1580) was
;
successful, as it had been four years before, in terminating that rather ridiculous phase of the intermittent struggle between the Huguenots and the Catholics which is generally
known
as the Guerre des
Amoureux. 1
But the Duke did not

Countries.
relinquish his projects in the

chief reason
Low
Indeed the
why
he had consented to act as a mediator in the
France was that he hoped thereby to strengthen himself for his intended enterprise abroad and meantime the rebels continued their negotiations with him. The
civil strife in
;
success of Parma's diplomacy made his help William of Orange indispensable to them.
more than ever was convinced

19, 1580,
that without
it
they were
lost.
On September
at
their representatives
came and found him
Plessis-les-
Tours, where they got his signature to a treaty in which it was stipulated that he should be made "prince et seigneur" of the
had been
the
Netherlands as his predecessors of the house of Burgundy and that, in return, he should bring with him to
;
Low
2
France.
Countries the alliance and support of the king of But here the Duke was promising far more than
true, had given him much the eve of the treaty of encouragement Plessis-Ies-Tours he protested that he would help his brother On the day of the peace which ended jusques a sa chemise.
he could perform.
Henry
III,
it is
in
words.
On
the Guerre des
secret pact to the
Amoureux he even put his signature to a same effect, but this time his promise was
made
conditional on the Duke's being "effectually received and admitted to the lordship" of the Low Countries; 3 in
1
Mariejol in Lavisse,
le
vi, 1,
pp. 199
by the Duke
23, 1581
3
:
at
Bordeaux on January
iv, p.
Documents concernant
les
les
relations
Pirenne,
175.
fntre
iii,
Due
a" Anjou
;
et
Pays-Bas,
Kervyn de Lettenhove, Les Hugue;
vi, 1,
pp. 469-493 pp. 207 f.
The
Mariejol in Lavisse, treaty was ratified
nots et les Gueux, v, p. 599 in Lavisse, vi, 1, pp. 207 f.
Mariejol
498
other words,
for
it

was
of
so phrased as to give every opportunity
indefinite
postponement.
collect his
army
Anjou invasion a motley band,
Meantime
began to
for the king,
alarmed by the protests of the Spanish ambassador, did everything possible to put obstacles in his way; but the
Duke was
boldly
so confident of success that he continued to go
forward. Finding it impossible to restrain him, and Catharine now determined to make the best of the Henry situation as it was, and to draw from it what advantage they
mind they gave the Duke just such support as they hoped would induce Philip to pay them a high price for abandoning him, and it was with a similar idea in mind that they espoused, at the same time, the cause of Antonio of Portugal. But the king and queen-mother did not even persist in this new policy. The support they gave the Duke was so half-hearted and ineffectual that he only succeeded in revictualling and strengthening Cambray then,
could.
With
this idea in
gentlemen volunteers, had "'only 2 enlisted for a summer's amusement," he disbanded his
as his cavalry,
of
forces,
made up
and departed
for
England
to pr<
his suit for the
hand
of
Queen Elizabeth.
months
of
backing and filling, as far at least as Franco-Spanish relations were concerned, had been very slight. If Anjou was to be a potential troublenet effect of these long
The
maker
for Philip,
it
was evident that he would not

If
it
receive, for
the time being, the cordial support of France.
he were to
of
become
really dangerous,
would be through the backing

the
'It has been well said of Catharine that hat idea wai "to put an end to all differences, as in a comedy, by a mar-
riage": and aha had plana at this stage for the settlement of all outstanding questions between France and Spain by wedding Anjou to B Spanish Infanta. On August 5, 1581. she made the Duke promiaa, in case she succeeded in her
and restore his on September 23 conquests there; following, the French ambassador at Madrid was instructed to propose a match between Anjou and one of the daughter! of the Prudent King. MaCountries
rit'jol in
Low
Lavisse,
vi, 1, p.
209.
Motley. Rise of
p. 525.
the
Dutch Rep"
iii,
scheme, to abandon his enterprise
in
BERNARDINO DE MENDOZA
499
England, and a chief reason why he had gone forward so boldly with his projects in the Low Countries in the face
of the half-heartedness of his brother
and
his
mother was
because he had recently been encouraged to believe that he could obtain it.
Ostensibly; at least, the state of the relations of Spain and England had changed for the better since we last considered
them.
After having been vacant for more than six years,
the post of resident Spanish ambassador at once more in March, 1578. *
London was
filled
de Mendoza, 2 whom Philip selected for the task, was one of nineteen children of Alonso Suarez de
Don Bernardino
Mendoza, the third count

Cisneros,
of Corufia,
a niece of the great cardinal
and Juana Ximenes de he was born in

;
Guadalajara in 1540 or 1541. Before he had reached his twenty-first year, he had been given a command in the royal forces he served at Oran, Pefion de Velez, and Malta from
;
1563 to 1565.
In 1567 he attached himself to the
Duke
;
of
Alva, and accompanied

in fact
him
into the
Low
Countries, where he
demonstrated his ability and usefulness
in
many ways
such
was his mastery of the military and political situation that when he was sent back to Madrid in the spring of there, 1573, on the proverbially difficult errand of extracting more
men and money from
the king, he succeeded, after a stay of 3 From that time foronly two weeks, in obtaining them. ward he was a marked man, and when, in December, 1577,
Elizabeth sent Philip a
subjects in
to despatch
1 C. 483.
demand
that he
make peace with
his
Low
Mendoza
Spanish,
Countries, the king seized the opportunity as resident ambassador to London with
1568-79,
no.
S.
P.,
'
Not
to be
contemporary
confounded with his elder Bernardino de Men-
captain of the galleys, several times mentioned in Vol. III. 3 Cf. A. Morel-Fatio, "D. Bernardino de Mendoza," in B. H., viii (1906), pp. 20-70, 129-147.
doza,
500
his

reply.
His selection, incidentally, was an interesting evidence of the extent to which every one realized that the
fate
Anglo-Spanish relations was bound up with the Netherlands, and of the firmness of Philip's determination
of
that his official representative in
England should be
fully
Mcndoza did not bring with apprised of the situation there. him any specific answer to the point on which Elizabeth had
demanded
satisfaction,
and
his failure to
;
do so made
*
his
first
interviews with the queen rather stormy 2 were to be conciliatory. instructions
but
in
general his
in
When,
August,
157S, the death of King Sebastian at the battle of Alcazarel-Kebir opened the prospect of Spain's annexing Portugal,
the king's anxiety to maintain good relations with England
was substantially increased. He was going to have need of all his resources at home. Any dissipation of his energies would be fatal. There was, however, another side of the |>. ture. Mcndoza himself was too hot-blooded to be an entirely willing instrument of the policy of watch fid waiting which his master
d<sired
him
to pursue
incidents occurred almost every day
which
ruffled
his dignity
and infuriated him.
Important
events, moreover, began to occur soon after his arrival in London, which could not fail to strain the relations between
England and Spain.

the lenders, began
its
The
Jesuit mission for the subversion
of Elizabeth's throne, of
which Campion and Parsons were work in 1580, and continued to

I
menace
was despatched by though a Pope with whom Philip was at odds,' and carried out by members of an order of winch he disapproved, it wai
until
1
December, L681
it
naturally
''
regarded
Spanish,
by
7!i.
1
Englishmen
no*.
\
as
O.
an
expression
ami
Elital
of
Ih,
S
'
P.,
I
L668
181
483-
Cf.
Meyer, England Catholic Church under Queen

pp. lvi ji Cf. ante, p. 62.
i
xr-i.
pp.
'",
ar.fl
,-inw/i,
1568-79, noa. 475-
476.
PHILIP
AND ELIZABETH
501
Catholic hatred, and Philip, the acknowledged lay head of the forces of the Counter-Reformation, inevitably came in for a
generous share of the odium which

believed that Philip
it
aroused.
It
was
also
was fomenting rebellion in Ireland. 2 Moreover, on December 13, 1577, Sir Francis Drake had set sail on the memorable voyage which put a girdle around the globe even before his return (September 26, 1580) news had
;
reached Europe of his depredations in the Spanish settlements in the New World. Mendoza remonstrated more
vigorously, in fact, than Philip, in his desire to avoid war, would have approved. The queen countered with queries in regard to the purpose of a great armament which was being assembled at Cadiz when Drake got back, she refused to give up any of the plunder which he had brought with him, while some of her counsellors mortally offended Mendoza by offering him a good bit of it as a bribe if he would smooth
;
matters over with the Spanish government. 3 There was, In June, finally, the question of Don Antonio of Portugal.
1580, he
nition
had sent an envoy
to Elizabeth to ask for her recog-
and support
of his claims,
and though the queen was
not yet prepared to commit herself, their correspondence continued by April, 1581, her secretary, Sir Francis
;
Walsingham, had been won over to the pretender's cause, and two months later Antonio himself arrived in England,
where preparations to aid him were
There seems to be no trustworthy evidence that either Philip or Mendoza gave any direct aid to Campion or Parsons. The phraseology of the paragraph in Mendoza's letter to the king of November 7, 1581 (C. S. P., Spanish, 1580-86, no. 160), in which he tells of his efforts to save Campion's life, is highly significant in this connection. 2 Froude, xi, pp. 205 f. Read, Walsingham, ii, p. 24. 8 D. I. E., xci, pp. 530-534; xcii, C. S. P., Spanish, 1580pp. 166-168
1
;
at
once begun. 4
;
Every
Froude, xi, pp. 38786, nos. 60, 159 Mendoza's phrase "fingi una 404, 442.
carta"
p.
is
442)
translated by Froude (xi, as "I have forged a letter,"
and by Major
Hume
in the Calendar
(no. 159) as "I pretended that I The context seems to letter."

it clear
had a
make
more
that Froude's rendering is the but perhaps nearly correct;
"I concocted" would have made Mendoza's meaning plainer still. 4 Read, Walsingham, ii, pp. 42 1.,
51, 55, 83.
502
effort
THE TWIXCIBLE ARMADA
was made To conceal the facts, but Mendoza soon got wind of them and reported to Philip, who wrote to Elizabeth demanding that Don Antonio be given up it was doubtless
;
largely for that reason that Antonio, shortly afterwards,
w as
r
allowed to cross over to France.

;
Elizabeth did not want
war any more than Philip but the force of events was driving them further and further apart, and the Spanish ambas-
London found it increasingly difficult to accommodate himself to the temporizing policy of his master. Such, then, was the situation when the Duke of Anjou arrived in London from the Low Countries in November, 2 He was by this time a familiar figure in England. 1581. He had been put forward, as we have already seen, as a suitor
sador at
1
hand in 1572, and though rebuffed .it the time. he had never abandoned hope six years later, when he first
for Elizabeth's
;
began
seriously to interest himself in the fate of the
Nether-
lands and needed her help there, he returned 65 the charge once more. In August, L579, he paid her a secret visit, and was <>n the whole encouragingly received; 8 on the other
hand, she could not then be persuaded to give him any assurance that she would vigorously support him i?i the Lou
Countries.
But
now,
in
all
1581,
changed.
In addition to
radically the other events of 'he interven-
conditions
had
two years which had threatened to make troub le between Spain and England, the victories, both military and diploming
atic,
of 'Alexander of
Parma
which
imperilled
it
the
fate
of
the
revolt in the Netherlands,

eth,
was
essential that Eliza-
for her
own
safety, should keep alive.

lie
Hitherto she
iad
had hopes that France could
brought to perform that

there seemed
xi,
important service for her, but

C. a. P.,
121.
127,
to
I
now
much
l<
8pomtk, 1680-66, no*.

'
/'
112, Fnr.ign,
Froude,
pp.
inf.;
Read,
ii.
L6S1
to 314.
Read, i. pp. I7fi. 306 210, 370 422. ii, pp. 19-24. passim
'
;
ELIZABETH AND ANJOU

chance of this
;
503
the air was
full of
rumors
of a
Franco-Span-
ish understanding,
and
of the possibility that
Anjou might
Elizabeth
wed
a Spanish bride.
The inference was
obvious.
must
herself lend aid to the rebels in the
Low
Countries;
she must also encourage Anjou 's matrimonial aspirations to whatever extent it might prove necessary, in order to prevent him from seeking another wife. The first she did with
extreme reluctance
rather
amused she was in earnes f lorgot about the Netherlands and threatened to outstay his welcome in England then indeed she was hard put to it to get rid of him. She had sent him 30,000 before he reached London, largely as a means of encourHe got 10,000 more from her while he aging him to come. was there, and the promise of another 50,000 after he should
,
her
; ,
the
for it second more willingly until Anjou, actually convinced that
return to the Netherlands, whither he finally departed in * She had bribed him to come in order to February, 1582.
bind him to her cause
she had bribed
him
to go in order to
all
keep him at his task.

tergiversations and
Nevertheless, despite
histrionics, this
the attendant
second English visit of the Duke of Anjou marks an epoch in the history of the relations of Philip and Elizabeth. It was the beginning of
the end of her policy of marking time.
to
Henceforth she was
be obliged, though most reluctantly, to take sides with increasing definiteness against him.
Meantime
in
Spain the influence of Cardinal Granvelle was
steadily gaining ground,
and
Philip, in spite of himself,
was
being driven every day to the adoption of a more aggressive In his dealings with policy against his numerous foes.
France and England, the king contrived, indeed, for a

foreign relations the cardinal
1
little
longer to preserve the status quo, for in this phase of Spain's
had not yet actively intervened

ii,
Read,
pp. 76-100.
504
but the success of the Portuguese campaign was a telling

action, and the place where, next after Portugal, the cardinal was most anxious that vigorous action be taken was in the Low Countries.
argument
in favor of
more vigorous
The events
of the year 1571),
and above
all,
Parma's astonish-
ing success in splitting the Netherlands into two hostile
winning back the southwestern one to its monarchy, convinced him that, by a little forcing of the pace, the whole rebellion could be crushed, and the Spanish power reelected beyond the possiin
camps, and
allegiance to the Spanish
bility
of
overthrow;
her
could
make
own
with that once accomplished, Spain terms with England and with France.
1580,
His correspondence in
Farnese,
is full
both with Philip and with

1
and repression. To treat or conciliate any longer, he averred, would make the Netherlanders kings and Philip their subject. The effect of his
of pleas for severity
On March 15, 1580, representations was speedily evident. there was formally drawn up, and in the following June published, the
in
famous ban
It
of the king against William of Orange,
whom
Philip
difficulties.
had now recognized the chief source of all his traitor and an enemy of declared him to be
:t
It put a price of 25,000 gold crowns upon his and promised the successful assassin forgiveness of any head, and all crimes that he might have previously committed, and his country.
if
he
were not
answered,
already noble, a coal of arms." before the end of the year, by the
of
1
It
\va>
famous
William Orange, and again on July 26, 'Apology' 1581, by the solemn deposition of Philip from the sovereignty
of
wrstpondanci
drnI
tin
.
Piot
viii.
dt Cardinal passim; I'liilp.

'-''..
Motley, pp. 167

J
iii,
pp.
4<>2
f.
Pirenne,
It,
f.
ippson, Kardinal drnnrilln,
and
I'irrim.', iv. p. ltis. culls the
Apology
rafwenoM than
P. J. Biok. History of thr Netherlands, tr.
1
<</
tin
Omm
PsopU
151
f.
J
Bientadt
"le plus beau peut-etre, et, i ooup tta, le plui prenant, en mime tempi le plus habile dee pamphlete <lu
XVP
and
Ruth
Putnam,
iii,
pp.
Bidcle."
ANJOU AND PARMA

of the
505
Low
1
the provinces of the
Countries by the representatives of the Estates of Union of Utrecht, assembled at the
Save for Holland and Zealand, which stoutly refused to have any other ruler than William the Silent and their own provincial estates, the Duke of Anjou was now the
Hague.
official 'prince et
seigneur of the rebel provinces, under the
terms of the treaty of Plessis-les-Tours.

to the
When
he returned
Netherlands from England, in early March, 1582, he was received with all honors by the States General, convened 2 at Antwerp, and formally welcomed as their new sovereign.
It
was evident that before long he and Parma must come to

Neither
side,
blows.
however, was as yet so confident of success as to be willing to be the first to appeal to arms. Anjou had difficulties in smoothing over the dissensions between many
the different factions of which his motley following
was
composed. Despite the wise advice and loyal support of William of Orange, he could not quiet the complaints of the Calvinists against the exercise of Catholic rites by his own
immediate
for battle
suite,
or allay the suspicions of the Flemings

3
against the French.

;
And
the
so
it
Low
ready he had not as yet enough money or enough men. came about that the months after Anjou's return to Countries were chiefly memorable for a series of
Parma, on
his side,
was even
less
attempts by Philip and his representatives to remove their The years 1582 to 1584 principal enemies by assassination.
are the great era of
murderers and hiring of murderers in the The resources of diplomacy had reign of the Prudent King. been exhausted. If war, which Philip still dreaded, was to
be avoided, there seemed to be no other way.
'Motley, iii, pp. 504-508; L. P. Gachard, "La decheance de Philippe II," in Academie Royale de Belgique,
Bulletins,
2
In the
aerie,
Low
(1863),
deuxieme
;
xvi
pp. 573-591.
3
Blok, iii, p. 161 Geyl, p. 183. Pirenne, iv, pp. 182 f

.
506
Countries the publication of the ban against Orange had, of course. Furnished the king and Parma with a host of applicants for the Ugly task for which it promised reward. The first of them to make the attempl was the Basque, Jean Jaureguy, who tried to kill William with a pistol on March
18, at Antwerp, and was slain by the prince's attendants on the spot. Orange was badly wounded, but finally recovthe incident, however, did great harm, for the time ered
1
;
being, to the cause of the
Duke
of
Anjou, for the mass of tho
their memories of Coligny and St. were at first convinced that the plot was of Bartholomew, French origin, and were with difficulty brought to understand that it was Spain that was really to blame. 2 In the following
population,
with
Italian by the name of Baza, and a Spaniard, were caught in an attempt to poison both Orange S.dcedo, and Anjou, and confessed that they had both been hired by
summer, an
Parma for the purpose 8 and three other plots to kill Orai all of them instigated by Philip or his minions, were detected
;
and
foiled before the final

it
and successful one
in July, 1584.
was not merely in tho Netherlands that the Spanish government planned to use hired assassins. In England Mendoza, egged on by the Jesuits. Creighton and Parsons.
got closely
in
And
touch with
all
the disaffected Catholics
in the
realm, and dabbled in plots for the murder of Elizabeth. this case i' seems probable that Philip rather sought
restrain
In
to
than to encourage the efforts of his ambassador. De8pite the derision of the Con8eJ0 in 1571/ he could not
i
ination of bring himself to reg:ml the heretical, sovereign, like the queen of England,
;i
reigning,
in
it'
quite the
same
lignl aa that of
v,
iii. iii.
an arrant
rebel like
William of Oranj
vi,
p-
,\9.
Brum
p.
II
1m.
1847-66, 6 vols.),
pp. Ixxii-
p.
540;
-
Hlok,
'
iii.
lxxviii.
4
Motley, iii. p THJMi nclomMUfl Inumt It Taciturne, ed. L. P. Gachard
Ante, p. 293.
MENDOZA ORDERED OUT OF ENGLAND
507
on the other hand, it would appear that he gave his endorsement to a scheme for that purpose which originally emanated from the Duke of Guise. In any case, the confession that
1
was racked out of Francis Throgmorton in November, 1583, showed that Mendoza had been sufficiently implicated in
various treasonable designs to make should remain any longer in England
it
;
undesirable that he
in January, 1584,
he
was ordered out of the realm. 2 The post that he left vacant in London was not to be filled again during the lifetime of the Prudent King, and Mendoza was promptly transferred as Spanish ambassador to Paris.
While Philip's campaign of assassination was developing, the weakness and incompetence of the Duke of Anjou became
more and more painfully evident.
Seldom,
if
ever, in history
has a hard-pressed nation called in a more unworthy deliverer. The troops which he had raised in France were almost
useless,
and totally failed to prevent Parma from capturing Oudenarde 3 (July 5, 1582) moreover, it soon became clear that Henry III would not send him any more, for the Valois court had by this time turned against him. Since it was
;
fj*<
thus obvious that Anjou would be unable to redeem his promises in the treaty of Plessis-les-Tours, the Netherlander
themselves absolved from the necessity of keeping theirs. Though the urgency of Orange, who still felt that the French
felt
was the only hope of salvation, had persuaded them to give him official recognition as their sovereign lord, they showed him no real respect, and soon refused to obey him
alliance
;
by midsummer, 1582, the queen
of
England began to com-
4 The plain of the scant support accorded to her lover. treatment that the Netherlander gave Anjou not unnatuii, pp. 382-384, and referA. O. Meyer, England there; and the Catholic Church, pp. 258 ff 2 D. I. E., xcii, pp. 528-532 C. S. P., Spanish, 1580-86, no. 366.
1
Read,
Pirenne, Archives
iv,
p.
182,
and references
ences
there.
*
de
la
Maison d'Orangeviii,
Xassau, premiere
122.
serie,
pp. 120-
508
rally

embittered his feelings towards them.
He had
no
real
use for them, >ave as a means to enable him to wear a crown.
With their aims and ideals, both political and religious, he was almost as unsympathetic as was Philip of Spain. The situation, so he told his French followers in January, 1583, had become intolerable, and there were but two ways out of Either he must retire from the Netherlands for good, it. which would disgrace him, or he must assert his authority there in such fashion that it would not be questioned again. A plan was therefore concocted whereby his French troops, which he had brought into the Low Countries in order to
1
should simultaneously seize possession of the principal towns in Flanders at the expense of the
fight the Spaniards,
native garrisons. Detachments were despatched to deal with the smaller places; Antwerp the Duke reserved to himself as his 'special prey.' On January 17 lie gathered
3000 of his men before

at
its walls on the pretext of holding a while the burghers were at dinner, a review; midday, signal was given, and the French rushed into the city shout-
ing
V Me gag nee!
if
need be, organize resistance; by night time Needorder had been restored and Anjou's treachery foiled.
add, this 'French Fury' at Antwerp was the end of Ids career in the Low Countries. For five months more he
to
and many tumult, and
A furious street fight ensued, Tue,tue! were slain, but Orange was on hand to quiet the
2
tendermonde, where his adherents had obtained control, and where Orange continued to negotiate with him m b lasl desperate attempt to conserve the French alliance;
bung on
at
by the end of June, however,
it
became evident
that not hing
could be done, and Anjou, on the pretext of consulting his mother and getting help from Henry III, retired to France
amid the execrations

Motley,
iii,
of his
f.
former subjects, and died
tlr
pp. 560
Motley,
iii.
p. 666,
ASSASSINATION OF ORANGE
1
509
One month later William (June 10, 1584) of consumption. of Orange fell a victim, in his house at Delft, to the bullet of
2 the Burgundian Balthazar Gerard, and the Netherlanders were left leaderless to face the vengeance of Parma.
iJ-
The
great
latter, in
;
in readiness
the meantime, had been getting everything now, at last, he was prepared to launch the
campaign which he had resolved to postpone until he should be certain of success. The year 1582 had been most
fortunate for him.
Taking full advantage of the universal contempt for Anjou, and the conviction that he would be unable permanently to give the land the peace for which it longed, he persuaded the Estates of Artois and Hainault to
permit him to transgress that section of the peace of Arras which forbade the use of foreign soldiers in the land. The cessation of hostilities on the Portuguese frontier came in
the nick of time
;
by the month
best tercios arrived from Spain,
of August three of Philip's and were reenforced shortly

3
afterwards
rebels
by
a few regiments
from
Italy.
Against these the
had but a bare 6000 men

;
in the field.
The
rest
were
now
occupied in garrison duty militarily speaking, the game was in Parma's hands. Yet even now he took no risks.
Like the master
whom
;
he served,
it
was ever
his policy to
make assurance doubly sure. The eyes of all Europe were focusscd on him The years it would never do to fail.
1583 to 1585 were to be golden years in the reign of the
power and prestige continuously marched on from one great triumph to another, and the chief element in his success was the careful, methodical, systematic
Prudent
King.
His
advance
1
of
Alexander of Parma in the
Low
Countries.
Blok, iii, pp. 166 f., 173; Pirenne, 183 f., 188. pp. Forneron, iii, p. 205, note 1, insists that the date of Anjou's death was June 11. 1 Forneron, iii, pp. 213-219, and
iv,
references there; Motley, iii, pp. 608"un Pirenne, iv, pp. 187 f. 614;
:
crime inutile." 3 Correspondance
du
Granvelle, ed. Piot, ix, pp.
Cardinal 273 f
.
de
510
Obviously, for Parma, the primary problem lay in the fortified rebel towns of Flanders and Brabant not until he
;
be safe to go on into the The only question was whether he should lay Northeast. to them or starve them out, and careful reflection soon siege
finished with
it
had
them would
convinced him that the latter was the preferable alternative. He knew by bitter experience "how much money and
blood are spent in sieges, and how after all the sacrifh s, success is by no means assured." He knew, on the other
'
hand, that the wealth of the Netherlands lay in the cities, and that without them the countryside could not support itself.
The
cities, in other words, must be taken, but they must be taken by the slow and certain methods of starvation and blockade he must rely on his engineers rather than on his officers.
;
He
must,
in
the
first
place, close
of
all
the rivers so as to cut off
the most obvious

countries and the
tegic points,
of
means
sea.
communication with the adjacent

erect blockhouses at
stra-
He must
Ypres, in January of large city to be cut off, and finally surrendered in April, 15X4. Bruges followed on the 20th of the following May. Ghent, which came next on the
in full
convoys 1583, were already that year, was the
and keep constantly on the watch for unexpected These methods, by the spring of supplies.'
2
operation.
first
list,
offered
tragic
spect acle
of
futile
heroism, desperresistance.
ate
;md
the
prolonged, inhabitants learned
but
no
of
effective
When
the
Orange, they Benl and congratulated
their condolences to
murder of William of Maurice of Nassau

there
to
him
on
being
lead
them
insl the tyranny of Spain. They told each other heartrending tales of Spanish Catholic bigotry and cruelty. The -I"\v inexorable proc< of famine, however, it was im-
bo
1
defy; on September
17.
1584,
Ghent bowed to
iv,
Fon, AUitnruim Farnese, p. 141.
Pimnno,
pp. 184
f.
SUCCESSES OF PARMA
the inevitable.
1
511
Brussels followed on
here, as in every other case,
March 10, 1585, and men noted with wonder and

of
admiration
the
extreme
to
liberality
the
the
terms
which
Parma
towns.
2
offered
It
the
inhabitants
all
of
vanquished
was Tournai
General
toms,
trifling
pardon, indemnities
over again, and even more. preservation of all the ancient cus(in
the
case
of
Brussels the
amount was remitted entirely), were the order of the day. The Protestants were dumfounded to discover that one of whom they had heard such dreadful things could be so generous, and Parma, as he had doubtless intended from the
first,
made much
3
capital for himself within the walls of
still
defiant Antwerp.
All exercise of the reformed religion
was
indeed strictly forbidden, but the Protestants were given two years in which to decide whether or not they would conform. Certainly no servant of Philip II could have been
indeed Parma was so disturbed expected to concede more lest his master should find him too lenient and disavow him, 4 that he wrote a full explanation of his policy to Madrid.
;
Meantime, beyond the limits of the Low Countries, the diplomacy of Spain had been proceeding with marvelous
success.
The
rebels
still
continued, after the flight of Anjou,

25, 1584,
to pin their
hopes on France, and on April
they had
recognized Henry III as his successor in the sovereignty of the Low Countries. But the king of France was in no
assume such an arduous responsibility. Even more promising years that had preceded, he had been now, by no means enthusiastic for his brother's cause
position to
in the
;
and Pirenne, iv, 185-187, pp. references there; Vazquez in D. I. E., burii, pp. 457 ff 2 On an interesting attempt at reconciliation made by Parma in 1585-86 through the canon Gilles de Gottignies, see Charles Piot in Academie Royale
.
de Belgique, Bulletins, troisieme xxix (1895), pp. 979-989.

3
4
serie,
Pirenne,
iv,
pp. 187, 190.
Belgium, Commission Royale d'HisCompte rendu des seances, 3 e serie, xiii, pp. 102-109.
toire,
512
far
from taking up the cudgels against Spain in a foreign land, he found himself obliged to seek measures of defence
On the last day of the year 1584, card that he had held up his sleeve for so Philip played the long, and amply revenged himself on the Valois for their
against
her
at
home.
Lukewarmness
in
in religion,
by allying himself with the Guises
the treaty of Joinville, against the French crown and the heretic Bourbon who was there to claim it as soon as
Henry
for the
III should
have passed to the grave.
French oppo-
sition to
Spain in the Low Countries could be safely ignored next few years; the Valois were amply occupied at
the eyes of
all
home.
And now
Until
Europe were turned on Antwerp.

Philip
Antwerp was taken,
could not
call
himseli
undisputed master of the provinces of the Union of Arras; and until rebellion was utterly crushed in the provinces oJ
the Union of Arras, Parma could not safely attack the chief strongholds of his master's enemies farther north. The city
was garrisoned by a strong force of Netherlander*, French Huguenots, and Scots, ably led by Orangi 'a devoted friend Marnix, and all of them enthusiastic for their cause; moreover, it was so situated that the mere methods of starvation
(
and blockade, which Parma had employed so successfully at ihent and Brussels, would not suffice to compel its surrender.
number of exterior forts, from which sallies could be effectively made against beleaguering armies. More
It possessed
a
important still, the Scheldt, on which it stands, wa.broad that Parma's few small ships were unable to guard
M
it,
and as long
not be cut
as the Scheldt
2
off.
remained open, provisions could Hut Parma's engineers were fully equal to
vi,
1,
the Occasion;
'
only give them time, and they promised that

p.
Maritjol
'
in
Liivissp,
in
241;
univertel diplomatique,
v,
1.
pp.
411
of
thf
(maty
Dumost, Corps
411
1
I'ircniH-, iv, p. 189.
THE SIEGE OF ANTWERP

the Scheldt should be closed.
513
September, 1584, the long process began, methodical, unrelenting, inevitable, after a fashion that must have delighted the heart of the
And
so, in
Prudent King. Clearly some sort of a barrier or estacada must be built across the river. The difficulty was that the
cannon
of
the
all
forts
of
Antwerp commanded the
chief
available points, so that the enterprise was But the Spaniards generally regarded as impracticable. were able, at this crisis, to utilize the peculiar characteristics
approaches to
of the
Low
same
Countries against the Netherlander, almost as
effectively as th<- Netherlander, in former years,
had
utilized
those
characteristics
against
them.
The
'canal of
of
Parma,' dug with
infinite labor across the
marshy land
Waes, made
estacada
it
possible to bring the necessary materials to
the desired point in flatboats.
On February
25, 1585, the
finished, the Scheldt closed, and Antwerp's avenue of supplies cut off. 1 The fall of Brussels, principal on March 10, the failure of Holland and Zealand to send
effective relief,
was
and the increasing conviction that Henry III could do nothing for them, all served at the same time to dishearten the garrison and the inhabitants of the beleathe civil and military authorities were at logguered city
;
effort was indeed made to break down gerheads. the estacada and reopen the Scheldt. Floating batteries and infernal machines were sent down the river whenever there
Even-
was
of
a favorable
all,
wind and
tide
but after the most formidable
them
constructed by the Italian Gianibelli, had failed
in April, 1585,
permanently to accomplish its purpose, it became evident that starvation could not long be delayed. 2 The slow inexorable advance of Parma's besieging forces in the next few weeks, the capture of the Kowenstyn dike on May 26, and of Mechlin on July 17, served to convince the
1
Pirenne,
iv,
pp. 189
f.
V&zquez
in
D.
I. E., lxxiii,
pp. 7
ff
514

surrender was
most obdurate that

17
now
inevitable.
On
Antwerp capitulated, on terms essentially similar August to those which had been granted to Brussels and Ghent,
though the period of grace granted to the Protestants, in which to turn ( 'atholic or Leave the land, was extended in this
case to four years.
than
in victory.
Never had Parma shown himself greater Never did he forget that his ultimate object
was not
sion,
to terrorize the
to
Low
'ountries into unwilling submis-
but rather
he made
When
win them back gladly to their allegiance. his formal entrance into the conquered city,
he took pains to keep his Spanish and Italian officers away. His escort was solely composed of the scions of the most
ancient families of the land.
a
It
was
like the joyeuse entrei of
national prince in the good old Burgundian days. 8 it has been well said that the capture of Antwerp marks it might the climax of the career of Alexander of Parma
;
also
be characterized with equal truth as the apogee of the reign of the Prudent King, and perhaps indeed of the power 3 We have already had and prestige of the Spanish Empire.
occasion to point out the great strength o! Spain's position In the interin 1578-79, but now it was far stronger still.
vening years the conquest of Portugal and of the Portuguese Krnpire had been converted from a dream into an aceomplished fact.
and more important part of the

l>;irk
Prance had been immobilized, and the larger Low Countries had been won
Militant
of
(
to allegiance.
'atholirism jy as one e
of
20,
<l,
more
in
Tho standard Spanish srmiml

nipRp
is
Parma from Monton on September

l"> s [Ciirri-spnndancr du Oranvelle, ed. Piot, xii,
">
j
thf>
F.
Barado y Font's
i
Sitio
Cardinal
1584
:
'*'
(Madrid, 1891).
> j
103
f.)
>
pp. \'.>~ f.. and rcfer!!'- then Fea, pp. '-'-i7 f. ' Philip lelighted .a the nawi thai h<- vroke indaughter [aabeila at h<-r about it. Cf. midnight to VenM an. viii. no. 284. P.,
Pirenne,
It,
de la baptaille <!< Sainot* Quintin, ny de la Navale [which it ia natural to interpret as Lepanto, despite
"que
ny
iot
to
the
contrary],
ay
d<-
la
t *
"
I> un-
ehooa pu
Ali<'i'."
ihoura vottrc wrote Granvelle to Margaret
queate de Portugal, ny de la Teroera, aul tree bona aucoea paaeez,8a M.ijesten'a monstrf- tanl de oontentement, comm' il ha faict de eery d'Anvers."
1
SPAIN
the saddle, with
AND ENGLAND
515
Philip as its acknowledged lay leader. were even cherished that Protestantism might be Hopes Never had Spain seemed so majestic, utterly stamped out.
so invincible.
The world was apparently
at her feet.
Four years later the picture had wholly changed, and England was to be the chief instrument in effecting that tremendous reversal. We therefore return to the relations between Philip and Queen Elizabeth, which we left in the month of January, 1584, when the Spanish ambassador Bernardino de Mendoza was ordered out of the realm.
story of the conversion of the Prudent King to wholetearted approval and support of a vigorous Spanish attack on
\J
The
England will probably never be fully known, but it seemj certain that the process was not complete till late in the yeari
'1585.
At the outset he had shown no inclination to proceed vigorously against the realm in which he had reigned as king consort from 1554 to 1558. The Anglo-Spanish tradition as we have seen, on the whole, distinctly amicable, and was,
despite his initial rebuff
by Queen Elizabeth,
first
Philip cherished
high hopes, during the

out a war.
half of his reign, that
England
might ultimately be brought back into the
Roman
fold with-
England seemed to him, moreover, to lie somewhat outside the orbit of European politics. Certainly he had many other more immediately pressing responsibilities. Even if he should attack and conquer her, there was grave He question whether or not he would be any better off.
least
would doubtless be able to re-Catholicize the kingdom, at on paper, but he could not set up a Spanish government
there.
The
legal heiress of Elizabeth
Scots.
1
Philip, a
stickler
pp. pp.
for legality,
f.
;
was Mary queen of would be in honor
Philippson,
Granvella,
iii,
Read,
Wahringham,
515 216
J.
i,
R. Seeley, Growth of British Policy,

p. 179.
f.
516

to place her
bound
Scottish
queen's
on the English throne, and in view of the maternal ancestry and affiliations, her
accession in England would redound to the benefit of Spain's 1 All these, and other considertraditional enemy, France.
ations,
his
combined to make the Prudent King hold back, when ambassadors and admirals urged him to attack in force.
indeed in Catholic plots, and gave the discon-
He dabbled
tented English Romanists large promises of Spanish support. In February, 1580, he even concluded an offem ive alliance
against Elizabeth with the grand duke of Tuscany and the 2 But when it came to giving actual effect to these Pope.
proposals, he could not be induced to move.
later
Three year-
When the Marquis it was the same story over again. Santa Cruz had defeated the second of the two squadrons which the pretender Antonio had sent to the Azores, 3 he
of
llwrote (August 9, 1583) to Philip urging an

4
immediate and
indeed, his letter to the vigorous attack upon England; is generally regarded as the initial step in the prepaking But Philip rations for the sending of the Spanish Armada."'
was not yet prepared

admiral's
to
do much more than "take

consideration.'
1
his
proposal
into
He wrote
him,
indeed, a letter of thanks, and spoke vaguely of certain indisHe also Bounded pensable preliminary orders to be issued/'
Alexander Farnese
l.'V,
at
the
same time
D.
in
regard to the
feasilot
op.
in
rit.,
thai
hand,
of
of,
Articles
federate*
the
On the 201. of the ConLeague .'mains' the

i,
p.
quarter of the Spanish maritime

/. E., xci, p. 473.
Parma ezpreM
queen
in ('
1
England (February
/'
,
18,
1580)
S. P.,
S
Venetian, \ ii, no. 826. Venetian, vfa, no. 826.

p. :5!I7.
I' the game idea in different words. was known, he said, that the qui of England could not arm more than
.m,i,
Fernanda! Dnro, La Armada Inpp.24] 243; of. Altolaguirre y Duvale, Alearo dt Baedn, pp. 129 f. ' The views of Santa Crui on this bared by most of Philip's statesmen and generals. In 158(1 Mendo*a wrote from London that the flnot withstand a .clish
*
ihips; as for the boasts of English captains, he made little oi them, since a< the battle of the Azores it was observed that their shi|>- fere the first to run away. Herrera, H General del Mundo, iii. p. 05. See also p. :('.<". note 5, sbt ernandez Duro, Armada /
I
i.
pp 243
f.
PROJECTS OF INVASION
bility of the plan,
517
and received from him a characteristically
The letters they exchanged are particularly cautious reply. interesting as evidence of how closely the attack on England
and the suppression of the revolt in the Netherlands were connected in the minds of the king and of his nephew, and of the way in which they both regarded the former, from the
very outset, as a land and a naval expedition combined. But for the time being nothing more was done. During the
year 1584 the whole project was apparently dropped again. In the autumn of 1585 fresh rumors of an 'English expedition'
1
began to
fill
the
air.
;
Lisbon was to be the rendezvous
for the various contingents
the king, if his health permitted, was to go thither in person to superintend things. Gradenigo, the Venetian ambassador, was at first inclined to
believe that
to
might all "be only a ruse to induce the Pope 2 but things developed before grant the bull of crusade"
it
;
the close of the year in such fashion as to convince him that The greatest of this time Philip really meant business.
Drake's plundering expeditions, to Vigo, Santiago, Santo
Domingo, Cartagena, and Florida, had

;
left
Plymouth on
full reports of its first depredations had September 14 already reached the Spanish court, and exceeded anything 3 that had been heard of corsarios Luteranos before. Hot on
the heeis of this

of Leicester
came word
of the expedition
4
under the Earl

consented to
which Queen Elizabeth had

relief of
finally
send to the
the Netherlands.
We may well believe

War,
1585-1587,
;
that this conjunction of events roused fury in the heart of

1
Gossart, Domination espagnole, pp.

f
.
Spanish
ed.
J.
S.
158
2
C. S. P., Venetian, viii, nos. 288, 292. ' C. 8. P., Spanish, 1580-86, nos. 387, 391, 409, 413, 444, 447, 465, etc. C. S.
;
Corbett, pp. 1-96 Joan de Castellanos, Discurso de el Capitdn Francisco Draque (1586), ed. Angel Gonzalez Palencia
(Madrid, 1921).
4 Leicester left England December 8, 1585. Read, iii, p. 130, and reference there.
P., Venetian, viii, nos. 290, 300, 304, 305,
308, 321, 334, 358, 416; E. F. Benson, Sir Francis Drake, pp. 188-203;
Papers Relating
to the
Navy during
the
518
the Spanish
THK INVINCIBLE ARMADA

Icing.
He had been
patient, infinitely patient,
vastly more patient than his soldiers and sailors could possibly comprehend, in suffering the insults and injuries of England. He had hoped against hope that "time would cure all thii but it seemed, instead, to have made them His mounting prestige and accessions of decidedly worse. territory and power had neither impressed nor terrified the English pirates as he had expected quite the contrary, they had but stimulated them to unprecedented outrages. His
;
heretical sister-in-law
had hitherto confined her
activities
on
Low Countries to vague promises of and lending of money. Now she had deencouragement spatched an expedition of 0000 men to their relief; she was
behalf of the rebels in the
assuming the role which France had been obliged to lay down. Small wonder if Philip was at last convinced that the game of
patience had been played out, and that the great enterprise, which he had hitherto postponed and postpon >d in favor of
every other item on his vastly overloaded programme, must be undertaken whole-heartedly and at once. When the
Marquis
of
Santa
'
Jruz
wrote
to
him
a sei
ond
inie
on Janu-
again advising him to fit out and dispatch an expedition against England, the king ordered his secretary, 2 Idiaquez, to requesl him to draw up a plan of campaign.
ary 13, 1586,
Two months
later
in
the Marquis sent

size,
in in
his preliminary
estimates, gigantic
meticulous
detail;
not only
Spain and Portugal, but also all the Italian and Mediterranean possessions wire to bear their share of the tremendous
burden.
There were
to
be
U
were
ih
carga and nanus peqm

or
150 ships in all, not counting fio% of these nearly one-third

;
classified as galleasses or galleons,
and the
total
resi
as na
gruesaa
armed merchantmen;
at
the
tonnage wai
it
imated
77,250.
The
fleet
i,
w&a to carry with

pp. 244-247.
7
no
247.
l<
tninrtl Doro, Armada Invencible,
Ibid
p.
ESTIMATES FOR THE ARMADA

than 55,000 infantry, of
519
28,000 were to be Spaniards, 15,000 Italians, and 12,000 Germans; there were also to be The land forces on 1600 horse and over 4000 artillerymen.
;
whom
board were, in fact, to be twice as numerous as the sailors evidently, even in the mind of such an old salt as Santa Cruz,
the real purpose of the Armada was to convey the invincible Spanish army to a point where it could engage, either on the decks of the ships or on shore, with the land forces of the foe.
The whole
armament, ammunition, and supwas reckoned at 3,801,288 ducats of months, this 1,211,769 was to be levied in Naples, Sicily, and Milan, thus leaving 2,589,519 to be charged to the crown of Castile. and by the spring of 1586 there Philip approved the plan
cost of wages,
plies for eight
;
were signs of great activity in all the ports and shipyards of No Spain, Portugal, and the Spanish possessions in Italy.
one was to be allowed, according to the king's instructions, 2 to know exactly what the object of all the preparations was,
but
must have been clear to every one that some great Those preparations were not perenterprise was afoot.
it
mitted to go on undisturbed. News of Drake's depredations in the Indies reached Philip in April, and he promptly com-
manded Santa Cruz
to sail thither
and take vengeance
but
word came that the pirate had got safely back to England, and Santa Cruz remained at home. 3 In the summer of 1586 five London merchantmen, returning from the Levant, decisively defeated and put to
before the admiral could depart,
flight Philip's Sicilian
galleys,
little
squadron of two frigates and eleven which had been lying in wait to intercept them off the
island of Pantellaria. 4
year later the king received

Altolaguirre y Duvale, Alvaro de Bazdn, pp. 134-136. * A. O. Meyer, England and the Catholic Church under Queen Elizabeth, pp. 307 f., and reference there.
3
Fernandez Duro, Armada Invencible, Fernandez Duro, Armada Invencible,

f.
;
i,
pp. 250-319.
1
i,
pp. 27
Herrera, Hisloria General

p. 62.
del
Mundo,
iii,
520
an even moro disagreeable and dramatic reminder of the darIn April, 1587, Drake ing insolence of the corsevrioa Ingleses. appeared off Cadiz, sailed straight into the harbor, Bank ^r
burned eighteen of the ships that were lying there, and captured six more, all laden with provisions and munitions of war.
He
then passed along the coast of Algarve, pillaging as he went, and established a base at ('ape St. Vincent. Through
and early June he cruised in the adjacent waters, capturing despatch boats and preventing concentrations, and.
May
possessed himself of a Portuguese East Indiaman, the San Filippe, Said to have been the largest merchantman in the
finally,
world, with a cargo worth more than 250,000 ducats,
with
which he returned
Philip's
tactics as this.
in safety to England. Small wonder if machine was paralyzed by such whirlwind great
And
in
just at the
moment
need
that the Spanish

of
vigorous and desperate aggressive advice and support, he was deprived by death of
monarch was
most
the most efficient of his servants.
On September
21, 1586,
Cardinal Granvelle, who, ever since his summons to Spain in 1579, had headed the war party in the royal councils, and
had ardently supported the expedition again-: England, succumbed at last to the attacks of a fever which he had
His gallantly fought off during the three preceding months. coninfluence, during the last four years of his life, had been
siderably less powerful than in the days of the annexation of Portugal, when for a brief space he had literally managed
the king, as usual, had grown jealous of his chief minister, and withdrew much of the authority with which he
rything
'On
turning
tin-
effeot to
of
this
oaptaN
<>f
in
.'.12,
513,
'.It.
'il8,
519,
521,
.'
tin-
marchanta
i
attention the East

in
Engliah
trade,
try
p.
India
tli>-
i.
K.
Laughton
-
Fernandez Duro, Armada Inven pp 29,334f.; Paperi Relatino to Wavy during th, Spanith War,
pp.
Sti
tin
ed,
National Cf. aJao p.

f
/'
pAy,
,
\,
1341,
Oorbett,
p
97 314; E. V. Bei Drake, pp. 204 220; >"/"'.
r. netian,
viii,
noa.
510,
DEATH OF GRANVELLE
had been previously invested.
521
the other hand, it is undeniable that the vigorous, aggressive line of action which the cardinal personified had remained the basis of the royal
policy, even after its originator
On
had been elbowed aside
the
king might make the actual decisions, but the Whether ciple of them was still Granvelle's.
guiding prinPhilip would
have consented to avail himself
of the cardinal's administra-
tive genius in the final stages of the preparations of the
Armada had Granvelle

fact
lived,
may
well be doubted
but the
in
remains that his death removed the only
man
Spain
really capable of effectively directing the organization of the
vastest enterprise that the Prudent

take.
1
King was ever
to under-
The
loss of
Granvelle and the ravages of Drake were not
the only misfortunes that Philip suffered during the period when the Armada was being got ready to sail. The state of
and Spain's foreign relations was a constant anxiety to him he was particularly disquieted by the attitude of Pope Sixtus V. At Rome, of course, he had emphasized the fact that the
;
Armada was
to be sent primarily for the purpose of bringing

;
ization of a plan that
it was to be the realEngland back to the Catholic fold had been cherished by the Holy See ever
since the accession of
Queen Elizabeth.
the
It
was
to be the ful-
Counter-Reformation, "No 2 heretic shall be allowed to reign." Obviously, under these

filment
of
the motto of
that he had the right to expect the hearty approval and support of the Pope in his great adventure he counted on him, moreover, for a liberal concircumstances, Philip
felt
;
tribution in funds.
But Sixtus
was
inclined to view the
matter in a somewhat different light. He did not conceal from himself the fact that, politically speaking, the expedition,
1
if
successful,
would redound
chiefly to the benefit of

2
Philippson, Granvella, pp. 621-626.
Philippson, pp. 520-527.
522
Spain,

and thai
her preponderance, already intolerable, would thereby be so much further enhanced that Rome would henceforth have to take her orders from Madrid. He recog-
England under the 'new Jezebel' was rapidly the chief stronghold of heresy but at the same becoming time he was fully alive to the great qualities of Elizabeth, and he still cherished the hope that she might be induced by
nized that
;
peaceful
means
to return to
Home.
There was
a long period
and parry between the Pope and Philip's representative at the Vatican, the Count of Olivares, in the winter of 1585-86. It showed, on the one hand, how deep was the distrust between Spain and the Holy See; on the other,
of diplomatic thrust
it
made
it
evident that neither could afford to bid the other
Before Christmas, 1585, the Pope had been prevailed on to grant Philip for seven years all the revenues of
defiance.-
the bull of crusade, which amounted annually to 1,800,000 3 crowns. But on his side, Sixtus not unnaturally felt that he had a right, in return for such a liberal contribution, to
He expecl that Philip would get something promptly done. was loud in his complaints of the Spanish monarch's interminable delays and of the fact that the great undertaking wa< again and again postponed. It would be difficult to
1
conceive of two personalities
less
fitted
to
understand one
another and effectively cooperate than the brilliant, fiery, impetuous punt iff, and the Blow-moving, meticulous, Prudent
Km-:.
The
tie
I
situation was, of course,

in
-till
further complicated by
the state of affairs

[egal
England
,
itself.
Mary queen
of See
heiress of
Kli'/.al >et h and in the eyes of all good the lawful queen of England, had been a prisoner
Paator. xxii, pp. 88

Ftrfttppaon,
|
'
Ibid., xxii, pp.

p.
47
f.
pp.
621 527;
PaKtor.
'/>/</.
4K
PbilippaoD, pp
526-
xxi.
_'66.
532
THE ENGLISH SUCCESSION

in her cousin's
.523
kingdom ever
since her flight
from Scotland in
1568.
of
She had been the centre and rallying point of all sorts men conspiracies against Elizabeth's life and throne
;
marvelled
that
she
had been permitted
to
live.
But
Elizabeth was deeply loyal to her grandfather's idea that the crowns of England and Scotland must some day be united.
Provided she herself was permitted to

in peace, she
live
out her
own days
;
was
fully prepared to
have Mary succeed her
Mary's son, the future James I, had gone over to Protestantism in 1585 naturally tended to confirm
and the
fact that
the English queen's resolution. Mary, on the other hand, was so angered at her son's defection from the cause of Rome
that she
made
haste to disinherit him.
On May
20, 1586,
she wrote to Bernardino de
Mendoza
at Paris that she
formally handed over all her rights to the English succession 1 to his master the king of Spain and a month later Mendoza transmitted to Philip a genealogical chart for the purpose of
;
making
clear to
him that
he, as a direct descendant of

of
Catha-
John of Gaunt, who had daughter married Henry III of Castile, was himself, next after the Stuarts, the lawful heir of the crown of England in his own 2 All this naturally had far reaching effects on the right. He was, by nature, policy and plans of the Prudent King. One of the things of precedent and law. deeply respectful that had made him hesitate so long over the enterprise against England was the reflection that, if successful, it would redound to the political advantage of the Stuarts, and also indirectly, owing to their French affiliations, to that of his most powerful continental rival. Now, after Mary of Scots should die, the Stuart claims would lapse and queen Spain would reap the reward she so richly deserved. Of course these same facts would make Sixtus hold off, for they
rine of Lancaster, the
1
C. 5. P., Spanish, 1580-86, no. 442.
Philippson, p. 537.
524
THK INVINCIBLE ARMADA
would redouble his dread of Spanish preponderance; but James's conversion to Protestantism was a telling argument
on the other side.
t
Unless the Pope supported the expedition, here was every probability that England and Scotland would
lost to
be permanently
latter
Home.
So
forcibly, in fact,
was
this
argument advanced by Olivares at the Vatican that by midsummer, 1586, the Pope declared himself prepared to grant 500,000 scudi out of the papal treasury, and 2,000,000 more from the revenues of the Spanish clergy, if Philip would add another 2,000,000
of his
own.
By the summer of 1587, however, the state of affairs had been considerably clarified. Philip's preparations were by this time so well under way that Sixtus could no longer doubt
that he really
meant business
their
3
and the execution

2
of
Mary
queen
of Scots
on February 8/1 8
served to force Pope and

closer alliance
Philip's Long
to
king, despite
all
mutual suspicions, into

of the chief causes ot
against England.
One
delays had been the

live so long.
If
fact that
Mary had been permitted
England, through her means, could be brought back to the Roman fold without a war, he would be spared the necessity of the invasion which he never really
desired
to
undertake.
Mendoza,
in
Paris,
when
first
informed of the schemes thai lay at the bottom of the Babington plot, wished to hall all the projects of attack until
the issue of the conspiracy had
been determined. 4
foiled,
Now.
however, thai the plotters had been

r,
'
and Mary's head

Channel are dated
in
xxii. p. 48.
rival fleets in the

I
ten
Calendar, or new style, Lntroduoed October 5/15. 1582, had tiy thia time replaced the Julias
Iragorian
iter
than they arc
histOI
England.
1 An excellent account of Philip* h effect reception >>f the news and of r.n hia position is to l' found in Kerry*, de Lettenhove, Marit Stuart
i t
I
Spain
untriei
and most of the

"f
Europe,
old style
while
until
i-
gland
]7.')j
r-
be
in
in
this
book the new style

;
2 v.lsj,
'
ii,
pp. 4.15
i>.
JO.
from the time that it waa ho that puch eventSpain as the different battles between the
followed
Pastor,
I
xxii,
;*8;
i,
Kervyn
pp. 350
de
f.
accepted
ettenhove, Un-i. Stuart,
AID FROM THE POPE

had
fallen, there
525
remained no alternative to war.
Then,
in
the second place, the removal of the Scottish queen made Philip, at least in his own eyes, the lawful king of England, and, in view of the situation across the Channel at that juncture, JJie_possession of England would be invaluable to
.hirm
Holy See that he himself be invested with the English crown, and when Sixtus
haste to
of the
He made
demand
demurred, he asked that it be given to his daughter, Isabella thus reviving all the Pope's fears of an Clara Eugenia
intolerable Spanish preponderance.
the other hand, the execution of the Scottish queen was a deed of blood which the church of Rome was in honor bound to punish and avenge.
On
The
hopes which Sixtus had once cherished that France be used for that purpose had now been shattered might
faint
only by
availing himself of the services of the king of Spain
would it be possible for him to accomplish his purpose. 2 So, on July 29, 1587, a definite treaty was drawn up between the Holy See and the Spanish crown. Sixtus promised a subsidy of 1,000,000 scudi, on condition that the expedition should set sail before the end of the year. Philip, if successful, was to nominate for England, subject to papal approval and investiture, a king pledged to restore and maintain the Roman Catholic faith. 3 How fully the treaty would have been ooserved, had the great enterprise been successful, may
be open to question but it seems clear that for the present Philip had succeeded in getting the Pope into line.
;
During all the period covered by these negotiations it had become increasingly plain that the Spanish invasion of England was to take the form of a land and a naval expedition combined, and that the fleet which was being prepared in the
Spanish ports was to act in cooperation with the Spanish

1
Pastor, xxii, p. 50.

Ibid., p. 32.
Ibid., p. 51
;
2
*
A. O. Meyer, England and the Catholic Church under Queen Elizabeth, pp. 520523.
text of the treaty in
526
forces
in

the Netherlands.
It of
will
be remembered that
to the feasibility
Philip had consulted Alexander

of the enterprise years before, in
1
Parma as 1583, when

2
;
the idea was
still
nebulous.
In the following year he placed a large measure

it
the direction of
in
Parma's hands
it
apparently, at this
stage of the proceedings,

(
was only to his nephew in the Low Jountriea that the Prudent King ventured to open his whole heart with regard to the invasion of England. Parma was
even more certain than Philip that the conquest of Britain and the suppression of the revolt in the Netherlands were
but parts of the same problem England was the head and Holland and Zealand the neck and arms of the san : body/
;
The expedition
immediate
of the Earl of Leicester,
though barren
of
further emphasized the closeness results, of the connection, and Parma must have been delighted to
still
had
receive from his uncle a letter written on

in
December
full
29, 1585,
po session of a in the Low Countries nothing could possibly be accomport 4 But when it came to giving effect plished against England. to this idea, it was a very different story. No decision could be reached for
a long
which Philip declared thai without
time as to what port should be selected
for the purpose.
Parma's capture of Sluys, in August, 1587, seemed momentarily tn Bettle the matter; but Parma, like He Sixtus, had expected the invasion to take place in 1587. had calculated on a rapid concentration and the effects of a
surprise.
the posl ponement of the expedition to 1588 his enemies were given time to make counter-preparations and prevent the flat boats which h;i<l been constructed in the heart There were also of Flanders from ever reaching Sluys at all.
By
E.
(i'.HSiirt.
Dor
f.
;
tvpOQndL
tupra, pp.
dans
:,\<
'
let
Pays-Baa, pp. 158
Leohat, </. cit., p. 14. Lettenhove, Murie Stuart,

I
.
'J
Ki-rvyn de
p. 346.
i,
p,
100;
lurneron,
Lea Ttfugila anglais dana Us Pays-has dumnt It rtym d'Elisahi th, V 143.
iii,
.ail
Fea, p. 280.
PARMA AND THE INVASION OF ENGLAND

numerous threats
of a diversion in the
527
form of an attack from
the Huguenots in France. Though no such attack ever took place, the fear of it was a constant anxiety to the duke. But all these troubles paled into insignificance in comparison
with the increasing difficulty of cooperating with Madrid. Philip's counsellors had worked on their master's well known
fear lest distant subordinates should get too independent in
order to discredit Parma.
ambitions of his
They insisted that he had vast own and was aiming solely to fulfil them.
By
with the only
the winter of 1587-88 Philip was often at cross purposes man to whom four years before he had been
;
willing to give his full confidence
he sent him neither the
money
army
whole
nor the
reinforcements
on which the duke had
counted.
in the
In Parma's eyes, from the very first, the Spanish Low Countries had been the vital factor in the
affair,
and the
sole function of the
Armada was
to be
to insure its safe transportation to England.
In Philip's mind the enterprise still took the shape of a land and a naval expedition combined, but the naval part of it had by this
time assumed far greater relative importance than he had 1 originally intended or Parma ever desired.
Parma was not the only one of Philip's servants whose efficiency and independence made them objects of suspicion
to their
master
there
still
remained one more, the
last of the
old sea-dogs of Lepanto, Alvaro de Bazan, the venerable
Marquis of Santa Cruz. One of the chief reasons why the king had steadily tended, since the beginning of 1586, to lay more and more weight on the fleet and the naval side of the
and less on the Spanish regiments in the was that the former, in Spain and Portugal, Countries, was more or less under his eyes, and therefore subject to his control. He demanded that every smallest detail of its
expedition, and less
Low
Gossart, Domination espagnole, pp. 168-163, and references there.
528
self for final decision
preparation, provisioning, and armament be referred to himnever before had he pretended to such
;
unlimited omniscience.
Santa
affairs
Vuz.
than
All this was gall and wormwood to He was well aware that he knew more of naval any man in Spain, and that the king was almost
1
totally ignorant of
them;
to be
bound hand and
foot
instructions from the Escorial

in spite of all the difficulties
was intolerable
to him.
by Yet
with which he was beset, he

all
it is vastly to his credit the fleet concentrated at
gallantly carried on his
work; and
that he had got practically
sail, when death overtook him on FebruThe king was by no means sorry to be rid of ary 9, him. The Marquis was not only far too independent, but also much too popular to suit his taste in any case, his
Lisbon and ready to

1588.
2
removal gave Philip the opportunity

the
to place in
command
of
Armada a man
of
whom
it
may
truthfully be said that
such was his ignorance of naval affairs that he had no alternative save blindly to obey the commands of hia sovereign.
Bueno, Duke of Medina Sidonia, who was given the post, was the richest peer in Spain. He was thirty-eight years old at the time of his appointment,
Alonso Perez de
el
3
Guzman
and had been married since 1572

old minister,
(
to the daughter of Philip's and the Princess of Eboli. He was Ruy Idmez, dumfounded when he learned thai the king had selected him, and protested, with pathetic truthfulness, that he had no
qualifications whatsoever for the post
4
;
but Philip insisted,

Jt
and
of
of course ultimately
had
his
way.
was characteristic
of the
him
that in a crisis like the present,

i,
when time was
The aviso$ which Philip received from his spies in France and England, during the rammer <>f 1.">S7. reveal the his information as to of what happening there. Many of
them
1
His correspondence with pp. 160 f. Philip during the months before hia death is printed in the Arehivo HistArico
I
'
'
m in
D.
1
printed
"/.
ii.
in
the
L'l
AfthitO Hiai.
,
pp. 43187, pa#.iim. 378 888. ernandez Duro, Armada Jnvencible,

ii.
S., xxviii, pp.

f.
pp.
ff.
pp. 429
Fernandez DuTO, Armwlu
Vc,
THE DUKE OF MEDINA SIDONIA

essence, he permitted six full
529
in futile
weeks to be wasted
correspondence with his new admiral; Medina Sidonia's formal appointment as 'captain-general of the Ocean Sea'
was not issued
until
March
21.
With
it
was sent a long letter
which reveals, if nothing else, how completely the king had now assumed control. Some of the topics with which those instructions deal shed a flood of light on the
of instructions,
workings
of
Philip's
mind.
One example
will
suffice
Medina Sidonia wa^ ordered

his soldiers
to take special care to prevent
and
sailors
from swearing, and from gambling

1
because
it
led to swearing.
The Duke had been ordered
to set sail as soon as possible
he had hoped, in fact, to get away by the end of March, in order to avoid the strong north winds which blow down the
But as soon as he had arrived at Lisbon, it immediately became evident, even to his inexperienced eye, that another long postponement was inevitable. Most of the provisions that Santa Cruz had got on board had by this time gone bad it was essential to More alarming still was the shortage of munireplace them. Not only was there not nearly tions, especially of powder. enough on board, it was apparently almost impossible to purchase any more the king, as usual, was loath to grant any money, and there was much talk of cheating, if not of 2 Such treason, on the part of the purveyors and contractors. were a few of the more immediate practical problems with which Medina Sidonia was confronted, and his confusion became worse confounded still when in early April he received a letter from Philip instructing him in the ways in which the 3 Cooperation with forthcoming campaign was to be fought.
Portuguese coast in the later spring.
;
1 D. I. Fernandez i, p. 424
E.,
xxviii,
pp.
383-392
2
;
Fernandez Duro, Armada Invencible,
Duro,
Archivo
Armada
Invencible, Histdrico Espanol,
i,
pp. 439-528, passim. * Ibid., ii, pp. 5-15.
ii,
pp. 144 &., passim.
530

the transportation of his veterans to England
Parma and
But Parma was were, of course, to be the keynote of it. now virtually blockaded by the Dutch, and besides, the sailing of the Armada had been so often postponed that there
was no longer any possibility of effecting the surprise on which he had counted; the English had had every opportunity to forecast Philip's plans, and were aiding their Dutch allies to forestall them. The Armada, so the king directed,
formation, and never to separate in It was to fight at close range, while pursuit of a fleeing foe. the English would be certain to shoot from a distance; how this was to be effected in view of the enemy's recognized
to
in close
was
remain
superiority in speed Philip could not define, but doubtless God would take care of it. Throughout the entire paper one
finds evidence that the king
portion of the English fleet
was convinced that only a small was at Plymouth and that the
main body of it would be encountered in the narrows of the Channel, where it would certainly be stationed in order to The Armada was therefore to proceed keep watch on Parma.
directly to the narrows
1) attempted to gain a that the king wrote these instructions, the disposition of the enemy fleet was. indeed, very much wh;it he had supposed.
and get control of them before base in England. At the time (April
it
Drake, Hawkins, and Krobisher were at Plymouth, but Lord toward of Effingham, who was, officially at least the English
,
commander-in-chief, was
patrolling Calais
still,
with some of his best ships,
By mid-April, however, it had become obvious thai a much smaller squadron, under Lord mour, was quite adequate to the task of watching Parma. It was also evident that Howard could be more useful farther
Roads.
twardj and on
left
May
23, Long before the

all
Armada
finally
in
the Coasts of Spain,
of the really effective vessels

in
the
English
fleet
were united
Plymouth Sound.
The
STRENGTH OF THE ARMADA
531
sequel will show that this change was to be of primary importance in determining the issue of the campaign. 1 Submerged by the steadily rising tide of conflicting orders
and demands, Medina Sidonia struggled bravely, if incompetently, on by May 10 everything was at last as nearly as he was able to get it. The Armada, when finally ready
;
united,
was considerably less imposing than the estimates of Santa Cruz had called for two years before. There were now 130 vessels as against 150, and of these only 73 could be fairly
;
regarded as fitted to take their place in the battle line

rest
the
were lighter
craft
and hulks.
;
The
total
tonnage was
57,868 instead of 77,250 the gente de guerra had diminished from 63,890 to 19,295 the genie de mar y de remo had
;
now
shrunk to 10,138
English
fleet.
these figures were to be still further lessened before the Armada got into contact with the
;
and
all
It
was divided
into a
number
of territorial
squadrons, Portuguese, Castilian, Andalusian, Italian, etc., according to the custom of the time, each of them com-
manded by an
officer of
experience and distinction
Juan
Martinez de Recalde, Miguel de Oquendo, Martin de Bertendona, and Pedro de Valdes were perhaps the most eminent.
Diego Flores Valdes, who had already made a name for him3 self in American waters, sailed with Medina Sidonia on his
'
.
J. S.
Corbett, Drake and the Tudor
Navy, ii, p. 150. 1 Fernandez Duro, Armada Invencible, 66 ii, p. Corbett, op. cit., ii, pp. 163165 W. F. Tilton, Die Katastrophe der spanixchen Armada, pp. 24 ff. There is
; ;
plates which belong to a Discourse concerning the Spanish Fleet, translated from the Italian of Petruccio Ubaldini. Cf. pp.
Corbett, Drake and the Tudor Navy, ii. 444-450, and Fernandez Duro,
Invencible,
ii,
Armada
p.
505.
It
is
also in the British Museum (192. f. 17) a copy of an exceedingly rare pamphlet of 42 folio pages by one Pedro de Paz
Salas, entitled La Felicissima Armada que el Rey don Felipe nuestro Seiior mandd juntar en el puerto de la Ciudad de Lisboa en el Reino de Portugal. El aho de mil y quinientos y ochenta y ocho. It was published at Lisbon on May 9, 1588, "por Antonio Alvarez, Impresor" and bound in with it are a set of colored
;
annotated in an English hand which the British Museum Catalogue attributes to Lord Burleigh, and was used by John Strype (cf. Annals of the Reformation, iii, A Simancas copy of what app. 519). pears to be the same pamphlet is reprinted, without title page or name of author, in Archivo Historico Espanol, ii (1929), pp. 384-435.
3
Cf. supra, p. 388.
532
flagship, the

San Martin.
The king had commanded that in all questions of tactics the Duke should defer to his advice, BO that he became, in fact, the real commander of the Armada. Why Philip selected him must always remain a mystery, for all the other squadron commanders had more
1 experience and better fighting records than he. None of the many comparisons that have recently been
made between
the English
the fighting strengths of the

is
Armada and
of
fleet
shifted so rapidly during the ten
wholly satisfactory, because conditions days in which they were in
contact; but they all tend to emphasize the important fact that the Armada was by no means so much the larger as used
be popularly supposed. Though the Spaniards had at least thirty more vessels than their foes when first they met
to
Plymouth Sound, the superiority was much Less than it seemed, for they were not able, as were the English, to develop all the offensive power they had; and by the time that Seymour had joined with Howard and Drake off rravelines, it seems clear that the English were actually more numerous than the Spaniards. In tonnage the Armada was
off
(
indeed greatly superior, at least on paper;
mil the Spanish
system of tonnage measurement was

English
so different
from the
of
that
it
now appears
be
that
the
at
amount
least
their
superiority
should
reduced
by
one-third.
Furthermore, that superiority, such as it was, became, under the circumstances under which the fighl was to be fought, a
positive disadvantage; for the Spaniards, rising tier on tier out of the sea, both fore and aft. till the "ocean groaned
under their weight," made a far easier mark than the English water only at the stern and jels, winch were high out of The greater weatherliness of the cu1 very low in the bows.
1
Corbett,
l>r<ik>
LI
and
the
Tudor Afoty,
Knta-
ii,
pp
]>,.;
ttrerphe, pp. 24 44 ; 8tati Papers Relal in the Defeat of ih< S/inrn'nh Armada,
\<L.
pp
J;
Tilton,
od. J.
K. Laughton,
i,
pp. xxxix-lii.
THE ARMADA PUTS TO SEA

English
ships,
533
perhaps the crucial factor in the whole
campaign, was also largely ascribable to the same cause. The proportion of soldiers to sailors on the Armada was far
larger than
on the English fleet, but this again, as things actually worked out, was destined to do it more harm than In weight, range, and efficiency of gun power the good.
1
Had the Spaniards English were clearly preponderant. been able, as they hoped against hope, to lure their foes into
an old-fashioned encounter of ramming and boarding, on the
lines of the battle of
Lepanto, they might have had a chance. Under the conditions which the English were able to impose
upon them, they were foredoomed to failure. But it was not in Philip's nature to foresee new things. Parma from the Netherlands kept urging him to send the Armada on, and finally communicated some measure of his impatience to his master the king was now anxious to have the great enterprise begin. There might still be practical deficiencies in leadership, munitions, and supplies, but every single man in the Armada had a certificate stating that he had confessed and been absolved, and monks and nuns had
;
3 encouraged the commander with assurances of divine help. On May 14 Medina Sidonia reported to the king that the
fleet
had begun to drop down the Tagus to Belem; on the
30th he had put to sea. 4 The wind on that day was a mere zephyr from the northeast, but the Armada was unable to
make way against it. On June south of Cape Espichel 6 not

;
1 it
till
had
drifted
down
to the
it
a fortnight later did

results of
regain the latitude of Lisbon.

FerTilton, Katastrophe, pp. 29 f. nandez Duro, Armada Invencible, i, pp. 75-77; State Papers Relating to the Defeat of the Spanish Armada, i, pp. xliv;
Meantime the
las remeras."
3
bad
postrera gran batalla en que predominan
Froude, Spanish Story of the Armada,
pp. 26, 28.
xlvii.
2

f.
f.
Rightly
characterized
p.
by G.
de
ii,
Artifiano
y de Galdacano (Arquitectura
79,
pp. 97-99, 105 Ibid., pp. 106
Naval Espafwla,
note)
as "la
534
had become tragically apparent. The food provisioning -tank, and the water was foul; 500 of the men were already the crews complained, and the officers with
down
were
dysentery
1
in
despair.
On June
10, the
wind shifted
to the south;
wot, and the Armada
at last got fairly started to the north
but the sickness on board continued to increase, and when, on the 19th, the wind became a gale, there was nothing for
it
but to put in at Corunna. were able to make the port
At
first
only forty of the ships
for despite the king's insisted
orders that the

scattered
it.
be collected again,
keep close together, the wind had Not till more than two weeks later could it and when the crews got on shore, large
fleet
3
The Duke was despondent. He numbersof them deserted. and feared that the news of his plight would reach England, that corsitrios would be sent to capture his battered shipOn June 24 he wrote to Philip, advising the abandonment of
!
5 But the king would not hear of it on July the enterprise. 5 and 12 he sent vigorous letters" to the Duke, promising
;
he needed, but commanding provide him with everything him to set sail at the earliest possible moment. The viceadmiral and the generals, too, were all opposed to giving up.
to
ii
Fernandez Dun>, Armada Immdblt,
sallied
dd
'
107 112 117-124. Ibid pp 121 124

p.'
JWd'
t
121,
note,
Hid reference
ftb once more. For two weeks the winds proved contrary, and H the "' st [U '~>' " ulfl d was to lic in awaiting Um long line off Ushant
,
1
1
^ rr0 Ibid
pp
131
184
Medina
Si-
started
of
1 It iming of the foe finally on July to blow from the north, and
<
.
the donia's fears were fully justified by Howard had joined Drake with farts. his beet ships a1 Plymouth in the Brat both were confident k of June; to make s dean at the that if
again they started southward

their
in search
permitted
the coasts of Bpain, they could On Annada bom putting to sea. they made a first attempt, but wind, WN contrary: and OB the
|
Two days later prey. were nearly across the Hay of Biscay and almost in Right of the OP*" then the fickle north wind died coast away, and finally veered into the soutb;
west;
and
they were forced to put the Spaniards were saved.

ii.
Corbett,
pp. 105-181. for details.
lfith
,.
|,
Mrf
two
,
FeraandeaDuro,,Arwiad/nsen*A
/6td.,
1II(
he,
Council to
finally
pp.
160
164,
184-186,
u, j>p.
also
to
try
again;
the
\r.-i
lortco
Nacumal,
V*
queen yielded, and on June 80 they
226,
THE ARMADA OFF THE LIZARD
535
ValdSs was particularly insistent, and Recalde seized the opportunity to make a final though futile appeal to Philip to
modify his instructions, and permit the fleet to secure a port on the English coast before advancing to the narrows of the Channel. Meantime fresh food and good water had been taken on board. The necessary repairs were made, and the gaps in the crews were filled up. Every man on the fleet confessed and received the sacrament and finally, on again
1
;
Friday, July 22, the
Armada made
a fresh start out of
Corunna.
west
;
This time the wind blew strong out of the southin the next three the fleet had crossed the days
Biscay and reached the mouth of the English Channel. 2 There they encountered another storm, which scattered them
Bay
of
and the flagship of Recalde flying French ports but on Friday, the 3 29th, the majority of the stragglers had been collected again. The wind now blew gently from the southwest, as the fleet
for refuge into the nearest
;
and sent most
of the galleys
came
in sight
in
of
the Lizard.
On
the
Sidonia, convinced that the crucial hour had at last arrived, determined to reenact the great scene that had inspired the Christians on the eve of Lepanto. A standard, displaying Christ crucified on the one side, and the Virgin Mary on the was run
other,
two o'clock
following day,
at
the afternoon,
Medina
up
at the
masthead
of the flagship
off, "and every man prayed our Lord to give us victory over the enemies of his
were shot
4
three pieces of artillery in the fleet knelt down and

;
faith/'
But the crisis which the Duke anticipated was not to come. While he knelt with his followers on the deck of his
galleon,
ii
passi SldC t0 PhiJ Julv 29, f , July r_nuip, in 1588, Archivo Histdnco Espahol, ii, pp. 252-255.
pp7 i^, ''Kmw w Lett J wi" Me

1?9
Invencible >
..
SS
of the ship9 lost in the e aIe of July 27, See C0rbett Drake and the Tud r
'
Fernandez Dure, Armada Invencible, pp 220f - 374 For an account

-
ii,
p. 189, note.
*L
536
it

if
not already past. Early on the Friday afternoon. Captain Fleming of the Golden Hind had burst in on Drake and his officers, who were playing their
was actually occurring,
game of bowls on Plymouth Hoe, with the news that Armada was already off the Lizard, and slowly proceeding 'iv the southwest wind toward Dodman Point. The in other words, now threatened to catch the Spaniards,
historic
the
glifih
in the
very predicament
:
in
which the English had so
often sought to catch them cooped up in a narrow harbor, with the breeze blowing full into the mouth of it, where a
vigorous attack, prepared with fire-ships, could scarcely

of complete success.
fail
situation, namely, to get to sea at once,

if
There was but one way to meet the and to the windward,
would be
fully available;
possible, of the
Armada, where the superior gunnery and
sailing qualities of the English ships
and
this,
despite the obvious perils of uncovering the threat-
ened port, Drake and Howard determined at once to do.' On the Friday night the ships were warped out of the harbor;
on Saturday morning the best of them were beating out of Plymouth Sound. In the early afternoon fifty-four of them
had almost reached Eddystone, where for the first time they caught sight of the Spaniards. At the same moment the wind
died down, and rain and fog
came
on, SO that there
was noth-
ing further to be done save to lie still under bare polo in order )n the Armada, in the thai the enemy might not see them.
(
meantime,
council of
war was being
held,
in
which the
expediency of attacking Plymouth in defiance of Philip's What decision was instructions was ardently debated.
reached we cannol
itradictory.'
I
.
surely tell, for the accounts are verj At any rate, when sunsel at last revealed
pp. 187
f.
ii,
li'a
t<>
King
Philip,
Knglished,
in
Ibid., pp.
'('(.
in
ii.
208 f. the rdac\6n of AJa pu / Duro, Armada I mencM*, ff l.tti-r of Pedro de

;
Papert Relating to the Doft Armada, ii, pp. 133-136; Spanish Corbett, op. it ii, pp. 905 f., 442 ff.
Si/ii,
>
.
THE ENGLISH TO WINDWARD
537
the English fleet a few miles to the leeward, off Eddystone, the Duke immediately came to anchor, for he was con-
vinced that he must keep the weather gauge in the attack which he confidently expected on the following morning. 1 But this was just what the enemy was determined at all
costs to prevent.
Soon
after
sundown, the southwest wind
rose once more,
and the English ships again made sail. The main body of them stood south, out to sea, across the front of the Armada, but apparently the Spaniards never saw them their attention was distracted by eight other ships which were beating dead to windward, between the left wing of the Armada and the shore. Consequently the Duke made no effort at all to prevent his right flank from being turned, and at daybreak on the Sunday morning he was dumfounded to
;
discover the pick of his daring foes reunited in safety to the
windward
skilfully
followers
fer
had been assumed which, maintained and improved by Drake and his during the next ten days, was ultimately to transof him.
The
position
from Spain to England the sovereignty of the

of the entire
seas.
It
was the decisive manoeuvre

It
campaign.
the
used to be said that the

in the
Armada advanced up
huge crescent, convex side to the been confirmed by numerous fore, contemporary charts and drawings and by the tapestries in the House of Lords. But recent research has made it abundantly clear that this was not the case. The basic idea on which Philip's elaborate instructions and Medina
Channel
form
of a
and
this conception has
Sidonia's orders were founded
was that the Armada would be
exposed, as
:
up the Channel, to attacks in both front and rear in the rear from Drake and his ships who were known to be in Plymouth, and in front from the main body
it
sailed
Corbett, op.
cit., ii,
p. 207.
ii,
pp. 274
Ferndndez Duro, Armada Invencible, f Corbett, ii, pp. 208 f

.
538

.
of the English fleel
which the Spaniards confidently believed
would be awaiting thcni in the narrows. Even after Medina Sidonia Learned} on Sunday morning, the 31st, that Howard
had joined
forces with Drake, he could not get
it
into his
head 'hat practically the whole fighting force of his enemies was behind him. He therefore adhered to his original formation.
He himself,
on the flagship San Afartin, led the van-
guard or 'main battle,' consisting of two squadrons of his best galleons, each strengthened by a galleasse in the cent re,
;
and directly behind him, were the hulks and the victuallers in turn, a strong rearguard of four squadron-. behind them,
;
of
which the two hindmost were placed on the extreme left and right, and each protected by a galleasse. As all the attacks of importance were to come from behind, it will be
readily seen that the adoption of this formation virtually wasted a large proportion of the Duke's best ships, because
they could not get into the fight it will also lerve, at least partially, to explain the origin and persistence of the idea of
;
the crescent formation, since
it
was
like a crescent
1
that the
Armada must have appeared when Been behind. The English tactics, on the
devised with the idea of making the
v the
English from other hand, wen1
fullest possible
use of the
two unquestioned points of English superiority, namely. better sailing ability and better gunnery; having got the weather gauge, they were prepared to take every possible
advantage
of
it.
single long line
en "/". as the Spaniards tacked back and forth across the rear of the
Their
fleet,
in brief,
was drawn up in a called it - which
weathem
fire,
Spanish ships, keeping them

resolutely refusing to
perpetually under
but
come
to close quarters.
Such
a refu
of course, confirmed the Spaniards' conviction thai the English
wire cowards, but that wa- about all the comfort that -ot from it. The fact, of course, was that their enem
ACTION OFF PLYMOUTH
539
had turned a fresh page in the book of naval strategy. The Duke and his followers were confronted with a situation with which they were powerless to deal. 1
The
first
contact of the two

31st,
fleets
outside of
Plymouth on
Sunday, the
opposite the
was
of
to give an inkling of the
these rival tactics worked.
mouth
way in which As the west wind bore him along the Sound, Medina Sidonia stood in
shore, partly perhaps with the idea of threatening the port,
more probably, however, for the purpose of cutting off the slower English ships, which had not been able to come out with Howard and Drake on the Saturday morning, and which now were attempting to get to sea and join the main fleet. But Howard and Drake made no move to intercept him
they were resolved at all costs to preserve the weather gauge, and so all they did was to attack the Spanish rear guard.
They contented themselves, moreover,
for the
most part,
with cannonading at long range, but the effects of their fire were so deadly that most of the Spanish ships crowded down
on Medina Sidonia
to
come up
in the
wind and face the
only the gallant Recalde had the nerve foe. For two hours he
stood his ground, virtually isolated from the rest of the Armada, while Medina Sidonia made futile efforts to beat up
merely gave a golden opportunity to the English squadron coming out of the Sound it worked to windward and soon rejoined the main fleet. Even
to his rescue.
efforts
;
But these
with this reenforcement, Drake and Howard were unwilling to risk a general engagement, at least at close quarters when Medina Sidonia finally succeeded in rallying his
discontinued the fight.
either side,
galleons to the relief of the battered Recalde, they simply
No great damage had been done to was ominously evident that the English could henceforth dictate just how and when all future
but
it
1
Corbett,
op.
cit.,
ii,
pp. 209-221, and references there.
540
encounters were to be fought. Meantime the wind and the The tide had carried both fleets to the cast of Plymouth. Spaniards could do no further damage there, and practically
all
the effective force of their enemies

of
was reunited
to the
windward
event.
8
them.
Monday, August
On
off
passed by without any important the morning of Tuesday, the second, the two
1,
fleets, their relative positions
waters
Portland
Bill,
unchanged, had reached the when the wind, for the first and only
time in that memorable week, hauled into the northeast and gave the Spaniards the precious weather gauge they con;
sequently made ready
to attack.
The
action that ensued

serif
was complicated
results;
it
in the
extreme, but not productive of

sides, a
m-
was, on both
The efforts
of the English to get to

fleet in
day windward enabled Medina
of lost opportunities
but then, instead of concentrating on the slower or inshore part, which le might have compelled to engage in a contest at close quarters, such ;iSidonia to cut their
;
two
all
swifter seaward portion, which he
the Spaniards desired, he foolishly gave chase to the was totally unable to catch
up with.
its
effectiveness once more,
The long-range cannonading of the English proved and the smoke from their heavy
discharges had the additional advantage of concealing their In the afternoon the wind position from the Spaniards. shifted back again into the southwest, and Medina Sidonia's
flagship,
which was momentarily isolated in a heroic attempt to protect the westernmost ships of the Armada, received terrible punishment from the batteries of Howard and 1 >ra
f. diario of Medina Sidonia in Fernandi /. DuiO, Armada Invencible, 230 ff.; the relacuin of Alonso ,..
Story of the Armada, pp. 42 f. 'The incident of Drake's leaving his place in the line to capture the disabled
', pp. :J76 ff.. and the two rclacione* in Archive Hiatdrico Etpafiol, li, p] ".8,267-270; also Corbett,
li,
Pedro de Valdes is rather English than of Spanish history, and need not be recounted here.
flagship of a part of
pp.
2J.1-22Q,
and Froude. Spanith
Cf. Corbett,
ii,
pp. 230-235.
PORTLAND BILL
The comments
of the
541
Spanish narrators on the fight of that day are bitter in the extreme they felt that they had had victory within their grasp, and then had been unaccountably
;
deprived of it. There was talk of treachery and cowardice, of the unwillingness of those ships "in which there was no
caballero or person
whom
them
the seamen respected" to go to

his capitana "
the rescue of the
Duke and
been
if
finally proved to
that
*
it
above all, it had was impossible to board

;
the
enemy did
not so desire."
;
The
first of
these difficulties
2
;
was dealt with

the
at once
sergeant-majors visited each ship in

his
Armada
to learn
how every man was doing
duty
but the second, from its very nature, was irremediable. The Armada continued on its eastern course, in substantially the
same formation
siderably
as
before,
while
the
enemy, now con-
augmented by ships that had come out to join it it had passed, was henceforth divided into four separate squadrons, headed respectively by Howard, Drake, Hawkins, and Frobisher. Each was directed to follow the same tactics which had been used hitherto by the entire English fleet, tacking back and forth astern of the Spanish rear guard, and pouring in volleys at the only difference was that henceforth the long range 3 assault was to be delivered in four places at once. Wednesday, the third, was a day of calm, in which neither
from the various ports which
;
of the fleets
could
make any
appreciable headway.
Recalde
was apparently the target

at
of some heavy cannonading, and the English threatened to surround and cut off his capitana but when Medina Sidonia bore up to his 4 In the the action was immediately discontinued. support,
one
moment
The best accounts of this engagement will be found in Fernandez Duro, Armada Invencible, ii, pp. 233-235, 256-258, and 381-384. Cf. also Cor1
2 3
4
Fernandez Duro, ii, p. 258. Corbett, ii, pp. 244 ff. Fernandez Duro, Armada Invencible,
ii,
pp. 384-386.
bett,
ii,
pp. 236-244.
542

wind rose again, and the Spaniards the Isle of Wight, where they had by this
1
late afternoon the wesl
came
in sighl of in
defiance of Philip's instructions, to try to The action establish a base and await the arrival of Parma.
time derided,
that ensued
on the morrow, to the south of Dunnose, is again very difficult to comprehend, principally because none of the contemporary accounts distinctly states the precise direction
of the
wind; it seems most probable, however, that it was more nearly south than west. This would account for the
that the port squadrons of the English fleet, which got
to the
fact
order to prevent a possible attempt to land, were temporarily deprived of the weather gauge; the Spaniards were confident that they had
north of the
left
rear of the
Armada
in
one of the English capitantu at their mercy "when nine light boats got her under way again ami took her out of our hands
'We with such speed that it was a thing of wonder to see*" * and they fled," goes the account attacked, and got near them, of the master of one of the Seville ships "they were broken
;
two parts and the victory assured, when the enemy's capitana turned upon our fleet, and the galleon San M(ti<<>,
in
mi
the point
of
our weather wing, gave way to
it,
and
this,
retreated into the main the
body
of the
Vrmada.
Seeing
into
enemy took
fleet
heart, and attacked the said

it,
wing with
:i
his
whole
or the greater pari of
and got
tis
corner,
in such fashion that if the Duke had qoI gone aboul with his flagship, we should have been vanquished thai day instead of
the victor-
hat
we were."
This account makes
it
clear that
while the rear port squadrons of the Armada had been occupied with the English ships which had got between them
and the shore, their vanguard had been vigorously attacked by the starboard Bquadrona of their enemies under Drake and
niti'l'-z
I>iin>,
Artnniln
Inrrtiri-
rntula
'
I n.
,
n,
,hh
ii.
|>|>.
386.
If.
Vn,i
p,,.
275
f.
VanogM
in
IVrnarulpz
Dtiro,
At-
THE
ISLE OF
WIGHT
543
Hawkins, who had kept the weather gauge, and as usual had been completely successful; the phrase "got us into a corner" doubtless refers to the possibility, of which the Eng-
had planned to take full advantage, that the Armada might be driven upon the dangerous banks called the Owers. Medina Sidonia's pilots were also alive to this peril. To remain where he was would bring certain disaster to pass on to the east meant the abandonment of all his hopes of but of the two evils establishing a base on the Isle of Wight the latter was obviously the less. So he signalled to his scattered ships to re-form around him, and by the middle of the afternoon he was once more headed straight east for Calais, his terrible foes hanging relentlessly on his heels. The rest of that day and night and the following morning both fleets continued on their eastward course, and there was no action worthy of the name. But if one reads between the
lish
;
;
lines in
the various contemporary relaciones, 1 it is only too evident that the Spaniards were deeply disheartened. They
off
had looked forward to the action
the Isle of Wight as critical. Once more they had thought that victory was theirs then it had been suddenly snatched away from them by
;
with which they were powerless to cope, and they had been driven past the point where they had hoped to establish their base. They had lost seven good ships since leaving
tactics
Corunna, and had seen their enemies constantly reenforced as they sailed up the Channel. Their powder was getting
dead and wounded; and though Medina Sidonia had proved himself both loyal and gallant in the way that he had come to the rescue of his hardshort.
There were a number
of
pressed friends,
it
man. 2
1
Still if
Parma and
was only too evident that he was no seahis veterans were awaiting them at
the
ii,
Fernandez Duro, Armada Invencible, pp. 238 f.. 258 f.. 268. 276. 386. ' The verdict of Fernandez Duro on
Duke
(i,
pp. 90-92)
is
more severe
than mine.
544
the narrows, the

game was
not yet lost.
Moans would
surely
be found to guard man doubted that if

lish soil,
Channel, and no a Spanish army was once landed on Engthe defences of their enemies would fall like a house
their transfer across the
of cards.
Message
after
message had been despatched
to
Parma, ever since the fleet had left Lisbon, begging him to be ready, 1 but so far there had been no definite word from
him, and on Saturday morning, the sixth, when the Armada had reached Calais Roads, Medina Sidonia sent him a final 2 But Parma, as we appeal to come out with his flatboats.
shall later see,
indeed, as
had no mind to do this. He was on hand, he had promised Philip that he would be, but he
till
resolutely refused to put to sea
the
fleet
should be able to
protect him, and that, for the

sible.
4
The
hopelessness of the
moment, was obviously imposArmada's position was at

to
to
(
last fully revealed.
the westward.
To
drift
Medina Sidonia could not beat back on past Calais and Dunkirk was
abandon all remaining hope of transporting the tercios the fundamental object of the entire expedition not to speak
of the
danger of being driven aground on the treacherous To remain where he was would shoals farther east.
obviously be perilous, as the governor of Calais took painto point out to him, but under the circumstances, there was no other alternative. And so, at five o'clock on the Saturday
afternoon, the
of
Duke came
to
to anchor, ami signalled to the
the
fleet
do
likewise.
At
the same time the

still
Spaniard.-,
already deeply disheartened, were

a group of thirty-six
further
ships,
down by observing
enemy
which had been lying to Leeward, and which they erroneously believed to be commanded by Hawkins, beat up around their
north flank, and join forces with the FarnAadM Doro, Armada InnneMt, Of.
1
rest of tin;
infra, p. 622.
I-.
English
fleet.
Li,
p.
1
C 3.P
Spanish, 1687-1603. no. 368.
<r s 374,380.
8ponih,
1687-1603, noi.
CALAIS ROADS
It was, of course, the
545
told off
squadron of Seymour, who had been to watch Parma, but who now, seeing that he could
no longer be of any use in the position to which he had been

originally assigned,
had very wisely decided, in the face of windward of the enemy at all costs and unite with Howard. Such was his contempt for the
conflicting orders, to get to
failure of
prevent this obvious move, that one of his ships poured a broadside at close range into the northern flank of the Armada as he sailed
Medina Sidonia
to
make any
effort to
by,
and then passed on, while the two rear galleasses 'returned thanks' with their stern culverins. The whole of
the English
fleet,
which had
within cannon-shot to
come to anchor, was now the windward of the Armada.

also
1
Sunday, August 7, passed off without any important engagement, but while the English spent it profitably in
means whereby they might dislodge their foes, the Spaniards could do nothing but worry and wait. Messages from Parma made it plain that the Dutch blockade of the Flemish ports would render it impossible for him to send out the ammunition and provisions of which the Armada was now
devising
in
desperate need, and he persisted in his refusal to move his troops or his flatboats until the Armada should be ready to The enemy divined the Spaniards' disprotect them.
couragement at the plight in which they found themselves, for he seized the opportunity to intimate his contempt for
them
in characteristic fashion.
At four
in the afternoon a
pinnace from the English fleet bore down on the capitana real, fired four shot into her at close range, went about and got away with no damage to herself but a culverin-shot
"Its daring," comments the author of the relacion which records the incident, "was very notable,
through her topsail.
ii,
pp. 238
f.,
260, 387
f.
Corbett,
ii,
pp.
262-265.
546
and more than ever we saw how with their very good and very light ships they could come and go as they pleased, the
which we could not do."
l
Bow
hut
far the position in

in
much worse was soon to come. which the two fleets now were had
But
it is
been Foreseen
England,
all
of course impossible to say;
we know that the

