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Kirk Ludwig

Indiana University, Philosophy, Faculty Member

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I work in epistemology, the philosophy of language, the philosophy of mind, and the philosophy of action, especially collective action. I have co-authored two books with Ernest Lepore on the work of Donald Davidson (Donald Davidson: Meaning, Truth, Language and Reality (OUP 2005) and Donald Davidson's Truth-theoretic Semantics (OUP 2007)) and edited a collection of essays that give an overview of Davidson's work for the Contemporary Philosophy in Focus series for Cambridge University Press (Donald Davidson (CUP 2003)). I am the co-editor of the Wiley-Blackwell Companion to Donald Davidson with Ernie Lepore. I am coeditor of the Routledge Handbook of Collective Intentionality with Marija Jankovic (Davidson College). I recently finished a two volume project titled, From Individual to Institutional Agency. The first volume is titled: From Individual to Plural Agency: Collective Action I (OUP Nov. 2016). The second volume is titled: From Plural to Institutional Agency: Collective Action II (OUP Dec. 2017).
Supervisors: Donald Davidson, Barry Stroud, and Bruce Vermazen
Phone: (812) 855-2404 (office)
Address: Philosophy Department
Indiana University
Bloomington, IN 47405-7005
http://www.indiana.edu/~socrates/

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Papers by Kirk Ludwig

Truth-Theoretic Semantics and Its Limits

Argumentation, 2017

Collective Intentionality

Philosophy, 2020

Collective intentionality concerns the intentionality of groups or collectives. Intentionality is... more Collective intentionality concerns the intentionality of groups or collectives. Intentionality is the property of being about, directed at, oriented toward, or representing objects, events, properties, and states of affairs. Examples of intentional states (states with intentionality, not just intentions) are belief, desire, hope, intention, admiration, perception, guilt, love, grief, fear, and so on. Collective intentionality involves joint, shared, or group intentionality and the intentionality of members (qua members) of groups that have joint or shared attitudes. More broadly, the study of collective intentionality concerns forms of intentionality that underpin social reality. What is distinctive about the study of collective intentionality within the broader study of social interactions and structures is its focus on the conceptual, ontological, and psychological features of joint or shared actions and attitudes, that is, actions and attitudes of (or apparent attributions of suc...

Rationality, Language, and the Principle of Charity

Oxford Handbooks Online, 2004

This article deals with the relations between language, thought, and rationality, and especially ... more This article deals with the relations between language, thought, and rationality, and especially the role and status of assumptions about rationality in interpreting another's speech and assigning contents to her psychological attitudes—her beliefs, desires, intentions, and so on. Some large degree of rationality is required for thought. Consequently, that same degree of rationality at least is required for language, since language requires thought. Thought, however, does not require language. This article lays out the grounds for seeing rationality as required for thought, and it meets some recent objections on conceptual and empirical grounds. Furthermore, it gives particular attention to Donald Davidson's arguments for the Principle of Charity, according to which it is constitutive of speakers that they are largely rational and largely right about the world, and to Davidson's arguments for the thesis that without the power of speech one lacks the power of thought.

The Reality of Language: on the Davidson-Dummett Debate

This chapter identifies the central issue between Michael Dummett and Donald Davidson on the role... more

Truth and Meaning

Donald Davidson

The Essential Davidson

Introduction PHILOSOPHY OF ACTION AND PSYCHOLOGY 1. Action, Reasons, and Causes (1963) 2. The Log... more Introduction PHILOSOPHY OF ACTION AND PSYCHOLOGY 1. Action, Reasons, and Causes (1963) 2. The Logical Form of Action Sentences (with Comments, Criticism, and Defense) (1967) 3. How is Weakness of the Will Possible? (1969) 4. Individuation of Events (1969) 5. Mental Events (1970) (with Emeroses by Other Names (1966)) 6. Intending (1978) 7. Paradoxes of Irrationality (1982) TRUTH, MEANING, AND INTERPRETATION 8. Truth and Meaning (1967) 9. On Saying That (1968) 10. Radical Interpretation (1973) 11. On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme (1974) 12. What Metaphors Mean (1978) 13. A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge (1983) Afterthoughts (1987) 14. First Person Authority (1984) 15. A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs (1986)

Opaque Contexts: Indirect Discourse and Attitude Sentences

Donald Davidson's Truth-Theoretic Semantics, 2007

Reply to Ferrero

I respond to Ferrero's comments on "What are Conditional Intentions?" in three parts. In the firs... more I respond to Ferrero's comments on "What are Conditional Intentions?" in three parts. In the first, I address three arguments Ferrero gives for his account and against mine, the argument from requirement of a formal distinction, the argument from continuity, and the argument from the rational pressures of intention. In the second, I raise some problems for Ferrero's views on the basis drawing out its consequences and testing those against cases. In the third, I consider in a more theoretical vein how reasons and intentions are related, and offer an explanation of why we should not read reasons for intentions into their contents.

Proxy Assertion

Oxford Handbooks Online, 2018

In proxy assertion an individual or group asserts something through a spokesperson. The chapter e... more In proxy assertion an individual or group asserts something through a spokesperson. The chapter explains proxy assertion as resting the assignment of a status role to a person (that of spokesperson) whose utterances acts in virtue of that role have the status function of signaling that the principal is committed in a way analogous to an individual asserting that in his own voice. The chapter briefly explains how status functions and status roles are grounded and then treats, in turn, the case of a spokesperson for an individual and a group and the differences in the significance of what the spokesperson does in each case. Finally, it reviews complications introduced by spokesperson autonomy, where the spokesperson is given leave to represent her principal’s views or positions in her own words and to respond to questions on his behalf.

From Individual to Collective Responsibility

The Routledge Handbook of Collective Responsibility, 2020

This chapter address the question how moral responsibility that attaches in the first instance to... more This chapter address the question how moral responsibility that attaches in the first instance to groups of agents (as opposed to organizations or institutions) should be distributed to the individual members of the group. It identifies the conditions under which such a group is collectively morally responsible for having done something and argues that in these cases, in the absence of other conflicting duties or responsibilities, and assuming members act freely and are aware of the consequences of what the group does, each member of the group is culpable to degree he would be if acting alone regardless of the size of the causal contribution and regardless of whether it was overdetermined

Phenomenal Consciousness and Intentionality Comments on The Significance of Consciousness

I discuss three issues about the relation of phenomenal consciousness, in the sense Siewert isola... more I discuss three issues about the relation of phenomenal consciousness, in the sense Siewert isolates, to intentionality. The first is whether, contrary to Siewert, phenomenal consciousness requires higher-order representation. The second is whether intentional features of conscious states are identical with phenomenal features, as Siewert argues, or merely conceptually supervene on them, with special attention to cross modal representations of objects in space. The third is whether phenomenal features are identical with what we can have first person access to, with special attention to features of thoughts that are individuated by reference to the self and the present time.

Unity in the Variety of Quotation

The Semantics and Pragmatics of Quotation, 2017

This chapter argues that while quotation marks are polysemous, the thread that runs through all u... more This chapter argues that while quotation marks are polysemous, the thread that runs through all uses of quotation marks that involve reference to expressions is pure quotation, in which an expression formed by enclosing an expression in quotation marks refers to the enclosed expression. We defend a version of the so-called disquotational theory of pure quotation and show how this device is used in direct discourse and attitude attributions, in exposition in scholarly contexts, and in so-called mixed quotation in indirect discourse and attitude attributions. In quotation not only does language turn on itself, but it does so word by word and expression by expression, and this reflexive twist is inseparable from the convenience and universal applicability of the device.

What are Conditional Intentions

The main thesis of this paper is that, whereas an intention simpliciter is a commitment to a plan... more The main thesis of this paper is that, whereas an intention simpliciter is a commitment to a plan of action, a conditional intention is a commitment to a contingency plan, a commitment about what to do upon (learning of) a certain contingency relevant to one’s interests obtaining. In unconditional intending, our commitment to acting is not contingent on finding out that some condition obtains. In conditional intending, we intend to undertake an action on some condition, impinging on our interests, which is as yet unsettled for us, but about which we can find out without undue cost.

Are Reference Rules Inessential to Meaning?

This article responds to a case-based argument by Mark Richard that rule of reference is not esse... more This article responds to a case-based argument by Mark Richard that rule of reference is not essential to meaning. It objects that the argument requires shifting between understanding the relevant term in the case, ‘marriage,’ as a determinable, in order to support one premise, and a determinate, in order to support another. On no univocal interpretation can both premises be made true.

Methods in analytic epistemology

Unconscious Inference Theories of Cognitive Achievement

Inference and Consciousness, 2019

This chapter argues that the only tenable unconscious inferences theories of cognitive achievemen... more This chapter argues that the only tenable unconscious inferences theories of cognitive achievement are ones that employ a theory internal technical notion of representation, but that once we give cash-value definitions of the relevant notions of representation and inference, there is little left of the ordinary notion of representation. We suggest that the real value of talk of unconscious inferences lies in (a) their heuristic utility in helping us to make fruitful predictions, e.g., about illusions, and (b) their providing a high-level description of the functional organization of subpersonal faculties that makes clear how they equip an agent to navigate its environment and pursue its goals.