England
\\
exploit of (lianibelli at
Antwerp
in
1585
had been noised abroad

in
over Europe, that (lianibelli was

that Walsingiiam had sent
fire
at the time with letters of introduction to Sir

finally,
Francis
alsingham, and,
orders and material for the construction of
ships to
Dover some days before the Armada reached Calais Roads. if some plan of dislodging the Spaniards by the use of vessels filled with combustibles had been careIt certainly looks as
In any case, the by their relentless foes. conditions on Sunday night were as favorable as could be The west wind had risen, and desired for such an attempt. So fearful, in fact were the tide was boiling up the channel. Howard and Drake that such an opportunity might never
fully considered
,
come
in to
again, that they decided not to waste time
by sending
there,
Dover
3
for the fire-ships
which had been got ready
but
t.i
sacrifice eight of their
own
smaller vessels for the pur-
Shortly after midnight the 'hell burners' were adrift, and came flaming down on the huddled mass of the Armada, "spurting lire and their artillery shooting," so runs
pose.
the Spanish account of

all
it
"which was
horror at night time,
our ships had to have two anchors out.' and when Medina Sidonia did not dare remain where he was he could
of
;
not weigh and BO in despair he gave orders for the cables be cut. and the Armada, with the ships that composed
;
to
it
running afoul of each other

out of the narrow.- of the
1
in
helpless confusion, drifted OB

of
1
Channel toward the shoals

'
hin-
FnrnllnilM Nun;,
pp. 2*2
f.
Armada
IntanoSbiU,
Hc.nl,
'
li,
Corbett,
Wnlsingham, ii, pp. 268
iii,
pp. 320
f.
f.
THE BATTLE OF GRAVELINES

kirk.
547
The
eight fire-ships, in the meantime,
themselves out,
had burned and had become harmless; "yet they had
accomplished," as the Spanish narrator bitterly remarked, "what the enemy had neither been able nor ventured to do
with 130
sail."
1
When dawn,
English
on the
Monday
morning, revealed to the
admirals the plight of their Spanish foes, they
promptly gave chase, intent on dealing a knockout blow In order before the Armada had had a chance to re-form.
to prevent this,
and
also because his pilots told
was getting perilously Sidonia came up in the wind, facing his pursuers, and some fifty of signalled to the rest of the fleet to do likewise them managed to obey and gather around him, and it was by these that the battle of Gravelines was fought. The English remained true to the tactics that they had so successfully
;
him that he near the Flanders banks, Medina
followed during the preceding week. They refused to grapple and board, and shot into their foes at the water line. The
Spaniards, of course, were as powerless as ever to prevent this, or to bring on a battle of the sort that they wished to fight though under the circumstances it was impossible
;
for
them
superb.
cannot be denied that their courage was All the accounts by Spanish eyewitnesses ring with
to win,
it
special praises of the
heroism displayed by the Portuguese the glory, be it galleons, the San Felipe and the San Mateo to the generals and soldiers on board them; noted, goes wholly
;
there
selves in the hottest of the fight.
Both placed themEach was surrounded by over a dozen of the enemy's ships, and fought them off for hours "without help except from God." Offers of quarter were contemptuously refused. 2 But finally the weather,
is
not a word about the
sailors.
Relacidn in
"
Fernandez Duro, Atii,
la
mada
1
Invencible, Carta del
p. 283.
Invencible,
Torre," in Fernandez Duro, ii, pp. 404 f.
Armada
Padre
Geronimo
de
548
THE lXVINXIBLE ARMADA
which had been bo favorable to the English during; the previous ten days,
came temporarily
to the rescue of the hard-
In the late afternoon a terrific squall of pressed Spaniards. wind and rain blew up, so that further firing was impossible
;
moreover, while the English came up in the wind and faced it, the shattered Spaniards were unable to do this, and simply drifted to leeward, with the result that the two fleets became
the squall had passed, the fight was But despite the fact that it ha been interrupted by the elements, the battle of Gravelines had been decisive. The Armada had been driven past the point where it had hoped to unite with Parma, and there was practically
separated
after
virtually over.
no hope
of its regaining
it.
The only
real question
now was
what proportion
to Spain.
1
of the fleet
would be able
to get safely back
though Philip's great Armada had innocuous, it was by no means out of dangei
For,
All
itself
I
become
destruction.
Monday
night the wind blew hard out of the northwest,
and when the Spaniards discovered their position on Tuesday morning, it became evident that they were being rapidly
driven
down on
the
treacherous
shoals
bo
the eastward.
Medina Sidonia and

efforts to
a few of his best ships

of the
made
desperate
weather them, but the bulk
Arniada was un-
able to do this.
-!y
on to
in
A mile or more away the English hung relenton their windward quarter, content to watch them p The Spaniards took soundings their inevitable fate.
and again
eight
fat
horns, six fathoms, five fathoms
the pilots
vowed
;
that such large ships had never passed that
way
before
clearly they
were now
at
the mercy of
rod,
and
officers
and men betook themselves to prayer. But, Bometime about noon, when they were all expecting death at any moment, "it pleased God to work the miracle" for which
1
Corbett,
ii,
pp. 290-292
Fern&ndez Duro,
i,
pp. 103
ff.
THE ARMADA
IN
THE NORTH SEA
549
they had besought Him. The wind eased off a point or two, and began to blow out of the southwest. The Spaniards
were just able to avoid the shoals, and in the early afternoon they had got together again in some kind of formation
in the deeper waters of the
least,
they were
1
safe,
North Sea. For the moment, and the English had been robbed
at
of
their prey.
Later in the day Medina Sidonia called a council of war on board his flagship, to determine what was next to be done. 2
few of his
officers believed
that
when
the wind shifted,
it
might be possible to return to Calais Roads and engage the The Duke himself, who was certainly no English again.
coward, would have been glad to do so, had it not been for the fact that the ammunition was practically exhausted but without powder and ball it was evident that they could
not fight.
point in
Some
of
them were
in favor of passing
;
on to a
Norway
;
to spend the winter and refit
but the Duke
did not like the idea of seeking refuge in the territory of strangers moreover, it would never do to leave the Spanish
coasts unguarded.
The only
home
as quickly as possible,
and with the wind in and the narrows of the Channel, the only way to get home was to âil up to the north beyond the Orkneys, and thence around the west of Ireland to Spain. Even this course had
its
alternative then was to get and with the least possible loss the west and the enemy between them
dangers.
The
provisions were almost as short as the
ammunition, and the water supply was the lowest of all. They had brought with them many horses and mules to drag
the artillery after
they
their
1
might now have hunger

;
had been landed in England, and these killed and eaten in order to appease but instead they elected to throw some eighty
it
2
i.
Fern&ndez Duro, Armada Invencibie, pp. 105 f., 172-174 ii, pp. 393 f.
;
Ferndndez
Duro,
i,
p.
106
ii,
pp. 394-396.
Corbett,
ii,
pp. 292-296.
550
of

in
them overboard
and the
All this,
fact
order bo husband their water supply. thai they were now in full retreat, took
Investigation revealed
the heart out of officers and men.

thai there had been
numerous cases of cowardice and insubA court-martial was held, and twenty were conordination. demned to death. Of these, however, only one was actually
executed, being hung from the yard-arm of a pinnace; the others were let off with degradation and minor penalties
"through
the
greal
clemency
of
the
Duke." J
During
Wednesday and Thursday, the 10th and the 11th, the English continued to pursue. They thought that the Spaniards would never dare return home with nothing accomplished,
and feared
they might possibly combine with the Catholics in Scotland. On Friday, however, it became evident the Armada was bent on flight, and the English that
lest
abandoned the chase They were almost as short of powder as their foes, and the queen was mosl reluct.- nt to pay for any more. Now that the danger was over, her parsimony erted itself; and as the surest way of preventing an]
further activities on the part of her
in
fleet,
summoned Howard to attend The misfortunes of the Armada were not yet a' As far I'- homeward journey was beset by gales.
his place
she peremptorily 2 her Council. \\
an end.
north
the Orkneys the
fleet
held together;
but
when
it
started to
beat westward into the Atlantic, the Ships that had suffered mosl in the fighting were unable to keep up with the P
Many
others
.-auk,
tell
riddled
like
sieves,
in
the
Northern Ocean;
away
to leeward and were wrecked on the rocky
1 If tie- sold:' te of Northern ami Western Ireland. and Bailors on board them wen' fortunate enough to escape death in the waves, they were mosl of them robbed and
Duro,
1
ii,
p
of the
Spanish
Armada on
tin-
('oast of
If
Cortn-tt.
ii.
[,.
Ci
."The Wrecks
Qt cat I*nd," (1906), pp. 429-451.
Journal,
xx\u
PHILIP GETS THE
NEWS
551
murdered by the wild

;
Irish, or else shot in cold
blood by the
the narrative of Captain Francisco de English garrisons Cuellar, who was one of the very few to escape, gives a vivid
picture of the conditions in Ulster and Connaught at the 1 time. Medina Sidonia, in compliance with the royal com-
mand, sent
off letters to Philip as
often as he could, to report

of
3,
the state of
affairs.
At
least
two
tively on August 21 and September
them, written respecapparently reached the
king's hands,
and gave him a

flee*
terribly vivid picture of the

after the battle of Gravelines,
miseries of his
Philip
A week
On August
had believed that the Armada had been triumphant. 18 he had written to Medina Sidonia a letter of congratulation on the victory which he had learned from "the reports of an eyewitness" had been won. 3 At the end of the month he knew that the Armada had been beaten, but he had not yet given up hope that it might return to the narrows of the Channel, unite with Parma, and get its re4 Four weeks later, however, he had to face the whole of venge.
the horrid truth.
into
On September
22 Medina Sidonia crawled

in the last
Santander
on the 23d he sent
and most
sixty or
tragic of all his reports to the king.
He had had
more ships with him when last he had written to Philip, but of these had since been scattered by the fury of the waves, and he had only brought eleven of them with him into port. Fifty-five others, in all a little more than half of the
most
fleet
that had
left
Corunna
in July,
managed, one by one, to
fight their
1
way
back, but they brought home with them

2
In the form of a letter to Philip, written from Antwerp, October 4, 1589.

Espanol,
ii,
ii,
The
;
original
is
printed in Fernandez
pp. 225-228, 252 f. 3 Archivo Historico

f.
pp.
;
Duro, Armada Inc-ncible, ii, pp. 337370 and there are English translations by H. D. Sedgwick, Jr. (New York,
1895),
272
4 Archivo Historico Espanol, ii, p. 273 Forneron, iii, pp. 350 f., and references
and by Robert Crawford (Lon;
here.
5
don, 1897) pages 70 to 79 of Froude's Spanish Story of the Armada are based
Fernandez Duro,
ii,
pp.
ii,
296-300
pp. 287
on
it.
Archivo Historico Espanol, 297-300.
f.,
552
THE INVTXCTBLE ARMADA
scarcely a third of the 20,000 men who had bravely gone forth to fight the battle of the Lord. Hopes still ran high
that
more would return.
In
November word came from

l
Alonso de Leyva, the darling of the fleet, had but Baved twenty-six ships, and raised a revolt in Ireland
Venice that
;
by Christmas time it was Learned that de Leyva had been drowned. Most of the rest of the best officers had also perished. Recalde and Oquendo both died within a few days of
Diego Flores Yaldes, who goi home with Medina Sidonia, was punished with a term of imprisonment in the castle of Burgos, for a scapegoat had clearly to be
their
return.
found,
and
he
was
the
obvious
one.
The Duke v
"permitted to retire" to his estates in Andalusia, and was not even deprived of his command. The mass of the
Spaniards detested him, and held him chiefly responsible for the disaster, but Philip stood loyally by him. and it is on
the whole to his credit that he did so.
3
Had
tin
king perhaps
some inkling that lie himself was the person really to blame? Or did he still believe that everything was to be attributed From his famous dictum to the inscrutable will of the Lord? that he had sent the fleet "against men and not against the
wind and the aeas,"
'
it
would look as
if
the latter were the
more probable, but
was certainly an awkward problem to explain why the Almighty had been so unkind to an expedition which lia<l been sent out expressly to do His work.
it
The
defeat of the Spanish
Armada was unquestionably

It
the
Bupreme
Spain's proved could lie beaten, and that she COUld be deprived of Davy the sovereignty <>t' the seas. It presaged the independence
!
disaster of Philip's reign.
that
Porneron,
iii.
p.
362, and referenoe
i.
pp
tin
'-'
144;
Froude, Spanish Story
thei
1
of
Froude,
Spanish
if.
Story
<>/
thr
Ar-
*' 89. the authoritiea f<T this roninrk !'Porneron, iii. p. 348, note 3
Armada, pp.
Fern&nde* Duro, Armada tniencibU,
oAndei I>uro,
i,
pp. 127
ff.
CONTINUATION OF THE WAR

of the
553
Countries and the break-down of the monopoly of Spain in the New World indeed, it is usually regarded as the death-knell of the Spanish Empire. One would gather,
;
Low
moreover, from a perusal of the pages devoted by the older English historians to the last fifteen years of the reign of
Elizabeth that
all
these tremendous results were immediately
evident, that the English sea-rovers sacked Spanish cities and plundered Spanish colonial ports and treasure fleets at will,
and that the Spaniards were powerless to prevent them. More recently a high authority on naval affairs has challenged this classical interpretation of the period, and maintained that the Spaniards, for years after the Armada, remained far more formidable than is popularly supposed. 1 It
probable that he, in turn, somewhat overstates his case, but there is certainly something to be said for the view that he advances. As regarded from the Spanish standpoint, the
is
war with England during the years 1588-98, which alone concern us here, falls into three distinct periods, each with well marked characteristics of its own, and sharply
history of the
differentiated
from one another.

in order.
We
will
now proceed
to
consider
them
it is
The
view
of
first is
event of
comprised in the year 1589, and the central the English expedition against Lisbon. In
the fury of Drake and his associates at being robbed of their prey when forbidden to pursue the Armada to the northward, it was inevitable that they should ask leave to
make reprisals in the following year the nation virtually demanded it and Elizabeth dared not refuse. 2 In Spain all this had been foreseen, for Philip still had his spies in Engmoreland, who kept him informed of the enemy's plans over, it had been correctly surmised that the chief objective
; ;
J.
S.
Corbett,
vi.
The Successors of
ii,
Drake, p.
Corbett, Drake and the Tudor Navy, pp. 307-318.
554

for the
would be Lisbon,
pretender Antonio had the ear of the
would
English government and had promised thai the Portuguese rise in his favor to a man. With the aid of his Portu1
guese minister, Cristobal de Moura, and Pedro Enriquez de ( ount of Fuentes, Philip accordingly did everyIn April, 1589, the thing possible to prepare resistance.
Aeevedo,
blow
tell,
but not at
first
at
the expected point.
fleet of
some 130 sail, carrying upwards of 15,000 men, under Drake and Sir John Norris, suddenly appeared before Corunna. 1 They promptly landed 7000 troops, attacked and captured the lower town, killed 500 Spaniards, and took prisoner the
commander
of the place;
and finding large casks of Spanish wines
but then they scattered to pillage, in the cellars of some
warehouses, a large proportion of them soon became helpPrudence, under the circumstances, would lessly drunk. have dictated a prompt withdrawal, with such booty as they
Norris insisted on remaining to town, which by this time had had a upper chance to prepare. Prodigies of valor were performed by
bad managed to
collect, but
lay siege to the
the Spaniards were Inspired by the heroic example and leadership of some of the women of the town, which apparently produced /nn</<r<s varonilea of the old
both
sides, but
'astilian sort. ;iml the
English were forced to retire with the
loss of 1200
men.
Spanish and laying waste the Burrounding country, they Burgos, 1 From Corunna they passed finally withdrew to their fleet.
pieces
:i
After consoling themselves by cutting to reinforcement sent on from Puente de
south to Peniche on the Portuguese coast, some thirty-five mile.- north of Lisbon. There Norris landed, with 6000 men,
pp. 386-888
hi.
Form-run,
"/ti
le
in.
pp. 31
<irt>-tt.
cit., ii.
C iii, pp. 338 ff. Corb*tt, pp. 334 342; M. A. S.Hume,

;
Drakt
;
and
:
lor
Th>
Yea
pp.
after
the
Armada (LoD
Forneron,
iii,
nfmoOM
1896),
31-39;
pp.
there.
359-3e
CORUKNA AND LISBON

;
555
and easily captured the place he then started overland for the Portuguese capital, while Drake sailed around to the mouth of the Tagus to support him with an attack from the
river.
Both parts
of the expedition signally failed to
accom-
The winds were so unfavorable that Drake could not enter the river, and in the meantime the army of Xorris had been dogged by misfortune. Fuentes had retreated before him, and denuded the country of
plish their purpose.
supplies
Xorris did not venture to pillage for fear of alien-
ating the sympathy of the Portuguese, from which so much had been hoped. The heat was terrific, and when the
invaders reached the suburbs of Lisbon and found that the

fleet
had not got
there, they lost all heart

in
in fact, they felt
themselves fortunate
being permitted
a little later to
reembark, virtually unmolested, at Cascaes. Sickness had decimated their ranks, but their provisions were replenished by the fortunate capture of a convoy of sixty Hanseatic
ships with cargoes of corn for Portugal.
On
the
way home
they revenged themselves by entering the harbor of Vigo, burning the town and the ships at anchor there, and devastating the country for miles around
;
but when the last
scattered remnants of the expedition got back to Plymouth,

it
was found that some thirty of the ships were missing, and that over 9000 men had died or been killed. Practically no was ill pleased, and, booty had been brought back the queen
;
despite the verdict of contemporaries like Camden, it is evident that the whole affair was regarded in England as a disastrous failure. On the other hand, it seems equally clear
was dissatisfied that the invaders had got off so She had merely got rid of them, but they had not cheaply. been decisively defeated. Both sides, in other words, felt that little was to be gained, for the time being, in continuing the struggle, at least in European waters and that feeling
that Spain
;
556

intensified, in Philip's case,
must have been
by the
fact that
the assassination of
Henry
III (August 2, 1589) necessarily

1
turned his attention once more in the direction of France
The
till
its
was that the next phase of the war, which lasted L595, assumed a complexion totally different from that of Philip made no serious effort against Engpredecessor.
result
Elizabeth did not attempt to invade Spain, but permitted her sea-rovers to harry the Spanish colonies, and lie in wait for the Spanish treasure fleets. From her point of
land.
view,
it
was obviously the proper

it
course.
It cost almost
might conceivably prove very lucrative, and it only semi-officially committed her to the continuance of a war which she never really wished to wage. In the summer
oothing;
of 15S0 the Karl of
Cumberland sailed with thirteen ships for the Azores and captured Fayal, where he maintained himself
till
October.
He
seized the vessels which were lying in the
port, and intercepted others homeward bound from the New World and laden with treasure. 3 In the following year both
Hawkins and Frobisher returned empty-handed to England, after similar attempts,3 and L591 was the year of the last
the gallantry of Grenville remains one of the most precious traditions of the British navy, it is but fair to add thai his Spanish opponent, Alonso de Bazan,
fighl
If
of the Revenge.
the brother of the Marquis of Santa Cruz, paid him
all
the
honor and courtesy which

In
1
his
heroism so richly deserved.
Indies.
593 the principal scene of interest is transferred to the The Earl of ( Cumberland resumed his activities there,
;
C de C.i iii. pp. 343 ff Corbett, Drakt and ihr Tudor Navy, ii. pp. 866 Fernandee Duro, Armada Etpai. p Cheyney, iii, pp. is :,i
|
expedition from I.isl>on cntmc] trc English end of the war to lnnnuish. Fernandei Duro, Armada Etpahota,
>- f. Cheyney, </>. cit., i, pp. pp 616 627. Fernandei Duro, Armada Etpanola, ill, pp. 78 f. and 383 389, ii, 'Corbett, pp. referenoea there; Cheyney, i, pp. 634 f.
iii.
. ;
//
'
England,
of
the-
i,
pp.
L63
(April
189.
The
1690
'I'-.-ith
Wabringham
16
and
life
privnt<-
relegation of Drake to nftcr tin- return of the
LAST VOYAGE OF DRAKE
557
and ravaged Havana and the shores of Trinidad. In that same year Sir Richard Hawkins, the son of Drake's old companion in arms, set
sail
with a roving commission to harry the

Strait of
Spaniards, and passed through the
Magellan into the Pacific. After plundering Valparaiso and capturing several prizes, he was forced to surrender, grievously
wounded, to Don Beltran de Castro in the bay of San Mateo 1 It (July 2, 1594), and was sent back a prisoner to Spain.
was partly on the pretext of avenging him that his father and Drake got permission from the queen to sail, in August, 1595,
on what proved to be their
they made
there
first
;
last
voyage.
On
this occasion
for the Canaries, only to be repulsed before
Las Palmas
indeed, the chief result of their appearance
was
to give the Spaniards a chance to send out warnings
to the colonies
and treasure
fleets in
the
New World.
When
in
the Englishmen reached the Antilles, readiness for them.
everything was
After being driven off from Porto Rico the Spanish artillery, they passed on and seized Nombre by de Dios. But when the troops they brought with them tried
to cross the
Isthmus
of
Panama on
foot,
with dysentery and had to return. demoralized by the loss of their two great leaders. Hawkins had sickened on the voyage across the Atlantic, and died, off
they were stricken They were also utterly
Porto Rico, on
November
22, 1595
2
Drake
fell
a victim to
1596,
the yellow fever of the Isthmus on February
7,
and
was buried at sea off Porto Bello. Needless to add, the news was received throughout the Spanish Empire with transports and Lope de Vega, who had had some personal experience of the ways of El Draque and Achines when he
of joy,
' '
'
'
The Hawkins' Voyages, ed. C. R. 1878), pp. xxivxxvii, 83-349. * C. de C, iv, pp. 151-157 Fernandez Duro, Armada Espafiola, iii,
1
Markham (London,
Corbett, Drake and the pp. 413-430; Benson, Francis 293-305 Sir Drake, pp. Cheyney, i, pp. 543-549.
pp.
96-112;
Tudor Navy,
ii,
558
served
in the Armada, wrote a poem of triumphant gratitude for the removal of the scourge of the church. The only Spanish reply to the ravages of the corsarios
Ingleaes
was
raid
on the Cornish coast
in the
summer
of
1595;
it
did a certain
amount
of
damage, and caused fear
and
irritation in
tance was accomplished. 1
England, but nothing of permanent imporBut the same statement holds
true, mviaJtis mutandis, of the
much more dramatic
exploits
of the English buccaneers in the Antilles;

result of
indeed, the chief

it,
them had been,
as Sir William
Monson expressed
"to waken rather than to weaken" the Spaniards. In the first place, Philip's naval men had made good use of the
from attack that had been accorded, in these years, to the Spanish ports themselves, and had constructed a whole
respite
new
fleet of fighting ships.
One high authority speaks

I
of the
period
as
2
navy."
failed to
actually witnessing "the birth of the Spanish In the second, the English sea-rovei had signally
is,
accomplish their chief objective, thai
to capture
the Spanish treasure

routes.
fleets, and get command of the trade Isolated ships and even smaller squadrons had indeed
off,
been cut
the
last
but the
'
Flota
'
and the
'
'
raUeons
continued
to sail as before;
the fact, already noticed elsewhere, that

Indies
in
tin
sums the Spanish crown derived from the

-
decade of the reigD were nearly four times as large those which it got from them in the sixth Bpeaks volumes
connection.
afi
'
in this
he years rolled
all his
Miuht it not be possible for Philip, who, by, became increasingly anxious to concen-
trate
forces against
Henry IV
of France, to persuade
Elizabeth thai the efforts of her corsairs were practically fruitless, and terminate the war which neither of them was
really
1
anxious to continue?
;
The
iii,
older historians used to

79;
p. vi.
iii,
1
Fern&ndex Duro, Armada Espahola. pp. 92 f. Cheyney, i, pp. 644 f. I'crn&ndcz Duro, Armada Espafiola,
p.
Corbett,
The 8ucccmot$
of
Drake,
EXPEDITION AGAINST CADIZ

believe that Philip
559
1594 to get Elizabeth poisoned, and bribed her Portuguese physician, Dr. Rodrigo Lopez, to accomplish it for him. More recently this view
attempted
in
has been attacked, and it has been demonstrated that Lopez was never really proved guilty of the crime for which he was
executed.
Is it not
trying to utilize
offer of
even possible that Philip was really him simply to approach the queen with an
peace ?
it
of the time,
In view of the state of feeling in the England would have been essential for him to have a
very secret agent to accomplish this,

for diplomatic
and the use
of physicians
purposes was by no means unfamiliar in the

1
sixteenth century.
If Philip
actually
chance of success.
made an offer of peace, it never had a The queen, as we have remarked, might
it,
have been willing to entertain

face of the wishes of England,
but she dared not
fly in
the
the death of Drake.
and England longed to avenge The war party, too, was once more
led
dominant
in the
Royal Council, and was vigorously
by
she
Elizabeth's youthful favorite, the Earl of Essex,
whom
was
Since buccaneering had not accomplished what had been expected of it during the last five years, it was decided to revert to the tactics of 1589,
at all costs anxious to please.
and make a great thrust at the heart of Spain. Cadiz was on June 30, 1596, a fleet of selected as the point of attack
;
sixty ships,
commanded by Howard,
of
Armada
fame, and
carrying 10,000 English soldiers
under Essex, and 5000 Dutch
under Louis of Nassau, suddenly appeared at the mouth of the harbor. Practically no preparations had been made to
1 Arthur Dimock in English Historical Review, ix (1894), pp. 440-472; Martin
A.
"
S. Hume, The Year after the Armada (London, 1896), p. 17, note 2; idem, Conspiracion del Dr. Ruy Lopez contra Isabel de Inglaterra y supuesta complicidad de Felipe II," in his
Espaholes e Ingleses en el Siglo XVI (Madrid, 1903), pp. 205-233; idem, "The So-Called Conspiracy of Dr. Ruy Lopez," in Jewish Historical Society of England, Transactions, vi, Forneron, iv, pp. pp. 32-55 (1908) 266-268.
;
560
Duke of Medina Sidonia, who as was summoned to protect Cadiz, governor showed himself even more incompetent than he had been in
receive them, and the
of
Andalusia
he did practically oothing save to report to Philip almost hour by hour the rapid progress of the enemy, which
L588;
he was totally unable
to
impede.
the few Spanish warships in an account of themselves as they otherwise might.

of
.
His indecision prevented the harbor from giving as good

Several
them were sunk by the cannon of the fo some of the Guadalquivir; all the merchant the rest escaped up
vessels
were burnt by the Spaniards themselves in order to Meantime the enemy's troops had save them from capture. been landed, and entered Cadiz practically without resistance.
lish
The
left
were
inhabitants promptly fled inland, and the Engto plunder the place at their good pleasure. For
sixteen days the process continued, and then, after Cadiz had
been completely emptied,

tion of
it,
it
was
set
on
fire,
and
a large por-
into the interior
including the old cathedral, reduced to ashes. Raids would have yielded a rich harvest and were seI
riously contemplated by the invaders, but he English did not realize the extent of Spain's unprep;iredncss hey also feared
;
I
for the persona] safety of the favorite of the queen, and so they
Faro on the south shore of Anally decided to make for home. Portugal was plundered on the way, and there was eveD talk
of an attack on the Azores
tion
;
but the
members
of the expedi-
by the booty that they had were in no condition to attempt anything taken that they further. They reached England safely op the sth of August.
had been
so demoralized
On the Cadis expedition we D. I.

p;
tl<t
.
K.,
xxxvi,
nl
Semen, HittoNa
Mvmdo,
iii.
Britain, mission,
'
Historical Manuscript* Calendar of Manuscript

Hatfield
iii,
Com/'
682 648; iv. pp 204 211; Pedro da emitA,breu, // to a del Soquec ili Men 1696, <"l Adolfo de l>r ro y Rossi (Cadiz, L86I a
pp.
|
Home,
vi,
pp.
I
383;
patiola,
Fernando*
pp.
91
Dure
,
Armada
J
117 133; Corbetti Successors of I >mki pp. 66 L33 Cheyim-.v,

ii,
pp
18
SPANISH REPRISALS
561
expedition to Cadiz had the merit of proving to Philip that his dreams of a peaceful settlement with England were
illusory
The
during the two remaining years of his life he burned 1 for revenge. In some respects he was now better situated
;
than he had ever been before for a direct attack on England. He was in close touch with the Catholics of Ireland, who
longed to strike a blow for their faith, and promised him a base there if he would support them. 2 The Spaniards, too, as we shall subsequently see, had captured Calais in April,
lack
and were thus possessed of the Channel had been so fatal to them in 1588. And so sent out for the assembling of a new armada at San Lucar. Medina Sidonia had proved so Cadiz that the command of it was given to
1596,
port whose orders were
Lisbon and
useless at
Martin de
y Manrique, the adelantado mayor of Castile. But despite the change of commanders there were the usual interminable delays. Philip did his utmost to hurry
Padilla
things,
but the tradition of tardiness and inefficiency had

;
been too firmly planted to be uprooted in a day the fleet was but half-ready by the middle of October, when the king had absolutely insisted that, ready or not, it should
set sail.
No
sooner had
it
put to sea than

;
it
was struck
by a southwest gale and scattered a third of the ships that composed it were wrecked, and over 2000 men were
lost.
'Truly," wrote Herrera in his Historia General del Mundo, "an admiral, like a doctor, must have fortune on
4
1 Agostino Nani, the Venetian ambassador to Spain, wrote to the Doge and Senate in midsummer, 1596, that, in talking with the papal nuncio, the king "seized a candelabra, and with energy declared that he would pawn even that in order to be avenged on the queen, and that he was resolved to accomplish this. These are words which, in the mouth of a king who has
his side."
never shown any passion in fortune, good or evil, prove that his mind is fully set upon undertaking that war C. S. P., Venetian, 1592-1603, again."
no. 473. 2 C. S. P., Spanish, 1587-1603, nos.
634-666, passim.
3
4
Fernandez 643 Duro, Armada Espanola, iii, pp. 129 f

;
.
Cf. infra, p. 657. Historia, iii, p.
562
Still

Philip did not despair.
of
A new though
later in the
unsuccessful
attempt
England
to invade Spain in July,

;
1597/
year,
still
further infuriated
him
and
same
when
'
Essex, with the best of the English fleet, was off on the 2 Island.- Voyage' at the Azores, where he hoped to intercept
the Biota from the Indies, the king sent the last of his arma-
das against England. It was a most imposing fleet, almost as A detachment of the Spanish large, in fact, as that of 1588.
soldiers in Brittany was to cooperate with
it.
Itb
commanders
its
had had experience

nation,
secret.
3
of English naval tactics,
and
desti-
the port of Falmouth, had been kept profoundly But the munitions and supplies were of pour quality
;
and
insufficient
worst of
all,
was so long delayed that it had no chance nel and establish a base there, as had been two
fleets, in
the departure of the expedition to reach the Chanoriginally planned,
before the return of Essex from the Azores.
Instead, the
sailed simultaneously,
complete ignorance of each other's positions, on converging courses, for the mouth
;
of the English Channel, from Corunna and from the Azores but before contact between them could be established, the
up and dispersed the Armada, 4 The while the English found refuge in their own ports. king was deeply cast down when he got the news, and the
inevitable northeaster blew
renewal of the exploits of the corsarios Ingleses in the Indies, particularly the capture of Porto Rico by the ubiquitous Earl of Cumberland in the summer of 1598, must have further
enhanced the agonies of the last weeks of his life. Yet no one could possibly maintain that he had tamely surrendered or abandoned the fight without struggle; moreover, the
:i
cessors of Uruk,.
151.
pp.
1H1
M'. de
4
StlCMMOn
nyniy,
ii,
pp. 424-4
iii,
Corbett, pp. 266 f. pp. 212-217. Fern&nciez Duro, Armada Espaftola, pp. 166 f.; Corbett, Successors of
(',
iv,
;
"/
Drnh,
Drake, pp. 217-227.
AFTERMATHS
example that he had
set
563
in the next reign,
was followed
and
1
England did not cease to be worried over 'invisible armadas'

and Spanish invasions of Ireland until the peace of 1604. The great issue between Spain and England had indeed been settled in 1588, but neither side was aware of it at the time, and it was primarily owing to the Spaniards' heroic, if misguided, continuance of the struggle during the next sixteen years that the real facts of the situation remained so long concealed, not only from the two contestants, but also from
the rest of Europe as well.
The Spanish Empire
of the early
seventeenth century' was a ghost of its former self, but the world at large did not realize it until after the peace of the
The legend of its invincibility was kept alive, by game of bluff, long after it had ceased to be in any way formidable, and James I often grovelled at the feet of the Spanish ambassador in London, the Count of Gondomar.
Pyrenees
in 1659.
a masterly
Corbett, Successors of Drake, pp. 253
ff
Cheyney,
ii,
pp. 496-499.
564

note
:it
Correspondance inedite de la Maison d'< hrange-Nassau, premiere aerie, ed. Willem Groen van Prinstoror (Leyden, 1836-47, 8 vds. and supplement), is valuable for the period to 1T)M, a- are also the Acles des Flats (icm'ranx des Pays-Bas, 1576The one small 1685, ed. I.. P. Gachard (Brussels, 1861-66, 2 vols.). volume of the Correspondance d' Alexandre Farnese avec Philippe If
Sources.
The
the cud of Chapter

Arc/tires ou
XXXIV, and
add
pour les anne'es 1578, 1579, ed. L. P. Gachard (Brussels, 1853), is drawn from the Belgian archives at Brussels; Gachard did d complete his work by printing the letters for 1580-81 preserved in the same collecI
From the archives of Simancas A. Rodriguez Villa edited the tion. correspondence of Farnese and Philip, in Spanish, of the y :- 157778, in R. A., 1883, pp. 60-66, 131-135, 160-163, 246 360, 305-312, Captain Alonso Vasques, Los Sucesos 348-362, 381-384, 137-440. de Flandes y Francia del Hempo de Alejandro Farnese, in vols, lxxiiIxxiv of the D. I. E.,
is
the standard Spanish
contemporary account
of the military operations of thai period. The originals of Bernardino de Mendosa's letters to Philip from London are printed in vols, xci-
The note on the authorities for the of the same collection. Armada campaign <>n pp. 442-451 of vol. ii of J. S. Corbett's Drake and the Tudor Navy renders it unnecessary for me to add anything in
xcii
regard to the
English end, save perhaps to mention the following publications of the Navy Records Society: the Naval Tracts of Sir William Monson, edited by Michael Oppenheim (1002-14, 5 vols.);
and the Slate Papers Relating to the Defeat of the Spanish Armada, ed. For the S] ai ish Bide of the story, C. J. K. Laughton (1894, 2 vols.)Fernandez DuTO's La Armada I nrcndble (Madrid, 1884 85, 2 vols.)
still
holds
its
and
It
rrlariiihrs,
place a^ the primary collection of contemporary letten and also gives a useful bibliography (ii, pp. ">(C{ 513).
archives of the house of Medina Bidonia
need-, however, to be supplemented by the documents from the in D. I. E., xxviii, pp. 364 124, the Armada letter of Pedro lv-trade in Mnnsnn's Naval Tracts, ii,
pp. 299 308, and still more by the Documentor procedientes del Archivo General de Simancas, selected by Enrique Herrera Oria, transcribed by
Miguel Bordonau and Angel de la Plasa, and published in the Archivo Hi torico I This last-named work con Valladolid, 1929). tains numerous letters between Philip and the Duke of Medina Sidonis which have never been published before. Papers Relating to the Navy dming th* Spanish War, 1586 1687, ed. J. 8. Corbetl 1898), U a publication of the Navy Records Society. Sir William Monson's account
ii
1
of the
i,
565
Cadiz voyage
;
of
1596
is
in his
Naval
Tracts, ed.
M. Oppenheim,
pp. 344-395
for
ii,
Later Works.
The
pp. 1-20.
standard authorities for the
Low
Countries
in
and
France
in this period
remain pretty much what they were
the preceding one, save that J. L. Motley's History of the United Netherlands (New York, 1861-68, 4 vols.) replaces his Rise of the Dutch Republic after the murder of Orange in 1584. Pietro Fea's
Alessandro Farnese, Duca di Parma (Rome, 1886) has long been the standard biography. It is now being superseded by Leon van der Essen's brilliant biography, of which, unfortunatelj', only the first volume (to 1578) has yet appeared (Brussels, 1933). Francisco Barado y Font, Sitio de Amberes, 158^-1585 (Madrid, 1891), is very useful. For the Armada campaign and the ensuing events, J. S. Corbett's Drake and the Tudor
Navy (London,
1900) are
still
1898, 2 vols.)
and
his Successors of
Drake (London,
opinion the most valuable authorities, if taken in they may be supplemented, on conjunction with Fernandez Duro the technical side, by W. F. Tilton's painstaking Katastrophe der spanischen Armada (Freiburg i. B., 1894) and by Gervasio de Artmano
in
;
my
y de Galdacano's La Arquitectura Naval Espaiiola (Madrid, 1920), already cited. The most recent life of Drake is that of E. F. Benson that of Hawkins is by J. A. Williamson (London, (London, 1927)
;
Professor E. P. Cheyney's History of England from the Defeat of the Armada to the Death of Elizabeth (New York, 1914-26, 2 vols.) gives an excellent account of Anglo-Spanish relations during the last
1927).
years of Philip
II,
and a great deal more
besides.
CHAPTER XXXVIII
ANTONIO PEREZ AND THE LIBERTIES OF ARAGON
foregoing chapter will have made it clear that the defeat of the Spanish Armada in 1588 marks the turning
point in the history of Spain's struggles with England and The dispersal of Philip's groat fleel with the Netherlands. saved the former; it made it probable that the latter would
The
The crucial years of Spain's conflict ultimately go free. with France were to come, as we shall subsequently sec
Not till Henry IV renounced his Prot-estantism in 1593 perhaps not, indeed, until five years afterwards, when the Edict of Nantes was issued and the was it evident that Philip's projpeace of Vervina signed
somewhat
later.
ects in
Between quarter were also destined to fail. these two great sets of disasters in the field of foreign affairs, there occurred a most extraordinary contest on the soil of
that
Spain itself, a contest which reveals perhaps more clearly than any other episode in Philip's whole reign the nature of
methods and viewpoint, and the measure of his coping with the new foes which were springing impotence up all around him. The accumulated weighl of long
the king's
in
centuries of tradition enabled him, indeed, to emerge officially victorious from this contest at home; but the way that the
-lory of
it
was circulated
in
foreign lands increased the bitter-
ness of the hatred of his fellow sovereigns,
and encouraged
tO
some
it.
of
them
to believe that they could safely give vent
The
broken
till
legend of Spain's invincibility, though it was not the middle of the seventeenth century, received
THE REALMS OF THE CROWN OF ARAGON
567
rude shocks during the two closing decades of the reign of the
Prudent King.
We have had many occasions to remark that the process of

Castilianization of the Spanish Empire, initiated really under the Catholic Kings and advancing rapidly under the Emperor, had reached its climax in the reign of Philip II.
The
fact that the

l
in 1561
Prudent King fixed his capital at Madrid was the outward and visible symbol of it, and his
during the twenty-six years after his return to Spain 2 in 1559, to pay more than one visit to the realms of the crown
refusal,
Aragon made a most painful impression on his subjects in 3 these kingdoms. Their pride was wounded by the fact that he ignored them for so long, save for the viceroys and gov4 ernors who represented him in his absence in this respect, as in others, his reign stood out in marked and disagreeable contrast to that of his father, whose long and patient sojournings among his East Spanish subjects went far to atone, in 5 their eyes, for his numerous absences from the peninsula. Their resolution to maintain all the forms and emblems of their ancient liberties and privileges inanimate, almost, had now become was vastly enhanced by the though they
of
;
policy of the Prudent
King. Material began rapidly to from the very beginning of the reign, for the accumulate, conflagration which finally burst forth in 1591.
Of
all
the defenders of the ancient autonomies of the east-
most ardent, and perhaps also the most were the nobles of the kingdom of Aragon. unreasonable, It will be remembered that they inherited from mediaeval
ern realms, the
1
Cf. ante, p. 42.
crown
1563-64. Danvila, Coroleu and Pella, ii, pp. 291-304 Las C&rtes Catalanas, pp. 361-366. 3 After the establishment of Philip's capital at Madrid, the realms of the
in
;
This
was
came
4
of Aragon, and also to be called virreinatos.
Navarre,
Pidal,
.
Philippe II, Antonio Perez,
et le
6
royaume d' Aragon, i, p. 36. Cf ante, Vol. Ill, p. 158.
568
THE LIBERTIES OF ARAGON

among
;
times a position almost unique

the Aragonese
the aristocracies of
Europe; thai they formed two of the four brazos into which ( Jortes were divided and thai they had given
1
countless occasions of their uncompromising and lack of cosmopolitanism. obstinacy They were zealous indeed lor the maintenance intact of all the national liberties
of the
evidence on
kingdom
of
Aragon, hut they were more zealous
still
for the preservation of their
own
special privileges within
that
kingdom, and
of their posit ion as a caste within the
body
Certainly some of these privileges were such as had no place in the civilization of Western Europe in the latter We may cite as an instance part of the sixteenth century.
politic.
which gave some of them the unquestioned right to Strangle their vassals without hearing what they had to say
thai
de Heredia, of whom we shall shortly hear much, was afterwards not ashamed to boast that he had twice availed himself.-' Small
in their
1
own
defence, a right of which
Don
h'ego
wonder
if
Philip
ardently
longed
to
break
down such
.1
position and such pretension.traditional

rights of the-
as these.
Not only were the

flagrant
Aragonese
aristi '.icy
st
COn1 radiction to the principles of the
rong monarchy which he and his predecessors had established they were also, from
;
purely humanitarian point

forget
iA'
view. atrocious, and

in
not
'
that
Philip
was
humanitarian
his
we must, own way,
was
Prudent King's subjects Hut Philip WSJ too much attached to Castile, and too busy with other affairs, to be able for a long time to take effective measures to remedy
-Mainly
tar
this group, at Least, of the

he.
more mediaeval than
Like almosi every other problem with which he was confronted, he preferred to deal with it from afar off,
these things.
by instructing his representatives in Aragon to support the attempt- of the rural population to transfer themselves from
Vol
I,
pp. 481
fT..
460
(T.
'
Pld
il.
/<
i.
pp.
f.
THE COUNTY OF RIBAGORZA

seigniorial to royal jurisdiction,
569
favor of marriages in inent Aragonese families, in the hope of breaking down the barriers between the two kingdoms and of making his East
and by using his efforts in Castile of the heads of the more prom-
Spanish subjects enter more sympathetically into his

1
own
A single instance will suffice to show what point of view. measure of success this policy attained. The great and ancient county of Ribagorza, extending north
from the neighborhood of Monzon to the Pyrenees near Bagneres-de-Luchon, and including seventeen towns and
200 villages, with some 4000 vassals, 2 was held, at the accession of the Prudent King, by John of Aragon, Count of
Ribagorza, who was descended, though illegitimately, from Alfonso of Aragon, the bastard brother of Ferdinand the In 1564 he married Luisa, of the Castilian house Catholic.
of Pacheco,
and went to live with her in Toledo but shortly on the ground that his wife was unfaithful to him, afterwards, 3 the Count caused her to be brutally murdered. It was the
;
beginning
of
terrible
blood
feud.
The
sister of
4
the
murdered Countess was the Countess of Chinchon, who spurred her husband on to vengeance. The Count of Ribagorza was forced to flee from Spain, was finally captured
in Milan,
like
brought back to Madrid, and publicly garroted, a common criminal, in 1572. Needless to say, the news
of
of these events
was hailed with delight by the vassals Ribagorza, who had suffered cruelly under the harsh rule the Count, and now eagerly seized the opportunity
1
of
to
Pidal,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
i, i,
i,
2
3
pp. 53 ff., passim. pp. 78-81. pp. 55-57: "Ton suppose
generalement qu'elle perit par les mains du Comte lui-meme et de ses serviteurs"; Forneron, iii, p. 258, states definitely that the Count killed her with his own hand.
4 Mother of the Count of Chinchon viceroy of Peru (1629-39), whose wife was cured of an attack of fever in 1638 by the use of Peruvian bark. On her return to Europe she brought with her a supply of this invaluable remedy, which took from her the name of chinchona or cinchona bark (i.e., quinine)
.
o70

that
demand
They
they
be
attached
to
the
royal
domain.
were, of course, vigorously supported by Philip, who asked nothing better than an opportunity to increase his own power and lands in Aragon at the expense of the most
proceedings he is said to have tried, though vainly, to get the Inquisition to exhume traces of Jewish blood in the family of the Count of
unruly of his subjects.
At one Btage
of the
if such had been found, he would have insisted Ribagorza he territories in question must not be allowed to remain that
;
I
descendants, especially since Ribagorza lay so perilously close to the heretical viscounty of Beam. But the Justicia decreed that the Ribagorza
in
its
1
the hands of any of
lands went lawfully to the Duke of Villahermosa, the brother of the executed count," and the Justicia's verdict was law the ( Jouncil of Aragon supported him, and so, much
;
as Philip disliked
it,
did two of his
own most
trusted Castilian
if
advisers,
Idi&quez
and
must
de
Moura.
tin"
Legal. ty,
not
expediency, was King saw that
clearly against
crown, and the Prudent
he
submit.
But
the
vassals
of
Ribagorza, having come
so close to the attainment of their
ends, were far less respectful than their monarch to the sentence of the Justicia. They rose in revolt, organized
their forces, elected leaders,
of the
and virtually took the control
county into their

civil
own hands.
situation, in fact,
to
exist,
not
remote from
war had begun

,
and the
necessity of dealing With it together with that of getting the recognition of the future Philip 111 by the representatives ol the eastern kingdoms, was the principal cause of the
olutioil of the
king to
meeting
<>\
'
of the General
summon and personally attend a Cortes at Monzon in the summer

of
L586.
The
iii,
pleasure
209.
accompanying
Aragon
<
Ins
daughter
n>-n-
p thinl brother, tin- Count of Luna, wrote Cfimi -ntarioa de loa Suceaoa de
Bo Pornaron,
n los
Ahoa 1691 y 1592,
tioned in the bibliographical note, p. 605. below.
PHILIP AT
Catharine,
MONZON
Charles
571
Emanuel of Savoy, as far as Barcelona on her wedding journey, was an added inducement to the Prudent King to depart from his
just
who had
married
beloved Castile.
us by Henry Cock, of Gorcum in Holland, notary apostolic and archer of the royal guard but as it concerns itself chiefly with brilliant
left
2
;
An
account of that journey has been
ceremonies and descriptions of the places through which the court passed, it has little of interest for us here. Certainly most of the solid business that was transacted at Monzon
passed wholly over Cock's head.
much against his will, formally to recognize the rights of the Duke of Villahermosa to the Ribagorza lands, but he made no efforts whatever to put down the revolutionists. Indeed, he
Philip
was
forced,
encouraged their worst outrages, and gladly seized the opportunity to incorporate into the crown domain other
tacitly
such as Teruel and Albarracin, where the seign3 iorial rights were less clear. Needless to add, under these the revolts in Ribagorza continued with circumstances,
territories,
unabated violence after Philip's return to Castile, and they

were rendered more horrible
still
by
risings of local Moriscos,
who were massacred with relentless cruelty by the moun4 taineers. The decision taken at Monzon had not improved matte: s; it had really made them worse, and Philip, whose chief adviser for Aragonese affairs was now Villahermosa's
mortal enemy, the Count of Chinchon, was convinced that he would have no peace until the Duke was induced to abandon
his lands.
Much plotting ensued, for the purpose of inducing the Duke's friends to desert him, and finally Villahermosa
1 absence was ultimately Philip's prolonged for over a year. Cf Forneron, iii, p. 255, note 4, for details. 2 Cf. edition published in 1876 by A. Rodriguez Villa and A. Morel-Fatio.
.
Pidal, i, pp. 59-102, passim. Argensola, Information de los Sucesos del Reino de Aragon, pp. 61-65 Pidal, i, pp. 122-127.
*
;
572
THK LIBERTIES OF ARAGON

to give way.
was obliged
Be unwillingly surrendered
and
a
at
last
his terri-
tories in return for a few high-sounding titles
generous
money indemnity, and Ribagorza was 1 But others of into the royal domain.
even
less
incorporated
his
countrymen were
content with this solution than he.
The
risings in
Ribagorza were indeed soon suppressed, bul Philip's policy had entailed too much going and coming of Castilians to
suit
the mass of the Aragonese.
The municipal
of
all,
authorities
of Saragossa, the Cortes, and,
most
the Justicia were
firmly convinced that

2
the national fueroa were in danger; and their anger reached its climax when, at the beginning of
1588,
the great Castitian house of
the king sent to Aragon the Marquis of Almeiiara, of 8 Mendoza, to oust the existing
This was certainly a viceroy and bring order out of chaos. if not a technical violation of the law which practical, provided that all the king's officers in Aragon should he
this was promptly brought hone to Philip the way in which Almenara was treated on his arrival. by The court of the Justicia, always a stickler for the letter of the
Aragonese;
and
he favorable td his pretensions; but he was regarded with eontempt by almost every one The aristocracy refused for the most part to accept else.
law,
to
was inclined indeed
his
invitations, while the populace characterized as
'Soup
Kniilhi-' tho8e
Who
lt.
did;'' before Long he retired to Castile,
to report to the kin
leaving behind him wh.it had started as a mere local disturbance in Ribagorza already half runsformed into something like a national uprising. Rut Philip
t
w:is not
to be denied.
Shortly after AJmenara's return to

filled
Madrid, the Counl of Sastago, who had

1
the office of
r
.
Pidal,
1 1
'
i,
pp. 142 f. iii, p. 526.

.'
'
ArgBniola,
i.
op.
f.
eit.,
pp.
I'l.l.il.
i
p
.
He itm
el
'..unt
Ibid
i.
pp. 100
of
Chinch6n.
Cf.
Mignet,
.
Antoi
Perez
Pkilipp* II, p
ALMENARA AT SARAGOSSA
573
viceroy of Aragon for the past twelve years, was removed his successor, Andres Ximeno. the bishop of Teruel, was the
;
son of a plain citizen of Saragossa, and obviously only and when Almenara came back, in intended as a stop-gap the spring of 1590, with increased emoluments and powers, it was evident to all men that it was the king's plan that he
;
the authority, and the viceregal title also, he could extract from the Justicia's court a definite provided With all his irritation verdict favorable to his pretensions.
should have
all
was not yet quite prepared openly to defy the existing law that was to be reserved till later. With things thus balanced, as they were, on the point of a needle, a new and dramatic personality was brought upon the scene by the arrival in Saragossa of Antonio Perez, the disgraced minister of the Prudent King, escaped from his
Philip
;
gloomy prison
in the
dungeons
a
of
Madrid.
most unhappy existence since his sudden arrest and fall from power, on the night of July 28, 2 1579. At first the king did not seem disposed to be severe.
Antonio Perez had led
He gave no immediate
his late minister,
orders to institute any process against and sent the Cardinal Quiroga to assure Perez's wife, the devoted Juana Coello, who had stood loyally by hiiii through all his divagations, that her husband had been
only temporarily removed because of the hatred of Rodrigo 3 Vazquez de Arce. the new royal favorite. Perez himself
was
visited
by the royal
confessor,
and even permitted to

became
~:
see
1 This, however, he never actually got: cf. Argensola. p. 57: "en este lugar es bien que se entienda que el marques de Almenara no era virei. ni exercitaba en Aragon ningun magistrado publico." 1 Cf. ante. p. 328. 3 Not to be confused with Mateo Vazquez de Leca, the informer, who waa also an enemy of Perez, and sub-
secretary of the they were not even related. Vazquez de Arce was just coming into prominence at the time He became president of Perez's fall. of the Council of Castile in 1591, and continued to hold the office until the Cf. Forneron. reign of Philip III. iii. pp. 62 f., 78, note. 263 iv, pp. 163 f.
sequently
Junta
574
his children.
fell
ill,

When,
in spite of
these encouraging signs, he

;
he was allowed to remove to his own house
and after
eight months' seclusion there, he was given leave to go out to mass, and to receive visitors. Shortly afterwards the king
departed for Portugal, and Perez, taking advantage of his

absence, began to lay plans for the recovery of his influence
and position. But Philip was only dissembling.

prudge against Perez, and. as usual,
it
He
cherished a mortal
was only waiting to feed

to he cautious.
fat.
The king had every reason

possession of
Perez
was
in
important state secrets and
numerous
documents; above all, if he were driven to extremities, he would infallibly reveal damning evidence that the king had But the formally authorized the murder of Escovedo.
reports that he played for high stakes with his friends house gave his enemies the opening which they desired
in his
;
and
when the
facts
were reported
a secret
to Philip. h<
ri><\
Vazquei
de Arce to start
career as a minister.
too easy to prove
left
;
inquiry into the honesty of Perez's His venality, needless to add, was only
it was found that, although his father had him nothing, he had amassed an enormous fortune and
lived in regal luxury.
But the king,
after his return

-till
from
to
Portugal
act
;
at
the beginning of 1583, was the murder of
in
no hurry
not until fresh rumors began to circulate in regard to

responsibility
for
the
Escovedo did Philip

merely on the
to
decide to strike again.
On January
23, 1585,
und
or
of his peculations, Perez of
was sentenced
two yeari
-
imprisonment in a fortress, according to the king to perpetual banishment from the court, and to the pleasure, But when the royal alcalde* payment of an enormous fine.
arrived to arresl him, they found him. to put it mildh A. Goni&lci /...- /'/,/,/./. ed.
-/.
more
//. pj.
f.
.'.'<
I'ril.-n.
Frngmrnliniiii,
Jar
in. pp Mignel <)><

1
1
17
'
PP- 157-160.
CAPTIVITY OF ANTONIO PfiREZ
575
troublesome prisoner. While they were ransacking his house for documents, he escaped to sanctuary in a neighboring
the king's officers made bold to arrest him was started between the secular and ecclesiastical authorities of Madrid which did not terminate till The documents, moreover, which were four years later. found in Perez's house were not at all what Philip wanted. Two more large boxes of them were indeed subsequently delivered up by Juana Coello, on receipt of a written order to
church, and
when
there, a quarrel
do so from her husband, who feared for her safety if she refused but even then, the wily Perez contrived to retain
;
the most important of them all, and particularly a number of notes signed in the king's hand. He was destined at a later
date to
make good
use of
them
for his
After the papers had been delivered up, 1585, orders were given for another brief intermission in the
rigor of Perez's captivity,
own advantage. in the summer of
putting him
off his
most probably for the purpose of guard. He was brought back to Madrid,
one of the best
installed in a sort of semi-confinement in
houses of the town, and permitted to receive visitors from the court. But the king, at this juncture, was absent in Aragon, and the implacable Vazquez, who accompanied him
thither, seized the
Saragossa,
of
who
opportunity to interrogate a native of had confessed himself implicated in the killing

of the
Escovedo.
The son
murdered man was on hand
in
Madrid to feed the

gation of the crime
flames.
formal though secret investi-
was decreed, and Perez was once more For more than four years the placed in strict confinement. miserable affair dragged on. There were countless phases
and ramifications of
enter.
it,
into
which
it
is
not worth while to
From
first
to last Perez took the line that he
had
nothing whatever to do with the crime, and in September,

1
Infra, p. 581
Forneron,
iv,
pp. 133
f.
576
1589,

by
a marvellously clever scries of secret missives
to
and
abandon his persuaded young Escovedo ease and request that his enemy be set at liberty. 1 But the rancorous Vazquez had by this time so poisoned Philip's ear
insinuation.-, he
against his former minister that the government pursued the
matter oo
its
own account more
relentlessly than ever.
Not-
only was the imprisonment of Perez continued and its rigor increased he was actually placed in irons. Finally, as all other efforts to make him confess anything had failed, the
;
king, on
January
4,
1590, sent to
tell
him
that he admitted
having ordered him to murder Escovedo, but that, for his own satisfaction and that of his conscience, he must know
whether or not the causes which had been given him for this action were adequate; he therefore ordered Perez to state
these causes in detail and give proof.
In this
way he hoped
to lure the latter into a confession of the crime, while he
trusted that, having secured the incriminating evidence in the documents that he had obtained from his former minister,
he could clear himself

plicity therein."
the eyes of the world from all comBut Perez refused to fall Into the trap. He
in
all
knowledge of, or participation in, the crime, until Vazquez and his minions, despairing of eliciting a voluntary confession, determined to extorl it from him l>y force. On February 21, 1590, Perez was chained to the wall
persisted in denying
The following day he was once more put to the question, and when he continued to remain obdurate, he was handed over to the executioner to be tortured. The rack
of his prison.
was brought
in,
and
after he
had Buffered eight turns of the
rope, he finally confessed, in great detail, the part that In himself had played in the murder of Escovedo. 3 When, how-
he was told to explain the reasons that had moved him to persuade the king to order the crime to be committed, oil
r,
1
MigMt,
p. 180.
'
Ibid., pp.
180-186.
'
Ibid., pp.
430-433.
PERSECUTION OF PEREZ
replies
577
less satisfactory. The information, he prowould be found in the documents which had been tested, taken from him the murder, too, had taken place twelve and most of those who could bear witness to the years ago,
were
truth of what he said were no longer to be found. And so the were again left unfinished. The king had got proceedings only half of what he wanted moreover, despite all the
;
secrecy of the inquisitors,

plicity in
enough leaked out of Philip's comthe whole affair to evoke strong protests at the
asked what manner of crime
fallen minister
it
court.
Men
could be, in
which the king and his

for which, nevertheless,
had collaborated, but
one ordered the other to be put to the torture, and sympathy for Perez was aroused on every
side.
But the end was close at hand, though not in the way which Perez was keen enough to perceive Philip had expected. that after the king had got everything out of him that he could, there was no reasonable doubt that he would be given over to the executioner, and he determined to make one final effort to save himself by flight. There was only one place where he could possibly find a safe retreat. Philip had been
willing to violate a sanctuary in Castile in order to recapture
him, but the
the kingdom of Aragon and the authority of its mighty Justicia offered Perez a far surer refuge. He was accurately informed of all that had recently occurred
soil of
earlier he had had a project of escaping and the situation there now was far more favorable thither, 1 to him than it had been then. As ever, his devoted wife was at hand to aid and abet him. 2 She was far advanced in
there.
Five years
indeed, the record of her confinepregnancy at the time ments and miscarriages through all this harrowing period is
1
Mignet, pp. 163, 170 f Cf their correspondence in Frag.
mentos del Archivo Particular de Antonio Perez, pp. 76-82.
578

least
by do means the
dinary
to
bale
in
remarkable feature of this extraor-
him
rack
made
but she finally contrived to obtain access his sufferings on the bis prison, on the plea thai death an immediate probability, and the two
bis results.
laid their
heads together with excellent
About nine
Perez passed through o'clock on the evening of April 20, 1590, in his wife's cloak. his guards and out of his prison, disguised farther on was one of his friends awaited him
Just* outside
;
from the on< to the other another with horses. On the way but Perez played the the local constabulary was encountered, remained behind in discreet silence while sulky servant, and But when he in talk. his companion engaged the officers The pains of the reached the horses he hesitated no longer.
torture did not prevent
him from making
thirty
eastward without stopping, leagues to the crossed the frontiers of the kingdom of Aragon.
until
1
good Spanish he had
The
fought
Perez had been battle between Philip and Antonio In Castile thus far under most unequal conditions.
all
the" king held
the
cards,
of
to
cause sympathy which the
and the wellnigh universal the fallen minister had evoked

that
bore eloquenl
happily
testimony
Perez
'characterizes
thai
the
mass
the
love of fair play which But the of mankind.
momenl
reached
whole situation ohanged. in defending the rights tection f a constitution which gloried and every Bort of tyranny, and f the individual againsl any
in
Aragon the Be found himself under the pro-
kingdom
of
Bensitivenese to its own people whose had just been stirred to the depths bj dignities and privileges of this chapter; he the events recounted in the early pages
the
midst
of
more propitious momentj could not possibly have arrived a1 a had been No essential feature of the government of Aragon
Mignet, pp. 196
f.
PEREZ ESCAPES TO ARAGON

abolished, or even seriously modified
579
or
by the Emperor
the Catholic Kings.
They had simply followed the plan

on the increase of the royal
of concentrating their efforts
power
in Castile,
alone, in the
subvert by
of leaving Aragon as far as possible that what they deemed it imprudent to hope force might ultimately perish from inanition.
a century past, this policy had,
and
Thus
more than the whole, worked well.

far, for
on
But now the Aragonese were sud-
denly thrust forward into the limelight again. They became all at once a centre of interest. Stirring memories were
inevitably aroused. They had a cause to fight for once more, and proposed to show that they were capable of defending
it.
battle royal
the rest
Philip's
was obviously imminent, and most of of Spain proposed to sit by and enjoy it. Even favorite court fool ventured to twit him about the
1
situation in open court.
Naturally the king could not endure the thought of being openly defied in his own dominions. At all costs Perez must
be recaptured and brought back. vent his anger on the only victims
within his reach.
escape, his wife
Philip's first act
was to
who were for the moment On Holy Thursday, the day after Perez's
public prison in
and children were seized and cast into the Madrid. 2 Perez, on his part, had not yet
reached the stage of bidding his former master defiance. On April 2i, from his place of refuge in Calatayud, he had
humble and respectful letter, offering and abandonment of all attempts to rehabilitate himpeace self, provided he were only permitted to withdraw, with his and he was deeply incensed when he family, into obscurity learned what Philip had done. 3 Meantime the king lost no
written the king a most
;
time in the pursuit.

1
Ten hours
*
3
;
after the fugitive reached

Ibid., p. 201.
Ibid., pp.
Pidal, Philippe II, Antonio Perez, et le royaume d' Aragon, i, pp. 225-227 Mignet, pp. 200 f
.
198-203.
580
Calatayud, there arrived a royal order to seize him, dead or But Perez had already alive, before he passed the Ebro. taken his precautions. Though right of asylum had not
1
availed
in
him
;
in Castile,
he
still
had some
faith in its efficacy
Aragon
arrest him, they found that
and when the king's representatives arrived to he had sought refuge in a Domini-
Even this step, however, might only serve as a stop-gap, with Almenara and his officers rallying to the the only permanent hope of safety lay in a royal cause and the protection of the Justicia of Aragon. 2 manifestation
can convent.
;
Gil de
him on
in results.
Mesa, Perez's devoted friend, who had accompanied his flight from Madrid, was accordingly despatched
hot haste to Saragossa to obtain it, and with the happiest Juan de Luna, one of the deputies of the realm,
appeared at Calatayud with fifty arquebusiers, to claim for Perez the ancient privileges of Aragon, just at the moment that Philip's emissaries were about to seize him in the
convent and deport him to Madrid. The people of the town rose for the defence of their liberties, and Perez was carried
triumph to Saragossa, where the whole populace turned out to bid him welcome he was lodged at once in the cdrct
off in
;
de loa manife8tado8. Philip had been decisively beaten in the first round of the fight but, legal minded as ever, he was
;
not yet prepared to infringe the established constitution. He accordingly entered a formal plea againsl Perez before
the Justiciars court, on the grounds sed the
of
his
having com-
murder
having altered
finally, of
Escovedo on false pretences, of his despatches and divulged state secrets, and,
of
5
having escaped from prison/
The conflict now entered upon a prolonged judicial phase. Perez had the good Bense not to be rendered over-confident
1
Cf.
Mignet, p. 204. anU, Vol. I, pp. 469-471.
Mignet,
245.
i>.
206;
Pidal,
i,
pp. 241-
PEREZ IN THE JUSTICIAR COURT
581
by the evidences of popular favor which greeted him on every hand. Once more he wrote to the king and to the royal
confessor from his refuge in the cared de los manifestados,
offering peace
if
Philip
would only leave him alone, but hintif
ing, in unmistakable terms, that
the king continued to
1 persecute him, he had ample means of defending himself. But Philip would not listen he was determined to fight to a
;
finish.
On
July
1,
1590, he ordered Perez to be
condemned
to the death of a
common
criminal
by the tribunals of
Madrid, and sent word to the Marquis of Almenara to push

the case vigorously in Saragossa. 2 Perez was prompt with his reply. He now confessed before the Justicia that he had
ordered the murder of Escovedo, but only at the king's own command moreover he produced a number of documents
;
which he had secreted about his person,
many
of
them
writ-
ten by Philip himself, in proof of the truth of his assertions. The effect of these revelations was tremendous. The people
Saragossa took delight in them and circulated them broadcast. Philip and his worst methods were exposed to the gaze of Spain, and also to the rest of Western Europe,
of
had by this time begun to attract universal 3 attention it was a terrible blow to the king's prestige. Obviously nothing was to be gained by continuing the royal suit before the Justicia's court, and an attempt of the Marquis of Almenara to subject Perez to an enquesta, on the ground that he had been unfaithful in his services as crown the Justicia issued a minister, was also speedily disposed of 4 At several junctures Jirma, and the process was stayed. these trying months the king had plans of using force, during
for the case
; ;
as
1
is
proved by his orders to the Castilian grandees dwelling

132
;
pp. 245
p. 249.
Forneron, iv, p. f., 428-433. 'Forneron, iv, p.
Pidal, Pidal,
i,
D.
I. E., xii,
pp. 22-24
p.
Fomeron,
Pidal,
i,
133;
i,
iv, p. 134. * D. I. E.,
xv,
480;
pp. 261-265.
582

of
on the confines
for
Aragon
to
muster their vassals and be ready
war
'
;
but Philip could not bear actually to appeal to
arms
until the uttermost resources of his various jurisdictions
had been exhausted. There still remained one tribunal in Spain against which the fueros of Aragon and the authority of its mighty Justicia were of no avail, the tribunal of the
Supreme and Holy Inquisition
and into
its
clutches Philip
now planned to deliver Perez. The necessary preparations were made with devilish ingenuity. The king and his confessor,
Almenara, and Chinchon collaborated to furnish
evidence to show that Perez, during his imprisonment and torture, had uttered words implying doubts of the existence
of
God, that he had planned to flee to the heretics of France and Beam, where his knowledge of weighty affairs of state
and important papers could have done much harm, and that the fact that he had succeeded in winning such devotion from
suppose that he possessed diabolical powers. The evidence was despatched to the tribunal of the Suprema at Saragossa. Precautions were
the
people
gave
reason
to
'
taken to make certain that the worst possible interpretation was placed upon it. 3 The local inquisitors in haughty terms
demanded
and the
of the Justicia's court that Perez
be given up
Justicia,
Juan de Lanuza, who, though zealous
for
the maintenance of the authority of his office against all secular jurisdictions, belonged to a generally royalist family, and was in mortal terror of the church, soon decided, with the
1
D.
p.
I.
i..
H.,
li,
pp. 226
f.
Forneron.
/. Pidal. i, E., xii, p. 129; 276-283. Forneron, iv, pp. 187, supposes that one charge against 1'i'n / before tin- inquisition was that h<had Bed from prison on a hoi whu-ii he might have taken with him
D.
pp.
Beam, thereby furnishing heretics with the materia] of war. It is true that the Inquisition was charged with
to
prevention of the export of horses other heretical lands Lea, History of the (supra, pp. 82 f Inquisition a) Spain, iv, pp. 278-281); orneron cites but the passage which /' /. /,'., xv, p. 482) relates not directly to Perei bill to his friend Diego de On Horedia's case see also Beredia. Lea, History of the Inquisition of Spain,
tin
to
Beam and
iv, p.
'
282.
iv,
Forneron,
pp. 136
f.
PEREZ AND THE INQUISITION

unanimous approval
required of him.
of
583
his
lieutenants,
to
do what was
On
the morning of
May
24, 1591, Perez
was transferred from the
cdrcel de los manifestados to the

1
secret prison of the Inquisition in the palace of the Aljaferia.
The people of Saragossa were less overawed than the The Inquisition Justicia by the authority of the Holy Office.
had never been
really popular in
it
Aragon, where
its essentially
Castilian origin caused
to appear, in the present tense
state of popular excitement, almost in the light of an impor-
tation from abroad
certainly
it
was
far less national
and
less
ancient than the fueros which all men were now sternly resolved to defend. Rapid though the Inquisition had planned
that
removal to the Aljaferia should be, Perez had been able to notify his friends and on the way
its
prisoner's
he was met by a group of them, including some of the most 2 Efforts to make the Justicia eminent men of the city.
interfere proving fruitless, the tocsin
;
populace called out mons, shouting Contra fuero! Viva la libertad! rushed to the palace of the Marquis of Almenara, who was popularly held responsible for what had occurred. The Justicia, hooted
in the streets as
was sounded, and the a vast crowd, nobles, clergy, and com-
he passed, had already taken refuge there the seriousness of the crisis, he begged the Marquis realizing But the scion of the Mendozas knew no fear. 3 He to flee.
;
had, moreover, a Castilian's contempt for a rabble horde, and was confident that he could assert his own authority. His
sole reply
was
to send an order to the inquisitors forbidding
them to deliver up Perez. Meantime the rioters had broken down his door and the Justicia, as a last resort, mounted to the balcony above, and called out to ask them whether, if he
;
would consent to take the Marquis and

1
his adherents to
Mignet, pp.
231,'f.
i
Mignet, pp. 232-238.
D.
I. E., xii,
pp. 161-166.
584
prison, they
would engage, OD their word as gentlemen and The promise cavaliers, to do QO violence to him on the way. was given by the leaders of the crowd below, but the rage
of the
mass
of the rioters
had by
this time
mounted
it.
so high
the proved Justicia and the Marquis issued from the palace, they were Buffered indeed to proceed a few paces in Bafety, but soon the
it
that
impossible to
make them keep
When
Justicia, jostled
foot
;
and when
lie
by the crowd, fell and was trampled under was lost to view, the mob became unconla
trollable.
In front of the ancient Iglesia de
Seu, the rioters
hurled
and stabbed him; Almenara, they would have killed him on the spot, had not a few of the nobles interfered his servants, too, were treated as cruelly
themselves on
beat
;
as he.
Obviously there was no chance of getting him,
alive,
as far as the cdrcel de los manifestados.
deposited, bruised and bleeding, in the old was on the way, and there two weeks later he died.
He was therefore town prison, which

1
In the
meantime another band
of rioters
had rushed
to the prison
of the Inquisition at the Aljaferia.
They demanded that

in
the
inquisitors deliver Perez into their hands, and threatened, in

of
refusal,
to
fire
the
building,
order
that
the
inquisitors might themselves experience the same suffering to which they sentenced others.For 8 time the inquisitors
hesitated;
bu1
a1
last
the bishop of Teruel,
who was
still
zalmedina* of Baragossa, and two representatives Of the archbishop succeeded in persuading them that only by yielding could they hope to end the revolt.
officially viceroy, the
afternoon of the day thai the insurrection had broken out, the Holy Office surrendered its prisoner, with the stipulation that he should be
so. finally,
And
aboul
five o'clock in the
guarded with Bpecial care, and treated

'I
in all
respects as
310; Minuet,
463.
if
he
Comenia
m,
pp
10-48,404
'
D.
I. B., mi. p.
p. 243.
467; ArgeiiBola, pp, BS 89.
Cf. ante, Vol.
I, p.
RISING IN SARAGOSSA
were
still
585
in its clutches.
Perez was driven back to the
cdrcel de los manifestados in a coach.

like a
His progress thither
was triumphal procession, and as he disappeared behind the walls of the cdrcel, he was adjured to show himself thrice
window, in order that all men might know that their fueros were not infringed. In one day he had made himself the emblem of the maintenance of the liberties of
a
day
at the
Aragon.
morning, when he was told by the Count of Chinchon of the death of Almenara. Stroking his beard thrice, he rose, dressed himself, and issued
Philip
was
in bed, at nine o'clock in the
orders which resulted, in a few weeks, in the concentration of large forces of infantry and cavalry at the town of Agreda on
the confines of Aragon. Evidently it was his first idea that the rebellion must be put down by force. But, as ever, he
was slow
to take vigorous action
and while
his troops
were
assembling, a
number
of considerations
began
to present
themselves, all of which strengthened his unwillingness to appeal to arms. If he invaded Aragon in force, he would be
virtually proclaiming to the world that Spain
of civil war,
relations,
was in a state and this, in the existing condition of his foreign he was extremely reluctant to do. The English
were harrying his Atlantic coasts.
The war
in the
Low
Coun cries was not going well. He was already deeply involved with the League in France. Antonio of Crato threatened to make trouble on the Portuguese frontier, and
Better, far better, mildly, was restive. dispose of this Aragonese trouble quietly, if possible, than
Catalonia, to put
it
reveal his internal weakness to his
numerous foreign
foes.
As usual, he made every effort to demonstrate that legality was on his side. He got most of the cities of Aragon, with
1
"... y
se
el
como
dice
echado en
la ceso tormenta, de Jonas quando fue mar." Argensola, p. 93.

aai
Pidal,
i,
pp. 305
f.
C. de
C,
iii,
p. 554.
586
the exception of Saragossa, to pronounce against the revolt. Some, even, of the more conservative of the Saragossans
obviously felt that the easiest way out of the situation would be to return Perez to the custody of the Holy Office, and the
the Inquisition aided these sentiments by publishing the bull Motu proprio of Pius V against all those who hindered its activities. Even the Diputacion Permanente
officials of
del
ReynOf after consulting with the most learned men in the kingdom, was persuaded to fall into line, with a somewhat
resolve
that,
equivocal
though
if
the
inquisitors
had no
authority to annul the right of iniutifestacion, they might

lawfully suspend
it,
and that
they again demanded the

for refusing
custody of their prisoner in such language as respected this

distinction, the Justicia to deliver
would have no excuse
him up.
But
friends.
left in
all
these favorable factors were more than counter-
balanced by the extraordinary activity of Pe>ez and his There were plenty of old-fashioned radicals still
Saragossa, and he speedily succeeded in binding everyThe events of May 24 had proved
if
one of them to his cause.

to
him,
he
still
needed proof, that he had a

Fie
real genius for
moving produced inflammatory pamphlets by the score, and they wen' smuggled out of his prison and
circulated
the masses.
His pretensions, moreover, bad by this time become stronger than they had been at the he now spoke openly of forcing time of bis arrival in Aragon
among
the crowd.
Philip to restore the 200,000 ducat.- he had unlawfully taken
from him.
1
There
256
f.
is
C'f.
even reason to believe that

also
he was
Mignet,
ulta
pp.
the
Arago& to Philip (June l) on the genenJ situation in Aragon, and thi- way to remedy it, in Pidal, pp I'm Ki.j * Mignei. pp 258-261. The most famoua of these pamphlets, the boi,
of the Council
of
Perez (cf. Argensola, attributed to j a dialogue of the dead between p .94 the Almenara, Vazquez de Aroe, ehronioler Blancas, and others on the It is printed in event* <>f May 24.
.
Pidal,
i,
pp,
410 429;
cf.
also
ii,
pp 383 361.
called
I'anquin
del
Infierno,
popularly
ACTIVITIES OF PEREZ
already in correspondence with
587
of France.
In intellectual. physical activity, too, fully three nights he sawed through the grating of his window in the cdrcel de los manifestados and had it not been for the
,
Henry IV matched his
His
treachery of
one of his friends, he would certainly have
The news of this attempt escaped. desirous than ever to finish matters
made
up
;
the king more
and despite the
advice of his counsellors in Madrid, who did not believe the 1 thing could be done without the aid of Castilian troops, he
sent word to his officials and to the inquisitors in Saragossa that Perez was to be brought back to the prison of the Holy Office. Orders were despatched that the transfer was to be
on September 24 but just two days before, Philip's projects suffered a heavy blow in the death of Juan de Lanuza,
effected
;
the Aragonese Justicia, whose complaisance and moderation during the past five months had been infinitely helpful to the
His son, also named Juan, who succeeded him royal cause. at the age of twenty-seven, was far less respectful to the
3 authority of the crown, and wholly lacking in experience. He complied, indeed, with the legal formalities which were
in loyalty necessary before his prisoner could be given up to the memory of his father he could scarcely do less but
;
when September 24 came, he found

;
himself powerless to see to it ihat the king's orders were carried out. Perez and his friends had been too active the crowd which assemamong
bled at the time of the transfer, they were fully as
numerous
and far more desperate than the supporters of the constituted authorities. Another scene of violence ensued, more terrible
in
some respects than that
of four
months
before.
After a
1 Philip created a special Junta de Estado para los negocios de Aragon in the summer of 1591 the names of its ten members are given in Pidal, and the consvMa it sent ii, pp. 2 f
; .
the
king on August 29 in
Pidal,
ii,
pp. 320-331. 2 Luna, Comentarios, p. 109

ii,
Pidal,
p. 32.
3
Mignet, pp. 267
f.
">*S

resistance,
t
brief
ho royal guards took flight, and Perez, delivered from the rural de Ins manifestados, was borno off in
triumph to the house of his best friend, Diego de Heredia. There he mounted a horse and fled north toward the mountains, at first with the intention of escaping to
France,
On
hearing, however, that the royal troops were pursuing him, he
lay hidden for a few days
returned in disguise
and then, dare-devil that he was, on October 2 to Saragossa, where his

;
faithful adherents took care that
he was kept well concealed.
He now had
and he was
plans of heading a real revolution against Philip, loyal, for the time being at least to those who had
.
helped him in distress, and who now desperately n< ded his 2 leadership to save them from the vengeance of the king. But Philip still dissembled. The news of the insurrection
of
September 24 doubtless convinced him that force would His advisers at Madrid were ultimately have to be used.
convinced of
it,
and their views were confirmed
f the
letters
that poured in from Saragossa, where the rebels, led by Diego de Heredia. had made themselves masters of everything.
The
royal forces
of 12,000
at
upwards
given to
served
Agreda had by this time increased to men. most of them raw levies, but with a
nucleus of 800 veterans.
The command
officer,
'*
;
of then,
was now
an Estremaduran
the Netherlands
in
AJonso de Vargas, who had he was doubtless selected prin-
cipally because he came from the Wesl of Spain, and could therefore have no real sympathy or affiliation with the Ara-
gonese.
But
it
was not
Vargas was permitted intervening weeks were
the very end of October that to cross the frontier. Most of the
till
occupied
with
between the king and the rebel leaders.