Methodological Individualism, The We-mode, and Team Reasoning

Social Ontology and Collective Intentionality, 2016

Davidson

Philosophy of Language, 2020

What Is Minimally Cooperative Behavior?

Minimal Cooperation and Shared Agency, 2020

The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this p... more The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

Triangulating on Thought and Norms

Dialogue, 2020

ABSTRACTThis article raises two questions about Robert Myers and Claudine Verheggen's terrifi... more ABSTRACTThis article raises two questions about Robert Myers and Claudine Verheggen's terrific book, Donald Davidson's Triangulation Argument: A Philosophical Inquiry. The first question, concerning the first part of the book, is whether, starting from the assumption that a solitary individual cannot have thought contents, we can show that adding another individual to the picture cannot resolve the problem. The second question, concerning the second part, is whether a more sophisticated, decision-theoretic, Humean about the pro-attitudes can respond to the objections to the simple Humean view, and whether Davidson was not in fact just such a sophisticated decision-theoretic Humean.

Truth-Theoretic Semantics and Its Limits

Argumentation, 2017

Collective Intentionality

Philosophy, 2020

Collective intentionality concerns the intentionality of groups or collectives. Intentionality is... more Collective intentionality concerns the intentionality of groups or collectives. Intentionality is the property of being about, directed at, oriented toward, or representing objects, events, properties, and states of affairs. Examples of intentional states (states with intentionality, not just intentions) are belief, desire, hope, intention, admiration, perception, guilt, love, grief, fear, and so on. Collective intentionality involves joint, shared, or group intentionality and the intentionality of members (qua members) of groups that have joint or shared attitudes. More broadly, the study of collective intentionality concerns forms of intentionality that underpin social reality. What is distinctive about the study of collective intentionality within the broader study of social interactions and structures is its focus on the conceptual, ontological, and psychological features of joint or shared actions and attitudes, that is, actions and attitudes of (or apparent attributions of suc...

Rationality, Language, and the Principle of Charity

Oxford Handbooks Online, 2004

This article deals with the relations between language, thought, and rationality, and especially ... more This article deals with the relations between language, thought, and rationality, and especially the role and status of assumptions about rationality in interpreting another's speech and assigning contents to her psychological attitudes—her beliefs, desires, intentions, and so on. Some large degree of rationality is required for thought. Consequently, that same degree of rationality at least is required for language, since language requires thought. Thought, however, does not require language. This article lays out the grounds for seeing rationality as required for thought, and it meets some recent objections on conceptual and empirical grounds. Furthermore, it gives particular attention to Donald Davidson's arguments for the Principle of Charity, according to which it is constitutive of speakers that they are largely rational and largely right about the world, and to Davidson's arguments for the thesis that without the power of speech one lacks the power of thought.

The Reality of Language: on the Davidson-Dummett Debate

This chapter identifies the central issue between Michael Dummett and Donald Davidson on the role... more

Truth and Meaning

Donald Davidson

The Essential Davidson

Introduction PHILOSOPHY OF ACTION AND PSYCHOLOGY 1. Action, Reasons, and Causes (1963) 2. The Log... more Introduction PHILOSOPHY OF ACTION AND PSYCHOLOGY 1. Action, Reasons, and Causes (1963) 2. The Logical Form of Action Sentences (with Comments, Criticism, and Defense) (1967) 3. How is Weakness of the Will Possible? (1969) 4. Individuation of Events (1969) 5. Mental Events (1970) (with Emeroses by Other Names (1966)) 6. Intending (1978) 7. Paradoxes of Irrationality (1982) TRUTH, MEANING, AND INTERPRETATION 8. Truth and Meaning (1967) 9. On Saying That (1968) 10. Radical Interpretation (1973) 11. On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme (1974) 12. What Metaphors Mean (1978) 13. A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge (1983) Afterthoughts (1987) 14. First Person Authority (1984) 15. A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs (1986)

Opaque Contexts: Indirect Discourse and Attitude Sentences

Donald Davidson's Truth-Theoretic Semantics, 2007

Reply to Ferrero

I respond to Ferrero's comments on "What are Conditional Intentions?" in three parts. In the firs... more I respond to Ferrero's comments on "What are Conditional Intentions?" in three parts. In the first, I address three arguments Ferrero gives for his account and against mine, the argument from requirement of a formal distinction, the argument from continuity, and the argument from the rational pressures of intention. In the second, I raise some problems for Ferrero's views on the basis drawing out its consequences and testing those against cases. In the third, I consider in a more theoretical vein how reasons and intentions are related, and offer an explanation of why we should not read reasons for intentions into their contents.