1
correspondence Both sides were

'*<>,
kigmaola, pp. 101

I.
.
106.
lal.
ii.
pp.
54-57;
148
Minuet,
1 -
una.
'
trio*,
pp. 13ft
pp. 41
Migni f.. 46 61.
881 PkUl, ii,

f.,
280
orneron,
iv, p.
INVASION OF ARAGON
anxious,
if
589
possible, to avoid bloodshed,
mined to
assert
The rebels, moments that they were
but each was deterwhat it regarded as its inalienable rights. who had always maintained in their most violent
acting solely in defence of the ancient liberties of the realm, stoutly asserted that the
entrance of a Castilian army on Aragonese soil would constitute a breach of their fueros. They persuaded the del Reyno, and also the youthful Justicia, to give Diputacion
them formal support
in this
contention
they notified the

they even sent
to a
1
king of the position they
had taken and

if
of their intention to
it;
organize armed resistance
he ignored
word
to
Vargas
to inform
him that he was condemned
traitor's
death in case he should invade the realm.
The
king, on the other hand, took the line that, fuero or no fuero, order must be restored and the royal authority maintained.
He was
cities,
encouraged by the fact that most of the Aragonese except Saragossa, had declared themselves favorable to
his cause,
and he was vastly relieved by the news that the rebels had been unsuccessful in their efforts to get help from
the sister county of Catalonia and the kingdom of Valencia. The Valencians refused to have anything to do with them at
all.
The Diputacion
to invade
of Catalonia
and the councillors
of Bar-
more sympathetic, and wrote to Philip to beg Aragon on the other hand, they were quite unwilling to lend armed support to the revolt, and it was chiefly because of their refusal actively to participate
celona were
him not
therein, that their

2
own
lands were later
left
untouched by the
royal vengeance. became divided among themselves.
Meantime
in Saragossa the rebel forces
too
much
of a firebrand to suit
Diego de Heredia was the views of those whose chief
aim was to preserve intact the letter of the ancient laws. He circulated a rumor that the Justicia and the chief nobles who
1
Pidal,
ii,
pp. 57-78, passim.
Pidal,
ii,
pp. 92-97, 364-371.
590
had stood by him had sold themselves to the crown. A riot ensued, in which tin- youthful Juan de Lanuza was violently
handled, while the Duke of Villahermosa and the Count of Aranda took refuge in flight. On the following day calmer The Justicia was persuaded once more counsels prevailed.
to accepl the official responsibility of defending the liberties of the realm.
On November
lie
issued forth from the town,
with all pomp and ceremony, holding aloft the banner of San Jorge at the head of a company of some 400 men, to stop
the
army
this
of Vargas,
now advancing
to the bridge of Alagon.
But
\
demonstration was no better than a solemn

his forces
farce.
had been generally well received in the the realm through which they had already passed, cities of and their power was plainly irresistible. After a futile attempt to negotiate with him, in the hope of inducing him
argas and
not to enter Saragossa, the Justicia
and
his adherents fled

th(
north
to
Epila.
On
receiving
this
news,
rebels
in
Saragossa dispersed. Perez, who, whether because he did not venture to issue from his hiding place, or because he had
temporarily
lost
his genius for
moving men, had
failed to
accomplish anything since his return, took flight for the last time on November 11, and found safety in Beam. On the
following day Vargas and his army made their entrance unresisted into the ancient capital of Aragon.*
Although the rebellion now seemed utterly crushed, the slow-moving king determined to make assurance doubly sun'
on
Well informed, as always, before he enjoyed his vengeance. tin situation as it developed day by day, he learned that
create
the Justicia, Villahermosa, and Aranda were now planning to a new centre of resistance :,t Epila, that they had high
(
hope- of aid from the

1
latalonians, incensed
iv,
*
by the presence
L26;
PuJal,
li,
pp.
Mil
f.
Forneron,
Argensola,
p,
Mignet.
p. 288.
\>l>.
146
f.
EXECUTION OF THE JUSTICIA

of a Castilian
591
Aragon, and that Perez was if possible, these new striving for intervention from France must be averted without the use of force. Vargas perils
army on the
soil of
played his part to perfection. Whether owing to the royal commands, or to his own admiration of the sturdy patriotism
of the Aragonese,
ness in his dealings with every one with

contact.
he showed the utmost courtesy and kindliwhom he came in
In a few weeks he so succeeded in convincing all that Philip's sole desire was a peaceful solution of the existing difficulties, that the 'Junta of Epila' broke up, and 2 Prothe Justicia and his adherents returned to Saragossa.
men
longed correspondence with the king ensued, in which Vargas and his advisers unanimously advocated lenient treatment
;
but the majority of the royal counsellors in Madrid took the other view, and insisted that an example be made of the rebel For some time Philip hesitated but the Castilian chiefs.
;
element in him was too predominant for the issue to remain at long in doubt. He had everything now under his hand
;
the morning of December 12 a secret messenger was despatched with a note to Vargas, who, when he opened it, is said to have burst into tears.
last it
was
safe to strike.
On
"On
the receipt of this paper," so
it
ran,
"you
will seize the
let me person of Juan de Lanuza, Justicia of Aragon, and moment that I learn of his hear of his death at the same
arrest.
You
will
have
his
head cut
off."
The order was
obeyed.
The youthful
Justicia
was
seized, cast into prison,
and given one night to prepare for death. His protest, perfectly valid under the fueros, that he could not legally be
condemned "save by the full Cortes, the king, and the kingdom," availed him nothing and at ten o'clock on the following morning, December 20, the last of the independent Jus; 1
Pidal,
ii,
pp. 116-121.
;
Ibid., pp. 121-124.
Mignet, pp. 291-293
Forneron,
iv,
cf. the comment of Motley, pp. 149 f. History of the United Netherlands, iii, p. 534.
;
592
ticias of the

kingdom
of
Aragon was beheaded
in the public
market-place of Saragossa. The Boldiers of Vargas, under anus, were the sole witnesses of the seme. The Sara gossans
wen*
prey to terror and dismay, and dared not issue from
their houses.'
(
Miviouslv there were other victims to follow.
The
aneient
fuer08 were for the moment in abeyance; where the next blow would fall. On January
issued a general
men wondered
17, 1592, Philip
amnesty and pardon; but twenty-two per-
sons were specifically excepted therefrom, in addition to those actually in prison at the time, a category which included the Duke of Villahermosa and the Count of Aranda, who had
been carried
off to Castile.
The
king, moreover,
was
at great
pains to state thai the Holy Office had

satisfaction for the indignities to
jected.-
full liberty to
it
demand
which
had been sub-
attention of
Before effect could be given to these orders, the all parties concerned was diverted once more by
the necessity of repelling an invasion from the north which Perez and his friends had organized in Beam. This, in it-
mere handful, got no farther than Sallen and Biescas, and Vargas and his forces soon drove them back across the mountains.' Perhaps the most notable thing about the whole matter was the
self,
a
was
very trifling
affair.
The
invader-,
success
which the government used the war cry of 'Navarrese heresy' to stimulate the ardor of the Spaniards
with
againsi the
of
new danger, and the loyalty with which the mass

Vargas.
the Aragonese supported
Much though
still
they
Feared the loss of their fueros, they dreaded
more the
a foreign country under the rule of and Perez, who. while lie had dwelt king; among them, had been a popular idol, was now branded at B
prospect of invasion from
Protestant
Luna, CometUaHot,
Pldal,
ii,
pp.
251-256;
'
l'ihl,
ii,
pp. 160
IBS.
Pktol,
ii,
pp. 165-168, 388-407. pp. 108-184.
ROYAL VENGEANCE
traitor
593
to
his
native land.
These events occupied the
greater part of February, and Philip was highly gratified at the evidences of returning loyalty which had been afforded
him
the original leaders of the insurrection, however, he

2
The spring, summer, could not bring himself to forgive. and autumn of 1592 witnessed a tragic series of executions
and torturings, the chief object of the latter being to obtain evidence from the leaders of the revolt in Aragon which would
enable Philip to proceed legally against Villahermosa and Both of these noblemen, however, died Aranda in Castile
mysteriously in prison, Aranda probably on August Villahermosa on November 6, "before it was even
that he was
"
ill
;
4,
and
known
but the process against them continued into the reign of Philip III, and ended, significantly, with an 3 The final vengeance of the Inquisition took the acquittal.
form of an unusually imposing auto-da-fe at Saragossa, on October 20, in which six of the condemned were burnt alive, and over seventy others sentenced to different forms of lesser
Since Perez, the arch-fiend in the eyes of the Holy Office, was now beyond its reach, there was nothing left save to burn him in effigy, in coroza and sanbenito, with all
4
punishments.
possible attendant maledictions
and
vilifications,
which was
done.
His children and his descendants in the male line were
declared incapable forever of holding secular or ecclesiastical office, and were forbidden "to wear gold, silver, pearls,
precious stones, coral, silk, camlet, or fine cloth, to ride on horseback, or carry arms, or do anything else that is forbid-
den by the laws of the realm and the regulations of the Holy 5 Office to those under similar disabilities."
The
1
insurrection
iv,
was thus put down,

*
6
its
ringleaders
Forneron,
Pidal,
ii,
pp. 152
f.
Pidal,
ii,
p. 223.
f.,
1
8
p. 185.
iv,
Mignet, pp. 302
and references
Forneron, pp. 228-230.
pp. 155
f.
Pidal,
ii,
there,
594
punished, and peace restored; there now remained the further problem of how to prevent its recurrence. That the
demanded radical modifications of the existing However admirable the spirit of independfueros was clear. ence in which they had been originally conceived, they cersituation
tainly
had no place
in
an absolute monarchy such as Philip

set up.
1
and
his predecessors
had
The
real question at issue
was whether it was safe to stop at that, or whether advantage should not be taken of the excuse which the rebellion had
kingdom of was ultimately to be done by Philip V in 1707. That the Prudent King finally decided not to go so far as this has often provoked surprise. Certainly he had all the power in his hands, and the pretext which his great-grandmother, Isabella the Catholic, had so often desired for 'con2 quering Aragon' had been amply afforded him. But there were a number of considerations which inclined him to the more lenient course. In the first place, he had always declared that he proposed to respect the fueros, and he did not wish to go back on his word. In the second, he desired
Aragon, as
offered to abolish entirely the constitution of the
show his gratitude for the loyalty with which the mass of the Aragonese had rallied to his side, when it was a question
to
of repelling the invasion

in
(
from Beam.
Thirdly, the situation

for
latalonia
and Valencia doubtless counted
much.
The
former had perhaps sympathized with, but nevertheless had

abstained from any active interference
in
the rebellion in
Aragon, while the hitter had held wholly aloof. The king, therefore, had no possible excuse for proceeding against
them, and unless their separate government! were abolished, .veil as that of Aragon, lie could not have a constitutionally united Spain; if their autonomy, in other words, not to
iiis Bpittolarum Cmturia, rliimirn ban kbundmnt experience the nature of monarchical
('
r /.
in
power and the dangers

its
arising
from
no.
Ixxvi.
excess, * Cf. ante. Vol. II, p. 85.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEM
595
speak of that of Portugal on the other side of the peninsula, must necessarily continue, there was not much point in putting an end to the fueros of Aragon.
And,
lastly, there
was
Philip's innate reluctance to violate the traditions of his
native land.
Even more than
his father before him,
he was
reverent of the past.

as
we have
Separatism, of wellnigh every sort, was, repeatedly pointed out, the most ancient and
of
;
dominant inheritance
Spain being Spanish, it must necesbe right. Aragon must be brought into line with Castile, but her autonomy was to remain intact. Negotiations were therefore begun between the victorious
sarily, in Philip's eyes,
king and the representatives of his rebel realm. Of these the foremost was Martin Bautista de Lanuza, a kinsman and lieu-
tenant of the executed Justicia, who, however, was a royalist

at heart,
and had carefully refrained from any active
partici-
In pursuance of the policy which the king had decided to adopt, the Cortes of the kingdom of Aragon were summoned to Tarazona, in order that
pation in the recent insurrection.
changes which were contemplated should have the sanction of the representatives of the realm but the agenda
the
;
for their deliberations
constituted for
were drawn up by a junta specially the purpose and carefully instructed by the
crown.
Of
this junta the
most important members were
Andres de Cabrera y Bobadilla, archbishop of Saragossa, who was then at the court, and the Count of Chinchon. Moreover, the first of these two was delegated by Philip formally
to
bitter
open the assembly in his name, for the king cherished memories of his experiences at Monzon in 1585, and
did not propose to appear until all the real business of the session had been done. 1 The meeting, originally fixed for
May
1
9,
2 1592, did not finally take place until June lo.
The
iii,
Pidal, ii, pp. 241-246 pp. 596-599.
C. de
C,
Pidal,
ii,
pp. 244-247.
596
los,
THK LIBERTIES OF ARAGON

needless
to
-mUI.
made
difficulties
over the royal
There was
absence, which they regarded as derogatory to their dignity. also much trouble over getting them to accept the king's demand for the abolition of the ancient fuero requiring
absolute unanimity of the votes of each estate, and the substitution of majority rule; but authority, if not tradition, now on the royal side, and in the end they submitted.
1
In the course of these events, the archbishop of SaragOBSB

died,
and Philip appointed Doctor Juan Campi, the regent of the Jouncil of Aragon, to take his place as the royal reprebut the news that daily poured in from Tar," zona sentative
(
;
made
bound
in
it
increasingly evident that everything was ultimately to turn out in accordance with the royal desires, and
mid-November
Aragon.
They
were
the king, with Prince Philip, arrived in welcomed at least with outward
a
cordiality."
There was
solemn
sol in of
the four brcutoa in

;
the archiepiscopal palace at Tarazona on December 2, at which the Prince of Asturias swore to observe the fueroa of the realm.
in
The king solemnly sanctioned

(
all
the chanj
the constitution which the

Pidal,
ii,
)ortes
had made, and formally
pp.
240
of.
enoea there; and
j:>l. and referalso pp. 112 415, a
"Papal obre que !a mayor parte de oada hrazo baga braaoi preeentado A
de
iraaona pore! Arsobii Zamajoaa," which ooncludea with the following curioua paragraph " La election del Bmp< radoi legitime si ee heeha oon pareaoer de la mayor part.' de lot aleotoree, y ha '1 Doiamo Eteyno de Aragon, euando an el fnlto Rey, ae cometid la election a raonae, y lo qua la mayor parte de aUoa determind ful aentenoia Kevin, de Aragon; > baatd para dar el y agora no quieren que baate para baeet y determinar an las Cortee, lo A la mayor parte que iendo asi que la vida y la muerte, la hacienda y la bonra, al im; mundo, haata la oonciencia eatAn aujetoa al juicio de la mayor
laa Cdrfa
i
parte; de lo rual SB vo quan eserupulossa cossa es DO atender A remodiar una singularidad tan ejrande comb ea querer en his C'6rtos conformidad sin y los quo ae han hallado diaorepacion en tienen anteriores mas algunaa
;
ii
obligacion de advertiiio y mae eecrupulo en faeilitarlo; por todo lo oual pap-see A Su Majeatad que al bien de eate Eteyno fuero para oonviene, que luego que la mayor parte de braao baga braao y la mayor parte de < Jdrte haga ( 'orle Over the gate li\ which (hey entered Tarazona appeared the followi
ing
rem
\ doe Felipea eaparOi En quien hoy eapera al mundo: El aegundo ea sin primero, \ al tercero ea *m aegundo."
Pidal,
ii,
p.
2M
is
'A
Pidal,
list
ii,
of those present
Riven
l>y
pp. 41&-419.
CORTES OF TARAZONA
declared the session closed.
597
a general amnesty to all who On December 5 he left Tarazona.

at Madrid.
1
the following day he granted were still prisoners in the realm.
On
On
the 30th he was back
The
constitutional changes which
had been voted by the
Cortes of Tarazona were simple but effective. Dictated, as they virtually had been, at the fiat of the monarchy, they put
an end to the real independence,
if
not to the formal
autonomy
removed.
of the
kingdom
but
all
of
Aragon.
to
lutely suppressed,
power
Nothing was absoresist the crown was
The king was given the
right, at least until the

;
next meeting of the Cortes, to nominate a foreign viceroy Aragon alone, of all his different realms, had hitherto
succeeded in reserving this
office for natives,
and she was
now brought into alignment with Valencia, Granada, and 2 In the Cortes, the abolition of the fuero requiring Navarre.
unanimity was the most important change the right to vote also, though not to attend, was taken away from those mem;
bers of the
two brazos
of the aristocracy
;
who had not
attained
the age of twenty years the Diputacion Permanente, too, was deprived of a large measure of its control over the use of the
national funds and over the national guard, and of its right to call together the representatives of the cities of the kingdom. The Justicia became for the first time removable at
the pleasure of the king, and the chief guarantee of his independence was thus annulled. The nomination of his five
lieutenants and of the seventeen legists
also rearranged in
such fashion as to
who advised him was put their selection much

it
more largely
in
1
in the royal
hands
indeed,
was the changes

all.
3
matters judicial that were the most important of

Luna,
ii,
Pidal,
pp.
Comentarios, pp. 330-335 Cf. also Luna, pp. 260-269. 372 ff ., and Mignet, pp. 377 f.,
;
on the reception
of Philip III at Sara-
gossa in 1599. 2 Pidal, ii, pp. 270 f. 3 Pidal, ii, pp. 271-274.
598
THE LIBERTIES OF ARAGOX

of
Dumber
other constitutional anachronisms were either
Notable among radically modified or else done away with. these was the so-called fuero of the via privilcgiada, which
enabled
in
a
case
prisoner to regain his liberty, temporarily at least, of any illegality in the form of his arrest; its
operation was
now
greatly restricted by the enumeration of
some
valid.
thirty important crimes for

1
which
All in
all, it
is
impossible to
was no longer to be deny that most of these

it
modifications, save perhaps that which provided that the Justicia should cease to be irremovable, brought real
improvement
for
conditions had
so
altered
since
the
ancient Aragonese constitution had first come into being, that it was no longer possible that it should be practically
enforced.
The tragedy
a
not been evolved as
lay in the fact that the changes had result of the constitutional develop*
ment
kingdom itself, but imposed, instead, at the commonarch who was so incorrigibly Oastilian in his viewpoint that the Aragonese really regarded him almost in
of the
of a
mand
the light of a foreigner.
A few minor difficulties si
ill
remained to be settled after the

<M these the most
dissolution of the Cortes of Tarazona.
important was the withdrawal of the Castilian army, which

the Cortes had demanded, and the whole realm ardently
desired.
It was D01 effected, however, until December, and Philip insisted. price of it, on the construction 1593, of a fort and the establishment oi a royal garrison in the Aljaferia, on the plea thai the safety of the Inquisition must
be insured.9
H<
with
genera] disarmament
followed this up, in the next two months. of all the Moriscos in the realm.
fur-
Their outbreaks during the preceding troublous years

nished
a
pretext
tor
it.
The measure waa
in
fact a fore1
to
shadowing
1
of the edict of general expulsion

Pidal,
ii,
which was
Pidal,
ii.
pp. 275-277.
pp. 418-421.
PEREZ IN FRANCE
put forth for
the rebel
all
1 Spain in 1609.
599
tion that the king
All in all, there was no queshad issued victorious from his struggle with Aragonese in Spain, at least, he had triumphantly
;
asserted the absolute supremacy of the crown.
On
the other
hand, his most powerful enemy had escaped, and was already revealing the most closely guarded secrets of his ancient
master at the courts of France and England, and moving heaven and earth to induce them to combine against him.
The
Aragon were not merely a cosa de Espana. They also had an international significance and in order to appreciate what that significance was, we must follow the
troubles of
;
'
'
fortunes of Antonio Perez after his flight across the Pyrenees

to
Beam. The
fugitive
burned
2
for revenge
long as Philip occupied the throne, his
on the Prudent King as life's ambition was to

;
His resentment, moreover, was greatly the king's attempts against him after his escape. enhanced by He was relentlessly pursued until he got across the frontier.
humiliate him.
When he was
in
Beam
Philip sought to lure

finally,
Spain on false pretences, and

did his utmost to get
tried
1
when
3
all
him back to else had failed,
him
assassinated.
still
Three Spaniards
Navarre, without
to kill
,
him while he was
in
Pidal, x pp. 279-288; cf. also the frontispiece to this volume.
There can be no doubt that the words and writings of P6rez went far towards creating that hostile conception of Philip II which continued to prevail north of the Pyrenees till the middle of the nineteenth century (cf. His Bratli, Philippe II, pp. 19 f.). influence on the development of French literature during the succeeding decades is also incontestable for everybody read him. Cf. "Antonio Perez," by Philarete Chasles, in the Revue des deux mondes, quatrieme serie, xxii, pp. 701716 (1840), which contains the following sentences (pp. 703, 714): "L'Slo;
exile avait donne l'impulsioii castillane a cet esprit francais que le moindre souffle fait vibrer, et qui se
quent
laisse
entratner
avec tant de
facility
et de force vers des regions inconnues.
l'Espagnole Anne d'Autriche tout devient Spouse Louis XIII espagnol en France. ... Le bannissea done 6t6 V accident ment d'Antonio
Alors
;
necessaire
qui devait greffer le genie de l'Espagne sur celui de la France." On the questions of loyalty involved in Perez's conduct, cf. the remarks of A. Morel-Fatio, L'Espagne au XVI' et
au
3
XVII e
siecle, p.
263.
Mignet, pp. 314-317.
600
success.
beautiful
harlot,
bribed
to
make
the
same
attempt, was BO fascinated by her intended victim that she ended by offering him protection and support. Two Irishmen, a1 the behest of Philip's representative in the Nether-
compass his death when he was in England in 1594, but were promptly seized and executed and the same was the late of the Baron de Pinilla, who was paid
Lands, Bought to
;
600 ducats to shoot him in Paris in 1595.

der
if
Small won-
vowed vengeance on the author of these dastardly attempts, and there was no question where he could most effectively seek it. Henry IV did not official!)
Perez
declare war on Spain
till
January
17,
1595
but Philip since
1584 had been ardently supporting the League, which continued to hold Paris till 1594, and thus prevented the union
of
Prance under Henry's sceptre.

excellent use of a
The French
si<t<
'
kins:
could
make
man
with the genius and disposition
of Perez.
Henry
therefore wrote to his
Catharine at
Beam, who had befriended the

hail
fugitive minister ever since he
crossed the Pyrenees, to send him northward at once; and the two men met at Tours in the spring of 1593. 2
time was to gain for himself the alliance of the cautious Elizabeth of England
of
One
Henry's chief desires
at
this
for the defence of his northeastern frontier in the

Philip,
table
war against which, though not yet declared, he foresaw was ineviand he promptly despatched Pen London, with a
Hut there were grave diffiLord Burleigh and the majority of the
it.
letter to the <(ueen, to obtain
way. Council were averse to participating

Elizabeth, as ever,
culties in the
in
Continental
\\
was loath to Bpend money, and Perez
v.
driven to seek the BUppOli Of the Earl of Essex, who led the small group which advocated a bolder policy. While in
London IWr/.
MiKN.-t, pp.
really Lived at his expense,

pasaim.
*
and on the proc<
M7-SM,
hiignet, p. IJJ1.
PEREZ IN ENGLAND
of a beggarly pension
;
601
for
which Essex obtained
him from the
queen through Essex he became friendly with Francis Bacon, much to the alarm of the latter's Puritanical mother, who could not endure to see her son in the company of such
But to attain the real and induce England to join France against Spain, proved for the time being to be quite
costly fellow."
"a proud, profane,
object of his mission,

2
All of political consequence that Perez achieved during his first visit there was to inform the English govern-
impossible.
ment
of the state of Spain
of the infamies of of 1594 that
and to circulate exaggerated stories her king it was at London in the summer
;
he
first
published his famous Relaciones, under

3
the significant
pseudonym of Raphael Peregrino. A year later he was back in France, where war, in the meantime, had been declared on Spain, and operations had begun on the northeastern frontier. Henry was now more
than ever in need of English aid, and after begging for it in vain during the autumn and winter, he sent Perez back to London once more on a last desperate effort to secure it in the spring of 1596. 4 At the time of his arrival the Spaniards
were besieging Calais, and shortly afterwards (April 25) captured it. Elizabeth consequently changed her tactics, and began once more to flirt with the French alliance which she
had hitherto opposed
all
this
was
of course highly favorable
to the success of Perez's mission.
But, unfortunately, when he reached London he found that the Earl of Essex, on whose
ardent support he had counted, had gone
1
off to
Plymouth to
et
Mignet,
p.
330,
note.
See
also
his
2
L'Espagne au
XVI'
au XVII"
"Antonio Perez en Inglaterra y Francia" by C. Fernandez Duro, in his Estudios Histdricos del Reinado de
Felipe II, pp. 247-380, especially pp. 249-256 and 379 f., and "Lettres
siecle.
plottings
Despite all the correspondence and described on pp. 93-97 of Mr. Lytton Strachey's Elizabeth and
Essex.
3
4
d'Antonio Perez ecrites pendant son sejour en Angleterre et en France," ed. A. Morel-Fatio on pp. 257-314 of
Mignet, pp. 328-330. Mignet, pp. 344-350, 434-437.
602
THE LIBERTIES OE ARAGON
Nothing prepare for the greal expedition against Cadiz. favorite bo return and run the risk would induce the queen'fl of seeing the dramatic stroke on which he had staked his
reputation
diverted
to
a
tamer purpose
in
the
English
that he had Channel, and Perez recognized with bitterness of factions and the plaything of become merely the sport
political chance.
1
He
bore no
real pari in
the settlement of
the Anglo-French treaty, which was signed on May 24 and 2 and when he at lasl returned to ratified later in the year;
Prance, he was disheartened and worn out.
He was
encour-
taken over, on aged once more in January, 1597, by being French monarch for in-nerous terms, into the service of the
;
Henry
recognized his great abilities,
and as long
as the
war
with Spain should last, he was Perez devoted good use of him. For some months thereafter his best energies to maintaining intact the Anglo-French to be a task beyond his alliance, but this ultimately proved
powers. Henry's recapture of Amiens, on September 24, convinced Philip that he could no longer profitably continue the war, and he soon afterwards offered the French king
confident that he could
make
terms which induced him to abandon the often disappointed him in the past, and sign
ally
a
who had
so
with Spain
at
Vervins on
May
2,
L598.
When
separate treaty Perez saw
that the peace which he had labored to prevent was inevitahimself ncluded in it, with ble, he made a strong effort to get
provision for the liberation of his restoration of his property; but he hopelessly failed. new turn of events made him a liability, ti"t an asset,
court of
wife and children and the
The
at
the
Henry
IV.
Moreover,
his
numerous reverses and
rebuffs in the course of the past six years had converted into
bitterness and insolence that rare personal

Mi K i,ot, pp. 99 102.
i
:
charm which had
nwhejr, op.
in
cil..
Cheyney,
Venetian, 486.
ii,
ix,
pp. 1 '. 148; C. S. I'. nos. 449, 455, 4fiX, 474,
IfaiiAfol
Laviase,
vi,
1,
p.
409;
LATER YEARS OF PEREZ

hitherto been his most powerful asset
;
603
every one
him the
cold shoulder.
The
sole consolation
now turned brought him by
the year 1598 was the news of the death of Philip, on Septem1 ber 13.
Perez survived his ancient master for more than thirteen

years, but the last part of his
life
saw no betterment
of his
fortunes.
He was
encouraged, indeed, in 1599, by the events

:
that signalized the initiation of the rule of Philip III the rumor that Philip II had advised his son to get reconciled to
his
exiled
minister,
the
fall
from
grace
of
his
'arch-
executioner/ Vazquez de Arce, the liberation of Juana Coello and her children, and the general atmosphere of hedonism and forgiveness which characterized the reign
of the
more than ever did he hope to be Picture King allowed to return to Spain. With the idea of gaining favor
;
'
'
with the new monarch, he tried to make himself useful in connection with the Anglo-Spanish peace negotiations of 1604, and so confident was he of success that he rashly
resigned his pension at the French court the attempt, however, was a miserable fiasco, for the French government had
;
warned the British that Perez's aims were purely selfish, and James I was furious when he learned that he had been even
3 permitted to land in his realm.
was
hartl
put to
it
to find a living.
Returned to France, Perez He was obliged to move
from one lodging to another, each meaner than the one before. His petitions to the different Spanish ambassadors at Paris to
intercede for
he could
1
him at Madrid were fruitless. A final hope that make capital for himself out of the negotiations for a
pp.
Mignet,
f.
351-370;
;
Pidal,
ii,
pp. 313
1
Mignet, pp. 371-378

ii
also Harleian
says, "Let the wife of Antonio Perez also be set at libertie, so that from hencefoorth shee live in a monasterie,
Miscellany,
(1809), pp. 395-397, "A Declaration of the last Wordes and Death of Philip the Second." On
397, the king, speaking to the prince,
and
let her daughters inherite patrimonie which she brought." * Mignet, pp. 384-389.
the
p.
(304
in double marriage between the courts of France and Spain was cruelly disappointed, and on Novemof L61 the
spring
ber
:>
of that
buried year he died, and was

1
in
the church of the
Celestines at Paris.
In Spain
Juana Coello continued
to labor for the repeal of
had pronounced the harsh sentence which the Inquisition in L592, and in June, 1615, unst Perez and his descendants
It would appear to have been she was finally successful. that this act of leniency should be kepi stipulated, however, for when Gonzalo, one of the at least, unheralded
2
secret, or,
sons of Perez, ventured to
public too ostentatiously, he was promptly cast into prison, and his mother, on learning in the arms of her of his arrest, died of grief shortly afterwards
it
3 The rancors that had been engendered Indaughter Luisa. m ner husband's extraordinary career were not to be allayed
make
his
'
own
generation.
573
D. I. E.. xii, pp. Mignet, p. 404 f. Forneron, iv, p. Ib2, note 2.
,
Mignet, pp. 389-403, passim. Gf. C. de C, iv, pp. 292 f.
See note at the end of Chapter
of the D. I. E.
605
Sources and Contemporary Authorities. The whole
XXXV,
and add
of
volume
xii
with original documents in regard to Perez. Angel Gonzalez Palencia published some Fragmentos del Archivo Particular de Antonio Perez in the R. A.,
and pp. 397-553
of
volume xv are
filled
1918-21, and also separately, in 1922; my references are to the separate edition. Eugenio de Ochoa edited Perez's letters from 1591 onward in the B. A. E., Epistolario Espanol, i (1850), pp. 463-570, and A.
Morel-Fatio added some more on pp. 257-314 of his L'Espagne au IP siecle; and numerous other manuscripts bearing P et au
XV
XV
on the case are published

below.
in the
works
of
Mignet and
Pidal, described
Pidal also gives a full list of the works of Perez and the various editions of them on pp. xxxiv-xxxvi of volume i and pp. 316-319 of volume ii of his great book it is worth noting that though the Rela;
and Obras were published four times in Paris and twice in Geneva before the end of the seventeenth century, they were not
ciones
Cf. also Enciclopedia Universal Ilustrada, till 1849. 647, on the question of the authorship of the Norte de Printhe latter work was first published cipes and the Arte de Gobernar at Paris in 1867, in Spanish and French, edited by J. M. Guardia.
printed in Spain
xliii,
p.
The "capitulo adicional" on pp. 520-612 of vol. iii of C. de C. gives an excellent account of the 'troubles' in Aragon and Perez's part therein
from the Castilian point
histories of the
The two standard contemporary of view. same events by Aragonese are the Information de los Sucesos del Reino de Aragon en los Anos de 1590 y 1591, written in 1604 by Lupercio Leonardo de Argensola, "cronista mayor del rei
la corona de Aragon, a instancia de los diputados del reino," but not published till 1808 at Madrid; and the Comentarios de los Sucesos de Aragon en los Anos 1591 y 1592, by Francisco de Gurrea y Aragon, Conde de Luna, who lived from 1551 to 1622 and was deeply this last work, involved in the affairs of the county of Ribagorza which contains copies of a number of contemporary letters, was first published at Madrid by Marcelino de Aragon y Azlor, Duque de
;
... en
Villahermosa, in 1888. Later Works. The most valuable
modern book on the Aragonese
end of the story

:
chapter has to tell is still the Historia de las Alterations de Aragon en el Reinado de Felipe II, by Pedro Jos6, Marit was first published in three volumes at Madrid in quis de Pidal 1862-63, but it was subsequently translated into French by J. G.
this
Magnabal, and published
in
two volumes at Paris
in 1867,
under the
606

;
title of Philippe II, Antonio Perez, et le Royaume d' Aragon my references are to this edition. It scarcely seems worth while to enumerate all the monographs, plays, and essays which have been written in
regard
hl.'i;
t<>
the personal character
and career
of
et
Perez.
The mosl
important are F. A. Mignet, Antonio Perez
my
An
references are to the fifth
Philippe II (Paris, edition of 1881) Gaspar Muro,

;
\'ida de la Princesa de Eboli
Perez:
A. Froude, "Antonio Unsolved Historical Riddle," in the Nineteenth Century
(Madrid, 1877)
J.
and May, 1883; subsequently printed on pp. 90-lo4 of his Armada (New York, 1S92) C. Fernandez Duro, "Antonio Perez en Inglaterra y Francia," on pp. 247-460 of his F studios Hist&ricos del Reinado de Felipe II (Madrid, 1890) M. A. S. Hume, "El Enigma de Antonio Perez," on pp. 167-203 of his Espaiioles 6 Ingleses en el Siglo XVI (Madrid and London, 1903); Andrew Lang, "The Murder of Escovedo," on pp. 32-54 of his Historical Mysteries (London, 1904); Jos Ferndndez Montana, De C6mo and Louis Felipe II no man do matar a Escobedo (Madrid, 1910);
for April
Spanish Story of the
Bert rand,
Philippe II,
line
desiring a fuller
list will find it
tcnebreuse affaire (Paris, 1929). Th<>-< on pp. vii-x of Julia Fitzmaurice-Kelly,

cf.
Antonio Perez (Oxford, 1922);
also Pidal, op.
cit.,
i,
p.
xxxvi.
CHAPTER XXXIX
SPAIN, FRANCE,
AND THE NETHERLANDS,
1584-98
dramatic interest of the story of the defeat of the Spanish Armada and of the subsequent naval struggle with
The
England must not make us forget that the period during which they took place was also of critical importance in the To the history of history of Spain's relations with France.
those relations
we now
rolled
return,
and therewith,
at the
same
time, to the history of the revolt in the Netherlands, which,

as the years
on,
became more and more
closely
involved with them.
Down to the death of the Duke of Anjou in June,

policy of the Prudent
1584, the
King with regard to France can fairly be summarized as one of 'watchful waiting.' The last Valois were so fully -occupied at home in their struggle to maintain
themselves against the Guises on the one hand, and the Huguenots on the other, that it was out of the question for
them
wage a foreign war in any such fashion as their predThe most they ecessors had done in the Emperor's day. could do, when they wished to make trouble for Philip, was to lend aid, directly or indirectly, to the rebels in the Low Counto
tries.
Philip, in turn, sought to parry these thrusts,
and
also
to
make
additional capital for himself out of the situation in
France, by secretly intriguing, through his ambassadors and other agents, with the various malcontents there. He might
have minor grievances, indeed but, in general, the status quo a France internally disrupted but still officially Catholic
607
lilts
SPAIN. FRANCE,
AND THE NETHERLANDS

Certainly he had nothing
was highly satisfactory to him.

to gain
at
by provoking war, and

recalled him. 1
if
any
of his representative's
belligerent, be
the Valoia court threatened to
become too
promptly
L58
1.
The continuance
of this policy
became impossible
first
after
The death of Anjou was the
of a series of event-
destined to force Philip into vigorous intervention in France. The Duke was the last, save one, of the sons of Henry II
and Catharine de' Medici;
his
death meant that when
his
III,
elder brother, the childless reigning sovereign,
Henry
should follow him to the grave, the legal heir of the crown of France would be the Protestant Henry of Bourbon, who in
L572 had inherited from Ins mother, Jeanne d'Albret, the French fragment of the kingdom of Navarre. The sue-ion of a heretic,
hostility to Spain,
and
of a heretic with a tradition of bitter
was now an imminent peril. Something must be done, and done at once, to avert such catastrophe and the obvious move under the circumstances was for Philip to draw near to the ultra-Catholic party in France, then
i ;
headed by the three Bone

I
hike of Guise.
oe Lorraine, second Hitherto the Spanish monarch had been

of Francois to
generally opposed
interests,
to his
the
projects of
this
family,
wh
though intensely Catholic, were politically oppos own, but now there seemed no alternative to an alliance
with them.
Henry
111
had been
officially
recognized as their
sovereign by the rebels in the bow Countries in the previi April, ami -nice his brother's death in June, he had been
piciously friendly to
Henry
of
Navarre;
clearly, for the
moment, there was nothing to be expected from him.'' on December 31, L584, Philip's ambassador in France, Juan
Cf. C. !'>./ ruocionet de Lista de
l
Buetamante,
Felipe
is
.
"Lm
Joan
*ta
Forneron,
Mariejol
i.
pp. 123, 225, 278. and

I.
i,
II
/.'
j, j,.
;i
references thai
'
de
1
In
1,
p- 239.
xvi
177
THE TREATY OF JOINVILLE
609
Bautista de Tassis, and the representatives of the Guises signed a treaty at Joinville which reanimated the League of
1576 by bringing
it
the support of the monarchy of Spain. 1

parties
The high contracting
made
a perpetual offensive
and defensive alliance for the preservation of the Roman Catholic faith, for the extirpation of heresy in France and in the Low Countries, and for the exclusion of the Bourbons
from the French throne.
sidies to the
Philip
was not yet ready

allies,
to send
his tercios to the aid of his
amount
agreed to pay in six pledged for the year.
but he promised subcrowns a month, and even months the total amount that he had
of 50,000
new
He was
crisis
promises as this.
The
not wont to make such must indeed have seemed to
him grave.
The year 1585 saw

ation.
several fresh developments of the situ-
In April the masterful Bernardino de Mencloza, who had recently been ordered out of England, supplanted Tassis 2 He immediately estabas Spanish ambassador to France.
lished contact
with Henri, third
Duke
of Guise,
and soon
became, in fact, rather Philip's representative with the League than at the Valois court to which he was officially
accredited.
At the same time
it is
evident that his confident
and imperious bearing made a profound impression on the The French king desired above all vacillating Henry III.
things to detach the king of Spain from the League, and even 3 offered Philip his alliance against England as the price of it
;
but
this,
Mendoza was not

and the
final
tempted by any such proposal as result was that in midsummer Henry

to be
weakly capitulated to the Guises. By the treaty of Nemours (July 7) he came to agreement with the forces of the League
'Text in Dumont,
diplomatique, v,
1,
G. Revue
Corps universd pp. 441-443. de Puchesse,' in Baguenault

questions
historiques,
(1879), pp. 30-33; Forneron, note 4. 3 Forneron, iii, p. 232.
iii,
p. 233,
des
xxv
610
SPATN, FRANCOS,
it
AND THE NETHERLANDS

perfectly clear that the Guises and
1
on terms which made

not
the Valoia were the master.

forth,
furious edict
against
heresy was put
giving alternative of confession or exile.
the
Huguenots the
All sorts of
naked
powers and
virtually
favors were accorded to the (luises; the
monarchy
placed itself under their tutelage in the conduct of the now inevitable war against the followers of Henry of Navarre.
the Guises, in turn, took their orders from the treaty of Nemours meant not merely the Mendoza, it signified that Fran< extirpation of French Protestants
But
since
political destinies were being delivered over to the kin;:
Spain, and that Spanish preponderance, already intolerable, waa to be still further enhanced in a new and unexpected
direction.
Rut
this the
new
pontiff, Sixtus
V,
who had
if
been
elected
in
the preceding April,
was
resolved,
possible, to
in his e\
prevent.
of
The saving
of
French Catholicism was

he wished
it
accomplished paramount for the mainwithout the interference of the Spanish king tenance of a powerful united monarchy in France was essen;
importance, but
tial
to the preservation from Spanish dictation of the inde2
pendence of the Holy See.

heresy, indeed, he
Of
Accordingly, when the
Gu
Vgaii
a bull
asked for his alliance, he refused to commit himself.
took a definite stand
by launching
1
but he excommunication against Henry of Navarre,' was unwilling '<> make common cause with the dominant
faction in Prance for fear of indirectly increasing the power
of Spain.
i
lb-
wished the
Y;d<>i> to fight
civil
their
own
full
battlei
Protestantism and
war and reap the
rew
of victory. Philip knew from that moment that the political jealousy and distrust of the Holy See, of which he had
MuiAjol It' of the
I 1
Lavi.-w, vi, 1, p. 248. tpvity in Ihimont, Corps rad diplomati<r"-. v. 1, pp. 45a f Pastor, xxi, pp. 262 ff.. 274 ff.
in
after
not, be it observed, until he hud learned of the tn-Bty of Wmoiirs. Pastor, xxi, p. 285.
'Though
SPAIN
AND THE LEAGUE
611
often complained in preceding years, were certain to be continued, if not intensified, as long as Sixtus remained
Pope.
During the next three years Philip's attention was centred on the expedition against England, so that the story of his relations to France falls somewhat into the background but Bernardino de Mendoza was incessantly active
;
promote the interests of his master. The course of the War of the Three Henrys that broke out in 1585 proved that the king of Navarre was a formidable opponent in the field, and the inconstancy of the Valois monarch caused the scene to shift almost every day but in
'
there in his efforts to
'
general
be said that the efforts of the Spanish ambassador were directed rather towards the preservation /
it
may
and extension
of Spain's political influence in France than to the extirpation of heresy there. Henry III, as was to be expected, at once became terribly restless under the control
of the Guises.
Before the end of the year 1586 there was talk of his seeking reconciliation with the king of Navarre. This of course, was determined to prevent, and notified the Philip,
it.
Pope that he would never consent to

France,
On the other hand, in
Mendoza put
forth every effort to widen the breach
between the Guises and the king, 2 for he wished the factions there to multiply and exhaust themselves in civil strife, and
to
make
sure that the control of the League should remain in
the hands of Spain. The success that he attained in this difficult task is a wonderful tribute to the power of his personality he seemed to tower like a giant above the weaklings
;
who surrounded him.

for
Guise was constantly running to him Spanish aid, for funds from Madrid, and for soldiers from Alexander of Parma he took delight in his smile, and trem;
1
Mariejol in Lavisse, vi, Joseph de Croze, Les
1,
pp. 259 f. Guises, ks
Valois,
et
ii,
Philippe
pp. 324
ff.
II
(Paris,
1886,
2 vols.),
612
bled
in
^
SPAIN, FRANQE,
at
AND THE NETHERLANDS

also
his frown.
affairs
Mendoza
England.
in
found time
to intervene
a
the
ottish
of
He
strove to
bring about
Catholic rising
1587, and organized

.
fresh con-
spiracies foi the
murder
to
time
for the
Armada
2 When it oame Queen Elizabeth set sail, he saw to it that the French
of
monarch was impotent to give effect to the threats he had made that he would go to the assistance of England; nay more, when in May, 1588, the Day of the Barricades bad forced Henry to abandon his own capital and take refligi
Chart res, Mendoza actually had the effrontery to present himself before him and demand an assurance of his support
in
the enterprise on which his master was about to embark. He virtually insisted that the Most Christian King g
him
let
guarantee that no Frenchman would ever pul or hindrance in the way of the projects of Philip of
a definite
3
Spain.
The news
redoubled
of the defeat of the
Armada was
if
great shock to
Mendoza, but
his
as
soon
as
;
he had
for
recovered
from
it.
be
own
activities
England was
to be lost to
Spain, there was all the more reason why Spain should mainEver since the beginning of the tain her influence in France.
year the ruises had resolved to force Henry to casl in his again with the League, and on such terms as would red
(
lot
him
to
impotence;
they
demanded
tin
capitulation of the
All king to a faction admittedly controlled from abroad. their actions had been directed to the attainment of this end.
Mendoza ardently supported them, and on

ailed
.July lM,
by
their
Edict of Union, they had apparently accomplished The king submitted on all points, and purpo
for the
de
*
*
pardoned those responsible

Baguenault de
I'm-hesse,
luc.
Day
of the Barricadi
cit.,
pp. 35 f Pornoron, iii. p, 1 Relation* jiohtiquea de la
siicle, ed.
France
el
I'Espaane avec l'cosse au \ V r A. Teulet, v, pp. 369-516. Bagucnault de Pucheaae, pp. 38 f Mariejol in Laviase, vi, 1, p. 277.
MURDER OF
GUISE
613
But the permanence of these arrangements remained to be tested, and the test was to come at the meeting of the StatesGeneral, which had been summoned to Blois in the autumn. The Guises did their utmost to secure the return of members
favorable to themselves, and with excellent success. When the assembly met it was found that they had practically all
the clergy, a majority of the nobles, and nearly three-quarters of the Third Estate they were certain that permanent was at last within their grasp. 1 But the wily victory
;
less sanguine than they, for he realized, as did not, the utter untrustworthiness of the king. In they
Mendoza was
September, without a word either to his aged mother or to
Henry suddenly dismissed his chancellor and two secretaries of state, and replaced them with men who would take their orders from him. In October, when he first addressed the Estates, he made it evident that he did not intend to abide by his promises of three months before. 2 The
Guises were furious, and were supported by the assembly. So confident were they in the assurance of popular support that they felt sure that in the end the king would be forced
to yield only Mendoza had any suspicions of foul play, and even he believed that he would be able to forestall it. For
;
the
Duke
of Guise,
nine long weeks the struggle continued, but when Henry became finally convinced that he could not win over the
have recourse to murder. On Duke of Guise was summoned to the royal council chamber, and was slain as he entered by the
Estates, he determined to
December
23, the
the next day his brother, the cardinal of LorOn January 5, 1589, the aged raine, suffered a similar fate.
royal guard
;
queen-mother died in the castle of Blois, and the last wretched scion of the house of Valois was left quite alone to
1
vi, 1, p.
280.
Baguenault de Puchesse, pp. 40

iii,
f.
Fomeron,
p. 250.
614
SPAIN".
PRANCE, AM) THE NETHERLANDS
wrestle with the herculean task of unifying and enfranchising his native land.
1
Mendoza was
(
utterly cast
down when he
learned of the
murder of luise. Four days later he wrote to Philip, assuring him of the many warnings that he had given the Duke, and bewailing the fact that all the hopes which he and his master
upon the League had now "gone up in smoke." too, was deeply disheartened by the news, and is Philip, reported to have declared that he counted it an even worse misfortune than the loss of the Armada. Yet both the king
had
built
'-'
;
ambassador underestimated the intensity of the antiroyalist feeling in France that had been aroused by the murThe central committee of the League in Paris, der.
and
his
not only raised the standard of revolt at the capital, but sent messages to all the chief cities of the realm, urging them to do the same Guise's sole
popularly
known
as the Seize,
surviving brother, Charles,

"
Duke
of
t
lieutenant-general of the
s1
ate and of
Mayenie was made he crown of France."

effectively, to keep
The
material was ready to hand which would have enabled
Philip,
had he
utilized
it
promptly and
for
France under Spanish control

just at the
many
year-
bo
come.
Hut
the
very moment when he should have acted boldly, He liked to have the Prudent King elected to play .-ale.
French monarchy in leading strings, but he could not quite lie instructed bring himself to countenance open rebellion.
Mendoza
in all
to
keep close
to
Henry
III
at
all
costs, to refrain
from asking him to explain what he had done, and to strive possible wayfl to rekindle the courage of the 'atholii instead of stimulating the activities of the League, the ambt
( 1
FwrrnTiiii.
:.-
/.
Duet
'/
(TiMMi
i>
ii,
pp.
*
districts Into
gueneull dc Pucheo,
1
i-
heads of the local councils of tin wLirh Paris was divided. orneron iv, p. Baguenault de
I
'.i
r>.
i\
xii. p.
Bo called because composed of tlM
MURDER OF HENRY
III
615
sador was given the impossible task of preventing an understanding between the Valois and the king of Navarre. In
the meantime Mendoza's courage had come back.
He saw
;
the chance to play the bolder game, and finally, in defiance but he of Philip's commands, he betook himself to Paris
was not able to accomplish much after he arrived there, and his departure from the court gave Henry an excuse for sending a special messenger to
recalled.
1
Madrid
to
demand
that he be
Again Philip hesitated, but this time hesitation was wise. Even before Mendoza had left the court, it was perfectly
obvious what the king of France would do. The successes of the League and the ebullitions of anti-royalist sentiment
which
it
had evoked
left
him no
alternative save an alliance
with Henry of Navarre.
He made
one
last effort, indeed, to
draw close to Mayenne, but it was evident from the first that it was certain to fail and while he was awaiting the inevitable refusal, the king of Navarre put forth his famous appeal to the French nation (March 4) which proved that even though he might be a heretic, he was a patriot first of all, who would tolerate no interference by foreigners within the realm. On April 3 the two Henrys agreed to the terms of an alliance. On the 30th they met at Plessis-les-Tours. In the succeeding weeks they advanced together on Paris, their
;
forces rapidly increasing every day.
By the end
2
were prepared to lay siege to the there was terror and confusion.
Leaguers to
a fanatic
capital.
It
July they Within the walls
of
was
bitter indeed for the

;
lose, after victory had seemed so near and finally Dominican persuaded himself that the only way to save the cause was to do unto Henry of Valois as he had done
unto Henry of Guise.

1
On
the last night of July Jacques

*
Baguenault de Puchesse,
p. 44.
vi, 1,
pp. 296-
298.
616
(
SPAIN,
PRANCE AND THE NETHERLANDS

On
the morrow,
'lement Btole out of the capital.
by dint
of
forged papers, he obtained access to the king a1 St. Cloud, and plunged a dagger into his breast. The assassin was slain
on the spol
thai
same evening the

to his
last
of the Valois died. 1
master on the following; day how "it has pleased our Lord to deliver us by an event so happy that it cannot l>ut lie attributed to His all-powerful hand;
Mendoza reported
indeed
it
gives us reason to hope that
we
are finished with the
heretics."'less
But Philip, when he got the news, was much For the moment he seemed far less enthusiastic.
in
interested
the vast possibilities which the assassination
opened up
for
him than
horrified at the murder, by a

if
monk
of his favorite order, of a legitimate,
unworthy, sovereign.
His servants and counsellors, taking their cue from the king's mood, though they persisted in speaking of the event as "a
marvellous judgment of God," took pains also to state their conviction that Philip should make every effort *'to care for
1
the safety and well-being of his
own
royal person."
Before we can carry further the story of die Spanish monarch's dealings with the situation in France, it is essential that
the state of affairs in the Netherlands be brought up to date. We left them, it will be remembered, at the time of Parma's
capture of Antwerp on August 17, L585. That capture. ,-i> w>- have remarked, was
for
Parma,
"t"
for Philip,
(
quesl
a
the
latholic
Spain Southwest save

;
,
and
for
it
notable triumph completed the recona

<
tor
Istend, Sluys,
and
the
few
other
places,
in
and
isolated
the
republic
1
and
Reformation
1
Utrecht, Holland, and Zealand.'

vi,
i.
But that
Mariejol
in
Laviaee,
pp. 298
let
.'nil;
L'EpinoU, La Ligtu
f the modern Netherlanda government, this region
<>!i
n:it
li:r
:i
<!, ri-
ng
turn.
ELIZABETH AIDS THE NETHERLANDS

final
;
617
stronghold was destined to prove the hardest problem of all indeed, it was before its walls that Philip's great war machine was ultimately to wear itself out. The three prov-
on the west by by water the North Sea, on the north and east by the Zuyder Zee, and on the southeast and south by the Yssel, the Waal, and the Meuse and could not be taken by assault obviously be required, and a siege, not of an isolated town a siege would That district, moreover, or fort, but of a whole district. count on ample supplies. Its defenders had ships could
inces were virtually surrounded
in
plenty, and
the Spaniards almost none.
Their
many
was
friends could send them, almost at will, provisions, munitions,
and men.
no
Though Orange and Anjou were

fill
gone, there
lack of leaders to
their places.
Maurice
of Nassau,
seventeen years old, son of William the Silent, was promptly His youth made it necessary elected to fill his father's office. that he should be guided for some time by a council but in
;
a few months he gave evidence of military talent which was subsequently to prove a thorn in the sides of the Spaniards. Though the death of Anjou, and the state of affairs in France,
showed that no further help could be expected from that

quarter in the immediately succeeding years, that very fact was enough to convince Queen Elizabeth that she
must henceforth
behalf.
bestir herself
more actively
in the rebels'
under
In the autumn of 1585 she agreed to take them in protection and send them 5000 troops December her favorite, the Earl of Leicester, arrived at
her
1
;
Flushing.
has been termed since 1874 the Holland Fortress,' and has formed the backbone
of all
'
conquer while
held out
;
the
central stronghold
of Holland, Zealand,
schemes of defence.
The rebels also held part or all of the northeastern provinces of Friesland, Drenthe, Overyssel, Gelderland, and Groningen. These from their geographical position were difficult to
and Utrecht still on the other hand, had that once fallen, they could have made no
effective resistance.
l
Motley,
i,
Xetherlands,
United History of the pp. 285-364, passim.
618
SPAIN. FRANCE,
AND THE NETHERLANDS

it
Leicester Bpeedirj
made
evident that he had neither the
ability nor the tact to carry out the exceedingly difficult task
His squabbles with the States-General and with his mistress at home soon reduced
with which he had been intrusted.
him
to impotence,
and convinced Parma that
for the
time he
And so it came about that the year could be safely ignored. >aw Philip's representative in the Low Countries prinL586
occupied with the task of separating the United Provinces from another set of allies whom they had recently In the year 1582 liebhard discovered within the Empire.
cipally
Truchsess, the archbishop of Cologne, had gone over to the Reformed religion, thus menacing the integrity of the
Rhenish 'priest street,' and offering the Dutch rebels the chance of obtaining valuable support in a position of the
highesl Btrategic
(
importance
from
The war which broke out

its earliest
in
"ologne in 1583, after Truchsess's conversion

closely linked
in inc<
became known,
with the
was thus
course of the revolt
Orange had sent troops to help Truchsess; it was his hope to get the whole of the Lower Rhine into Protestanl hands and isolate in Kriesthe Netherlands.
land the northeastern detachment of the Spanish army under 1 Parma, on the other hand, did everything he Verdugo.
could for Earnest of Bavaria, the bishop of Liege,
whom
the
Catholic
members
of the
place of Truchsess.
Cologne had elected in He had quartered some of his besl regichapter of
ments on the confines of Gelderland. There had been a series And of inconclusive engagements between the rival forces. now in L586, Parma determined to concent rate on this problem and solve it. On dune 7, in spite of all the efforts of
,
Leicester and his allies to prevent him, he took Grave, thus
opening to the royal armies the

''i.
sels.
18'.-
pi
/<
oftheMeuse;
I
thi
|.
Vardugo, Commtntario
<t>
la
Pimm
a,
ed
H. Lonchay (Brus-
PARMA CAPTURES SLUYS

weeks
later
619
Venloo surrendered.
Thence Parma advanced
rapidly into the electorate, captured Neuss, and massacred to complete the task that he had set himself to its garrison
;
perform only remained to capture Rheinberg. But this he was unable to accomplish. His foes had by this time
it
discovered the
by meeting but by diversions, for which their command of rapid river transport rendered them particularly no sooner had Parma begun the siege of Rheinberg apt
him
at the point of attack,
;
way to thwart
his plans, not indeed
than he was obliged to go to the rescue of Zutphen. During the remainder of the year, and also in 1587, he continued,
but save indeed, to win a majority of victories in the field * for the capture of Sluys (August 5, 1587) they brought him
;
little
advantage.
The
centre
2
of
the rebellion
continued
successfully to defy him.
was an evidence to all men that the expedition against England, so often mooted and postponed, was now to be carried through to the exclusion of The duke had always maintained that a everything else. on the coast of the Netherlands was essential to success, port and he wished to be permitted to follow up the taking of 3 Sluys with that of Flushing but Philip would not hear of it. Though Parma had been almost the first person whom the king had consulted when the plan of the expedition had been originally broached, matters had developed in such fashion
Parma's capture
of Sluys
;
in the
intervening years as to
between them no longer
make effective cooperation The root of the difficulty possible.
was, as usual, Philip's perennial jealousy of distant and too efficient subordinates, a jealousy of which Parma, since the
sur la inedits l'Ecluse," ed. Ernest van in Commission Bruyssel, Belgium, Royale d'Histoire, Compte rendu des troisieme iv seances, serie, (1863),
Cf.
prise
1
"Documents
de
pp. 173-182.
Vazquez in D. I. E., lxxiii, pp. 139 ff. Pirenne, iv, pp. 195-197; Fea, Alessandro Farnese, pp. 256-276 Motley, History of the United Netherlands, ii, pp. 260-281. 3 Pirenne, iv, p. 198.
2
;
620
SPAIN',
FRANCE, AND THE NETHERLANDS

;
it was capture of Antwerp, had become the principal object that jealousy which had caused the king to concenlargely
trate the control of the expedition in Spain

it
and thereby get
The delays and postponements were another source of friction. Parma had counted from the first on the effects of a surprise, but that was now impossible; the English knew more of the state of Philip's preparations than Philip knew himself. Add to all this the
oul of the duke's hands.
1
fact that
it
is
the king kept his nephew terribly short (if funds, and no wonder that Parma was gradually becoming luke-
warm
with regard to the whole enterprise against England;

1">NS,
indeed, in letters to Philip of January 31 and March 20, he frankly foretold its failure." His misgivings had
also
manifested themselves
date.
in
another form
at
much
earlier
In the first months of the year 1586 he had made 1 overtures for peace to the government of Queen Elizabeth. Philip had consented, not indeed with any idea that the
negotiations could possibly be successful, but rather in the hope of lulling the English into a feeling of security and thereby gaining time. The queen was anxious at all costs
to avoid war, and though her counsellors had little faith in the sincerity of the Spanish offers, there was apparently
Some hope
iti
that
:i
Parma could be induced

promise
4
to
betray his uncle

in
return for
of independent
sovereignty
the
for
Low
Countries.
The
negotiations dragged lamely on
In March, L588, Parma was so certain over two years. that the Armada must fail that he advised Philip to abandon
pretence and seek an accommodation in earnest before it was too late," but the king refused. The negotiations continued,
1
Cf
ante,
/'
p
.
'.
[60
L603,
i
tpagnoU
,
Spanish, 16S7
BOft
reported in Philip; cf. C 8. P., SjunIt ii, however, ,1687 L603.no. 143. f:ur to note that Monrinza was a bitt.r
209, 241,
166, note
enemy
I
of
-
Panne.
/
.
Tbid., p. xlvii.
h,
Spam
1667
1608,
least w>
Bernardino
<!<
Mendoae
241.
PARMA AND THE INVASION OF ENGLAND

and
finally
621
culminated in conferences held at Bourbourg in June, 1588, needless to add, without success. Each side knew by this time that the invasion of England was inevi*
and spar for time. The the whole affair is the light it only significance incidentally sheds on the relations of Parma and the king.
table,
and merely sought

of
to feint
real
There
to
at
duke actually intended play his master false. On the other hand, he was disgusted the delays and inefficiency of Philip's plan of campaign, and
is
no
reliable evidence that the
unenthusiastic, to say the least, about cooperating with it. The king was fully aware of his nephew's state of mind,
but under the circumstances he could neither replace nor dispense with him. On September 4, 1587, he wrote him a
most intimate
his part
letter
to tell
it
on him, and how essential
him how completely he depended was that he should be ready to do

arrive.
when the
crucial
plans had been rejected, Parma prepared to conform to the king's, which he knew were certain to fail 4 he must adhere to the strict letter
with a heavy heart,
moment should since his own wiser
And
so,
of his instructions, in order to avoid

bility for the inevitable defeat.
any share
in the responsi-
In the early part of 1588 his headquarters were for the most part at Ghent but in May he moved over to Bruges, where his flatboats were assembled
;
in the canals,
and whence he had arranged to have them towed to Nieuport and Dunkirk when the Armada should have reached Calais Roads. The expeditionary force was quartered in the adjacent villages, and on July 18 he wrote
to the
6
Thereking that everything was at last in readiness. after he began to receive constant, increasingly plaintive, and
1 C. S. P., Spanish, 1587-1603, nos. 239, 308. 2 Ibid., nos. 209, 210, 223, 241, 242, 264, 265, 308, 309, 319. Ibid., no. 141.
Ibid., p. xxxv. Gossart, op. cit., p. 165. S. C. P., Spanish, no. 348.
' 5
1587-1603,
622
SPAIN, PRANCE,
AND THE NETHERLANDS
Belf-contradictory letters from Medina Sidonia, informing him of the Armada's condition and whereabouts; the last
three of these, written on
beg him and

lie
to
August 6 and 7 from Calais Roads, 'hasten his coming out/' and "bear aid in
'
resisting the enemy's fleet."
All this
Parma had
foreseen;
would not, because he knew he could not, comply. In tun letters to Philip (August 8 from Bruges and August 2 10 from Dunkirk) he indignantly reiterated that it was the
Armada's duty to protect his passage and clear the sea of enemies, and that he would not stir until it was in a condition
to
do
so.
And
so
the
duke bore
silent
witness,
in
so
impotence that was probably not altogether ungrateful to him, to the tragedy of the next three days, the battle of
Gravelines and the dispersal of his master's great fleet. If had trusted him, he would have done his utmost to Philip
bring
it is
him
victory.
If his original
advice had been followed,
its
even possible that the Armada might have tccompliahed object; but in view of the way in which the king had
and enemies, it is small wonder that when the critical moment arrived he refused to do more than the part that had been assigned to him. " What adds more than I can here express to my grief at this disaster," bo he wrote to Philip from Dunkirk on August 10, " i- that it was humanly impossible to remedy it, or aid in any
listened to the slanders of his rivals
way."
Parma came
remnantof the
in for
more than
his share of
the taunts and
invectives with which Spain resounded
when me shattered
;
indeed, quite as
Armada got back to port he was blamed, much as the Duke of Medina Sidonia. He
to his master.
was accused
of unwillingness to perform the part that had
gned to him, and of treachery

Sui ,r,i, [.. 544, and C. 8. I'., Spanish, 1587-1603, noa. 355, 364, 368, 371, 372.
1
The
'
Ibid., nos. 374, 380.

Ibid., no.
380
(p. 371).
PARMA'S SUCCESSES
old
623
obtain
a
separate sovereignty for himself in the Low Countries was circulated once more. It would even appear that Elizabeth, taking advantage of the resentment which she knew these cavils
report
that
he
was
aiming
to
would inevitably arouse in him, consented to have it suggested to him that he assume the crown of the Netherproposal which Parma indignantly rejected. Philip for the time being refused to listen to these calumnies of his traducers possibly he began
lands as the ally of England
1
;
how much wiser it would have been more reliance on Parma from the outset.
to realize
to
have placed In letters of
October 10 and
17, 1588,
plete satisfaction,
expedition. that nothing more could be accomplished against England and Parma, his courage restored by the renewal of the royal confidence, returned in the end of 1588 to the problems of the
rebels in the Netherlands
new
he assured his nephew of his comand directed him to draw up plans for a For the moment, however, it was obvious
;
and
of the Protestants in Cologne.

;
He sent troops to the aid of Ernest of Bavaria and though he himself was unsuccessful in an attempt to take Bergenop-Zoom, his lieutenant, Peter Ernest of Mansfeld, seized
Wachterdonk, and thus extended his power in Gelderland. In 1589-90 he gained greater victories still. In Cologne Ernest of Bavaria decisively defeated the adherents of
Truchsess, so that
direction.
3
Parma was
relieved of
all
anxiety in that
Rheinberg, which had defied him in 1586, finally surrendered to Mansfeld in January, 1590, and nine months
earlier
Parma
himself had got possession of Gertruydenberg.
been before
last as they had never and Farnese, whose achievements had been the more remarkable in view of the wretched state of his own
Holland and Zealand were isolated at

;
Gossart, op. pp. 311-319.
cit.,
p.
180
Fea,
*
3
Gossart, p. 180. Pirenne, iv, pp. 198
f.
624
SPAIN, FRANCE,
AND THE NETHERLANDS
health and the mutinies of his discontented soldiery, was confident thai the last embers of the rebellion could be
speedily stamped out.
1
But once more it was the duke's hard fate to be railed off from the task which he had originally been Riven, and was on the way to accomplish, to attack another, which in the estimation of his master was of even greater importance.
The
assassination of
Henry
of Valois on
August
1,
1589, con-
vinced the king that everything must be sacrificed to the

opportunities thus opened for him in France, and ordered to bear aid to the forces of the League.
Parma was
To
serve a
master with as
many
irons in the
fire
as Philip
was almost
more hopeless than the serving
of two.
Never had the Spanish monarch shown himself more 'prudent' than when he received word of the murder of Henry III. He had been profoundly shocked as we have
already seen, and
at first a little terrified
by the news;
it
then,
when he began
to realize the opportunities that
offered him,
remoter future.
he elected, instead of acting promptly, to lay plans for the As son-in-law of Henry II, he could himself
if
lay claim to the vacant throne,
the Salic
first
Law were
ignored,
and some
rid of
of the French, in their

III,
enthusiasm at getting
his
Henry
declared for the "election of the king of
Spain, and the placing of everything in Philip at firsi Beemed in ao way desirous
hands."
But
to grasp the prize.
Quite the contrary, he instructed his representatives at Panto favor the candidacy of the aged cardinal of Bourbon, who
bad been proclaimed king by Mayenne under the title of Charles X. Saving made excellent use of a moribund
1
Vaequea
In
I'.
/.
S.,
lxxiii,
pp.
Forneron,
:
iv,
pp.
1,
|.
40-61;
M:iri''jr,l in
J,:tviHni\ vi,
806
olai de Neufville, Seigneur <lo Memoiret d'Batat, ed. Da VUleroy, Meenil Besire (Sedan, 1622), p. 180. Baguenault de Pucheeae, p A plan of Mcndosa that Philip Bhould
'
THE FRENCH SUCCESSION
625
cardinal as a stop-gap once before under similar circumstances, at the time of the annexation of Portugal, he
was
happy
to experiment. repeat embarrass the king of Navarre and give cohesion to the forces opposed to him on the other hand, it could not place any permanent obstacle in the way of Philip's own ultimate plans,
to
the
It
would
serve
for the cardinal
had been
a prisoner of the
French crown ever
since the assassination of the Guises,

1 never able to liberate him.
and the League was

Philip
At the same time
despatched his former ambassador Juan Bautista de Tassis and a certain Commander Moreo to collaborate at Paris with
Mendoza, who had displaced Tassis there. Apparently the principal objects of their mission were merely to keep the king informed of everything that occurred and to distribute
bribes
;
in
any
case,
when
their
money
ran out, in June, 1590,

2
they both of them returned to Madrid.
One
thing,
how-
ever, they accomplished during their brief stay in France,
which was very encouraging to the king of Spain and that was the establishment of cordial relations with the papal
;
legate. Cardinal Errico Caetani,
whom Sixtus had

Henry
despatched
III.
3
to Paris
when he
learned of the murder of
That
event had dealt a rude blow to the pontiff's hopes of reelecting the supremacy of the Catholic church in France without
the aid of Spain.
Unless the king of Navarre would turn Catholic, which at that moment seemed improbable, the Pope would have to make common cause with Philip in
order
keep France within the Roman fold and in December, 1589, he actually offered to conclude an alliance
to
;
assume the
title of 'Protector of the realm of France' was wrecked by the opposition of Mayenne and the papal legate, Caetani, who insisted that his Holiness "did not regard it as fitting that any one save himself should be declared Protector of the Catholic in France." Cf. religion Villeroy,
op.
cit., Mariejol in pp. 165-167; Pastor, xxi, Lavisse, vi, 1, pp. 329 f. pp. 321 ff., passim. l The Pastor, xxi, pp. 325, 363. cardinal died on May 9, 1590.
;
i 3

Pastor, xxi, p. 327.
(32(5
SPAIN, FRANCE,
AND THE NETHERLANDS
with the Prudent King in order to effect this end. Before Philip had had time to accept representatives of the Catholic
,
adherents of Benry of Navarre arrived in Koine, and revived the pontiff's hopes that he might do without Spanish aid. When Philip's ambassador, the Count of Olivares, tried to
bully him, he
became
furious,
and even threatened to excom-
municate the Spanish king; in fact, down to the day of his death, which occurred on August 27, 1590, he avoided
definitely
committing himself
to the Spanish cause in France.
the meantime the legate Caetani, in spite of the Pope's complaints, did everything possible to favor the designs of
in
Hut
Philip;
when Sixtus should
moreover, the Prudent King rightly foresaw that, die, the worst of his troubles with the
for
it
papacy would be over,

as the king of
was inconceivable
a heretic,
that another
1
Pope should be as violent in his opposition to him.

Navarre remained
n
As long
now seemed
support of
almost
inevitable that Spain should have tin

2
Rome.
While Philip planned and plotted, his rivals and enemies were far more active. The king of Spain was not the only foreigner who aspired to control, or if that were impossible,
to
dismember France.
His
as
son-in-law
Charlee
Emanuel
1
'the Great' of
Savoy, who
a
claim to the French throne/'' saw
had a grandson of Francis a chance in the prevailing
confusion to
fulfil
long-cherished
dream
of reconstituting
for himself the ancient

I'nriiiK
kingdom
of Aries,
and launched an
the
i
liriof
Qnaory XIV
I.V"
pontificate of the Spanish
embassy at Some "urgently importuned" the Pope thai the whole hmi-i- of Bourbon t- declared incapable of reigning in r.i 00, becaOW of Iti thai nil the upport of herel 2)
1
Catholic faith may not perish in thai kingdom." Letter <>f Cardinal Dal Monte to the grand duke of Tueoai January J, L691, in Societe de l'Hietoire <lti Proteetantiame Franâis, hullitin,
lxxxi
1932), p, 36. Pastor, xxi, pp.

I
340
-574.
/Histim,
tpility
of
:
:i
Navarre'i party be
(3)
in
and
l.a
*
xxii,
I.
rmmtininattd
I
thai
to
tie-
Pope
mm
p. ,1 lis
366; Papen,
(
also
p. CitiO
L'fipinoii,
pay 60,000 crown? the war in run.-.
month
maintain
Villeroy, op
it.,
p.
160.
order that the
HENRY OF NAVARRE
army
against Provence in the
627
autumn
of 1589.
A little later
the duke of Lorraine, who was a son-in-law of Henry II, made a similar attempt against Champagne. 1 But these efforts and others like them encountered vigorous opposition. The Savoyards soon became "rather the besieged than the
besiegers in Provence,"
self to
and Charles Emanuel betook him-
Madrid
to ask for Spanish help.
The
principal Lor-
rainers, too, after their initial repulses,

in the
tended to gravitate
same
direction.
By
became evident that the foreign pretender whose ambitions need be taken seriously the battle, in other words, was to be fought by him and those
;
the end of the year 1591, it king of Spain was the only
he could induce to support him, against the The latter had patriotic though heretical king of Navarre. lost no time after the assassination of III. On August Henry
in
France
whom
1589, he had put forth his famous declaration promising the maintenance of the Catholic faith within the realm, in the hope of rallying all true Frenchmen to his cause but it did
4,
;
not produce the effect he had anticipated.

recognitions
it
Too many
of the
elicited
were but provisional, and there were

of his
many
defections.
Some even
Protestant friends
;
deserted
soon dwindled to half
him because he had promised too much his army its original size. But he speedily
demonstrated that he could make good use of his shrunken forces in the field. Realizing that it would be madness, for the present, to attack Paris, he retired into Normandy, pursued by
Mayenne with
much
larger
army
and
so sure
were
champion would return victorious that they hired windows in the Rue St. Antoine to witness the spectacle of the king of Navarre brought back in chains. But Mayenne was fatally hesitant when the critical moment
arrived.
the Parisians that their
He had all the worst of that series of skirmishes dur1
Martejol in Lavisse,
vi,
1,
pp. 331-334.
628
ing the
SPAIN. FRANCE,
last
AND THE NETHERLANDS
September, which are collectively finally, in October, he designated as the battle of Arqucs retreated to Paris, pursued by the rival whom he had been
ten
days
of
Henry even ventured to attack expected to capture. the suburbs, but, realizing that he was not yet strong enough to take the capital, he soon retired westward, and
established the seat
of his
government
for the winter at
Tours.
Against such an active adversary a policy of mere bribery and plotting could not avail; every day it became increasingly evident that Philip
of the League.
must send military aid to the forces
But the question was where to find the and the men. The defeat of the Armada had been a money terrible blow both to his treasury and to his tercios', and he
in
was more than ever

in
need of military and financial resources

t
Spain, to repel the counter-attacks of

potential
lit'
English and
'>
stifle
rebellions.Under all the u.cumstam seemed to Philip that the wisest course was to send then, the duke of Parma from the bow Countries against Henry
it
of Navarre.
His ability as a soldier was wel] known. He was aearer the scene of action than any other of the king's commanders.
left
if
Possibly Philip was influenced by heold fear that with nothing else to do but suppress the rebellion in the
t
.
Netherlands, Parma might possibly prove too successful, and set up an independent sovereignty there. As far back i"> s i he had commanded him bvs to keep his eye <u tin sit1
uation
in
Prance.
On September
Henry
III,
7,
1589,
after he had
rest
learned of the murder of

the defensive
in
he wrote him to
in
on
the
Low Countries
;
order to save
money
to be distributer! to his
ribility
Mariejol 810;
nois. l.i
I.
1
French friends, and even spoke of the of armed intervention in November, after he had
*
LftriMe, vi. i. pp. 307 .n. iv, pp. is 22; L'Epij tr e l Us Papet. pp. A.i'.i 360.
in
it
will
be
to
had Neaped
of.
remembered that Aragon in April, 1590;

I
ante, p.
PARMA DIVERTED TO FRANCE
629
received news of Arques, he evidently regarded such intervention as ultimately inevitable, and sent Juan Moreo to the
Netherlands to bear aid in organizing it. 1 To Parma, as will be readily imagined, all this was unwelcome in the highest
degree.
He was
;
very
ill
he longed to
finish his task in the
he knew that, at the best, he had barely enough money and men to accomplish that. He could not believe that an expedition into France would have any hope
Netherlands
of success,
2
and
in letters to Philip of
1590,
he plainly cold him so;
at
March 24 and July 22, the same time Moreo

writing
aroused Philip's suspicions of
Parma once more by
back from Flanders, on June

be the ruin of
all his
22, that the duke's ill-will

3
would
of
plans.
But meantime the king
Navarre was again advancing on Paris. Unless something were speedily done, there was every probability that he would
it and so Parma, not yet ready to move himself, sent Count of Egmont from Flanders with 500 arquebusiers and 1200 Walloon lancers to the rescue of Mayenne. With the army of the League they met the king of Navarre at Ivry (March 14). Henry won the most brilliant of his victories. Egmont was killed, and his forces took flight. The Bourbon continued his triumphant march on Paris. 4 Unless Philip was prepared to lose all hold on France, it was evident, after Ivry, that he must have done with half meas-
take
the
ures.
Nothing short
of
Parma
himself, with
all
his available
forces, could possibly save the situation, and the king sent Tassis to Flanders to hasten the departure of the duke. 6 Parma's misgivings were unabated, but it was not his
reluctance that
was the
chief cause of the delay
it
was the
263
Gossart, Domination espagnole, pp. f. Fea, pp. 332-341. 2 Gossart, pp. 273-278, 281-284. 3 Moreo died Ibid., pp. 278-280. suddenly at Meaux, August 30, 1590,
1
;
not without suspicion of poison. Coloma, Guerras, p. 85. * Mariejol in Lavisse, vi, 1, pp. 312316; Forneron, iv, pp. 23-27. 5 Baguenault de Puchesse, p. 47.
630
SPAIN. FRANCE,
AND THE NETHERLANDS
lack of funds to pay his troops, and the incipient mutinies
among
his soldiers
which followed as the inevitable

1
result.
By midsummer, however, the money had at last arrived, and in the early days of August he crossed the frontier. Henry
had invested Paris on April 25. Within the next two months the food had run out. Mendoza won golden opinions by his
liberal giving
and by
his organization of relief.
At this
crisis
he played the part of the

that
his
Roman
political
Catholic fanatic, declaring
master had no
ambitions
in
Trance, but
;
I
cared only for the preservation of the ancient faith even credited with a plan for making bread out of dead men's 2 bones. But by early August things had reached a point which flesh and blood could no longer endure 111, 000 people
;
had already died of starvation, and negotiations preliminary to a surrender had begun, when suddenly news came, on the
30th, that
Parma had united with Mayenne

to
at
Meaux and
was rapidly advancing
the rescue.
Henry, anxious to
prove his valor against the most celebrated soldier in Europe, raised the siege of Paris and advanced to meet the foe.
Parma, whose object it was to save the capital without the decisive battle which the king of Navarre desired, ito renched
himself between the
enemy's attack. not venture to assault
swamp, and awaited the So strong was the position thai Henry did
a
it;
Marne and
then
at
last, after
seven days of
of his regi-
waiting, the duke, under cover of
a .-ally,
got
two
ment
\\ ith
across the
Marne on
bridge of boats,
in his
and took Lagny.

was able
both banks of the river

Paris, but
control, he soon
'victual
the reception accorded

to
his
him within
the
walls
did
not
measure up
expectations.
The
inhabitant
med
less grateful to
him
for their deliverance
than BU8pici0UE of the Spanish domination which his arrival

rneron, hr, pp. 60 f. Be.gnene.uH '!< Punhrsflc, pp. 47
and
f..
references
there
to
the
Salirt
Mtnippie.
PARMA RELIEVES PARIS

portended
;
631
and Parma, after writing frankly to the king of the unpopularity of the Spanish army in France, and the
dangers of attempting to dominate the country, retired in
November
him
to the
Low
Countries.
He had
brilliantly
accom-
plished the almost impossible task which his master had given to perform, but he had the gravest forebodings for the
future.
1
The achievements
of
Parma should
certainly
have con-
vinced Philip that his representative in the Low Countries was by far the most efficient of his servants had he sent him
;
supplies, the duke, though he might not have been able to make his master king of France, would almost certainly have succeeded in putting an
at
all
once
his available troops
and
end to the revolt in the Netherlands.
But
just at the very
moment when he
reign,
Philip elected to dissipate
should have concentrated his resources, them never before, in his entire
;
had the disastrous results of the multiplicity of his and of his jealousy of overcompetent subordinates been plans
so painfully apparent.
If
he could not gain control
of the
whole of France, the next best thing, from his point of view, would be to dismember her. At the very moment that he was utilizing Parma in an attempt to effect the one, he
despatched two other armies in the hope of accomplishing the
other.
was a comparatively small force which he sent into Languedoc in the spring of 1591, at the invitation of the Marechal of Joyeuse, the chief representative of the League in that province he had hopes of regaining at least a part of the great domain north of the Pyrenees which had formed part of the county of Catalonia in the Middle Ages. But the whole affair was half-heartedly conducted. Philip desired to have his army ready in the neighborhood of
first
The
of these
'Vazquez
489
ff
.
in
D.
I.
E.,
lxxiii,
pp.
los
Estados Baxos, pp. 75-97

370.
Fea, pp. 332-
Carlos Coloma, Guerras de
632
SPAIN, FRANCE,
AND THE NETHERLANDS
the realms of the crown of Aragon to deal with any insurrection which the activities of Antonio Perez might stir up
there;
duke
he also wished to keep an eye on the progress of the of Savoy farther eastward; and these and other dis-
tractions
were
fatal
to
the
success
of
the
invasion
of
number Languedoc. were taken, hut there were many desertions. The French Leaguers did not cooperate effectively; and all
certain
of small
towns and petty
fortresses
Spain's hopes of gaining territory in that quarter were blasted by a decisive defeat at Yillemur (September 10, 1592); their commander was drowned in the ensuing flight.
1
::.")()()
In Brittany, on the other hand, whither Philip despatched men by sea from Corunna in September, 1590, there was
In the eyes of the legist, that province
fully part of the
a different tale to tell.
realm of France, but was still the property of the ancient ducal line on that theory could plausibly lay claim to it on behalf of his daughter Philip
;
had never become
Isabella Clara Eugenia, the great-granddaughter of Claude, the wife of Francis I. At that moment Brittany was
occupied
by
the
brother-in-law
of
Henry
III,
Philippe
wife,
Emmanuel de
Marie
house.
of
Lorraine,
Duke
of
Mercoeur, whose
Luxemburg, was a descendant of the ancient ducal Mercoeur had declared for the League, and Philip
probably thought he could utilize him for his own purposes and get rid of him afterwards; while Mercoeur, who had solicited the intervention of Spam, doubtless counted on
reversing the process.
to besiege
far less
In
;
November,
1590, the allies began
Hennebont
but then military achievements were
notable than the scandalous bribery which the Spaniard- employed to win the Bretons to their cause, and keep
them from bemg too

to.,
friendly to
Mercoeur; the native- were

respeel for the Spaniards.
.
poor to refuse, but they

'Forneron.
iv,
Lost all
I.
pp. 7s HO;
Muri6jol in
1.
pp 381 352
(
f.
A SPANISH GARRISON IN PARIS
633
Philip's army, however, remained in Brittany, and was to be heard from again in the ensuing years. 1 But the centre of interest still remained at Paris. Since
that some recognition of the services of Spain was due him. Until the death of Charles of Bourbon, he had desired to have the title of Prohis general
had rescued
it,
Philip
felt
tector of the realm, on conditions so generous that
"no one
believed he would observe half of them."
he openly put forward the claims of his daughter Isabella Clara Eugenia 3 to the throne and Mayenne sent Pierre Jeannin, the presi;
Now
dent of the Parlement of Dijon, to Madrid to discuss the validity of the Salic Law with the chief jurisconsults of 4 Mendoza in Paris was the king-pin of these negoSpain.
tiations.
He
also succeeded, in February, 1591, in bring-
ing into the capital a small
permanent garrison of Spaniards, and Walloons from across the frontier of the Neapolitans, Netherlands an even more visible proof that his master meant business. It was the last important service which
the great ambassador
was
to render to the
Prudent King.
;
He had
blind.
5
suffered cruelly during the siege of Paris

left
since 1586
he had had a painful cataract of the
Worst
of
all,
though
his policies
eye and was nearly had been loyally

at odds with
supported by the Seize, he was
now completely
Mayenne, who was profoundly

Spain, and tolerated
1
jealous of the intervention of
it
solely because for the
moment he
and Forneron, iv, 81-86, pp. references there Mariejol in Lavisse, The correspondence of vi, 1, p. 335.
;
Mercoeur and the Leaguers in Britanny with Philip was edited, with a learned introduction by Gaston de Carne, in Archives de Bretagne, xii (Xantes, 1899). 2 Mariejol in Lavisse, vi, 1, p. 329.
on the French by Philip in January, 1592, is translated into French by Gachard in Lettres de Philippe II
succession
3
A memorandum
drawn
a ses filles, pp. 74-80. In it he insists that Isabella Clara Eugenia was the lawful heiress, though obviously with little hope that the French would accept his point of view. There are two recent biographies one by Miss L. of the Infanta, Klingenstein (London, 1910) and the other by Felix de Llanos y Torriglia
). (Madrid, 1928* Forneron, iv, pp. 115, 201. 6 Forneron, iv, p. 99, note 1.
up
634
SPAIN, FRANCE,
AND THE NETHERLANDS

1
was not strong enough to get on without it. For months past he had been begging Philip to release him, ? but the king had insisted thai he remain at his post. Whether or not lie had been given formal leave to depart at
realized that he
the time he quitted the capital (late January, L591), does not appear; but it would seem that he left for the Netherlands
with an escort of 200 Germans, and mel the oncoming Spanish garrison which he had procured for Paris on the way.
The
garrison brought with
it
as his successor the ubiquitous
him, and a certain Diego de Ibarra, "a vile and haughty fellow"; and their ineptitude soon drove the Seize to such excesses that they lost their authority,
Tassis
who had preceded
undermined the prestige 3 hands of Mayennc.' The
of
Spain,
and strengthened the

irreparable,
loss of
Mendoza was
though he continued to correspond with Philip and advise him for many months to come. One gathers from his letterthat, like almost all the rest of the ablest
and most faithful
servants of the Prudent King, he had been traduced at the lasl ly jealous rivals, and that their accusations had not
To the day of his death Philip fallen on unwilling ears. could never learn to give his whole confidence to a really
able man.
4
By
the
autumn
of 1591 the situation in
France had become
somewhat
clarified,
whole so strong as it had been troubles in Aragon were beginning
but the position of Philip was not on the The earlier in the year.
to
embarrass him
this
at
home.
had
had
The power
manipulated
the
1
of
the fanatics
in
Pun-,
the
whom Mendoza
Spanish
claims
.
;
to such -rood effect,
was by
time broken.
more
definite
>1'-
statement
p.
<.f
HfiK'iPTi.iult
Pimhctti.
l,
50;
i
MariAjol
in Lnviusc, vi,
pp. 3js
;i>.
/'
gpomeft
iv,
1587 1603. no.
de Pucheaae, pp. 60 f Mnriejol LaviMe, vi, l. pp. 836 hit. " A. Morel-Patio, D. Bernardino Cf. de Mendoza." in B. H.. viii (1906),
n.-uilt
in
690
1
PI..
7i'.
129 147.
Fornoron,
pp. 99 103;
Hague-
PARMA AGAIN
IN
FRANCE
635
aroused the patriotic opposition of all good Frenchmen. Henry of Navarre had not again ventured to besiege Paris,
maintained a partial blockade of it. Elizabeth of England and the Protestant states of the Empire were sending him reeenforcements. Clearly Mayenne and the League
still
but he
could
not
hope,
unaided,
to
defeat
him
in
the
field.
Mayenne was more
hostile than ever to Philip's designs
on
the throne, which he coveted for himself.
On the
other hand,
the king of Navarre and this, despite tentative negotiations, he was not yet he could not afford to dispense with Spanprepared to do
unless he were willing to
make terms with
he longed, in other words, for a fresh intervention by Alexander Farnese. Parma was even more reluctant to
ish aid
;
invade France
landers, as
now than he had been

shall later see,
in 1590.
The Nether-
had profited by his first absence to strengthen their forces, and Parma desired to be left alone to deal with them. Philip, however, was convinced that he must make another demonstration of his military superiority
in France,
we
August, 1591, Parma received orders to cross the frontier again. His main object on this occasion
and
in
was
to relieve
auxiliaries
brilliantly
Rouen, which Henry of Navarre with English began to besiege in December, and this he accomplished in April, 1592. Another splendid
in
demonstration of the power of Spanish arms was given in the

following
May, when Mercoeur and the Spaniards
Brittany joined forces to defeat the Prince of Conti before Craon. 2 Naturally Philip did not propose to render such aid as this without recompense. From the time that Parma
entered France, the king's representatives never ceased to
Mariejol in Lavisse, 348-354.
2
;
vi,
1,
pp. 323,
p.
Cf. also R. B. Wernham, 352. "Queen Elizabeth and the Siege of
Coloma, Guerras, pp. 140-177; Fea, pp. 415-424 L'Epinois, op. cit.. p. 551 Mariejol in Lavisse, vi, 1,
;
Rouen,
1591,"
in
Royal
Society, Transactions, xv, pp. 163-179.
Historical fourth series,
636
SPAIN',
FRANCE. AND THE NETHERLANDS
demand
rights of his
League thai they recognize the French throne, and that the daughter Kst a tea-General be forthwith convoked to ratify this action
to the
select a
of the chiefs of the
and
husband
for the princess.
The Leaguers, under
the circumstances, dared not definitely refuse; but they replied with counter-demands for concessions from the Spanish long,
and above
all
for subsidies in such quantity as Philip
Until the delivery of Rouen the Spaniards had, ostensibly at least, the best of tin bargaining; after that service had been rendered, the backs of the
was unwilling to grant.
Leaguers stiffened. Mayenne showed no disposition to proceed with the summoning of the Estates he even had hopes
;
that after they
had assembled, they might be brought
to do
In the meanhis will rather than that of the king of Spain. time Parma had been grievously wounded in attacking the little town of Caudebec (April 25). and soon afterwards drew
off his forces to
a place of safety at Chateau-Thierry; he himself was carried back in a litter to the Netherlands, and spent most of the
vain effort to regain his Without the inspiration of his leadership, the Spanat
summer
Spa
in a
health.
ish
forces were comparatively valueless,
and Philip was
at
his wits'
pressure on
end to find other equally effective means to bring 1 Mayenne and the League to do his bidding.
After the
summer
France.
of L592 there
was
a hill in
the military
operations take a third campaign there in the autumn, but death overlook him in December, before anything could be accomplished.
in
Parma had
received orders to under-
Though
in
his
successor,
the
Counl
ami
of
Mansfeld,
advanced
the
following
it
Bpiing
Captured
NoVOD
(March
final
30, L593),
invasion of Prance from the
would >eem that the chief object of this bow Countries was not
Fou,
f.
;
BaK'U'iiiiult (Je Puchesse, p. 51. Marijol in Lavisae, vi, 1, pp. 364
pp.
4 '24-44
Forneron,
iv,
pp
123-126.
the tats-g6nraux
much
to
637
wage war as to bring pressure on the EstatesGeneral, which Mayenne, in fulfilment of his promises, had summoned in the previous June on them all eyes were now focussed, for it was by them that the great decision must be made. 1 Rheims had been chosen as their meeting place. Since it was to be their duty to elect a king, there was
;
historical justification for this,
but the
;
real reason for the
choice
the
was pressure from Spain for Philip wished to have business done in proximity to Parma's army, and
2
But Parma's death (December refuse. removed the only one of Philip's representatives 2-3, 1592) whom Mayenne really feared or respected and as soon as he
Mayenne dared not
learned of
it, he promptly transferred the meeting of the Estates to Paris, where he felt that he would be free from
Spanish tutelage and able to play his own game. He was further encouraged by the support of the new Pope Clement
VIII,
who took
a vigorous stand against the claims of the

;
3 and though Henry declared against the king of Navarre and forbade all the parts of the realm which he conEstates, trolled to send deputies, he did not succeed in discrediting
them.
At the time
of the
opening session, which took place

4 they really represented France.
on January 26, 1593, at the Louvre, the deputies had some

justification in feeling that
Wei! informed, as always, of the march of events, Philip recognized the importance of the approaching crisis, and in
October, 1592, he despatched a special ambassador, Lorenzo Suarez de Figueroa, Duke of Feria, 5 to represent him at the
Estates.
Feria was instructed to do his utmost to have the
Infanta Isabella Clara Eugenia either declared or elected

1
Cf. infra, p. 650.
vi, 1,
pp. 365
f.
wrong
Philip's in 1558.
in
2
3 * 6
Pastor,
xxiii, pp. 61-64. Mariejol in Lavisse, vi, 1, pp. 368 Baguenault de Puchesse (p. 52)
identifying this man with in representative England That Ehike of Feria had died
this
f.
in 1571
man was
his son.
is
n38
queen,
left
SPAIN. FRANCE.
or. failing that, to
AND THE NETHERLANDS

have the choice
of the
in Philip's hands. Failing that, again, the election of Albert or Ernest the archducal brothers of the
.
new monarch lie was to urge

he was to
Emperor Rudolf.
If
he could not compass

I
this,
support, as a last resort, the claims of the

of the cardinal of Lorraine;
his
hike of Guise or
and he was commanded to do utmost to prevent the dissolution of the assembly until one of these candidates had been chosen. Feria, travelling
1
by way of Genoa and the Netherlands, joined the Spanish
army
a few days later in February, 1593, at Landrecies; M.ivenne came out to meet him at Soissons. The latter did
not yet feel strong
If enough to dispense with Spanish aid. Parma's death meant the loss of an effective army, he was
still
more than ever
in
sort of treaty
with Feria,
need of funds; and so he drew up a in which he promised to recognize

his queen,
Isabella Clara
accepted her,
to do.
sidies.
3
Eugenia as and to use all
provided the Estate!
his influence to
persuade them
so
Feria, in return, pledged himself to furnish large sub-
the second of the following April, the Spanish ambassador was received with impressive ceremonies by the
Estates.
On
On
this
first
occasion he
made no mention
of the
claims of the Infanta, but contented himself with enumerating the vast services rendered by his master to the Catholic It was not altocause in France since the day- of Henry II.
gether tactfully done; and Cardinal de Pellev6, who replied for the Estates, did not omit to point out that France had
also
done many favors

instruction*
are
to
Spain
the
in
the past, from the time
'These
in
contained
25,
paper,
dated
January
1592.
and
u
.
.
entitled "El intento que tunc Maejeetad en lea bosh de Francis ." a French translation is printed
;
psychology <>f Philip II; ever] possible contingency seems to have been foreseen and provided for, and
yet
last,
diil
one with
is
oppressed, from first to conviction that the king
in
I.>lir<
I,
</.
PhiUppt
II
<
set
filles,
fl
I'
Qaehard
is
(Parie,
1884),
pp.
74-80
'-f.
also pp. 481.).

a
doeumenl
curious
The whole commentary ""
not really believe that any of his alternatives could possibly SUCOBed ariejol in Lavisse, vi, 1, p. 876
Baguenaull de Purhesse,
p. 53.
SPAIN AGAINST THE
BOURBON
639
when the Catholic Franks chastised the heretic Visigoths of Spain and forced them to renounce the Arian faith, to that when Bertrand du Guesclin overthrew Pedro the Cruel. 1
Nevertheless, the impression of Philip's power and prestige which Feria had succeeded in producing was undeniable. If no other outside influence were brought to bear on the
Estates,
it
seemed that he might win

Philip
his
But the very prospect that
game. would attain
his
ends
I
roused the royalist Catholics in France to make a last desperate effort to keep the crown out of foreign hands.
They demanded a conference with the chiefs of the League. The Estates accepted, and when their delegates left Paris to
meet the royalists at Suresnes, the acclamations of the 2 populace convinced them that they had made no mistake.
they met the representatives of the other side, they embraced each other; the first thing that they did was to arrange a truce clearly their dominant feeling was the desire to unite all Frenchmen and rid the realm of strangers. But
;
When
when the
first
effusions of patriotic ardor
were over,
it
became
evident that the heresy of the king of Navarre would prove a stumblingblock to complete accord the most that the
;
deputies of the Estates would do was to recognize the priority of his rights to the French throne, but they stoutly maintained that they were nullified by his Protestantism. There was but one way out of the impasse, and Henry had the wis-
dom
17 the archbishop of Bourges announced to the conference at Suresnes that the king had declared his intention to be converted. On the 25th of
it.
to
see
On May
the following July, in the ancient cathedral of St. Denis, he received him into the communion of the church of Rome. It
1 Procks-V erbaux des lZtats-Generaiix de 1598, ed. A. Bertrand, pp. 113-115, 132-142; Mariejol in Lavisse, vi, 1, pp. 370 f
.
2 Mariejol in Lavisse, vi, 1, pp. 371375; J. Nouaillac, Villeroy, pp. 227-
240.
640
SPAIN, FRANCE,
"
t
AND THE NETHERLANDS
was indeed
be marriage ceremony of the king and the kingl
dom
of France."
representatives at Paris, when they first got word of the kind's intention to he converted, did their utmost
The Spanish
to prevent the step
from having any
effect.
It
probably did
not greatly surprise

faith in a heretic?
or at least
who could put doubted its genuineness^ They justifiably were convinced, and with good reason, that Henry
them
or their master, for
I
had abandoned his Protestantism as a mean Hut it had come at a most awkward moment end.
political
for
them.
Their attention had been wholly concentrated on M avenue and the Estates, and the problem of the Infanta's n -ognition there. They had counted on getting that settled first and OB
,
dealing with the heretic pretender afterwards, and now the news of the intended abjuration had thrown everything into
the melting pot again.
But they did not despair. They and distributed bribes. Over 2 1,000 opened their purses crowns were handed out to the Estates, and lesser sums to the
captains and magistrates of Paris, and more was promi in the near future. Meantime, in the end of May. the can-
When the didacy of the Infanta was definitely put forward. Estates demurred on account of the Salic Law, it w:is
announced that Philip would be entirely satisfied if they would elect as king the Archduke Ernest of Austria, whom the Spanish monarch had selected to be the husband of his
daughter.
on having Frenchman for their king, the Spaniards assured them that Philip would run object, provided that he could have the
insisted
Then, when the Estates
choosing of him. that he should marry the Infanta, and that the crown of Prance should be held conjointly in solidum) by
I
them both.
a
last
The Spanish
in
1
resort,
the
middle
representatives even proposed, as of duly, that the Infanta

vi,
1,
Mari6jol in Lavisse,
pp. 380
i.
PHILIP
AND CLEMENT
VIII
641
be married, under the same conditions, to Charles, the young
Duke
of Guise,
whom
all
the Parisians adored. 1
But these
rapidly mounting concessions merely proved how completely the ground had been cut from beneath the Spaniards' feet by
had been shifted elsewhere.
the action of the king of Navarre. The real scene of interest In early August the Estates were
prorogued, having signally failed to accomplish what had been expected of them, though in different ways, both by Philip and by Mayenne. They had not succeeded in proFrance with a king. viding
of
In the meantime the Spanish monarch, with a truer sense where his best chance lay, had been moving heaven and
earth to prevent the acceptance of Henry's conversion

see
of
by the
of
Rome.
The
personalities
had
shifted
in 1589.
there since
Philip's last great issue with the
papacy
The place
the gentler but perhaps even more conscientious and hard-working enthusiast Clement VIII, while that of the Count of Olivares had been taken by the Duke of Sessa and the latter was commanded
;
the fiery Sixtus
V was
now occupied by
do everything in his power to turn the new Pope against the king of Xavarre. At first this did not seem an impossible
to
task.
religion
Clement was full of scruples and fears. For him was the only thing that mattered, and he fully
that Henry's action had been dictated by raison He was also indignant that the Gallican church should
initiative in the
realized
d'etat.
have taken the
matter of the absolution, to
own sovereign pontifical rights. By tact and sympathy with the hard position in which showing the Pope was placed, Sessa could have effected much but
the prejudice of his
;
instead he took the bullying tone, and threatened to retire to
Naples
1
;
if
Clement permitted the envoy

2
of the king of
xxiii,
Navarre
Mariejol in Lavisse, vi, 1, pp. 376382 Bagueqault de Puchesae, pp. 55-58.
Pastor,
pp. 77-85.
642
bo
SPAIN. PRANCE,
in
AND THE NETHERLANDS
remain
Rome.
the
Pope
against the Spanish cause.
Such menaees simply served to turn In November, 1593, he
consented to give an audience to Henry's ambassador, the Duke of Nevers, though he still firmly refused to grant the
absolution for which
the matter
at
lie
hung
fire.
8 For nearly two years more prayed. Sessa surrounded the French envoys
the \ atican with spies in the hope that they might discover something that he could use to good effect. He was
encouraged, in the end of 1594, by the expulsion of the Jesuits from France, as the result of two attempts to assassinate
Henry which were traceable
to their influence, and

3
by the
he pro-
anger the measure evoked at Rome.

of as king of
4
As
a last resort
tested not against the absolution, but against the recognition
Henry
ground thai this

of Spain.
Navarre and duke of Brittany, on the was an infringement of the rights of the king
this shift
final
But
from considerations religious to
ruin of the Spanish cause, ('lenient had come to his decision before Sessa made his protest and it only served to strengthen his conviction that he had decided
political spelt the
.
right.
On
the very
of
next
day (September
received
17.
1595),
the
representatives Henry papal pardon and recognition for their master, and the Bourbon was at last 8 formally reconciled with the see of Rome.
the
Long before the papal absolution had been obtained,

situation
in
the
France had completely altered to the prejudice of the League and the Spaniards and to the advantage of the king of Navarre; in fact, the latter, though fully realizing that reconciliation with Rome was indispensable to him, had
elected to act as
If it
were ultimately inevitable.

in
All sorts of
yi
gratifying evidence- reached him,

xxiii. p. ">7.
1
the
lasl
part of the
Ibid., xxiii. pj. Mari^jol in Lavisse, vi,
1,
pp. 396
f.
Pastor,
xxiii. p.
134.
be whole story is told, from tho French nde, with b woalth of dVnil. in L'ftpinois, La Ligut et Us Papt*, pp. 581-634.
I
THE SPANIARDS LOSE PARIS

1593, of the growing strength of his cause.
643
the 27th of the
On
following February, at Chartres,

1
he was formally crowned
and anointed king of France. Everything now depended on for until he was master of the capital of his realm he Paris, was sovereign only in name and in spite of their recent reverses, the Spanish army and diplomats in Paris were by no means negligible. There was even talk of sending the
;
Spanish forces in the Netherlands to
March
feld.
2
rescue again, and on 6 Mayenne left the city to go and consult with MansHis place at the capital was taken by a violent
its
who was apparently on the best and the Spaniards. All in all it looked as though Paris might be able to withstand the attack which Henry was obviously planning to deliver. 3 But
Catholic
of
named
Brissac,
terms with
Feria
the king wished to avoid further bloodshed.
He
coveted
were weary of civil war. If he could bribe Brissac to turn traitor and open the city's gates, he was only too glad, and Brissac rose to the
popularity at
all costs,
and knew that
his subjects
bait.
It
his Spaniards
speaks volumes for the extent to which Feria and had lost their hold there, that they had not the
wit to forestall his treachery. They had received warning of his intentions on March 21, and Feria had made him go the rounds on the following night, in a pouring rain, accompanied by some Spanish captains, who had orders to kill him
at the slightest sign of trouble
;
but Brissac survived the
test,
and a few hours
later
4
soldiers of the king.
opened three of the gates of Paris to the So accurately had the affair been timed
that the Spanish troops were completely surrounded before they realized what had happened, and could offer no
Mariejol in Lavisse, vi, 1, p. 385. Forneron, iv, pp. 386 f. pp. 214-216. 'Forneron, iv, p. 217. Ibarra referred to Brissac as a "cavallero
2 1
que Paris quedava

4
muy
assegurada."
Ibid.,
Pierre
de
L'Estoile,
Memoires-
muy
catolico,"
under
whom
"paresce
12 vols.), 179 f., 258-261; Baguenault de Puchesse, pp. 60 f. Forneron, iv, pp. 218-220.
(Paris,
Journaux
vi,
1875-96,
;
pp.
644
SPAIN, FRANCE,
AND THE NETHERLANDS

killed
resistance.
Henry could have captured or

;
them
all,
had he
so desired
but he preferred to pose as the purveyor of
universal happiness, and notified Feria thai if the Spaniards would leave Paris that day and swear never again to bear
arms against him, he would gladly grant them their liberty and their lives. And so at three in the afternoon the Spanish garrison evacuated the capital of France, which they had
Countries.
occupied since 1591, and turned their faces toward the Low "We left," reported Ibarra to Philip, "with our
flags flying
and our drums beating, and without giving the

But; the dignity of
semblance of despairing of our cause."
the Spanish retirement made a far less permanent impression than the conduct of the French monarch as the tercios filed
past.
Men
from a window
never forgot, to their dying day, how Henry, in the Porte St. Denis, saluted his departing
"Commend me to your back again." The haughtiness of master, but never come the Spaniard was no proof against such tactics as these. There were touches of comedy, too, of which Henry made
enemies, and called after them,
1
the most, in the story of the relations of Spain and France in the months which succeeded the evacuation of Paris. It
was the heyday of the intercepting of letters. During the final weeks of the Spaniards at the capital a last desperate plea for
help had been despatched to Philip. Henry had caught the bearer of it on the way, and then, simply for the fun of seeing
how the Spanish king would reply, sent it on to Madrid by a henchman of his own, one Fouquet de La Varenne, an old
cook of Margaret of Valois, with instructions to play the So well did this man perpart of messenger of the League. form the role that had been assigned to him that he was t\\
called before the king's COnsuUa,
and sent back with a packet

Fomeron,
pp. 221-223.
of letters, which, needless to add, he delivered to the king of

i
f.
iv,
INTERCEPTED LETTERS
France.
645
made
After the Spaniards had evacuated Paris, Henryuse of Varenne a second time. Rumors of the king's
first
wife on account of her sterility had already reached the Spanish court, and it occurred to Philip that since it was now obviously impossible to keep the
intention to divorce his
Bourbon
off the French throne, he might save something from the wreckage of his plans by offering him the Infanta in marriage he therefore sent a messenger with such a proposal
;
Henry's counsellors did not wish their master even to receive him, but the king insisted on doing so and shortly afterwards he once more despatched Varenne to Madrid, with
to Paris.
;
instructions to get in touch with Bernardino de
Mendoza,
who was living in retirement near by, and see what could be made of the situation. It is difficult to believe that Henry
took the matter seriously, and Varenne's efforts at Madrid merely resulted in imperilling his master's reputation with
Elizabeth of England and the Protestant princes of the Empire but both of the envoy's missions seem to indicate
;
that, for the time being at least, the
French king believed
that the wisest

fool of
way
to deal with Philip
was to try
to
make
him. 1
of
The mass
at Brussels,
Frenchmen had not the same sense

Mayenne, who appeared with
of
humor
as their king.
a safe-conduct
was loaded with reproaches by Feria and Ibarra,

of ruining their master's cause in France,
who accused him
and wished to have him arrested. A letter of Feria to Philip on the matter was intercepted by Henry and sent back
to
Mayenne, who was furious when he read its contents, and solemnly demanded leave to vindicate his honor by a duel
with his principal accuser. 2 The resentment of Mayenne against Spain and the Spaniards was shared, though for very
1 Baguenault de Puchesse, pp. 62 and references there.
f.,
Baguenault de Puchesse,
p, 62.
l)4t)
SPAIN, FRANCE,
AND THE NETHERLANDS

of the rest of France.
different reasons,
a
by most
feeling thai
Spanish
influence
eliminated.
Though
Philip's
There was had not yet been wholly soldiers had by this time been
1
cleaned out of Picardy, except La Fere, they still hung on in Brittany, and threatened on the southern and eastern fron-
was rightly feared that the Spanish monarch, defeated in his hopes of gaining control of all the realm, would 2 revert to plans for its dismemberment. Under the cirtiers.
It
cumstances there was no alternative save to transform what
had hitherto been a
civil strife into a
national one, and bring
it to a conclusive end. On January 17, 1595, Henry formally declared war by land and sea against the king of Spain. 3 In order to be able to follow the course of the ensuing con-
flict,
we must once more
revert to the story of the parallel
struggle in
the Netherlands.
The calling off of Alexander of Parma the autumn of 1590 had given the rebels in
to relieve Paris in
the
Low
Countries
an admirable opportunity to resume the offensive, and under the lead of Maurice of Nassau they prepared to take advantage of
Hitherto their foreign alliances had availed them little. Anjou had been a flat failure, Leicester a disappointand the Protestants in Cologne had been crushed but ment, His intern the king of Navarre promised better things.
it.
;
were now almost identical with those of the Netherlander, and geographical proximity virtually compelled them to work
in
unison.
The
alliance
bet
ween France and the United
Provinces, which Orange had sought in vain to inaugurate, was now practically established by the march of events, and destined to endure, to the undoing of Spain, down to the 4 of Louis XIV. age
liwtfjol in Laviase,
1
vi,
1,
p. 390.
'
Mitritjol in Lavisae, vi,
1,
pp. 398
f.
Form
ron,
iv, p. I'll.
Firenne,
iv,
pp. 199
f.
PARMA AND MAURICE OF NASSAU

Parma, on
his departure for France,
of
647
had intrusted the
government Mansfeld, and the

to his son Charles
the
Low Countries to Peter Ernest of command of such troops as were left there
the small detachment under Verdugo in Friesland had been almost cut off from communication both
;
with Brussels and Madrid since 1587, and was to remain so till 1594. The Mansfelds, moreover, proved quite unable
1
to discharge the duties that
had been
laid
upon them.
The
younger resigned, almost immediately after his appointment, in a huff, and thereafter succeeded in so poisoning his father's
ear against
Parma
that the old
man began
to write letters,
2 traducing the duke, to Madrid. opportunity for young Maurice.
All this furnished a golden
Encouraged both by Eliza-
beth and Henry, he soon seized the offensive. He used the period of Parma's first absence in France to make his prepIn the spring of 1591, when Parma had got back, with his attention divided and his forces diminished, Maurice
arations.
was ready
to strike.
The campaign
of that year
astrous to the Spanish cause. In May took Zutphen and Deventer, and thereby gained control of the course of the Yssel, which, while in Spanish hands, had
cut off Drenthe, Overyssel, and
was disand June, Maurice
most
of Gelderland
from comthree
of
munication with the heart
of the republic.
The next
months were
largely spent in a struggle to get
command
the Waal, so as to render the provinces of Holland and Utrecht safe from Spanish attacks on the south. The most
important fortress on this river, Nimwegen, on the left bank, was still occupied by Philip's troops but their position there was made uncomfortable by the garrison of a hostile fort on the opposite side, which Parma besieged in July but was unable to take. Soon after he had drawn off his forces, the
; 1
Verdugo,
Commentario,
ff.
ed.
Lon-
Motley,
chay, pp. 83
Netherlands,
iii,
the History of pp. 76, 216.
United
648
SPAIN'.
PRANCE, A\D THE NETHERLANDS

came.
counternrtroke
On October
;
21
Maurice raptured
Nimwegen.
H< had not only solidified the defences of Hol-
land. Zealand,
and Utrecht
ho had prepared points of attack
Parma was already against the territory of the Spaniards. on his way to the relief of Rouen when he Learned the news.
It
was
crowning demonstration of the wisdom
of his coun-
sels to Philip to
3 concentrate, not to dissipate, his energies.
But Parma, though he was spared the pain of ever knowing
was being dealt, at that moment, than assignment to an impossible task

it.
a
;
blow
far
more
cruel
the master
whom
he
had served so loyally and so long had at hist made up his mind to betray him. It was the old, old story, in its final and most aggravated form, of royal suspicion of a distant and too
Ever since the tragedy of the competent representative. when there had been rumors of Parma's Armada and the days
ambition to
Low
himself up as an independent sovereign in the Countries, Philip had been on the watch foi accusations
set
It was no wonder that they were against the duke. The atmosphere of his court and his methods furnished him.
government lent themselves readily to Just that sort of thing; and the jealousy of the Spaniards was easily aroused by the brilliant successes of one whom they never ceased to
of
regard as an Italian and

detractors was the
foreigner.
hie of his principal
Duke of Medina
Sidonia,
whose calumnies
were passed on to Philip by his friends. Old Verdugo, who Was Convinced thai it was Parma's fault that he was isolated
Friesland,
of
vilest
was another; intriguers, was a
the
third.
commander Juan Moreo, Parma had had some

r
inkling of these accusations

in
a1 the time of his first campaign and wrote vigorously to the kim, to complain of France, them and to assure him of his loyaltj and devotion. He also
Pinnae,
of
th.
iv.
p,
200;
1).
Blok,
//
<y
iii,
I'.npl.
of
land*,
<;.-yi, Revolt pp. 24>i f. lands, pp. 220 222.

;
<>f
On
\<ther-
PHILIP
AND PARMA
649
took pains to remind him that he had several times requested, in the course of the last few years, to be relieved of his post
in the Netherlands.
He was
in failing health,
and
his views
of his duties
and
responsibilities
were so diverse from the

he wished to
instructions which were sent

utterly discouraged.
him from Madrid that he was

if
All Philip needed to do,
get rid of his
nephew, was to accept these requests at their But the king face value and give him permission to retire. and his most intimate advisers did not dare to do this they were afraid of what Parma might do if he were at large.
;
They determined that somehow must be got back to Spain.

1
or other Alexander Farnese
So in February, 1592, Philip sent the Marquis of Cerralvo to the Netherlands, the bearer of a letter to Parma, requestbut as Cerralvo died before he ing him to report to Madrid
;
could accomplish his task,
it
was intrusted
in the following
June to Pedro Enriquez de Acevedo, Count of Fuentes, who had come into some prominence three years before in defend2 He was sent on the pretext ing Lisbon against the English.
that his presence was necessary in order to retrieve the military situation, but he carried a commission as governor
and lieutenant-general, and subsequently received a confidential letter which implied in almost every paragraph that Parma was to be got rid of and sent back to Spain. But
nephew should have any suspicion of the fate that was awaiting him until the blow was ready to fall. Four days after signing his instructions to Fuentes, the king wrote to Parma to congratulate him on the delivery of Rouen and urge him to take care of his health.
Philip did not propose that his
In several subsequent letters he spoke indeed of his desire to consult with the duke in Spain, but assured him that he
1 Gos9art, Domination espagnole, pp. 187-192, and references there; Fea, pp. 440-453.
2 Cf. on the details of this man's life, and the different authorities thereon,
Forneron,
iv,
pp. 337
f.
G50
SPAIN, FRANCE,
AND THE NETHERLANDS
would receive the wannest welcome there, that he enjoyed the full confidence of the king, and that no calumnies against
him would be heard.

his
On December
nephew
;
6,
he even wrote a
final
letter of instructions to his
in
regard to the conduct of
hut Parma was already After an inspiring exhibition of physical beyond courage before his troops, holding himself bolt upright on horseback when he was in no condition to leave his bed, he
third
campaign
reach.
in
France
its
had died, at the age of forty-seven,
at
Arras, on the night of
December 2-3, 1592. Parma was the last

alter his death, the
least,
of the really great servants of Philip II
Prudent King was reduced, in Europe at to valiant captains and obsequious secretaries. Philip
first
was not the
Spanish sovereign to treat his ablest repre-
sentatives as he had Parma.
He had
inherited the practice
from his forbears, though he may have carried it to greater extremes than they. It was after the same fashion that the
Emperor had rewarded Ximenes and Cortes, and Ferdinand

the Catholic the (ireat
flection
in
which occurs
in
And the inevitable reCaptain. connection with all these tragedies

it
the case of
Parma
is
particularly true
it
is
that,
judged by modern standards
at least,
>vas the
servant
who
was always
right,
all
The
"I
worst of
and the master who was invariably wrong. Philip's faults was his intolerance, political
as well as religious, his inability to see that any conception

-late or church save his
own
whatsoever.
His worst error
in his
could have any virtue in it dealings with the Nether-
landers had been his contempt tor them, his refusal to believe that they w<re even to be regarded as honorable foes.
Parma made
neither of these mistakes.

in
In matters religious
he wafl always
favor of concessions;
he was,
its
in
fact,
an
advocate of liberty of conscience before

1
time.
He
always
V&z.pnz
in I)
1.
/;.,
Ixxiv. pp. 851
-a. pp.
453-460.
DEATH OF PARMA
made
a point of treating the rebels in the
;
651
Low
Countries like
gentlemen
even
in
the
given a perfectly free hand in the great task that had been laid upon him, at the focal point of international politics during the age in which he
lived, the
triumphs, he invariably a valiant, if defeated foe.
moments of his most notable accorded them the courtesies due to
Had he been
whole course of European history might well have
been changed.
The years 1593 and 1594 were almost
as disastrous to the
progress of the Spanish arms in the Low Countries as they were to Philip's hopes of gaining control of the kingdom of
As Parma's successor in the government of the Netherlands, the king had designated his own nephew, the Archduke Ernest of Austria, the brother of the Emperor Rudolf, who had spent most of his youth at Madrid, and was familiar with his uncle's ideas but as he was not able to arrive in the Low Countries until nearly twelve months after
France.
;
his
appointment,
of
all
hands
the
Count
authority remained concentrated in the of Fuentes during the year 1593.

soldier,
Fuentes was a competent

of office
Spaniards, a brother-in-law of the
Duke
but also a Spaniard of of Alva, and his term
gave the king a chance to return to his old policy of
complete Hispanicization of the government of the loyal provinces, in a way which Parma would never have allowed,
and which violated the terms
of the peace of Arras.
All
Parma's Belgian and Italian advisers were dismissed, and their Exchanges of prisoners with places taken by Spaniards. the rebels were henceforth definitely forbidden any soldiers of the enemy who were captured were promptly sentenced
;
to the gallows.
Small wonder
Netherlanders.
They
;
the change infuriated the had feared, but also respected the
if
duke
of Parma
but now this reversion to the methods of Alva,
652
SPAIN, FRANCE,
a
AND THE NETHERLANDS
under
Leader
whom
they believed to be less able, inspired

of
them
ress
to efforts of desperation.
under
1
Maurice
Nassau
They had made good progin 1591-92, They now

country of the Span*
had high hopes that they could

iards.
rid their
no position to meet such determined foes. Since Philip kept him even shorter of funds than his predecessors, there were many mutinies among his troops, with the
in
Puentes was
usual results.
as
Furthermore
his attention
was divided, quite
much as Parma's had ever been, between his difficulties in the Low Countries and the necessity of interfering in France.
At the time
there.
appointment the king's interesl \\ as chiefly One of the main reasons why Philip had sent his
of his
.
nephew Ernest to the Netherlands was that he might Inclose at hand if the Etats-< leneranx could be persuaded to elect him king of France; and Fuentes received constant
orders to have his
1
army
it
.
in
readiness on the FY< ach frontier,

I
or,
if
possible, across
bo as to bring pressure on
he
ass<
mHis
bly
at
Paris
when the
decisive
moment should
arrive.
efforts in this direction,
however, were quite

;
sterile,
save for
2 Mansfeld's rather futile capture of Xoyon moreover they him from offering any effective opposition to prevented Maurice. On June LM, L593, the latter recaptured ( ier-
truydenberg, thus closing one of the
lasl
breaches which had

;
opened by the Spaniards in the defences of Holland irothence he turned northward again-t Kriesland and
(
The key to the control of these regions was th( strong fortress of Koeworden in Drenthe, which commanded
ningen.
1
PfreniM)
iv.
pp.
203
in
f.,
i!
and
refer-
Even
at
era] of the 'obedient' Netherlands Mruueels it was openly declared thai salvation fif the country required a of rtmiiRo "Vemos sovereignty. let Is Religion catholics, nuestras hasienrla* y vidas Al Hit viejo,
:
lurion; meparesce que tiempo que busquemos otro uno, porque ya pareeoe quo La oaM de Austria ha Uegado A la oumbre donde puede Uegar." Brussels, SepBoletin tcmber 3, 1503; Hitldrieo,
tardo,}
-
(1880
*Ci
p r>7 ante, p. 686.
FIGHTING IN THE NETHERLANDS

the chief access to
653
morasses, and old Verdugo had attempted intermittently, for the previous six months, to wrest it from the hands of the rebels but in May,
across the
;
them
1594, Maurice appeared before the place and drove him off. The siege of the city of Groningen followed ; it surrendered
1
on July
24,
and
its fall
was the
signal for the elimination of
the last vestiges of Spanish control in the northern provinces.
Verdugo's long term of isolation was at an end, and he was permitted to retire to Luxemburg, where he continued to
death in the following year. In the rebels were still further encouraged by the January, 1595, news that Henry IV had formally declared war on Spain and
fight valiantly until his
was anxious to act in concert with them against their common foe and the death of the Archduke Ernest in February seemed at first sight to deal another blow to the authority of 3 Philip in Northern Europe. But the death of the archduke was to prove rather an aid to Spain than the reverse. It was a full year before his successor could be appointed and reach his post. During the interval all authority was once more concentrated in the hands of Fuentes, and, under his able and energetic leadership, the Spanish infantry were to give one more splendid
;
demonstration that they were Europe. The cause for which
still
the finest soldiers in

ruined,
they strove was
indeed, by the intolerance and ineptitude of the monarch whom they served but they valiantly fought on to the
;
Henry's schemes for the cooperation of the French and Dutch armies were effectively checkmated. His
bitter end.
general, the
of
Duke
of
Bouillon,
Luxemburg by Verdugo. Mondragon had all the best of

4
2
3
was speedily driven out The nonagenarian Colonel

United Netherlands,
hi,
a series of ensuing skirmishes

History of the pp. 317-320.
Verdugo, Commentario, pp. 134^148. Ibid., pp. 182 f. 206 iv, Pirenne, p. Motley,
;
654
SPAIN. FRANCE,
AND THE NETHERLANDS

1
In the meanwith Maurice of Nassau and his cousin Philip. time Fuentes had led another army across the French
frontier to rescue the few places that
still
Henry
arrived
in
the
Ham. The town was captured massacred on June 21 but three Spanish garrison days later he occupied Le Catelet, and on July 24 he won a splendid victory over the combined forces of the Duke of
too
late
region to save
of
the
Somme and
held out against the Oise. He
and
its
Bouillon and the
Count
of St. Pol outside Doullens.

itself,
A week
afterwards he entered Doullens

of the frontier,"
one of the "bulwarks

he took Cambray. 2
and slew
its
garrison as the French had slain

7,
that of
Ham.
Finally, on October
In other parts of France the course of the struggle was less favorable to the Spanish cause. A threat of Henry against
Franche Comte had brought Juan Fernandez de Velasco, the governor of Milan, across the Alps to its rescue, with an army
of
and
over 15,000 men. Mayenne had joined forces with him, they finally encountered the French at Foutaine-
won by
Franeaise outside Dijon, in a battle which had been virtually the Spaniards when a last desperate charge by the French monarch, an act of foolhardy courage of the sort
which Henry loved, turned victory into defeat. Mayenne was so much discouraged at the issue that he shortly after-
wards made
dt
his submission to the king,
and many of the
her old chiefs of the League followed his example in the 3 In Brittany Mercoeur held out till 1598, ensuing months.
but three years earlier his opposition had ceased to be serious. He n S8 now completely a1 odds with the Spanish detachment
there.
They foughl
;
alliance
against each other quite as often as in the whole province was turned over to brigandage
Ooronel
iloma, Villalobos y
p;
'On Mon'lragon "

Kuu.
i
see Angl Baloedo Cristobal de dragon," in Ciwlad de Dius, lxvi,

Kl
l'.
Ouerrat,
Bctun
iiles,
300-350; pp. Comenlario$,
Ixvn
ni.Tnii, iv. pp.
Forneron, iv, pp. 246-261. 240-246.
THE ARCHDUKE ALBERT

it
655
Clearly Henry could not call himself master of his kingdom while Brittany was in such a state. On the other hand, it was perfectly obvious that he
a "forest of robbers."
it as long as he was content would certainly do the same by him. His alone, only important problem, and the sole remaining hope of the Spaniards, lay on the northeastern frontier. Fuentes was not given the opportunity to win further
was
could take his time in reducing

it
to leave
it
military victories in 1596.
In February a
to
new governorPhilip
general arrived in the
Low
2
Countries, and Fuentes soon after-
ward departed
to Spain.
The man
whom
decided to confide the administration of
had now the Netherlands was
another of his archducal nephews, Albert, the younger brother of Ernest, who had died in the preceding year like him, he had been sent at an early age to be brought up at the
;
court of the Prudent King. Spanish ways than Ernest.

to
He had He spoke
absorbed far more of

Spanish in preference
any other tongue.
In his aspect, his
methodical laboriousness, and his resembled his royal uncle there was complete confidence and intimacy between them. In 1577, at the age of eighteen,
;
temperament, his fervent piety, he closely
he had been appointed a cardinal by Gregory XIII but his uncle had more need of him in the state than in the church,
;
he had been sent as viceroy to Portugal. So successfully, in Philip's eyes at least, did he fulfil his duties there, that when the governorship of the Netherlands became
and
in 1583
vacant on the death of Ernest the king soon selected him as
had previously cherished plans, as we have already seen, of solving his problem in France by getting the Archduke Ernest made king there and marrying him to
his successor.
Philip
Mariejol in Lavisse, vi, 1, p. 405. Coloma, Guerras, pp. 365-367. Pirenne, iv, pp. 211-213. He had been considered for the place before,
*
both in 1576 and pondance de Philippe

ii,
in II,
1586.
iii,
Corres-
p. 432,
and
p. lxxix.
fiofi
SPAIN, FRANCE.
AND THE NETHERLANDS
By this time it had become probable that Franco would escape him but might it not be possible that, if thinge continued to go wrong there, lie might still find both
the Infanta.
;
;i
satisfactory solution of his difficulties in the Netherlands and
bella
the peace for which his whole soul longed, by marrying IsaJlara Eugenia to Albert, and establishing them as joint
(
sovereigns of the
Low
from vows of
clerical celibacy
Countries? Certainly dispensations were not difficult to procure.
At the time, however, that the cardinal-archduke arrived the Netherlands, there was no open evidence of such ulterior designs. Albert was sent there at the outsel to carry on the campaign which Fuentes had begun he was furnished with fresh troops and, what was even more important, with money. There is no reason to think that he knew anything
in
;
of military affairs, but there
army who
did.
The
the Spanish morale of the troops had been restored by

officers left in
were
the fact that at last they had got their pay; they burned to capture more town- and booty in France, and Albert was only
too glad to be carried along with them, officially as their chief,
but really little more than a figurehead. Since the close of the last campaign the French king had been besieging La Fere, which was -till held by a Spanish garrison, and which
commanded
to Paris,
lo
the most direct route from the
Low
Countries
was
and the most obvious thing for the invading army But that was not the plan of the to relieve it.
Spanish captain- who were managing the cardinal-arehduK campaign for him they showed an originality, an unexpect;
edness, which reminds one of the Greal Captain.
La
F*
surrounded by swamps, proved even more difficult to than to invest, and the invaders left it to its fate;
rved out 00
Qaloboi y
relii
it
\
May
1,
I'L'.
Instead, the Spaniards diverted

;
Beiw
mmtariot, pp. 137-181

p. 406.
Forneron,
iv,
pp. 252-256;
Mari/'jol in I.nvisse. vi,
THE SPANIARDS TAKE CALAIS

their attack to the north,
657
and
in early April
they suddenly
appeared before Calais.

Its garrison
The
place
was utterly unprepared.
ruins
was inadequate and its fortifications almost in On there was no resistance worthy of the name.
April 17, 1596, the Spaniards entered the city without strikweek later they captured the citadel and masing a blow. on May 23 they also took Ardres sacred its few defenders
Both places yielded them an enormous booty. Guisnes and Le Catelet surrendered and the commander at Ham was bribed shortly afterwards, 2 All and more than the old Calais to follow their example. Pale' of the days of the English occupation was now in Spanish hands moreover its capture had at last given Philip the Channel port whose lack had been so fatal to him in 1588 another Armada might use it to excellent advantage. Yet it is worth noting that when Henry sent over a hurried message to Elizabeth to beg for her aid, after the siege was begun, the
without
firing
shot.
'
queen at first refused to help him, save on the condition that Calais be restored to England. Rather than see it in French,
she preferred that it should remain in Spanish hands for the moment she seemed far more alarmed by the prospects
;
of the recovery of
France than by
this
3
temporary recru-
The progress of descence of the power of the Spanish arms. the Spaniards in the next four weeks convinced her, it is true,
would not do to hold off too long. On May 24 she finally signed a treaty by which she granted Henry a force of 2000 men and a loan of 20,000 crowns, in return for his
that
it
4 promise not to make peace with Philip without her consent. But it was at best a half-hearted step, and Elizabeth deeply
repented
1
it
two years
later
when Henry broke
his
word and
ii,
iii,
Herrera, Historia General del Mundo, pp. 607-616. Forneron, iv, p. 256. 3 Mariejol in Lavisse, vi, 1, p. 408;
Cheyney, History of England,

131-142. 4 Mariejol in Lavisse, vi, Cheyney, ii, pp. 148-152.
1,
pp
p.
409;
658
SPAIN, FRANCE,
AND THE NETHERLANDS

to envisage the future,
deserted her.
She always sought
while Philip scrutinized the past, and she rightly foresaw that a united Prance would prove a far more formidable
enemy
of
empire of the
England in the years to come than the tottering Prudent King. Had she lived on into the sucSpain was
still
ceeding age she would not have been misled, as was her successor, into thinking that
"the greatest of
all
the
kingdoms
of
of the earth."
The capture
ment
of Calais
;
was the
last great military achieve-
Philip's reign
from that time onward the tide
turned steadily against the Spaniards. In August, 1590, the cardinal-archduke felt obliged, despite the desire of his captains to pursue their
advantage
in France, to return again to

;
the
Low
Countries to deal with Maurice of Nassau

before him, he
like
Parma and Fuentes
impossible task of being in he recaptured the town of Hulst from the rebels; but this triumph was rendered nugatory by the great victory of
was distracted by the two places at once. In August
Maurice
at
Turnhout
in
the following January, and during
the rest of the year 1597 one important town after another fell back into the hands of he Netherlander. 1 One more attack
t
in
France, led by Hernan Tello Portocarrero, the Spanish

at
oil
1
commander
by surprise
rful in
)oullens, succeeded, indeed, in taking
Amiens
March
11,
1597)
but the Marshal de Biron

it,
hurried across from
Rouen
to recapture
and was sucth

it
the following September, despite

its relief.-
all
the carall
dinal-archduke could do tor

defeats
in
Worse than
of
these
the
field
was the shortage
money.
The year
1596 had Been Philip repudiate his financial obligations, and without money it was Impossible t<> continue to fight. And
'('olnrna, (luerraa,
Icy,
iii.
pp.395
fT.
Motvi.
'
Villaining
pp. 202
p.
1.
y
ft.
;
Hittory of tfu Unittd Nttherlondt, pp. 122 C.U. ISA 188; I'ir.-nn.-. iv,
tarioa,
BmiAYkiet, ComenMari6jol in Lavisae,
410.
PEACE NEGOTIATIONS
there were various other considerations which
659
general
movement towards peace.
in great straits for funds,
made for a The French king was also and anxious to spare his kingdom
from a prolongation of the wars which had devastated it for the merchant classes in the Netherlands were weary so long
;
Pope Clement VIII, too, had been laboring, ever since his absolution of Henry IV, to bring about a reconciliation between Spain and France he rightly feared that it would be the Protestant states of Europe that would reap the sole benefit of the continuance of the strife between 1 the two chief Catholic powers. Perhaps most important of all was the ardent desire of the Prudent King himself to end He had never really liked war, and had his days in peace. often gone to great lengths to avoid it. Since 1595 he had
of fighting.
;
known that he
he desired reconlonger ciliation with his enemies on earth, in order to have opporcould not live
;
much
tunity to become reconciled to his Maker. After the French had recaptured Amiens, in September, 1597, there was no Negotiations longer any doubt of the speedy end of the war. for peace between Spain and France, already begun in Paris through the instrumentality of the papal legate and the general of the Franciscans,
in
were formally opened at Vervins

3
The course of the proceedfollowing spring. ings there was closely followed by the cardinal-archduke, who had been given full powers to treat in the name of Spain. He
the
had
his
own
interests, as
we
shall see in a
moment,
in
having
them reach a
successful termination.
Elizabeth of England did her best to prevent an accord. She had counted on Henry IV to bear his share on land in the
war against
1
Philip which she

;
was
cf.
to continue to
wage on sea
in Lavisse, vi,
1
pp. 134-146 Mariejol p. 411. C. S. P., Venetian, ix, no. 348. 'Mariejol in Lavisse, vi, 1, p. 411;
Pastor,
xxiii,
1,
le
i,
also Louis Calendini, "Notes sur Traite de Vervins," in Revue Henri TV, pp. 86-88 (1905).
660
SPAIN, FRANCE.
AND THE NETHERLANDS
and she complained with justice that the French king had promised her two years before thai he would not conclude a The news of the 'perpetual and irrevocable' Beparate peace.
1 Edict of Nantes (April 30, 1598), by which Henry granted a measure of tolerationto the French Huguenots, may well have
riven Philip pause.
There seems to be no record

learned of
it,
of
what he
his
said or did
when he
at
though we know that
representatives poison the Pope's ear against the French king;

Philip could not comprehend,
it
Rome
did their utmost to
make use
it
of
it
to
a
was
harbinger of modernity, of a totally different world,
which
and in which he felt he had no have strengthened his desire to place; very possibly may In any ease the peace conference at Yervins was gone. not interrupted, and on May 2, 1598, a treaty was signed ihere, which was characterized by a contemporary as "the
most advantageous that France had concluded for five hunThe Spanish king gave up Calais, and all the dred years." other places that he still held in Picardy and Brittany. His claims to the duchy of Burgundy were recognized in theory,
but as he promised to seek to vindicate them solely "by the the friendly way of justice and not by appealing to arms
4 recognition was tantamount to a renunciation.
For
forty
years past he had alternately aspired to influence, to cont rol, an<l to dismember Prance now, in order to have peace with her before he died, he had been obliged to recognise her
;
integrity and independence under the rule of a king who had a heretic horn, and had recently announced his intention
'i
1
'
>n this
date,
we
de
j>.
article of P.
Vigneatuc,
the very ronvinHriR "La veritable
renoe there.
Dumont,
v, 1, pp.
*
Corp.*
Text of the treaty in univerttl diplomats
date
d<-
l'tviit
Nantes,"
p
in
li-
lit
1^7.
Pastor,
Bell
xxiii,
16
of
Booh was tho verdiol

no
of
Pompone
los
561-664. oonunenl of Coconut, 'iurrras, on this provision: "como si 497, Reynoe, 6 Sinorios tan grandeB,
Cf. the
de
of of
n<Rotia the pence, af terward" chancellor Franco. I'irenno, iv, p. 214, and
the
a las leyes de! eetuvieeeo snjftos dcrorho, y no a las quo dan las armas. y el valor."
TREATY OF VERVINS
to be tolerant of heretics.
661
Finally, after all his concessions,
he failed actually to obtain one of the principal advantages which the treaty ostensibly accorded him. One of the chief
reasons
why he had been
in such haste to obtain peace with

free, before
France was that he might be
he died, to
settle
the question of the Netherlands; and he had every right to expect that, after the treaty of Vervins had been signed, the French king would cease to support his enemies in Holland. But Henry, in this matter, did not live up to his word.
He
heartened the United Provinces with promises of his continued support. Though he had ceased to wage war openly
against the king of Spain, he continued it covertly by aiding the rebels in the Low Countries, and the latter were encouraged to persist in their struggle until they won formal recognition of their independence at the peace of Westphalia. 1 turn finally, then, to the settlement in the Nether-
We
lands
for
if
Henry was not altogether
loyal in his observ-
ance of the treaty of Vervins, Philip was not quite free from duplicity in the arrangements which he sanctioned in the Low
he had been really wise, if he could have had a glimpse into the future, he would have gone the whole way in his quest for reconciliation, and granted the Netherlanders their freedom in return for the peace for which his whole soul
Countries.
If
longed.
They had been
a liability throughout his reign, a
'plague spot,' a 'running sore'; it was largely through the ramifications of his difficulties with them that he had become
involved in his disastrous struggles with France and England. Spain and the Spanish Empire would have been vastly betrid of them. But Philip could not possibly bring himself to see this. As we have often remarked, he looked backward, not forward. The decision
ter off
if
he could have got
Villeroy,
Pirenne, pp.
iv,
215; p. Nouaillac, 362-378. Villeroy was
spoken of as "un des peres de d'Espagne."
la
pais
662
SPAIN. FRANCE,
AND THE NETHERLANDS
of his father that the
Countries should go to Spain the and his precepts worst mistake the Emperor ever made to Philip to cherish and retain them, counted for far more in
Low
the king's ryes than the problems inherent in the future. The fact that half of the Netherlands were now in full revolt
against him, and were trying to set up, in defiance of his authority, a system of government and religion which he
abhorred,
made him
all
the
more certain that
it
was
his
bounden duty to get them hack into Spanish control. On the other hand, he had the wit to see that for the present it was
utterly impossible for
him
in
to accomplish this.
His treasury
was empty,
his
army
poor shape.
He
probably already
realized that his son, so shortly to succeed him,
was
little
more than
a pleasure-seeker,
who
could not be trusted to

essential to the con-
expend the energy and labor which were
tinuance of the Net herland campaigns. Everything pointed, under the circumstances, to the necessity of devising a stop-
nap
-some arrangement by which Spain could be given an
opportunity to rest and recuperate, so as to be able to earnon the struggle successfully in later year.-, and by which, in the meantime, the Low Countries should not be permitted to pass out of her hands.
Philip, as
we have
Been,
of his difficulties at the
had contemplated such time that he had sent the

Netherlands
in
a solution
(
'ardinal-
Archduke Albert
Bet
to the
1595 96.
To marry
Albert to his cousin, the Infanta Isabella Clara Eugenia, and
them up
as joint sovereigns of the
Low Countries under

way
out.
Spanish suzerainty Beemed now
to be the only
in his
The
Spanish king wafl Strengthened

this expedient
determination to adopt
by the fact that there was ample historical cedent for what he proposed to do. Clear back in L539,
had had
hifi
his father
a
|"
scheme
of detaching the Netherlands

a
from the
resl of
ons by giving them as
dowry
to
SETTLEMENT IN THE NETHERLANDS
663
one of his daughters and marrying her to the Duke of 1 A similar plan had been considered for one of the Orleans.
Infantas in 1573
;
Requesens had advocated

2
it
in 1574,
and
On all these occasions the solution Juan de Zufiiga in 1586. had been refused. In those happier days it had seemed unnecessary, for it looked as though Spain could keep the Netherlands without adopting it but now the situation had
;
completely changed.
And
so,
on
May
6,
after the conclusion of the treaty of Vervins, Philip
1598, four days put his
signature to the act by which the Low Countries were handed over to the cardinal-archduke and the Infanta, who were to
be married as soon as possible, 3 to be ruled by them as the seven rebel provinces of the Union of sovereign princes
' ' ;
Utrecht were of course theoretically included in the arrange4 ment, as well as the loyal ones of the Union of Arras.
But the phrase 'sovereign

'
must not be interpreted to mean that the archdukes' were in any sense really emancipated from the tutelage of Spain. In the first place, it was provided that whenever either Albert or the Infanta should
princes'
Countries should revert to Spain, unless there were issue of their marriage and Philip had good reason for
die,
the
Low
believing that their union would prove, as it ultimately did, to be sterile. In the unlikely case of their producing offspring,
1
it
was stipulated that the

on
222.
child,
April
if
18,
a boy, should not

1599.
l'histoire
E. Gossart, "Notes pour servir a du regne de Charles-Quint,"
Pirenne,
iv,
p.
pp. 68 ff ., in Academie Royale de Belgique, Memoires couronnes et autres in collection lv memoires, octavo, (1897); idem, "Projects direction des Pays-Bas en royaume sous Philippe II," in Academie Royale de Belgique, Bulletin, classe des lettres, 1900, pp.
* For a detailed Ibid., pp. 220 f. account of the negotiations preceding Gustav Turba, see the marriage, "Beitrage zur Geschichte der HapsAus den letzten Jahren des burger spanischen Koniga Philipp II.," in
:
Archiv
6
.
fur
osterreichische
Geschichte,
558-578.
2
lxxxvi (1909), pp. 309-452.
Pirenne, iv, p. 216, and references
there.
'The proxy marriage took place at Ferrara on November 15, 1598, and the wedding ceremonies at Valencia
Cf H. Lonchay, "Philippe II et le mariage des archiducs Albert et Isabelle," in Academie Royale de Belgique,
Bulletins,
classe
des
lettres,
1910,
pp. 364-388.
604
SPAIN, FRANCE,
AND THE NETHERLANDS
many
girl,
without the consent of the Spanish crown, and if a should be wedded either to the Spanish king or to his
son.
The archdukes, furthermore, were
obliged
to
give
assurances that they would maintain the

faith
Roman
Catholic
and do their utmost to extirpate heresy; if the Pope should accuse them of being contaminated by it, they 1 It is worth noting promised to renounce all their rights.
also that they
the Indies;
restrictions,
were rigorously excluded from commerce with though hedged about with all kinas of Spanish
the
New
they were denied the privileges of Spaniards in World. And there were other secret clauses besides,
by which the archdukes were still further bound. Altogether the arrangement was such as made them little more
independent than the various royal representatives in the Low Countries from the days of Margaret of Parma to those
of her son.
Under
their rule
all
the traditions of the Spanish
regime were maintained, and on the death of the cardinalarchduke in 1621, the Netherlands reverted once more to the
Spanish crown, in accordance with the plans thai had been 2 laid by the Prudent King.
He may have taken Yrtainlv Philip had earned his rest. with disastrous persistency, but no one could wrong turn deny that he had labored, valiantly and unremittingly, to the
(
the
very last, to do his duty as he conceived it to be. And, in addition to the political reverses and economic disasters of
the last few years, he had been tortured
all
the time
by the
even
t
ttdily increasing ravages of a terribly painful disease.
Rumors
thai he was not well had reached

as early as
a
Rome and
until
Constantinople
'iter that
;
I593,
bu1
it
was not
his condition
began
to give
I'.,
cause for real

ix,
Pirenna, iv. p Ibid p. 247

,
218
C. 8.
Venetian,
nos. 150, 218.
PHILIP'S LAST ILLNESS

alarm.
665
On May 13, 1595, the Venetian ambassador reported that the doctors said that the king's body 'was so withered and feeble that it was almost impossible that a human being
such a state should live for long. Philip's original ailment was the gout but in the later stages he also suffered intermittently from a "double tertian [fever] with irregular
in
;
'
spasms," and painful sores and ulcers broke out all over his 2 A crisis was feared on Good Friday, 1596, chiefly, body. it would appear, because there was an eclipse, and Philip
and others of his house but on that very day an improvement took place, possibly because he had been bled, "though the blood flowed with difficulty and two-thirds of it was watery humor." There were also other occasions, in December of that same year, and in September, 1597, when 4 it was believed that he was likely to die, but Philip survived them all, and in May, 1598, when there was a great festival,
"recalled
his father, his mother,
;
how
had died at a
similar conjuncture"
ball
"the King, though in bed, gave his orders and directed the with as quick and lively spirit as if he had been at the
head of his army." 5 On the last day of the following June he insisted on being carried in a litter from Madrid to the
Escorial, against the advice of his doctors,
who dreaded
the
the journey. 6 justified by the event.

effects of
Their apprehensions were more than
For a week
after his arrival at

;
San
Lorenzo Philip had another violent attack of fever in July there was a temporary improvement, but in early August all
his
different
afflictions
came back upon him
at
once,
with redoubled violence, and continued unabated to the

end.
7
C. S. P., Venetian,
Ibid., no. 418.
ix,
no. 348.
Ibid.,
no.
707,
and
Cervera
ix,
in
2 3
4
C. de
7
C,
S.
iv, p. 298.
Ibid., nos. 418, 422. Ibid., nos. 528, 610. Ibid., no. 690.
C. P., Venetian, 709, 714, 715, 717-722.
nos.
707,
666
It
SPAIN, PRANQB,
is
AND THE NETHERLANDS

harrowing details
of the progress those last dreadful weeks. He of the king's malady during was in constant agony. His bed linen was impregnated by
useless to follow the
the suppuration from his abscesses, but it was apparently impossible to change it, for he could not bear to be moved
the odor was frightful, and vermin began to appear.
He
med
literally to
be rotting away, a microcosm of the vast
empire which had begun to disintegrate under his rule. But neither Philip nor those who watched by hi> bedside gave The king their principal attention to these terrible things.
ransacted such business of state as he could, but his thoughts were chiefly fixed on the next world. His patience in suffert
they compared it to He constantly harped on the sins of the patience of Job. which he had been guilty, and humbly expressed his hope
ing
of all
2
was the wonder
who beheld
it
that they would be forgiven.

the sacred relics
He
took comfort
in confession,
in
in the prayers of the priests at his bedside,

3
gazing on of the Escorial which were brought to be
and
contemplated by him for the last time; more than ever his principal interest DOW,
the church was

for
it
opened
for
him the way
to eternal
called in to see his father,
The Infante was frequently and on A.ugust 28 he was given two

life.
sealed packets, "with instructions to open

his
'
them only
after
What had been placed in those Majesty's death." does not appear, but we are fully informed of the packets contents of a paper which, two days before he died, the king
handed
to
hi.-
confessor with order.- to read

8
it
to his son the
moment
that he had gone. That paper was not filled with the sort of advice which the Emperor had BO <ften given
Philip, with full
1
and
.
specific
781
<
;
comments and
C. da 'C 8 C. de
,
facts concerning
C S
/'
;
iv.
bo.
,hr,pp.298f
/'
i
.
Fomeron, ir,
ix,
p. 290,
pp. 800 317. P., Vmntian, is, no. 727. c iv, pp. 817-810.
iv,
.
C,
m (ion,
ff.
bo.
727
C. de
C,
iv,
pp. 300
DEATH OF PHILIP
667
the state of his realms, and the character of his ministers. It was an excerpt Philip had not even written it himself.
from the
life
of St. Louis
1
IX of France, by
;
his contemporary,
the Sieur de Joinville, which had been translated into Spanish and published in 1577 it contained the advice which
that
monarch had given
to the son
who was
God and
;
to succeed him,
and who,
It is filled
like the Infante,
was
to bear the title of Philip III.

live righteously
;
with exhortations to love
to reverence the
fairly
;
church and avoid war
to administer justice
not to be cast
2 pride by success. any one could take exception but it was no more apposite to the needs of the Spain of 1598 than it is to those of any
;
adversity nor puffed up with it contained nothing to which Certainly
down by
country or any age, and it speaks volumes for the extent to which Philip at the last had managed to forget the rivalries of this world, that he preferred it, written as it was by a monarch of the realm which had been the traditional
his house, to
enemy
of
anything that he could have invented himself. In the early days of September it was evident that the end could not be long delayed. Philip's courage never deserted
him, and his love of minutiae exhibited itself to the very " Pie has made himself most familiar," wrote the Venelast.
tian ambassador, Soranzo,
"not only with the thought of death, but with the details and the discussion thereof, and with all that should be done after he is gone. He has
arranged every detail of his funeral, and has ordered the purchase of a large quantity of black cloth to drape the church of the Escurial. He has caused them to bring into his room
and to his bedsrae a

after
shirt of lead, in
last,
he has breathed his

la
corpse
1
when his hour is come.

as
'Lonvilla.'
wrapped and a leaden coffin for his He examined both and caused
2
which he
is
to be
Antonio Cervera de
the
iv, p.
name
317.
Torre gives C. de C,
C.
de
C,
iv,
pp.
317-319,
390-
392.
668
SPAIN, FRANCS,
AND THE NETHERLANDS
himself to be measured, and gave orders for the necessary l At daybreak on the morning of September 13, alterations.''
he died, in a little room twelve feet square, whence he could look out on the altar of the great monastic church whose
construction had been one of the deepest
his
life.
satisfactions of
to find
It
would have been impossible
more
fitting spot for the
termination of his arduous labors.
Just two weeks later Soranzo reported that he had "heard the Adelantado of Castile declare that they would see what
the Spanish were worth now that they have a free hand, and are no longer subject to a single brain that thought it knew all that could be known, and treated everyone else as a block-
head."
But
this
was only the view
of a
discontent
<
grandee,
who
rejoiced in the relief
from the tension to which

;
be Philip's rule had subjected him and others of his kind doubtless foresaw for himself both financial favors and
preferments in the reign of a king who delegated everything to subordinates and was immersed m the pursuit
political
people #n the news
of pleasure.
tar
run- picture of the feeling of the Spanish

of Philip's death
vas firsl
known
is
givenlf^ a brief paragraph in a letter from tie- same Venetian ambassador, which was written on the day that the king
change is usually popular," so he nobles and people, rich and poor, universally reported, "yet show great grief." Despite all the misfortunes which his
expired.
"Although
reign had l>rough1 them, the Spaniards loved their Prudenl
King.
'('. 8, P.,
1
VttHtian,
ix,
no. 727.
Ibid., no. 744. irttn de Padilla
The adelantado was

y
Manrique, sub-
sequently prominent invasion of Ireland.
in
plana for
no. 737.
thfl
*C
8.
/'
Venetian,
ix,
669
See notes at the end of Chapters
XXXIV
and XXXVII, and add
In addition to the Sources and Contemporary Authorities. standard sources and chronicles of this time, such as the Proces-Verbaux des Stats Generaux de 1593, ed. Auguste Bernard (Paris, 1842), and Enrico Caterino Davila's Historia delle Guerre Civili di Francia, which it does not seem worth while to enumerate here, there are three notable contemporary accounts of the course of the war in the NetherThese lands during this period, all by men who participated therein. are the Commentario de la Guerra de Frisa by Francisco Verdugo, edited, with an admirable introduction and the text of a number of letters from Verdugo, by Henri Lonchay for the Commission Royale d'Histoire (Brussels, 1899) Las Guerras de los Estados Baxos desde el ano de M. D. LXXXVIII. hasta el de M. D. XCIX., by Carlos Coloma (Antwerp, 1625; my references are to this edition; also in B. A. E., and the ComenHistoriadores de Sucesos Particulares, ii, pp. 1-203) tarios de las Cosas Sucedidas en los Paises Baxos desde 1594 hasta
;
;
1598,
by Diego de Villalobos y Benavides,
ed.
Alejandro Llorente
None of them, save possibly (Madrid, 1876) in the Libros de Antano. Coloma, who was subsequently to attain eminence as an ambassador,
makes any pretension
to historical insight or perspective
;
but their
narratives are full of color
and vividness
and Coloma's work has been
characterized as "el mas precioso arsenal de noticias que poseemos referentes al periodo de 1588 a 1600." The two standard contemporary accounts of Philip's last illness, by Antonio Cervera de la Torre and Christ6val Perez de Herrera, are to be found on pp. 297-402 of vol. iv of C. de C.
Later Works.
History of the
useful,
As
a detailed narrative of events,
United Netherlands
its
(New York,
though
point of view
is
J. L. Motley's 1861-68, 4 vols.) is still so unfriendly to the Spaniards that
it is difficult
on its judgments. An article by Gustave Baguenault de Puchesse on "La Politique de Philippe II dans les affaires de la France, 1559-1598," in the Revue des questiones historiques, xxv (1879), pp. 5-66, contains much that is still valuable and Henri Forneron, Les Dues de Guise el leur epoque (Paris, 1877,
to place
much
reliance
and Henri, Comte de L'fipinois, La Ligue et les Papes (Paris, throw much light on the policy of the Prudent King in France. 1886), Joseph Nouaillac's Villeroy (Paris, 1908) is a model of what such a monograph should be and his "Regne de Henri IV, sources, travaux,
2 vols.),
;
et questions a traiter," in Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine, ix (1907-08), pp. 104-123, 348-363, give precious indications for those
670
SPAIN. FRANCE,
AND THE NETHERLANDS
who wish to pursue the story further from the French point of view. The forty-seventh volume of the Ciudad de Dioa, published on September 13, 1898, to commemorate the tercentenary of the death of Philip II, contains a number of interesting estimates of the king, and accounts The name- of numerous other bookfi of his different achievements.
and
article.-, of
in the
too Bpecial a nature to be inserted here, will be found appropriate places in the footnotes.
CHAPTER XL
FINAL REFLECTIONS
the close of so long a book, the author may be permitted, if not expected, to moralize. And the question on
At
which
his opinions,
is
be desired,
to explain
they be worth anything, will naturally that of the fundamental reasons which combine
if
the Spanish Empire, so overwhelmingly preponderant in the middle decades of the sixteenth century, should have disintegrated with such tragic rapidity in the
why
Like every other similar phenomenon in succeeding age. the history of the human race, its fall was the product of a complex of different causes and we are still quite as far
;
from having discovered them
all,
and from having reached
any general agreement as to the relative importance of those that have been already assigned, as we are in the case of those that have been given for the fall of Rome. Yet it is
only by constant statement and restatement of the views of successive generations of historical students that there
is
any hope
of
ultimately obtaining the truth.
Even
if
opinions be expressed which are subsequently proved wrong, there is always a chance that they may render a real service
;
for
it is
not seldom through the very process of sub-
verting them that fresh light is incidentally revealed. The first, and, in some respects, the most far reaching of the considerations that must be borne in mind by those who seek\ to know the causes of its fall, is that the Spanish Empire
was rather the
result of a series of accidental
and
artificial
It.
agglomerations than of
a normal and natural growth.

671
672
exhibits,
FINAL REFLECTIONS
indeed,
a
certain
magnificent
continuity,
the
product of the crusading ideals

it
which animated and inspired from the cave of Covadonga to the death of Philip II;
those
crusading ideals were shared in very unequal proportions by the different realms in the Iberian peninsula.
but
They
in
it
impetus to Castile, in completing the great work of the Reconquest but we must
it
furnish,
is
true,
chief
the days of the Catholic kings, forget and the discovery of the New World, Castile played a relatively small part in the upbuilding of the Spanish Empire.
that
to
down
Save
all
for
the
Canaries,
till
to
which
Spain's
title
was not
-
definitely established
the time of Ferdinand and Isabella,
the various mediaeval conquests of Spain

of those activities
were the result of the activities of
beyond the the realms of the crown
of
Aragon, and the origins
were rather hostile
than friendly to the church. Two really divergent currents were united by the marriage of the Catholic Kings. The events of the succeeding period, particularly the discovery oi
America, served
imperial
to
place Castile, which had had far
Less
experience
than the
t
Eastern
Kingdoms, perma-
nently
in
the forefront of
he picture, and the Spanish Empire
Small wonder, conprogressively Castilianized. her fresh responsibilities and opportunities across the sidering Atlantic, that Castile was reluctant to assume the duty of
maintaining the Italian and Mediterranean possessions which had been foisted on her by the union with Aragon. And
then, on lop of
all
;ill
became
this,
came
the
Hapsburg inheritance
ti*I
thai it implied, particularly the baleful responsibility oi the Netherlands! an even more beavy and unnatural burden for nation, which for eight Centuries hail been almost exclu;i
sively occupied
;ii
borne, to be called
long
"i comparative isolation, under the Leadership of her most uncosmopolit une,
upon to bear. After Spain was summoned to
SEPARATISM AND DIVERSIFICATION

part, the
673
posed
of a large
stupendous task of governing a world empire comnumber of widely scattered and hetero-
geneous units accidentally drawn together as a result of two

fateful marriages.
There can be no doubt that
all
the difficulties arising from
the conditions described in the preceding paragraph were perpetuated and intensified by that tendency toward separa-,
tism and diversification which, as

is
we have
often remarked,
It
^
a distinguishing characteristic of the Iberian peoples.

it
rendered
impossible for
Ferdinand and Isabella and their

administration of the
'
I
Hapsburg successors
to unify the
various territories over which they held sway. It was a chief barrier to the efficiency that ought to have been the finest
fruit of the
system of royal absolutism which, in

political
full
accord
,
with
the
prevailing
theories
of
that
day and
generation, they established and attempted to maintain.
The
variety of the problems with which they were inevitably confronted was so bewildering that no monarch could
possibly deal with
them
all,
particularly
if,
like Philip the
Prudent, he was unwilling to delegate anything to subordinates. No doubt the Catholic Kings and their successors were fully conscious of this difficulty, and Philip, in abolishing some of the most cherished of the 'liberties of
Aragon,' took a step toward remedying it; but he was far too good a Spaniard to go the whole way, and put an end to
the separate! constitutions of the Eastern
corpses
Kingdoms.
since gone
for all the vitality
had long
were
Their
suffered to remain unburied, until the advent of the

in the eighteenth century
Bourbons
changed the government of Spain from a decentralized to a centralized despotism on the model
of that of
Louis XIV.
The Hapsburgs' maintenance

of Spanish separatism
is
of the
constitutional
emblems
if
one of the
most
striking,
unfortunate, proofs of the fact that they
674
FINAL REFLECTIONS
in
respects far more thoroughly EUspanicized than their successors from across the Pyrenees.
became
It
some
but a platitude to remark that the Spanish Empire of the sixteenth century was vastly over-extended, that Spain
is
was
called
upon
to
shoulder a burden which
it
was beyond her
capacity to hear.
But
if
the process of over-extension had

it
been more gradual, the effect of
unfortunate; it world empire was thrust upon her that accounts in lai measure for Spain's failure to maintain it. We have already
might well have been less was the appalling suddenness with which
remarked that the only portions of the Iberian peninsula which had had any practice worthy of the name in the
management
of overseas possessions,
Isabella,
down
to the reign of
of
Ferdinand and
were the realms of the crown
Aragon. When, under the Catholic Kings and the Emperor, the really great advance.- came, things so fell out
that
the leadership of the Spanish
Castile,
which was totally
Empire was shifted to unprepared to assume it; the

I
Eastern Kingdoms gradually faded front the picture, and >f their imperial experience was thus largely thrown away.
course the non-Spanish responsibilities of the Emperor made the situation even more difficult still. Charles saw it all,
plainly enough, in the closing years of Ins
of his
life.
His division
to
inheritance, and
his
advice to Philip to forbear

-
attempt any further increase of his territorit

that he realized that fate
or power, show
a
had suddenly saddled Spain with
For the first twenty-five burden beyond her power to hear. years of hi.- reign the Prudent King followed hi.- fat her'.- counsels.
Though champion
he
rested,
of the forces of militant
Cathol-
icism,
politically
Bpeaking,
<m
the
defensive-
Then Destiny once more intervened and another great empire fell into his lap. From Philip's own standpoint, his annexation of Portugal and
its
dominions was not an
act of a
PLACE OF AMERICA IN THE EMPIRE

sion,
675
but merely the gathering in of an inheritance indubibut it is easy to see why the rest of Europe tably his own
;
refused to regard
it
as such,
ible rapidity of Spain's rise, in little
and was appalled at the incredmore than a century,
from a position of comparative insignificance to the leadership of the most extensive empire that the world has ever
seen.
And not only did the suddenness of the transformation put the rest of Europe up in arms, in a way which in all probability a more gradual growth would not have
done
;
it
was
also fatal to Spain's
hope
of a successful defence.
Such widely scattered and highly diversified territories could not possibly be welded together, under an efficient imperial
organization, in such a comparatively short space of time.
Without the
Indies,
picture would of paragraph may well be devoted at this point to the consideration of the dictum of a recent writer that "America, in
;
and the revenues they yielded, the and a course have been totally different
Spanish history, was a white elephant."

solely of the role of Spain in
If
one thinks
Western Europe, this verdict is sound. Had it not been for the monopoly unquestionably which she claimed in the New World she would not have
gained the position in the Old, which drew down on her the she might well have jealousy and hatred of her neighbors devoted herself, with their full approval and support, to the
;
conquest of a more permanent domain in North Africa. But the subject of this book is not so much Spain as the Spanish
Empire, and if w e envisage the question of the American lands from the standpoint of empire, we are likely to be led to
T
were, after all, a sine qua non of its existence, and a fundamental cause of Spain's greatness while it lasted without them she could scarcely have
a very different conclusion.
Tney
attained imperial power at

1
all,
at least in the sixteenth
S.
de Madariaga, Spain, p. 351.
Ik
i76
FINAL REFLECTIONS
Ami though, three hundred years later, the Americentury. can colonies declared and won their political independence,
the Language and culture which they had inherited from their
mother country remain as their permanent possession. If empire be measured by standards other than the political and economic, the Latin American lands are still a part of the
picture,
and the glory of having settled and

of
civilized
them
belongs forever to Spain.
Another consideration,
fact that the
tremendous
fall of
signii
cance in the
is
problem of the causes of the
the Spanish Empire,

ideals
the
it
principles and had Income antiquated by the end

Its
main
which underlay
of the sixteenth century.
most ancient tradition, namely, that of crusading, lost its hold on men's minds after the battle of Lepanto, and the
kindred idea that
it
was the duty

with
of all true Christians to
extirpate heresy
collided
the nascent
tali
conception of
religious toleration.
Politically, too, the
much
the
same.
The overwhelming preponderance which
the Ha]
burg inheritance and the discovery of America had give] Spain was a flagrant com radict ion of the principle of national
individuality, and of the
modern idea
it.
of the balance of power,
which was being gradually evolved as the most
obvious
maintaining Certainly misfortune than her fault, the resull of her inheritance rather
Li
method
of
was rather Spain's

committed
to
than of her
own
choice, that Bhe found herself
that
these antiquated ideals; but it was none the less inevitable when the crisis came, she found thai practically all the more modern BtateE of Europe were arrayed against her
Her
failure to grasp
just
any
of the principle- oi
sound econom
beginning to emerge in the end of the sixteenth century, and were subsequent!} to become one of
which were
the
chief
another chapter
controlling force- of the modern world, is .it the >aine Btory the phrase of Siguensa,
I
ANTIQUATED IDEALS
''those
677
faith
good old centuries when there was so much
and
so little
money/'
is
deeply significant in this
connection.
Spain longed for the return of them, because she was out of Laudator temporis acti was the place in the modern world.
role that appealed to her most she hated to look forward she loved to look back. And perhaps the hardest part of it all was the suddenness with which Spain was brought into
; ;
these unsympathetic forces of modernity during the last two decades of the reign of Philip II. Until the annexation of Portugal he had made a strong effort to
collision
all
with
maintain the good old ways.
-In
obedience to his father's

;
counsels he had rested, politically speaking, on the defensive the Counter-Reformation had given him a welcome oppor-
tunity to champion the ancient faith. Then, in a trice, the scene had shifted, and the Prudent King had assumed the
only to be confronted with new foes who used weapons which he could neither compete with nor comprehend. The suddenness of the rise of the Spanish Empire
offensive,
hasT already been noted. If it partially explains, exceeded by the suddenness of its fall. certainly
it
was
empire builders, who had been responsible for Spain's greatest triumphs under Ferdinand and Isabella and Charles V, had begun to die out before the accession of Philip
of
The breed
and nothing worthy to be compared with them was produced during his reign. His best soldiers and sailors, such as Alva and Santa Cruz, were inheritances from his father. In
II,
politics
and diplomacy the decline was perhaps not quite so marked, but the fact that he had been obliged to call on
a Burgundian
Cardinal
Granvelle
to
aid
gathering in of the Portuguese inheritance,
him in the was certainly

still
ominous
remains
:
for
the future.
But the further question
the reasons for the disappearance of this race of empire builders ? Was it that Spain had been so
What were
678
FINAL REFLECTIONS
exhausted by what she had accomplished in the preceding period that she was no longer capable of producing them? Or was it the result of the transference of so much of her best
talent
to
the
New World?
Was
it
due
to
the
uncon-
scious growth of a conviction that her empire
great that
it
the
spirit of
was already so could not, with safety, be further enlarged ? Of defensiveness that Charles had commended to
Philip's well
Philip?
Of
known aversion
by
a
to
oi
war?
Of
progressive paralysis of initiative

surveillance and residencias?
system
it
monarchical
Or was
just the inevitable
ebb which sooner or

the affairs of
of
definite
later succeeds the flood of the "tide in
men
"
'.'
None
of these questions
is
susceptible
answer; none of the alternative explanations which have been offered is wholly satisfactory yet there is a measure of truth in every one of them. Perhaps, probably after all, it would be fairer to regard the phenomenon which
;
process 6f decline and decay, but rather as a transference of the energy and genius that had hitherto manifested themselves in conquest and in
just
we have
been considering, not as
Certainly war, to the gentler realms of literature and art. the Spain of the seventeenth century- the dreariesl of all
periods
painters
in
her
political
will
annals
produced
far
writer.-
and
whose names
remain immortal.
The
considerations which
we have thus
put forward
are possible causes of the decline of the Spanish Empire to complete the all, of course, of the OlOSl general nature; there were also I picture it is essential to bear in mind that
Large
number
his
of
more immediate and
specific ones.
Of thi
Charles's utilisation of Spanish
resources for non-Spanish bestowal of his Burgundian inheritance oo purposes, Kn instead of on Ferdinand, the Prudent Philip
~~
meticulous paternalism, and

impolicy,
are
Btill
more
his ruinous econoi
among
the
mosl
important; but as
th
THE SPANISH AND THE BRITISH EMPIRES
679
matters have been fully set forth in the last two volumes of this work, it scarcely seems worth while to enlarge upon
them
here.
One
chapter has been
of the principal objects of this concluding to remind the reader of a fact which we
attempted to emphasize in the opening paragraphs of our first volume, namely, that though nine-tenths of the history
Spanish Empire is concentrated between the accession Ferdinand and Isabella and the death of Philip II, the origins of it reach back to the early Middle Ages and beyond, and that its development, during the century of its greatness and decay, cannot possibly be understood without some
of
of the
knowledge of what had gone before.

last, is full of
Its story,
from
first to
amazing contradictions, and the comparison with the British Empire, with which this book began, may well be recalled at its close. The Spanish Empire had a continuity, a background, which the British Empire lacked. Spain's expansion under the Catholic Kings in North Africa
and
in the
New World was
but the logical sequel of the
Reconquest.
latter part of
The wars with France which occupied the their reign, and were bequeathed by them to
their successor, followed inevitably as the result of the mediaeval achievements of the Catalans and the Aragonese in Italy and in the western basin of the Mediterranean. Eng-
had been practically driven off the continent of Europe, and had virtually renounced all thought of further conquest of the there, by the time that the
exploits
land, on the other hand,
Tudor sea-dogs opened visions to her gaze of an empire beyond the seas. She had got out of the Old World before she started to win the New. By breaking with her mediaeval traditions and turning her back upon the past, she was
enabled to concentrate her attention on the future, and to develop, normally and gradually, in the new fields to which she had elected to devote herself. But Spain could not bring
fi80
FINAL REFLECTIONS
Europe
herself to relinquish her inherited responsibilities in

:it
the time that she
was presented with an empire
across the
Atlantic.
fate
ities,
Her reverence for the past and the accidents of combined to overwhelm her with a load of responsibilall
it
carry
over the world, so tremendous that she could not Paradoxical as it may seem, it was the for long.
very continuity of her imperial tradition that furnishes the chief explanation of the suddenness of her rise and of her fall.
For her
and her loyalty to the great task which Destiny had given her brought her into fatal conflict with the principles that rule the modern world.
it
was
all
or nothing
"8
J3
O
H Z W H
p
i
GG
w W H
GENERAL INDEX
GENERAL INDEX
Arabic the latter.
it is
References are to volumes and pages, Roman numerals indicating the former, In a compound item, each volume reference carries until
'ff.' indicate that the reference is to the page designated and, respectively, to that next following or to the two next follow(In the footnotes to the text, on the other hand, ff .' is not restricted to ing. the two pages following, but may include a larger number.)
'
superseded by another. The abbreviations 'f.' and
Abancay, battle
573
f.
of the (1537),
iii,
sovereigns of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries not absolute,
Abbadie,
Jean Pierre de, secret agent, iv, 361.
French
dynasty,
leader,
ruler,
i,
even
in theory,
i,
207.
Abu
i,
Abbassides,
i,
Mohammedan
Bekr, governor of Constantine,

324, 325.
17
ff.
Abd al-Mumin, Almohade

23.
claimant to the Abu-el-Abbas, throne of Morocco, iv, 342, 345.
Abul
i,
Abd al-Wahid, Almohade

81.
Hassan, king of Granada (1462-82, 1483-85), ii, 62, 63, 64,

II,
65.
Abd
ar-Rahman,
i,
first
Omayyad Abu Mohammed Abdallah

of
king
i,
ruler of Spain,
18.
Abd ar-Rahman Omayyad caliph

961), i, 69, 77.
18,
III
of
(an-Nasir),
25,
Tlemcen (1528-40), iii, 320. Abu Yahya, king of Majorca,

312
ff.
i,
Cordova (91221,
19
f .,
65
ff.,
Abu
Zeid, king of Valencia,

i,
293
f.
Abyla,
'
6.
Abd ar-Rahman al-Ghafeki, Mo- Abyssinia, iv, 337. hair medan viceroy in Spain, Acachinanco, iii, 500.
i,
214, n. 4. 229. 256. Acciajuoli, Florentine family, i, 378claimant to the 381. Abd-el-Malek, throne of Morocco, iv, 342, 344. Acentejo, Spanish defeat at, ii, 182. Aben Aboo, Morisco leader, iv, 94. Achaia, principality, i, 364, 374, 379, Abencerrages, massacre of the, ii, 64. 381, n. 1. Aben Humeya, Morisco leader, iv, 'Achines' (Hawkins), iv, 557. 89, 91, 94. Acropolis, the, in Athens, i, 379, 380. Abogado delfisco, i, 507, n. 1. Abou-Abd-Allah Mohammed, claim- Actium, naval battle of (31 B.C.), ant to the throne of Morocco, iv, iii, 324. 342 f ., 345. Act of Resumption, the (1480), i, 255; ii, 106, 108, 131. Absolutism, royal, i, 448, 449; ii, the Castilian Acuerdos, iii, 646 f. 79, 84, 149, 166 f
titles,
iii,
iii,
;
30; death of, 31. Abd-el-Aziz, Hafside prince,
Academic
ii,
255,
Acapulco,
512
iv,
683
684
Acufia,
GENERAL INDEX
Antonio
de,
22),
iii.
bishop
70,
of
ff.,
6,
12,
14,
(d.
15,
38, 40, 48, 50-55,

II of
iv,
Zamora (1507
91, 121.
86
59, 171, 174,
Affonso
192,263.264. 1-491), son of John

ii.
Acufia, Cristobal de, Jesuit, iii, 590. Acufia, Ferdinand de, viceroy of
Sicily,
ii,
Portugal, 333.
54,
264,265,318;
Uil.
ii,
Acufia, Pedro de, Adalides. i. J">7.
139,
Africa, i, 158; ii, 72; F.drisi's description of. i, 143; Portuguese discoveries in, 75; ii, 200; Cas(
Adalingi, i. 169, n. 2. Adelantado, office of, in the

ii,
ianaries, 180, 184, 185, 186, 187.

la
Adelantado de
216.
Mar dd
Svr,
ii,
and Portuguese on the western coast, i, 14S; ii, 171, 180, 184, 188 f., 196, 225, n. 1, 263. See North Africa. "Africa begins at the Pyrenees," i, 4,
tilians
27. Adelantado mayor or del rey, i, 210, African slave trade, introduced into 230; ii, 105. Adelantadns dt comaTca, i, 231. America, iii, 657 f. Adelantados froiilerizos, i, 231. Agde, i, 289. Ailehmtados menores, i, 231 f. Agermanados, iii, 108, a. 1, 127 f.
iv, 334. AghlabiteS, Moslem dynasty, i, 19. first iv, Agnellus, bishop of Fez and Administration, iii, 138-188; 40JM89; of the Indies, iii, 637Morocco, i, 82. 664 iv, 200-225. Agnes of Poitiers, daughter of Duke William IX of Aquitaine, wife of Admiral, the, in Castile, i, 210, 260; in Sicily, 515; Columbus given Ramiro II of Aragon, i, 277. that rank, ii, 194, 209 Agramont, noble family of Navarre, Admiral of Castile, see Enrfquez, iii, 101. ii, 23; Fadrique. Agreda, iv, 585, 588. Adorno, Antoniotto, doge of Genoa Agriculture i.::.f.,86, 179 is;;. 262 ii. 2. f., 296, !'.>"), 502, 503, 510, (1513, 1522-27), iii. 228. A dos Feli]>es e.spero, iv, 596, n. 2. 519; ii, 136 ff., 190, 313; iii, 128 in the Adrian VI (Adrian of Utrecht I. Pope v, 129, NO IT., 201 f. Indies, iii, 631; Argentine, 612; (1522-23), earlier regent ot Castile, ii, 108,34'.); iii, 0, 30, m 3. 32. Artec, 470; Chibcha, 581; Cortes 16, 51 t\. 55 f., 67, 68, 69, 73-77, and, "'12; Cuban, 633; Mayan, 168 Peru> ian, 552 f, 80, 81 86, 92, 93, 99, 100, 117,
Aden,
I'.
ft".
118, 120,121, 129,
192,227 f.,23
1.
122, 50 Adriatic Sea, the, iii, 323, 329. Aegean Sea, the, iii, 290, 322, 323. ina, island, i, 381
.
Ambrosio d', Aguiar Coutinho, Portuguese in the service of Philip

II. iv,
392.
iii.
Aguuar. Jeronimo de, shipwrecked

Spaniard,
AgUllar, 509.
171
il<
f.,
529.
licentiate,
iii,
\i
idt
turn.
I
i
\\
12, n. 2.
Marco-
Affonso
ff.
Benriquez), count, later king of Portugal Mill 85), i, 7:;
i.
III,
king of Portugal
ff.,
L245
347.
Aguilar, Marquis de, Spanish am19. bassador, iii, Aguirre, Francisco de, conquistador,
1
103
120, n. 2;
iv,
in.
590
348.
I..
604
t".
iv,
L80,
l!'
'
Affonso
Brave), king of i. Portugal (1325 57 L06, o. 3,

(tin
.
IV
2
Ahmed
in.
III, ruler of
Tunis (1542-^9),
.'>17;
iii,
L21,
122,
11.
Ugues-Mortes,
53,
i,
267,
266.
V
Portugal
(the African), Kin^ of 138 SI), i, 97, 157; ii,

l
Aix, in Provence,
i,
288;
iii,
GENERAL INDEX
Aix-la-Chapelle, 127, n. 2, 223.
i,
685
112;
iii,
44, 117,
Aj6dar, Spanish reverse at, ii, 178. Alabama River, iv, 165. iv, 608. Alagna, Lucretia, i, 520. Albuera, battle of (1479), ii, 54. Affonso de (the Alagon, bridge of, iv, 590. Albuquerque, Alagon y Martinez de Luna, Artal Great), viceroy of Portuguese de, third Count of Sastago, viceroy India, iii, 420 iv, 336 f of Aragon (1575-89), iv, 572 f. Alburquerque, Duke of, see Cueva. Alain le Grand, ii, 340. Alcabala, in Castile, i, 226, 251 f., Alamanni, defeated by Clovis, i, 29. 253, 254; ii, 130, 134, 135; iii, Alans, barbarian tribe, i, 13. 160, 163, 192, 195; iv, 206, 429, Alarcon, Alonso de, iii, 321 f., 324 f., 442-445, 450, 452 in the Indies, 333. at ii, 230 iv, 208, 440 iii, 652 on imports from the Alarcon, Fernando de, Spanish solSeville, in the Netherdier, iii, 209, 283. Indies, iii, 636 Alarcon, Hernando de, discoverer of lands, iv, 285, 286, 301, 302, 303 a deadly cancer, 301. the mouth of the Colorado, iii, 516 f. Alcacovas, treatv of (1479), ii, 54,
;
.
Jean d', king of Navarre (1484-1516), ii, 340-346; iii, 20. Albret, Jeanne d', queen of Navarre,
Albret,
Alarcos, battle of (1195), i, 24, 78. 173, n. 1. Alaric II, king of the Visigoths (484- Alcala, castle near Velez 507), i, 29, 236. Gomera, iv, 113. Alcala, Duke of, see Ribera. Alarifes, i, 188. Alcala de Henares, i, 230; Alava, i, 193, n. 1.
de
la
ii,
325;
;
Alava, Francisco de, Spanish ambassador to France, iv, 174, 175, 263 f., 269 f ., 286, 478.
iii,
ii,
ii,
217 295
161
iv,
;
455
ff .
f.,
treaty of (1497), university of, i, 265

;
253;
iii,
176, 214;
iv,
284, n. 2, 324, 433. Albania, i, 424. Alcalde de las sacas, ii, 142. Albarracin, i, 284; iv, 571. Albaycin, Moorish quarter in Gra- Alcalde entregador, ii, 139. Alcaldes, i, 187, 231; ii, 151, 186, nada, iv, 89. Albert of Austria, cardinal-archduke, 229; iii, 474; iv, 231, 328, 456, 457, 574 f Alcaldes de carte, ii, 124, n. 4. Albert of Brandenburg, archbishop Alcaldes de hijosdalgo, iv, 456. of Mainz (1514-45), iii, 42. Alcaldias mayores, iii, 645. Albert Alcibiades, margrave of Bran- Alcantara, battle of the bridge of (1580), iv, 365 f., 367. denburg-Culmbach, iii, 358, 374. Alcantara, militarv order of, i, 177 Albi, i, 289. f. ii, 108; iv, 340, 421, 432. Albigenses, the, i, 284 ff.
iv,
360,
370,
376
f.,
638,
655-
664.
Albion, Juan, Spanish envoy, ii, 285 f Albo, Francisco, iii, 429, n. 2. Alboran, naval battle of (1540), iii,
.
Alcantara,
Francisco
iii,
Martin
de,
conquistador,
555, 594.
Alcaudete, see Cordova y Velasco. 331 f. Alcazar-el-Kebir, battle of (1578), Albornoz, Gil Alvarez Carrillo de, iv, 344 f., 348, 500. archbishop of Toledo, later car- Alcazar Real, the, at Seville, ii, 224; iii, 625. dinal, i, 128, 236, n. 1. Albret, house of, ii, 340-346; iii, Alcira, iii, 112, 113. 222. Alcudia, iii, 115 f. Albret, Henri II d', king of Xavarre Alencon, Duke of, see Francis. Aleson, Navarrese annalist, iii, 104. (1516-55), iii, 94-98, 101 f.
twr,
GENERAL INDEX
III,
Alexander
177.
Pope (1159
(Rodrigo
1503
.
i,
74,
Alexander
VI
192
Borgia),
Pope
il
Li,
154,
200
ff.,
240, 241, 285, 286, 287, 291, 293, 5 301, 304, 306, 345; iii, 467, 525; iv, 7f>. 265.
1
Alfonso XI, king of ( 'astile and Lôn (1312-50), i, 96, 97, 117, 120, n. 1, 121, 127 ff.. 133 f., 170, 193, 195, 213, 233, 244 f.. 249, 251, 257, 261, 203.302,445; ii. 22, 02; iv, 127. Alfonso V, king of Leon (999-1028),
i,
179, n. 2.
Alexandria, Alexandria
Alft'rrz,
i.
I
iv,
L25, a. 2.
Alfonso
iii,
IX.
i,
king of Leon
(1188-
(in
Lombardy),
Warrior),
275.
1230),
78, 79, 100, n. 4. 265.
187.
Alfonso
Alfonso
(the
king of
ii.
II, king of Naples (1494-95), 2S4, 280, 287.
Aragon (1104-34), i, 72 i., 90, 115, Alfi >nso II, count of Provence (1 196 275 f., 155. 1209), i, 284. Alfonso II (the Chaste), king of Alfonso, son of James of Ar.igon, i, 317. Aragon (1162 96), i, 283 f. Alfonso III (the Liberal), king of Alfonso, grandson of Alfonso X of Castile, see Cerda, Infantes de la. Aragon (1285-91), i, 116 f., 316, 321, 329, 332, 333, 335-343, 386, Alfonso (d. 1468), son of .lohn II of Castile, ii, 7, 12, 13, 16 f., 18, n. 3, 434, 437 ff., It'.;,, 498, n. 1. Alfonso IV (the Good), king of Ara38; iii, 217, n. 1, 600. gon (1327-36), i. 118, 120, n. 4, Alfonso de Aragon, illegitimate son of Ferdinand II of Aragon, arch356 ff., 383, 384, 395. Alfonso v (the Magnanimous), king bishop of Sarag0888 (1478-1520), of Aragon U6 58), of Sicily (as iii, 7, 17, 37. H6 58), and of Naples Alfonso Fadrique, governor of Alfonso, 142 5S), i, 11(1, Alfonso I. Athens 1316 30 Ilegitimate son of Frederic III of Sicily, i, 375, 378. 120, n. 4,307, n. 1. 381, LOO, U0,
i
| 1
411- 125,
194,
L48, 167, 174 i.. 179 f., 195, ."I'M'.. 513 f., 5is, 519,
ii.
Algarve,
Algeciras,
L29,
i,
103-107,
i.
120;
i\
338,
n. 1, 520.
520 525:
0.
18,
19, 20, 21, 23,
22, 109, 110, 126, 127,

17
in
24, 25,36, L61,
-'56,280,294,299,
130,251
i,
308, 309, 310; iii, 130. I (the Catholic), king of Vsturiaa (739 757), i, 59. Alfonso III (the Great), king of Asturiae (866 910), i, 62, 63. Alfonso VI, king of Castile (1072
Algeria,
5(17.
15,
Alfonso
Alghero, town
Algiers,
21
n.
f..
2 22 Sardinia,
i,
396,
;
i. 22; ii, 254, 267, 258 iii. 203, 292 297, 318. 320, 330,
341, 345,348; iv,59,99, 101, L08,

2.
:
1109),
i.
22. 70. 71
f.,
89.
90,
ill.
100.
HI
Alfonso
77.
\"II
(the Emperor), king of
L85
iii,
campaign
1,
131. IMS, Mil', of 1511 against,
(1126 57), i. 71. 72, 73 f., 89 ff., ill. 277, 284; iii, LI. Alfonso VIII, king of Castile (1158 121 L), i. 7s it 81, MM. 284, 317. Alfonso X (the Learned), kinL of
stile
.
334 340,
ii,
311, 400,
513;
iv,
103. n.
107.
Algoa Bay,
Alguacil.
I
200;
iv,
334.
iii,
i,
m;.
171
187; ii, 151, 186; iv, 231, 328, 459, n.

i,
5.
stile
(1252 84),
i,
91,
96,
I
'.'7.
Almuicil mayor,
187.
64.
iii,
115, in;. L20, 132, 133, L4, 171. L89, 191, 197 f., 206, 207, D.2,
212,
229 f., 236, 238 244,246,249,

5.
2.
Alhama, ii, Alhambra, the, Alhambra lull,

I
ii,
the,
138, 218.
260,
n.
I,
J'.::.
264, 265, 266, 297. 298, 319, 320, in. 11,21 i.n. 3.
Ali,
Merinite king of Morocco (1331i,
L8),
127.
iii,
128, 304.
Alicante,
346.
GENERAL INDEX
Ali
687
Hamet, Sardinian renegade, iii, Aluch Ali, infidel corsair, iv, 126, 330 ff. 138, 143 f., 147, 150, 151, 152. Ali Pasha, commander of the Turk- Alumorados, iv, 80 f. ish fleet at Lepanto, iv, 137 f., Alva, Duke of, see Toledo, Fadrique 141 f. Alvarez de Toledo, Fernando Alvarez de. Alistamiento, iii, 19, 208; iv, 475. Aljaferia, the, iv, 583, 584, 598. Alvarado, Alonso de, iii, 573 f.,
;
594. ,Aljamas, i, 198, 200, 201, 248, 456. Aljubarrota, battle of (1385), i, 123 Alvarado, Pedro de, f., 137, 213 ii, 52 iv, 333. 464, 466, 491, 493
; ;
iii,
f .,
454, 463, 496, 500 f.,
Alkmaar, iv, 299. Allegiance, formula of, in Aragon, 458. Alligators, iii, 579. Almada, iv, 362.
Almagro, Diego de, conquistador,
543-576, 586, 590, 593. Almagro, Diego de, the younger, 572, 575 f ., 593 ff
.
i,
519, 570 f., 576 f. of Gaul, iii, 175. Amalaric, king of the Visigoths (507531), i, 29.
505
f.,
Amadis
Amalfi,
353.
iii,
248.
i,
iii,
Amari, Michele, Sicilian historian,
iii,
Amauta, Peruvian men

iii,
of learning,
551.
Almaguer
(or Malagon), Francisco, Spanish contador, iii, 197, n. 2. Almanzor (d. 1002), regent of Cordova under Hisham II, i, 69, 70,
77, 83.
Almanzora, the, i, 11, 84. Almazora, i, 472, n. 3. Almeida, Francisco de, first viceroy of Portuguese India (1505-09), iii, 420 iv, 336. Almeida, Jorge de, archbishop of Lisbon (1570-85), iv, 371. America, i, 4, 9, 54, 311, 498, 519; Almenara, iii, 110. ii, 56, 73, 75, 85, 89 f., 110, 122, Almenara, Marquis of, see Mendoza 136, 143, 144, 153, 161, 173, 188, y de la Cerda. 189, 190, 192-239, 345 iii, Book VI iv, Chapter XXXIII, 675 f. Almeria, i, 77, 127, 301 ii, 69, 70, American possessions, part played 71, 72; iv, 410, n. 1. by, in the Spanish Empire, iv, 161, Almirante, i, 210, 260; ii, 161. 486, 675 f Almogavares, the, i, 392 f ., 484 in the Orient, 367-382. Amezqueta, Pedro de, governor of Malta, iv, 118. Almohades, Mohammedan sect and dynasty, i, 23 ff., 26, 76 f., 78, 81 Amiens, iv, 602, 658, 659. Ampues, Juan de, Spanish colonizer, f., 83, 84, 85, 102, 177, 312. iii, 534 f Almojarifazgo, ii, 226 f iii, 635 f iv, 206, 208, 443. Ampurias, i, 8, 289, 486.
; ; ;
; . ;
. .
203, 211 iii, 588 ff. iii, 589. iv, 337. d', cardinal and archbishop of Rouen, French statesman, ii, 306. Amboise, Pacification of (1563), iv, 266. Ambrose, Saint, bishop of Milan (374-397), iv, 474.
ii,
;
Amava, i, 64. Amazon, the,
Amazons, Indian, Amboina, iii, 455 Amboise, George
Almojarife mayor,
Almojarifes,
i,
i,
210, 252.
198.
Amsterdam, iv, 296. Amurath, see Murad.

dy- Anagni, i, 334, 345 treaty of (1295), 347 f., 349, 353, 386, 511. Anaquito, battle of (1546), iii, 598 f.
; ;
Almoravides,
Mohammedan
see
nasty, i, 21 ff., 25, 26, 70, 77, 312. Almotacenes, ii, 186.
Al-Muwwahhidin,
Alps, the,
iii,
Almohades. iv, 212, n. 4. 232, 282, 374 iv, 654. Anarchy, in Castile, before the ac;
ins
GENERAL INDEX
ii.
cession of the Catholic Kings,
f.,
6, 10,
i.
17, 48,
98 f.
518
f.
Anatolia,
.1
368, 378.
thi
,
Ancasmayu.
ndadores,
iii,
i,
1SS.
i
Ansite, Canarian stronghold, ii, 178. Antarctic France, iv. 163, 387 f. Antequera, i, 84, 130, 199: ii, 62. Anthony of Bourbon, king of Navarre (1555-63), iv, 259 f.
\: :
iii.
Pascual de, conquistador

i,
l.
Anthropology,
Antichrist, iv. 63.
iii,
iii,
063.
;
542, 585,
2(>.
_':;.
356
precursors
;
of,
Andalusia,
138,
21, 20, 39, 77,
85, 251, 276; ii, to, 48, 196; in. 71. 77, L38; iv, 98, 206, 410, n. 1, 448, 552, 560; cli-
81,82
mate
-ilk
of,
i,
37;
2"J">,
Jews
in,
in,
ii,
;
manufacture
141
92; tuna
of,
Antilles, the, iii. 631 iv, 557, 558. Antiochus, Saint, iii, 29N. Antonio, prior of Crato, son of Prince Louis of Portugal, claimant to the Portuguesi throne, iv, 341,
.61, 365348, 352, 353, 358 f., 369, 372. 390-394, 498, 501 f., 516, 554, 585. Antonio, Prior, see Enrique*. Antwerp, iii, 216, 401, n.2; iv. 254, 270, 2S6, 295, 303, 194, 505, 506. 511, 546; statue of the Duke of Aha, 283; the Spanish Fury (1576), 300. 307, 309, 310, 316; the French Fury (1583), 508;
fisheries of,
17.
a. 1.
Andalusia, -"-called dependency

i,
Andalusian plain, the, i, 35 Andainarca, the, iii. 563. Andes, the, iii, 430, 55N
iv,
1.
I'.,
5s0
f.
187, 188, 190, 197, 198.
Andrew
Achaia,
Palaeologus, i, 381
.
prince
of
Andronicus II (Palaeologus), Bvzantine emperor (1282 132.S), \\ capture (1585), 177, n. 1, 512 ff., 616. 365, 366 .!70. 209. Angevin proprietors of Naples, re- Apo8( rUador, establishment of, ii, 312. Appalachee Bay, ii. 218; iii. 529. Angevins, see Anjou. Apulia, i, 350; ii, 294, 300, 301 iii, 266, 321, 322. Angora, battle of (1 M)2), i, 160. Aquaviva, Claudius, general of the Angouleme, iii. 2 13. Jesuits 1615 Anjou, iv, 315. iv, 62, 239. Anjou, Duke of, see Francis. Aqueducts, iii, 500, 552; iv, 218. Anjou, house of i, 310 f.. 322 f.,325- Aquitaine, duchy of, i, 31. 329, 332, 360f., 364 Aquitaine, duke of, see William X.
:
:
i,
!,
t'..
367
198,
r_'l
f.,
101,
102,
U0,
11
Arabia,
:
i\
335.
H9,
ii.
511, 512, 515, 520, 521 37, 56, 57, 272, 280, 283, 313.
of
1
Anne, daughter
milian
1,
Emperor Maxi1
fourth wife of Philip ..i Spain, iii, 369; iv.32, 370, 139. Anne ol Austria, daughter of Philip of Spain, wife of Louis XIII of ace, iv, 599, ii. 2. Anne, duchess of Brittany, w ife liarli- XIII of France, of 2 I,. in- XII, ii. 274, 276. 1702 ne, queen of England
1
1 1
Arabic language, iv, 85 I. 163 conquer Egypt, Arabs, the, i." western conquests of, l"> ff. in the Balearics, 26; Aral, influence
i,
:
in
Aracena.
'a-tilian architecture, 207. i, 104, 105.

7<>.
Arago, the, river, i. 273. Aragon, i, 33, 53, 56, 72,
77,
7!t,
83, 90, 91, 94. 113, 115 119, 120, is. 121, 122. 126 f., 128, 133, 139,
I
167,
181, n. 3. 233, 249,

in.
n. 2,
259,
ff.,
17,
37
l'.;
IT..
162
156
. .
ff.,
180
1.
ff.,
187
iv,
203, 248,
Roman commander,
193
f.
378,
I
MX),
ii.
109,
no,
;
IP.) IT..
433
ii.
ff..
i.
Id.
Ml
02X,
2,
Annuil
ies,
iii,
672, 673, 679
the realms ol
GENERAL INDEX
689
the crown of Aragon in the Middle Arenoso, i, 472, n. 3. the liberties of Arequipa, iii, 572. Ages, i, 273-427 Aragon, 428-150 institutions, Arevalo, ii, 289. 451-529; Bernaldez quoted, ii, Argentina, iii, 549, 606-612 iv, 3 f ; reign of John II, 18-39, 56-62 190. marriage of Ferdinand and Isa- Argentina, iv, 194, n. 1, 243, 389, n. 3. results of the union Axianism, i, 29; iv, 639. bella, 39-43 of Aragon and Castile, 55 f., 80- Arias, Diego de, i, 216. institutional changes Arias de Saavedra, Hernando, gov86, 90, 96 under the Catholic Kings, 116, ernor of the Rio de la Plata, iv, 117 f., 124 f., 130, 138, 143 f., 197. 161,162-166; the Aragonese and Arias Montano, Benito, royal chapthe affairs of the Indies, i, 54 lain, iv, 46, 343, n. 2. ii, 195 f., 220 ff. relations of Aragon Arias v Miranda, Jose, theory of, ii, and Naples, 280 f th troubles,' 236. iv, 83, 433, 457, 580-606, 634; Aristocracy, see Nobility. Antonio Perez and the liberties of Arizona, i, 41. Aragon, 566-606. Arkansas, iii, 530. Aragon, Alfonso of, illegitimate son Aries, kingdom of, iv, 626. of John II of Aragon, iv, 569. Armada, the Invincible, i, 136; ii,
;
;
Aragon, Fernando de, archbishop of Saragossa (1539-77), iv, 63. Aragonese language, the, i, 428, 471.
Aramon, Baron
iii,
d',
French diplomat.
343, n. 3. Aranceles, i, 264.
Aranda, Count
iv,
of,
Aragonese noble,
161; iv, 26, 300, 431, 446, 477, 485, 490-565, 566, 607, 612, 614, 620-623, 628, 648, 657. Armada de la Carrera de las Indias, iv, 210. Armada of the Southern Sea, the, iii, 634.
590, 592, 593.
flicts of, in France, i, 95 ii, 78. Armendariz, see Diaz de Armendariz. Arborea, town and district in Sar- Armengol, count of Ampurias, i, 486. dinia, i, 355-358, 408, 412 f., 505. Armenia, i, 368. iv, Arbues, Pedro, inquisitor, ii, 90, n. 2. Arms, right to bear, iii, 178 f.
;
Aranda, Juan de, iii, 421 f. Araucanians, the, warlike tribe, iii, 592 f ., 604 f.
179-184.
Armagnac, Louis d' (d. 1503), Duke of Nemours, ii, 303, 306. Indian Armagnacs and Burgundians, coniv,
162,
141, 142, 389, 571. Archidona, i, 131. Architecture, in mediaeval Castile,
Archers,
iv,
593.
i,
266, 267;
ii,
;
Kings,
iii,
217 f. 46, 485 f 468; Peruvian, 552, 567; en- Arras, bishop of, see Granvelle. thusiasm of Pedro IV for Greek Arras, Union of (1579), iv, 493
.
iv, 627 f., under the Catholic 629. 162 under Charles V, Arraez, i, 336, 337. under Philip II. iv, 42- Arras, iv, 650; treaty of (1579), Aztec, iii, 469 Mayan, 493, 494, 495, 509, 651.
;
;
Aroche, i, 104, 105. Arques, battle of (1589),
f.,
380. Archivo de Indias. iii, 632.

i,
architecture,
Arcimboldo,
archbishop
of
Milan
(1550-55), iii, 273. Ardres, iv, 657.

Arellano, Alonso de, Spanish navigator, iv, 228, 229.
512, 663. Arrieta, licentiate, iii, 174, n. 2. Arsina, i, 478. Art, in mediaeval Castile, i, 266 f John II a patron of, ii, 5 under
.
the
Catholic
Kings,
iii,
under Charles V,
161, 162; 217; under
'>!()
GENERAL INDEX
\-turias,
Philip II. iv. 11 ff., 485 f.; Peruiii. 552. vian, Arta. Gull of, iii. 325, n. 1. Arthur (<1. 1502 Prince of Wales, ii. iii. 252. i?:.".. 295, 318,321 ArtUuro rum/or, iv, 211. Artillcrv. i. 258, 261 Li, 159, 160; 172. 234. 387 f., 466, 177; iii. 73. use of, in the Granadan war, ii,
.
Prince
of,
see
Carlos;
ff.,
Philip III.
Asuncion,
191
ff.,
iii. 008-611: iv. 186 194 f., 196, 197, 198
Asylum, privilege Atacama, iii, 544,
of,
i.
170, a. 2
iv,
iii,
n. 1.
:
Atacames, iii. 544, 547 Atahualpa, tnca chief, 558-567,570.

Ataranzas,
i,
17'..
549 f.,
495.
ii.
Artois,
ii.
_".>>
iii.
242;
ii.
iv, 8,
493, 343,
Atella. siege of (1496),
293.
509
Ar/ila.
i,
12, n.
4;
248;
iv,
344.
Asceticism., iv, 340.
Atheism, charges of, iv, 102. Athens, city. i. 378 Athens, duchv of. i, 349. 364.
381, 400, 424.
37..
Ascham, Roger, on Pedro de Toledo, Atienza, on Spanish dominaiii, 283, ii. 4 legist,
;
tion in
tacne.
\-i:i.
i.
iermany, 371. ruanche leader, i, 148

(
1
f.
7.
12.
Asia Minor, i. 371 iii, 302. Asientn, iii, 195,

;
158 159
It'.l:
I"..
ii.
192,
f.,
de, Bpanish 455. Atouguia, ( !oun1 of, i. l~>7. Attica, i. 364. 373, 377, 378, 380. Aubigny, Robert Stuart, Siour d',
iv,
Bartolome*
368
370,
French commander,
306.
ii,
301, 305,
u. 2, 657; iv, 265. Aspergillus, ii. 95. of Alessandro de' Assassination, Medici, iii. 279 of Pisarro, 593 f. Barproposed, of Kheireddin of 307 f.; barossa, proposed, Magellan, 423 of Coligny and the of ] Huguenots, iv, 296 ff.
; : ; :
Avdiencia, in Spain, i, 230 ff.; ii. 121-124, 222: iii. 183, 188, 640, n. iv,456,457: in the Canaries, in the Indies, ijj, ii, 186 iv, 156 64(> 648; 189 ff., 195, iv, 188, in the 196, 197, ii 3, 199, 234
1
: ; ;
581 vedo, 325-330, 574 .".77, of the Guises, 615, 625; of Henry III of Prance, 616, 628; of William of 504 f.. 506, 509. Orange, 510 attempted, of Elisabeth of
:
Philippines, 235 f. Augsburg, iii, 359, 365, 367. 368, 406 relig* us peace of (1555 101: r
:
Augu.-ta.
<
leorgia,
iii,
'>-.*.
Augusta Emerita (Merida), i, 11. Augustinian friars, iv, 81, 220. 227.
i.
England, 293, 612; attempted, of Y of France. 642 at1' hit tempted, (1 f Antonio Peres, 599 f.
1
239.
Augustus.
1
Roman emperor
(31 b.(
Philip's campaign of assassination, 507.

i
Il,n.2. 12.11.4. 143. Australia, iv, 185, 337. Austria, ii, 320; iii. \4 11. 225, 29
1
s.n.i.i. 10.
Asti,
iii.
26
iii,
1
:
i.
5,
to.v
ii.
tatorga,
174. D 10 Ifltrologers, iii,
iv,
iii,
I'
Austria, house of, iv. 10, 652, n. I.
61
12
See Hapsburg.
orbi
bronomy, Astec,
viaj
iris
169;
i.
1
1
.
Peru12,
i
!,'.
iii.
' -
in pi
:;
run
f.;
:
110:
iv,
and
i
lallaecia,
Autonomy,
1
iv,
i.
594
'if. ff.
attained by
of
<
Asturias.
;
56 63
ii,
'
205,
in
kstile,
!astilian
99; iii, 212: iv the heir of the lastilian throne called Prince of Asturias,
i.
border
the
cities,
I85f.;
Biscayan
for,
."1
1
;
tradition of, region, 192 f.;
Majorcan passion
passion
for,
206.
394 Sicilian subversion of

;
GENERAL INDEX
local
691
autonomy
ii,
in
Castile,
iii,
ii,
146-152.
Autos acordados, 647 iv, 455.

;
115;
169,
Aztecs, iii. 339, 468-509, 551, 580, 581, 664. Az Zahra, palace, i, 69.
Autos-da-fe\
Lima (1548), iii, (1573), iv, 217; at Mexico (1574), 217; at Saragossa (1592), 593 at Valladolid (1559), 17 f ., 79.
at
655;
;
Babington plot, the, Babylon, i, 7.

'Babylon,'
iii,
iv, 524.
302.
Avalos, Alonso de, Marquis Vasto, Spanish commander,

Avalos,
(d.
Babylonian Captivity, the, of the del papacy, i, 176, 401.

iii,
231, 269, 270, 274, 277, 283, 309.
Francisco
1571),
viceroy of
on Antonio Hernando de Marquis of Pescara, Bacon, Francis, English philosopher and statesman, iv, 601. Sicily (1568-71), iv,
;
Bacallaos, the, iii, 505. Bacon, Ann (Cooke), Perez, iv, 601.
468, n. 2. Badajoz, i, 22, 24, n. 2, 70, 121 iii, Avalos, Hernando de (d. 1525), Mar447; iv, 359, 360, 362, 369 f. of Pescara, Spanish comquis treaty of (1267), i, 105. mander, iii, 227, 231, 233, 234. Badoero, Federico, Venetian am236, 273, 274, 283 iv, 410. bassador, quoted, iv, 413. Averia, ii, 226 f iii, 632 iv, 207, Baetica, i, 11, 12. n. 2. Baeza, iii, 77. Aversa, i, 373, 416 battle of (1528), Bagdad, iii, 317. iii, 249, 252, 255. Bagneres-de-Luchon, iv, 569. Avignon, i, 154, n. 1, 286, 356. Bagnolo, treat v of (1484), ii, 283.
;
;
.
Avila, ii, 13, 14, 18, 38 iii, 67, 73, Junta of. iii, 596, 600 iv, 444 67, 72-75.
;
Bahamas,
the,
ii,
197, 218.
Bahia, iv, 385, 386, 389. Bajazet I, Turkish sultan

1403),
i,
(1389-
Avila,
Sancho de, Spanish mander, iv, 303, 367.
com-
159, 160.
Bajazet
1512),
iv,
II,
ii,
Turkish sultan (148194, 300.

iii,
Aviles, iii, 628. Avis, house of, iv, 337, 345, 347. Avisos, iv, 528, n. 1. Ayacucho, iv, 215.
Balance of power,
676.
see
243, 257, 403
Ayala, Balthazar, Spanish publicist,

484. battle of (1451), ii, 23. Ayllon. Lucas Vasquez de, Spanish lawyer and explorer, iii, 490, 524, 644, n.; iv, 166, n. 1. Ayora, Gonzalo de, ii, 67. 157, 245,
iv,
Balboa, Balbv, Jean de, agent of Charles V,

iii,
Nunez de Balboa.
302.
Ayl
Baldwin II (de Courtenay), Latin emperor of Constantinople, i, 110,

364. Balearic Islands, the, i, 8, 25 ff ., 285, n. 2, 486; ii, 221, n. 2, 232, n. 3 iii, 22, 109, 113-116, 319, 320, 331, 336; iv, 133, 248, 259, 420; a Roman province, i, 12 conquered
;
n. 1.
Ayuntamiento, i, 188; 638; iv, 425, 462 f.

iii,
ii,
186;
iii,
Azamor, expedition against (1513),

420.
Azores, the, ii, 173, 198, 202, 203; the key to iv, 334, 379, n. 1, 556 the New World, 391, n. 2 estab; ;
Aragon, 54, 282, 293, 294, 296, n. 2, 311-316, 431, 458; in the kingdom of Majorca, 290,
318, 330, 332, 333, 335, 337, 341, 347, 386, 387, 390, 391, 392, 428; represented in the Catalan Cortes, 481, 499 represented in the General Cortes of the eastern king;
by James
I of
lishment of Philip's power, 390the Islands Vovage 397, 402;

(1597), 562.
M'2
doms, 183
505.
iii. 557. Baltic lands, the, i. 194. Baits, the, i, 205, d. 2.
;
GENERAL INDEX
institutions of,
l
l|v
285, 286, 288, 289; 260, 2! 17.
(1529), 253,
Balms,
Bamberg, bishopric Bands, iii. in.

Bantrui'V,
iii.
<>i".
iii,
37
I.
Barcelos, Duke of, iv, 3 16. Bardaxi, Felipe de, iv, 260 f. Bardaxi, Juan de, Spanish spy, 261.
iv,
lo .t.
iv,
Barletta, fortified island city in the Adriatic, ii, 306.

445, 447.
Bankers, iii. 194-196; Banking, i, 181. Bankruptcy, iv, \3

i
17.
Baronage, the, see Nobility. Barragania, i. 175, a. 3, 227. Barrameda, Alfonso de, appointed
bishop of Rubicon,
i.
Bantam, h
Barajas, mi
383.
154, a.
iv,
1.
village
near
of,
Madrid,
iv,
Barricades,
Barrios,
i,
Day
L98
;
of the, iv. 84.
612.
Zapata de Bartholomeu doe Martyres, archSisneros. bishop of Braga (1559 82), iv. :>7! Barba de Campos, Pedro, Castilian Bartholomew, the apostle, iv, 47.
Barajas,
I
Count
see
L56. admiral, i, Barbarigo, Agostino, doge of Venice (1486 1501), ii. 290. Barbarigo, Agostino, Venetian com1
">.">.
Basel, Council of (1431
i,
422,
518.
mander
17)71
),
iv,
136,
141.
Basque language, the, i, 34, L93, n. 1. Bastia, iii, 330. Bastidas, RodrigO, notary and explorer,
ii.
ii,
Barbara, Venetian diplomat, iii. 383. Barbarossa, Arudj, ii. 255 f., 257;
iii, 21 f., 291, 292 f., 334, 635. Barbarossa, Kheireddin, ii, 255 1.. 257; iii. 131, 140, 171 f., 250, 266, 270, 201, 293 350, passim, 635;
212
iii.
."78.
BataUata,
L58.
Baths Moorish,
destroyed,
prohibited,
i\.
86;
s 7. 88.
iv.
109.
I
Battle, abbot of, i. L36. Baux, Jacques de, i, 37!'. Bayard, Chevalier de. ii. 30">;
iii.
Barbarossa, set lassan 1. Barlinrv coast, the, i. -V-IT ii, 7(>. 7 I. Set 188, 241, 212; iv, '.'7, 108.
1
;
221, 231
f.
Boyle]
Bay
190 501. i, 188, of Biscay, the i. 28, 77

l
iv.
North tinea.
Barbosa, Duarte, iii. 137. d. 2. Barcelona, city, i, 31, 280, 289, 307,
312, 349, 380, 387, 389, lit;, 129, .n i. 171. 176,
182, 185
f
.
:.:;:.. 534, ii. Bay of Naples,
naval
battle
in
(1284),
W0, 403,
L80,
181,
187, 188
197,501,604,
l
Bayona, iii, Bayonne, iii, 230. Bayonne, interview or conference

I
of
518;
l
12. 143, 26, 27, 57, 61, 85, iii. 11. 199, 203, 204, 246, 332; 15, :,:;. 55, 57, 109, 212. 254,
ii,
1565), iv. 174,261 265. Bayonne, treaty of (1462), 32, 58; arbitration of (1
l
ii.
30f.,
W3)
200.
2iiti.
2<<u.
:
554, 596, 652, 661

i
81, iv.
123, 152, 133. 351.
Baza, ii, <>. 71 Baza, Francesco de, Italian poisoner,

.
571,589; dockyardsand
1
iv,
506.
oal,
of,
i.
2i.">.
10, n.
177. n. 2
I.
i,
i
university
in,
iv,
Alonso de, Bpanisb seaman,
556.
1
Barcelona,
county,
32
i.
f.,
19,
274
288, 289, rcelona, house of,

f.,
32
193),
f.,
27727,
.
ini
f.
ii,
of
ii.
Basan, Alvaro de. the elder. Bpanisb naval commander, iii, 21 f. Basan, Alvaro de, the younger, Marquic of Santa Crua (from 1569), Bpanisb naval commander,
GENERAL INDEX
212, 298, 299, 306, 314, 330, iv, 112, 114, 130, 136, 137, n., 142, 143, 144, 345, n. 2, 478, in the campaign of 556, 677 in the expediPortugal, 359 f tions to the Azores, 393-397, 516; prepares for the Armada,
iii,
693
331;
death 516, 518 f., 527 f (1588), 528. Beam, ii, 339, 345; iv, 582, 590, 592, 594, 599, 600. Beatrice, natural daughter of Alof Castile, wife of Affonso fonso III of Portugal, i, 103, 105, 106. Beatrice, daughter of Sancho IV of Castile, wife of Affonso IV of Portugal, i, 106, n. 3, 121.
.
Belalczar, Sebastian de, conquistador, iii, 536, 570, 576 f., 583, 585, 586, 598. Belem, iv, 533. invasion of Belgium, iv, 246; (1914), iii, 379. Belgrade, iii, 290. of Belisarius, Roman general, i, 422.
Bellay, Guillaume du, French general and diplomat, iii, 372, n. 4. Belle-tie, French port, iv, 392.
Bellievre, 660.
Pompone
de, quoted, iv,
Beltraneja, see Joanna. Benaguacil, i, 472, n. 3.
Benchomo,
181
f.,
Teneriffian
f.
chief,
ii,
183
1538), daughter of of Portugal, wife of Charles III of Savoy, iii, 377, 378 iv, 347. Beatrice of Portugal, cousin and wife of Ferdinand, son of Edward of
(d.
Beatrice
Benedict
416.
XIII,
i,
Avignonese
154, n.
1,
Pope
407
f.,
Emmanuel
(1394-1424),
Berbers, the, i, 6, 18; iii, 294, 312; resist the Arabs, i, 15 i, 123. iv, 154 of countess Provence become fanatical Moslems, 15 f., Beatrice, 21 Count Julian perhaps a Ber(1245-67), wife of Charles of the conquest of Spain Anjou, i, 287 f. ber, 16 Beatrice of Swabia, wife of Ferdieffected largely by Berbers, 16 f. nand III of Castile, i, 81, 111. relations with the caliphate of attacked by the Beaucaire, i, 112, 113. Cordova, 20 f Beaumont, noble family of Navarre, Alnioravides, 22; the Guanches
;
Portugal, ii, 54. Beatrice, daughter of Ferdinand of Portugal, wife of John I of Castile,
Benefactoria, i, 180. Benevento, battle of (1266), i, 319. Beni Hud, the, i, 82 f. Bentejui, Canarian chief, ii, 174,
178
f.
ii,
23;
iii,
101.
Beauj.e, Renalid de, archbishop of Bourges (1581-1602), iv, 639.

Beccadelli, Antonio, Sicilian scholar, i, 519. Becerro de las Behetrias, i, 183. Bedford, Earl of, see Russell.
almost certainly of Berber stock, 142 f. Berber soldiers in the El Zagal armies of Spain, 303 f. robbed by Berbers, ii, 72; aid Arudj Barbarossa, 256 acknowledge Spanish overlordship, 256 f
; ;
; .
Berengaria,
sister
of
Henry
i, 127. Castile, wife of Alfonso IX Beer, iii, 366, 387. Leon, i, 78, 80 f Berenguer Ramon, count of ProBeggars, the, iv, 253. vence (1131-44), i, 283. Beggars of the Sea, the, iv, 294, 298, 299. Bergen-op-Zoom, iv, 623. 137; Berlin, iii, 407. Behetrias, i, 179 f., 182 f. ii, behetrias de linaje, i, 180, 182 be- Bermudez, Juan, dean of Rubicon, hetrias de mar a mar, ISO, 182 ii, 174, 175. the Becerro, 183. Bernaldez, Andres, Castilian chronBejar, Duke of, see Zuniga. icler, ii, 3 f ., 98, 162.
Bedmar,
of of
694
Bernanio
<
MINERAL INDEX
Anjou, wife of James
("the
II of Aragon of the llolj' Peace'), i,
del Carpk), legend of, i, 68,91. Berneval, Berthin de, kidnaps Ca-
Queen
Berroquenn, iv. Berry, Charles,

(
346,347,349. Blanche of Aragon and Navarre, daughter of John II of Aragon, wife of Henry IV of Castile, ii, 8, Duke of (d. 1472), also Duke of Normandy and 18, n. 3, 2!. 29 f., 32. Iharka Blanche of Bourbon, wife of Pedro ruienne, second son of
narians,
i,
l
18.
i
1.
n. 3.
VII Of Fiance,
ii,
30, 39, 46,
17.
of Castile,
i,
134.
Blanche of France, w ite of Ferdinand de la Cerda, i, no, 112, 113, 132. Bertendona, Martin de, .Spanish Blanche, daughter of Charles III of commander, i\ .">.;i B. Balu, 289. Navarre, wile of Martin I of Sicily and later of John II of Aragon, i, Besanron, iv, 44, 'J47, 330. 409,410,411,513; ii, 19,20,21 f., Bethencourt, .lean de, attempts the 25. oonquesl of the Canaries, i, 145
,
.
i.
165,
163.
i,
Blasphemy, charges
165.
of, i\.
192.
Bethencourt, Eleynauld de, Beners, i. 279, 286, 289.

Biar.
i,
Blockhouses,
iv,
167, 510.
296.
the, at
Blois, iv, 613. Blois, treatvof (i:)0:)),ii,32Sf.,33t);

hi,
~>t>l
;
Bible,
Cajamarca,
at Valencia, 55.
(1512), 297.
342f.,
344;
(1572),
iv,
Bicocca, battle of (1522), 255. Bidassoa, the, iii, 242. 253.

I'm
ii
iii,
228,
Blomberg, Barbara, mother of Don John of Austria, iv, 92, Mid.

Boabdil, see
Mohamn
see
sb
myrar
iv,
ii,
<i
todo, iv, 25.
Board
of
Trade,
ed XI. Lonja de Contrar

ii,
Biescas, Bigorre,
592. 339.
tacidn.
Bobadilla, Beatrice de,
177, n.
1,
Bigotry
201
f.
in religion, not
always chari.
MM.
Bobadilla, Fleanordo, wife of Ferdinand Peraza the younger, later of
acteristic of the Spaniard,
ss
Bilbao,
Biniini,
iii,
ii,
628
217, 21s.
;
Fernandez de
n.
1,
is
i.
LllgO, 185, 194.
ii.
ITli,
177,
iv, 181. Biobio, the, iii, 592 Biron, see ( iontaui de Biron. Bird, iii, 5 12. Biscay, iii, 27, 627 f.
Biscayan pilots, at ladis, i, 264. Biscayan ports, the, i. 84, 260;

(
iv,
Bobadilla, Francisco de, friar, iii, 574 f. Bobadilla, F rani'i-co de, governor of the Indies, ii, 209, 228. Boccaccio, Giovanni, Italian humanist, i, 111. 267, I7.'i iii, 213.
;
HI.
Bishoprics, new, in the Netherlands, iv. 252, 253, 284. Bizerta, iii, 305. Black Death, the, i, 129, 200. Blackfriars, iii, 252. jluaid. Black Prince, the, Black sails, i. 325, 349.
364, 373, 379. in. 536, .">77. 580 583, 586 Bogota^ Bohemia, i. 519 hi, 397, n. 5. Bohol, iii,
Boeotia,
i,
f.
Bokhara,
Bolafios,
plorer,
i,
94.
51
Francisco de, Bpanish exiii.

I.
I
Jeronimo
historian, i. iv, 586, n. J
lis.
de,
166,
<
Ar
169,
I7i);
Blanche, daughter of
Iharlee
"i
Boleyn, \nue, Becond wife of [enry VIII of England, iii, 261. Bolivia, iii, 549; i\. 189. Bologna, i, 236, 519; iii, 68, Hi. 176, 223, 261, :;'><>. 649; collegi
GENERAL INDEX
at, i, 236, coronation of 266, n. 1 Charles at (1530), iii, 260, 650. Bologna, Giovanni di, chaplain to
695
for
Spanish students
;
n.
1,
Philip II,
iv,
Bologna, Jacopo da,
346, n. 4. iii, 153.

iii,
bishop of Rouen (1550-90), cardinal (1548-90), pretender to the French throne, as Charles X, iv, 624 f., 633. Bourbon, Francois de, Count of
St. Pol,
iii,
Bomy,
322.
truce of (1537),
iii,
267, 268,
Bourbon,
Bona.'i, 26;
314, 317, 318.
Bonavre, i, 357, 358. Boniface VIII, Pope (1294-1303), i, 345, 346 ff., 350, 351, 352 ff., 366,
413, 505, 511.
de (d. 1496), of Montpensier, Duke of Sessa, viceroy of Naples, ii, 292. Bourbon, Pierre de, i, 134. Bourbon dynasty in Spain, the, i,
249. Gilbert
Count
182, 206; ii, 220; 377, 409, 673.
iv,
200, 209,
iv,
Boniface IX,
Roman Pope
(1389- Bourbourg, conferences of (1588),

621.
i,
1404), i, 402. Bonifacio, fortress in Corsica, 414, 415.
413,
Bourges, archbishop of, see Beaune. Bovadilla, see Castillo de Bovadilla.
Bonifacio,
seur,
i,
connois- Bovage, i, 432, 481. Boyl, Benedictine monk, ii, 205, 206, 231. Bonnivet, Guillaume, admiral of France, iii, 231. Brabant, iv, 306, 494, 510. Bracci, i, 516 f., 518. Bontier, Pierre, priest, i, 150, 165. Books, iii, 152; iv, 46 f., 224, 264. Braga, archbishop of, see Bartholomeu dos Martyres. See Literature.
84, 260.
Ramon, naval
Bordeaux, i, 29, 30, 134, 135, 327, Braganza, Catharine, Duchess of, 328 f., 339, n. 2; iv, 177, 266, iv, 346, 347, 384 f. Braganza, John, Duke of, iv, 346, 267, 289, 497, n. 2. 358, 361, 384 f. Borghese, Camillo, quoted, iv, 26, n. 1. Braganza, Theotonio de, archbishop
Borgia, Valencian-Italian family, 475. Borgia, Alfonso, see Calixtus III. Borgia, Caesar, ii, 18, 304.
i,
of Evora (1578-1602), Braganzas, the, iv, 370.
iv,
371.
Brandon, Charles, Duke

iii,
iii,
of Suffolk,
229.
Borgia, Francis,
214.
Duke
of
Gandia,
Brazil,
Borne'
iii, 438 iv, 229, 237, 337. Borromeo, Count Carlo, archbishop of Milan (1560-84), iii, 273; iv, 61, 474 f Boscan, Juan, Catalan poet, iii, 215. Bosphorus, the, i, 368, 395 f
;
. .
iii, 426, ii, 203, 211 ff., 268; 448, 606, 610; iv, 175, 204, 334, 335, 379 f., 384-390, 402. Brazil wood, ii, 219. Brazo real, i, 455. Brazos, in the Cortes of Castile, i, 189; of Aragon, 460 f., 468; iv,
Bouges, near Namur,
iv,
313.
Bouillon, Henry, Duke of, French father of the great general, Turenne, iv, 653, 654. Boulogne, iii, 270.
of Cataof Valencia, i, 473 of Sardinia, 508. Bread from bones, iv, 630. Breda, conferences of (1575), iv,
568
lonia, 481 f
304.
Brenner Pass, the,
iii,
373. 379.
Bourbon, Charles, Duke 231-234, 242, 245 f.,

256, 273, 276.
of,
iii,
247,
229, 255,
Breslau, iii, 58. Bretignv, peace of (1360),
i,
Breton war, the,
ii,
273-280, 283,
electors,
iii,
287, 288, 295. Bourbon, Charles de, brother of Anthony, king of Navarre, arch- Bribery, of the imperial
696
42,
GENERAL INDEX
195;
<>t
members
of
procuradores, 51; of French Statesfche

fche
General, iv, 640 Bridge of boats, over

161.
Buffoons, iv, 30, 579. Bugia, i. 302, 305, 505 25(1.257; iii, 339, 345
:
ii,
I'.,
254, 255, 348.
Oxus,
i,
Brienne, Walter de, duke of Athens (1308 11), i. 373f., 377. Brigandage, iv, 654 f. Brill, capture of (1572), iv, 294, 295.
Bulgars, the, i. 369. Bulla de la Crusada, see Bulls of crusade. Bull-fights, iii, 28, 180; iv, 433.
Bulls, papal, i, 347, 515; ii, 53, 87, 107, 108, 200 IT., 313, 322, 515;
iv, 60 f., 265. 292, 399, 471, 586. Bulls of crusade, i, 516 ; ii, 132; iii, 195; iv, 59, 208, 209, 517. 522. Burgo de tema, ii. iv, 15. Burgos, i, 64, 65, 84, 102, I"..'. 221, 2(10; ii, 7, 12, 137, 217. 295, 333;
(
1
1
Neapolitan Beaport, ii, 294, n. l. (d. Brissac, Charles II do Count, later Duke of, 1621), marshal of Prance, iv, 643. British Empire, the, compared with the Spanish, i, 3 iv. 679. of Castile British Isles, Alfonso
Brindisi,
:
plans to invade,
i,
101.
Bnto, Antonio de, Portuguese commander, iii, 443 f. Brittany, iv, 562, 632 f., 635, 642, Burgundy, i, 30; ii, 53, 320; iii, It, 15, 97, 117, 222, 241 IV.. 253 ff., 646, 654 f., 660.
Briviesca, iii, S3. Brother Peter, iii, 301
4, 19,34, 18,69,83,88,89, 98 iv, 125, 153, 247, 301, 398, fill 481, 552; cathedral of, i, 267. Burgundian luxury, iii, 177; iv, 28 f., 426.
iii,
;
265, 404, 409.

f.
Burgundy, duchy
of, iv, 660.
Brougham, Lord,
Bruges,
20.-,.
i,
i.
130.
J 13,
494; 224;
iii,
117,
iv,
119, n. 2, 270. f>10, 621,
Burleigh, see Cecil. Burning, of books,
iii.
:
175;
of
Challcuchima, 566
at
;
622.
Brunei,
152.
iii,
13V
Brussels. \2<K of Jan Millar, at Lima, can-, is7

;
of Lutherans, of Mexi401
Brussels,
It. L6, L9, 24, 81, L01, iii. 154, 225. 365, 378, 392, 394,
101; iv, 9, 15,247, 254, 255, 282, 285, 286, 290, 296, 302, 306, 312, 313. 194, 511, 512, 513, 51 I. 645, 647 Btatue of fche hike of Ah a
:
of Atahualpa, averted by acceptance of Christianity, of the Marian martyr-. 662 564
655;
his
:
at,
283
fche
Protestants in Spain, 18, 78 i Protestants in the Indies. 217 of d< fenders of fche liberties of Aragon, 59
iv,
"i"
I
Bruti, Albanian in
ice, iv,
Spanish serv-
Burriana,
Burriel,
153.
i,
Bubierca,
223.
i. 294. Andre's Bcholar, i, 211.
Mar
Spanish
Buddha,
Bude,
iii,
iv,
382.
Burros,
in,
494.
Gufllaume,
213.
iv,
French
190, n. 2.
scholar,
Byzantine Empire,
pire.
a Eastern
Em-
Buenaventura,
Buenos Aires,
198,
iii,
608
iv,
162,
194,
Saballeria,
169, 171 'about
199:
refounding of (1580),
<>f,
CabaUerot,
.
in
Buenoa
oe
195 f ., 197, 198. Aires, sudieneia n. 3, T

Aires,
Ufonso de, ii, 16. mediaeval Castile, i, in Aragon, 153, 454, 164.
1
iv,
197,
''/'"
V e$pada. iv, 205.
province,
iv,
separated
from Paraguay,
But:
ii,
197.
518.
CabaUtrot de la Sopa, iv, 572. Cabesa de Vaca, Alvar Nunez, Spanish soldier, iii, 516, 520 IT., 610 f.; iv, 162, 192.
GENERAL INDEX
Cabildos, iii, 539, 591, 63S f., 666; iv, 230. Cabo de las Virgenes, iii, 430. Cabot, John, iii, 505.
697
of,
Cadiz, Marquis Leon.
see
Ponce de
;
Cabot, Sebastian, iii, 448, 449 ff., 606 f. over ecclesiastical affairs, iv, 58. Cabra, Count of, ii, 64. Cabral, Pedro Alvares, Portuguese Caetani, Errico, titular patriarch of Alexandria, cardinal (1585-99), iv, 334, explorer, ii, 212, 213, 268
;
Caesar, Julius, iii, 601, n. 1 iv, 286. Caesdrea Karoli, iii, 454. Caesaropapismus, defence of the supremacy of the secular power
335.
Cabrera,
Andres
ii,
de,
1.
Marquis
of
Moya,
514.
177, n.
Cabrera, Anna, Sicilian heiress,
i,
Cabrera, Bernaldo de (the elder), Aragonese admiral and royalist, i,

443, 444, 487.
papal legate, iv, 625, 626. Cagliari, town in Sardinia, i, 355, 357, 358, 383, 413, 507 iii, 309 battle of (1409), i, 404. Cahors, capture of (1580), iv, 357. ii, 304, n. 2. Cairo, i, 361, 494, n. 1
;
;
Caixcas Abiabar, Jewish physician,

ii,
37, n. 2.
iii,
Cabrera, Bernaldo de (the younger), Aragonese admiral, i, 402, 409,

443, n. 2, 487.
Cajamarca,
558-567, 570.
;
Cabrera, Diego de, third Count of Chinchon, adviser of Philip II, iv,
420, n. 2, 569, 571, 572, n. 3, 582, 585, 595. Cabrera, Luis Geronimo de, fourth Count of Chinchon, viceroy of
Peru (1629-39), iv, 569, n. 4. Cabrera de Cordoba, Luis, Spanish quoted, historian, iv, 72 f., 201
;
88, 468.
Cabrera y Bobadilla, Andres de, archbishop of Saragossa (1587 Calatrava,

92), iv, 595, 596.
Calabria, i, 327, 350, 352, 415, 417 ii, 292, 293, 296, 297, 300, 305. Calabria, Duke of, see Ferrante. Calahorra, ii, 345 iii, 46, 48. Calais, i, 134 iii, 79, 226, 229, 387, n. 2, 390, 406; iv, 9, 368, 544, 660; taken by the French (1558), 11 f., 14; taken by the Spaniards (1596), 561, 601, 657, 658. Calais Roads, iv, 530, 544-547, 549, 621, 622. iv, 579, Calatayud, i, 455, n. 3 580.
;
;
grand
master
of,
see
Giron.
;
Cabrillo,
iii,
Portuguese Calatrava, military order of, i, 177 Rodriguez, mariner in "the service of Spain, iii, 192; ii, 107 f.; iv, 340, 421,
"14
f.
iii,
433.
Caccia Diabolo, corsair captain, 296 1., 298.

Caceres, 145 f.
Calendar, Chibcha,
iii,
581
Gre-
town
in Estremadura,
ii,
Caceres, Felipe de, acting governor

of Paraguay, iv, 192, 193, 194. Cadamosto, Alvisi, Venetian navigator,
i,
156.
i.
Cadiz, city, 260, 264;

iii,
8, 108, 145, 148, 160,
gorian, iv, 34, 524, n. 2; Julian, Peru524, n. 2 ; Mayan, iii, 468 vian, 552. Calicut, iv, 334, 335. California, iii, 513 ff. California, Gulf of, iii, 514, 516; iv, 161. Caliphate, the, i, 16, 17 ff.
;
205, 207, 211, 223; 212, 624 ff ., 627, 628 iv, 100, 170, 276, 344, 359, 362, 397, 501, taken by the English 520, 601 (1596), 559 ff. Cadiz, province, ii, 63.
ii,
:
Calixtus III, Pope (1455-58),

;
i, 423, ii, 200. 475, 523, 525 Callao, iii, 633, 634; iv, 184, 185. Calmette, Bernard, iii, 429, n. 1. Calonna, i, 247.
(
'alpe,
i,
6.
,i!S
CENKKAE INDEX
i.
<
Jaltabelotta, peace of (1302),

f.,
672
366, 367, 512, a. l. Caltagirone. Bonaventura Secusi di, general <>t' the Franciscans (1593L600), iv. 659. Calvi,
30.
and colonization
town
in
Corsica,
i.
113;
iii,
beginning of the conquest of, i, 142-158, L63; treaty of Truxillq (1479), ii, 54, 173; the Inquisition in, 89, |s7 completion of the conquest, 171-184; administration of the
;
:
Calvin, John, Protestant reformer and theologian, iii, 445, n. 2; iv,

52, 253,
(,
174.
iv,
184-189; their imporislands, tance to the Spanish Empire, 189 IT. Canaries, audiencia of the. ii, 186;
iv,
alvim-m.
304.
456.
iv,
Calvinists, iv. 15, 52, 167, 253, 270, 283, 284, 492, 494, 505. Cain, DiogO, Portuguese explorer, ii, 266. Cdmara Real tie ( 'asttllu, iii, 149 iv, U6, n. 3, 418 f., 457. unarero, i, 209.
;
i, 209 f. Candelabra, anecdote uf the,
Canciller,
n. 1.
561,
iv,
'Candles,' court fees in Sieilv, 469, n. 3. Canellas, Vidal de, i. 46

(
'
Cambodia, king of, Cambray, iii, 384;
iv,
237.
11,
iv,
Marquis of, see Hurtado de Mendoza. 392, 495, C&ngas de Onis. i, 57.
Jafiete,
498, 654; treaty of (1529), iii, 253 f., 258, 259, 297, 302, 628,
ii.
Cannibalism,
(
iii,
463, 469, 604
i\
3.
iv,
Cambresis,
12.
of,
i,
Tamerlane, i, 162 f. Cano, Juan Sebastian del, circum122.
183, 184. 'ano, wife of
Cambridge, Earl
Camden. William, English

(
historian
(
and antiquary, iv, 555. Jamel hunts, i, 158.

<l>l(u
Camera
ii,
Sommaria,
i,
523,
.">_'
1
;
( (
311; iv, 470 f. Camlet, iv, 593. Camoens, quoted, iv, 271. Jampanella, Tommaso. ii. 310.
(
navigator of thi' globe, iii, 427, 11.".. 448 f. 437. n. 2. 441, l! ano, Melchior, Spanish theologian, iv. 58, ',;;, 481 'aiitaln'ia. iii. 212. 'aiitalniaii cities, i, 188 I. lantabrians, i, 261.
iv. 3
Cantillana,
L76,
(
lict
of (1580
ii.
2. iv,
'anijx'achy,
lull"
of, in,
163.
'anton,
337.
ii,
mpeggio, Lorenzo, papal legate to England (1519 28), iii, 252. Jampfranch, i, 339, a. 2. Campi, Juan, regenl of the Council
(
Capde
(
la
Vela,
2M.
212, 214.
15,S;
ape Blanco, iv. LI (ape Bojador, i. 152.

201.
(
ii,
200,
of
(
Aragon,
iv,
596.
oi
'ampillo, peace
iv,
(1304).
i,
117.
(
(
mpion, Edmund, English Jesuit,

500, 501, n. 1. mpufl Vocladensis, battle of the 507), i, 2
Jape Jape Jape
'anaveral,
Jatoche,
iv.
173.
iii,
162.
4!
.
teseado,
iii,
ape Bspichel, iv, 533. ape Falcone, ii, 2 1.

1
262; ii, nal of Parma,' the,

ados,
i,
l
'ape Hatteras, 'ape Horn, iii,

'apellan mayor,
iii,
iv,
1
166.
n. 1.
l'..
iv
51
i,
209.
oanore,
117,
n.
.,.
iv.
..">.
the,
.;.
i.
51. 55,
-'l.
MM
ii,
Capello, miral,
<
Vincenco, 7 3
Venetian
.
ad-
ii.
p.m..
L07, 200, 207, 226,

iii,
E 241, 249, 269;

-',
'.77;
151, 294, iv, 112.
<
Maracapana, iii. 532, 53 Japt 'ape Matifou. iii. 338, 339. 'ape Mendocino, iii, 515.
GENERAL INDEX
200, 266; hi, 420, 441, 442, 452; iv, 334, 338, 381, 383. Cape Orlando, naval battle of (1299), i, 351, 352. Cape Passaro, iii, 282. Cape Pera, i, 315.
ii,
699
ii,
Cape Nun, ii, 200. Cape of Good Hope,
viceroy of Naples (1509-22),

;
244, 310, 339 iii, 283. Cards, iii, 173, 179, 562, 666. See Playing cards. Italian Carducci, Bartoiomeo,
painter, iv, 46.
Carducci, Vicente, Italian painter,

iv, 46.
Cape Oape Cape

520
Sable, iv, 162, n. 2. St. Martin, iii, 296.

St.
;
Vincent,
i,
14;
iv,
359,
naval battle of (1337), i, 121. Cape Santa Elena, iv, 166. Cape Verde Islands, the, ii, 173, 202, 203,212; iii, 426, 442 f. iv, 334,
;
Careta, Indian cacique, ii, 215. Caribbean Sea, the, iv, 164, 278. Carinthia, iii, 41, 373. Carlat, viscounty, i, 289, n. 1. Carlos, Don, king of Cebu, iii, 435 ff., 451. Carlos, Don, eldest son of Philip II
of Spain, iii, 364, 380, 385, 397 iv, 13, n. 2, 17, 31, 32,34-40, 61,
;
385.
Capitacion, i, 248. Capitania, ii, 158.
263,274,425,491.
161.
Capitan mayor,
ii,
Capitans, i, 377. Capitoli, i, 517.
Carmelites, iv, 54 barefoot, 50. Carniola, iii, 41. Carolingians, French dynasty, i, 32.
;
Capo
d' Orso,
i,
iii,
248.
Capri,
415.
Carranza, Bartolom6, archbishop of Toledo (1558-76), iv, 55, 82, 480 f.

Carreratge, i, 490. Carrillo, Alfonso de, archbishop of
ii, (1446-82), i, 216; 10-13, 15, 17, 18, 35, 40, 41, 50. Carroz, Francisco, Aragonese admiral, i, 357, 358. Carroz, Ram6n, ii, 256. Cartagena, in Spain, ii, 244 iii, 22, 245, 331, 339, 628; iv, 204, n. 2.
;
Captain-general of the Ocean Sea,

Sidonia, iv, 529. Captains-proprietors, in Brazil, iv,
title of
Medina
Toledo
386 f. Capua, ii, 301. Caracciolo, Giovanni,
Neapolitan
seneschal, i, 414, 417, 418. Caracciolo, Cardinal Marino, governor of Milan, iii, 274.
Caraffa, Carlo, cardinal, iv, 7.
Caramani, 330,332.
infidel
commander,
iii,
Cartagena, town in Colombia, 214; iii, 579, 584, 585, 634;

164, 517.
ii,
iv,
Carbaial. Francisco de, conquistador, iii, 601. Carcassonne, i, 32, 286. Careel de los manifestados, i, 469 iv, 580, 581, 583, 584, 585, 587, 588.
;
Cartagena, bishop of, see Rivas. Cartagena, Juan de, captain of the San Antonio, iii, 426-429, 430. Carta patente, iv, 372. Garthage, a Phoenician colony, i, 7
;
Cardenas, Alonso de (d. 1499), grand iii, 310. master of Santiago, ii, 107, 108. Carthaginians, iii, 174; in Spain, Cardenas, Garcia Lopez de, explorer 7ff., 10,25,28,41,312.
of the
i,
Grand Canon,
iv,
iii,
517.
ff .
Cardinals, college of,
66
Carthaginiensis, i, 12. Cartier, Jacques, French explorer,
Cardona, Jacobo de, bishop of iii, 525; iv, 163. Gerona, ii, 26. Cartography, Majorcan school of, i, 504. Cardona, Juan de, Spanish naval Carvajal, see Galfndez de Carvajal. commander, iv, 136. Cardona, Ramon de (d. 1523), first Carvalho, JoSo, iii, 437. Duke of Soma, Spanish admiral, Casa Consistorial, i, 484,
700
Caaa de ayuntamiento,
ii.
GENERAL INDEX
146.
of Italy, 248: of the
Netherlands
Com
ilc
Coiitratacinri, the, at Seville,
ii.222 227,235; iii, 421, 422, 124, 425. 619, 623 628, 630, 032, 636. 657, 658; iv, 202, 204 208. Casa de la Especeria, proposed, iii. 628. Bartholomew de las, 'Protector of the Indians,' ii. 235. !asbah, tbe, at taran, ii. 251 Cascae8, iv, 362 f., 365, 366, 555. :. 284, 405. 406,407.
( (
. I
309; of the Spanish Kmpire, 672. Castilio, Antonio de. Portuguese representative at London, iv, 365. Castilla, Alonso de, iii, 145.
Castilla del Oro,
ii.
21
1.
CastQleja de
la
Cuesta,
iii,
513.
Castillo, see Enrf(iuez del Castillo. Castillo ile Bovadilla, Jer6nimo,
Spanish
legist,
ii,
1.50;
iv.
158,
spian, the,
i.
159.
461, 402, 405 f. Castillo de Toledo, Spanish architect,
Juan Bautista,
iv.
14.
Ca^taneda Spanish
163.
de Najera, Pedro explorer, quoted,
dr.
iv,
Castro,
(
Beltran de, Spanish comiv,
mander,
557.
99.
!astronufio,
ii,
Castagna,
Giambattista, papal Catalan Grand Coinpanv, the, i, 348, nuncio, archbishop of Rossano 363-382,480,484; iii. 300. Catalan tongue, the. i. 42\ 1< and cardinal, iv, 61. ii,
1
:
Castellmios,
i,
377.
i,
55.
Castillo dell' Ovo, the, at Naples, 417. Castello Ursino, the, at Catania,
513.
(
Catalonia, i,32f., 34, 77. 00; ii, SO. 85, 110. ltd. 221, n. 2; iii, 39-46,
108, 109, 157. 15s, ISO, 181,266; 113. 420. 135. 430. n. 2. 149, insti585. 589, 590, 504. 631. 079
iv.
;
i.
lastelnau, Pierre de, papal legate, 285.
i.
<
lastelnuovo, fortress,
13.
iii,
327
f.,
330,
tutions of, i. revolt in, against John

i
ii,
143
12.
l
f.;
15,
II,
Italian Paldassare. Castiglione, iv, 491. poet, iii, 215, n. 1 -tile, i, 20. 30, 339, 341, 3S5, os7. 393,395, 106, 425, n. I. 128, L29 f ., 431, 433, 438. 14S, 440. 451 t"..
;
20 ff., 30-37, 11. 48, n. :,ui.. 272; decline of, 143 f., 161. Srr Aragon. Catania, i, 402. 513; university of.
510.
Cataract of the Nap",

<
iii,
587.
155.
156,
157.
15s.
159,
loo, 462,
at.
ml
i.
iv.
369
f.
163, 192, 198, 521. 527; iv. 309, 376, 672; in the Middle A^-. i, the mediaeval festuians, 166 167 201: institutions, 205 270; under the latholic Kinu^. ii. 3 s 10 56, internal 62 75: 39-43,
<
;
Cateau-Can
iii.
270, 282, a. 2; iv, 57. 00. 220. 256, 257.
n'-i-. treatv of (1559), 12 ff., 56,
<
Catharine of Aragon. daughter of Ferdinand and Isabella, wife (1) of Arthur, Prince of Wales, (2
reorganisation, 7s 168; death of Isabella and the succession to the annexation of throne. .'.!
Henry \ III of Ei -land. ii. 266, 275. 276, 205. 318, 319,321, 322; in. 213. 251 f.. 370. n. 1.
Catharine, daughter of Philip I of ile, wife of John III of Portut
Navarre, 347; imperial education

of,
iii.
57,
117
f.,
134
fT..
221
ff.
development Of. under Charles V. chapter XXIII: government of, under Philip II, iv. the CastUian chapter XXXVI
internal
;
gal,
'
iii.
75,
(
137
iv,
33.3,
341
death of (1578
atharuie of
Philip
6.
I.
342.
'ourtenay, daughter of
titular
emperor
East,
of
i.
<
!on-
tradition, 19, 671 f. tilianization of Aragon,
Btantinople or the
iv.
I
GENERAL INDEX
701
Catharine, daughter of John of Centralizing tendencies, in the government of the Indies, iii, 639. Gaunt, wife of Henry III of Castile, i, 138, 155, 206; iv, 523. Cephalonia, island, Catharine (de Foix), queen of Naiv, 138.
i,
364
ii,
300
varre
(1483-1517),
;
ii,
340,
341,
Cephissus, battle of the (1311),
i,
344 hi, 95. Catharine, daughter of Prince Edward of Portugal, Duchess of Braganza, iv, 346, 347, 384 f Catharine, daughter of Philip II of Spain, wife of Charles Emanuel of Savoy, iv, 32, 33 f., 571. Cathay, i, 162. 'Catholic Kings,' title bestowed on Ferdinand and Isabella by Alexander VI, ii, 154. Cattaro, Gulf of, iii, 327.
f .,
.
342
374
f.,
378.
iv, 12.
Cercamp, abbey,
Cerda, Infantes de la, i, 96, 109, 113 f., 116 f., 133, 320, 339, 345. Cerda, Juan de la, Duke of Medina
Celi, viceroy of Sicily (1557-65), iv, 101, 102, 104, 105, 468, n. 2.
Cerda, Luis de
later
193.
la (d. 1501),
Count,
ii,
Duke
of
Medina
Celi,
Cerda, Luis de la (Prince of the Fortunate Isles), i, 144 f., 146.

i, 33, 279, 289, 290, 291, 330, 332, 337, 386, 390, 391, 393, 394, 498, 499; ii, 28, 31, 32, 33, 58, 59, 143, 272, 274, 276, 277, 286, n. 1, 288, 292, 306, 318. Cerignola, battle of (1503), ii, 306. Cerisoles, battle of (1544), iii, 270.
Cattle hunts, i, 158. Cattle raising, in Brazil,
Cerdagne,
iv,
385.
Cauca, the, iii, 577, 584, 585. Caudebec, iv, 636. Caupolican, Araucanian leader,
605.
iii,
Causeways, Mexican, 485, 494 ff., 570.

Cavendish, Thomas,
iii,
470, 483,
Cavalleros limpios, iv, 421.
of, see Pacheco. Cervantes Saavedra, Miguel de, English seaSpanish poet and novelist, ii, 162
Cerralvo, Marquis
man,
iv, 179,
Caya, the, i, Cebu, iii, 434-438 iv, 227, 228, n. 2, 229,230, 231,232. Cecil, William, Lord Burleigh, Eng- Ceylon, iv, 381 f. lish statesman, iii, 379; iv, 531, Chaeronea, battle of
; ;
240, 389. 106 iii, 447.

;
214, n. 3, 329, n. 3; iv, 144, 485 date of his death, 485, n. 2. Ceuta, i, 13, 20, 126, 130, 301, 304; ii, 52; iv, 153, n. 1, 334.
iii,
(b.c.
338),
i,
n. 2, 600.
374.
Celestine V, Pope (1294),
i, 345. Celestines, church of the, at Paris, iv, 604.
Chagres, the, iii, Challcuchima, Peruvian

566.
634.
chief,
iii,
Celibacy, clerical,
Celts, the,
i,
iv, 54.
27
f.
Chaloner, Sir Thomas, English ambassador to 277 Spain, iv,

;
Cempoala,
526.
iii,
475
ff.,
483, 491
ff.,
quoted, 100, n. 4. Chambord, treaty of

372.
(1551),
in
iii,
Censorship, iv, 415. Censos de poblacion,
iv,
447
;
ff .
Chambre des Comptes,

iii,
Navarre,
Census, in Peru, iii, 550 iv, 215. ii, 19. Centefio, Diego, conquistador, iii, Champagne,
601.
266
iv,
ii,
627.
19.
;
Champagne, counts
of,
Central America, ii, 210, 212; iii, Chancellor, the, in Naples, i, 522 in Castile, ii, 105. 468; discovery and first settlement of, 505-508, 519-523; ad- Chancilleria, ii, 121-124; iii, 183 ff. ministration of, 641-644. iv, 456 f. Central Asia, i, 142, 158-164. Chantonnay, see Perrenot.
702
i
iKNKKAL INDEX
Charles IX, king of France (1560(
lhapultepec,
iii,
~>00.
Charoas, iii, 586, 655. See Ciudad de la Plata. Charcas, audiencia of, iv, is* ff.,
195, 196, 197, a. 3. Charlemagne, i, 31.
iii,
74), iv, 132, 268, 265, 289, 297. 'harles X, see Bourbon.
'harles II,
'harles
I
duke
of Lorraine (1545of
160S). iv, (127.

5.x,
274, 47(5;
2.">7.
Charles
II.
emperor,
tee
Charles
I,
king of France. Charles V, Boly

(1519-56), Charles I.
Anjou), king (1266-85), Provence (1246-85), i, 321, 323, 326-329, 332,

(of
and
Sicily
Naples count of
288, 319, 339, 345,
Roman emperor
Spain
i,
old, 364
(
f.
king of 1516-56),
(as
'harles II (of Anjou), kin^ of
Naples
91,
111,
(1285-1309),
i,
329, 339ff., 345,

:73.
139, 164. 329, a. 2, lis, 423, 425; ii,96, 115, 120, 121, 131, 140, 157, 163. 186, 204, n. 1. 226, 228, 235, 241, 269, 270. 282, n. 1, 306, 313,
349, 350, 352, 353
Charles IV count of
salem, Charles
(of
Anjou and Maine),

^0-81),
Provence
titular kingof Naples, Sicily, Jeruii, 272. (the Bad), king of Navarre (1349-87), i, 379. Charles III (the Noble), king of 125 1. ii. 19. 21 Navarre (13S7
320, 321, 323, 325, 334, 335, 337, iii, passim 338, 349 iv, passim; appearance and character, iii, 11-14; education, 11; first visit to Spain (1517 20). 26-52; Ilis; ;
etc.,
II
259, 400, 630; linguistic limitations, 11, 31, 57; and the internal development of Spain, Chapter XXIII; and the conquest and colonisation of the Indies, Bunk VI; relations with
panicizatioD
of,
Charles
53),
III,
duke
of
Savoy (1504
Charles
with with the France, Chapter infidel, Chapter XXV: with the with Lutherans, Chapter XXVI
England, ('hapter
XXIV
XXVI;
;
264, 267, 270; iv. 12. king of Spain (10641700), iii, 642; iv. 223. Charles, Duke of Angoulenie, later Duke of hrleans (a. 1545), bod of Francis I of France, iii. 265, 2ti.s,
iii,
II,
<
271,361,364.
(harles,
(
Archduke
i\
,
of Austria,
ii
Duke
Lor-
of Btyria,
'harle-,
'-'73.
<
the
-hi
401-404, 409f., 397 abdications, 39 retirement at Yuste, 398 f., 112
papacy,
;
et
BOO of
irlefl
II
of
pe
in
!'.
;
raine,
bishop
ot
iv.
Met/, cardinal
638.
general
399 113
Charles
summary summary
Bold),
77),
in.
ii,
;
of
his
reign,
(1589 1607), Charles, c< in1
of hi- rei^n in
the Indie-. 664 667.

(the
(1
duke
37,
of
Bur57,
gundy
I
167
17.:.:;.
Valois, son of Philip III of France, i, 352, 366, 438. 'harles of Viana (d. 1461 ), BOD of of Aragon, i, 514; ii, 18, John
of
1 1
60. 274
222.
(
n.
:;.
21
27.
332
I <
Charles (the Bald), king of France 340 877), 32 harle- \l, kinu of France 1380
i.
< (
I
'harle-
Ireal Emanuel (the duke of Savoy (1680 1630), iv,

I,
122,,
i.
137,
if..
Ki7.
r
Charles VII (the victorious), kim, of France 122 61), i, 139, a. 2;

1
1
571, 626 f., 632. Charlesfort, iv. 167, 168. Charles Mallei, i, 30. Charolais, ii, 298.
ii,
78.
rlee
.
Chart
\ III,
re-, iv.
king of France (14*

1
;
ha-te,
Avmar
iv,
612, 643 de. French

:')!l(i
com-
364, a. i. 381, a. 154, 241, 273 297, 298;

iv,
ii,
:<7,
(
mander,
(
f.
m, 2-2;
hateall-Thierry,
lhaucer,
<
iv,
i.
636.
129.
reoffrey,
GENERAL INDEX
Chauny,
iv, 11.
703
iii,
Cintla, battle of (1519),

;
471
f.
Chaves, Nufrio de, conquistador, Cintra, ii, 55; iv, 379. Cipango, ii, 198 iii, 450. iv, 187 f., 190 f. Cities, concentration in, i, 86, 184. Chayscan, lord of Cathay, i, 162. See Municipalities. Checks and balances, paralyzing Ciudadanos, i, 502, 503. system of, iii, 410 f., 653. Chepoy, Thibaut de, French noble, Ciudadanos honrados, i, 492. Ciudad de la Plata, iv, 189, 194, 195. i, 373. Ciudad de los Reyes, iii, 568, n. 1. Cherchell, iii, 297.
Chesapeake Bay,
iv,
176.
Chess, iii, 562. Chiametla, iii, 512. Chiapa, Chiapas, iii, 643, 644, n.
661.
Ciudadela, i, 316, 499, 500. Ciudad Real, i, 24, n. 2, 96, n. ii, 122 iii, 448.
;
2,
Ciudad Rodrigo, iii, 72, n. iv, 484. Claude of Brittany, wife of Francis I
;
of France, iv, 632. Chibchas, native race of the plateau of Bogota, iii, 580 ff., 604. Claude, daughter of Louis XII of France, ii, 306 iii, 136. Chieregato, papal nuncio, iii, 426. Clement IV, Pope (1265-68), i, 297. Chievres, see Croy. VI, Avignonese Pope Chile, iii, 431, 544, n. 1, 549, 590 ff., Clement under Philip II, iv, (1342-52), i, 144. 601, 603 ff Clement VII, Avignonese Pope 178-186, 198, 199. China, iv, 41, 232, 233, 235, 239, 381. (1378-94), i, 401, 410. Clement VII (Giulio de' Medici), Chinchon, Count of, see Cabrera. Pope (1523-34), iii, 121, 129, Chinchon, Countess of, see Osorio Pacheco. 141, 215, n. 1, 228, 231, 232, 237, Chinchona bark, iv, 569, n. 4. 243, 244-247, 251 ff., 255, 256, 260 ff., 283, 303, 622, 649; iv, Chindaswinth, king of the Visigoths
;
.
(641-652), i, 237. Chinese, the, in the Philippines,

232, 233.
57.
iv,
Clement
Chochama,
iii,
542.
Cholula, iii, 477, 480-483. Christian II, king of
Denmark
(1513-23), iii, 37. Christian Turks, iii, 300. Christh a of Denmark, niece of Charles V, wife of Francesco II Sforza, later of Francis I, duke of Lorraine, iii, 263, 265, 284.
Christina,
100, n. 4.
VIII Aldo(Ippolito brandini), Pope (1592-1605), iv, 64 ff., 637, 641 f., 659, 660. Clement X, Pope (1670-76), i, 85. Clement, Jacques, assassin, iv, 615 f. Clergy, the, in Castile, i, 174-177, 227, 238, 254, 256; in Aragon,
454 522 220
f.
; ;
in Sicily, 517 in
in Naples,
Cortes, cease to attend the Castilian and the Sicilian Cortes, ii, 128
; ; ;
the
Castilian
princess
of
Norwav,
i,
Chronicle of the Morea, i, 374. Chronicon Burgense, i, 69.
Chupas, battle of (1542),
iii,
595.
Cibola, iii, 515-519. Cid, the, i, 61, 88, 96, 447. Cilician Gates, battle of the (1304),
i,
Parliament, 166; exempted from under the the alcabala, 135 under Catholic Kings, 152 ff. Philip II, iv, 49-54, 479 ff Clerical abuses, iii, 32 f., 173, 181, 662 f. iv, 50, 216 f.
;
.
368
f.
Cimarrones,
iv, 182, n. 1.
iii,
Clerieux, see Poitiers. Cleves, duke of, see William V. Cliff dwellers, in Majorca, i, 314 f. Clifford, George, Earl of Cumberland,
Cinnamon,
228, 229.
586,
587,
595
iv,
English
562.
seaman,
iv,
389,
556
f .,
704
<;
i:\ERAL INDEX
V
in,
iii,
Clocks, interest of Charles

376.
Colonial system, Spanish, ii, 190, 219 235; iii, Hook VI iv, Chap:
Clovis,
(
king of
the
Franks (481
f.,
ter
XXXIII.
511), i, 29. loaches and litters, iii, 177 ioaque, iii. 556. !oas1 defences, iv, 130 f.
Sir
Colonna, noble
204. 244.
Roman
family,
iii,
Colonna, Marcantonio,
Sicily
4.
Cobham,
(
Henry,
IV,
290, Q.
!obos, Francisco de 1"-, secretary to Charles V, iii, 141 f.. 145, n. 1,333,
viceroy of (1577-84), iv, 468, n. 2; commands the papal fleet in the campaigns of 1570 and 1571, 128,
129, 132, 136. n. 3.
411, 622.
Coca, the, confluent of the Napo,

iii,
Colonna, Prospero, imperial comiv, mander, iii. 227, 22S, 231

;
587.
i,
110.
Cocas,
(
261, 487.
iii,
;
Colonna,
(
444 iv, 335. Cock, Henry, Anales del AHo Ochenta

'oehin,
V ginco, iv, 571.
iv,
Prospero, cantonio, iv, 366.

i,
son
345.
f.
of
Mar-
lolonna, Sciarra,
iii,
Colorado, the,
laws,
iii,
516
Cocoa,
iv,
218,385.
of
Columbus, Bartholomew,
172
ff.
;
ii,
192
f.,
Codification
207, 208.
454
f.
Columbus, Christopher,
wife 575,
of
Coello,
IV-rez,
Juana,
iv,
Antonio
579,
7:;.
7:.,
181,
190,
i, 34; ii, 192-210, 211.
573,
-".77 f.,
603,604. Cognac, League of (1526),

249, 283.
iii,
243of,
212, 213, 219, 220, 223, 227. 228, 231, 232. 236. 237; iii. 121. 117: iv, 331. Columbus, Diegt ii 228; iii. 160 f.
.
Coimbra,
372.
iv,
367;
university
:
Columbus, Ferdinand,
148.
ii.
197;
iii,
ii, 8; Comares, i. 109. Coinage, Castilian, i, 263 f. under the Comares, Marquis of , see Hernandes 170: Aragonese, i, de Cordova. 135: ii, bholic Kings, 83,
(
Ihibcha,
i.
iii,
581.
iii,
'omendadores,
iv,
421
loins,
Spanish,
252.
32, n.
1.
'ojedorea,
French de, Philippe Comines, statesman and historian, ii.

-' (
290, Colegio de Santa 'ruz, iii, 663. 'omisidn )'< hnanente, iii, 160. Coligny, ( laspard de, admiral of (or Memoirs) France, Huguenot lender, iv. 7, 10, Commentaries Charles V, iii, 406. II. 167, 168, 17.;. 175, 266. 2s9,
(
of
296, 297, 387, 506.

<
<
Commerce,
39, 264;
of
of
lollioure.
i.
321
mediaeval Castile, Aragon, 304 307

1
:
i,
'"Ho,
Aragonese
expedition
to
'
(1282), i. 325. Manuel, Spanish lohneiro, torian and economist, ii, 93.
Cologne, in.
,
his-
of Barcelona. 280, Valencia, 17 192 196; ii, 13. 14; of Majorca, i. ii. 143, Ml. 501, 502. 503 f.
1
I ;
<
"'
of Sardinia, of Castile,
I
.
i,
510 of Sicily, 519 under the Catholic

; :
<
lologne, archbishopric of, iv,

f..
818
Kings,
I90f.
;
ii.
12
of
the
<
lanaries,
646;
ii,
chapter of, 618.

21
1.
n.
i
iii,
577,
n. 2.
584
643, 'ill:
r.
Colombo,
< (
382
223 227 of Naples, 313; under Charlec V, 20 207. 623 638; under iii. 130, Philip II. iv. 201 211, 275 1..
of
the
Indies,
Iol6n, city in
Panama,
ii,
ii,
21
1.
(
7 f..
151
ff.
i,
!ok>nel-general,
159.
kmuningee,
32,
GENERAL INDEX
Communes, Milanese,
473
f. iii,
705
278;
iv,
Consejo de Aragon, see Council of
Aragon.
Consejo de
551.
the,
iv, 201.
Communion, the, iv, 39. Communism, in Peru, iii, Como, iii, 275.
ii,
Cdinara
de las Indias,
Consejo de Costilla, see Council of

Castile.
Complutensian Polyglot Bible,

155.
see
Consejo de Estado, see Council of
Compostela,
postela.
Santiago de
Com-
State.
Consejo de Flandes,
iii,
154
iv,
399,
Compostella, capital of
iii,
'
New
Galicia,
n.
1.
iii,
516, 528.
of the (1520-21),
f.,
Consejo de Guerra,
201.
144;
iv, 88,
Comuneros, revolt
ii,
131
iii,
26, 34, 67-133, 145, 159,
171, 190
f.,
199
228, 229, n. 1, 650; iv, 417.
202. 215, 223, 293, 363, 502, 599,
Consejo de Hacienda, ii, 116, 117, 118, 133 f. iii, 191 iv, 437 f., 457. Consejo de Indias, see Council of the
; ;
Indies.
iv, 412, Consejo de Italia, iii, 153 419 f., 435, 467, 470. Consejo de Justicia, see Royal Coun;
Comunidad, iii, 69 ff., 74. Comunidades, i, 455, n. 3.

186, 187, 188; ii, 147, 463, 465. Concell, the, at Barcelona, i, 488 ff.
Concejo,
i,
149
iv,
cil.
ii,
143
ff.,
f.
i,
Concell de Cent, the, at Barcelona,
Consejo de las Ordenes, ii, 117; iv, 421 f. Consejo de la Suprema y General
Inquisition, ii, 89, 117; iv, 81, 203, 480. Consejo de Navarra, iv, 457. Consejo Privado, iii, 154. Consejo Real, see Council of Castile.
496; ii, 143 f. Conceller en cap, i, 485. Concepcion, iii, 604. Conception, the, iii, 425-438.
Conchillos,
488
Lope
de,
ii,
227.
Conclaves,
331.
papal,
iv,
66
f.,
330,
Conselho da fazenda,
Consell, the, at
iv,
Palma,
i,
379, n. 502.
1.
Conde, Louis I de Bourbon, Prince Consiglio Collaterale, in Naples, ii, 311; iv, 471. de, French general, iv, 289. Consiglio de Santa Chiara, iv, 470. Condestable, i, 210, 257 ii, 159, 161.
;
Condestable de
table.
Castillo,,
see Condes-
Consiglios, iv, 474.
Condottieri,
iii,
Conducho,
i,
262. 247.
Consilium exiraordinarium, Consols de mar, i, 490, 496.
i,
468.
Confessional, the, iv, 425. Conflans, district in Roussillon, 289. Conflent, see Conflans. Congo, the, ii, 266. Connaught, iv, 551. Conquistadores, in the Canaries,
i,
in Constable, the, in Sicily, i, 515 Naples, 522. Constance, iii, 629. Constance, Council of (1413-18), i,
;
407, 518.
i,
186; in Attica, i, 377; in virtues 175 ii, America, 502
94;
ii,
Constance of Aragon, wife of Teobaldo II of Navarre, i, 101. Constance, daughter of Pedro IV of Aragon, wife of Frederic IV of
Sicily,
i,
398, 399, 441, 443.

of
Constance of Castile, second wife and faults of, iii, 522 f Louis VII of France, i, 71. Conrad IV, Holy Roman emperor
.
(1250-54),
i,
111.
Constance,
Conradin, duke of Swabia, last of the Hohenstaufen, i, 319, 329.
Castile, wife of i, 135, 137.
daughter of Pedro of John of Gaunt,
706
Constance,
GENERAL INDEX
daughter
of
Dinis
<>f
verted Moors, iv, 85. Constance of Sicily, wife of Pedro Convoys, iii, 631 ff. iv, 210 f. III of Aragon. Copiapo, the, iii, 591. 319,320,410. Constantino (the treat), Eiomarj Coral, iv, 593. Jorbeil, treaty of (1258), i, 33, 282, emperor (308 337), iii, 404. 289,290,318,319,328; ii, 28. Constantinople, i. 14, 131, 161, 364, 366, 367 f., 369, 370, 379, 396, Corbera, Juan de, Valendan ad;
Portugal, wife of of Castile, i, 121.

1.
IVrdinand IV
Conversos, converted Jews, i, 200 f., 457; ii, 86 f., 91, 314, 315; con-
<
424, 305, 343, 109,
504; iii, 263, 269, 293, 320, 333, 334, 339, n. 2, n. 3, 347; iv, 89, 99, 112, 115, 125, 146, 151, 153, 154, 342, 343. 430, 664.
304, 340,
104, 152,
miral,
Corces,
i,
i,
474. 487.
in Argentina, iv, 193. city,
i,
Cordoba, Cordova,
110,
11, 18, 67, 77,

9,
82
f.
199;
ii,
101,
n.
3,
193
Constitutional affairs, in Aragon, iii, 50, 70, 72, n., 81, 218, 577 152 ff., 156 ff., 180 ff., iv, 126, 444 iii, 37 ff., Spanish base during 187 f.; iv, 133 ff., 567-573, 578the Granadan war, ii. 599; in Castile, iii, 31-37, 49-52, Cordova, caliphate, i, 18-21, 65 66 f., 69; ii, 162. 67-92, 122-126, 138-152, 158180; iv, 409-467; in Catalonia, ( ordova, see Fernanda de Cordova. in Germany, 359-372 Cordova, Aloysius de, Duke of iii, 39-46 in the Indies, 537, 611, 618-667; Sessa, iii, 283. in Milan, Cordova. Qonsalvo de (the G iv, 202-207, 211-225; in the iii, 272-278; iv, 473 ff. Captain), i, 257, 258; ii, 67, 73.
;
Wtherlands, iii, 156, 372, 394 ff. in Portugal, 284 ff., 309; iv, 370-378; in Bicily, iii, 23-26; in Valencia, iii, 52-57, iv, 468 f.
;
L06 113. 127
f.
See Institutions.
iii,
Constitutional liberties,
126, 182.
<
nsulado of Seville, the, iii, 625 t'.. 632 iv, 206. <'<>ns, tit, i, the, in the Netherlands, iv, 250, 330; in Milan, 473. Contador, tin-, of the <(im de Con|
I'll it:;. 247, 299 f., 302, 294, 305 308, 309, 314, 324, 336, 337, 348; iii, 20, 22, n. 2, 207. 209, 210, 234, 541; iv, 650. 656. \ lordova y lasco. Alonso
L57,
I.V.i.
287,
303, 333,
127,
291
ff.,
258,
de,
trataci&n, 'ontador de
ii,
<
22
1,
225
i,
f.
ol Count Alcaudete, Spanish commander, iv, 109 ff. Martin d<-, Cordon Velasco, Count of Alcaudete, Spanish commander, iii, 335, 344 IT., 100;
iv,
cttHUa,
in,
210.
ii,
109.
Contadoree
194,
<
mayoret,
190;
116,
133,
ii.
2;
a
iv,
136
f.
Hutu, Inn
nr,
ma
de
cuentax, iv,
< (
Martin de, the onlova y \ younger, Spanish commander, iv, 109 ff.
!orduba
lorfu,
'<
Bf. {adores realee, i. 210, ii. 5, 253. taduria de cut ntae, ii, 133. laduria de hadtndOj ii. 133. Coniaduria Mayor, iv, 136 ff. in, I90f.
(
.
island,
lordova), i, i. 364, 367

1
1
iii.
322,
7:
Corinth,
(
iv,
136,
1*7,
147.
i.
378, df of,
iii,
i,
lornel,
Ximeno,
299. 431.
Jonti.
of,
Franooii de Bourbon, Prince

the,
i,
iorner, ('oriii-h
Francesco, quoted, iii, 7 f. coast, Spanish raid on

,
Contienda de Moura,
\trafu6To, plea of,
106, n.
i
(1695 ore
iv, 558.
ate
iii.
\na de
<
Soro.
iii,
188.
Coron,
299 f., 304.
GENERAL INDEX
Coronado,
Francisco
explorer, Coronelia,
;
707
de, Spanish 181; Tarazona (1592), iv, 433, 595-598. 516-519, 530. ii, 158, 159; iii, 209, Cortes, the, of Castile, i, 175, 176, n. 1 193 f., 218-228; ii, 49, 104, 114, iv, 359. Corozas, iv, 17, 593. 115, 126-130, 131, 222, 323; iii, Corporal punishment, i, 170, 453, 150, 155, 159-180, 289, 630; iv, 464. 415, 422-433, 441^146, 448 ff., 454 f., 459-465, 477; Briviesca Corpus Christi College, Oxford, iii, 213. (1387), i, 214; Burgos (1271), Corregidores, i, 195, 233 ff ii, 134, 239; Burgos (1315), 193, 200; 458147-151; iii, 185; iv, 425, Burgos (1515), ii, 154, 347; iii, 467 in Peru, 215. Cordova and Madrid 95; Corregidores de capa y espada, iv, (1570-71), iv, 410, n. 1, 423, n. 2, 460; Madrid (1462), ii, 460,465. Corregidores de Indios iv, 215. 10; Madrid (1510), 334; Madrid Madrid Corregimientos, ii, 147, n. 3, 148, 151 (1528), iii, 147, 163; Madrid iii, 645; iv, 421, 458-467; in (1534), 163, 203, 306; Peru, 215. (1551), 146, 168, 205; iv, 414; Correo mayor, ii, 224. Madrid (1563), 432, n. 3 Madrid Corrientes, founding of (1588), iv, (1566), 425; Madrid (1573-75), 196. 425; Madrid (1576), 429, 432; Madrid (1579-82), 424; Madrid Corsairs, i, 26, 259, 312, 326, 407 ii, 254, n. 1, 280; iv, 375, 534; (1583-85), 397, n. 2, 424, 457; Madrid (1586-88), 430, 432; Christian, 125, n. 2; English, Madrid (1588-90), 424; Madrid 198, 275-279, 283, 520, 558, 562 French, 109, n. 3, 164; corsarios (1592-98), 424, 425, 432, 433; Luteranos, 167, 169, 175, 179, 240, Madrigal (1576), ii, 101, 105, 517 229 Moorish, 111 f., 126, 128, 131, 134, 137; 402, Malay, 431 Turkish, 431. See Pirates. Xajera (1137), i, 237, 239; Ocafia Olmedo Corsica, i, 8, n. 2, 25, 26, 347 f ., 350, (1469), 216; 49; ii, 351, 354, 355, 356, 358 f., 395, (1445), i, 207; Santiago and 413 f., 415, 503, 520; iii, 330; Corunna (1520), iii, 46-52, 68, 69, iv, 116. 78, 81, 124, 125, 627; Segovia Cort, i, 229. (1532), 163; Toledo (1480), ii, Cortereal, Caspar, Portuguese ex89, 105 f., 108, 112 f., 115, 123, plore", ii, 268; iii, 505. 126, 128, 131, 142, 146; Toledo Cortes, the, of Aragon, i, 294, 401, (1497), 267; Toledo (1502), 125, 402 f., 425, 436, 437, 438, 439, 324; Toledo (1525), iii, 135, 136, 160 f., 162; Toledo (1538), 163, 442, 443, 455, 459, 460 ff., 465, 466 ff., 470, 481; ii, 23, 130, 165-169; Toledo (1559-60), iv, Toro (1505), 324; iii, 37 ff., 102, 180 ff. iv, 108, 414, 425, 428 f. Toro (1512), 132 f. 439, 568; Exea (1265), i, 432, ii, 126, 327; 452 f., 464; Valladolid (1282), i, 114; VallaSaragossa (1264), dolid Valladolid 432; Saragossa (1347), 442 f. (1293), 233; Tarazona (1283), 433; general, (1312), 248; Valladolid (1385), 428, 483 f.; 213; Valladolid (1518), iii, 33 ff., ii, 130; 155, iii, Valladolid 156-160; iv, 433; Fraga and 78, 95 f., 105, 124; Lerida (1460), i, 509, 514; MonValladolid (1523), 122-126; zon (1563), iv, 113, n. 3, 433 ff. Valladolid (1537), (1527), 161 ff. Monzon (1585), 433 ff., 570 ff., 164, 205; Valladolid (1542), 168, 595; special, iii, 155, 156-160, 205; Valladolid (1544), 168, 169;
iii,
.
708
.
(.KNERAL INDEX
Council of Italy, iii, 153; iv, 412, 419 f., 435, 107,470. Council of Justice, at Milan, iii, 272. Council of Portugal, iv, 374 f. Council of State, ii, 116, 118, 120; iii, 143 f. iv, 412 f. ouncil of State, in the Netherlands,
;
Valladolid (1648 L68, 204, 205; Valladolid (1555). lo.s; iv. 414; ill. Valladolid 133; (1558), Zamore (1274), i, 229. 'ortes. the, of atalonia, l, 2114,
(
312, 389, HI. 170. 480 iii. ii, 130; 39-45, Lerida (1460), 27.
1
lv;,
1")"),
:.()7
;
158;
iv,
250, 305, 300.

;
Cortes, the, of Navarre, ii, 22, 347. ties, the, of Portugal, iv, 373 Lislxm Alnieiriui (1580), 352 f.
;
(ouncil of the Indies, ii, 117, 118, 220, 227 f. iii, 506, 51 1, 537, 554, 550, 585, 619-623, 626, 644 ff.,
648; iv, 189, 191, 200-203, 205, 212, 399, n. 1, 417. (ouncil of the Indies, in Portugal,
iv,
(1579), 352; :i 376.
Thomar
of
(1581), 370,
i,
Cortes,
the,
;
Sardinia,
41.3,
507
ff.
ii,
L65.
;
379, n.
f.
1.
ii,
Cortes, thf, <>f Valencia, i, 473 f. 130; iii. 55 i'.. 130, 155, 158, ii,
lsi.
(
(ouncil of the Orders,

121
(
117;
iv,
'ouncil of Troubles, iv, 282.
Hernando, conqueror of Council of War, iii, 144; iv, SS, lortes, 201. Mexico, i, 54, 149; iii, 45, 330, 339, 451, 459-513, 521, 523, 541, Count, title of, in Castile, i, 169 f. 546, 548, 560, 569, 591, 638, 640, Counter-Reformation, the, iv, 4968, 135, 272, 297, 208, 319, 474, 648, 659, 665; iv, 161, 187, 657. IM, 485, 4x0. 501, 521, 077. Corunna, i, 137, 145; ii, 319, 330; 571. 50 ff., 57, 59, 60, 386, 44S, Courtrai, battle of L302), iii, 449, 489, 525, 627 ff., 658; iv, Covadonga, cave of, i, 53, 56; iv, 672. 1. 554, 562, 632; 534, 535, 543, ordinances of (1554), 415. Covarrubias, Alonso de, Spanish
i,
."."
mografo-cronistu.
iii,
ti20.
architect,
iii.
217.
Costa, Alvaro da, Portuguese diplomat, iii, 423.

<
!otopaxi,
3.
iii,
570.
in Calabria,
ii.
Covarrubias y Leyva, Diego de, Spanish legist, iv, 484. Covilham, Pedro de, Portugal
navigator,
iv,
Cotrone, city
(
300, n.
ii,
1
334.
171
.
Cozumel,
the,
iii.
iii,
163,
lounci] of Aragon, 117 !.. I'M, n. 2:
16, iv,
1,
Jraon, iv, 635.

iv,
152
IT.
Crato, coininandery,
Credxto,
<
340, 374.
1.
419, 420
.v...;.
f.,
135,
570,
586, n.
iii,
195, n. 2.
;
Council of Blood,
<
iv.
282, 307.
1
<
iv, 47 Iremona, iii. 275 Irespi, Juan, Majorcao
rebel,
iii,
ouncil of
81,
<
!astile,
iii,
1,
ii.
:',.
7\
2,
115.
ill
n.
152,
3,
164,
169,
171.
n.
181,
183,
l'.'Of..
<
597, ii. _'. 620, 622; iv, 252, 293, 307, 325, 112. li:; 151 158, 137. 126, 421, 167, 170, 184, 506, 573, d. 3. ouncil of Finance, ii, 16, 133 f.; iii, 118, 191, 511
1
289, 511, 201, 202,

119,
Creepy, peace of (1544), 36
iii,
271,352,
(ntc,
(
W2,
1
i. 26; iv, I2s, 133. sbows, in. 338. rown pastures, 'lie. in Apulia,
ii,
301.
17.
iv,
\,
Quillaume
tutor
I
.
Chievres.
in.
9,
lord de, of Charles

10.
"i
V.
119,
137
<
f.,
157.
12
15,
20,
30
'<'un<-il
I,
of
1.
Flanders,
iii,
154
iv,
39,
or
1^.
5o.
07.
69,
117,
n.
422.
GENERAL INDEX
Croy, Guillaume de, archbishop of Toledo, hi, 32 f., 35, 67, 87. Cruelty, toward Indians, iii, 481 f.,
493, 531, 532, 534, 536, 564, 566, 605, 656-662 iv, 215 f ^ 582, 596, Crusades, belated enthusiasm for, the last of the cruiii, 288, 306 sades, iv, Chapter XXXII.
;
.
709
in
Catholic Kings, ii, 83, 134, 142; the Canaries, 190 f. the
; ;
635 f.; almojarifazgo, 226 f. iii, iv, 206, 208, 443; frontier customs between Castile and Portugal,
Cruzada,
iii,
195;
iv,
59, 208, 209,
375,376,441. Cuzco, capital of the Incas, iii, .549 f., 563, 565-575, 590, 594, 595, 597, 601, 602, 603, 655; iv,
187, 216.
517, 522.
;
Cuadernos of the Cortes of Castile, Cyprus, i, 361; ii. 189; iv, 124, iv, 423-136, 449. iii, 169-180 125, 128 f., 133 f., 146, 149. Cuba, ii, 197 f., 206, 213, 235 iii, C'yzicus, i, 36S. 461-467, 472, 473 f. 486, 489, 490, 523, 530, 644, .; iv, 168. Daggers, iii, 178 f. Cubagua, ii, 208; iii, 532, 589, 658. Dahlen, battle of (1568), iv, 283. Cubello, Sardinian noble family, i, Daiguao, iii, 460. 412 f. Dalada, iv, 382.
;
Cuellar, Francisco de, narrative of, iv, 551.
Dalemar,
Athens,
Philip,
i,
vicar-general
f
.
of
379
kidnaps
the
Cuenca, i, 192, 284; ii, 153; Cuenca, Juan de, translator,

Cuento,
iii,
iii,
i,
51.
268.
163.
Cuernavaca, iii, 499, 512. Cueva, Alonso de la, iii, 90. Cueva, Beltran de la, ii, 9 f.,
13, 14, 16, 50.
queen of Sicily, 400. Dal Monte, Cardinal, see Joyeuse. Damascus, i, 17. Damville, see Montmorency.
Dante,
11, 12,
Danube,
Cueva,
de la (d. 1571), 401 Alburquerque, viceroy of Navarre, governor of Milan, iv, Darien,
Gabriel
of
Duke
267, 333. iii, 141, 161, 172, 258, 261, 289, 290, 294, 302, 303 f., 340, 346. 347, 349, 352, 357, 400,
i,
the,
iv, 55.
475.
Cuevas, Francisco de, postal pioneer, iv, 453.
ii, 215, 229; iii, 431, 471, 505, 520, 542, 543, 633. Daroca, i, 455, n. 3.
Darro, the,
ii,
65.
Cugncia, i, 478. Culiacan, iii, 515.

Cullera, i, 296. Cultivadores libres,
180. 533, 658.
i,
Dasmarinas, Gomez Perez, governor of the Philippines (1590-93),

iv,
234, n. 2, 235.
iv,
Dasmarinas, Luis,
;
234, n. 2.
Cumana,
iii,
Cumberland, Earl of, Cura de los Palacios,
see Clifford.
see
Davila, Pedrarias, Spanish official, ii, 216 f., 228 f. iii, 519-522, 541,
545, 585, 633. Day of the Barricades, iv, 612. Daza, Juan, bishop of Oviedo, later of Cartagena, ii, 119.
f.,
Bernaldez.
542
Curia, i, 229. Curie! de la Torre, Juan de, Spanish

financier,
iii,
196, n. 2.
Currency, i, 264, 518. See Coinage. 'Curse of the Jews,' the, ii, 270. Customs duties, in Castile, i, 250 f. iv, 440 f national, i, 250 local, 250 f.; protective tariffs, 264; in Catalonia, 494 f. export duties on grain in Catalonia, 495 Castilian customs revenues under the
;
.
;
Dazila, Canarian princess, ii, 183. Dead cat, episode of the, iii, 386. Debts of the crown, iii, 194-200,
398 iv, 438-447. Decree of suspension of payments (1575), iv, 443 ff., 447; (1596), 446,658.
;
Decretals, the,
i,
241.
710
Delaya in justice, 222 f., 414 f.
I
GENERAL INDEX
iii.
184,
646;
i\\
Diezmo,
i,
250.
Delft, iv, 509. >elli, Dello, Italian painter,
Diezmos de aduaruu, ii, 134. Diezmos de la mar, iv, 441.

i,
266.
Dollys,
ii.
258;
iii,
292,348.
Demarcation Line,
'Demon
the, ii, 202 f. of the South," appellation of Philip II. iv, 133.
iv. ."508.
Dijon, iv, 632, 654. Diniz, king of Portugal (1279-1325), i, 105, 117, 120,321. Diocletian, Roman emperor (284306),
i,
12.
Dendermonde,
Denia, i. 296; iii, 107, 110. Denia, Marquis of, iii, 74 f., 76. cidn General. Depopulation, iv, 450. Deposition at Avila, the, ii, 13, 14, Diputacion del Reyno,
38.
Diplomacy, Spanish, iii, 2X5; iv, 478 f. Diputaci&n de Cataluna, see Diputai,
461, 483
Derecho de lanas, iv, 440 f. Derecho de pernada, i, 478. Derechos de ad nana, i, 250. Derechos de sello, ii, 134. Derechos de vecindad, i. 490.
Desafio, the, i. 170, 492. eshonor del trabajo," Deventer, iv, 647.
1
586, 589, 597. Dipxdacion General,

iv,
i,
481, 483, 4X7,
491; ii, 27, 31,33; iv, 589. Dipidados de las Cortes, iii, 159. Diputazione del Regno, i, 517 f. Diu, naval battle of (1509),
336.
39.
iv,
'
i,
Divide
et
impera,
iv, 190, 49'j. of, iv,
Divine right of kings, theory
484. Robert, second Earl of Essex, nobleman, iv, Doce sabios, the, i, 211 f. English Doctor illumina 559 f., 562, 600 IT. Lull. Dexart, Joannes, Sardinian his- Dodman Point, iv, 536. torian, i, 507 f. Dole, capital of Franche Comtl, 247. Desa, Pedro, president of the chancillerfa of Granada, later cardinal, Dolls, iv, 430. iv, 86, 90, 91. Dominic, St., i, 285, 286. Diabolical power-, iv, 582. Dominica, West Indian island,
Deveroux.
iv,
ii,
Diaz, Bartholomew, Portuguese explorer, ii, 212, 266. Dfaz de Armendariz, Miguel, commis8ioner of the Council of the
Indies,
iii,
5.S.").
205.
Dominican convent at Calatavud,

iv.
580
;
Dominican
in
Diaz de Aux,
Martin. Justicia of
\0).
i,
Aragon
133
167.
177.
)
Dfaz del Castillo, Bernal, Spanish

historian, iii, iv ,.. 507.
i
165,
166
17.").
friars, iv, 63, 481, 615 f. the Canaries, ii, 186; in the New World. 231 f., 234, 235; iii. 533, 556, 621 f., 659, 660, 662 f. iv, 165 in the Philippines, 239.
:
Dow
(
m'
ulil,
<
ii,
17_', n. 2.
,
Dfaz de Montalvo, Alonso,

jurist,
ii.
lastilian
nation of
i.
'"ii>tantin<
the.
1.
125.
Donativo,
182, 508. 515, 517.
518;
Diaz
Dire,
1
de
iii,
Solis,
ii.
Juan,
f.
:
Spanish
iii.
ex-
plorer,
>iego,
o.
213, 218
179.
606.
17::.
iv. 474. ii, 166,312; 439, 468, Donate, Leonardo, Venetian amquoted, 28, bassador, h 95, 98
.
son ol Philip fray, corpse

iv.
II, iv,
371
f.
n. 3, 29, D
of, iv, 36.

:;.
Dor, Pierre, French consul at Lisbon,

iv.
Dieppe,
519, 170
:.
ii.
361.
chief,
ii,
17.'-!,
Doramas, Canarian
171. 176, 177.
tmerot,
i,
'_'">-'.
GENERAL INDEX
Dorante,
Francisco,
the,
i,
711
i,
confessor
iv,
Don John of Austria,

Dordogne,
30.
of 313, n. 2.
i,
Duke,
title of, in Castile,
169
i,
f.
Dulce, heiress of Provence,
33.
Doria, noble Genoese family, 383.

114,
355,
hi,
Dunkirk, iv, 544, 546 f., 621, 622. Durance, the, i, 33. Dusay, Juan, viceroy of Sardinia,
ii,
Doria, Andrea, Genoese admiral,
165, n.
1.
iii,
167, 198, 212, 249 ff., 252, 266, 282, 297, 298 f., 304, 306, 309, 317, 319 ff., 323-329, 333, 336, 338, 340, 341 ff ., 362 iv, 102, 105, 113, n. 1, 477. Doria, Bernabe, i, 358. Doria, Filipino, hi, 248, 250.
;
Dutch, the,
453
.
Dutch adiv,
venturers in the East Indies,

235, 238, 383
f
Dutch East India Company, iv, 384. Duties on colonial imports and exports, iii, 635 f iv, 208.
.
Gian Andrea (d. 1606), Earthquakes, hi, 552. Genoese naval commander in the East Africa, iii, 420; iv, 334 f., 336, Spanish service, iv, 102-105, 128, 337, 381. East Cathay, iii, 450. 129, 130, 136, 142 f Doria, Giannetino (d. 1547), father Eastern Empire, the, i, 14, 321, 363Doria,
.
of the preceding, iii, 329. Doria, Girolamo, cardinal (1529-58),

iii,
371, 424.
East Indies, the,
iv,
225-241, 334;
181.
of, see
Dorset, Marquis
Grey.
of,
Douai,
284,
iv, 7, n. 2.
493;
university
339, 379-384, 390, 402. East Romans, in Spain, i, 14, 26 at Ceuta, 16 in the western Mediterranean islands, 26.
;
Doullens,
iv, 654, 658.

i,
Douro,
the,
11,
36;
ii,
51.
Eboli, Prince of, see Gomez da Silva. Eboli, Princess of, see Mendoza y de
Douro basin, the, i, 57, 70, 76, 77. la Cerda. Dover, iv, 9, 294, 295, 546. Ebrard, see Saint-Sulpice. Dragut, corsair captain, iii, 324, 326, Ebro, the, i, 8, 31, 36, 275; iii, 102, 329 f., 340, 341 ff., 370; iv, 103, 103 iv, 400, n. 1, 580. Ecclesiastical affairs, i, 58 ff., 174104, 106, 107, 115. 152 ff., 231 f., Drake, Sir Francis, English seaman, ii, 179, 454 f.; 313 ff.; in Aragon, hi, 181; in iv, 26, 178, 179, 383, 389, 391, 501, 517, 519, 520, 521, 530, 532, Castile, 32 f., 86 ff., 121, 173, 186 f., 192 f.; iv, 49-53, 78-83, 534, n. 4, 536-546, 553 ff., 556, n. 1, 557 f ., 559. 479-482; in England, iii. 375, in Ger382 ff., 386, 388 f ., 391 Drama, the, in Spain, hi, 215 f. iv, 485 in Peru, iii, 552. many, 352-363, 404; iv, 618 f. in the Indies, iii, 654-663 iv, 216 Drenthe, iii, 399, n. 4; iv, 617, n., ff in Milan, iii, 273 647, 652. iv, 474 f in Naples, 471 f. in the Netherunder the Dualism, Spanish, Catholic Kings, ii, 81-86. lands, iii, 129, 401 iv, 252 f., et saepe in Sicily, 469 the Council Dudley, Lord Guildford, iii, 376. of Trent, 54, 59 f., 82, 471, 484. Dudley, Sir Henry, iv, 5.
; ;
Dudley, John, Duke of Northumberland and Earl of Warwick, iii, 375 ff. Dudley, Robert, Earl of Leicester, English courtier and general, iv, 517, 526, 617 f., 646.
Duefias,
ii,
See
Bulls,
Clergy,
Dominicans,
Franciscans,
Excommunications,
Heresy,
Inquisition, Interdicts, Jesuit order, Monasteries, Papacy,
Persecution, Protestantism, Reformation, Rome.

ficija,
48, 101, 330.
battle of,
i,
109.
712
Eclipse (1596),
iv.
GENERAL INDEX
665.
1.
Economic affaire,
38 ft'.. 86, 262 ff., 192-196, 501-504, 510, 519; ii, 190 f., 222 227, 136-144. 164,
in the Indies,
iv.
1
:
195; 336.
iv,
125;
Kgvptian
fleet,
in Spain, iii, 206 21 iii, 207; iv, 428 ff., 436401, n. 2. in the Netherlands, 275 f., Elba, iii, 281, n. 2. 285 f., 303; economic prosperity Elbe, the, iii, 358. of the 3* Elche, i, 298. Philippines, 240 f. Agriculture, Commerce, Manufac- El Dorado, iii, 548, 570. tures, Mesta, Mineral wealth, 'El Draque,' iv, 557. Mines, Pasturage, Shipping, Slav- Eleanor of Alburquerque wife of 120. Ferdinand I of Aragon, ery. Trade routes. Ecuador, iii, 544, 549; iv, 179, 190, Eleanor, daughter of Charles II of n. 2. Anjou, wife of Frederic III of Eddystone, iv, 536, 537. Sicily, i, 353. Edid of 1526, the, iv. s(i, ss. Eleanor, daughter of Alfonso II of Edict of Union, the (1588), iv, 612. Aragon, wife of Raymond VI of Toulouse, i, 284. Edinburgh, treaty of (1560), iv. 258. Edrisi, Arab geographer, i, 143. Eleanor, daughter of John II of Aragon, wifeof Gaston IV de Foix, Education, iii. 175 ff., 214; iv, 411, in mediaeval Castile, ii. 29,30, 61, 328, 339,341. 433, 481 f. in Aragon, 265, n. 4 in Eleanor, daughter "f Pedro IV of i, 2!)."> f. under the Catholic of ( 'astile, Sicily. 519; Aragon, wife ol
;
312f.; 651 f.
177
!..
:
iii,
c2s
t,:;s,
hs
Egypt, sultan of, see Kansuh. Ehingers, bankers of Constance, 629 f. Kin neues Lied irir heben an,
iii,
i,
Kirifi>,
ii,
161
in
f.
;
the Indies,
iii,
i,
405.
663
iii,
f.
iv,
224
of Charles V,
;
l.li
11;
gellan,
iv.
I
of Maof Cortes, 459 f. 419: of Antonio Perez,
324; of Philip II, li) f. Edward (Longshanks), kin^ of Kngland (1272 1307), i, 102, 110,
132, 321. 339, 341.
anor, daughter of Mariano IV of i, 397. lleanor, daughter of Alfonso VIII of 'astile, wife of .lames I of Aragon,
Arborea,
i, 317. Eleanor, daughter of Ferdinand III
of
'astile,
\\
ife
of
Edward
of
Edward
77-.
i,
[II,
king of England (1327
133, 134, 388. IV, icing of England (1461 i. 139: ii. 37. 38, 80, 66. Edward VI, king of England (1547 lb ff., 607, n. 1. Edward (tin- Black Prince), bod of Edward III of England, i, 135,
Edward
England, i. 102, 110, 132. Eleanor, daughter of Ferdinand IV nt iastile, wife of Alfonso I\ ol Aragon, i, 118, 384 f.
(
inor,
(
daughter of
wife of
Philip
I
of
'astile,
Emmanuel of
Por-
tugal, later of Francis

ii.
1
of France,
93.
Edward, Prince, bod

of Portugal, iv, 346.
of
Emmanuel
.
269, 320; iii. 13, 26, 240, 241, 12, 123; iv. 242, 253, 396, of Eleanor, daughter of Edward
1
Enrique de, Spanish architect

iii,
217.
."lit.
".
:
Lamoral,
251, 281
Count
f.
of,
iii,
England, betrothed to Alfonso III of Aragon, i, 321. leanor, daughter of Henry II of land, wife of AlfonSO VIII ol
j
1
iv,
tile,
i,
11)1.
i"iit,
Philip,
-
Count
n.
of, iv,
-
629
L93
f.,
'I'll"-!
tnidan.
I
pt,
i,
15,
17,
19
Portugal, daughter of linand. Duke of Viseu, wife ol John II of Portugal, ti, 71 iii, 419.
of
;
nor
GENERAL INDEX
713
Eleanor, daughter of Pedro II of Encabezamiento, iii, 160, 163, 168, Sicily, wife of Pedro IV of Aragon, 192; iv, 209, 429, 442-445, 450,
i,
399.
i,
452.
Elephants, at Tamerlane's court, 163 in Borneo, iii, 438.

;
Encina, Juan de, Spanish dramatist,

iii,
215.
El felicissimo Viaje, iii, 365, n. 4. Enciso, see Fernandez de Enciso. Elizabeth, queen of England (1558- Enclosures, struggle over, in Eng1603), iii, 376, 379, 394, 634; iv, land, ii, 140. 12, 13, 40, 55, 82, 168, 267, n. 3, Encomenderos, ii, 235. 270-280, 283, 286-294, 295, 297, Encomiendas, ii, 232-235; iii, 593, 298, 302, 305, 308, 311, n. 2, 596, 646, 652, 656-663; iv, 215, 314 f., 316, 318, 356, 361, 365, 233, 433. 391, 397, 436, 495, 498-503, 506 f., Enghien, Duke d', French com515 ff., 521 ff., 550, 553, 556, mander, iii, 270. 558 f., 600 f., 612. 617, 618, 620, Engineering, Aztec, iii, 469; Peru623, 635, 645, 647, 657 f., 659 f. vian, 552 militarv, iv, 510, 512 ff Elizabeth, daughter of Henry II of England, i, 3, 94, 95, 97, 101, n. 3,
;
.
France, third wife of Philip II of Spain, iv, 31, 35, 256 f., 262; death of (1568), 289. Elizabeth, duchess of Lorraine, wife of Rene I of Anjou, i, 421.
115, 122, 123
188
f.,
f., 129, 132-139, 172, 193, 219, 221, 257, 258, 261,
303, 328, 392, 448, 449, 469, 494,

ii, 66, 78, 79, 88, 93, n. 2, 109, 152, 193, 236, 261, 271, 273, 274-279, 298, 318 f., 321 ff., 332, n. 2, 343 ff.; iii, 44, 80, 117, 135,
519;
El Mehedia, iii, 341, 342, 343, 348, 368; iv, 103, n. 1. El Mostancer, Hafside sultan of
Tunis,
i,
324.
see
El Rey Chico,
Mohammed
XI.
Elvas, iv, 360, 361, 362, 370, 371. Elysian Fields, the, i, 142. El Zagal, see Mohammed XII. Emanuel Philibert (Ironhead), duke of Savoy (1553-80), iii, 282, 396, 409 ; iv, 13, 347 governorgeneral of the Netherlands, 5; commands the Spanish army, 9,
;
136, 156, 213, 229 f., 238 f., 251255, 261, 375-395, 400, 405 f., 607, n. 1, 633, n. 1, 634; iv, 9 f., 11, 112, 132, 168, 332, n. 1, 350, 397, 401, 402, 415, 448, 585, 599, relations with 600-603, 679; Spain in the time of Philip II,
Chapters XXXIV, XXXVII, pasinfluence sim, 617 f., 635, 657 ff. of English literature in Castile, i,
;
10.
Embargo, breaking
279.
of peace bv, iv,
Emeralds, iii, 556. Emigration to America,

of,
ii,
the English Parliament, 268; 227; iii, 389, 391, 392; iv, 424, 436 English colonies in North America, ii, 230 Carranza in, iv, 480 f. the oath of allegiance,
;
privileges
483.
221.
English
adventurers
in
the
East
Indies, iv, 235, 383 f. (the Fortunate), king of Portugal (1495-1521), ii, 93, 94, English Channel, naval battle in the 212, 265-270; iii, 37, 83, 92 ff., (1588), iv, 535-546. 137, 419, 420. 421, 422 ff., 427, English East India Companv, the, iv. 384, n. 2, 390. 439, 440 iv, 333, 346. Empehado enjuros, iv, 441. Englishmen naturalized in Spain, iv, 429. Emperor, title of, in Spain, i, 89 ff Empire builders, passing of the, iv, Enquesta, iv, 581. 332, 478, 677 f Enrique, natural son of Ferdinand of Aragon, iii, 111. Emprestito, i, 249, 253 ii, 230.
;
.
.
Emmanuel
714
GENERAL INDEX
of
Enrique de Malacca, slave

gellan,
iii,
!'_'.").
1
Ma-
Enriquez, Castilian family, gradually acquires hereditary headship of the oavy, i. 210. Enrique/. Fadrique (d. 1537), admiral of Castile, iii, 5, 81, 82 fi\,
118, 120, L22.
Ernest, Archduke of Austria, iv, 638, 640, 651, 652 f., 655. Ernest of Bavaria, bishop of Li&ge, archbishop of Cologne, iv, 618, 623.
Erzingan,
i,
161.
Escorial, the, iii. 413; iv, 29, 33, 51, 146, 332, 351, 379, 421, 469,
185,
528, (165-668;
of,
Enriquez, Frederic, II (d. 1473), admiral of 'astile, i, 120, n. 4

I
ii,
22.
Enriquez, Joanna, wife of John II of Aragon, i, 120, n. 4 ii, 22, 24, 31,
;
de, secretary of of Austria, iv, 325-330, 574-577, 581. Escovedo, Pedro de. son of the pre-
embellishment Kscovedo, Juan
building and 42-49.
Don John
32, 37.
ceding,
iv,
575, 576.
Enriquez de Acevedo, Pedro, Count Escribanos, i, 210. of Fuentes, Spanish commander, Escuadron, ii, 158. nephew of the famous Duko of Kscudero, Doctor, iii, 174, n. 2. Alva, iv, 554 f., 649, 651-656, 658. Escuderos, i, 220. de Almansa, Martin, Espafiola, ii, 198, 205 f., 207, 208, Knrfquez 210, 211, 214, 215, 217, 227, 228, viceroy of New Spain (1568-80) and o'f New Castile (1581-83), 230, 231, n. 1, 232; iii, 460 ff., 471. 499, 520. iv, 212 f., 2m. Knrfquez fie Guzman, Alonso, con- Especido de todoa loa derechos, i, 241. quistador, iii, 578 576, 614. spejo, Antonio de. Spanish explorer and colonizer, 161. Enriquez de Guzman, Enrique,
1
Castilian noble,
tilian chronicler,
ii,
293.
17, 100.
Enriquez del Castillo, Diego, Casii,
Espejo ilr todos los iii reckos, i, 241. Espinosa, Diego de. Spanish minand inquisitorcardinal ister,
general,
iii,
Enriquez de Toledo, Antonio, grand

prior of Leon,
iv, 37.
iv.
86, 88,
'.'I.
324, 417.
Espinosa, Ga par de, alcalde mayor,

543.
political,
iv,
Entenca, Berenguerde, Leader of the Catalan Grand Company, i, 370,

371.
Espionage,
256,
271.
Teresa de, countess of Urgel, wife of Pedro IV of Aragon, i 384. Ephesus, i. 368. battle of (1848 Epila, iv, 500, 591
Entenca,
314, 178 553. Espirito Santo, iv, 389.

12. Espolones, iv, :!'.. Esquiros, iii, L03. Essen, John van. Protestant martyr,
l
I
iii.
101.
\,
ii.
2.
1
i.
145,
149,
152,
155,
165,
166.
Epuus, i, 364. Erasmus, Desiderius, humanist,

155, n.
1
:
ii,
Earl of, set evereux. Estacada, iv, 513. Estacfto Alcantara Terra, iv, 365, n.
l.
iii,
213.
Francisco de 1570), (d. Eraso, secretary of state, iii, 196, n. 2,

16;
iv.
ido 'in India, iv.
888 f v 380 384.

i.
EstamerUoe,
S irdinia,
in
Valencia,
:
174
;
in
324.
i.
508
ii.
165.
benes,
9.
Estafiol,
berenguer,
i,
governor
of
Ercilla y Zufiiga, Alonso de, Spanish soldier and poet. iii. 605. Eric XIV, king of Sweden (15601
Athens,
ktes,
375, 377. the, in Sardinia, 860 Esta
nil.
266, Ericeira,
iv,
n.
<
'mint
of,
sn
Meneze<.
Ere (1471
I
ile
d',
dnke
281.
of
Kerrara
:.o:,). ii,
GENERAL INDEX
Estella,
ish
iii,
715
;
20.
Estrada, Ferdinand,
Duke
321.
of,
Span-
Chibcha iii, 581 Campo,,73.

Fajardo, Pedro,
Velez,
of
Medina
del
los
ambassador,
ii,
first
Marquis de
against
iii,
Estranjeros, iv, 203, 204. Estremadura, i, 193, 229 ii, 145, 349; iii, 71, 398, 541; iv, 206, 342, 588. Estremoz, iv, 362. Etaples, peace of (1492), ii, 277, 278, 298.
;
commander Agermanados (1521),

Fajardo
de
the
1.
108, n.
Pedro (d. 1579), third Marquis de los Velez,

Cordova,
i,
iv, 342, n. 1. Falconaria, battle of (1300), iii, 293. Falcons, i, 401

;
352.
Euboea, see Negropont. Eudes, duke of Aquitaine, i, 30. Eudes I, duke of Burgundy, i, 70
Eugenius, Saint, iv, 32. Eugenius IV, Pope (1431-47), 422, 525 ii, 200.
;
Faleiro,
f.
Ruy, Portuguese cosmogiii,
rapher,
Falucas,
i,
421-424.
Falmouth,
562. 487.
iv, iv, 129, 133, 137.
iv, 17,
i,
419,
Famagosta,
Familiars,
469.
stimulated Euphrates, the, i, 369. Fanaticism, by the Euric, king of the Visigoths (466church, i, 88, 199 ii, 86, 90-97
;
28, 236. Euxine, the, i, 159.
484),
i,
15, 21 f. Farnese, Alessandro, see Paul III.
of the Berbers,
i,
Evora, archbishop Theotonio de. fivreux, counts of,
of, see
Braganza, Farnese,
ii,
19.
Alexander, grandson Paul III, archbishop Avignon, cardinal (1534-89),
Pope
of of
iv,
Excommunications, i, 78, 337, 340, 346, n. 4. 341, 347, 376, 402; of Elizabeth Farnese, Alexander, duke of Parma of England, iv, 292 of Henry of (1586-92), governor-general of the Netherlands (1578-92), iv, 347, Navarre, 610 proposed, of Juan Fernandez de 475; 392, 491-499, 502, 504 ff., 509Velasco, threatened, of Philip II, 626. 514, 516 f., 526 f., 530, 533, 542, Excusado, iv, 59, n. 2, 209, 443. 543-548, 551, 611, 617-624, 628 f., Exemptions from taxation, in Cas647-651, 658; in France, 630 f., 635 f., 646 ff.; distrusted by tile, i, 253 f. 110, 131, 135, ii, 137; in Aragon, i, 453, 454; in Philip II, 476, 494, 527, 619 f., the Canaries, 153; ii, 186; in the 622 f., 629, 648 f., 650; death of
;
; ;
Indies, 230.
(1592), 636, 637, 638, 650.
Exequatur, Neapolitan, iv, 350, 472. Farnese, Ottavio, duke of Parma (1547-86), iii, 280, 355; iv, 249, Exerica, Pedro de, Valencian royalist, i, 444, 445. 250, 491. Farnese, Pier Luigi, natural son of Exoculation, i, 246. Pope Paul III, iii, 280, 362. Exorquia, i, 478. Explosives, used at the siege of Faro, iv, 560. Fast, Atahualpa's, iii, 559 f Niebla, i, 104. Extraordinario, appropriations for Fasting, iv, 21, note 6, 476, n. 2. war and diplomacy, iv, 447. Fatimites, Moslem dynasty in North Africa, i, 19 f. Factor, the, of the Casa de Contrata- Fayal, one of the Azores, iv, 556.
.
cion,
ii,
224, 225
iii,
623
iv, 204,
Federmann, Nikolaus, Swabian explorer

in
211.
the
service
of
the
Welsers, iii, 536, 577, 583. Fadrique (d. 1438), illegitimate son of Martin I of Sicily, i, 409. Felipillo, interpreter, iii, 563, 564. Fairs, in Castile, i, 263; ii, 137; Felix V, Basel Pope (1439-49), i, 422.
716
Kenton.
iv.
(MINERAL INDEX
Edward, English seaman,
I.
19X. 3ssf.
Ferdinand
Holy
Roman emperor
(1556-64), ii. 325, 335; iii, 4-8, 17 f.. 35, 37, L19, 131, 137, 139, n. 1, 140, L62, 223, 225, 230, 245, 266, 268, 271, 289, 290, 301, n. 2, 303 f., 335, 357, 358, 364-368, 371 I'., 373, 380, 394, 397, 402;
iv, 55.
65) and of Leon (1037-65), i, 68, 200, 275. Ferdinand III (the Saint), king of Castile (1217-52) and of Leon
(1230-52),
i,
68,
78,
80-85, 91,
94, 95, 97, 98, 103, 108, 115, 129, 189. 210, 211, 212, 217, 219, 220,
238, 239, 268.

of Castile
i,
n. 1,
260, 261, 264, 265,
Ferdinand IV (the Summoned), king

I
Ferdinand
(of
Antequera), king of
i,
and Leon (1295-1312),
Aragon (1412-16),
n. 4, 130, 199, ii. 4 f., 19.
115, 119, 120,

4s").
405-411,
513;
96, 106, 117, 120, n. 1, 121, 127, 192. 220. 249,300. Ferdinand II, king of Leon (11 57
Ferdinand II (V of Castile, III of 88), i, 177. Naples) (the Catholic), king of Ferdinand (the Handsome), king of Aragon (1479-1516) and Sicily Portugal (1367-83), i, 12 (1468-1516), i, 3, 34, 38, 55, 61, 84, Ferdinand (d. 1363), son of Alfonso IV of Aragon, i, 3S-1. 1-15. Hi, 132, 139, 89, 91, 97, 98, 11."), 12. 15s, 104, 168, 17s, H)4, 201, Ferdinand, son of James I of Aragon,
1
I
211, 235, 263, 319, 450,
217, 21S, 221. 222, 22S, 231, 245, 249, 250, 255, 258, 261, 204, 265, 266, 268, 307, 308, 381, n. 1, 406, 410, 423, 449, 451, 457, 468, 17:.. 480, 485, 1, 198, 503, 504, 506, 507, n. 509, 510, 519, 521, 522; in. 3-10,
23, 94, 96, L03, 106, 12. 124, 127. n. 2, 129, 137. Lis, 143, Ml. 152, 173, 175. 181, L83, is;,. |S7, IS!), 192, 193, 203, 205,
14,
16,
1
i,
317.
of Austria, 273. Ferdinand, grandson of Alfonso X of
Ferdinand,
(
Archduke
iv,
lount of Tyrol,
ill-,
ufantes de la. Ferdinand, younger son of James I
Cast
'
see
eri ta
17,
Of Majorca, i, 372. Ferdinand, younger brother of Alfonso V of Portugal, claimant to
the Canaries, i, 157. Ferdinand, son ol Philip

iv,
II of
Spain,
291, 317 !'.. 146, 618, (123. 1.20. 02X, 029. 030, 633, '137. 665; iv, 83, 94, 98, 221, 240, 259, 398, 401, 112. 121. 15li, 507, 509, 579, 650, 672, 673, 674, 677, 678 liis first marriage (with 679; character of, Isabella I, ii, 3-41 attain- with Isabella the 12 !.
222. 257,
33.
la
i
Ferdinand de Alfonso \
Feria,
1
Cerda, eldest son of

Castile,
i,
112, 132.
Duke
.
of, see
Figueroa.
Fernandez, Juan, Spanish pilot, iv, 85 f Fernandez de AC ba, Pedro, juez

pesquisidor.
ii,
174 f
sovereignty of Castile, 10 oi sucthe throne of Aragon, oi f. bis joint rule with Isabella, 210, 219 221. 240 242, 261
;
Fernandez
(d.
de
C6rdoba,
Antonio
of
1606),
f.
fifth
Duke
at
Sessa,
iv,
Spanish ambassador
65, 641
<
Home,
1
the
(
<
'a-tilian
succession,
ond marriage (with rermaine de Foix 330 the later years of liis reign, 210 219, 224 260, 335 349; bis attitude toward the enterprise of lumbus, 195.
i,
;
Fernandez de ttrdova, tiego, ii, 244, 246 f., 254. Fernandez de Knciso, Martin, Spanish lawyer and geographer, ii,
21 l, 215, 210; iii, 554. Fernandez de Heredia, Lorenzo,
187.
iii,
ind
I,
kinn of
a-tile
in
Fernandez de Lugo, Alfonso, Span-
GENERAL INDEX
ish conquistador in the Canaries, iii, 577. ii, 174. 177, 180-185;
.
717
Fighting qualities, decline in, iv, 233 f., 432 f., 476. Fernandez de Lugo, Luis Alonso, iii. Figueiredo, Cipriao de. adherent of Antonio of Crato, iv, 390. 578, 583 f Fernandez de Lugo, Pedro, conquis- Figueroa, Gomez Suarez de (d. 1571), fifth Count and (from 1567) first tador, iii, 577 ff., 583 f. Fern&ndez de Oviedo, Gonzalo, Duke of Feria, Spanish diplomat, iv. 37, 272, n. 1, 637, n. 5. Spanish historian, ii, 220 quoted, 121 iii, 523 f., 531. Figueroa, Lope de, Spanish comFernandez Duro, Cesareo, quoted, mander, iv, 142, 392. iv, 55S. Figueroa, Lorenzo Suarez de (d. Fernan Gonzalez, count of Castile 1607), second Duke of Feria, (c. 930-970), i, 65-68, 69. viceroy of Catalonia and Sicily, Ferrante I. king of Nunles (1458-94), special ambassador to represent ii. 25, 48, 57, i, 424, 521, 525 f.; Philip at the French StatesGeneral (1592-93), iv, 637 ff., 143, 280. 281, 282, 284, 308. Ferrante II, king of Naples (1495643, 644, 645. Finance, public, in mediaeval Cas96), ii, 286, 291,292, 293, 294. Ferrante (d. 1559), Duke of Calain Aragon, 462 in tile, i, 246-255 Catalonia, 480 f. in Sardinia, 506 bria, son of Frederic of Naples, ii, in Sicily, 515 f., 517; in f., 50S; 299,302; iii, 79, n. 1, 127, n. 2. under the Catholic Naples. 522 f Ferrara, iii, 260; iv, 663, n. 3. Kings, ii. 79, 106, 129 f., 131-135, Ferrara, war of (1482-84), ii, 281 ff., under Charles V. iii, 287. 230. 311 ff.
;
Ferrelo, Bartolome, iii, 515.

Ferrer, St. Vincent,
n. 3.
i.
Spanish
pilot,
42, 126, 128, 188-200, 278, 452, 503, n. 4, 618-638, 665; under
406, 457, 474,
Philip
II,
iv,
204-209,
f.
285
f.,
428
ff.,
436-447.
Ferrer de la Nuza II, see Lanuza. Ferro, Canarian island, i. 149, 152, 158 ii, 172, 185.
; .
Fire-ships, iv, 389, 536, .546 iv, 581. i, 469, 470; Firma de spoli, i, 478.
Firma,
iv, ii, 225, n. 1 Feudalism, not fully developed in Fisheries, i, 264 429. in Catalonia, Castile, i, 172 ff 429. 475-480; in Aragon. 452- Fistel, ravine, ii, 246. 456' iv. 567-572; in Sardinia, Flanders, i, 494: ii, 143, 188, 298;
; ;
i.
10;
:
in Sicily, 515, 516, n. 2,

f.
519
in Naples, 521
;
Fez. city, i, 19, 24 iii, 307. Fez, kingdom, ii, 173, 240. Fez and Morocco, bishopric of,
85.
i,
82,
4. 19, 38, 117, 189, 205, iv. 249, 430, 379. 584, 650 n. 4, 446, n. 1, 494, 508, 511, 547, 629. Flatbnats. iv, 513. 526, 544, 545,
iii.
;
242,
440, 526,
621.
Firming. Thomas, English seaman,

iv,
Fiction, harmful influence of, iii, 175. Field of the Cloth of Gold, the (June, 1520), iii, 117.
Fieles.
i,
536.
in
;
Flemings, in England, iv. 275: iv, 281, 429 Spain, iii, 31 f.

;
at
the court of Philip II, 28.

in
187
f. iii.
Fieschi, conspiracv of the,
FlennVh influences, traceable tilian painting, i, 266 f. 280,

Flint Island,
iii,
Cas-
361
f.
432.
of the
Fiesco,
Giovanni Luigi, Count of Flood, the, i, 6. Lavagna, Genoese noble, iii, 280, Flor, Roger de, leader
362.
Grand Company,
i,
Catalan 366-370.
718
:
OENERAL INDEX
iii.
Florence, .. 422; 279 282; 204,
194, 253, 260, Fontaine-Francaise, battle of (1595), in Florentines iv, 654. Tunis i. 306; Florentine mcr- Fontarabia, iii, 89, 105, n. 2, 171. chante expelled from Barcelona, 223, 230. Food, scarcity and dearness of, iv, 494. 451. Florentino, Nicolao, probably the Forced loan, iv, 480. same ae Dello Delli, i, 206. Floree NTaldes, Diego, captain-gen- Foreigners, dislike of Spaniards for, iii, 7 f ., 33 ff., 67 f., 123, 190. eral of the Armada ae la Carrera de las India*, iv, 388. 531 f., 552. Forenses, rural population of Maiii. jorca, i, 501 ff. 505, 523 f., Florida, ii, 217 f. 526, 528f.,643; settlement of,iv, Foret, Jean de la, French agent, iii, 162-178 conflicts with the French 307, n. 1. and massacres, 103 f., 166-178, Formentera, island, i, 315; iii, 200. 205. 207. 208, 278, 396; Hawkins in, 27S; Drake in. 178, 517. Forneron, Henri, on the murder of
;
Flonnda
Flota, the,
Cava, i, 16. convoyed flee! for New Spain, iii, 631; iv, 209 ff., 558,
la
iii,
FJscovedo, iv, 325 f. Fornovo, battle of (1495),
ii,
292.
562.
Flushing,
Foix,
i,
26, 79, 398;
iv,
295.
017,619.
32, 279, 289.
Caroline, iv, 109, 171, 172. Forus Inquisitionis Officii JuetU Aragonvm, i, 408. Fountain of perpetual youth,
Fort
ii,
Foix, house of, ii, 339. Foix, Andre de. Bieur de L'Esparre,
217; iv, 102. Fouquet, Guillaume,

la
Varenne
French
iii,
commander
ff.
in
Navarre,
cook, later
Marquis de French diplomat, iv, 644 f.

(d.
1016),
101
Foix, count of, see Raymond Foix, Gaston IV de (d. 1172),
Fourquevaux, Redmond de Beocarie, Baron de, French ambassador to Roger.

ii,
Spain,
iv.
175,
.
177, 207.
29, 32, 61. Foix. Gaston de (d. 1512), ii. 341, 342, 343. Foix, Germaine de. second wife of Ferdinand II of Aragon, later married to John of Brandenburg and then to Ferrante of Calahria,
ii, 90, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 334, 336, 338, 341, 342; iii. 17. 97, 127. era, i, 217. 248.
..
Fourth Crusad the, i, 303, 373. Foxe, John, English church historian and martyrologist, iii, 662.
Fraga, iii. 55. France, i. 3 ". 90, 94, 95, 97, 101,
111, L13, 115. 110. 117. 129, 132L39, 173, 17s. 188 f., 193,235,257,
267, 274, 27'.'. 280, 281, 282-291, 303, 320f., 329ff., 330, 3-15, 310, 348, 410, 424, 13:!, 436f., 138, '<. 21. 28 lis. 170. 518, 525 37,
Foi of
Uonso Toledo (1524 Fonseca. Antonio

1
de,
archbishop
I
38,39f
n. 2,
34),
iii.
13,
21
I.
109, 149,
n.
53, 56 61, 66, 7s. 79, 93, 152, 102. 193, 261,
Pamplona
Foj
de, bishop of 10. 15 15 50). iii, \ntuiiio de, Spanish com( 1
266,
328
I,
f.,
mander,
..
iii.
7:;,
1.
10.
2, 271 315, 321. 324 f., 330, 332, o. 2. 333, 340, 341, 342 346, 348; iii. ii. II, 71. so. 94 106, 114,
i:;i. L35, 136, 138, 140, 141, 171. 181, 385. 387, a. 2, 393,
bitonio de, Spanish envoy,

-
lis. lot.
ii,2s:,f.
Etodrfguez de Fonseca. Vlfonso de, Axevedo.

ii.
395,
mi.
f.;
iv,
!
in:..
I
525f.,
99,
684.
121,
at
631,
126,
634
Hi. !i7,
archbishop of Seville,
I".
L47, 149;
rench warrior-
the
GENERAL INDEX
719
capture of Toledo (1085), i, 70; Frederic, king of Naples (1496French adventurers in the Cas1501), ii, 48, 294, 298 f., 300 ff.; tilian army (1385), 123 n. 2. Betheniii, 127, court and La Salle in the Canaries, Frederic III (or I), king of Sicily 145-155 wars with Charles V, iii, (1296-1337), i, 333, 343 f., 346, 221-272, 275, 286 f., 302 ff., 306 f., 347, 348, 349-354, 356, 359, 360, 314, 319 f., 322 f., 340, 357, 369 f., 361, 366, 372, 375, 376, 398, 399, 374 f., 377 T381, 384, 389, 390 f.; 511 f. relations with Spain, iv, Chapters Frederic IV (or II) (the Simple), XXXIV, XXXVII, XXXIX; king of Sicily (1355-77), i, 376, escape of Antonio Perez to, 588, 398, 399, 512. 599-604; attempts to colonize Frederick I (Barbarossa), Holy 162-17S Antarctic Roman emperor (1152-90), i, 283. Florida, Frederick II, Holy Roman emperor France, 163, 387 f. France, chancellor of, see Rochefort. (1212-50), i, 81, 319, 334, 360, n. 1. marquis of Saluzzo Francesco, Frederick III, Holy Roman emperor (1529-37), iii, 262.
;
Franche Comte, iii, 15, 271, 385, 393, (1440-93), ii, 274. 397, 399, 405 II, king iv, 246 f., 330, 654. Frederick Francis II, duke of Brittany (1458(1559-98), iv, 266,
;
of
n. 4.
Denmark
Francis
274,275. king of France (1515-47), ii, 282, n. 1, 348; iii, 16, 38, 43, 94, 97-101, 117, 135, 151, 207,
88),
ii,
9, 60,
Frederick
13),
I,
king of Prussia (1701-
I,
elector of
Brandenburg
i,
(as
;
Frederick III, from 1688),

iii,
385
407.
Frederick (the Wise), titular Count Palatine of the Rhine and Duke of wars with Charles V, iii, 221-272, Bavaria, Elector Palatine (as Frederick II, 1544-56), iii, 13, 275, 286 f., 302 ff., 306 f., 314, 319 f ., 322 f ., 340. 303. Francis II, king of France (1559-60), Fregoso, Caesar, French agent, iii,
209, 276, 291, 300, 352, 360, 412, 445, 452, 525; iv, 12, 626, 632;
iv, 16,
257, 258, 272, 273.
269.
Francis,
Revolution, the, ii, 110. son of Henry II of France, 'De- Fresneda, Bernardo de, bishop of Cuenca (1562-71), confessor to fender of the Liberties of the Low C untries,' iv, 315 ff., 392, 490, Philip II, iv, 324. 492, 495, 502 f., 505, 506, 507 ff., Friedewald, treaty of (1552), iii, 372.
511, 607, 608, 617. (d. Dauphin 1536), France, iii, 242, 253, 264.
friars, iv, 54,
Duke of Alencon and Anjou, French
Francis
of
Friesland, 652.
Frisia,
iii,
iv,
296, 617, n., 618, 647,
15, 399, n. 4.
Franciscan
659
in the
ii,
Frobisher,
Sir
iv,
Martin,
English
Azores, 390; 186; in the
in the Canaries,
New
;
World, 231
;
f.,
in the 507, 663 iv, 198 Fronde, the, party in France (1648Philippines, 238, 239. 52), iv, 41. Franciscans, general of the, see Froude, James Anthony, on the Caltagirone. murder of Escovedo, iv, 326. Francis Phoebus (de Foix), king of Fruela II, king of Asturias (910-925) Navarre (1479-83), ii, 340. and of Leon (924-925), i, 62 f. Franconia, iii, 373. Frumento, Alessandro, papal nuncio, Frankfort, iii, 42, 44. iv, 361, 364. Franks, the, iv, 639.
;
234
iii,
530, 541, 556. Froissart, Jean, French chronicler, i, 123, 137.
seaman,
720
GENERAL INDEX
iii.
Frundsberg, George, imperial general,
245, 247.
Fuentes, Count of, see Enrfquez de Acevedo. Gallaecia, i, 11, n. 4, 12. Fuero de lae Leyes, Nee Fuero Real. Galleasses, iv, 135, 136, n. 4, 139, Fuero Juzgo, the, i, 206, 228, 237, 141, 143, 538,545. Gallego, Juan, iii, 333. 'Fuero of Aragon,' the, i, 436, Galleons, iii, 211, 631. 439. Galleons, the, convoyed fleet for Panama, iv, 209 ff., 558. Fuero Real, the, i, 239 f., 244, 245; ii, 125. galley of Don John Galleys, iii, 211
;
1532), Spanish chronicler, iii, 146; correo mayor of the Indies, iv, 453.
(d.
14.">,
Fueros, municipal, i, 38; of the Castilian cities, 184-189; of Aragon, 433, 435, 436, 438, 439, 441,
155,
of Austria, iv, 135,
...
2.
;
Gallican
<
641 church, the, iv, rallicans at the Council of Trent,

ii,
161,
172,
.".98;
473;
of
592, 594 ii. 3 of j
Huesca
572, 582i, 455, (1247), 432, 463;

iv.
59.
Cuenca,
Gallipoli, Neapolitan seaport,

tt.1.
294,
of Leon, ISO; of Sepulveda, ISO, 455, n. 3; of Sobrarbe, 403; of
Gallipoli, peninsula,
ff.,
i,
366, n. 2, 369
378.
iii,
Snria, 186, n. 3;
n.
3.
of Teruel, 455,
Gallo, island,
545
ff.
Gama, Vasco
tor
i,
da, Portuguese navigaii,
Fuero Yiejo, the, i, 1S4, 23S, n. 1. Fuero Vicjo de las Cabalgadas,

259.
and viceroy,
iv,
iii,
212, 268;
iii,
444; 567;
334, 335.
173,
Gambling,
l~9f., 460, 565,

ii,
Fuerteventura, Canarian island, i, 146, U9, 150, 152, 153, 157, 158;
ii,
iv, 52'.).
Gaming
Gandfa,
(
houses,
iii,
i,
240;
3, 149.
172.
Fugger Newa-Letters, quoted, iv, .'lis. Fuggers, Augsburg banking house,

iii,
110, 214. ranges, the, ii, 211.
Garay, Blasco de, naval inventor,

iii,
(
192. 195
iii,
f.,
630.
172
f.
(
212.
Fundi,
1
305.
i,
ui- "f Valencia, the,
Gachard, Louis Prosper, editor, iv, on the murder of Escovedo, Garcia, king of Leon (910-914), i, (12 f. 325 f. ii. Gaeta, i, 340, U9, 121 293, ::<><;. Garcia II, king of Navarre (92f>
;
Francisco de, eonqutUtador, 504. larav. Juan de, refounder of Buenos Aires, iv, 192 f., 194, 195, 196.
larav,
iii,
307;
i-.
iii,
250.
i.
970),
i,
till.
Eloman jurisconsult,
-.
i.
236.
Garcia IV. king of Navarre (1035i.
OaleoU
;f.
Is7.
27:,.
Galera,
Morisco
i.
Btronghold,
<
iv,
rarcfa V,
i,
king Of Navarre
(1
13
60),
276.
OaU
<
ras,
i
187.
iii.
>-.
Juan,
517.
1
.
ialicia,
137,
150,
i. 35, 37, 59, 7 72, 7:;. 7 I. ii. 192, 251. 259, 274; 51, 122, 156; in, W, 183, 212; iv,
i
Garcia de Castro, Lope, viceroy of Peru (1564 69), iv, 212. del Garcia Castillo, Fernando,
Spanish officer, ii, is:*. Garcia de Loaysa, Francisco, president of the 'ouncil of the Indies
<
icia,
audiencia
de
<
of,
ii.
[22;
iii,
(1524
16), in,
621
f.
L83: r llndei
157.
Garcia de Moguer, Diego, Spanish
!arvajal,
Lorenzo
explorer,
iii.
007.
GENERAL INDEX
721
Garcia de Paredes. Diego, Spanish 280, 281, 296, 299, 309, 330, 362, career and exsoldier, ii, 305; 365, 657; iv, 108, 351, 638. 210 f. ploits of, hi, Genoese, the, i, 347, 355, 358, 364, Garcia Fernandez, count of Castile, 367, 371, 383 f., 395 f., 404, 408, i, 68. 413, 414, 419 f., 423, 494, 505; Garcia Serrano, Miguel, archbishop Genoese naturalized ii, 57, 256; of Manila (1619-29), quoted, iv, in Genoese Spain, iv, 429; 235. bankers, 445. Gardiner, Stephen, English prelate, Georgetown, South Carolina, iii,
524. iii, 384. Garigliano, the, ii, 306 f. Georgia, iii, 529. Garrote, the, iv, 79, 569. assassin of Gerard, Balthazar, William of Orange, iv, 509. Gasca, Pedro de la, president of the audiencia of Lima, iii, 599-604, Gerba, island, i, 307, n. 1, 359 f., 654. 361, 403, 418; ii, 256, 258; iii, disaster at (1560), Gascons, in revolt against Henrv III, 294, 342 f. iv, 103-107, 109, 111, 114, 116. i, 101. Gascony, i, 17, 101, 102, 107; ii, Gereon, Saint, iv, 48. 271; iii, 98. Germaine, Queen, see Foix, Germaine de. Gattinara, Mercurio, chancellor of
;
the, of Valencia, iii, 53-57, 106-113, 127-131; iv, 83; n. 2. of the Balearics, iii, 109, 113-116. Caesar's characteri- Germans, among the La Plata Gaul, i, 12 zation of the Gauls, iv, 286, n. 2. colonists, iii, 608; in the Indies, 629 f. Gelderland, iii, 15, 399, n. 4; iv, German soldiers in the Spanish 296, 617, n., 618, 623, 647. service, iv, 135, 359, 495, 519; Gelmirez, Diego, archbishop of in the Portuguese service, 344 Compostela, i, 72, 192, 259. under Louis of Nassau, 303. Gembloux, battle of (1578), iv, 312 f., 493. Germanv, i, 12, 111 f., 303, 494; n. 66: iii, 46, 60, 97, 131, 143, Genealogical chart, transmitted by Bernardino de Mendoza to 152, 173, 195, 213, 222, 252, 333,
iii, 39, 51, 52, 119, 140, 141, 143, 153, 227, 236, 255, 259,
Charles V,
Germania,
Philip II, iv, 523. 352-375, 400 ff., 446, 599; iv, General Cortes, the, of the realms 53, 618 f., 623 f., 646; German of the crown of Aragon, i, 428, warriors at the capture of Toledo 483 f ii, 130 iii, 155, 156-160 (1085), i, 70; the Germanic element in Spanish law, 242 Geriv, 433 Fraga and Lerida (1460), mans as auxiliaries of the Pisans, i, 509, 514; Monzon (1563), iv. Monzon (1585), 357. 113, n.3,433ff. 433 ff., 570 ff., 595. Gerona, i, 289, 330, 331, 479; ii, General Privilege, the, in Aragon, i, 31 f. 434 ff., 439, 460, 462, 464, 466. Gertruydenberg, iv, 623, 652. GenerosGS, i. 492. Gesu, church at Rome, iv, 44.
.
Genetes,
i,
258.
Gevaudan,
i,
33, 279, 289.
Geneva, iv, 15, 474. Genoa, i, 77, 306, 313, 321, 354
;
Ghent, iii, 267; iv, 307, 492, 494, 510 f., 512, 514, 621. f., 358, 359, 371, 384, 396, 398, 410, Ghent, Pacification of (1576), iv, 413, 422, 423 f., 493 307, 309, 496. ii, 282, 332, 336; iii, 194, 205, 210, 228, 230, Ghibellines, i, 111; Aragon and 248, 249 f., 260, 262, 263, 266, Ghibellinism, 345 f
.
722
Ghirlandajn,
painter,
(
(5KXERAL INDEX
Domenico,
lti'2.
Italian
G6mez de
437, n.
2,
Espinosa,
111
(".,
Gonzalo,
f.
iii,
ii,
443
rianibelli,
rederigo, Italian military

iv,
Gomes
513, 5 16. Giannone, Pietro, Neapolitan torian, i, 520, 524, 525. iiants, Patagonian, iii, 430.
engineer,
his-
da Silva, Ruy, Spanish minister, iv, 12, 10, 37, 262, 323 f., 340, 413, 490, 52S.
Gondomar, Count
ii,
Gibraltar,
i.
28.
iv,
L27,
129,
131;
of, see SarmientO de Aeuna. Gontaut de Biron, Charles de, mar(
112,278; corsair raid <>n (1540), iii, 330 f. Gibraltar, Strait of, iv, 334, 341;
62;
iii.:;
17.
nut a serious harrier, iii, 357. Gilolo, iii. 452. ringer, iv, 277, 385.
(
i,
f.,
16.
shal of France, iv, 658. ronzaga, Ferrante, viceroy of Sicily (1535-46), count of Guastalla (as Ferrante I, 1539-57). governor of
riengen.
Giotto, 266.
(
followers of, in
Castile,
i,
Milan (1546-55), iii, 271, 275, 277, 278, 280, 283 f.. 321 323 ff., 328, 333, 336, 337, 361, 362; iv, 309. Gonzaga, Julia, iii, 305.
Gonzaga,
n. 1.
iir6n,
Francisco,
conquistador,
iii,
Ottavio,
iv,
309,
312,
603.
'.iron,
Louis de Pedro, II, grand master of Gonzague (Gonzaga), Duke of Nevere, Calatrava (1445-66), ii, 12, 15, (d. 1595),
38.
ambassador
Pedro
de,
general of the Comuneros (1520), iii, 70, si tT. Glajon, Philippe de Stavele, Seigneur de, councillur of state in the Netherlands, iv, 251. Glapion, Jean, confessor of Charles V. iii. 123, n. 5.
Giron,
Pome,
(
iv,
of 642.
Henry
.
IV
at
Sonzalez, Beatrice, b
iv,
369.
Gonzalez, Tomas, Spanish scholar,

lis.
Gonzales Davila, Gil, Spanish explorer, iii, 507 f., 520 IT. Gonzalez de Berruguete, Alonso, Spanish architect, iii, 217. ilassware, iv, 130. Goa, iv, 334, 335, 336, 338, 381, 383. Gonzalez de Clavijo, Ruy, Spanish Martin de, Spanish comambassador to Tamerlane, i, HiOSoiu,
I I
mander
230, 231.
in
the
Philippines,
iv,
L64.
Gonzalo, ruler of Sobrarbe and Gold and silver drawn from the Ribagorza, i, 27"). lOrcum, iv, 571 Indies, iii, 636f.; iv, 207 ff. Francisco Golden Fleece, order <>f the, iii, Gordillo, de, Spanish 11, 394; iv. 358, explorer, iii, 524.
(
.
Gold* n lliml, the, iv, 536. Golfo Dulce, iii, 507.

<
torgona, island,
iii.
5 17.
<
rOlisanO,
iii,
<
OUnl
Of,
head
in
of
the
(
provisional government
Bicily,
( lothia, Visigothic proi Ince in taul, i, 29. lothic models, in ( 'astilian sculp-
24
f.
<
ture and architecture,
i.
_'o7.
;
'
oara, see Lopez de 16mara, Sanarian island, i, romera,

<
Gotha, the,
<
I
iii.
<
32,
171.
204
iv,
15.
19,
lottignies,
iv, 511, lourgues,
lilies
de, Belgian cai
162,
I
158; ii, 17-'. 17'.', 185, 190 stevan, mutineer, iii, 431
I
n. 2.
1
(
.
tominique
f..
de,
French
de.
f.
patriot, iv, 177
266.
nez.
Violante
of
(the
.if
(
Pelican),
JratO,
iv.
Gouvenol (Gorrevod), Laurent
mother
Antonio
begine licensed exportation 01 negro slave- to America, iii, 657.
GENERAL INDEX
Gower, Robert, English poet, i, 268. Gozzo, i, 8 iii, 295, 343 iv, 104. Venetian Gradenigo, Vincenzo, ambassador to Spain (1583-86),
; ;
723
iv, 12, 130, 245,
quoted,
iv,
517.
de,
ii,
144, n. 3, 371, 382, 396; 252 f., 258, 330 ff., 350-356, 358, 360, 363 f., 398, 412, 453, 472, 490, 503 f., 677; death of (1586), 520 f.
tile, iii,
Gramont, Roger
Granada,
sador at Rome,
301.
;
French ambas- Granvelle, Nicolas Perrenot, seigneur de, chief minister of Charles
V, iii, 141, 264, 277, n. 3. Granvelle palace, at Besancon,
44.
iv, 303, 618. Gravelines, iv, 532; naval battle of (1588), 547 f., 551, 622. iv,
city, i, 24, 83 ii, 62, 63, 65, 69-72, 92, 122, 348; iii, 44, 70, 72, n., 138, 244, 451, 577;
iv, 410, n. 1,
484; siege
and cap- Grave,
Gravesend, i, 136. Graves of Zenu, iii, 584. Great Britain, iv, 273. Granada, kingdom, i, 24, 76, 84, 94, Great Captain, see Cordova. 96. 100, 107-110, 115, 118, 122, Greater Antilles, the, iv, 209. 125-132, 199, 254, 262, 281, 299- Great Khan, the, ii, 197, n. 1, 198. Great Schism, the, i, 154, n. 1, 176, 302, 383, 438; ii, 7, 93, n. 2, 241 401. iv, 597; the Granadan war and the conquest, ii, 62-77, 84, 92, Greece, i, 363 ff., 367, 372-382, 400;
;
ture of (1490-92), i, 53, 54, 258; ii, 68, 72-74, 80, 134, 171, 194, persecution of 240, 243, 346; the Moors at, 95, 96 proeuradores of, iii, 124 iv, 439, 444, 446.
;
103, 129, n. 4, 132, 153, 155, 156, 157, 158, 174, 181, 242, 273, 274, 282, 283; iii, 649; iv, 83, 398; revolt of the Moriscos in (1568.
iv,
430.
the,
i,
Greek church,
377.
;
Greeks, in Spain, i, 7, 8 driven from western Sicily, 8 Greek slaves in

;
71), 83-99, 127, 130, 450; silk Barcelona, 480. industry of, iii, 205 f iv, 452. Gregorian calendar, 524 n. 2. Granada, Chancillerfa of, iv, 456 f.
;
the,
iv,
34,
Granada, treaty of (1500),

328.
ii,
300
f.,
Gregory' VII,
346.
Pope
(1073-85),
i,
Granada, West Indian island,

208.
ii,
Granada, Fray Luis de, iv, 484. Grand Canary, i, 149, 150, 152, 156,
176, 177 ff., 180, 181, 183, 184, 185, 186, 190. Grand Canon of the Colorado, the, iii, 517. Grand Chamberlain, the, in Naples,
Gregory IX, Pope (1227-41), i, 82, 287 294. Gregorv X, Pope (1271-76), i, 112,
113/
Gregory XII,
15),
i,
158,
ii,
172, 173
f.,
Roman Pope
(1406-
407.
Gregorv XIII (Ugo Buoncompagni),

iv, 53, 59, 61-64, 147, 149, 154, 241, n., 331, 349 f., 352, 357, 364, 500, 516, 655.
Pope (1572-85),
i,
Grandes, i, 168 ff Gregory XIV (Nicolo Sfondrati), Grand masterships of the military Pope (1590-91), iv, 626, n. 1. Sir orders, annexed to the Castilian Grenville, Richard, English
.
522;
ii,
310.
crown,
i,
255
ii,
106
ff .
seaman,
iv,
556.
Gresham, Sir Thomas, English Granvelle, family of, iv, 247. Granvelle, Antoine Perrenot, seifinancier, iii, 395. gneur de, bishop of Arras, cardinal Greujes, i, 462. (1561-86), chancellor of Charles Grey, Lady Jane, iii, 376, 377. V, viceroy of Naples (1571-75), Grey, Thomas, second Marquis of Dorset, English general, ii, 345. president of the Council of Cas-
724
<
G KXKRAL
' (
INDEX
ruianas, the, ii, 211. Guicciardini, Francesco, Italian historian, iii, 8, 205.
rricio,
raspard de, b retary for the affairs of tin- Indies, ii. 227.
Grijalba, Juan <i<\ Spanish diaooverer, iii. L62 ff. Marco, papal admiral, irimani,
I
iii,:
7.
iii.
ii.
Groningen,
d.,
399, n. 4;
1
iv,
617,
484.
515.
652, 653. Grotius, Hup', hitch jurist, ( Irunendal, iv, L3, note 1.
iv,
ii, 343, 345; iii, 230; 260, 267. ( hike of, sec Berry. ruienne, Guinea, ii. 173, 196, 200, 201; 373. Guiniguada, battles at (147m,
Guienne,
iv,
iv,
ii,
174.
iii,
(
Guadalajara, Guadalajara,
encia
of, iv,
in
New
Spain,
in
New Spam,
audi-
ruipuzcoa, i, 193, iii, 106; iv, 227.
n,
ii,
344;
L90, n. 2.
Guadalajara, in Spain, iv, 409. Gaudalaviar, the, i. 295. Guadalcanal, silver mine in
Sierra
the
;
Morena,
ii,
225, n.
iv,
206.
Guise, Duke of, see Lorraii Guises, the, iv. 16, 256, 258, 270, 388, 512, 007, 60S- til 5. 025. Guisnes, iv, 057. Guitar, the iv, 30,486. Gulf of Darien, the, ii, 214.
(
Gulf of Guinea, the, ii, 212. iulf of Maracaibo, the, ii, 21 1. Gulf of Palmas, the, i, 357. Guadalupe, monastery, iv, 342, Gulf of Iral.a. the, ii, 214. Gulf Stream, the, i. 37. 356, 358. luadarramas, the, i. 64. Guns, iii. 299. ma tufactured in runpowder, Guadiana, the, i. 24, 36, 102, KM. 10. Mexico, iii, 499, d. 3. 105. 107. 120: iii. 459; iv. Guadix, i. L09, 110; ii. 70, 72; iii, rurrea, Miguel de, Aragonese aoble, 607. iii. U4ff. Gurrea y Aragon, Fernando de, Guam, iii. 432. see Duko of Villahermosa, iv, 570 ff., Theneeor Guanartonio, the,
Guadalquivir, the, i. 5, n. 1, 36, 81, iii. 138, 125, 610, 624, 83, 84; 62S; iv. 10. 560.
1
Senii<lan.
(
590, 592, 593.
blanches, primitive inhabitants of tin112 158; ii. Canaries, i.

17:;
P. io.
;
Gurrea
( (
Aragon,
I.
Francisco
de,
Jounl of
ruarani [ndians, iii. 609 i. iv, 198. Guatemala, iii. 454, I7n. 505, 519, 570, 660 !'.. 662. Guatemala, audiencis of, iii. 641,
(
iurrea y of Ribagorza. iv, 569
570. n. 2. 005. lrag6n, John <le, ( 'mint

iv,
f.
una.
tavus
II
Sweden
209.
(Adolphus), king (1011-32). ii. 155;
of
iii,
till:
<
iv,
190, n. 2.
iii,
Gvzmdn,
501
f.,
ii.
ruatemoc, Aztec emperor,

508, 507. luayaquil,
-
Guzman, noble
is.
<
208, n. 2. Andalusiai) family, 62, n. 2; iii, 70.

iii.
'
<
iulf
of,
iii,
547,
554,
ruzman, Eleanor de, i. 121. Guzman, Enrique de, second Duke

of
i,
'/,
iv, 181 f. iv, 182.

r, iv,
Medina Sidonia,
ii,
L93.
Guzman, Enrique
497.
at
de, Becond
f
.
Count
of Olivares, Spanish
K(,nie, iv. oi
ambassador
522, 524,
Guesclin, Bertrand du, French cominder, i. 135 iv, ft

;
;:ti|.
641.
,,
f
Begg
I
Guzman,
.r.
iii.
iU<
i.
>
<
17
I.
D. 2.
Minor
<
if
Tello Francisco de, the Philippines (1596n. 2.
Guiana,
iii.
14,
GENERAL INDEX
725
Guzman, Gaspar de, third Count Harun al-Rashid, caliph of Bagdad of Olivares, Duke of San Lucar, (786-809), i, 19. minister of Philip IV of Spain, Harvard Universitj', iii, 664.
iv,
377.
Hasdai, Jewish physician of Cor-
dent of the first audiencia of New 67), iv, 109 f., 115. Spain (1527-29), iii, 511, 515, Hassan, Omayyad caliph, i, 18. Hassan Aga, commander at Algiers, 516, n. 2, 528. Guzman de Silva, Diego, Spanish iii, 335-339. ambassador to England, iv, Hassan Corso, Turkish commander, 274 ff., 279, 290. iii, 345.
Gypsies,
iii,
Guzmdn, Juan de, third Duke of dova, i, 67. Medina Sidonia, ii, 241. Hassan II (Barbarossa), pasha of Guzman, Nuno or Nunez de, presiAlgiers (1544-51, 1557-61, 1562-
179.
Hastings,
i,
136.
Havana,
Haarlem,
iv,
iii,
633;
iv, 164, 166,
169,
299.
210, 557.
Habilitacidn, i, 460, 482. Habilitadores, i, 508.
Hawkins, iv, 277

;
Sir John, English

f.,
seaman,
Hacienda, 437 f.
i,
252
f.
ii,
225
iv,
207,
Hadrian,
138),
i,
Roman emperor
10;
iii,
(117-
50.
;
290, 391, 530, 541, 543, 544, 556, 557. Hawkins, Sir Richard, English seaman, iv, 179, 557. Hawkins, William, makes a voyage
f.,
279
Hafsides, iii, 305 f iv, 126, 150, 152. Hainault, iv, 493, 509.
Haiti,
ii,
Hebrews,
to Brazil, iv, 388, n. 4. see Jews.

iii,
198.
Hakam
Heidelberg,
365.
II,
caliph of
976), i, 67. Hallucinations, iv, 81. Ham, iv, 11, 654, 657. Hamilcar Barca, Carthaginian general,
i,
Cordova (961- Hennebont, iv, 632. Henry VII, Holy Roman emperor
(1308-13),
i,
356.
i,
Henry
80.
I,
king of Castile (1214-17),
8.
iii,
Henrv
II (of
Trastamara), king of
i,
Hannibal, Carthaginian general,

601, n.
1.
Castile
and Leon (1369-79),
Hannibal, illegitimate son of Gadifer de La Salle, i, 151.
96, 98, 118, 122, 130, 135, 136, 138, 170, 213, 230, 255, 393. Henry III (the Invalid), king of
Hans
of Cologne,
i,
German
architect
Castile
i,
and Leon
97,
(1390-1406),
206,
;
in Spain,
267.
96,
;
130,
;
138,
252,
Hanseatic ships, iv, 555. Hapsburg dynasty, the, in Austria, ii, 273, 274, 278, 288, 289; in
Spain, i, 38, 54, 111, 142, 182, 201, 218, 264, 308; ii, 120, 124, n. 4, 136, 150, 221, 313; iv, 54, 250, 263, 271, 273, 318, 331 f., mar350, 401, 412, 427, 673 f. riage alliances with the house of
;
6 his coniv, 523 nection with the conquest and colonization of the Canaries, i, 142, 146 f., 151 f., 153, 154, n. 1 sends missions to Tamerlane, 158ii,
;
405
164.
Henry IV
Castile
Trastamara, ii, 60 f., 278, 279, 288 f ., 295, 319-338, 349. Haro, noble Castilian family, i, 212. Haro, Count of, royalist commander, iii, 84, 89.
(the Impotent), king of (1454-74), i, 97, 131, 138, 157, 164, 194, 197, 199, 201, 210, 214, 215 f., 222, 255, 257; ii, 3, 4, 6, 7-18, 29, 30, 32, 33, 35, 38, 39, 46, 47, 48 f ., 50, 62, 82, 99, 111, 127, 135, 141,
and Leon
145
iii,
196
iv, 37.
726
GENERAL INDEX
Henry II (of Luaignan), king of Henry (the Navigator), Prince, son of John I of Portugal, i, 124, 155, 361. Cyprus (1285 1324), 156; ii, 192; iv, 334. Henry II. king of England (1154i,
i.
101.
Heredia, Diego de, Aragonese noble,

f.,
Henry
Henry
6]
i,
III,
king of England (1216

189.
72), L 101
\
i.
iv, 568, 582, n. 2, 588, 589 f. Heredia, Pedro de, conquistador,
iii,
I.
king of England (1422-
~>M.
II.
Heresy, i, 29. 246, 328; death by heretics fire the penalty, 246; hilled alive, 246; strangled, iii, 179; iv, 79; Bergenroth's theory 288, 295, 318 f., 321 f., 334, n. 1, concerning Joan.'i the Mad, ii, 343; iv, 276. 326, n. 3; Julius 11 ac< uses the [enry VIII, king of England (1509Navarrese of heresy, 345. See 17), Li, 88, 321, 322, 343, 348;
L38f., 417.
ory VII, king of England (14851509), ii, 42, 78, 142, 274-278,
1G, 26, 37, 79, 98, 119, n. 2, 136, 156, 200, 213, 223, 226, 228, 232, 237, n. 1, 238 f., 242, 243,
iii,
Albigenses.
Hermandad
192
f.
;
de
147.
las
Maristnas,
i,
ii,
245, 247, 251 ff., 254, 256, 269 f., 271, 284, 376, 380, 381, 383, 388, 389: iv. 276.
Hermajidades, brotherhoods of the Castilian municipalities, i, 191194,
463, 485;
of
ii,
Henry
iii,
II.
king of France (1547-59),
Hermandad
the 48, 99; 1465-67, 99 f.

;
'242, 253, 258, 262,

f.,
369
10,
264 f., 272, 372, 374, 379; iv, 6 ff.,

15
f.,
the reorganized Hermandad under the Catholic Kings, 67, 100-104,

105, 115, 118, 121, 137, 155, 177,
194,
n.
13
f.,
273,
608,
624,
627, 638.
und<
the
Kniperor,
Henry
89)*,
III,
king of France (1574-
iii,
18, 179.
iv, 65, 263, 289, 302, 305, 315, 360, 364, 392, 395, 396, 511 f., 513, 196 ff., 508, 507, assassination of, ''"s-616, 632; 556, i.iii, (121, 625, 628.
Hernandez de Cordoba, Francisco (d. 1518), Spanish commander,

iii,
462, 521, n.
d(
2.
Hernandez
lieutenant
iii,
Cordoba, Francisco,
of
Pedrarias
Davila,
Henry
Hi 10
III,
1
IV,
king of France
of
(1589
521.
<le
and
Navarre
iii,
(as
Henry
103; iv, 65, 183, 512, 558, 566, 587, 600, 602, 608-616, 62.5-630, 635-647, 654, 655, 656, 657 f., 659 It. Henry, king of Portugal (1578-80),
1572-1610),
Hernandez Marquis
:,t
of
iii,
Oran,
I
Cordova, Diego, Comares, commander 292f 344.

.
archbishop (1545 80),

I
of
iv,
Lisbon,
cardinal
345 355, 372, 398.
l">i, third miii of FerdiHenry (d. nand of Aragon, ii, 10, n. 3. Henry of Aragon (Prince of Forl I
>iego de. claimant to the Herrera, Canaries, i, 156, 157; ii, 176; Becured in the possession of Lanzarote, Fuerteventura. Ferro. and 172 adminii. lomera, i. 158 i-t ration of these islands by the
'
;
family of Herrera, 172, 175, is

185.
1,
tune), Duke of Segorbe, son of the preceding, ii, 18. [enry of Burgundy, count of Portugal (1090 1114), i, 70-73. Henry of Lancaster, great-grandson of Henry III of England, i, 129.
I
Herrera, Fernando de, Spanish

iv,
I
pi
484
11.
f.
[errera,
iv,
Juan
185
f.
<lc,
Spanish architect,
Herrera y Tordesillaa, Antonio de, Spanish historian, ii, 150, 220;

iii,
Hei
190,
'
191, 210,
unt of Nassau, -"-'l. 26
iii.
13,
138,
iv,
160,
453,
,
620,
627;
quoted,
561
GENERAL INDEX
Hesdin,
iii,
727
384.
Holy League, the (1511-13),
Hidalgos, i, 169, 171. Hidalguia, iv, 457. Hieroglyphics, Mayan,
iii,
468.
ii, 258, 339, 342, 345, 348. Holv League of Cognac (1526), iii, 243-249, 283.
Hieronymite monks,
Hierro, see Ferro.
iv, 44, 48.
Holv League
of
1538, against the
the, in Naples, i, 522; ii, 310. Higueruela, battle of (1431), ii, 62,
High Steward,
Turk, iii, 322-332. Holy League, proposed, between France and Spain (1565), iv,
263.
n. 1.
Hildebrand, see Gregory VII. Hippolita (d. 1488), daughter of Francesco Sforza, duke of Milan, wife of Alfonso II of Naples, ii,
287.
Holy League, the (Spain, Venice, and the Pope), iv, 123-149. Holy League, the, in France (157696), iv, 65, 270, 585, 600, 609-615,
625-645.
Holy Roman Empire,

i,
the,
i,
90,
Hispania, diocese,
12.
111
f.,
;
320 Hispania Citerior, i, 11, 28, 38. Hispania Nova Citerior, i, 11. 254, 281, 283, 314, 618, 635, 645. Hispania Tingitana, i, 12, n. 4. Holy Sepulchre, the, James I of Aragon plans the recovery of, i, Hispania Transfretana, i, 12, n. 4. Alfonso III promises to 316 f. Hispania Ulterior, i, 11, 28, 38. attempt its recovery, 341. Hispania Ulterior Baetica, i, 11, n. 3. Hispaniae Consolatio, iii, vii, 57-61, Hombres buenos, i, 212 ff., 217.
;
518; ii, 152, 261,262, 291, iv, 126, 132, iii, passim
65, 118.
Hispanicization, of Charles V, iii, 259, 400, 630; of the Spanish monarchy, iv, 3 ; of the government of the Low Countries, iii,
Hombres de paratge, i, 492. Homer, iii, 605. Homines de redemptione, i, 478.
Homonbon,
iii,
433.
372;
iv,
251
f.,
280-286,
400. Hispaniola, iv, 166. Historia Apologetica, of Las Casas, iii, 659.
of Italy,
iii,
Honduras, ii, 210, 212', 213, 214; 520 ff. 332; iii, 506 f., 509, 519, Honduras, Bay of, iii, 507. Honeine, iii, 298.
Honore"
81),
I,
iii,
prince of 262.
28.
Monaco (1523(395-
Historiography,
iv,
iii,
174
f.,
216
at
;
f.
Honorius,
423),
i,
Roman emperor
482
,
f.
Histor^
instruction
in,
the
Honorius
new 161 court, ii, fashions in historical composition, 162.

Spanish
Hoces
iii,
(or
Hozes),
1.
Francisco
of,
i,
de,
449, n.
IV, Pope (1285-87), i, 337, 338, 339. Hoorn, Philip II, Count of, Netherlandish noble, iv, 281 f. iv, 182, 433; Horses, iii, 203 f. export of, to France, 83, 582, n. 2
; ;
Hohenstaufen, house
91, 111,
horse of Lake Peten, see Sacred

horse. Hospitallers, the, see Knights of St. John of Jerusalem. House of Lords, tapestries in, iv, 537.
319, 320, 334, 346, 511, 512, 517, 522, 524; ii, 308; iii, 41; iv, 468. Holland, iii, 151 iv, 294, 296, 304, 306, 311, 316, 383, 505, 513, 526, 571, 616, 623, 647, 648, 652, 661 modern, 246.
;
Houtman,
Cornells, gator, iv, 384.
Dutch
naviof
iv,
Holland Fortress, the,

Holofernes,
iv, 40.
iv,
616, n. 4.
Howard, Charles, Lord Howard

Effingham, English admiral,
728
530, 532, 534, n,
I,
(JKNERAL INDEX
536-546, 550,
L572),
559
f.
Howard, Thomas
of Norfolk,
ft".
(d.
Duke
iv.
293.
Hnz, Pedro Sancho de, conquistador, iii. 590 Buancavelica, iv, 214. Huarina, battle of (1547), iii, 601. Huasear, Inea chief, iii, 549 f., 558, 562 f., 564, 566. Huayna Capac, Inca ruler, iii, 549.
Huesca, university
of,
i,
Prince of Melito, Duke Franca villa, president of the Council of Italy, iv, 323, 420, n. de Burtado Mendoza, Diego (d. 1575), Spanish statesman and author, iii, 216, n. 2, 284 f., 331, n. 4, 361, 650; iv, 323, n. 2. Burtado de Mendoza, Garcia, governor of Chile, viceroy of Peru (1590-96), iii, 605; iv, 180,
(d. 1578),
of
213.
Huco
36),
Ill,
i,
Judge
of
Burtado de Mendoza, Luis, second Arborea (1321Marquis of Moiulejar, president

265, n. 4.
of
iv,
355, 357, 358, 396. Huguenots, French Protestants,
the
Council
of
52,
the
Indies
f.,
83, 253, 259 f., 265, 270, 283, 289, 296 f., 315, 357, 391, 497, 527, 607, 610, 660 in the Netherlands, 512; colony of, in Brazil, in Florida, 166-178, 163, 387 f. 265, 267, 268, 278, 396.
; ;
(1546-59), iii, iv, 202, 417.

for other
622
set
650;
Burtado de Mendoza,
Mendoza
the same
re-
members
of
family.
Hutten, Ulrich von, German former and humanist, iii, 58.
Huitzilopochtli, Aztec war god, i, 54; iii, 469, n. 1, 501, 504, 551. Hulst, iv, 658.
Huygen Dutch
van Linschoten, navigator, iv, 383.

.
Jan.
Human
(
sacrifices,
iii,
463,
f.,
501
Aztec, 469, 476, 478 Peruvian, 551 f.

;
485, 4S8; among the
'hibchas,
iii,
5.S1
Humunu,
285.
433.
of the, iv,
the,
;
Hundredth penny, levy
Ibarra, Diego d< Spanish diplomat, iv, 634, 643, n. 3,644, 645. Ibarra, Francisco de, conquistador, iv. 161. Iberian Peninsula, the, geography and ethnography of, i, 3, 4-7, 34
41.
Hundred Years' War,

;
i,
132,
Iberians,
i,
5, 6,
ii, 271 iv, 12. 133, 260, 261 Hungary, i, 430, 519; iii, 131, L62, 260, 290, 301. 301. 334, 355. 3f.x. 397, n. 5, 650: iv. 123.
Ibn al-Ahmar, king of Granada (123S ;.: i.24,83fT., 107 ff., 220,
2d7. Ibn Turnart, founder of the Almohades, i, 23. Ibrahim, founder of the Aghlabite
Hunting, i, 137, 401; iii, 189; 21, 429; love of Charles V

iii,
iv,
for,
11.
Burtado de Marquis of
213.
Mendoza,
Cafiete, Peru (1556 61), iii. 6o:;
Andres, viceroy of
:
dynasty, i. 1'.*. Ibrahim, Turkish grand 303 It.. 321.

[conoclasm,
iss, 5(13.
iii,
vizier,
iii,
iv,"
ISO,
134
IT.,
476,
180,
Burtado
(d.
lo. iii,
de
Mendoza,
Diego
I
Iconoclasts,
hliaqur/..
57(i.
iv,
251.
1531),
third
Duke
of
nt.ui-
72, n.. 2 18.
Juan de, Spanish diplomat and minister, iv, 351, 518,
Burtado
;
de
<
.
Mendoza.
iii,
Diego
f.,
336
kronl of Melito. vice-
[drisites,
Mohammedan dynasty
ii,
in
roy of Valencia, L06 112; iv, 323,.
56
70,
>;
D. 2.
1
Morocco, i, lit f. Iliu. town in Africa,

Ifrikla,
i,
189, n. 2.
Burtado
de
Mendoza,
17,
19, 20.
GENERAL INDEX
Iglesia de la Seu, at Saragossa, iv, 584.
729
519
;
Drake
207
.
in,
revenues from,
ff.,
558.
town in Sardinia, i, 355, 357, 383. Illana Bay, iv, 236. Illegitimate birth, how regarded, in mediaeval Castile, i, 175, n. 3 in the Italy of the Quattrocento, 562, n. 1 at the court of Louis XIV,
Iglesias,
; ;
Industry, under Charles V, iii, 204 ff under Philip II, iv, 451 f Infantado, Infantazgo, Duke of, see
; .
Hurtado de Mendoza.
'
Infante,' contrasted with 'Principe,'

iii,
5, n. 1.
Infanzones,
i,
175, n. 3. Illora, ii, 69.
in mediaeval Castile, in Aragon, 453, 454. Infernal machines, iv, 513.
169
Illuminati, iv, 80 f "II n'y a plus de Pyrenees," Iloilo, iv, 236.

. .
Ingolstadt,
i,
iii,
355
ff.
27.
Ingratitude of kings, the,

650.
iv,
219,
Inhuman punishments, iii, 179. Imaginative prose, iv. 484 f See Burning, Torture. Immigration, to the Canaries, ii, 190 to the New World, iii, 619, Ink and sand, story of the, iv, 24 f. 629 f ., 666. Innocent II, Pope (1130-43), i, 90. Immorality, of Castilian clerics, i, Innocent III, Pope (1198-1216), i, 175, n. 3 checked, under the 78, 285, 292, 346. Catholic Kings, ii, 154. Innocent IV, Pope (1243-54), i, 103, 287. Imperial, Francisco, Italianate CasInnocent VIII, Pope (1484-92), ii, tilian, i, 267. 71. Imperial title, the, in mediaeval Innovations, gratuitous, avoided by Castile, i, 89 ff the Catholic Kings, ii, 100 f. Incas, the, i, 54.
;
Incas, empire of 548-569, 664.
the,
iii,
135, 258,
bull,
iv,
Innsbruck,
iii,
373.
;
In coena Domini, papal

60 f., 471. Index Librorum 54 f.
Inquisition, papal, ii, 87 iv, 54 in Aragon, i, 457 at Milan, iv, in Naples, ii, 314, 315. 475, n. 1
; ;
;
Prohibitorum,
iv,
India, i, 75; ii, 202, 212, 268; iii, 420, 452, 631, n. 2; Portuguese
conquests in, undt. Philip
iv,
334-337, 338
II,
380-384;
;
com;
merce
336.
of,
373, 383
the,
fleets of, 375.

iii,
Indian Ocean,
Indians,
ii,
442
iv,
Inquisition, Spanish, ii, 83, 87-97, 144, 152, 153 iv, 58, 78-83, 84, 85, 86, 96, 260, 278 f., 290, 432, in Sicily, ii, 163, 164 434, 480 f in Sardinia, ii, iii, 23 iv, 169 163, 164; in the Canaries, 187, 190 in the Netherlands, iii, 367 in Valencia, 128 ff. extended to
;
.
205, 206 f., 208 f., 211, 213, 214, 215, 219, 226, 229, 230-235; iii, 20, 206,
197,
198,
the New World, iii, 655 iv, 202, 203, 217 f. unsuccessful attempts to introduce it into Naples, ii, 314 f.; iii, 362; iv, 82; and into
;
460-669; 224 f.
iv,
180-184, 198, 215
f.,
Indies, the, i, 9, 40, 54, 76, 315, n. 2; 132, 139, 152, 153, 192-239, ii, 253, 259, 283; iii, 45, 105, 139, 140, 142, 168, 189, 192, 195, 206, 207, 212, 216, 285, 419-669; iv, 161-244, 562, 664 emigration to, 450 postal service in, 453
; ;
Milan, 82, 475, n. 1. Inquisitor General, the, ii, 90. Insaculacidn, i, 222, 468, 482;
143.
ii,
Instability, patterns of, iv, 40. Institutions, the, of Aragon, i, 428471 ii, 80, 81, 83, 84, 85, 89, 90, 96, 116, 117 f., 124 f., 130, 138; of the Catalan duchy of Athens,
;
730
i,
liKNERAL INDEX
376
ff.;
of the
ii.
198 505;
ries,
143
f.:
i. Ireland, i, 101, n. 3; iii, 387, n. 2; 153, 158; Castile i. 107-270; ii, 78-143, iv, 501, 549, 550 f., 552, 561, 563, of Catalonia, i, 600. 144-162, 167 f. 42X, 420, 130, 175-498; ii, 80, 85, Iria, i, 59, 259. 116, 130, 138, 143 f., 161; of the Iria Flavia, see Iria. of Iron ore, iii, 206 Indies, 117, 118, 219-236; iv, 428.
;
Balearics, 428, of the Canaii, 184-191; of
Ionian Sea,
Irala, see
iii, 299, 329 iv, 136. Martinez de Irala.

;
Naples, i, 429, 7,20-526; ii, 309- Irrigation, iii, 173, 548, 552. 315: of Navarre, 19, 347; of Iruracbat, i, 193, n. 1. Sardinia, i, 355, 429, 505-510; Isabella I (the Catholic), queen of of Sicily, i, 429, 510Castile (1474-1504), i, 3, 38, 55, 163 ff. ii, . 520; ii, 61, 84, 89, 91, 97. 98, 115, 119, L63-166; of Valencia, i, 428, 429, 436, 444, 446 f., 124, 129, 132, 139, 142, 157, 164, 471-475 ii, SO, 85, 116, 130. See 168, 177, 178, 194, 201, 211, 217, Constitutional affairs. 218, 221, 222, 228, 231, 235, 217., Insulae Fortunatae, i, 142. 249, 250, 255, 258, 261, 263, 264, Intellectual life, of Castile in the 265, 266, 268, 307, 308, 319, 406, later Middle Ages, i, 265-268; 449, 450, 451, 457, 468, 475, 485, of Sicily, of Majorca, 504 1'.; 498, 503, 504, 506, 509 iii, 35, 7 of Naples, under Alfonso 519 f. 124, 129, 137, 138, 142, 143, Ml, the Magnanimous, 525; of Spain, 161, n., 173, 183, 185, 189, 192, under the Catholic Kings, ii, 161 193, 203, 205, 257, 446, 618, 623, f the Coniplutensian Polyglot iv, 626, 628, 630, 633, 637, 665
;
of 155; Spain, Charles V, iii, 213-218;

Bible,
under under
of
.
27, 83, 94, 98, 224, 240, 333, 398,
Philip
II,
iv,
481^87;
.
the
401, 412, 421, 45 456, 567, 579, 594, 672, 673, 674, 677, 679;
.
Indies, iii, 663 f iv, 224 f Inter caetera, papal bulls (1493), 201 f. ii, iii, 467, 525; iv, 265, 399.
; ;
Intercepted letters,
iv,
644
f.
Interdicts, i, 78, 114, 328, 332, 347, 402. Interest, rate of, iii, 194, 195; iv, 429, 438, 447. Interim, the, iii, 359, 369, 370. Internationalism, iii, 60.
of with Ferdinand marriage character of, Aragon, ii, 3-41 42 f attains with Ferdinand the sovereigntv of Castile, 46-61 their joint rule, 62-210, 219-224, 240-242, 261-325; her attitude toward the enterprise of Colum;
.
bus, 195.
Isabella,
daughter of James
Philip
Aragon,
Isabella,
wife of France, i, 289.
III
of of of
International law, iv, 79, 483 f. [nteroceanic canal, schemes tor, 505. Interoceanic strait, hypothetical, 606 f. 504 f.. 514 '., 524
I'.',
daughter of Philip
i,
iii,
Prance,
Isabella,
133.
iii,
daughter of James II of Majorca, wife of John Palaeologus, marquis of Montferrat, i,
Intestacy, provisions concerning,

239,
n. 2, 17s. 17s. i.
i,
393.
Isabella,
1
Portugal,
;
Intolerance, inculcation of, by the 'hurch, i, 88, 199 spirit of. not always characteristic of the Span-
daughter of Prince John of wife of John II of Mir, i, 124; ii, 6 f., 8 f iv,
.
333.
Isabella,
1
daughter of
270;
iii,
Emmanuel
124, 136
of
201 f. policy of, under the Catholic Kings, ii, S<^ '.(7.
iard,
88
f.,
'
irtugal, wife of
ii,
Emperor Charles
f.,
ff.,
V,
93
GENERAL INDEX
160, 175, 189, 239, 413, 450, 454, 554, 649 iv, 323, 333, 346. Isabella (d. 1498), daughter of Ferdinand and Isabella of Spain, wife (1) of Prince Affonso of Portugal, (2) of King Emmanuel of Portugal, ii, 54, 61, 82, n. 2,
;
731
;
;
Italian 266, 267 f ., 274 f. ii, 161 merchants at Barcelona, i, 494
Italians in the Canaries,
ii,
190.
See
Florence,
Pisa,
Genoa,
Milan,
Naples,
Romans,
Rome,
93, 264,
265
333.
f.,
267
f.,
270, n.
1,
319;
iv,
town in Espafiola, ii, 206, 207. Isabella Clara Eugenia, daughter of Philip II of Spain, iv, 32, 33 f., 514, n. 3, 525, 632. 633, 636, 637 f., 640 f., 656, 662 ff. Isabelle, daughter and heiress of William of Villehardouin, i, 364. Isidore of Seville, iii, 214, n. 3. Islands Voyage, the (1597), iv, 562. Isla Santa, ii, 208. Isle of Wight, the, i, 136 iv, 542 f
Isabella,
; .
Sardinia, Sicily, Venice. Iviza, i, 8, 280, 311, 315, 336, 386, 498; iii, 115, 116,297. Ivry, battle of (1590), iv, 629. Ixtaccihuatl, iii, 482.
Iztapalapa,
iii,
483, 498
Jaca, capital of Aragon in the ninth century, i, 273. Jaccic sols, i, 453.
Jaen,
i,
11, 82,
83
f.
iii,
proposed
kingdom
of,
72, n., 77; for the
Infantes de la Cerda, i, 113. Jaen, bishop of, see Merino. Jaffna, iv, 382. Jaguars, iii, 579.
Jalisco,
iii,
Jamaica, ii, 206 iii, 498. James, the apostle, i, 48. James I (the Conqueror), king of Aragon (1213-76), i, 33,54, 100 f., Israelites, see Jews. Italian soldiers in the Spanish 108, 189, 281, 282, 286, 287-298, service, iv, 135, 359, 362^ 519; 304, 306, 312-318, 319, 320, 365, in the Portuguese service, 344. 388, 394, 406, 430-433, 436, 453,
; .
Ismail, shah of Persia, iii, 301 f. Isolation of the western Spanish realms, largely traceable to the war of the Reconquest, i, 86 f
512.
Italicus,
i,
169, n. 2.
14,
Italy,
111, 129, 163, 235, 259, 266, 267, 303, 317, 340, 354, 356, 383, 411, 412, 414, 417, 420, 423, 439, 451, 473, 474, 475, 484, 498, 526; ii, 24, 36, 37, 93, 128, 144, 154, 157, 162, 188, 241, 242, 243, 246, 247, 253, 258, 259, 262, 272-315, 324, 328 f., 333, 335, 336-339, 348 iii, 42, 43, 86, 97, 117, 118, 119, 139, 140, 142, 144, 153, 171, 173, 189, 213, 215, 217, 218, 222-287, 297, 305 f., 309, 318, 320-323, 341 f., 361 f., 364, 366, 368, 374, 380, 391, 393, 395, 398, 399, 400 f., 409, 452, 460, 590, 607, 629; iv, 7, 15, 53, 311, 347, 419 f., 430, 440, n. 4, 450, 467^75, 509, 519; Italian warriors at the capture of Toledo (1085), i, 70; influence of Italy on the intellectual life of Spain,
i,
9,
456, 464, 471, 472, 476, 479, 486, 488, 493, 494, 526; ii, 28, 232. James II (the Just), king of Aragon (1291-1327) and of Sicily (1285i, 120 f., 126, 127, 300 f., 302, 305, 333, 337-361, 371, 383, 465, 511. James I, king of England (1603-25) and of Scotland (as James VI,
95),
1567-1625), iv, 479, 483, 523, 524, quoted, 658. James I, king of Majorca (12761311), i, 290, 318, 330, 331, 332,
563, 603
;
337, 339, 347, 372, 441. II, king of Majorca (132449), i, 386-393. James (d. 1334), eldest son of James II of Aragon, i, 356, n. 2. of Castile, James, son of Alfonso i, 113, 114. James (d. 1375), son of James II of Majorca, i, 393.
James
732
James
111.
I,
CKXERAL INDEX
count
I\'
of
Alfonso
of
Aragon,
Urgel, son of i. 384, 390,
113.
II.
James
i.
44 4. count of Urgel, claimant
of the
Axagonese crown (1410),

iii,
Joanna (the Mad), queen of Castile, of Ferdinand and daughter Isabella of Spain, wife of Archduke Philip of Austria, ii, 61, n. 2, 268, 289, 295, 319 f., 321, 323334;
iii,
406, H'7. los. Jamestown, Virginia,
4, 7, 14, 24,
1,
29
f.,
36
f.,
524.
74-77, 79, n.
84, 392, 568, n.
1.
daughter of Edward III of England, i. 134. Janizaries, iii. 305; iv, 134, 142,
Jane,
145.
.la
Joanna, queen of Cebu, iii, 434. Joanna I, queen of Naples (134382),

i,
393, 398.
II,
Joanna
iv.
pan.
235. 23S, 337, 338.

de,
35),
iv,
i,
queen of Naples (1414 410, 414-4 19

II
I
Jara, 236.
Juan
camp-master,
Joanna, daughter ol John Aragon, wife of Ferrante

Naples,
ii,
of of
Jarandilla, iii, 398, n. 2. Jarnae, battle of (1569), iv, 289.
Joanna,
Castile,
daughter
wife
i,
71, 280. of
Edward
of
of
Jasper, Jativa,
n. 2.
iv, 45.
i,
Portugal,
of
Henry IV
113,
79, n.
1,
110, 296, 475; iii, 107, 110, 112, 113, 127,
Jaureguy, Jean, assas-in, iv, 506. Java, iii', 414; iv. 337, 383.
Pierre, president of the Parlement of I >ijon, iv. 633. Jemgum, battle of (1568), iv, 283. Jerez de la Frontera, i, Ki7. 108.
157; ii, 8, 9 f., 14, 38. Joanna (La Beltraneja), daughter of the preceding, i. 97; ii, 9-13, 18, 40, 46 f., 48, 49, 50 ff., 54 f., 329,
n. 1.
Jeannin,
Joanna, daughter of ( 'harles Y, wife of Prince John of Portugal, iii,

386;
iv.
263, 333.
10.
I
Jerica,
i,
472, n.
.'!.
John the Baptist, iv, 15, Join, XXII, Pope (1316 34),
:;:.0f.
i,
355,
i,
Jerome, Saint, ii, 155. 16. iv, Jerusalem, ii. 36. 53 Jerusalem, kingdom of, iii. 387.
l ;
John
li)7.
:
XXI
I
1,
Pope
,
(1110-15),
Jesuit order, the,

54, 63f., 82,
iii, iv, 106, 21 1 L98, 211. 239, 259,
John
(the
Hunter
king of
Arapm
349, n. 3. 352, 390, 183, 500, 506, 642. Jews, the, i, 132; iv, 8, 570; opthe Visigoths, i. 16; pressed by in mediaeval 197 202, lastile,
<
(1387 95), i, 400 ft. John II, king of Aragon (1458 79), i. 120. n. 4, 307, n. 1, 410, 1!'.).
111.
11
111.
121. 425, n.
."-1
1,
iso. 503,
509, 513,
f..
1
1.
518,
lo
.'.l'.'.
L5,
13,
18
li.
526; ii, 8, 18,56 62,63,

277,
227, 248; Bontierand Le Verrier in Aragon, 156 f., on, 160. n. 171 in in 158 Valencia, in Sicily, .~>l .i Majorca, 501 in in Sardinia. 163 f. 163 f. ii,
1
; ;
;
L38,
332, 339;
L65, 272, iii. 114.
2S0
f.,
John
1
I,
kinfr;
of
i.
Castile and
118,
f..
Leon
(1379 90),
97,
and
3, 123,
137
aotes 200, 210, 213,

120,
tlic
315
80,
in Naples, Canaries, 190; under the < latholic Kin^s,
86 f., '.M '.'I. 96, 111. 152; expelled from Portugal, 93, 267 the curse of the Jew.-. 270.
Jezebel,
Jijeli,
iv, 522 near Bugia,
ii,
220, 230, 257; ii, ."-2. 82. John II, kinjj of Castile and Leon il 106 54), i. 96, 97. 119, notes and :<, 121. 130. 13'.), n. 2.
1
164, L64, I'.':;. 196, 197, 201, 210, 21 1 I.. L'17. 222. 223, 225, 253,
256.
Jimenez Cerdan, Juan, Justicia of i.,7. 171. Aragon

I.
i,
255, 257, 266, 268, M)5, 411; ii, 4-7. 8, 15,62, 111. 150; iii, 217, n. 1 iv. 333.
'.'.
GENERAL INDEX
John (Lackland), king
,
733
of
England
(1199-1216), i, 435. John I (the Great) king of Portugal (1385-1433), i, 123 f., 137.
John
II (the Perfect), king of Portugal (1481-95), ii, 51, 52, 53, 192, 199, 201, 202 f., 212, 264, 265 hi, 419, n. 2 iv, 333.
;
;
of Procida, Sicilian statesman, 320, 321, 365. John (d. 1497), son of Ferdinand and Isabella of Spain, ii, 54, 61, n. 2, 265, 266, 267, 278, 289, 295, 319, 340.
i,
John
John Cantacuzene, Byzantine emperor (1347-57),

i,
396.
iv,
John
king of Portugal (152157), ii, 204, n. 1, 269, 270; iii, 136, 137, 378, 447, 452 f. iv, 333,
III,
;
John Casimir, Count Palatine,
339, 340, 386.
John VI, king

26),
iv,
earlier
of Portugal (1816regent (1792-1816),
316, n. 4, 492. John Frederick (the Magnanimous), elector of Saxony (1532-47), iii, 357 ff., 370.
John Joachim,
Johore,
iv,
see
Passano.
385, n. 1. John I of Anjou (d. 1470), Duke of Calabria and of Lorraine, i, 525
;
iv,
381.
Joinville,
Jean de, French chronicler,
667.
ii,
18, n. 3, 36, 57.

(d. 1358),
i,
Joinville, treaty of (1584), iv, 512,
John
John
son of Alfonso IV of
son of Ferdinand and
332.
609.
Jolo, iv, 229, 237. Jonah, iv, 585, n.
1.
ii,
Aragon,
384.
(d. 1509),
ii,
Germaine,
John
of Austria,
Don, natural son

;
Jouffroi, Jean, bishop of Albi, Journeyings of Charles V,

;
39.
sum-
of Charles V, iv, 92, 325, 327, 491
commander
against the Moriscos, 93 ff., 127 commander of the armament of the Holy League,
;
Tunisian cam130-149, 290; governor-general paign, 149-152 of the Netherlands, 307-317, 319, 490, 491, 492, 493. John of Avis, see John I, king of
;
John
1526), margrave of Brandenburg, captain-general of Valencia, second husband of Queen Germaine, iii, 97, 127, n. 2. of Castile, i, John, son of Alfonso 113, 114. John, Cingalese chief, iv, 382. John (d. 1500), son of Gaston IV de Foix, ii, 341. John of Gaunt, Duke of Lancaster, fourth son of Edward III of
Portugal. (b. 1493, d.
395 Foronda's marized, iii, Estancias y Viajes, 64. Joyeuse, Anne de (d. 1587), first Duke of Joyeuse, admiral of France, iv, 396. Joyeuse, Antoine Scipion de (d. 1592), Duke of Joyeuse, grand prior of Toulouse, commander of the Leaguers at Villemur, iv, 632. Joyeuse, Francois de (d. 1615), brother of the two preceding, archbishop of Toulouse, cardinal
(1583-1615), iv, 626, n. 1. Joyeuse, Guillaume de (d. 1592), father of the three preceding,
Viscount of Joyeuse, marshal of commander of the France, Leaguers in Languedoc, iv, 631. Joyeuse entree, iv, 514. Juan de Colonia, see Hans of
Cologne.
England, i, 97, 122, 135, 137 f., 206; iv, 523. John of Marigliano, Milanese in the Spanish service, iv, 153. John (d. 1554), son of John III of Portugal, iii, 386; iv, 263, 333,
340.
Juan de la Cruz, iv, 484. Juan Fernandez islands, iv, 185

Juana, see Joanna. Juba II, king of Mauretania,
Jucar, the, i, 14, 296. Judgeships, in Sardinia, 408, 412 f., 505.
i,
i,
f.
143.
355-358,
734
Judith, iv, 40. Jueces de salario, i, 233. Jueces pesquisidores, ii,
179.
GENERAL INDEX
376
140,
174,
;
in
iii,
Sicily,
23
Sardinia, i, iv, 469.

;
509
in
Aragon, i, 429, 438, 439, 440, 453, 458, 459, 460, 461, Juez de result m-ia, ii, 151 462, 463-471, 483; ii, 124 f.; iii, iv, 464187 f. 467. iv, 582, 597 f attempts to establish a Justicia in Valencia, Juezes ecclesiastical, iv, 432. Juezes ofitiales, iii, 623 f. 474; no Justicia in i, 444, Juez superior de las Cortes, i, 460, Catalonia, 482. 470. Justiciar, chief, in Sicily, i, 515. Julia Constantia, Roman colony, i, Justification by works, iv, 54. Justin, Roman historian, i, 8. 12, n. 4. Justinian I (the Great), Roman Julian, Count, i, 16; iii, 334. Julian calendar, iv, 524, n. 2. emperor (527-565), i, 14, 241, 422. Julius II (Giuliano della Rovere), Justus, Saint, iv, 47, 48. Pope (1503-13), i, 518; ii, 154, Juzgado de Indias, at Cadiz, iii, 624 ff., 628. 314, 322, 337, 339, 345 f.; iii,
;
. ;
Justicia, the, in
252
iv, 64.
Julius III (Gianmaria de' Medici, or del Monte), Pope (1550-55), iii, 367, 369, 383, 388, 389, 391. Junks, iii, 439. Junta, i, 463. Junta de Estado para los negocios de
Kairawan,
i,
15, 17.
Kandy,
Kansas,
iv,
iii,
382. 519.
of
Kansuh IV (al-Ghuri), sultan Egypt (1501-16), iv, 335.
Aragon,
iv,
587, n.
1.
Junta
de Cuerra y Armadas Indias, iv, 201 f., 211. Junta de la Comunidad, at Valladolid,
iii,
Kassandreia, i, 373, n. 1. Kelawun, soldan of Egypt, i, 339. de Kerkeni, island, i, 359/418.

Kliorasan,
iii,
302.
i,
King,
office of, in Castile,
205-211
;
85.
conflict
of
the hereditary
Junta de
las
Cuadrillas,
at
Val-
elective principles
205
f.
and law of
ladolid, iii, 85 f. Junta de Noche, iv, 328, 573, n. 3. J uniii General, of tin Hermandad,
1
ii,
100, 101, 104.
Junta of Badajoz, iii, 447. Junta of Kpila, iv, 591, J a nidus, i, 501 502.
Juros.
/n
iii,
inheritance in Las Siete Partidas, 206 the king not absolute in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. 207 f. causes if the actual weakne>s df the royal power, 208; the royal officials, 209 ff. the
;
i
193
f.;
iv,
43*. 445.
Aragonese kinship, 458 f. King of Kings, title of Alfonso VII
of Castile, i, 90. imae noctis, i, 478. see in King's administration Council, the, Royal of, Justice, ouncil. iii, 187 gon, i, 462, 463 471 i. iv, \:; l. 578 593 among the Knights of St. John of Jerusalem, the. i. 102, 177, 276. 329, n. 2; Aztec-, iii, 469; in Castile, i. 228 ii, 254, n. 1, 258; iii, 290, 295, 235; ii, 79,83, 114, 120 125, 19, 151 f.: in. 173. L82 187; 309, 314, 316, 338, 343, 426, n. !, iv, 27 in the iv. .7.), 107, 113, 115-122, f., 148; 413-416, 453 467; '> 16 in the Indies, exploit of three galleys, 13, Empire, iii, 371 n. ii. 1L'">, 2: Portuguese Hospi229f.; iii, 6 10-648; iv, 214in in tallers, i, 106. Milan, iii, 277 f. Naples, i, 523 f.: in the Nether- Knox, John, Scottish Reformer, iv, 258. lands, iv, 2S2; in Portugal, 375,
(
;
:
GENERAL INDEX
Koeworden,
337.
iv,
735
iv,
652
f.
Landrecies,
of,
iii,
iii,
638
siege of (1543),
Koudiat-es-Saboun, heights
270.
of
(1529),
iii,
Landriano,
dike, the, iv, 513.
iii,
Kowenstyn
battle 249, 252, 255. Landshut, iii, 355.

ii,
La Araucana,
605.
Landsknechts,
245.
i,
160
iii,
120, 130,
f.
Labrador, ii, 268. Labrador, ii, 136 into a caballero,

;
how transformed Languedoc,

i,
17; iv, 261, 631
169, n. 4.
ruler,
iv,
Lacandola,
230.
Philippine
iii,
Lachine Rapids,
505, n. 2.
Lannoy, Charles de, Prince of of viceroy Sulmone, Naples (1522-24) and imperial general, iii, 231, 233 ff., 238, 243, 245,
283.
La Cosa, Juan
210, n. 3.
de,
mapmaker,
ii,
Lanuza, Aragonese noble family,
i,
Ladies' Peace, the (1529), iii, 253 f., 467. 258, 259, 297, 302, 628, n. 3. Lanuza, Ferrer de, II, Justicia Ladislaus (of Durazzo), king of mayor of Aragon (1547-54), iii, 187. Naples (1386-1414), i, 401, 402, 410. Lanuza, Juan de, III, Justicia of Ladrones, iii, 432, 451 iv, 227. Aragon (1507-32), iii, 14.
;
Fere, iv, 10, 646, 656. Lafuente, Modesto, on the of Escovedo, iv, 326. La Giralata, iii, 330. Lagny, iv, 630.
La
Lanuza, Juan de, IV, Justicia of
murder
La
Goletta, iii, 308, n. 3, 310-314, 333, 348; iv, 107, 116, 150, 151, 152. Lagos, iv, 362.
iv, 570, 572, 573, 580, 581, 582 ff., 587. Lanuza, Juan de, V, Justicia of Aragon (1591), iv, 587, 589-592, 595. Lanuza, Martin Bautista de, lieutenant of the Justicia of Aragon, iv, 595.
Aragon (1554-91),
La Guarda, bishop
Joao de. La Herradura,
lost ai, iv, 108
of, see
Portugal,
Lanzarote, Canarian island, i, 144, 145-152, 154, 157 f ii, 172,

.
Spanish
f.
squadron
175, 183, 185.

i, 246. Plata, the, iii, 450, 630 iv, 162, 191-199. See Rio de la 190, Plata. La Plata, see Ciudad de la Plata. La Plata (Charcas), diocese, iv, 192. Lara, noble Castilian family, i, 80,
Lapidation,
Lake Lako Lake Lake
Maracaibo, iii, 534. Nicaragua, iii, 520.
La
Peten, iii, 507. Texcoco, iii, 468, 470, 483, 496, 498-501.
iii, 590, 601, 637. battle of (1494),
ii,
Lake Titicaca,
La Laguna,
183.
81, 212,
223
f.
i,
Lara, infantes de,
61, n. 1.
Lalemand, John, minister of Charles La Rabida, monastery, ii, 193. La Rambla, royalist confederation V, iii, 142.
La Mancha, iv, 485. of (1521), hi, 77. La Marck, William de, Dutch naval Laredo, Asturian seaport, ii, 319, 336 iii, 398 iv, 16. commander, iv, 295. Lancaster, Duke of, see John of La Rochebeaucourt, French am;
Gaunt.
Lancaster, James, English seaman,
iv,
La
bassador, iii, 96. Rochelle, i, 145

(1372), 136.
Salle,
naval battle of
389
of
'Land
Cinnamon,'
iii,
586
ff.,
595.
La
Gadifer de, attempts with
736
GENERAL INDEX
Recojrilacidn, 126
;
Bethnicourt the eonquesl of the

(
iv,
427, 454
f.
lanaries,
i.
145
L49;
l ;
quarrels
19 f. retires with Bethencourt, to France, 150 f. I,:is Casas, Albert de, bishop of Rubicon, i. 154. Las Casas, Bartolome* de, Spanish
the Novisvma 455.
RecopHacton,
iv,
Lawrence, Saint, iv, 43, 47. Laws of Burgos, the, ii, 234
f.
Laws
I.ea,
of the Indies, the,

dt
LazariUo
Tonnes,
iii,
220. 216.
ii,
461, 465, 533, 505, 596, 656 662; iv, 219, n. Las Casas, Francisco de, conquistador, iii. 506, 521
Dominican,
iii,
Henry Charles, American
his-
torian, ii. so, 93. League of Canibrav, the (1508),
ii,
337
f.
La Serena, iii, 592, n. 3; iv, 17'.). Las Navas de Tolosa, battle of (12 12), i, 24, 54, 79 f., 12S, 2S5,
291, 312
j
ii,
66.
Laso de la Vega, Gabriel Lobo, iv, 416, 421 quoted, 412. Las Palmas. town in the Grand Canary, ii. 179, 185, 186, 190;
;
League of Nations, iv, 484. League of Venice, the (1495)-, ii. 291-294,297,318. Lebanon, iii, 301. Lebrija, Antonio de, teacher at
Alcala,
(
iii,
214.
456, 557. Las Pragma ti rax del Reyno, ii, 126. Las Salinas, battle of (1538), iii,
iv,
Lebu, the, iii, 601. Le 'atelet, iv, 1, 654, 657. Lesiazpi, .see L6pez de Legazpi. Legnano, battle of (1176), iii, 273. Leicester, Earl of, see Dudley.
1
575 f. Las Siete Partidas, Alfonsine code,
Leipzig,
i,
iii,
58.
Lemonnier,
Henry,
'
French
3
his-
96, 113, 167, 197 f., 206, 207. 224, 241-246, 259, 261, 265, 463; ii. 125; iii, 174, 203; iv, 455. Latin, instruction in, ii. 161.
torian, quoted,
iii,
Lemons, iv, 385 Leo X (Giovanni

(1513-21),
iii.
de' Medici),
Lope
32, 37, 43, 58, 86,

'.'0
;
La Tremouille, Louis
French general,
ii,
II,
Duke
de,
87, 117, 192, 226f., 352.
306.
1
Leon, city,
dral of.
i.
i,
62
267.
iii,
50
cathe-
La Trinidad,
Laudonniere,
iv,
195,
Rene
iv,
de,
French
ff.
Leon, kingdom,
leader, Lauraguais, i. 32.
Huguenot
168
i, 55, 62 69, 72. 73, U5, 75, 76. 77, 78, 70, OS. 102, 103. 116. 177, 101, 206,
ML
Lanria, see Roger de Lauria. Lautrec. Odel de Foix, Seigneur de,
218
French commander in Italy, iii, 210, 228, 248 f. I.a Yalcttc, .ban Parisol <lc, grandmaster of the [ospitallers l">">7
'.'7.
I
.
f., 229, 236, 211, 265, 271, 27o. 278; ii. 96, 99, 220, 221, n. 2, 211. 325; in. ."'00; iv, 448.
Leon, Fray Andree

iv,
16.
'le.
illuminator,
iv, 101, 102,
lb"
118, 122.
of,
la
Varenne, Marquis
t.
Fou-
<|iii
Lavezares, Guido de, governor of the Philippines, iv, 232 ff.
Luis ponce '!", Spanish Leon, s I. theologian and poet, iv, 81, Leonor, k>nna, see Telles. iv, Lepanto, Fortress, iii, 299 Lepanto, < lulf of. iv, 137 139. of 1571 ), Lepanto, naval bat
I
l<
law,
i.
iv,
189
in
mediaeval
in
<
!astile,
iii,
1
250,329, 156;
lio,
151,
iv, 59,
is:,.
138
:,i
I.
hi,
235 246;
Aragon,
<
.
462
f.;
is,
152. 290, 307, 319,

n.
:',,
in
in Valencia. 1/ 2 I iatalonia, 196 f.; under the Catholic [., the in Kings, ii. li:., I25f.: Indii the A 220, 234 f.
; . ;
322, 330, 131, 172. 527 35, 670.

2
1
Lepe, Diego de, Spanish explorer,

1
ii,
IT.
GENERAL INDEX
737
Lepidus, Marcus Aemilius, Roman Lille, ii, 295, 320. triumvir, i, 28. Lima, iii, 568, 574, 576, 593, 595, 27 452 iii, Lerida, i, 483 ii, 596, 597, 598, 634, 654, 655; university of, i, 265, n. 4. iv, 188, 195, 197, 212, 215, 217, 219. Lescar, ii, 30. Lesser Antilles, the, ii, 205. Lima, audiencia of, iii, 641, 642, Letrados, i, 217, 230, 244; ii, 111, 644, 645 iv, 188, 190, 199. 120, 124, 139, 208, 209 iii, 185 Li-Ma-Hong, Chinese pirate, iv, 233. iv, 234, 437, 460, 465, 468.
;
; ;
Leucate, iii, 267. Levant, the, i, 503
ii,
144, 255
iv,
Limasaua, iii, 433. Limpieza de sangre,

iv,
iii,
146,
630;
124, 147, 148, 149, 431, 519;
the
421.
Catalan Grand Company in, i, Linguistic limitations, of Charles V, 363-382 Catalan merchants in, of Philip II, 366, iii, 11, 31, 57; 493; Catalan maritime law en388, n. 2, 395 f. iv, 19, 20. forced in, 496. Venetian Lippomano, Girolamo, Le Verrier, Jean, priest, i, 150, 165. ambassador, quoted, iv, 471. Lewes, prior of, i, 136. Lisbon, i, 74, 122, 123, 143, 157; Lex Romana Visigothorum, i, 236. ii, 199; iii, 195, 444; iv, 268, Leyden, iv, 368; relief of (1574), 335, 340-345, 347 f ., 360 ff ., 372,
;
304.
376, 379, 383, 386, 393, 396, 400,
n. 1, 517, 528, 529, 544, 556, n. 1, Leyes de las Indias, iii, 623, 639, 641 f., 651, 655. 561, 649; capture of (1580), Leyes del Estilo, i, 240. 363-368; royal chapel at, 375; chamber of, 375; English exLeyes de los Adelantados, i, 240. Leyes del Reyno, iv, 427, 455, n. 2. pedition against (1589), 553 ff. Leyes de Toro, ii, 126. Lisbon, archbishop of, see Almeida. Leyes Nitevas, i, 240. Literature, in mediaeval Castile, i, in Valencia, 475 Leyva, Alonso de, Spanish com99, 266, 267 f in Catalonia, 497 in Majorca, mander, iv, 552. 504 at the court of John II, ii, Levva, Antonio de, Spanish soldier, 5 under the Catholic Kings, iii, 209, 227, 233 f., 248, n. 2, 260, 261, 265 f., 273, 274, 283 iv, 111, 161, 162; under Charles V, iii, n. 3, 410. 152, 213-217; under Philip II, Leyva, Sancho de, Spanish naval iv, 481-485, 678; Peruvian, iii, coi mander, iv, 111 f. 552; Spanish names in Roman Libenus, Byzantine governor of literature, i, 10. Livianas occasiones, iv, 421, n. 5. Africa, invades Spain, i, 14.
.
Liberties of Aragon, the,

iv,
i,
428-450
566-606.
Libro de las Leyes, see Las Siete

Partidas.
Libya, i, 5, n. 2. Libyans, the, i, 6.

Licenciados, iv, 205.
Liebana, Doctor, report of, on the Moriscos, iv, 431, n. 3; quoted,

96.
iv, 535, 536. 553, 554, 586. Llibre del Consolat, i, 496 f Loaysa, Garcia Jofre de, bishop of Osma (1525-32), archbishop of Seville (1539-46), cardinal (153046), iii, 143, 448. Loaysa, Garcia Jofre de, Spanish
Lizard, the,
Llamas,
iii,
commander,
iv,
iii,
448
f.,
451, 606;
227.
Life tenure for professors, evils of,

iii,
Loaysa, Jeronimo de, archbishop of
175.
i,
Lima
Lighthouses,
487.
Lodi,
iii,
(1546-75), iii, 655. 233, 234, 275.
738
Logrono, siege of
Loire, the,
i.
(
(SKNEKAL INDEX
1">2I
(,
iii,
102.
son
28
of Charles II of Lorraine; Lorraine, Charles de; Lorraine,
Loja,
ii,
69, 3 18.
Louis de.
Lorraine,
Lombard League, the, iii, 273. Lombard merchants, expelled from

Barcelona.
n.
i.
494.
tribe,
i,
Charles de (d. 1574), brother of the second Duke of archbishop of Itheims, Guise,
Lombards, Germanic
2;
169,
cardinal, iv, 7.
invade Italy. 14; their Lorraine, Charles de, Duke of kingdom threatened by the MosMayenne, son of the second Duke of Guise, iv, 014, 015, 624, 025, lems of Spain, 31. n., 627, 629 f., 633 f., 635, 636 ff., Lombardy, iii, 117, 209, 223, 227, 640 f., 643, 645 f., 654. 228, 230 238, 250, 200-278, 365, (d. 361, 120; iv, 8, 01, 102, 265, 308. Lorraine, Charles de 1640),
London,
388;
130; iii, 3N4, 3s:>, :;sii, 246, 272, 274, 279, 365, 499, 500, 502, 503, 507, 000, 001 exploit of London merchant ships
i,
iv.
fourth Duke of luise, iv, 638, 641. Lorraine, duke of, see Charles II. Lorraine, Francois de (Le Balafrel, second Duke of Guise, French
<
(1586), 519; 563, 603.
treaty
of
of
(1604),
iv,
Longjumeau, peace
289.
(1568),
i,
Lonja de Conlratmion,
ii,
ISO,
190;
general and statesman, iii, 374 iv, 7 f., 257, 608. Lorraine, Henry I de (Le Balafr6), third Duke of Guise, French general, head of the Catholic League,
144.
iv,
L6pez, Dr. Rodrigo, conspirator,

559.
iv, 507, 609-015. Lorraine, Louis de (d. 1588), son of the Becond Duke of Guise, car-
L6pez de Alcocer, lVn>, iii, 171, n. 2. dinal, iv, 013. Lopez de Gomara, Francisco, iii, 92, Lorraine, Philippe Emmanuel de, Duke of Mercosur, commander of 142, 210 f., 271, 374,401. the Leaguers in Brittany, iv, 632, L6pez de Haro, Diego, Spanish 635, 654. ambassador, ii, 240, 285. L6pez de basorra, Miguel, bishop of Los reives, set Las Palmas (14S0 .vs.. ii, 179. Los Patos. island, iii, 606. (the Pious), emperor (814Lopez de Legazpi, Miguel, conqueror l.oiii33 f .476. of the Philippines, iii. 455; iv, 840), 227-2; ;_'. Louis VII (the Young, or the Pious), ls7). king of France (1137-N0), i, 71. Lopez de Padilla, Garn'a (.1. graiid master of < lalatrai a, ii, 108. Louis VIII (the Lion), king of 286. France (1223 26). Lopez de Recalde, Inigo, founds the Louie I\ (St. Louis), king of France Jesuit order, iii, 100. I>6pez de Villalobo Ruy, Spanish (1226-70), i, 110. 112, 129, 132, commander, iii. 454 f. 287, 289, 290. 295. 319, 323; ii, 28; in. 288; iv, 667. L6pei de Zufiiga y Velasco, Diego, 16] S3), Count of Nieva, viceroy of New Louis Xl, king of Fiance
(
i,
i.
iv.
212,
ii.
<
1.
Lord High
(
< Ihamberlain, see rrand Ihamberlain. Lords of the Congregation, iv, 258. gade Lorosa, Pedro Alfonso d(
28 37,39,46.47 ... 52, 53, 54, 56, 57, 58 61, 7s, 271, 272, 273, 277, 281, 282; iii, 241,
i.
139,385;
ii,
n.
:;.
Louis
1.
Icing
13,
Portuguese,
i
iii,
10.
L515), n,
tee
(
Lorraine, u Lorraii ordinal
198of France 297 307. 323, 328 f., 19, 342f., 344, 345;
1
of,
harles,
iii,
5,
136, sii, 272.
GENERAL LNDEX
43), iv, 599, n. 2. Louis XIV, king of
739
iv,
Louis XIII, king of France (1610- Luna, Juan de, Aragonese noble,
580.
France (1643- Luna, Lope de, Aragonese noble,

;
i,
Arellano, Tristan de, governor of Florida, iv, 164 ff L' union fait la force, iv, 492. Naples (1382-84), i, 393. Louis II (of Anjou and Provence), Luque, Hernando de, iii, 543, 547, claimant to the crown of Naples, i, 554 f
1715), i, 27, 33, 175, n. 3 iv, 40 ff ., 48, 673. Louis II, king of Hungary (151626), iii, 37, 162, 301.
I
443, 445.
Luna, Maria de, wife of Martin of Aragon, i, 479.
Luna y
Louis
(of
Anjou), titular king of
393, 401, 402, 410. Louis III (of Anjou), titular king of Naples, i, 414, 415, 4 0, 417, 418, 419.
Lusitania, i, 11, 62. Luther, Martin, leader of the Ref-
ormation,
iii,
80, 86, 90, 117,

;
118,
356, 445, n. 2, 446
iv, 52, 53.
Louis, king of Sicily (1342-55), 512.
i,
Louis, Prince, son of Emmanuel of Portugal, iv, 346. Louise, daughter of Francis I of
Lutheranism, iv, 4. Lutherans, iii, 129, 139, 152, 171,

240, 244, 252, 261, 271, 280, 333, 340, 352-363, 401 ff., 513, 599; iv, 8, 52, 217, 253, 283, 284.
France, iii, 16, 136. Luxemburg, iii, 97, n. 4, 224; iv, Louise of Savoy, mother of Francis 309, 312, 653. I, and regent of France, iii, 235, Luxury, of the Moors in Spain, i, 22 of the Castilian clergy, 175; in 239, 240, 253. Catalan Athens, 378 at the court Louvain, iii, 6, 59 university of, 213 iv, 284, n. 2. of Alfonso the Magnanimous, 425, Louvre, the, iv, 637. 522, 525; in Majorca, 504; in Low Countries, see Netherlands. iv, 28, 426, 430. Castile, iii, 177 f Lower California, iii, 512, 514. Luzon, iii, 454, n. 3 iv, 230-233. Loyola, village in Guiprizcoa, iii, Lyons, treaty of (1503), ii, 306, 324.
;
106.
Loyola, Ignatius de, see Lopez de Maecabees, the, iv, 48. Recalde. Macedonia, i, 371, 372, 373. Lucca, iii, 282. Machiavelli, Niccolo, ii, 18, 43, 307 Luccans, i, 494. iv, 412, 491. Luchmhyor, i, 392. Maciot, nephew of Jean de BethenLucius III, Pope (1181-85), i, 178. court, i, 153, 155. Lufti Pasha, seraskier of Rumelia, Madagascar, iv, 266, 336, 383.
iii,
321.
i,
Fernandez de Lugo. 484, 675. 173 Lull, Ramon, Majorcan scholastic Madeira, i, 155 ii, iv, 334, and missionary, i, 504 f seized by Peyrot de 379, n. 1 Sire de, see La Marck. Monluc (1566), 266-269. Lumey, Luna, ancient Aragonese house, i, Madrid, i, 160, 188, n. 1, 230; ii,
see
; ; . ;
Lugo, Lugo,
179, n. 2.
Madalena, nurse, iv, 34. Madariaga, Salvador de, quoted,
iv,
407.
Luna, Alvaro de,

5
ff.,
i,
215, 222;
ii,
9, 11, 21, 22, 23.
Luna, Count of, see Gurreay Aragon. Luna, Juan de, imperial commissioner,
iii,
361.
10, 15, 49, 124, n. 4 iii, 135, 237, 239, 240, 242, 407; iv, passim; made capital of Spain, 42, 43, 567 treaty of (1434), i, 139, n. 2 ; treaty of (1526), iii, 241, 243, 248, 404.
; ;
'40
7, 40.
ii,
(iFXF.RAL INDEX
Malines,
tilO.
Madrigal, ii, Madrigalejo,

Maestricht,
3 19. Waestrazgos, iv, 209.

iv,
law of (1545), ii, 2S9 Sir Mechlin.

;
iii,
195,
iii.
196.
Malplaquet, battle of (1709), iv, 11. Malta, i, S. 329: iii, 295, 309, 343;
IT.,
Magdalena, Magdeburg,
the,
iii.
577
584
f.
iv
117,
368, 369, a.
2.
103, 101; siege of (1565), 107. 122, 121.
Magellan, Ferdinand of, Portuguese navigator, iii, 3, 419-437, 439, II l. Ii:.. 151, 153, 155, 606; iv, 225, 227 236.
('..
Man, John, English ambassador

Spain,
iv,
to
79
1'..
82, 200.
Manco
!apac, traditional founder of the inca monarchy, iii. 5 19.

(
Magellan, Strait of. iii. HOI'., 504, 605,630; iv, 179,388,567.
Manco
217..
Inca,
iii,
566
f.,
7)72
f.
iv,
Magna Magna
369.
<
!arta,
i,
i,
Curia,
434. 516.
Mandeville, Sir John, i, 159. Manfred, king of Sicily 1- 8 66),

1
i,
Magnesia, city
in
Asia Minor,
the,
i,
i,
368,
319, 364.
Manfred, duke of Athens, son of

504.
i,
Magnetic needle,
\fagnlfico8,
ii.
Frederic III of Sicily
i.
375.
580, 586
i,
489.
of,
Manifestaci&n,
2ss, 2S0,
i,
100
iii,
f.
;
iv,
Maguelonne, bishops
1.
Manihiki Islands,
432.
Mainz, iii, 400. Mainz, archbishop Brandenburg.
of,
s&
Albert of
Maize, iii, 470. Majorca, city, see Palma. Majorca, island, i. 8, 25 f., 280, 31 1. 313-310. 332, 335, 336, 386, 392, 112. 137. 498, 199, 500-503, 510; iii. 339; ii, 27.: iv, 108; revolt in
(1521
23),
iii.
Manila, iv, 185, 231 ff.. 237. 23S. Manila, archbishop of, see Garcia Serrano. Manila, audiencia of, iv, 235 f. Manila Hay, iv, 230. Manises, i. 172, n. 3. Manno, Giuseppe, Sardinian historian, i, 509 Manrique, noble Spanish family,
iii,
I
15.
113
116.
Manrique, Alonso, bishop of Badajoz

iii,
Majorca, kingdom
of, i, 289, n. 1, 290. 306, 337, 343, 348, 357, 386 395, 42\ 198 505, 520*; ii, 1 13,
(I
199
1516),
iii,
9.
Manrique, Garcia, Count of Osorio,

022.
'
144.
Manrique,
i,
I
r6mez,
Luis,
<
lastilian
poet
Makkari, Moorish historian, i. 5< Mala, conference of 1537 in. 7.7 Malabar coast, the, ii, 212:
(
.
looi.
I.
Manrique,
20.
grand almoner,
(d.
iv,
iv,
35.
Manrique, Rodrigo
iii.
1170),
first
Malacca,
120.
111.
17,2;
iv.
(
|
'oimt
ol
Paredes, grand-master of
ii.
337, 381.
Santiago,
109, 160;
ii,
107.
Malaga,
243;
i,
64, 69
IT..
72.
Manrique de
1535
102. 101.
in.
332,
154,
628;
1
iv,
108,
md
Antonio (d. Lara, l>nke of Najera,

iii.
112. 113, 11 l, 201, ,,. 2; 12. soldier at Lepanto,
Mai
iv,
viceroy of Navarre,
315.
179,
98
f.,
101,
Malcontent-, the.
in
France,
Manrique
n.
I.
de
Hops.
Hernando,
iv,
Maldonado, Francisco, Spanish com-
Spanish commander,
168, 169,
mander
ISO.
in
the
t
<
!ananes,
ii,
Manrique de
renoese noble fami,
:;
Malespini, the.
ilv,
Ztifiiga. Alvaro, Marquis of Villa Manrique, viceroy of

f.
(
hou,
iii.
133.
New Spain (1585 89), iv, 222 Mansfeld, Iharlea of, iv, 64/.
GENERAL INDEX
741
Mansfeld, Count Peter Ernest of, Margaret of Provence, wife of Louis IX of France, i, 289. governor-general of the Netherlands (1592-94), iv, 254, 623, Margaret of Valois, daughter of 636, 643, 647, 652. Henry II of France, wife of Henrv IV of France, iv, 263, 289, 642. Mantua, iii, 260. Manuel I (Comnenus), Byzantine Margarita, West Indian island, ii,
emperor (1143-80),
365.
i,
288,
293,
208.
Marguerite d'Angouleme,
Francis
I
sister
of
Manuel, Juan, grandson of Ferdinand III of Castile, i, 117 f. Manuel, Juan, great-great-grandson
France, wife of Charles, Duke of Alencon, later of Henry II of Navarre, iii, 240. of the preceding, Castilian na- Maria, queen of Sicily (1377-1402), i, 376, 399, 400, 401, 402, 404. tionalist, agent of Philip the Handsome, ii, 327 iii, 9, 10, 14, Maria, daughter of Ferdinand I of 227, n. 2. Aragon, wife of John II of Castile,
of
;
i, 119, 411; ii, 6, 7. Maria, daughter of Henry III of i, Manufactures, in Barcelona, Castile, wife of Alfonso V of 494; in Castile, under the CathAragon, i, 119, 411 ii, 6. olic Kings, ii, 141 under Charles Maria de Molina, queen regent of 120, V, iii, 204 ff. under Philip II, iv, Castile, i, 106, 193, 212, 428 f. 249. Maria of Montpellier, wife of Pedro Marbella, ii, 69.
Manuel, Juan, bishop

(1565-74),
iv, 17.
of
Zamora
II of Aragon, i, 285, n. 2, 288, Marble, iv, 45. Marcellus II, Pope (1555), iii, 391. 365. March, Ausias, Valencian poet, i, Maria, daughter of Affonso IV of 475. Portugal, wife of Alfonso XI of Marche, James II of Bourbon, count Castile, i, 121. de la, second husband of Joanna Maria, daughter of John III of II of Naples,
i,
410, 414.
Marck, Robert II de la (d. 1535), Count of Aremberg, iii, 97, n. 4,

224.
Portugal, first wife of Philip II of Spain, ii, 270 iii, 363 f., 454 iv,
;
;
31,333.
Maria
f.
ii,
ii,
(d. 1577),
daughter of Prince
Portugal,
wife
of
Marcq, peace conference at (1555),

iii,
Edward
of
390
Mar Mar
del Sur, the, Dulce, the,
n.3.
Alexander of Parma, iv, 347. 216 iii, 431. Maria, daughter of Ferdinand and 219; iii, 606, Isabella, second wife of Emmanuel the Fortunate of Portugal, ii, 269
;
;
2 iii, 137, n. Margaret of Austria, wife of Prince John of Castile, later of Philibert Mariana, Juan
II of Savov, regent of the Netherlands (1507-30), ii, 61, n. 2, 266,
i,
iv,
333.
de, Spanish historian,
6,
56
iv,
483.
;
267, 278, 289, 295, 319; iii, 9, 13, 140, 154, 253. Margaret of Austria (or of Parma),
Marian martyrs, the, iii, 662 iv, 5. Mariano IV, Judge of Arborea
i, 396, 397. (Doria), Judge of Arborea (1387-1407), i, 404. Marie de Brienne, wife of Baldwin
(1346-76),
Mariano
natural daughter of Charles V, wife of Alessandro de' Medici, later of Ottavio Farnese, regent of the Netherlands (1559-67), iii,
261, 265, 280; iv, 249-255, 280, 281, n. 3, 330, 491, 494 f., 664.
Marie
II of Constantinople, i, 110 f. of Luxemburg, wife of Phi-
lippe 632.
Emmanuel
de Lorraine,
iv,
742
Marignano, battle
ii.
(
GENERAL INDEX
humanist and historian, ii, 161. 304, n. 2, 348; iii, 12, 22, 35, 38,
42, 65, 100.
of 1515), ii, 348; 348; iii, 43, 230, 232, 270. Marin, Fernando, abbot of Najera,
iii.
283.
iii,
Mary
-172.
iii.
I,
queen of Kngland (1553-58),
Manna, Mexican woman,
M,
186.
136, 213, 238, 376, 377-394, to:,, 406; iv, 9f., 31, 481, n. 1;
of,
Marineo
scholar,
iii,
Siculo,
i.
519
iii,
ii,
f.
Sicilian Lucio, tcaclicral Alcala,
death
12,318.
Mary queen
21
I.
Mariquita, Marwcales,
586.
I")!'.
of Scots, iv, Hi, 257, 272, 274, 288, 292, 293, 308, 311, n. 2, 515 f., 522 525.
of Charles of
Mary, daughter
gundy,
wife
Bur-
Mamr.
the. IV, 630.
of
Emperor Maxi-
milian I, ii, 47, 60, 271. Marnix, Philipp van, Lord of SainteAldegonde, Dutch writer and Mary (d. 1558), daughter of Philip I of Castile, wife of Louis II of statesman, iv, 512. NetherMar Pequena, the, ii, 188. Hungary, regent of lands (1531 .V>), iii, 10, 154,301, Marquesas group, iv, 185. 307, 368, 370. 371, 374, 396; iv, Marquis, title of, in ( lastile, i, 169 f.
t
1
Marram,
iv, 8, 177.
249.
Marranos, see Converso*. Marriage treaty, the, of Ferdinand and Isabella, ii, 39, 81 ff.
Marseilles,
Mary, daughter of Hugh Cyprus, wife of James II

gon,
i,
III
of
of Ara-
361.
1
313, 316, 417, 474; Biegeof (1524), iii, 262, 303, 307 232. Marshal] Islands, iv, 227.
i,
8,
Mary
of
of Navarre, wife of Pedro

1
Aragon, i, Mary, daughter

of
10.
ol
Charles V, wife
II, in,
Emperor Maximilian
Martial,
i,
10.
Martm
IV, Pope (1281-85), i, 114, 322, 325, 332. Martm V, Pope (1417-31), i, 415 f., 117; ii, 200.
(the
268, 365. 369. Masbate, iv, 231.
Massacre,
iii,
ai
:
ajamarca, by Pizarro,
(
561
f.
;
at
at
Iholula,
by
lortes,
181
Martin
Humane),
1
king
of
493
057
!ll
;
Mexico, by Alvarado, in of Puna Indian-. 557

;
Aragon (1395 U0) and of Sicily Martin II, 1409- 10), i, 11!), 105, 179, 399, un. 102, lo:;
I
,
Florida,
;
iv,
171
ff.;
;
at
at
(
(
Calais,
ialera,
,
at
Doiillens, 051
at
Ham.
at
654
at
La
roletta
507, 513;
ii,
34.
,
Martin
i.
L409 [, king of Sicily (1391 101,402,403 ff., 109, 511, 512 f.,
n.
519,
3;
of
ii.
19.
Martinez
Justicia
IliO.
Axtasona,
Aragon
Pedro, (1281 83
II,
.
i,
Rotterdam, 295, n. 4; oi St. Bartholomew, 264, 296 ff., 302, 506; at Zutphen, 299. Mastia (( !ai tag 8. Matau. iii. 435 ff. Matilda. Countese of Boulogne, retit
i,
152:
n. 2.
pudiated wife of AifonBO

licen-
III
<'f
Martinez de BurgOS, Andres,

tiate,
iii.
Portugal,
iv,
347.
ii,
171.
ii.
2.
Martinez de Irala. DomingO, adelantado of Paraguay, iii, 609 ff.

iv.
Maule. the, iii, 549, 572. Mauretania, 19, 23, 143;

i,
240,
245, 259.
186.
Mauretania, ecclesiastical provih

GuijaiTO,
63.
Martinez
called
'I
Sill'
f
Juan, archbishop of
oledo
1546
Mauretania aesariensis, Mauretania Tingitana, i,

<
i,
12.
12.
11,
Martyr
<le
Anghiera, Peter, Italian
Maurice, Saint,
iv,
47.
GENERAL INDEX
743
Maurice, duke of Saxony (1541-53), grand duke of Tuscanv (1569-74), iii, 357 f., 372 f. iii, 279 ff., 361, 387, n. 2. Maurice, prince of Orange and Medici, Ferdinando I de', grand count of Nassau, younger son of duke of Tuscanv (1587-1609), William the Silent, stockholder of iv, 626, n. 1. the Seven United Provinces (1587- Medici, Francesco Maria de', grand duke of Tuscany (1574-87), iv, 1625), iv, 510, 617, 646 ff., 652 ff.,
658.
516.
I,
Maximilian
Holy Roman emperor Medici,
'.iulio
iii,
de', see
Clement VII.
(1493-1519), i, 99; ii, 60 f., 266, 274, 275, 276, 277 ff., 288-291, 294, 295, 298, 321, 323 f., 336, 337. 338,349; iii, 10 ft.. 13, 14 ff., 37,
38, 40.
Medicine,
Aztecs,
176
iii,
f.
among
f.
the
469.
Medicine men,
527
i,
Medina Medina
Celi,
Duke
of, see
Cerda.
;
del
Maximilian
II,
Holv Roman emiii,
Campo,
230, 263
ii,
peror (1564-76),
139, 365, 367,
368 f., 380; iv, 32, 124, 132. Maximilian of Egmont, Count of 84. Buren, imperial commander, iii, Medina Sidonia, duchy
355, 356.
325; iii, 73 f., 174, n. 2, 586; treaty of (1489), ii, 276, 318. Medina del Rio Seco, iii, 77, 83,
of,
iii,
70.
Maximilianus Transilvanus,
n. 1.
iii,
441,
Mayas, iii, 468, 470, 471, 472, 580. Mayenne, Duke of, see Lorraine, Medios frutos,
Charles de.
Medina Sidonia, Duke of, see Guzman, Perez de Guzman. Medinat az-Zahra, see Az Zahra. Medio general, iv, 445.
iii,
193.
Mediterranean problems, iii, 162, Mayorazgos, i, 174. 172, 182, 212, 213, 249 ff., 266, Mayor demo, i, 209 ii, 105. 290-351, passim, 635; iv, 83-160, Mayport, iv, 169, n. 2. passim, 430 f. Mazarin, Jules, statesman and cardi- Mediterranean race, the, i, 5. nal, iii, 373. Mediterranean Sea, the, Spain's first
;
Meaux,
iv,
629, n. 3, 630.
Mechlin, iv, 299, 513. Medellin, iii, 459. Medici, ruling family at Florence, i, 423 iii, 253, 282. Medici, Alessandro de', duke of Florence (1531-37), iii, 261, 265, n. 1,279, 280: iv, 249. Medici, Alessandro de' (d. 1605), archbishop of Florence, cardinal (15S3-1605), papal legate, later Pope, as Leo XI, iv, 659. Medici, Catharine de', wife of Henry II of France, iii, 262, 264 iv, 32, 65, 168, 173 f., 175, 178, 256, 257,
;
;
ventures made in, i, 278 f iv, 679. Meerzas. councillors of Tamerlane,

imperial
. ;
i,
161
Megara,
i,
378, 380.
iii,
ii,
Melgosa, Captain, Melilla, i, 20, 22;

153, n.
1.
517. 241, 248;

iv,
Melinde, iv, 335. Melito, Count, Prince
of, see
Men-
do za.
Memphis, iii, 530. Mena, Juan de (d.

writer,
i,
1456), Castilian
267.
de,
Mendana, Alvaro
gator, iv, 184
f.
Spanish navi194
f.
iii,
259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 266, 268, 269, 270, 271, 283, 296, 297, 347, 364, 391, 392, 496 ff., 608; death of, 613. Medici, Cosimo de' (the Great), duke of Florence (from 1537),
258, 265, 289, 396,
Mendieta, Diego de,
iv,
Mendoza,
iv, 199.
city in Argentina,
605
Mendoza, noble Castilian family,

ii,
50;
iii,
52, n. 4, 56, n. 2, 70,
'44
GENERAL INDEX
iv.
6491.;
L80,
213,
583.
See
Mendoza v de
Burtado de Mendoaa for other members of the same family, and

see alto genealogical table
iv,
opposite
third
of
la (Vrda, Anna de, Princess of Eboli,iv, 323, 326-329, 330, 346, n. 4, 350, 351, 528. Mendoaa y de la Cerda, [fiigo de,
firsl
681.
de,
c
Marquis
f.,
of
Almenara,
f.,
iv,
Mendoaa, Alonso Buarea

(
572
581, 582, 583
585, 586,
'oiint of
!orufia, iv, 499.
n. 2.
Mendoaa, Antonio
de,
viceroy
Mendoaa y
Marquis
New
Spain
l.">3.~>
50)
.
and
of
Peru
I. una, .Juan de, third of Montesclaros, viceroy
(1551 52), iii, 70, 331, a. 4, 154, r, 511, 513 i'., 596, tin:;, 622,
.">
l
if
New Spain
L5),
(1003-07) and Peru

iv, 22;;.
(1607
quoted,
ti(7.
ii.
;.
1149
li.V,
iv,
110, n. 3,
163, 211
1..
213, 323, a. 2.
t'.,
';:;'>.
Menendea de A vile-. Pedro, Spanish 70. 7s, 265, commander, iv

1
Mendoaa, Bernardino de, Spanish naval commander, iii. 331

650;
iv,
269, 395; 302, ii. 1.
death of
de,
(1574),
178,
L08,
199. n. 3.
Meneses,
1
Enrique
viceroy
of
Mendoaa, Bernardino de, Spanish Portuguese India, iii. 144. Boldier and diplomat, iv, I'd, n. 2, Menezes, )iogo de, Portuguese com320, 323, n. 2, 365, 478, 179, 502, .".(Mi, .",07. 515, 516, n. 524, t.ii'.'. 610, '.ll It., 014 !'., 620, n. 4, 024, n. 4, 625,
t99
"),
523, 616,
mander, iv, 363. kraal Meneaes, Luis de, third Ericeira, Portuguese historian,
<
of
iv.
630,
370. 384.
633
f.,
645
de,
Menin, Captain, French seaman,

genera] of
267.
iv,
iv,
Mendoaa, Francisco
the galleys,
110, 111, 113.

de, adelantadooi L86, 187.
Menin, Jean, comp nion

iv,
of Ribaut,
Mendoaa, Gonzalo
207.
i,
157. Menisco, Marquis of, Paraguay, iv, 188. Mendoaa, Ifligo L6pea de, second Mensajero8, Count of Tendilla, first Marquis Mercedes de w lUajaa. iv, 420. of 303, 300, 484 Mercenary troops, Mondejar, iii, 70, 6 19. Mendoaa. Lfiigo L6pez de, third 15ii. L57; iii. 208, 233, 245, ii. 07, 374; iv, 303, 359, 195, .".19. Marquis <>i Mondljar, captaingeneral at Granada, viceroy <>f Mercoeur, Duke of, see Lorraine,
i, i,
;
Mendoaa, fiiii< L6pea de id. 1458 Merida, iv. 359. firsl Marquis of Santillana, cele- Melinites, Mohammedan dynasty,
1
Naples,
iv.
87
f.,
90
ff.,
92.
Philippe
Emmanuel
120
de.
brated
at
(
'
!as1 ilian
Mendoaa, Jer6nimo
loron.
iii.
poet de, 299.
i.
267.
i.
21.
:
v-',
ii,
commander
:;ui
85, 03.
130,
301, 302,
Mendoaa, Juan
de, general "t the galleys, iv, 102, l" Mendoaa, Lorenao Buarea de, \ roy of New Spain (1580 82), iv.
Merino, Esteban Gabriel, bishop of Jaen 1523 35), iii, 13. \l< rums, i, 231 f. 152. ii,
1
Mere-el Kebir,
tress,
ii.
213.
North African for212 217. 249, 2:,!). _T.'2. 254, 259; iv. 98, 153; defence of
(1563), LOOff.
ii
Mendoaa, Luis
Victoria,
iii.
de, captain 127 IT.

<!<.
of
oi
the
Mi rum
l
mixtum
de,
imperium,
<f
i,
Mendoaa, Pedro
Plata,
L98.
in,
coloniaer
iv,
522.
607
IT.:
L86,
195,
<>f
Mesa,
Gil
iv,
friend
Antonio
Mendoaa, tiidni;n
in.
de.
Marquis
ff.
580 Meseta. the, i, 35 ff., aaeroe, i, 453 f.

Peres,
67, 86.
GENERAL INDEX
Messina, i, 161, 326 f., 343; hi. 24,25,318,319,11.1.321; iv, 103,
'45
Miguel
Messina, Strait hi, 298 f

.
133, 135, 136, 145. 151, 468. of, i, 350, 353, 421
(d. 1500), son of Emmanuel of Portugal, ii, 268, 319, 321, 323. Milan, i. 420. 423, 424; ii, 299, 301,
Mesta, the, sheep owners' gild, i. 238. 250, n. 1, 263 h, 136, 138 ff. iii, 202 f. iv, 449. Metals, exported from Spain to the East in early times, i, 7 export of gold and silver from Castile forbidden in the Middle Ages, 250: Inquisition, 82, 475, n. 1. iron and steel exported from Bar- Milanese, the, ii, 298 f., 348. the geld and silver Militarv affairs, i, 86, 210, 255-259 celona, 494 of the Indies, ii, 195, 198, 206, 462, 484 f. ii, 67-69, 155-160 hi, 18 f., 110, 207-211; iv, 432 f. 225, 232; hi, 636 f. iv, 207 ff. See Mines. 475 ff Aztec army, hi, 469 Metellus (Balearicus), Quintus Cae553 Biscayan arquebusiers, 327 of Spanish soldiers cilius, i, 25. efficiency in Milan. 274 f. 353 Metz, siege of (1552-53), iii, 3741'., military 379. districts of Spanish America 645 Peruvian army. 553 Metz, bishopric, iv. 14. pikeMeuse. the, iv, 294, 303, 304, 495. men, 258 Spanish veterans in 370 f. 617, 618. Germany. stratagems, Mexia, Pero, Spanish historian, iii, 319; unpaid troops, 198. See
; ;
;
;
348; iii. 119, 208, n. 2, 210, 227, 228, 232 f., 237 f., 245, 248 f., 252, 255, 259, 260-278, 282, 283, 284, 361, 362, 364, 365, 387, n. 2, 399, 405. 412, 584 iv, 248, 249, 284, 301, 304, 419, 420, 468, 472-475, 519, 569, 654; unsuccessful attempt- to introduce the Spanish
65, 90.
255, 336. 459-519, 537, 569, 596, 633, 637, 638, 643, 651, 661: iv, 161. 165, 211. 217, 225, 227. 228, 240. 241. Mexico, audiencia of. iii, 511, 6401'.. 642. 643 f., 645, 647. 04^ iv. 234.
Mexico,
i,
149
iii,
Explosives, Mercenary troops, Military knighthood, MuArtillery,

tinies.
Mexico, Gulf
209.
Mexitli.
iii.
of, iv,
162. n. 2. 164,
Militarv kniohthood, orders of, in Castile, i, 177 f. iii, 67, 162, 192, 202 iv, 432 f annexation of the grand masterships by the crown, ii, 106 ff. i, 255 Militarv Orders, of Portugal, iv,
;
; . ; :
469, n.
1.
374, 379, n.
1.
Mezie ss, iii, 224. Millar, Jan, Flemish Protectant, iii, 655. Mezquita, the, at Cordova, i, 77. Michael VIII (Palaeologus), Bvzan- Millau, i, 33, 279, 289. tine emperor (1261-82), i,* 317, Mi Hones, iv, 446. 321, 363, 364, 365. Mindanao, iii, 454 f. iv, 229, 236 f. Michael IX (Palaeologus), Bvzan- Mindoro, iv, 231. tine emperor (1295-1320), i,*370. Mineral wealth, the, of the Iberian Michelantonio, marquis of Saluzzo Peninsula, i, 39 f. (1504-28), iii, 249. Miners, German, iii, 630. Middleburg, in Zealand, iii, 154: Minervois, i, 32.
;
iv,
296, 299, 303.
Mieres,
479.
Tomas, Catalan
jurist,
i,
Mignet, Francois Auguste Marie, French historian, iii, 253, 286; on the murder of Escovedo, iv, 325 f. Minho, the
Mines, revenues from, in Castile, i, 249 the silver mine of Guadalcanal, ii, 225,n. 1; iv, 206; the American mines, ii, 225, 233 iii, 637; iv, 207 f., 214.
;
i,
71.
746
Minorca,
386, 319.
i,
GENERAL INDEX
s,
I'.'s.
138,
25f., 315, 316, 335 ff., 199, 500; iii, 115,
Molina,
iv,
Luis,
Spanish
theologian,
;
4S3.
iii,
Minorities, royal, a cause of
weak
i,
government,
23.
i,
96.
in
Moluccas, the, ii, 204, n. 1 439-444, 447-453, 627 f. 227, 229,238, 381, 3M.
iv,
420, 226,
Mint, tribunal of the,
Naples,
Mombasa,
iv,
381.
i,
Mommsen, Theodor,
of
12.
Mirabello, park of, iii, 233 f. Miracles, iii. 434 f., 488; iv, 48. Miranda, Count of, viceroy
Monorchia Simla, iv, 60. Monarchical power, nature

594, n.
1.
of,
iv,
Navarre, iii, 104. Mirandola, iii, 262, 282. Miscegenation, iii, 609. Missionaries in Paraguay, iv, 198; in the Orient, 238 f. Mississippi, the, iii, 523 f., 557.
Mitylene,
i,
Monargma Indiana, iii, 663. Monasteries, special privileges of, reform of, ii, 154. i, 238; Monastir, town near Tunis, iii, 341,
368.
161
iii,
ii,
255.
Moncada, Guillen, Moncada. Hugo

Sicily (1509-17),
i,
313.
de,
iii,
Mobile Hay,
Model
658
f.
523, 530; iv, 165. colony, Lae Casas's, iii, 533,

ii,
viceroy of 23 ff., 244 f.,
248, 283, 293
f.
Modorra,
294.
183.
iii,
Moncada, Ramon, i, Moncontour, battle

162,
_'S9.
313.
of
(1569),
iv,
Mohacs, battle of (1526),
Mohammed,
i.
15.
Mohammed
30),
ii,
I,
king of
Mondragon, Crist6ba] de, Spanish commander, iv, 653 f. Fez (1500- Moneda, i, 247, 248
248.
1,
Mom da fori ra,
i,
king of Granada 1-38-73), see Ibn al-Ahmar. Mohammed II, king of (Jranada (1273-1302), i, 109 f., 125 f., 300,
342.
Mohammed
Monluc, Blaise de, French commander, iv, 260 f. Monluc, Pierre Bertrand de. called, Peyrot, French commander, iv,
266-269.
Mohammed
H302-09),
301.
III,
i,
rranada king of 126 f., 220, 300 f.,

<
Mohammed
(1325 33
.
1\',
i,
king of (iranada
Mohammed
(13.-.
I
117, 127. V. kin^ of
Mons, iv. 296, 298. Monson. sir William, English man. Montalvo, toctor, iii. 171. MonUugo, i, 251 ii, 140, n. I.
i
Granada
Monte Argentaro,
<
iii,
281
i
.v.i.
Mohammed
64 of
7(),
!"..
1362 91), i, 130. XI (Boabdil), king of

182 83,
l
Monteleone, !oui Montesclaros, Marquis

iloza y
I.
Pignatelli.
of, see
Men-
Granada M
69,
7(1.
187 92),
ii.
una.
71. 72, 71.

),
Montesinos, Antonio de, Dominican

kin^
ii.
Mohammed
71
f.
XII (the Valianl

(1
Granada
185 87),
64, 55,
monk, ii, 2:; 1. Montezuma, Aztec

175
I'm.
ruler,
iii,
470
f.,
I'M
t\.
:>;<.
Mohammed
1505 16
.
V,
II
king
(the
(1
of
<
Tlemcen
254
t".
n. 245. 251.
Mohammed
sultan of
Sonqueror),
81),
i,
Turkey
LSI
iii,
Montfort, Amaury de, i, 286. Montfort, Simon de. leads the crusade againsl the Albigenses, i. 285 i.. 291, 130.
Montgrf, (iuillem
tie.
:icri.-tan
of
Mohammedanism, raw
17.
of,
12,
15
See Arabs,
Moon
Serona, i, 315. Montiel, battle of (1369),

<
i,
GENERAL INDEX
Montigny, Baron de, representative of Egmont and Hoorn in Spain, iv, 282 strangled, 284. Montmorency, Anne de, French marshal and constable, iii, 268, 390 iv, 7, 10. Montmorency, Henri I de, son of the preceding, Count of Damville, governor of Languedoc (1563
;
747
iv,
Mor, Antonio, Flemish painter,

45, 46.
Morabitin, i, 21. Moradia, iii, 420 iv, 374. Morales, Ambrosio de, official chronicler, iv, 482 f Morales, Luis de, Spanish painter,
;
.
iv,
486.
iv,
1610), iv, 261. Montpellier, i, 33, 279, 284, 2S7, 288, 289, 290 f., 330, 335, 337, 386 f., 388 f., 391, 392, 394, 498; iii, 97, 229, n. 1. Montpellieret, i, 289, n. 1, 386.
More, Sir Thomas, iii, 551. Morea, the, i, 365, 374, 378;
431.
Moreo,
special agent of 625, 629, 648. Morga, Antonio de, governor of the Philippines (1595-96), iv, 234,
Juan,
Philip II,
iv,
Montpensier, Count
Gilbert de.
of, see
Bourbon,
;
n. 2.
Moriscos, revolt of (1568-71), iv, Monzon, i, 294, 483 iii, 155, 157 83-94, 97 ff., 127, 450, 475; opiv, 569; truce of (1537), iii, 267, pression of, 94 ff prosperity of, 268, 322. 96, 431 expulsion of (1609), 40,
;
.
Mook,
Moors, the,
;
of Aragon, dis961'., 431, 599; 174; iv, 83-160, armed, 598; of Ribagorza, 571. passim, 175, 341, 346, 361, 432, Morocco, i, 5, 13, 16, 18, 19, 20, 21, 433 conquer Spain, i, 12, 16 f 22, 23, 24, 25, 81 f., 85, 108 ff., political and administrative rela125-132, 300-305, 387; iv, 153, tions of Moorish Spain to North 379, n. 1 expedition of Sebastian of Portugal, 341-346. Africa and the East, 17-25 in the
iii,
. ; ;
;
battle of (1574), iv, 303.
in France, Mediterranean, 26 f 30 f gradually driven back by the Spanish Christians, 53-94, 96, 107-110, 125-132, 273, 275 f., 277, 278, 291-300, 311-316, 335 f of Azamor, ii, 4, 82, 132 of Granada, 205; (Moiii, 420; riscos) of Valencia, 111 f., 128 13 j. 296; in Aragon, i, 457 f. in Castile, i, 197 f ii, 96 ii, 80,
. ;
.
Morone, Girolamo, Milanese chancellor,

iii,
237.
f
.
Moros,
iv,
236
Morosini, Gioan Francesco, Venetian ambassador, quoted, iv, 23

f.,
25, 33, 348.

iii,
Moses, Bernard, quoted,
638.
Mostaganem, iii, 21, 344, 346. Motu proprio, papal bull, iv, 586.
Moulins,
i,
iv, 175.
86,
149;
493;
lencia,
tion,
Catalonia, in Majorca, 503:
in
i,
476,
in
Moura, Va- Moura,

347
104, 106, 107.
on Magellan's expedi425 expelled from Castile, ii, 84-97 expelled from silk manufactures Portugal, 94
;
474
Crist6bal de, Portuguese counsellor of Philip II, iv, 340 f.,
iii,
of,
scholarship among, 162 Moorish fashions in Castilian See Algiers, architecture, i, 267.
141
;
f., 353, 354, 359, 362, 371, 372, 376, 554, 570. Moya y Contreras, Pedro de, president of the Council of the Indies, iv, 202, 203. Mozambique, iii, 442.
.
Almohades, Almoravides, Bugia, Mudejares, i, 198 f Cordova, Fez, Granada, Idrisites, Mtihlberg, battle of (1547), Merinites, Morocco, Mudejares, 258, 358 f., 369, 373. North Africa, Omayyads, Tlem- Mugeres varoniles, iv, 554. Mula, iii, 70. cen, Tripoli, Tunis.
iii,
90,
748
Mules,
iii.
GENERAL INDEX
203
f.
Nafi,
i,
15.
ruler of Tunifl (1525 12), in. 306, 307, 312 i'.. 315, 317, 318, 324, 333, 348; iv, 150. Muley Mohammed, ruler of Tunis,
Muley Hassan,
Najera, Lara. Xainur,
Duke
iii,
of,
see
Manrique de
390;
iv,
312, 313.
ii,
Nancy, battle
of (1477),
53.
iv,
150
ff.
Mul-Hacen, i. 36. 302,305. Muluya, the, Martin de, Munguia,

i,
Nani, Agostino, Venetian ambassador to Spain, quoted, iv, 27, n. 3, 561, n. 1, 665 (under L596,
Biscayan
arquebusier,
iii,
327, 328.
i,
;
Munich,
iii,
is.")
iii.
365.
Municipalities, Castilian,
t'.
;
183-187
1597, L598). iv, 337. Nantes, iv, 289. Nantes, Edict of
Nanking,
(1598),
I ,
iv,
566, 416,
iv,
457-467
(
tation of, in the
represenlortes, 221 ff.

;
;
Valencian, ( 17.; MajorSatalan, 488 497 501 ff. 510 Sardinian, can, under the Catholic Kings, ii, 144in the 152: isG; Canarian, Indies. 220; iii, 038 f., 060; iv, 221 f. 567 iii. Juzco, 215, Manila, iv, 231 Santiago de Chile, iii, 591; Vera Cruz. 171. 591, 638.
Aragonese,
:
154
f.
40. 660: revocation Naples, citv, i, L61, 351, 415, 417, 422, 479, 520; ii, 24, f.. 301 f., 306, 310, 314; iii, 248 !.. 250, 269, 274; iv,
292
215, 102,
470.
Naples, kingdom, i, 319-354, 364, n. 1, 381, n. 1, 387, 410,414-425,

507, 515, 518, 520-527: ii. L62 f., 21!. 2l(i. 272, 277 315. 324, 527. 328, 329, 332. 333, 335, 33(1, 337, 338, 348; iii, 7, 2. 209, 222, 25, 101. 181, 208, 248 f., 252, 226, 227, 231, 23 255. 255, 259, n. 1, 200. 203, 265, 271. 272. 281, 282, 283, 284, 306,
129,
36,
511,
Muntaner,
Ramon, chronicler, i, 326, 356, 358, 365, 367, 369, 374; at Gerba, 359, 372. n. 4. mad III, sultan of Turkey (1571
citv,
i,
>
>.
95), iv. 59, 154.
309,336,362,387; iv,61,82,
S2,
S3,
100,
Murcia,
iii,
203.
108,
20N
111,
115.
f..
108.
i,
350
100,
114,
116, 248, 249, 284, 304, 120. 130, 150, n. Ii, 468,
I
Murcia, kingdom,
lis.
170
ff..
474, 519,
280, 296, 297 :'.. ii. L38; iv, lis. 299, n. 1. Muret, battle of (1213), i, 286, 291.
L92,
276, 301
;
Napo, the, iii, 587, 588, a. 2 589. Napoleon 1, naperor of the French
(1804
i,
1
1-.
ii,
NO;
iii,
363.
Murgab,
the,
i,
161
6"
Narbonese Gaul, Roman province,
Munllo, Bartol
ish painter, iv,
i
Esteban, Span-
28. ne, city,

iii,
l.
Narl
29,
i
30.
51. 277,
Muro, Diego
(1512 25),
de, bishop of
iii,
Oviedo
289;
229, 266.
32, 313.
L18.
1
;
Murviedro, i, 11 Muscat, iv, 381 I'M ii. Music,

.
iii,
110.
Narbonne, viscounty, Narbonne, Visigothic

taste taste of
:
provinoe
in
i.
.">
i\
iii,
186
1
;
of
'
lharles
for,
Gaul, i. 29. Narvaez, Panfik de, Spanish eon190 193, iii, quiatador, ii, 213;
l's. 524, 526 f.. 529. Nasrides, Moorish dynasty,
<
Philip
II for. iv. iv,
Mustapha, Turkish general,

Mutinies,
iv,
115.
299,
1
300,
303,
306,
176, n. 2, 624, 630,
Mutis,
nist,
-
Jose*
iii.
652 stino, Spanish bota1.

i
586, n.
ii-iii. iv,
50, BO
i, 83 f. Nassau, k>un1 of, see Henry. Nassau-Dillenburg, Counl Louis of, brother of William of Orange, iv. death of 283, 288, 289, 2!)(i; (1571i, 505
GENERAL INDEX
Xassau-Dillenburg,
749
Count Louis Navarro, Pedro, ii, 247 f., 250, 251, Gunther of, nephew of the preced252, 253, 254-258; iii, 99, 295, n. 2. ing, Dutch commander, iv, 559. Xassau-Dillenburg, Count Philip of, Naves gruesas, i, 261 iv, 518. brother of the preceding, iv, 654. Navidad, iii, 454, 515 iv, 227.
;
National assembly, the, in Naples, i, 522 ii, 310. National churches, idea of, ii, 152. National independence, modem political principle, iii, 402 f., 408;
;
Navigation acts, i, 474, 495 ii, 142. Navios pequehos, iv, 518. Nebuchadnezzar, king of Babylon,
;
Negropont, island,
i,
374, 377.
see
iv,
676.
149, 154.
unification,
National Librarv at Madrid, the,

iii,
Nemours, Duke Nemours, treaty

i,
of,
Armagnac.
of (1585), iv, 609 f. Xeopatras, Catalan duchv in Greece,
National
work
of,
in
378, 381, 424.

iii,
France, Spain, and England, ii, 78 f. Naturalization, i, 227, 461 iv, 429.
;
Nero, iv, 395, n. 2. Xervus belli est pecunia,

;
124, 285.
Netherlands, the, ii, 241, 274, 320, Navagero, Andrea, Venetian diplo323, 324, 334, 336 iii, 6, 8, 9, 15, mat, iii, 141, 142, 215. 16, 18, 29, 39, 44, 46, 59, 79, 98,
Xaval
affairs,
i,
84,
128,
192, 210,
259-261, 321, 483, 485-488; ii, 160 f. 15, 211 ff., 248-251, iii, 490 iv, 477 f brigantines on Lake Texcoco, iii, 499 f. junks, war canoes, 439 praus, 439
;
116, 118, 120, 123, 124, 129, 131, 136, 139, n. 1, 140, 141, 154, 156, 157, 171, 191, 195, 212, 224 ff.,
496, 500, 579; galleasses, iv, 135, 136, n. 4, 139, 141, 143, 538, 545; tactics at espolones, 139, 142 convoys for Lepanto, 136-144 the fleet of the New World, 209 the Invincible 562 ff., 558, Armada and the opposing English
;
227, 241, 255, 258, 266, 267, 270, 271, 272, 284, 293, 306, 342, 354, 355, 364, 366 f., 370, 372, 375, 378-381, 385, 387, 390, 392-397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 405, 584, 667; iv, 3-15, 45, 53, 124, 126, 132, 149, 427, 440, 450, 477, 672, 678,
Chapters
XXXIV,
passim.
XXXVII,
XXXIX,
Neuss,
iv,
619.
fleet,
515-553
the
with England after

563.
war Nevers, Duke of, see Gonzague. 1588, 553- New Andalusia, ii, 214; iii, 541.
naval
Navarino, i, 381, n. 1. Navarre, i, 30, 33 f., 66, 68, 78, 79, 100 f., 107, 119, 122, 193, n. 1, 273-278, 290, 411, 436; ii, 5, 7,
19-24, 291'., 33, 34, 57, 61, 154, 221, n. 2, 328, 335-347; iii, 20 f., 31, 71, 89, 91, 94-106, 119, 173, iv, 200, 222, 223, 229 f., 399, 569 111, 203, 259, 260, 398, 440, n. 4, 441, 449, 567, n. 3, 597, 599, 608.
;
New Castile, in Spain, iv, 448. New Castile, viceroyalty of,
iii,
554-
617, 631, 633, 634, 641, 644, 652, 654; iv, 184, 209. 212-219, 234, 440. New Christians, iv, 84. New fortress, the, at Tunis, iv,
151
f. iii,
Newfoundland,
New New
Galicia, Galicia
iii,
505; iv, 278. 515 f., 519, 633.
(later
iii,
Guadalajara),
Navarre, Marshal of, iii, 99. Navarrese Company, the, i, 379

381, n.
1.
audiencia
f.,
Navarrese heresy,
Navarrete,
i,
iv,
;
iii,
91
592. battle of (1367),
New New New New
641, 642, 644. Granada, iii, 582, 584 f., 638. Guinea, ii, 203 iv, 337. Hebrides, the, iv, 185.
of,
;
;
258.
Laws,' the, iii, 585, 595 ff., 641, 642, 654, 661 iv, 202, 220.
750
GENERAL INDEX
Mexico,
i,
New
New
iv,
41
iii,
515, n. 3,
of,
iii,
1
Nombre do
557
;
518.
Dios, iii, 633 f. iv, 210, founded by Nicuesa, ii, 214.

;
Spain, vicerovaltv
459- Norfolk,
540,
IK).
631, 641, 643 1'., hi .) 054: 184, 209, 212 !'., 229, 234, 236,
set
.
Duke of, see Howard, Thomas. Normandy, i, 153, 388; iv, 627 f. Normans, the, in Sicily, i, 26, 143,
511,
New New
World, tin', Zealand. i\
America.
512;
ii,
185.
Nicaragua, iii, 508, 521 f. Nice, iii. 270; truce of (1538), 267, 271. 322 f.
Naples, 307 359, 360, n.

see
f.
1
;
in 258, 307 f. take Gerba, i, in the Canaries,

;
;
Norman warBethencourt riors at the capture of Toledo

(10S5), 70. Sir John,
Nicephorus
II
(Phocas), Byzantine
i,
emperor (963-969),
340
IT..
24.
'!_,,
Norris,
i,;;;;i,
English
ii,
com;
Nicholas IV, Pop,' (piss

345.
mander, iv, 554 f. North Africa, i, 11;

21
IT.,
71, 73
iii,
Nicholas V. Pope (1447-55),

Nicosia,
iv.
ii.
200.
L28.
Nicotera, i, 327. Nicuesa, Diego de, colonizer, ii. 211 f.

Niebla,
73, 99, 105, 131, 135. 151, 162, 167, 172, 181, 19S. 289, 305319, 32!' 351, 100, 611; iv, Ml,
',7,
iii,
planter 633.
and
in
98,
100, 177,
150 ft,
375,
Moorish
i.
kingdom
133,
101, 108-114, 133, 237, 341-345, 361, intimate 675, 079;
Andalusia,
N ieuport,
<
iv,
103-107. 021
.
Nieva, fount v Yelasro.
of, see
Lopez de Zufiiga
natural and historical connection with Spain, i, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 13, 17-25, 53; conquered by the
lastOe and Mohammedans, 15 f. the North African slates. SI, 115, 125 132: Aragon and the North African Btates, 281, 299- 30S. 311, 313. 322 325. 336, 339, 369 ff.,
(
Ntmes,
1.
27'.'.
284, 2s6, 289.
Nimwegen,
Nine of
211.
(
iv.
047
f.
convention
19,
of (1573), 299, 312.

!aspe, the,
i,
1
405
f. ii,
Nino, Alonso, Spanish explorer,

Nitrate beds, iii, 590. Nizza, Pray Marcos de,
384, 389, 403, 418, 432, 458, 493,

;
195, 50.", Spanish expansion in, under the Catholic Kings, ii, 71. 516 171. 210 260, 283; .Jews flee to, iii, 528. 93: Moore xpelled from Spain boundNoailles. Antoine de. French diploforbidden to n soil to, and between mat, iii, 382, 385. ary Portuguese \oain, battle of (1521), iii, 103, Spanish spheres of influence in, 101. 248 f.. 269. Nobility, the, in Castile, i, 168 17 1. North 'arolina, iii. 529. in Aragon, 13) Northern Marls, the, w ".i_\ '; 254, 017. .".07 572: in iv. North Sea, the, iv, 549 150. 452 IT.; in CataDuke of, see I7_\ 17:;; Valencia, Northumberland,
!'..
*
>
.,
1.
lonia,
n.
iii
170, 491
in Sicily.
in
J
3j Naples, 521
512, 516,
f
ii.
Sardinia. 508, D. 2. 5 7
I
hidley. John.
iv,
523
hostile 0.
:
Norway, iv, 549. Nostradamus, astrologer,
16.
the
of
Hermandad,
103
repression against, linand and Isabella, 101

127.
U
measures Notarios, i. 209 f. taken by Novara, iii, 275.

1
10,
Nova
Scotia,
iii,
525.
126,
the,
<
iii.
496
iii,
t..
601.
1.
ima Recopilaci6n, iv, 155. Novoa, Matlae de, Spanish historian,

iii.
Nogarolles,
!ount of,
303
196.
GENERAL INDEX
636, 652 iv, treaty of (1516), iii, 16, 94 f., 96, 98, 117. Nuestro Consejo, see Royal Council. Nueva Recopilacion, ii, 126 iv, 427,
751
Noyon,
Olmedo,
215;
ii,
i,
Omar
i,
I,
230; battle of (1445), 15,22; (1467), 15 f., 38. king of Tunis (1284-95),
7, iv,
i,
303.
454
f.
Omayyads, Moslem dynasty,

overthrown in the East,
discoverer
89
Nueva Vizcaya, iv, 161. Nunez de Balboa, Vasco,

of the Pacific,
ii,'
17;
rule in Spain, 18-21, 57, 76.
215
ff.,
299
iii,
Onate, Juan de, Spanish explorer
Nunez
431, 520, 541, 542. Vela, Blasco, viceroy of New Castile (1544-46), iii, 596-599,
and
One,
colonizer, iv, 161.
see
Honeine.
; ;
631;
iv,
191,212, n.
4.
Ophir, iii, 450. court of iv, 367 Oporto, iii, 419 appeal established at, 376.
iii, 505, 510. Oppas, legendary bishop of Seville Obedezcase pero no se cumpla, iii, (710-711), iii, 334. 659. Oquendo, Miguel de, Spanish comObscene literature, iv, 433. mander, iv, 531, 552. Oran, i, 20, 22; ii, 243, 245-255, Obscurantism, iv, 482. 259; iii, 21, 292 f., 294, 335, 344, Ocampo, Florian de, official chron-
Oaxaca,
346; iv, 108, 122, 153, 154; attack on (1563), 109 ff. Orange, house of, iv, 247. iii, 533. Ocampo, Sebastian de, circumnavi- Orange, Prince of, see Philibert, William I. gates Cuba, ii, 213. Oranges, iv, 385. Ocana, ii, 40.
icler,
iii,
174
f.
Ocampo, Gonzalo
de, conquistador,
Ocean
Sea, the, ii, 201. Ogerio, Genoese master shipwright, i, 259.

Oidores,
i,
Orbitello,
iii,
i,
281.
Orchil, the,
153;
ii,
Ordenamiento de
240.
las
191, n. 1. Tafurerias,
i,
642 f., iv, 206, 235, 374, 420, 421, 437, 456, 457. Oidores de cuentas, i, 483. iv, 654. Oise, the, iii, 270 Ojeda, Alonso de, Spanish explorer, ii. 210 f., 214, 215; iii, 534, 541. Okba, Mohammedan leader, i, 15, 17. Old Castile, i, 41 iii, 73, 77, 518, 553 iv, 448.
; ; ; ;
231 653
ii,
123
iii,
184, 623,
of Alcala, the (1348), 206, 244, 245, 463, 480; ii, 125. Ordenanzas Navales, i, 487. Ordenanzas Reales, ii, 117, 125; iv, 454. Ordenanzas Reales para el Consejo de
i,
Ordenamiento
las Indias, iv, 200 f Order of Christ, Portuguese military

.
order,
ii,
200, n.
1.
Old Christians,
Oleron, i, 339, Olid, Cristobal de, iii, 463, 466, 500, 506, 507, 519, 521. Olinda, iv, 385.
Olite, treaty of (1462), ii, 29, 30, 61. Olivares, Count of, see Guzman.
iv, 84. n. 2.
Ordono II, king of Galicia (910-924), and of Leon (914-924), i, 62 f. Ordono III, king of Leon (950-957),
i,
66.
Ordono IV, king

i,
of
Leon (957-959),
66, 67.
;
Oregon, iii, 515 iv, 162. Martins, Joaquim Pedro, Orellana, Francisco de, conquistador, iv, 161. iii, 588 f. Portuguese historian, quoted, ii, 51 f. Orgofiez, Rodrigo de, conquistador, iii, 575. Olivenza, i, 106, n. 3 iv, 362.
Oliveira
;
Ollanta,
n. 2.
Quechua drama,
iii,
552,
Orihuela, battle of (1521),

n. 1.
iii,
108,
7.v:
GENERAL INDIA
the,
<>nn<>r<>,
I
Iristano,
in. 533, 536. ii, 208; feudal marquisate of, in Sardinia, i. U3, 505
iii.
Oviedo, see Fernandas de Oviedo. Iviedo, bishop of, see Muro.

(
(
(were, the,
iv, 7>43.
<
triloba,
(77
"
,
19, 550. hrkneys, the, t\ )rl'a n -. Francois d' (d. 1631 !ounl 1, of St. Pol, later hike of Fronsac,
(
I
Oxford, iii. 213; iv. 481, Oxus, the, i. 160, 161.

I
n.
1.
tyster beds,
iii,
~>32.
governor of Picardy,
(
iv,
65
Pace,
11.
Richard,
ii.
English envoy,
iii.
>rinuz,
i\
336.
2.
Oropesa. iii. 110, 319; iv. 219. Orthes, ii. 30. Ortii, Juan, Spanish interpreter,
529.
<
iii,
>rtiz.
Luis,
iii,
206.
Pachacamac, iii. 563, 571. Pacheco, Diego Lopez, Marquis of Villena, grandson by marriage of Hurtado de Mendoza, Diego md Marquis of Santiflana
tall'
72, n.
Ortu de Vergara, Francisco, goveroor of Paraguay, i\, L86ff., 191. Ortiz de Zarate, Juan, adelantado of the Rio de la Plata, iv. 191 195,
196.
(
opposite
iv,
681),
I
ii.
Pacheco, Francisco, cardinal

79), iv. 264, n. 4.
1561
Pacheco,
>rtiz
de Zarate, .luana.
2
H'>.
iv,
194
!'..
Count
Pacheco,
tnes, wife of the third of ( 'liinelion. iv, 7)69.
196.
(
>r\ irto, iii.
Villena,
Juan, i. 216;
Hi.
first
ii,
:.().
Marquis
10-13,
51.
15,
oi
16,
)-ina.
bishop
i.
of, see
Loaysa.
17.
Is. 35,
isona,
teorio,
_'v.i.
Anna, wife of the fourth Count of Chinchon, introduces Peruvian bark into Europe, iv,
569, n. 4.
of John de Gurrea y Arag6n, i\ 51 Pacheco, Maria. Spanish revolution*
Pacheco,
Luisa,
wife
<
toorio,
iio,
Count
of, see
(
Manrique.
Portuguese
iii.
Jeronymo,
iii.
.i
ary leader, iii. 70, 87, 91 f., 650. Pacheco, Rodrigo, first Marquis of lerrarvo, Spanish diplomat, governor of ralicia, brother oi Fran( <
chronicler,
<
1.
no, Juan de, murdered, toorno, iv, 182

iv,
608.
Pacheco iv, 19 Pacha, Pedro <lc. Majorcan noble,

cisco
I
Ostend,
<
616.
I
iii. 115. Pacific Ocean,

ii,
<
Ostia, ii. 293; iv, tauna, Duke of, set Tellea

'
216;
named
iii.
iscovered by Balboa,
by
Magellan's
revolu1
liron.
.
expedition,
12,
431.
tho,
n.
I
Roman emperor
ii,
I
69
i,
Padilla,
Juan
de.
ii
Spanish
tionary leader,
13,
70. 72. 7
77,
Otranto,
21.
281, 294, n.
iii.
1
;
iii,
Otumba,
<
battle of (1520), Kidenarde, iv, 507.

1 .
196f.
84 '.M.' Padilla. Lorenzo de. Alcala, ii. 71. 210.

icler,
ii.
-nor
of
Padilla. Lorenso de. Spanish chron71. n. 2.
<
kied-Martine, river, iv, lit. 71 139 Ourique, battle of i, Nicolae de, governor afiola, ii. 227 230;
160.
of
iii,
I. in.
399,
ii.
iv,
617.
n..
64*
I,
Maria de. i, 134. y Manrique, Martin de, adelantado mayor <>f Castile, iv, 561 quoted, Papa d'awantaggio, iv, 420, n. Ilamachu, Araucanian chief, iv,
Padilla. Padilla
:
.">.
i.
10;
i.
in.
240.
182
tlting, in.
I-,
:.;
62
217:
iv,
485f.
GENERAL INDEX
Paix des Dames, see Ladies' Peace. Palacio Real das Xecessidades, iv, 365, n. 5.
753
Palawan,
Palencia,
iii,
i,
438.
72;
iii,
77,
at,
120;
i.
rudi-
265. Palencia, Alonso de, Castilian chronicler, ii, 9 f

.
mentary university
Aragon. 347 f., 354 ff., 395, 397; the Triple Schism and Aragon, 407 f. Alfonso the Magnanimous threatens to support Benedict relations of the XIII, 415 f. Catholic Kings with the papacy, 152 ff., 199-203, 281 f., 285, ii,
;
;
Palermo, i. 323, 324, 325. 326, 337. 350,515.519: iii. 24, 25 iv, 466. 189 ii, Palestine, i, 342. 505 iv,
;
; ;
125.
291, 293, 304, 313 ff., 322, 337, relations of Charles V 339, 345 f. with the papacy, iii, 360-363, 400, 401 ff., et saepe; relations of Philip II with the papacy, iv,
;
Palestrina, Giovanni Italian musician, i

156, 158; 186.
ii,
Pierluigi 486.
i,
da,
Palma, Canarian island,

177, 180
149, 152,
52-68, et saepe. See Bulls. Excommunications. Inquisition, Interdicts, Rome, and under the
several
f.,
184, 185,
Popes.
;
Papal guard, the, ii, 71. Palma, city in Majorca, i, 313 f., Paraguay, iii, 608-611 iv, 186-198. 316, 335, 392, 499, 500-503, 504. Paraguav, the, river, iii, 606. 505; ii. 143; iii, 116. Parahyba, ii, 213, n. 3 iv, 387, 388. Parallel between the Spanish and Palomera, i, 313. British Empires, i, 3 Palos, ii, 193, 196, 199, 237; iii. iv, 679 510. between Philip II and Louis XIV, 40 ff., 48. Pamplona, i, 29 ii, 345 iii, 20, 101, 103, 106, 230; treaty of (1464), Parana, the, iii, 606 f., 610; iv. 192, ii, 35 f., 37 f. 193, 197.
;
;
Panama,
520
f.,
iii,
441,
470,
:
507,
519,
Paredes,
Count
of,
see
Manrique,
541-548, 553, 556, 563, 598, 600, 633, 634 iv, 192, 197,
209.
of,
iii,
Rodrigo. Parga, iii, 324. Paria. Gulf of.

Paris,
ii,
iii,
532.
iii,
Panama, audiencia
^42, 644.
596, 641. 210, 212,
53,
298;
267, 268, 270;
iv. 8, 9. 11, 15.
174.246.256,259,
Panama. Isthmus
218;
iv,
of,
ii,
557.
iii,
Panama
Panav.
360, 479, 483, 507, 523, 524. 600. 603, 604. 615. 616, 624, 625, 627, 628, 656.
Canal, the,
634.
629
ff.,
632-645, 646, 652,
iv.
229
f.
Pandects, the, i, 241. Paris, Parlement of, iii, 272. Pangasinan, iv, 233. Parliament, in England, i, 227 Panormita, see Beccadelli. iii, 389, 391, 392; iv, 424, 436. iv. 519. Parliament, the, of Sicily, i. 512. 513, Pantellaria, island, i, 359 f. ii, 165 f. Pantoja de la Cruz, Juan, Spanish 515, 516 ff. Parliamentary privilege, in the Caspainter, iv. 46. tilian Cortes, i, 224 f. Panuco, iii, 498, 504. 531. Papacy, the. and Pedro II of Aragon, Parma, iii, 227, n. 2, 280, 361, 362, 285 in conflict with Aragon 370 iv. 250. i, over Sicily, 319-334, 337-348; Parsons, Robert. English Jesuit, iv, the peace of Anagni (1295), 500, 501. n. 1. 347 ff. the Sicilians continue the Particularism, see Separatism. the peace of Partidas, see Las Siete Partidas. contest, 349-352 Caltabelotta (1302), 352 ff. Cor- Pasqualigo, Piero, Venetian diplosica and Sardinia granted to mat, iii, 11, 12.
:
754
GENERAL INDEX
Aragon (1196-1213),
284
430,
ff.,
i,
quin dd Infiemo, iv, 586. u. 2. Passano, Genoese merchant, iii. 238. 373 f. Paau, treaty of iii,
.
2SS, 334, 342,

(the
33, 79, 345, 365,
mi
III
int, iv,
17.
is.
Pedro
iv, 59.
Great),
king
of
of
P istor, Ludwig, FreUierr von, Pastrana, castle, iv, 329.
Aragon (1276-85) and
Sicily
Pasturage,
L38fif.,
i,
:
39.
iii,
262f.;
201
IT.;
ii,
136,
Pedro I, L282 85), i, 113, 116, 290, 303, 318 335, 336, 360.
106, 117 119,433 137,486,494, 412. 495 f., 199, 511 11, iii, Pedro IV (the Ceremonious), king of Aragon (1336-S7). i. 99, a. 2, 118, 135,290,302,304 f., 358, 361, n. 2,
I'.. j
301
s
iv,
429,
149.
" Mesta.
of,
.".(i,
Patagonia, iii, 127 131, 449. Patents of Legitimacy, purchase

iv,
<
139
f.
iii,
Paternalism,
Patras,
255.
in.
665.
rat,
i,
376, 379, 380, 381,

10:..
299.
privath) del
real,
i,
130,
HO
117.
100, 401, lis, 456, n. 1.
I'ulrimintio
208,
.
46"),
187, 7)07.
I,
Pedro
;
Pairimonio
iii,
208, 256, 461 ">07 166, 166, 199; iv, 129, 142.
Petri, the,
iv, 0, 9.
i,
emperor of Brazil 1822 31), king of Portugal (1826), iv.

385, n.
1.
<
Patrimonium
iii,
422;
.
ii,
Pedro (the
iruel),
kinji of
i,
Castile
lis,
293; 282; Paul III (Alessandro Farm (1634

_'f,7.
and
Pope
I.e.m
(1350 69),
f.,
'.'i.
121. 122, L30, 134
138, L83, L93,
19), iii, 149 f., 262, 264, 265, 280, 306, 322, 323, 335, :;:,:, t.. ;::,!. 359 363, 367, 109; iv, .".;. 249. Paul IV (Giovanni Pietro Oaraffa),
213,253,305, 393; iv,639. Pedro, king of Portugal (1357 67),

120, n. 2.
i,
Pedro
i,
II,
king of Sir
1
1337
I
512.
(d.
Pope (1555 59), ii, 313; iii, 281, 282,391,393,397,398, W0, W9f.;
iv,
:.,
Pedro
of
Aragon,
138), -on of Ferdinand i, 116, 117, 420, 121.
54, 57, S5, 252,
171.
422.
Paulus, Julius,
i,
Roman
jurisconsult,
236. ia, battle of (1525), iii. 129, 136, L60, 21."-, n. 1. 233 238, 217. 255, 256, 27:;. 283, 284, 300; iv, 111,
n
i. t.-i.
Pedro (.1. L296), Aragon, i, Pedro (d. i
of
Pedro
III of
Sancho
of
Portugal, Pedro,
I
1.
315.
ble
Mil'.!.
BOH
i
of
of Portugal Pedro, (hike
(d.
of
17v
iii,
loimbra, and
town
if
in
Peru,
(
634
.
iv,
;
90,
of
is.
Jamee
ii.
I.
[sabella, daughter ounl of Urgel, ii,

;
n.
:;.
1
;;
1.
35,
,;
Monsieur
iv.
:.'
L676
iv,
|
315.
Pedro
(d.
1.
W2), boo
K'l.
oi
Martin
of
Peace of the I'vp

i.
lie
I6f
-
Sicily,
291
"
Peace with
<
Christian
kin^.-."
iv,
iii,
171, 172, 259, 260,

\
362;
99.
ii,
enezuela, the, Pear] fisheries, iii, 632, 658. Pearls, iv, 277, 593.
1
211.
Peking, iv, ' Pelayo, Spanish chieftain, kin^ "i edo (720 7:;7 1, 1, 56, .">7, 68, 205; in. 171. in, Peloponnesus, the, i, 364, :;7'.i
;
99.
insurrection,
264.
1
is
Majorca
Pembroke,
Pefia,
I
lai
of,
iv,
1.
rancisco de, auditor of the
Rota, quoted,
la.
07
f.
Zufiiga, Francisco de.
Iro
II
(the
Catholic),
kin^
of
.'he, iv,
664
f.
GENERAL INDEX
Peniscola,
110.
i,
755
293, 294, 408, 416

;
iii,
Penon d'Algel, ii, 257 iii, 21 f., 295. Penon de la Gomera, iii, 294, n. 5. Penon de Velez, iv, 111-114, 115.
iv, 165, 166. Peralta, Alonso de, commander at
Perrenot, see Granvelle. Perrenot, Thomas, Seigneur

r
,
de
Chantonna} Spanish ambassador

to France, iv, 167, 168, 174, 256, 263, 264. Persecution, religious, i, 88, 199-202, under the 246, 285 f ., 456, 474
;
Pensacola,
Catholic Kings, ii, 86-97, 163 f., Bugia, iii, 345 f. 314 f. under Charles V, iii, 129 f ., Peraza, Ferdinand, claimant to the 401 ff., 655; under Philip II, iv, Canaries, i, 156, 157. 16 ff., 52-55, 78-83, 217, et saepe. Peraza, Ferdinand, the vounger, ii, 176 f., 179, 184, 185. Persia, i, 164; iii, 290, 301 ff., 341 Peraza, Inez, wife of Diego de iv, 100. Persian Gulf, the, iv, 337, 381. Herrera, i, 156; ii, 172. Peregrino, Raphael, pseudonym of Pertau Pasha, Turkish general, iv, Antonio Perez, iv, 601. 138. Perez, Antonio, Spanish minister, Peru, i, 149 iii, 462, 506, 512, 529, iv. 312, n. 1, 324-330. 346, n. 4, 541-604, 607, 608, 611, 634, 637, 351, 354, 409, 411, 573-593, 628, 647, 660, 661 iv, 179, 1S6, 187, n. 2, 632 in France and England, 191. 192, 197. 241, 417.
; ;
; ;
;
599-604;
601
;
Don
his Relaciones, 327, of the poisoning of Carlos, 38.

tells
Perugia,
iii,
260.
of
Perez, Gonzalo, Spanish minister, iv, 258, 324. Perez, Gonzalo, son of Antonio, iv, 604.
Peruvian bark, iv, 569, n. 4. 'Peruvian Solon,' appellation Francisco de Toledo, iv, 218.
Pescara, Marquis of, see Avalos. Pesquisa, i, 232, 246.
Pesquisa
;
secreta, iv,
466
f.
ii,
Perez, Juan, Franciscan friar, ii, 193. Perez, Luisa, daughter of Antonio, iv, 604. Perez de Almazan, Miguel, state
secretary,
iii,
Pesquisidores, i, 232; 185 iv, 464.
147;
iii,
14.
el
Perez de
Guzman
Peter the Hermit, iii, 288. Petitum, i, 247. Petrarch, i, 144, 475.
72),
i,
of Medina Sidonia, commander of the Invincible Armada,

iv,
Duke
Bueno, Alonso, Petronilla, queen of Aragon (1137277, 280, 428.

iii,
Pharmacy,
176
f.
528-552, 621 f., 648; Phayre, governor of Andalusia, 560, 561. agent
367,
Periploi, the, i, 37. Peris, Vicente, commander of the
121.
William,
at
Madrid,
English special quoted, iv,
Valencian Germam'a,
Perjury,
iii,
iii,
110-113.
186.
iv,
Philadelphia, city in Asia Minor, i, 368. Philibert, prince of Orange (150222, 1526-30), iii, 13. Philip, the apostle, iv, 48. Philip III (the Good),
Pernambuco,
385, 389.
iv,
Peronne, iii, 266. Perpetual Edict, the (1577),

312.
311,
Perpetual vouth, fountain

iv, 162.
of,
ii,
217
duke Burgundy (1419-67), i, 419. Philip I (the Handsome), king Castile (1504-06), Archduke
of of of
Perpignan, i, 330, 331, 390 f., 408, 437; ii, 58, 59; iii, 181, 229; university of, i, 265, n. 4; peace
of (1473),
ii,
Austria, ii, 61, 213, 246, 268, 274, 279, 288, 289, 295, 298, 306, 320, 321, 323 f., 325, 326-333, 334, 336,
58.
342
iii,
8, 9, 129.
:.m;
GENERAL INDEX
XXXTV, XXXVII, XXXIX; last and
days
death. 66
1
Philip II (Augustus), king of Franco i. 286. (1180 1223

.
670.
Philip III
Bold), king of Prance (1270 85), i. 113, 289, 320, 321, iv, 330, 331, 332, 438; 867. Philip IV (the Fair), king of France
(tl
i
(12s:. 131 i.334, 338, 340,341, 347, 386. Philip V (the Tall), king of France
1
.
Philip III, king of Spain (1598 1621 i. 164; ii. 313; iii, 020; iv, 29, 32, 22:;. 570, 573, n. 3, 593, 506, 597, n. I. 603, 666 f. Philip IV. king of Spain (1621-64), iii, 642; iv, 29, 81, 377. Philip V, king of Spam (1700 16),
.
(1316-22). i. 133. Philip VI. kingof Franco (1328 50

i.
388 f., 392, 198. Philip (the Magnanimous), landgrave of Hesse (1 ")()<) 07), iii. :;.">7.
133, 387,
i. 27: iv. 594. Philip (d. 1277 1. kin^ of Thessalonica and prince of Achaia, aon of < iharles 1 of ^njou, i, 36 1.
Philip, son of
Baldwin
II
of
Con-
370.
Philip Philip
king of Macedon, i, 374. king of Spain (1556 98 i. 120, 139, 224, 319, 469; ii. 120 126, 228, 264, 270, 282, n. I, 313
II. II,
stantinople, titular emperor of the Fast, i. ill. :<46. i. 28. Philippi, battle \ (b.c. 12
.
Philippine Islands, ii. 204 158; iv, 225 211, 322.
iii.
I.
ican
rreeks, tho,
in
i.
8
i,
iii.
139, ill. d. 180, n. 3, 182, 189, P.M. 196, 197

15,
1.
12
136,
nicians,
Spain,
7.
8,
9,
I'.:
201,201'.. 209, 268, 274, 277. 270,
68,372,373,375, 377-394,395 112. 154 t\. 525,586, 620. 622, 627, 629, 630, 631,632, ancestry 633, ii. 1. 644, n.. 007 and early environment, iv. 19: education, 19, 20 Linguistic limitations, 19, 20; in tne Netheri
281
,284
of Spain, i. 35 U. Piacensa, iii, 210, 227, q. 2, 245,280, 361 iv. 250. Piali Pasha, Tin' h admiral, i\, loi. 106 !'.. 115 121. 123, 105,
Physiography
:
137.
Picardy,
8,
'
iii, 227, 228, 229, 258; 283, 646, 660.

.
iv,
kinds, 16 ff.
return to Spain, 3 16; physical traits and habits,
20
ff.
methods
:
<>f
government,
f.
;
ire King, the, i\ 603 Picture kings,' ii. 19. Picture writing, A/tee. iii
1
169,
189,
family compared with Louis life, 31 40 XIV, 40 ff.; the Escorial, 12

the papacy, 52 68, >i sat m of the Jounter-Reforand the tnation, 55, 67 1, 676 f.
pi; religious life,
iih
22 30;
relaxations, 30
n.
1.
49 52; relations
;
Piedmont, ui. 201. 266. Pigafetta, Antonio de, chronicler f Magellan's voyage, iii. 126 143
champion
Indies,
<
<
Pignatelli, teleone,
34), in
Pillars "|
lit
re,
mint
<.f
<
M<mI.">I7
viceroy of Sicily
25
f.
iii,
I
the
and lhapter XXXIII Chapters therlands,

;
Pilcomayo, the,
16,
608
i,
\X\1\.
liberties
WWII. XXXIX:
Aragon, Chapter the administration of
<
Hercules, the,
5, 9.
Pineda, Alonso de, Spanish explorer,

iii. 523. Pinelo, Leon, annalist, iv, 42. n. 600. Pinilla, Baron de. executed,
I
.
.
annexation <>f Portugal, Chapter XXXV; Antonio Perez and the

of
:
XXXVIII
in
la,
the.
ii,
190,
pilot,
ii,
in
;
W\*
XXXVI
lations
reign,
Chapter Pinzon, Martfn,

198, 211.
II
:
193,
196,
relations with England,
Chapten XXXIV,
with
\XX\
re-
Pinzon, Vicente
xTafiez, explorer,
ii,
France,
Chapters
211. 212. 213, 218.
GENERAL INDEX
Piombino, iii, 281, n. Pippin (the Short),
2.
757
iii,
king
i,
of
the
Franks (751-768),
Piquet,
Pirates,
ii,
31.
iv, 30.
i,
11, 259, 312, 371, 486,

f.,
;
487
Pleytos de mil y quinientos, iv, 416, 456 f Pliny the Elder, i, 143. Plus oidtre, iii, 27, 122, 446. Plutarch, i, 143.
.
183
Plymouth Harbor, iv, 279 f. 518,519; Moorish, 430; Turkish, Plymouth Hoe, iv, 536. See Corsairs. 381. Plymouth Sound, iv, 530, 532, 536, 539. Pisa, i, 321, 354-358, 493. Pisa, Council of (1409), i, 407; Po, the, iii, 269. (1511), ii, 345. iv, 424 f. Poderes, i, 222 f
;
.
iii, 248, 254, 255 ff. 28, 53, 131, 172, 288-351, passim, 400, 628, 631 ff. Elizabethan, iv,
242
Plymouth,
iv, 291, 361, 517, 530, 534, n. 4, 537, 539, 540, 601.
280, 311, 347, 395, 505. Pistols, iii, 179; iv, 37. 506. Pius II (Enea Silvio Piccolomini),
Pisans,
i,
Poema
del Cid, the,
i,
267.
Pope (1458-64),
i,
381, n.
1.
Pius IV (Giovanni Angelo Medici), Pope (1559-65). iv, 53, 57 f., 60,
61, 123, 330, 443, 474.
Pius
(Michele Ghislieri),
Pope
Poetry, iii, 215 f.; iv, 484 f. Poison, use or attempted or suspected use of, ii, 15, 16 f ., 18, n. 3, 27, 30, 333 iii, 127, n. 2, 264, n. 3, 308, 356, 439, 509, 510; iv, 38, 506, 558 f., 629, n. 3; poisoned arrows, ii, 214 iii, 589.
;
(1566-72), iv, 53, 60, 61, 145, 330, the Holy 331, 443, 475, 586;
Poitiers,
i,
29.
League,
cates
Pizarro,
123-135
of,
excommuni(1570),
Queen
292; death
Elizabeth 146 f.
Guillaume de, seigneur de Cle>ieux, French ambassador, ii, 296, 300, n. 3. Poland, iv, 302.
Poitiers,
Francisco, conqueror of Poland, king of, see Sigismund II. Pole, Reginald, papal legate, iii, 388, Peru, i, 54, 149 ii, 217 iii, 135, 531, 541-594, 630, 665; iv, 161, 390, 391. Political institutions, of Aragon, iii, 187,215. Pizarro, Gonzalo, conquistador, iii, 152-155, 156 ff., 180 ff., 187 f. of Castile, iv, 567-573, 578-599 555, 573, 574, 586 ff., 595, 597138-156, 158-180, 182-187; 603; iv, 161, 215. iii, of the Indies, iii, Pizarro, Hernando, conquistador iii, iv, 409-467 637-654 iv, 200-225. 555, 560, 563, 565, 568, 571, 573,
;
;
; ;
574 ff.. 586; iv, 161, 215. Pizarro, Juan, conquistador, 568.
iii,
Political
iii,
Testament
iii,
(so-called)
;
of
555,
406 ff. iv, 259. Polos, the, Venetian travellers,

Charles V,
159, 163.
i,
Pizarro, Pedro, Spanish chronicler,
555
f.
Polygamy,
iii,
iii,
609.
i,
Pizzighetone,
235.
Pompev, Cneius, invades Spain,

28.
'Placards,' iv, 252, 253, 307. Plague, the, iii, 28, 39, 249. Plateresque style in architecture, 217 f.; iv, 486. Plato, dictum of, i, 41.
Ponce de Leon, noble Andalusian

iii,
family,
plorer,
ii,
48, 62, n. 2.
Ponce de Leon, Juan, Spanish exii,
217
f.
iii,
523.
official,
Playing cards, crown monopoly

iv,
of,
Ponce de Leon, Luis, Spanish

iii,
208, 441.
509.
Plaza 25 de Mayo,
iv, 195. Plessis-les-Tours, iv, 615 treaty of (1580), iv, 497, 505, 507.
;
Ponce de Leon, Rodrigo, Marquis of

Cadiz, ii, 63, 64, 69. Pons, Felipe, Spanish legist,
ii,
116.
7.5S
GENERAL INDEX
Ddjgada,
i,
1
Ponta
Pontasgo,
iv, 393. 251 10, n. 1. ii, 135), i, 120. Ponsa, naval battle of Popayan, iii. 577, 583, 585, 598, til I.
; 1 1
14, 38, 50 f., 52, 53, 54 f., 93, 262, 264-270; claims on lie Canaries,
t
182, Popocatapetl, Popotla, iii. 196. Population Of Spain, under the under Catholic Kings, ii. 93;
iii.
183.
Philip II. iv. 117 i. Porra, iv. 191. Porras, Martin de, procurador Burgos, iv, 449, n. 3. Portazgo, i, 251. Porte, the, see Turks. iii, 190; iv, 418. Portero, i. 201 Porte St. Denis, iv, 644. Portfangos, i, 357. Portland Bill, iv, 540. Port Mahon, i. 336, 337, 357;
I
;
144 f., 155 158; ii, 54, 171 IT.. 171; expansion in Africa, i, 130; ii, 188 f., 240 f., 245, 248 f., 263; colonial rivalry with Spain, 198 20 1. 210, 218, 266; expulsion of the Jews, !:!, 267, 270; expulsion of the Moors, 94 in .Julius IPs list of precedence, i, 510: annexed to
i,
;
of
Spain (1580), 53;

iv,
15:;,
ii,
I
262, 264;
151,
155,
SI. 201,
106,
190,
492,
500,
520,
322674 !'..
677.
Portugal,
Castile,
Alvaro de, president of

ii,
119.
Portugal,
Francisco
iv,
de.
Count
of
Vimioso,
iii,
366, 372, 391, 392,

.-on
394.
3 19
Porto Bello, iv, 164, 557. Portocarrero, Hernan Tello, Spanish
Portugal, Infante of, sec Pedro, of Sancho I of Portugal. Portugal, Joao de, bishop >'f
361, 372. Portugal Restaurado, iv, 384,
La
commander,
Portocarrero,
iv,
658.
Guarda,
iv,
Pedro, Spanish com152.

.
mander,
Porto Porto Porto Porto Porto
562.
iv,
Ercole, iii, 281 Farina, iii. 310. Ferrajo, iii, 281. Longone, iii. 281
Portuguese, America,
barn
'
from
:
Spanish
204 iv, neglect tho Philippines, 225; in the Orient. 22ii, 227, 2:':', 230, 232, 238, 240;
in Africa. 266.
n. 2.
i\,
Rico,
ii,
'-'17,
218;
557,
Portuondo,
admiral,
Postal ser\
Etodrigo
iii,
_'
de,
Spanish
Porto San l.-tefano, iii, I'M. Porto Seguro, ii. 212. Porto Venere, i. 120.
Port Royal Sound, iv, 167. Port St'. Julian, iii. 127 130,
III.
ice. i\
Potidaea,
Poto.-i,
iii.
i.
453. 373, n. 1.
,
IJ86,
637
iv, 21
I.
133,
Pottery, Peruvian, iii. 552. Poupct de la ( 'haux, iii, 300, n.

paint*
r,
ii.
3.
Pradilla y Ortis, Francisco, Spanish

7:; f.
i.
Portucalia, see Portugal
Portugal,
mil'
15, 69, 71
I
7."..
107.
15,
M7,
ii,
:
78, 79, 90, lis. 119 125,
193,
I'll'
213, 298;
71
l'-.
iii.
71.
60 56 92 IV..
L35
306, 364, 102, 119 125, 139 156, 590, '-.-"J. 62* iv, 62, 113, 226, 140, n. 1. .Mit. 514, 519, 527, 560, 574, influence of lier rise on Spanish
tT..
151,
172.
17:;.
Praedt, Sieur de, imperial ambassador, iii. 238. Pragmdticas, legislation by, iv. 12:>. see /."- Pragmdticas. Pragmdtica Praus. iii. 438f.
.
Precedence,
Julius
lit
ii,
lis!
i.
of.
f.
published
b)
II.
518
de Bidoulx, French admiral.
308.
maritime development, 39, 75 12. f., marriage al163, 279:

i.
1
Prescott, f.. 331
William
f.
;
Hickling,
I
;
ii.
328
71
f.
:
iii.
liances
106,
with Castile,
121,
103
12:;,
f.,
!<>">.
120,
122.
121;
ii,
quoted, iii, 564
i,
;
399, n. 268, 171; Ii,
iv,
291
iv, 2<i.
GENERAL INDEX
Presenda, Luis de, agent of Charles V, iii, 307 ff. President of Castile, ii, 119.
Presidios, the, in
759
in 646; in Florida, 166-178; France, 289, 627 (see also Huguein the Indies, 217 in the nots)
; ;
North
Africa,
iii,
;
21
ff.,
on the coast
292-301, 309-319, 329-351 of Tuscany, 281 f.,
Netherlands, 270, 492, 493, 494, 511, 514, et passim; in Scotland, 273 in Spain, 78 ff., 480.
;
399. Prester John, iv, 337. Prette, Pierres de, iv, 39, n. 1. Prevesa, naval battle of (1538), 324-328, 330, 332, 333, 347
;
Prothonotary, the,
Proti,
iii,
i,
in
Naples,
i,
i,
522.
519.
34,
Provencal tongue, the,

472.
iv,
428,
Provence,
103, n.
1.
290,313,497;
iv,
Price fixing, iv, 450 f. Price revolution, the,

Prices, rise of,
iii,
33, 34, 279, 284, 287ii, 36, 272; imperialist invasion of (1524), iii, 231 f
i,
. ;
451.
1,
32, n.
199
f.,
258, 265 invasion of (1589),

(1536),
f.;
Savoyard
627.
i,
iv,
206
f.
iv,
451.
Provinces of
13, 38.
Roman
Spain,
10-
Ptolemy, Claudius, Alexandrine asbefore 1473, i, 519. tronomer, i, 99. Privados, see Validos. Puebla, Rodrigo de, Spanish ambasPrivateering, iv, 431, n. 2. sador, ii, 319. Privileges of Union, the (1287), Pueblos, iv, 429. i, 438-446, 459, 460, 464, 466, Pueblos de solariego, i, 183. Puente de Burgos, iv, 554. 472, 473. Puerta de Pinos, ii, 194. Privilegio de los Veinte, i, 455.
Priestley, Herbert Ingram, quoted, iv, 164. Primogenit, ii, 26. Princes' League, the, iii, 372 f. Printing, introduced at Palermo
Provisores, i, 508, 509. Pruebas vulgares, i, 246. Prussia, ii, 91.
Privv Council, in Castile, iii, 154 in England, 388, 392 in Milan, 272. ii, 229 Procuradores, i, 188 f ., 482 169-180; iv, 416, 422-434, iii, 439, 441-446, 450, 451, 459-465. Procurador fiscal, i, 231 ii, 123. Procurudor real, i, 507.
; ; ; ;
Puerto Caballo, iii, 508. Puerto Cansado, on the African coast, ii, 189, n. 2.
Puertos secos, 441.
iv,
West
430,
375,
n.
2,
Puerto Viejo, iii, 570. Puig de Cibolla, fortress,
i,
295.
1492),
Prophecies, iv, 89, 98. Proposition real, iv, 434. Protection of national industries,
iii,
Puka-Puka,
Pulgar,
iii,
432.
del
ii,
Hernando
(d.
Spanish chronicler,
16,
115
f.,
204.
title
Protector of the Indians,
of
133, 145 f., 156, 162; Puna, island, iii, 556 f.
iii,
153.
Luque,
iii,
555.
Puno,
Peruvian
department,
iv,
'Protector of the
Realm
of
proposed
title
of France,' Philip II of
190.
Spain, iv, 624, n. 4. Protestantism, rise of, iv, 217, 248, 258, 259, 271, 287, 515, 523, 610, 639, 640. Protestant martyrs, iii, 356, 401, 655, 662; iv, 17 f., 78 f., 217.
Protestants, the,
Punta Gallinas, ii, 211, n. 1. Punta Santa Elena, iv, 166, n.

Purveyance,
iii,
1.
177.
Pyrenees, the,
52-55;
in
94; Cologne,
ii,
iv, 35, 49,
iii, 103, 105, 117, 118, iv, 4, 324, 349, 120, 171, 232, 257 400, n. 1, 402, 409, 569, 599, 600, as a barrier, i, 4, 27 f. ; 631, 674 peace of the Pyrenees (1659), i,
;
618,
623,
291
iv,
563.
760
GENERAL INDEX
Ramirez, Juan, Castilian
L26.
jurist,
ii,
Quacks, in. 176. Quadra, Alvaro della, Spaniafa ambassador to England, iv, H'l ff.
Quanhuahuac, Quauhpopoca,
iv,
i,
iii.
iii,
499, n. 486, 487.

1
Ramirez de Quifiones, Pedro, president of the audiencis of Cnarcas,

iv,
189, n. 5.
I,
18.
Ramiro
i,
king of Aragon (1035-63),
289, a. 1. Quercy, 127. Quesada, Quesada, Gaspar de, captain of the 'oncepcidn, iii, 427 Ef. Quesada, Hernan Perez de, iii, 583,
i,
<
275.
Ramiro II (the Monk), king of Aragon (1134-37), i, 277 f. Ramiro II, king of Leon (931-950),
i,
65
67.
f.
585.
Ramiro
i,
III.
king of Iron (966-9-v
Queaada, Me Ximenez de Quesada. la Jean de Quesnot Chesnee, Jacques, draws a parallel between Philip II and Louis XIV, iv, iu
ff.
Ramon Ramon
Berenguer I, Barcelona (1035-76),
count
i,
of
32, 476.
Quiahuitztlan,
iv, 60.
iii,
476.
bull (1098),
Quia prudentiam, papal
Quicksilver mines, iv, 214, ill. Quijada, Luis de (d. L570), mayordoiiui -t Charles V, iii, 398, 399;
iv, 37.
Berenguer II, count of Barcelona (1076 82), i, 493. Ramon Berenguer III, count of Barcelona (1096-1131), i, 32 f., 28 Ramon Berenguer l\. count oi Barcelona (1131-62), i, 277, 280,
283,
128.
111,
i,
Ramon Berenguer
count
of
Quiloa, iv, 335. Quilon, iv, 335. Quinine, iv, 569, u. 4. Quint, Nicholas de, Spanish com-
Provence (1168 il), 284. Ranke, Leopold von, German historian, iii, 278; on the murder of
326. Escovedo, Raphael Santi, Italian painter.
i
mander,
Quinta,
V,
i,
iii,
2'_'.
ii,
.
i\.
L90 f Quintana, Pedro, adi iser of

136:
in,
1
Pi.
i
Jharles
Ratisbon,
Ravaillac, \&
iii,
35 356, 365 Francois, assassin,

;
.
iv,
Quintanilla,
Alfonso
'-'.
de,
contador
mayor, ii. 93, a. Quinteros, iv, I7'..

nto, royal,
iii,
.
Ravenna,
565
:
Sat tie of
hi,
(1512), n. -ill,
<>i
342, 348;
188,
iv,
99.
207.
Raymond
(1] is
of
Burgundy, governor
Quipus, iii. 551 Quiroga, Gaspar

[\>ledo
'!,
archbishop of
Galicia (1093 1107)*, i, 71, 72. Raymond V, eounl of Toulouse

94),
i.
and cardinal, inquisitor-
2
cot
.
eral, iv, front ispiece, 573.
Raymond
i
VI,
\
1
of
Toulouse
Quiroga, Rodrigo de, acting governor of Chile 155 1. 1561 L565 67)
I
I'M
1222
19),
i.
i.
I:
mond
1222
1,
284 i., 286. count of Toulouse
and governor (1575

Quito,
iii,
.".pi.
80), iv, I80f. 569, 570, 576 f., 586,

n 2
594, 599.
Quito, audiencis of, \\ 190, s |., 530. Qutvira, iii,

,
."
Ra
tin /.
ii,
:
iv,
I
-171
ii
6
I
ranciw
secretary,
count of 287 f. Raymond Roger, eounl of Foix 86. [88 122 Valthe, at Real ChanciUeria, iv. 150 ladolid, hi, 69, 7s Real Patrimonio, i, 516.
Raymond Berenger
Provence
1208
286, 287. IV,

L5
i,
I'.
!:
aide,
Juan Martinez
de, Spanish
GENERAL INDEX
commander,
541, 552.
iv,
761
etc.,
i,
531.
535,
539,
Naples, Jerusalem, Sicily,

;
Reccared
I,
king of the Visigoths

i,
(586-601), (652-672),
237.
237.
ii, 36 f ., 57, 272. 419, 422, 525 Ren6, prince of Orange, iv, 247. Renee, daughter of Louis XII of
Recceswinth. king of the Visigoths

i,
;
France,
Rentas,
iv,
iii,
5.
452. iv, 378, Renty, battle of (1554), iii, 390. Reconquest, the, i, 53-93 the Aragonese Repartimientos, in Valencia, i, 296 402, 672, 679; in Majorca, i, 315 n. 2 ii, 232 Reconquest, i, 273-277, 280, 291in the Canaries, 187 232 299. ii, in the in America, 232-235; Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias, Philippines, iv, 231. iv, 221. Repeal of legislation, iii, 169; iv, Redes, i, 32, 289. 422 f. Redon, town in Brittany, ii, 276. Red Sea, the, iv, 334, 337. Requesens, Spanish noble family, i, 360. iii, 44, Reformation, the, i, 457 403; iv, 49, 258, 492, 616. .See Requesens, see Zuniga y Reque;
Protestantism.
sens.
iv,
Regents, Portuguese,
358, 362.
353, 356,
305.
Requesens, Berenguer de, iii, 329. Requesens, Galceran de, Spanish

admiral, ii, 291, 292. ii, 150 ff., 185, Residencia, i, 234 ff. iii, 183, 185, 276, n. 216, 229 f. of iv, 678; 3, 621, 646, 653; of Coronado, Cortes, iii, 509 f of Pedrarias Davila, 520 519 of the claimants of New Granada, request for its enforce585, 638
; ; .
Reggio,
i,
326
i,
ii,
;
292
ii,
iii,
Regidores,
187
146,
149
iii,
231, 462, 463. Regimiento, municipal council, iv, 461. Regnans in excelsis, papal bull (1570), iv, 292. Reina de la paz, iv, 31. Reinos de alia mar, i, 507.
474;
iv,
Rejon, Juan, Spanish commander in the Canaries, ii, 172-176.

Relaciones of Antonio Perez, 327, 601. Relaciones Topogrdficas, iv, 23.
Relator,
iv,
iii, 190. Relics, gathered for the Escorial, iv,
47
f.
Religious enthusiasm, as a motive force in Spanish expansion, i, 87 ff. iv, 155 f ii, 74, 243
.
Religious toleration, iii, 260, 492, 676. Remensa personal, i, 478.
403
iv,
Renaissance, the, i, 411, 423, 475, 525, 526; ii, 161, 162; iii, 213- Revolutionary Tribunal, the (1793), iv, 282. 218; iv, 491. Renard, Simon, imperial diplomat, Revolutions, era of the, iv, 224. 392 iv, 'Rey Encubierto,' the, iii, 113. iii, 377, 381 ff., 384, 389,
;
ment, 35 in Castile, iv, 416, 464467 in Naples, 470 in the New World, 221 ff. of the Marquis of Villa Manrique, never ended, 222 f. Residenciados, iv, 465 ff. Revenues, of Carthage from Spain, royal, in mediaeval Castile, i, 9 in in Catalonia, 481 246-255 in Naples, 522 f. Sicily, 515 f. under the Catholic 311 ff. ii, Kings, 131-135 from the Canaof the Indies, i, 9 ii, ries, 190 f. 222 f., 230; iii, 635 ff. iv, 207 of Charles V, iii, 188-198; ff.; of Philip II, iv, 436-447.
;
;
7.
Rene
Rheims, iv, 637. Good), duke of Anjou, Rheinberg, iv, 619, 623. count of Provence, titular king of Rhine, the, iii, 41, 354, 401, 406.
I (the
762
Rhodes,
I
GENERAL INDEX
i,
161
ii,
254, n.
1
;
iii,
Rio
Sala.lo. battle of (1340),

ii,
i,
121,
290. 295, 300; iv, 115. Rhodes, rrand Master of, seeVilliers
128, 129;
62, 66;
iv,
342.
de
I'Isle A<l:mi.
Rhone
the, i. 28, 29,30. Riario. Alessandro, titular patriarch of Alexandria, cardinal (1578-85), iv, 357, 363 I., 371.
Rio Salado, in Argentina, iv, 193. Rivas, Lope de, bishop of Cartagena (1459-82), ii, 101.
Roa, iii, 30. Robert (of Anjou), king of Naples

(1309-43),
i,
356, 360, 361.
Ribagorsa, county, 569 572.
i,
273, 275;
Ribagorza, Count of, see Aragon. 371 ff., 375. Ribaut, Jean. French navigator, iv, 166-169, 170-175, 265, 266, 395. Rocca, fifth historic Inca, iii, 549. Ribera, Perafan de, Duke of Aleald Rocchetta, in Cerba, iv, 103, 104. de loa Gazules, viceroy of Naples Roche, de la, French ducal house
(1558-71), iv, 330. Ribiera de Alcantara,
iv,
Robinson Crusoe, iv, 186. Rocaberti, see Dalemar. Gurrea y Rocafort, Berenguer de, leader of the Catalan Grand Company, i,
iv,
is
365, n.
5.
Richard of Cornwall, i, 112, 287. Richelieu, Armand Jean du Plessis, Rochlits, battle of (1547), iii, 358. Due de, French state-man, iii, Roda, ieionimo de, secretary of the 373. Council of State at Brussels, iv, 305. Ricoshombres, in Castile, i, 100, 168of Toledo 174, 241, 256; in Aragon, 453, Roderic, archbishop
(
Athens, i, 364, 373. Rochefort, Gui de, chancellor France (1497-1507), ii, 298.
^\
454, 464. Ridoln, Roberto di, conspirator, 293. Riepto, i, 170, 246, 492.
Riff, the, i, 5, n. 1, 12. Riff Berbers, the. i, 6.
(1210-47),
iv,
it
i,
51.
Rodriguc- de Sousa,
to
Jofio, envoy England by Antonio of
Crato, iv, 365. Rodrfguez, Fray Agustfn, Spanish

explorer, iv,
I'll
.
Juan, proourador of painter, ii, 162. rranada, iii, 124 f. Rincon, Antonio, agent of Francis Rodrlguei de Figueroa, Esteban, of France, iii, 269, 303 f., 333 f. Spanish commander, iv, 236. Rio de Janeiro, ii. 218; iv, 163, Rodriguez de Figueroa. Juan, presi387 f. dent of the Council of Castile Rio <b' la Hacha, the, iii, 6 13, 644. L563 65), i\. 117. Rio de la Plata, the, ii. 213 ex- Rodrlgueii de Fonseca, Juan, minister of the Catholic Kings for co606 612, iii, plorations, 218 f.
Rincon,
Antonio
del,
Spanish
I
Rodrfguez,
(
617; settlements, iv, L86 199. Rio de la- Balsas, iii, 151, 504. Rio de la.- Palmas. iii. 526. Rio de hto, Spanish colony in Africa,
lonial
(i.-.l
l
affairs,
24),
in,
227;
bishop of BurgOS 204 f., 210, 223, 224, 422,423,489, 502 f., 619,
ii,
621, 657.
ii,
189, n. 2.
'
Roger
Roger
n.
l.
I,
grand count of
long of
Sicily,
i,
26
de San .luan, iii, 543. 585. Rio irande del Norte, the, river of rth America, iii, 518. rrande d<> \ iptaincy in
l!i<.
'
iv, 60.
II.
Sicily,
i,
143, 360,
Roger de Lauria, admiral

gon<
ice,
i,
in
theAra-
Brazil, iv, Pedro Rios,

..i
de
los,
(1526-2!'
governor IV
of
320, 326, 329, 331, 335, 336, 338, 344, n. 2, 351, 359, 365, 487.
GENERAL INDEX
Roig, Jaume, Valencian poet, i, 475. Rojas, Spanish noble family, iii, 145. Rojas, Antonio de, archbishop of Granada (1507-24), iii, 145, 146. Rojas, Ferdinand de, author of
Celestina,
ii,
763
291, 330, 332, 335, 337, 386, 390, 391, 393, 394, 498, 520; ii, 28, 31, 32, 33, 58, 59, 143, 272, 274, 276, 277, 286, n. 1, 288, 292, 306, 318; iii, 232, 270.
162.
Rovere,
Francesco
Maria
de
la,
Duke of Urbino, commander of Rojas, Francisco de, Spanish amthe papal army, iii, 245. bassador, ii, 107, 288 f., 290. Roldan, Francisco, ii, 208. Royal Chamber, tribunal of the, in Roman Empire, the, iii, 49 f., 631, n. Naples, i, 523. 2; iv, 482, 671. Royal Council, the, in Castile, i, 145, Romania, i, 364; the 'Assizes of 211-217, 220, 229; ii, 9, 89, 111Romania,' 377. 119, 120, 121, 122, 127, 129, 139,
iv, 460; in Castile, i, 148, 149, 151, 152, 194, 222, n. 1, 240 ff., 244, 262; ii, 125; 227. See Council of Castile. in Aragon, i, 462 f ., 465 in Rubicon, fort in Lanzarote, i, 145, in Catalonia, 476, Valencia, 472 146, 148, 149, 154 ii, 174, 185. 480 f. Rubios, Palacios, Castilian counRomano, Diego, bishop of Tlascala cillor, ii, 139, 227. Rudolf I (of Hapsburg), Holy Roman (1578-1606), iv, 222. Romans, the, i, 28; iii, 174, 567; emperor (1273-91), i, 112. iv, 15; Spam under, 9-13, 25, Rudolf II. Holy Roman emperor 37 f., 262, 312; defeated by (1576-1612), iv, 319, 638, 651. Clovis, 29; importance of the Rueda, Lope de, Spanish dramatist,
Roman
235
law,
ff.,
cities in
Roman Spam,
i,
;
Antoine, iv, 627. Ruiz de la Mota, Pedro, bishop of 286, 293, 306 iv, 6, 8 f Rome, see of, i, 154, n. 1, 285, n. Badajoz (1516 ?-20) and Palencia 2, 328, 331, 332, 334, 340, 341, (1520-22), iii, 9, 14, 26, 31, n. 3, 342, 345, 347, 353, 354 ii, 15, 88, 34, 49 f., 59, 95. 107, 123, n. 2, 152, 200, 201, 203, Runnymecle, i, 435. Rural population, the, in Castile, i, 240, 301 iii, 360-363, 400, 401 ff ., et saepe in Aragon, 455 f 179-183 in iv, 52-68, et saepe. Romero, Doctor, iii, 333. Catalonia, 477-480; in Majorca, Roni al, Spanish victory at (1516), 501 ff under the Catholic Kings,
city,
;
Rome,
184. 285, 339, 381 ii, 285,

.
iii,
216.
St.
Rue
136^140 under Charles V, iii, 201-204 under Philip II, iv, 429, Ronda, i, 110, 129; ii, 69; iii, 77. 449 ff. Ronquillo, Juan de, Spanish commander, iv, 236 f Russell, John (d. 1555), first Earl of Ronquillo, Rodrigo, Spanish comBedford, iii, 386. mander, iii, 73, 74. Russia, iii, 135. Ronquillo de Pefialosa, Gonzalo, governor of the Philippines (1580- Saad, king of Granada (1445-46,
iii,
20, 94.
ii,
83), iv, 234, n. 2, 235.
Rosas, i, 330 iii, 365. Rota, the, i, 523.

;
1453-62), i, 131 ii, 7. Saavedra, Alvaro de, veedor,

;
iii,
451,
n. 3.
Rotterdam,
iv,
i,
Rottingdean,
295, n. 4. 136.
Saavedra Ceron, Alvaro de, Spanish
commander,
Sabrosa,
iii,
iii,
451
1.
f.,
512.
Rouen,
658.
iv,
259, 635, 636, 648, 649,

i,
419, n.
iii,
i,
Sack of Rome,
33, 279, 284, 289, 290,
245
ff .
Roussillon,
Sacramental,
485.
'04
CKNIOHAL INDEX
aeur de, French ambassador to
Spain, iv, 265. Sola de gobiemo, iv, 11. f. Sola de Jveticia <l> la Com de Contrataeion, iv, 206. Sola </( las kijosdalgo, i, 231 ii, 123. Sola ilc Mil >/ (Juirii ntas, iii, is:-};
">
;
Sacred bone of Lake Peten, worship of the, iii. 507 Sacro Consiglio, in Sicily. 1, .")iti. <H Santa io Soero Regto Chiara, in Naples, i, 523 f. ii,
.
111
lv.
170.
Saosahuaman, Peruvian
Sahagun,
torian,
fortress,
iii,
iv, 4 ic.
456 f.
iii,
Bernardino
iii,
de,
Spanish
Salah Reis, viceroy of Algiers,
nciscan
missionary
663.
'>,
and
his-
345 f. Salamanca,
17."),
Sahara, the,
245. St. Angelo, castle of, iii, 246. St. Augustine, town in Florida,
l.
;
21
ii.
iv,
193) iii, 1',', 41), 50, university of, i, 265; Lii,459 f. iv, 284, n. 2, 484; cathedral of. i, 266.
ii,
176,
214;
171, 172, 173, 176, 178.

St.
Salaries,
of,
iv,
iii,
198.
Bartholomew, massacre 264, 296 ff., 302, 506.
415 f.,419, 456. Salazar, Diego de, president of the

Solas,
(
iv,
St. St.
St. St. St.
Benedict, order of, iii. 162, Cloud, town near Paris, iv, 616.
1
ago
'li
'ontrataci&n, iv, 205.

i,
Salasarde Mendoza, Pedro, Spanish

scholar,
tenia, cathedral, Lv, 32, 6

)i/.ier,
211.
ile,
Lv,
247.
iv,
1
Salcedo,
l">,
1
Juan
in
Spanish
com-
Klnio, castle, 118.

17.
1*1.
117,
St. Francis,
iv,
church
of, at
in
Valladolid,
St.
ii,
George, fortress 290 f.

,
Cephalonia,
peace
of
the Philippines, iv, 230. 231, 233. Salcedo, ope de, governor of Honduras, iii, .">_'_' Salcedo. Nicola.-. Spanish poisoner,
1
mander
iv,
:><)ii.
St.
Gennain-en-Laye,
Sale of offices,
325,
138,
iii,
(1569 iv, 289. Saint-Gouard, .lean de Vivonne, neiir de, French ambassador
139,
193; 163;
...
iv,
204. 217.
titl
of
2.
nobility,
129,
170,
-pain,
(
Lv,
348, 358, 360.
Salerno, iii, 248. Salerno, Prince of,
n<<
Charles
II
of
Saint iudule, church of, iii, 14. Saint Helena, island on the coast of
South
(1 31
iarolina. iv, L66, n.

iii,
1.
St. .lean-de-l.u/.
212:
167,
treaty of
169, 170,
Naples. Salian Franks, the. i. 29. Salic Law, the, iv. 624 Salisbury, Pari of, i, 129.
Sal le. i.
Lv,
40.
17m. Li, 60 f. John's River,

1. 1\\
692.
'
iv,
171.
31
rence,
<
lulf of, in, 525.

of.
iii.
Salona, county in Greece, Salonica, i. 373, n. 1. Salou, .. 313, 336.

3,
...
i.
381
St.
Lasarus, archipelago
153
293.
in.
IT.
Salt pit-, revenues from, in Castile,

..
31
31
Mary's Port, near Cadis, i. 160. Paul's cathedral. London, ii. 19.
')
249;
193;
i.
iv,
ill.
Salt tax. the,
136
Peter, basilica of, iv, 131. Pol, Count of, .-,< Bourbon, ncois de Means, Francois de. Quentin, battle of 1557), h B,
(
; 1
Saluzso, marquis of. .<<< Michelantonio. Salvador, iii, 508, 519.

Salvatierra, iii. 89
S.'iiiiar.
'
Frances.
fcmnt of, Spanish rebel,

.
mi"
::.
:.i
I
l.
...
:<.
Simon,
)uc de, L. I7.~>, n. '.i. .lean Bbrard, B
Salvatierra, treaty of (1383

ni,
!
i,
123.
GENERAL INDEX
765
Samarcand, i, 160, 161 ff. Sandoval, Gonzalo de, conquistador, Sampson, Richard, English envoy, iii, 490 ff., 500 f., 510. ^ iii, 124, 138, n. 1, 229 f., 237, 301. Sandoval, Prudencio de, Spanish San Antonio, the, iii, 425-431, 524. 80 historian, iii, 22, 39, 64,
77,
f.,
Sandwich Islands, the, iii, 452, n. 1 San Espiritu, iii, 607. Sanchez de Palazuelos, Hernan, San Felipe, Portuguese galleon in the Armada, iv, 547. Spanish knight, i, 159. Sanchez de Reina, Pedro, priest in San Filippe, Portuguese carrack, iv, Magellan's company, iii, 429, 430. 383, 520. ^ Sanchez de Tovar, Fernan, Castil- San Gabriel, island, iv, 194.
iv.
.
Sanbenitos, iv, 17, 593. Sanchez Coello, Alonso, painter,

^
92, 189, 204, 254.
35, 46.
ian admiral, i, 13fi. Sangiiesa, in Navarre, ii, 23 iii, 102. S&nchez de Vargas, iii, 588. San Jorge, banner of, iv, 590. Sancho IV (the Bravo), king of San Jos6, convent at Avila, iv, 50. Castile and Leon (1284-95), i, 96, San Juan, Prior of, iii, 87, 91. 109, 113 f., 116 f., 125 f., 133, 191, San Juan de Puerto Rico, bishopric,
;
206, 230, 249, 265, 302, 320, 321, 339, 340, 345. Sancho I (the Fat), king of Leon (956-957, 959-966), i, 66 f. Sancho, king of Majorca (1311-24), i, 387. Sancho III (the Great), king of
^
ii,
231, n.
1.
iii,
San Juan de Ulua,

508.
463, 472, 490,

1.
San Lesmes,
the,
iii,
449, n.
San Lorenzo, iv, 145, 351, 665. San Lucar, i, 160 ii, 218 iii, 425, 427, 526, 556, 610, 624, 658 iv,
; ;
Navarre, including Aragon (9701035),

ii,
561.
sometimes
i,
called
68, 115,
peror of Spain,'
20.
'Em- San Lucas, patache, iv, 228. 274 f. San Martin, galleon, iv, 393; Me;
Sancho IV, king

^ 76),
i,
dina Sidonia's flagship, 532, 538,

of
Navarre (1054-
540.
275, 276.
San Mateo,
177.
in Florida, iv, 172, 176,
Sancho, count of Provence (1181-
San Mateo, Portuguese galleon, iv, 85), i, 284. ^ Sancho, son of James I of Aragon, ^ 393, 394, 542, 547. San Mateo, Bay of, iii, 556; iv, archbishop of Toledo, i, 318. 557. Sanoho, Pedro, Spanish notary and cj ronicler, iii, San Miguel, town in Peru, 558, 598, 566, 567, 613. Sancia, heiress of Leon, wife of Fer601, n. 1. dinand I of Castile, i, 68, n. 1. San Miguel, town in the Philippines, Sancia of Provence, wife of Richard iv, 228, n. 2. of Cornwall, i, 287. San Miguel, Gulf of, iii, 542, 585. Sanctuary, right of, iii, 187 iv, 575. San Salvador, island, ii, 197. Sande, Alvaro de, Spanish com- San Salvador, in Uruguay, iv, 194. mander, iii, 355 iv, 102, 105, 106. San Sebastian, fort in New AndaSande, Francisco de, alcalde of the lusia, ii, 214, 215.
;
Sande,
Manila, iv, 234, 235. San Sebastian, seaport in GuipuzPortuguese ambassacoa, iii, 628. Santa Ana de Coro, iii, 534 ff dor, ii, 203. ^ Sandjak, Turkish standard, iv, 146. Santa Catalina, island, iv, 198, 388 f. Sandoval, Francisco Tello de, presi- Santa Clara de Coimbra, convent, dent of the Council of the Indies, ii, 55. Santa Cruz, in Teneriffe, ii, 181, 183. iii, 654, n. 1 iv, 202.
audiencia
r
>f
Ruv de,
'66
S'KKAL
('ruz.
INDEX
Domingo, audiencia
of,
iii,
Santa
Alonso
iii,
d(
royal cosmfh
1.
Santo
grafo mayor,
63, 62
Santa Cms, Marquis of, see Bazan. Santa Crua de la Sierra, iv, ls7. 188. Santa ( Jrua df Mar Pequefia, iii, 29 l. Santo Domingo, bishopric, Santa IV. in Argentina, iv, 193, 194, n. 1.
195, 196.
190, 522, 533, 534, 536, 537, 560. n. 3, 563, n. 2, 578, 640, 642, 643 iv, 190, n. 2.
ii,
231,
Santos,
iv,
:'S!>.
Santa
194.
'.'.
nrar
<
iranada,
ii,
72
I'..
SSo Miguel, one of the A/ores, 390 f., 393f.
iv,
Santa IY\ iuoniino de, i, !.". Sadne, the. i. 30. Santa V de BogotA, iii, 530, 577, Sao Salvador, in Brazil, iv, 3S">. 582 .. 585 f. Sao Vicente, iv, 385, 389, Santa Fe* de Bogota, audiencia of, Saragossa, i, 31, 275 1., 277 434 till. 115. 137, 438, 441, 442 f., iii, 585 f., 641 136, Santa Junta, the, iii. 72 89, 92f., 155, 166, 473; ii, 90, a. 2, 195, 332; iii, 37 ff., 109, 423, 152; iv, 100, 108, 127, n. 2. Santa Maria, the, ii, 196, n. 2, 198. 572, 573, 575, 580 593, 597, n. Santa Maria de la Victoria, iii, iinivcr-itv of, i, 265, Q. 4; cathe1 I
;
472.
Santa Malta, iii, >77 I., Santander, iii, 29, 116;

.
.">s3,
585.
I,
dral of, ii, 24; iii. 152 ff., 455;
treaty of (1529),
iv,
225.
of, see
iv,
302, n.
Saragossa, archbishop
Alfonso
551.
de
ii,
Aragon
Aragon,
1
Fernando
Santangel, Luis de, Santa I'onza, i, 313
194.
de.
Sardinia,
f.,
1
.
Santarem,
iv.
361, 362, 363, 366.

of,
Santee, the, iv, 166. n. Santiago, national Spanish legend

i.
59
ff.
Santiago, the, iii, 425 129. Santiago, largest of the Cape Verde
2: 26 346, ::17 1 i, 8, 9, 350, 351, 354 3 395 398, 400, 104, 408 f., 412 f., II 1, 429, 505 510, 518, 520; ii, 2o, 89, 163 ff., 309, 310; iii, 298, 306, 309, 330, 835; iv, 248, 259,
120.
KiS,
,,.
|.
blands, i\ .">17. Santiago, military order

.
of,
iii,
i,
177:
423,
Sardinian fever, the, i, 3571., 4in Sarmiento, Francisco, Spanish com-
ID7. ins. 254, n. 510; iv, 421, 132.

ii,
16,
tiago.
councillor,
3
Licenciado, ii, 227.

iii.
<
iastilian
mander, iii, 328. Sarmiento de Acufia, Diego, Count of Gondomar, Spanish ambassador to England (1613 18, 1619
-_'
atiago de Chile,
iv,
t
591
ff.,
604
;
.iv.
I7
'.
51
183.
Sarmiento
< (
ae
in
Gamboa,
Saraini
i,
i.
Pedro,
355, 383
Jompostela, i, 60, 72, 137, 177, 259; iii. 16 50, 386; church of, i. 60, 77. 83; ii, 66.
iago de
lalician Bailor, iv. 184, 219, a.

:iri,
town
(
112.
Santiago de
(
-
taba,
iii,
nil
loi
'
f.
ruatemala, see luatemala, audiencia of. tiago de loa Saballeros, iii, 505.
<
I
illana,
[fiigo
Marquis Lopea de.
of,
tot
Mendoaa,
202, n
2.
" Alagon. Sastago, !ounl of trow, Bartholomaus, Pomeranian notary, iii, 356. Satin WerrippSe, iv, 630, a. 2. Sauermann, Georg (Georgiue Sauromannus), iii, 57 63 66.
,
Vntonio, island,
I
ii,
Sauvage, Jean
I
le,
Burgundian chaag
ii,
208,
tomingo, city in Espanola, 234; iii, 524, "

517.
lor,
iii.
422, 657.
Savannah,
n. 2
the,
iii,
520;
iv,
166,
GENERAL INDEX
;
767
interview of Sedefio, Antonio de, conquistador, Savona, iii, 249 Ferdinand the Catholic and Louis iii, 533. XII at (1507), ii, 333, 336 f. Sedefio, Antonio, Jesuit, iv, 239. Savoy, i, 17 iii, 264, 268, n. 1, 282 Seelev, Sir John Robert, quoted, iv, 287 f. iv, 113. , , r Saxon} iii, 357 ff. Sega, Filippo, papal nuncio, iv, 66. Scales, Lord, see Woodville. Seggi, ii, 310; iv, 470. Scanderbeg, Albanian prince, i, 424. Segorbe, Duke of, iii, 110. Scandinavian pirates, i, 259. Segovia, i, 230, 248 ii, 16, 17, 49, in the 82 iii, 68, 73, 567 iv, 282, 446, Scepticism, eighteenth
;
484. century, ii, 97. Scheldt, the, iv, 295, 304, 512 f. Segregation, of Moors and Jews in of Jews, in Scheyfve, John, imperial ambasCastile, i, 198 f sador at London, iii, 376, 377, Aragon, 456. 381. Segura, the, i, 33.
.
Schmalkaldic League, the, iii, 90, Seis malos usos, i, 478 ff ii, 138. 354-359,409. Seize, the, iv, 614, 633. Schmalkaldic wars, iii, 172, 354- ISelim I (the Terrible), sultan of
.
375.
,
Turkey (1512-20),
iii,
iii,
290, 293.
Schmidel, Ulrich, historian of La Selirn II (the Sot), sultan of Turkey

Plata,
608, 610, n.
1.
Scholar King, the, see Alfonso

Castile.
of
Scholarship, works
iii,
of, iv, 481-484. School of Navigation, the, at Seville,
iv, 98, 123, 125, 137, 138, 142, 147, 151. Selkirk, Alexander, prototype of Robinson Crusoe, iv, 186. Seminara, battle of (1495), ii, 292;
(1566-74),
624.
iv,
Schoonhoven,
296.
Sciacca, i, 352. Science, contribution of Alfonso

to,
i,
(1503), 306. Senate, the, at Milan, iv, 473.
iii,
272-277
Senegal,
i,
23.
Majorca, Senlis, treaty of (1493), ii, 278. 504. Sentencia arbitral de Guadalupe, i, 480 ii, 138. Scoriae, iv, 42, n. 2. Scotland, i, 518; iv, 16, 258, 272, Separatism, Spanish, i, 34-40, 63, 75 273, 288, 523, 524, 550, 612. f., 95, 167 f., 190, 193, n. 1, 237, Scots, the, iii, 270 395, 429, 497 f., 500, 511, 514; iv, 277, 512. Scu'pture, in mediaeval Castile, i, ii, 80 f., 85, 149, 166 f., 221 f iii, 267 under the Catholic Kings, 68, 109 iv, 673 f. under Charles V, iii, 217 Septimania, Visigothic province in ii, 162 under Philip II, iv, 485 f. Gaul, i, 29, 30 in Moorish hands, 31 forms part of county of Scurvy, iii, 432. Barcelona. 32. Scylla, Calabrian fortress, i, 421. Sea Beggars, see Beggars of the Sea. Septuagint, the, ii, 155. Sebastian, king of Portugal (1557- Serfdom, in Castile, i, 180-183 ii, 137 in Aragon, i, 455 f. 78), iii, 386; iv, 132, 226, 268, ii, 138 in Catalonia, i, 477^80; ii, 138. 333, 339-347, 454, 500. ^
;
99
progress
of, in
Sebosus, Statins,
143.
(
Roman
writer,
i,
Sebu, the, i, 5, n. 1. Secret Council, the, at Milan, iii, 272. Secret of good ruling, the, iii, 650.
Sergipe, iv, 387. Serpa, i, 104, 106, 107. Serrao, Francisco, Portuguese commander, iii, 420, 439 f Serrao, Joao, follower of Magellan, iii, 429, 435, 437, n. 2.
.
76S
Sertorius, Quintus,
i,
GENERAL INDEX
Roman
general,
ii.
Shipyard Creek,
n. 2.
in Florida, iv,
169,
143.
Sarvicio, i. 226, 248 f., 252, 253; L29, 130. 133; iv, 439.
Shoos,
iii,
206.
.
(roordtnorto, iv, 307, n. 2. icio rohnit/irin, ii. 230.

-
icio
<
y montasgo,
larlo
3esa,
iv.
-
de,
<
iii. 193. ii, 140; Florentine martyr,
of, iv, 2:0 Sibylla of Forcia, witV of Pedro IV of Aragon, i, 400. Sicilian Vespers, the, i. 321. 365; ii,
Siam, king
36.
Sicily,
i.
Is.
,
s.
11. 25, 20.
113, 133. 300,
>f Duke wa, de; Aloysiua

(
Cordova, Fernandez de
1.
see
318 327, 337 354, 359 ft".. 375 i.. 398 105, 409 f., 112, 415,
317,
lis,
!6rdoba.
nario. the,
i
S<
-
//
ba
I.
iv.
230, d. 3(i2. 368.

i.
410. 424. 133, 136, 143, n. 2, 509, 524; ii, 10 20, 2.'.. 20, 36,39, n.2. 89,258,291,292 807,
:,07.
Seven Cities of Cibola, iii. ">l"> 7)10. Seven United Provinces, the, iv. loi 515, 616 (124. 846 664.
in. Seville, i,22,82, 83, 84, 85, 103, 114. 145, 146, 158, L99, 260, 263, 266,267, 195; Li, 85, 111. 148, 172.
I
308,309,310,335;
153,
iii.
181, 20s. 235, 260,
23 26, 10. 263 269,

I
222, 223, 221. 226; iii. 72. n., 77. 137, 184, 212. 121. 12:;. 121. 125, 443. 176, :,17. 529, 554. 606, 610, iv. 611. 623-620. 632, 635 f.. 666 100, 202. 201. 205, 277. 328, 110, n. 1, 4.72, 542; Protestanl con:
272. 274. 282, 283, 203. 295, D. 2. 305, 306, 300. 318, 330, 336, 387, n.2, 300. 112: iv. 47.01. 100. 102. 115, 150, 151, 152, 248, 120. 430. 168 ff., .'00: institutions of, i, 120. 510-520; ii. 116. 163-166. von, German Franz Sickingen, knight, iii, 221.
Sidney. Sir Philip. El and general, iv, 312
ajlish
author
gregation at. 78, 79. 180. Seville, audiencia of, iv. 156, 457. mour, Edward, Duke of Somer-'t,
iii.
37.").
Seymour, Lord Henry, English commander, iv, :.3(). 532, 545.

Sforsa,
Siena, iii. 280 ff., 284, 301. 387, n. 2. Sienese. i. 19 1. Sierra del l'ordon, the. iii. l(t:;. Sierra Elvira, batlleof (1431), ii, 62. Sierra Madre, the, iii 477.
Sierra
22.'),
Morena,
n.
1.
thi
96, n.
n.
1.
1.
20s
23.
ruling family in Milan, iii. 228, 236. 275.
ii.
Sierra
i.
Nevada
582;
iv,
the. fe.
i.
.">.
Sforsa, Francesco,
rsa,
duke
of Milan,
iii.
Sierra Yerineja. the.

l
ii,
242.
Francesco II. duke of Milan, Sigismund, Holy Roman emperor 111 37), i, 108, U9. iii. 237. 260 264, 27.; Sforsa, Galeasso Maria, duke of Sigismund II (Augustus), king of Milu. (I Oiii 7f,i. ii. ;:7. 7,7. Poland (1548 72k iv. of rsa, Lodovico (il Moro), duke of Siguensa, Jose" de. firsl librarian s 17 the !'.-<.. rial, i\ Milan MUM 1500), ii. 287, 290, quoted, 676 f. 99. Sfona. Musk) Attendolo, Italian Silk. iv. 130, 5fl Silk manufacture, in Andalusia, ii, mdottiere. i, 414 IT.. 417. 141 hi. 190, 193, 207) f. iv. 452, Shakespeare, William, rv, 485. Si la lid Rey, iv. 4 1. Sheep raising, in Castile, i. 2621 202 f. in iii. New Spain. 7,12. Siloe >i( _'" de. Spani8fa architect.
.
in.
217.
'01 de, Spanish sculptor,
n.
I. iii,
Sliil-pinn,
i.
84, 2.V.MT., 171. 12 1.. ii. 504

1
185
iv.
ff.,
Siloe.
B9.
217,
GENERAL INDEX
Silva,
ii,
.
769
Alfonso de, Spanish envoy, Solomon Islands, the, iv, 184 f Sol6rzano Pereira, Juan de, Spanish Silva, Diego da, i, 157. legist, iv, 223, 458; quoted, 222 Silva, Juan de. Spanish ambassador f., 399, n. 1. to Portugal, iv, 342, 343. ii, 27. Somatent, the, i, 4S4 f. Simancas, iii, 70, 99, 121, 407; iv, Somerset, Duke of, see Seymour.
285.
;
<
Sinan
23, 284. 'the

iii,
Somme,
Jew,' Turkish 311, 343.
n. 1.
the, iv, 10. 654.
officer,
Sinan Pasha, iv, 151. Sinchi Rocca. iii, 549,

Sindicatores, iii, 277. Sindici, i, 377. Sindicos, i, 482. Singers, i, 401. Sinope, i, 161.
Sisa, i, 249; 192.
m
naval Sophia, the, iii, 301. Soranzo, Francesco, Venetian ambassador to Spain, quoted, iv, 666, 667 f. Soria. iii, 211; iv, 446. Soriano, Michele, Venetian ambassador, quoted, iv, 22.
Sos, ii, 24. Sosa, captain of guard, ii, 251.
Ximenes's body-
iii,
166
f.,
168,
n.
1,
Sosa,
^
ii,
Lope
227
;
Sixtus
della Rovere), Pope (1471-S4). ii. 66, 87, 88, 107, 153, 200, 281, 282: iii. 149.
IV (Francesco
iii,
de, Castilian councillor, 520. de, conquistador,

f..
iii,
;
Soto,
Hernando
Sixtus
(Felice Peretti), Pope (1585-90), iv, 53, 64 ff., 68, 521525, 610 f., 625 f., 641.
528-531, 557
^
560, 566, 644, n.

de,
1.
iv, 161.
Sotomayor,
cavalier,
ii,
Alonso
305, n.
Spanish
Slavery, i, 148-158, 179, 180, 181, Sotomayor, Elvira de, widow of 306, n. 4, 371, 480, 504, 510; ii, Rejon, ii, 176. 71, 188 f., 232-235; iii, 270, 288- Sotomayor, Pelayo de, Spanish
351, passim, 525, 532 657-663 iv, 38. 100
;
193, 277, 339, pines, 240.
485
536. 630, 144, 165, in the Philipf., f.,
knight,
i,
159.
iv, 572. de, first roval governor
.
'Soup Knights,'
Sousa,
Tome
Sluys, iv, 526, 616. 619. Small pox, iv, 31, 257. Sobrarbe, i, 273, 275. Sobrejuez, i, 210, 230. Sobr*juntero, i, 463.
Socorro,
iii,
of Brazil, iv, 386 f South America, ii. 203, 208, 210217; iii, Book VI; iv, Chapter
XXXIII.
Southampton, iii, 386; iv, 291. South Carolina, iii, 524; iv, 166,
1,
n.
195, n. 2.
iv,
167.
ii,
Socotra, island,
Sof, tribe in
336.
iv, 104.
Southern Ocean, the,

431.
216:
iii,
Gerba,
Sofala, iv, 334. Sogamoso, iii, 582. Soissons, iv, 638.

Solariegos, 137.
n. 1.
i,
Spa,
iv,
636.
see
Spanish
ff..
Armada, Armada.
Invincible
180
477. 479;
'Soldans of Babvlonia,'
i,
Spanish Empire, see the tables of contents of the several volumes final reflections, iv, 671-680. 493, 494. Spanish Furv, the, at Antwerp
ii,
;
Soliman, Philippine ruler,

231.
Solio,
Soller,
i,
iv,
230,
461, 482.
Spanish Mark, the, 488 ii, 28.

^
;
(1576), iv, 300, 307, 309, 310, 316. i, 31 f., 288, 486,
attack on (1561), iv. 108. Solomon, king of Israel, i, 7.
Spenser, 485.
Edmund, English
poet, iv,
770
Spes,
GENERAL INDEX
Guerau de, Spanish ambas- Studium genemle, i, 265. sador to England, iv, 291 ff., 298. Styria, iii. 41. n temple of, iii, 582. Sphericity of the earth, demonstra- S tioD of the, iii. II.;, n. I. II.".. n. 2. Suarez, Francisco, Spanish
i
;
.
>
thi
Spice Islands, the,

123,
iii,
120, 421, 422,
139
ill. 504,
618;
iv,
334,
Spice trade, the, i\ 238. Spinelly, Sir Thomas, English envoy iii. 13, n. 2, 16, 26, 29, 124, 120, 28! Spires, iii, 371
,
logian ami publicist iv, 483. Snare/; de Carvajal, Juan, first president of the Cam de Contmlni inn, iv, 205.
.
Suarez de Figueroa, Lorenzo, Spanish ambassador, ii. 287, 290, 301.

Subsidio, iv, 59, n. 443. Sucre, iv, ISO. Suevi. rermanic race,
<
2,
209,
3o0,
Squarcialupo,
Stamenti, Starnina,
artist,
in
Gian
iii,
Luca,
i,
Sicilian
revolutionist,
25.
i,
13.
Sardinia,
413.
Gherardo,
i.
Florentine
of
Suffolk, see Brandon. Sugar works, in Brazil, iv. 3f
Staten
del
266. Island, southeast

iii,
1
Tierra
136,
Fuego,
19, d.
1.
MoMerinite king rocco (1308-10), i, 126 101, 304. Suleiman (the Magnificent), sultan
Suleiman,
i
States-* lenera]
of
France,
iv,
of 3
Turkey (1520
passim
1
:
613, 636-641, 652. States-General of the

iii,
i
.
17,
iv,
66), iii, 162,290 107, 109, 15,

1
Netherlands,
123.
156, 157, 394 IT.: iv, 285, 306 310, 312, 317, 492, 196. States-* lenera] of the 'obedienl
'
Sumatra, iii, Sun. temple
18
iv,
337.
at
(
<>f
the,
Hizco,
iii.
Netherlands
n.
1.
al
Brussels,
iv,
652,
States-General of the Seven United

Proi inces, iv. 383, "<:>. 618. States "I" the ( hurch, tlie, ii, 301, 313. State dei Preaidii, iii, 281 1'.. 399.
-
567; at Tumbez, 548 Sun, worship of the] in Peru, iii, 549 ff., 552, 562; among the Chibcbas, 580 f.
Super-state, idea of a, iii, 60. 17 ('.. ,'idP. Hi. 36, Superstition, i\ 370, 665. Swpn ma, Bee 'om sj le la Suprema. Suresnes, iv. 639. iv, 35. Surgeons, iii. 177 Susa, pass of, iii. 232.
,
phen, negro guide,

28.
iii.
516, 527,
Stevens, John, translator of Mariana's history. 1. 6. Suspension bridges, Peruvian, iii, 552. ward, see High Steward. Stone carving, Peruvian, iii. 552. Suspension of interest on state debts
37, Strabo, Strangling of vassals,
i.
l
13.
iv,
568.
(1575), iv. 146, 658.
143
ff.,
447;
,
(1696),
v.
iii,
209
1
1 1
Straubing. iii. 608. Strozsi, Florentine

izzi,
i\
f.i > in. 279. Filippo, Italian commander, 194, 397, n. 2.

1 1
,
Swearing, profane, i\ Sw ine, iii. 541, 586 f. Swintua, king of the Visigoths (621
626), i. M. Swiss, the, d. 60, 298;
iv,
iii
75;
ii,
Strozsi, rietro, papa] generalissi

iv, 8.
270;
Swiss mercenary troops

<
at
the Biege of
iii,
1
1
.
Iranada,
67,
Strype,
John, Reformation,
iii,
historian
iv,
,">:;i
.
of
the
156.
Switzerland,
Stuarts, tb
Syracuse,
176;
iv,
I
Students,
Syria,
iii.
512; 305 IV,

i,
;
iv,
103.
125.
GENERAL INDEX
Tabasco, Tabasco,
iii,
771
Taxation, in mediaeval Castile, i, 248-252 in Aragon, 462 in Catin Majorca, 502 in Tablate, gorge, iv, 90. alonia, 481 in Naples, Tabriz, i, 161. Sicily, 515 f., 517 522 f.; ii, 311 ff. iv,470; for the Tacamez, iii, 544, n. 1. Tactics, iii, 209. Hermandad, ii, 102, 103 f. under the Catholic Kings, 110, 130, 133 Tacuba, iii, 495, 498 f., 500. ff. in the Indies, 230; iii, 635 Tafur, Pedro, iii, 545 f f at Tagliacozzo, battle of (1268), i, 319. iv, 207 ff Aztec, iii, 469 Tagus, the, i, 36, 70, 71, 76, 102 ii, Milan, 278 in Peru, 550 under 122 Charles V, 157-169, 189, 192 f iv, 362, 365, n. 5, 366, 533,
river,
472, 643, 644, n. 2. iii, 463, 471.
555.
Talamone,
of
iii,
281.
95, 106, 193.
Talavera, Hernando de, archbishop
Granada,
ii,
under Philip II, iv, 426, 429, 438447; in the Netherlands, 285 f., 303 exemption from, to colonists, to letrados, 176 555 taxiii,
; ;
Talaveruela,
iii,
412.
farmers, 159, 160, 164, 202.
Tamerlane,
visited
Tartar
conqueror,
i,
by Castilian embassies,
iii,
159-164.
Tampa
180
f
.
Bay,
523, 526, 529.

ii,
Tampu-Tocco, iii, 549. Tanausu, Canarian chieftain,

Tangiers,
i,
Teheran, i, 161. Tehuantepec, iii, 512. Tehuantepec, Isthmus of, iii, 644. Teissier, Antoine, historiographer of Frederick III of Brandenburg, iii,
407.
Telles, Eleanor, wife of
Ferdinand of
22;
ii,
iv, 111.
Tanto Monta,
Tapestries,
iii,
83.
Portugal, i, 122 f Tellez Giron y de la Cueva, Pedro,

.
iv, 30, 45,
537.
first
Duke
of
Osuna,
Spanish
of
T&pia, Andres de, Spanish historian,

488.
;
envoy to Portugal, viceroy Naples (1582-86), iv, 372.

Templars, the,
Taranto, ii, 293, 302 iii, 127, n. Tarascon, treaty of (1291), i, 341
344. Taridas, i, 487. Tarifa, i, 84, 109, 110, 126, 128. Tarik, conquers Spain, i, 16 f. Taro, the, ii, 292.
2.
f.,
i, 177, 178, 276. Tendilla, Count of, see Mendoza. Teneriffe, Canarian island, i, 149, 156, 158; ii, 176, 177, 179, 180,
181-184, 185, 186. Tenes, i, 20, 22 ii, 258;

;
iii,
21, 292,
344 348.
Tenochtitlan, iii, 469, 470. Tenorio, Alfonso Jufre, Castilian
Tarraco (Tarragona),
Tarraconensis,
i,
i,
11.
11, 12, n. 2.
admiral, i, 128. Tarragona, i, 31, 280; iii, 181. Tarragona, ecclesiastical province, Tenth penny, the, see Alcabala.
i, 322, 332. iii, 450. Tarshish, i, 6 f Tassis family, iv, 453. Tassis, Juan Bautista de, Spanish ambassador to France, iv, 364, 391, n. 2, 608 f., 625, 629, 634. Tasso, Torquato, iii, 605. Taula, or bank, of Barcelona, i, 481.
.
Tenumpuela, iii, 554, n. 4. Teobaldo I, king of Navarre (123454), 70),

i,
295.
II,
Teobaldo
i,
king of Navarre (1254-
101.
Teotocopuli, Dominico (El Greco),
Cretan painter, iv, 45. Tepeacans, Mexican tribe, iii, 497. Tavera, Juan de, archbishop of Terceira, one of the Azores, iv, 391, 393, 396, 397, 514, n. 3. Santiago de Compostela (1525Tercias, iii, 160, 163, 192 iv, 209, 34), iii, 146.
;
Tavern
of
Windows,
iii,
549.
442,444.
772
Tercias renles,
Tercio,
iii,
i.
GENERAL TNDE*
2 10
;
ii.
'J
Thomas
209, 274. Tcresi of Avila, Santa, Spanish mystic, iv, '<>("., si f., -184.
of Palaeologus, prince Acbaia, i. 381, n. 1. Thrace, i. 371, 372, 373. Throgmorton, Francis, English con-
Teresa, daughter of Alfonso VI of 'mint Henry of Sastile, Wife of (

(
Thyraea.
spirator, iv, 507. i, 36S.
Ticino, the. iii, 233. Tidore, iii. 439 ff.; iv, 381. 381. Tiepolo, Paolo, Venetian ambassador, quoted, iv, 27. Terraeina, i, 421. Terranova, battle of (1502), ii, 305. Tierra de Guerra, iii, 660 f. Tierra Firme, iii, 462, 471, 498, 521, Terre, i, 522, n. 1. 664. Terre des Bretons, iv, 170, 171. Teruel, i, 284, 444, 455, n. 3; iv, Tierras de abadengo, ii, 137. Tierras de alld mar, i, 429; ii, ! 571. Tesorero, the, of the Casa de Con- Tierras de realengo, ii. 137 trataridn, ii, 224, 225; iv, 204, Tierras de sefwrio,\, 180; ii, 137. 206 f. Tigris, the, i, 369. Tesorero mayor, i, 210, 252. Timor, iii, 442. Tingitana, i, 12. Tetuan, i, 130. Tinguaro, brother of Benehomo, ii, Tetuan, river, iv, 114. 183. Texas, iii, 527.
Portugal,
i,
71, 73.
ff.
Ternate,
iii.
430
iv,
236, 238,
Texcoco,
iii,
iii,
498
ff.
Tintoretto, Venetian painter,

144.
f.
iv, 45,
Thamasp, shah
135, 270,
of Persia (1523-75),
302
Thames,
the,
i,
136.
Theatines, monastic order (founded

1524), iv, 54.
Tipton, Hugh, qu< Vd, iv, 277. Tirna, the, iv, 181. Titian, Venetian painter, iii, 359;
iv,
45, 144.
Thebes, Catalan capital

i,
in
Greece,
regent,
377, 378.
(
Thenesor Seniidan,
ii,
':in:iri;in
Tlascala, iii, 177-483, 492-500. Tlaseala, bishop of, see Romano. Tlemcen, city, ii, 252, 254 iii, 202
:
f.
173
f.,
177, 17s. 181.

59.
of the 20.
Tlemcen,
Africa,
ii,
Moslem
i,
state
in
North
305;
f.,348
Theodemir (Tlieodomerus), bishop

-if
108, 126, 302. 303,

iii,
.
Iria (r. 800),
i,
240,254;
ins. n
ii,
292
f.,
31
Theodoric (the Great), king

<
m mirths
iv, 99,
2.
(475-526),
i.
i,
Tohano,
I
;
2's.
i,
236. Theodoaan Code, the, Toledo, city, iii. 32f., Theodoshu I (the Great), Roman
emperor (379 395),

Theology,
427.
iv,
i,
10;
iii,
50.
183. fact,
iii.
30, 79; ii. 40, 173, n. 48ff., 69-73, 84, 87 f.. 01 f.. 100, 135, 184, 189, 206, 217. 240, 510. ' '. 560; iv, 32.
125,
Theory and
Therouanne,
i
gulf between, iv,
384
f..
77 Thessaly, Theuchs. king oi the

548).
i.
378.
i
^" i
tr
1 1
(631
13
f.
taken by Alfonso VI lines of 90, 276; Gomes Manrique, LOO f. cathedral of, 267; convent church of San Juan de Log Reyes at, ii. 52 woollen industry of, ill: art of
569;
i.
(1085),
7o.
Third Estate,
Thirteen,
1(17,
the, iv, 613.
working iron
iii.
tin-,
at Valencia,
54,
Toledo, archbishop
<
at, iv, 45. of, see
Martinez
in
ill.
.
ruijarro.
Thirty ****' War, the (1618-1ii, 160; iii. 373; iv. 173, 178.
Toledo,
archbishops
i,
of,
the
Castilian Cortes,
220,224.
GENERAL INDEX
Toledo, Toledo, Toledo, Toledo,
773
ii,
Councils
of,
i,
218
f.
Tordesillas,
2.53.
333;
iii,
4, 5,
;
28
ff.,
diocese of,
ii,
247, 252,
kingdom, i, 193. 1, 212 f. iii, 421, 447, 453, 525, 590; Fadrique Alvarez de, second iv, Duke of Alva, Spanish general, 265. iii, 101, 143. ii, 344, 345 Tordesillas, Rodrigo de, hanged, Toledo, Fadrique Alvarez de, fourth iii, 68. Duke of Alva, Spanish com- Tordesillas Line, the (1494), i, 203 mander, iv, 296, 299, 355, n. 4. f., 212 f.; iii, 421, 447, 453, 590; Toledo, Fernando Alvarez de, third iv, 176, 334, 399. Duke of Alva, ii, 258; iii, 124, Torghoud, see Dragut. iv, 444 274, 284, 336, 355, 357, 358, 374, Toro, i, 11 ii, 51 iii, 90 410 f. iv, 12, 113, 252, n. 2, 256, battle of (1476), ii, 51 f., 172. 272, 342, n. 1, 476, 677; before Toros de Guisando, reconciliation of Algiers (1541), iii, 336; in Ger(1468), ii, 18, 38, 39, 40, 46. many (1546-47), 355, 357, 358; Torquemada, Juan de, Spanish before Metz (1552), 374; viceroy historian, iii, 663. of Milan (1555-56), 274, 284; Torquemada, Tom&s de, first Spanish inquisitor general, ii, 92, n. 4. viceroy of Naples (1555-58), 284; conducts the war against Torreanaz, Conde de, i, 212. iv, 5 member of the Torre de Pinto, iv, 328. Paul V, 6-9 Council of State, 174, 323 f., 325, Torre de Santa Cruz, ii, 189. 413 at Bayonne (1565), 262 ff. Torres, Luis de, Malagan cleric, iv, 126, 127. governor-general of the Netherlands (1567-73), 126, 255, 280- Torres de Vera y Aragon, Juan, adelantado of the Rio de la Plata, 301, 302, 303, 308, 309, 331, n. 2, invades 651; 490, 495, 499, iv, 195, 196. Portugal (1580), 355 f., 359-369; Torres Naharro, Bartolome de, death of (1583), 397 f. dramatist, iii, 215. Alvarez Francisco de, Tortona, iii, 275. Toledo, vounger brother of Fernando Tortosa, i, 31, 289, 293, 481, n. 1, Alvarez de Toledo (d. 1571) 497; iii, 32. fourth Count of Oropesa, viceroy Torture, i, 170, 246, 470, 472; ii, of Peru (1569-81), iv, 184, 195, 110; iii, 116, 179, 295; of Acuna, of Guatemoc, 502; 213-219. iii, 121, n. 2; of the zipa of of Valdivia, 604 Toledo, Garcia de (d. 1510), eldest son of the second Duke of Alva, Bogota, 582 of Perez, iv, 576 f of Francis of St. Lawrence, 43 father of the third Duke, Spanish Throgmorton, 507 of Christians commander, ii, 258. de Garcia by Moriscos, 90 of the defenders (d. 1577), Toledo, of the liberties of Aragon, 593. Marquis of Villafranca, son of See Burning. Pedro Alvarez de Toledo, captaingeneral of the Mediterranean, Toul, bishopric, iv, 14. viceroy of Sicily (1565-66), iv, Toulon, iii, 270. 113 f., 115, 116, 117-121, 123, 146. Toulouse, city, i, 29, 30, 32 iv, 261. Toledo, Pedro Alvarez de, Marquis Toulouse, county, i, 32, 289. of Villafranca, second son of Tournai, iii, 224 f., 399, n. 4; iv, 495 f., 511. the second Duke of Alva, viceroy of Naples (1532-53), iii, 279 f., Tournaments, iii, 31, 366; iv, 433. 283 f.; iv, 113. Tours, iv, 600; battle of (732), i, 31. Tonanpoco, plain of, iii, 496.
;
37, 48, 74-85, 392, 489 (1494), ii, 203, 204, n.
treaty of
774
Tower
Hill. ni.
GENERAL INDEX
Tuamotn Archipelago, iii, 432. 375 Jommeroe. Tubal, son of Japheth. i, 6; iv, 483. Trade routes, obstructed by the Tueapel, battle of (1554), iii, 604, 606. Ottoman Turk-, i. ISO; the new trade routes, 519. Tucuman, iii. <W4 f. iv. 193. 199.
Trade,
Trajan,
i.
Roman emperor
iii.
(98-117),
10;
1
;
50.
Trani,
Neapolitan seaport, ii, 294. n. OOmbal of French and Spanish knights at (1502), 304 f.
iii,
siege of (1087). i. Tudela, iii. 101 71; (1512), ii. 345. Tudor, house of, ii, 78 iv, 271, 288,
; ;
318, 424.
See
Henry VII. Henry

VI,
22, 231
f.
VIII. beth.
Edward
iii.
Man-
I.
Elisa566,
598,601. iv, 176. Tunis, i, 15. 295,305,306 307, n. 1. Transubstantiation, doctrine of, iv, 403; ii, 256, 258; iii, 172, 261, 54. 263, 284, 305 319, 341, 344, 848, iii, 318. 400; iv, 59, 111, 126, 131, 148, Trapani, i, 325 Genoese expedition Trastamara, house of, i, lis, 128; 259, 342: ii, 8, 8, against (1390). i, 145; expedition 145; iii. 30; iv, 401. Of Pedro III against, 323 ft.. 336 oealogica] table, ii, 3. tribute of, 360 f. Trataihirrs, i. 508. expedition of Alfonso V against, 41*; taken by Traz-os-Montes. iii, 419, n. 1. Aluch Ali (1574i, iv. 1.50-152. Treasure fleets, iii. 631 ft". iv. 209 ft".
:
Transcontinental strait, hypothetical, iii, 504 f., 514 f., 524 i'., 806f.j
Tumbez,
54s, 555, 556
ft..
")").
Tunja, iii, 582. Trebiaond, i, ifil. 371. Trent. Council of (1546-63), iii, 353 Tupac Amaru, iv. 215 f., 219, n. f., 360, 363, 369; iv, 54, 59 f., 82, Tupac Hualpa, pupi>et ruler of Peru (1533), iii, 566. 471,484. Turm. iii. 265; archives, iv. 33. Trepanning, iv, 35. Turks, the, i. 131. 159 f.. 368, 369, Triana, i. 84. 376, 381, n, 1. 423, 424, 504, 519; Tributes, ii, 312. 143. 144, 230, 256. 262, 280, Tributns <le India* y de Xegms, iv, ii, 20 v 281,282, 285, 299f.; iii, 141, 153.
'Trinacria,' 361.
kingdom
of,
i,
352, n.
island,
4,
15s.
|hi. Hv4,
550,
171.
172, 211. 222.
Trinidad, 207 f.
;
Wesl
iii.
Indian
iv,
ii,
533:
557.
n. 3.
Trinidad, the, iii. 125 in. 151. Trinitv House, London, iii. 624, Triple Schism, the, i. 407.
Tripoli,
:
252, 260, 261, 266 f., f., 288 351, pauim, 362, 367, 368, W0, 110. 115. 150; iv, 52, 83 loo, passim, 175, 330, 842,
240 270
348, 131,
i.
iii.
1
359, 118, n. I, 193; ii. 23, 295. 333. 343, 348

131,
151
:
iv,
15,
unsuccessful
(1560),
expedition
0)7.
against
i,
OH
Turnhout, battle of (1597). iv. 658. Tuscany, iii. 282: Tuscany, grand duke of, sm Medici. Tuxpan, iii. 186. Tusulutlan, iii, 660 f.
Tyrannicide, doctrine of. iv, ITyre, taken l>v Nebuchadnezzar,
i,
Troubadours, 197. Truchsess, Gebhard, archbishop

< Cologne, iv, 61 v 623. Truxillo. town in I'.-tri'inadiira, 7o. 541 ii, treaty of (1 179 173. 240. Truxillo, town in Peru, iii. 634.
:
of
7.
Tyrol,
iii,
iii,
41. 354, 365, 373.

142.
.54,
Obeda,
da,
iii.
iv,
ii.
Ucles,
355. 107.
GENERAL INDEX
Ulloa,
775
Alfonso de, biographer of Usatges, i, 377, 476, 480, 483, 499. Charles V, iii, 216. Usbegs, iii, 302. Ulloa, Francisco de, explorer, iii, 514. Ushant, iv, 534, n. 4. Usury, prohibition of, i, 200. Ulm, iii, 357.
Ulster, iv, 551.
Ultrapuertos (French Navarre),
ii,
Utopia, iii, 551. Utrecht, iii, 399, n. 4

647, 648.
iv,
296, 616,
346
f.
iii,
103.
Unanimity
of votes, iv, 596, 597.
Undelina, Saint, legendary queen of

Sicily, iv, 47.
Unfortunate Isles, the, iii, 432. Union, the, in Aragon, under James under Pedro III and his I, i, 432 under Pedro successors, 433^440 IV, 395, 441^46, 465; general considerations, 447-450. Union, the, Valencia, under Pedro IV, i, 442, 444, 445, 446 f Unitarians, see Almohades. United Provinces, see Seven United
;
; .
Utrecht, Adrian of, see Adrian VI, Pope. Utrecht, Union of (1579), iv, 494, 496, 663. Uxers, i, 487.
Vaca de Castro, Crist6bal, Spanish lawyer and administrator, iii, 594

iv, 417. f., 597; Vaez, Miguel, Spanish spy,
iv,
392,
397, n.
1.
ii,
Val de Alcantara,
Vald6s,
eral,
267.
Hernando
iii,
;
de, archbishop of
Provinces.
Universities,
Castilian,
i,
Seville
265;
ii,
(1546-68), inquisitor-gen146 iv, 17, 480 f.
214; iv, 284, Valdes, Pedro de, Spanish naval of Bologna, i, 236, n. 1, n. 2, 433 commander, iv, 392, 531, 535, 540, of n. 2. in Aragon, 265, n. 4 519 Catania, 519 in the Netherlands, Valdevez, meadow of, i, 74. in the Indies, iii, Valdivia, city in Chile, iii, 604 iv, iv, 284, n. 2 182. 663 f iv, 224. Valdivia, Pedro de, conquistador, iii, Urabd, Gulf of, iii, 584. Urban II, Pope (1088-99), i, 515; iv, 182. 590-593, 603 f
162
f.;
iii,
;
175
ff.,
Valencia, city, i, 54, 82, 281, 294, Urban V, Pope (1362-70), i, 397. 295, 296, 317, 321, 324, 429, 446 475 iii, 107, 113, f., 472, 473, 474, Urbina, Juan de, Spanish soldier, 212 iv, 108, 663, n. 3 university exploit of, iii, 210. Urbino, duke of, see Rovere. of, i, 265, n. 4. Ureas dc carga, iv, 518. Valencia, kingdom, i, 34, 100, 276, Urdaneta Andres de, Spanish navi282, 293-297, 312, 333, 428, 429, 430, 431, 436, 438, 441, 443, 444, gator, iv, 226 f., 228. 446 f., 451, 520; ii, 221, n. 2; iii, Urte, Pierre II (d. 1508), Sieur d', 44, 45 f., 51 f., 52-57, 70, 80, 106French commander, ii, 305. 113, 123, 127-131, 158, 173, 296; Urgel, county, i, 280, 284, 289. iv, 420, 435, 439, n. 2, 440, n. 4, Urraca, queen of Castile (1109-26), 275. 441, 449, 589, 594, 597; institui, 71, 72, 73, 90, tions of, i, 471-474, 483 ii, 80, 85, Urraca, daughter of Fernan Gonzalez of Castile, i, 65 f 116, 232, n. 3; intellectual life, i, 475; Moriscos of, iii, 111 f., 128Urraca, wife of Alfonso V of Leon, i, 131, 296; iv, 85, 99, 108, n. 2; 179, n. 2. Valencians in Alva's army (1580), Urrea, Eximen de, on bovage, i, 432. 359. Urrea, Pedro de, iii, 14.
iv, 60.
; ; ;
Uruguay, iv, 190. Usages of Barcelona,
see Usatges.
Valencian dialect, the, 471, 475; ii, 55.
i,
34,
428,
76
Valenciennes, 296.
iii,
(IKNERAL INDEX
224;
iv,
253, 254,
i,
Vancelles, tnice of (1556),
iii,
397,
398;
iv, 5, 7.
Valera, Diego de, Spanish writer, 225; quoted, ii, 98f. Valespir, distncl in Roussillon,
Vazquez de Arce, Rodrigo, Spanish

minister, iv, 573, 574, 575, 576, 5s0, n. 2, 003.
i,
289
Validos, i. 215. Valla. Lorenso,
Italian
i,
Vazquez de Leca, Mateo, informer,

iv,
32S, 573, n.
ii.
3.
iv,
and historian,
213.
humanist 409, 525; iii,
Wdores dajuzcnda,
Veedores,
iii,
379, n.
1.
147
iii,
190.
Vega, Garcilaso de
i,
la,
Spanish poet,
Valladolid,
114, 121, 153, 192,230, 243; n.7.40,41,99, 122, 123, 156,

iii,
70, SO, n. 2, 215, 316, 587.
Vega,
i
210,330;
L8,
19,30-37,38,
16,
is. 51,69,72,74,77,80,82 f.,85 91, 101. 119, 120. 122 126, 143, 175, 17ti, is:;. 184, 190, 203, 346, 347, 386, 397, 398, 419, 422, 441.
Juan de, viceroy of Sicily 1517 57), ui. 342; iv, 468. n. 2; president of the Royal Council (1557 58), iii, 140; iv, 417.
de,
ii,
503;
at,
i,
iv,
IN!);
stadium general*
;
Spanish dramatist iv. 185, 557 f. Vega, Pedro Laso de la, iii, 70, 72,
Vega,
Lope and poet,

s.,|.,
102;
Protestant congregation at, iv, 78 I'., 480 autosda-fe al (1559), 17 ., 79.

205, n. 1;
-
100, n. 2, 215.
Valladolid, chancillerfa of,

Valles, Valles
\
i.
i\,
450
f.
Vega Carpio, Lope Felix de, Spanish dramatist and poet, iii, 214. n :.. V eg iters, i, 377. 4S4, 4SS, 190, 501.
Yeladoris,
i,
179.
188.
ile
Covamibias,
physician of Philip II, alms, house of, ii, 336, 344; iii. 222; iv, 55, 56, 203, 273, 287, 288, 315, 318, 512, 007. Valparaiso, iv, 179, 185. 557.
Francisco, iv, 370.
Velasco, Castilian family, gradually acquires hereditary headship of the army, i, 210.
Velasco,
Castile,
f.,
[fiigo
iii.
de,
Si,
09,
f.
constable of S2 IT., 93, 98

de,
100, 102
.In.i
Valverde, Vicente de, Spanish Dominican, iii, 556, 561. Vandals, Germanic race, i, 13; conquered l>y the lasi Etonians, in the Mediterranean islands, 25; thai the maintains Ldher ruanchee are of Vandal origin,
1 I
Velasco,
Fernandez
'
Duke
of Friaf
of
(
larO,
eleventh
constable of
lastile,
governor and
captain-general of Milan, presi* dent of the louncil of Italy, iv,

<
<
475, 654. Velasco, Luis de,
I,
viceroy of
New
12.
ii.
2.
Van Byck,
i
I
Flemish painter, 266 f. argas, Alonso de, Spanish commander, i\, 588, 589, 590, 591,
.Ian,
Sastile,
i,
Spain (1550 64), iv, 163, 101, 166, 212, 213, 220 227.
Velasco, Luis i\>\ II, Marquis of \r\\ Spam A Salinas, vicerov 1590 95) and of New Castile (1595 10(11., i\. 213. Velasco, Pedro Fernando de, I)uke of Frias, Count of Haro, ninth constable of lasfeQe, iv, 441. Velasquez, Diego, conqueror of
(
12.
Vargas Mejfa, Francisco de, Spanish
ambassador
Vargas
\
\
at
Mejfa,
Rome, iv, 59. Juan de. Spanish

i
<
ambassador
sequel
ssto,
to France, iv, 364. de lyllon, n \yllon. Marquis del, sss Avalos,

ii.
Cuba,
179,
10.
ii.
213;
iii,
is.,,
is'.if.,
io 1-467, 473 I., 49s, 502 f., 638,
\|i'ii-u de.
059.
[sidro,
nan, the,
1
107. 202,
is.",;
iii,
Velasquez Salmantino,
isfa
Span*
64, 361
522 521, 012.
historian, iv, 372.
GENERAL INDEX
Ve4ez,
777
14. Marquis de los, see Fajardo. Verdun, bishopric, iv, 333. VSlez de la Gomera, ii, 248, 249; Vergara, Juan de, iii, 348 iv, 111-114. Vergara, see Ortiz de Vergara. iii, 294, 331, Veronese, Paul, Italian painter, Ve4ez Malaga, ii, 69, 70.
; .
iv,
145. Veltwyck, Gerard, secret envoy of Verrazzano, Giovanni da, Italian Charles V, iii, 340 f navigator in the French service, Vendramino, Francesco, Venetian iv, 170. ambassador to Spain, quoted Versailles, iv, 41 f., 48. 1595), iv, 665.
Veneguera,
n. 1. Vervins, treaty of (1598), iv, 476, ii, 178, 566, 602, 659 ff Venetians, the, i. Ill; ii, 299, 304, anatat Tunis, i, 306; in the Vesalius, Andreas, Belgian 305; in Xegropont, 374, omist, iv, 35, 36, n. 1. Levant, 364 Vespucci, Amerigo, Florentine ex377 shipping of, 49." 448. iii, plorer, ii, 210, n. 3 Venezuela, ii, 211 iii 532-537, 577, 643. Vespucci, Juan, iii, 448. 578, 608, 630, 20. Venice, i, 422; ii, 184, 211, 304; Viana, iii, merVianelli, Geronimo, Venetian iii, 151, 228, 233, 237, 260, 262, chant, ii, 243. 266, 269, 282, 284, 299, 320, 322n. 1 Yia privilegiada, iv, 598. 329, 330, 333, 340, 400, 426, in Vicente, Gil, dramatist, iii, 215. iv, 65, 335, 351, 430, 552; alliance with Aragon (1351), i, Vicenza, iii, 426. in of pre- Vicerovs, in Majorca, i, 500; 395, 396 in Julius II's list in in the war of Naples, ii, 3091".; iv, 470 ;1 519; cedence, in Sicily, Sardinia, i, 506 f. Ferrara (1482-84), ii, 281 ff. the 468 ff.; 513, 515, 516, 518; iv, League of Venice (1495), 289in the New World, iii, 648-654; 294 League of Cambray against the iv, 211-225. (1508), 337, 338 takes part in 479. Holy League against the Turks Vich, i, Victoria, the, iii, 425-445. (1570-73), iv, 124-129. Victoria, Tomas Luis de, Spanish Yeni creator Spiritus, iii, 382. composer, iv, 486. Sebastian, Venetian comVeniero, of n. 3. Viedma, Mendo de, bishop 136,
. ;
(May
13,
Yeni, vidi, fugi, hi, 245. Venloo, iv, 619. Venta Cruz, iii, 634.
22, 292. Vera, Pedro de,
iii,
Rubicon, i, 154, n. 1. Vienna, iii, 162, 211, 294. Vienne, ii, 285. commander, Vienne, Jean de, French admiral, Vera, Diego de, Spanish
138.
mander,
iv,
i,
French scholar, Spanish commander Vignaud, Henry,

;
n,
197. in the Canaries, ii, 175 f., 178 f. n. 2. Vigo, iv, 517, 555. iii, 526, 2. Villach, iii, 373. Vera, Santiago de, iv, 234, n. Vera Cruz, iii, 463, 472-476, 486, Villafafila, ii,330. de, governor of 489, 491, 493, 498, 499, 505, 508, Villafane, Angel Florida, iv, 166. 546, 591, 633, 638, 651 510, 526, Villagran, Francisco de, conquistador, iv, 165. 604 f. iv, 180, 181. iii, 592, Verallo, papal nuncio, iii, 360. Villagran, Pedro de, acting governor Vera Paz, iii, 661. of Chile (1563-65), iv, 180, 181. 294. Vercelli, treaty of (1495), ii, 292,
; ;
Verdugo, Francisco, Spanish com- Villahermosa, Arag6n. mander, iv, 618, 647, 648, 653.
Duke
of, see
Gurrea y
778
Villahir. battle of (1521), 102.
sician,
(iKNERAL INDEX
iii,
90, 101,
Villaloboe, Francisco, Spanish phyii.
121.
Yillalva.
Cristobal,
Spanish
comsee
Visconti, Valentina, ii, 298. Visigoths, Germanic tribe, i, 168, 169, n. 2, 211, 218, 235, 236, 237, 312,403; iv, 30X, 63!) rule of, in in Spain, i. 13 f., 10 f., 2.",, 3S
;
mander, iii, 20, Villa Manrique, Marquis Manrique de Zofiiga.

Villanueva de la Serena, Villa Rica de Vera Crui,
Villarrica,
iii.
i,
iaill,
f.
;
28
ii,
fT.
persecute
;
Jews,
of the
of,
100
Visita,
S6
importance
cities in
11.
iii,
Visigothic Spain, i, 184. 646, 653; iv, 221, 222,

3.
iii,
473
f.
223, 461, n.
604;
iv,
1S2.
ViUas arimidtu, iv, 461. Villaviciosa, iii, 27 f., 476. Villa Vioosa, in Portugal, iv, 360.
Villegagnon,
(
Vital, Laurent, courtier and chronicler, iii, 20 1'., 31, 33, 67).
Vitelleschl,
tolic,
i,
Giovam
>
legate
apos-
422.
Nicolas
Ihevalier de,
Durand, French explorer, iv,
Vitoria, Yitoria,
iii.
Francisco
120, n. 3, 242. de,
Spanish
if,: 5,
387
f.
Villemur, battle of (1592), iv, 632. Villena, Enrique de (d. 1434), sometimes called Marquis of Villena, Spanish writer, i, 267 j ii, 10,
n. 3.
publicist, iv, 484. Vivero, Juan de, ii, 41.
Vivos, Juan Luis, Yalencian philosopher, iii, 213 f. Yivonne, .see Saint-( louard.
17. ii, 123, Viscaya, i. 193, n. Vocladian Field, see VouillA Voes, Henry, Protestant martyr, iii,
1
:
Villena, ViUeros,
Villiers,
taller,
Marquis
i,
of, see
Pacheco.
462.
de,
n. 3.
Gaspard
iii,
French HospiPhilippe de,

I
MM,
n. 2.
i,
343,
Voltaue,
27.
i.
Yilliers
de
l'lsle
Adam,
Youille, battle of (507),
29, 236.
1.
grand master of the iospitallers of St. John of Jerusalem (1521

34),
iii,
Voyage
<l<
Bom
ii,
i,
154, n.
Yulgate, the,
17)7).
13.").
Vimioeo. Count Francisco de.

I
of,
see
Portugal,
tiilitjitutriiKi
de ('mi,
of
i,
182.
I
Waal, the, iv, 617 647. Wachterdonk, Waesland, iv, 7)13.

i
Violante,
daughter of .James
wife
i.
of
of
W'ah-.
Aragon,
Castile,
Alfonso
I.
X
I
|\. 148 W.dlia, kin^, of the Visigoths (415-
KM), n.
297.
119),
i.
13.
of Violante, daughter of John Iragon, wife of Louis II of Anjou and Provence, i. 393, mi. ItU. 410, III: ii. 36. Violante of Hungary, wife of James of Aragon, i, 294, 317. 318. Virginia, iii, 525.
I
Walloon
lancers, iv. 629. Walsingham, Su- Francis,
minister,
iv.
1.
288,
"'"1
546
English death
of. 57)6, n.
Wamba,
680),
i,
king of the
30.
isigoths (672
inathus,
Lusitaniao
iv,
shepherd,
i,
Vim inatoe,
Viscaino,
\ i-coiiti,
567, a. 3. Sebastian, Spanish

f.
exof
Warlieck, Perkin, pretender, ii, 319. War canoes, iii, 196, 5<K), 570, 589. War of the Three Henrys, iv, 61 I. War. of the Roses, the, i, 05 ii, 7 s 275
1 ;
-.
plorer, iv. 161
W
dnke
119,
atling's Island,
at
ii,
107.
Milan
I
FilippO Maria, L12 17), i, 117,
120
Weishaupt, canon law
Weber-
of professor Ingolstadt, iv, 80. Augsburg banking house,
Adam,
GENERAL INDEX
iii,
779
ii,
195, 534-537,
f.
578, 583, 608,

;
Woodville, Elizabeth,
;
66, n. 4.
629
Africa, iii, 151, 294 f. 278, 334, 379, n. 1, 380. West Florida, iii, 529. West Indies, the, ii, 190; 466, 523-529, 537, 633, 637, 640, 643, 644 iv, 164, 209 f
; .
West
Woollen industry, in Barcelona, i, of Toledo and Seville, ii, 494 iv, 277, HI; under Charles V, iii, 205, 380 export of wool, iv, 440 f ., 450. iii, 460;
Worms,
Westphalia, congress and treaties of

(1648), iv, 13, 380, 479, 661. of the, iv, 675. White palfrey, gift of a, at Naples, iv, 472. Widrington, Robert, English seaman, iv, 389. William X, duke of Aquitaine (112737), i, 277. William (d. 1338), duke of Athens, son of Frederic III of Sicily, i,
city in Germany, iii, 33, 87, 88, 90, 117, 129, 224, 276, 445. Wi'irzburg, bishopric of, iii, 374. Wyatt, Sir Thomas, iii, 385.
White elephant, metaphor
Xaquixaguana, overthrow of Gonzalo Pizarro at (1548), 604. Xativa, see Jativa. Xauxa, iii, 566.
iii,
601
f.,
Xavier, St. Francis, Spanish Jesuit missionary, iii, 455 iv, 337. Xenil, the, ii, 65. Xeres, see Jerez. 375. Xerica, see Jerica. William V, duke of Cleves (1539- Ximenes de Cisneros, Francisco, archbishop of Toledo, ii, 135, 154 92), iii, 270,353. William II, viscount of Narbonne f., 157; iii, 7, 15, 17-23, 30, 31 f.,
;
(1397-1424),
(as
Judge of Arborea
III, 1408-09),
i,
208,214,599;
the
iv,
William
404,
Granadan Moors,
650; persecutes 95 f ii,

.
408 f., 412. William I (the Silent), prince of Orange (1544-84) and count of Nassau, first stadtholder of the United Provinces, iii, 15, 277, n. 3; iv, 12, 247, 251, 282 f., 288, 295 f., 297, 303, 306, 310,
311, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 491, 492, 497, 504-509, 617, 618; his 'Apology' (1580), 504; assassination of (1584), 504 f., 506, 509, 510. William of Villehardouin, prince of Achaia, i, 364.
of Castile regent provisional (1506-07), 333; founds the university of Alcala, 161 f., 253; in the North African campaigns,
241-255, 259 his Complutensian regent of Polyglot Bible, 155 Castile (1516-17), 241. Ximenes de Cisneros, Juana, iv,
; ;
499.
Ximenez de Quesada, Gonzalo,

quistador,
iii,
Wimala Dharma (Don John), CinWinchelsea, Winchester, Wittenberg,

galese chief, iv, 382. i, 136. iii, 386.
iii,
con536, 577-584. Ximeno, Andres, bishop of Teruel, viceroy of Aragon, iv, 573, 582. Xocotla, iii, 477. Xoloc, iii, 500. Xucar, the, see Jucar.
Yaakub, Merinite king

(1258-86),
i,
of
Morocco
58.
304.
Wolsey, Thomas,
English
states-
Yahya
I,
Hafside king of Tunis
man and
cardinal, iii, 119, n. 2, 136, 138, n. 1, 224, 226, 238 f., 243 f., 256, 257.
4.
Woodville, Anthony, ii, 66, n. Woodville, Sir Edward, ii, 66.
(1228-49), i, 315. Yantares, i, 247, 248. Yelves, iii, 447. Yolande, see Violante. Ypres, iv, 510.
780
Yssel, the.
to,
KXEKAL INDEX
471
f., iii, 151 iv, 294, 296, 299, 303, 304, 306, 311, 316, 505, 513, 526, fil(i. 623, 648. Zenetr, Marquis of, see Mendoza,
617. 647.
f.,
Zealand,
Yucatan,
Vuste,
P.,
iii.
iii.
462
166, 468,
f.,
506, 521,
n. 2, 'it:;.
644, n. 2.
i;;\ n. 3, 1<>6,
398
412
415, 667; iy, 11. 12, 43. Vusuf I, king of Granada (1333-54), i. 127 f., 129,302.
Rodrigo de. Zenu, graves of, iii, 584, Zivan, king of Valencia (1229-3s
i,
Vusuf,
Merinite ruler of Morocco

i,
294, 295.
Zoraya, queen of Granada, ii, 64. Vusuf, Merinite king of Morocco Zuccaro, Federigo, Italian painter, iv, 45 f. 1.N6-1306), i, 126, 127,300. Vusuf, descendant of Okba, chosen Zulil, i, 12, n. 4. ruler of Spain by the army, i, Ziunel, Juan, deputy of Burgos, iii,
1265),
.
lOSfif., 114.
17.
34.
Vusuf
Ibn Tashfin, leader, i, 22 f.

iii,
Ahnoravide
Ziiniga,
iii,
Alvaro de, Duke
of
Hejar,
Zacatula,
Zafra,
451, 504, 644.

de,
ii,
Hernando
ii,
73.
Zabara,
63.
Zallaka, battle of (10S6), i, 22, 70. iv, 584. i, 463 ; Zamafo, iii, 452.
166,411, 510. Franciseo de (d. 1662). Ziiniga. third Duke of Penaranda, Spanish diplomat. iv, 479. Ziiniga, Juan de, grand master of Alcantara, resignation of (1494),
143,
ii,
Zalmedina.
i,
108.
Zamora,
70,87.
62;
ii,
51, 52;
iii,
68
f.,
Zamora, bishop of, see Manuel. Zane, Matteo, Venetian ambassador, quoted, iv, 27. Zanne, Venetian leader, iv, 129.
Zante, iii 299. Zapata, Luis, Castilian
ii,
Ziiniga, Juan de, comendador mayor of Castile, tutor of Philip II, iv, 301. Ziiniga, Juan de, son of the preceding,
iii,
Spanish ambassador
141, n. 4.
at
Home,
Ziiniga
councillor,
227.
Puis de. y Requesens, brother of the preceding, governor-general of the Netherlands (1573-76), iv, 300 305,308,315.
3.
Zapata de
(
(
( 'isneros, PrancisCO, firsl uuiit ol Barajas, president of tin'
Zuni pueblos, iii, 515, n. Jeronimo de, Zurita.

historian,
lis.
ii,
i.
kmncilof the Orders, then (1583

(
341,
146,
358,
lis.
Aragonese W0, W6,

164,
"><>7;
92 <.f the 417i.
kronen of Castile,
iv.
122,
134,
Zapolya, (1526
John,
lii>.
<
king
of
Hungary
304. Zarate, tee >rti/ de Zarate. Zaraii/, Biscayan town, i, 264.

in.
60f., 183, 296, :;17; iv, 482f. Zutphen, iv, 299, 619, <H7. Zuyder Zee. the, i\, 299, 817. Protestant, Zwingli, Ulrich, >u iii, 445, ii. 2.
"
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1's

THE SPANISH EMPIRE

OLD WORLD AND

THE MACMILLAN COMPANY

BOMBAY CALCUTTA MELBOURNE

THE MACMILLAN COMPANY

.&* -*0C7~.(g eft*/

visto est a carta y papeles

en los despachos que se han de mewbrar l algo desosegado

Pero bien es myrar a todo y El mal es que

quiza ellos se tomarian.

que agora me paresce es 3 que no ofreciendose es algun

esta tarde esa carta

y papeles [Conde de Chinchon].

ble reading, but I means certain.

This seems the moat probaam by no

puedan juntar para

THE RISE OF THE SPANISH EMPIRE

OLD WORLD AND IN THE NEW

ROGER BIGELOW MERRIMAN

VOLUME IV PHILIP THE PRUDENT

THE MACMILLAN COMPANY

All rights reserved

part of this book

written for inclusion in magazine or newspaper.

PlIMTfr. IN THF TUTTED STATES 07 AUR1'

that I have spent

much more time and

discoveries in this field are

unfortunate that more

English and American scholars are not tempted to explore

the appearance, during the last five

years, of four different lives of Philip II (cf infra, p. 75)

not deter prospective readers

of necessity to painstaking analysis of

friends and colleagues both here

The names numerous to men-

Salmon of Amherst, and to U. M. Ford and Chandler H. Post, and to

George W. Robinsoo has gone

manuscript again and again with the most a>siduous

care, at the various stages of its preparation,

myself of his Bervici

wife has been the inspirat ion w

THE SPANISH EMPIRE AT ITS GREATEST TERRITORIAL EXTENT

Battle of St, Quentin (August 10, 1557)

Philip returns to Spain Auto-da-fe at Valladolid (October 8, 1559)

physical traits and habits Government by pen and ink

tefusal to delegate to subordinates

The Infante Don Carlos

between Philip and Louis

building of the Escorial 'Decoration of the interior sculpture

library Relics of the saints

and the Counter-Reformation Santa Teresa of Avila

Note on the General Authorities on the Reign

Protestantism in Spain Autos-da-fe at Valladolid

The Alumbrados or Illuminati J The Spanish Inquisition The Moriscos

Political functions of the Inquisition

of the Edict of 1526

Diacontenl of the Morisoos of Granada

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