Proxy Assertion

Oxford Handbooks Online, 2018

In proxy assertion an individual or group asserts something through a spokesperson. The chapter e... more In proxy assertion an individual or group asserts something through a spokesperson. The chapter explains proxy assertion as resting the assignment of a status role to a person (that of spokesperson) whose utterances acts in virtue of that role have the status function of signaling that the principal is committed in a way analogous to an individual asserting that in his own voice. The chapter briefly explains how status functions and status roles are grounded and then treats, in turn, the case of a spokesperson for an individual and a group and the differences in the significance of what the spokesperson does in each case. Finally, it reviews complications introduced by spokesperson autonomy, where the spokesperson is given leave to represent her principal’s views or positions in her own words and to respond to questions on his behalf.

From Individual to Collective Responsibility

The Routledge Handbook of Collective Responsibility, 2020

This chapter address the question how moral responsibility that attaches in the first instance to... more This chapter address the question how moral responsibility that attaches in the first instance to groups of agents (as opposed to organizations or institutions) should be distributed to the individual members of the group. It identifies the conditions under which such a group is collectively morally responsible for having done something and argues that in these cases, in the absence of other conflicting duties or responsibilities, and assuming members act freely and are aware of the consequences of what the group does, each member of the group is culpable to degree he would be if acting alone regardless of the size of the causal contribution and regardless of whether it was overdetermined

Phenomenal Consciousness and Intentionality Comments on The Significance of Consciousness

I discuss three issues about the relation of phenomenal consciousness, in the sense Siewert isola... more I discuss three issues about the relation of phenomenal consciousness, in the sense Siewert isolates, to intentionality. The first is whether, contrary to Siewert, phenomenal consciousness requires higher-order representation. The second is whether intentional features of conscious states are identical with phenomenal features, as Siewert argues, or merely conceptually supervene on them, with special attention to cross modal representations of objects in space. The third is whether phenomenal features are identical with what we can have first person access to, with special attention to features of thoughts that are individuated by reference to the self and the present time.

Unity in the Variety of Quotation

The Semantics and Pragmatics of Quotation, 2017

This chapter argues that while quotation marks are polysemous, the thread that runs through all u... more This chapter argues that while quotation marks are polysemous, the thread that runs through all uses of quotation marks that involve reference to expressions is pure quotation, in which an expression formed by enclosing an expression in quotation marks refers to the enclosed expression. We defend a version of the so-called disquotational theory of pure quotation and show how this device is used in direct discourse and attitude attributions, in exposition in scholarly contexts, and in so-called mixed quotation in indirect discourse and attitude attributions. In quotation not only does language turn on itself, but it does so word by word and expression by expression, and this reflexive twist is inseparable from the convenience and universal applicability of the device.

What are Conditional Intentions

The main thesis of this paper is that, whereas an intention simpliciter is a commitment to a plan... more The main thesis of this paper is that, whereas an intention simpliciter is a commitment to a plan of action, a conditional intention is a commitment to a contingency plan, a commitment about what to do upon (learning of) a certain contingency relevant to one’s interests obtaining. In unconditional intending, our commitment to acting is not contingent on finding out that some condition obtains. In conditional intending, we intend to undertake an action on some condition, impinging on our interests, which is as yet unsettled for us, but about which we can find out without undue cost.

Are Reference Rules Inessential to Meaning?

This article responds to a case-based argument by Mark Richard that rule of reference is not esse... more This article responds to a case-based argument by Mark Richard that rule of reference is not essential to meaning. It objects that the argument requires shifting between understanding the relevant term in the case, ‘marriage,’ as a determinable, in order to support one premise, and a determinate, in order to support another. On no univocal interpretation can both premises be made true.

Methods in analytic epistemology

Unconscious Inference Theories of Cognitive Achievement

Inference and Consciousness, 2019

This chapter argues that the only tenable unconscious inferences theories of cognitive achievemen... more This chapter argues that the only tenable unconscious inferences theories of cognitive achievement are ones that employ a theory internal technical notion of representation, but that once we give cash-value definitions of the relevant notions of representation and inference, there is little left of the ordinary notion of representation. We suggest that the real value of talk of unconscious inferences lies in (a) their heuristic utility in helping us to make fruitful predictions, e.g., about illusions, and (b) their providing a high-level description of the functional organization of subpersonal faculties that makes clear how they equip an agent to navigate its environment and pursue its goals.

Methodological Individualism, The We-mode, and Team Reasoning

Social Ontology and Collective Intentionality, 2016

Davidson

Philosophy of Language, 2020

What Is Minimally Cooperative Behavior?

Minimal Cooperation and Shared Agency, 2020

The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this p... more The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

Triangulating on Thought and Norms

Dialogue, 2020

ABSTRACTThis article raises two questions about Robert Myers and Claudine Verheggen's terrifi... more ABSTRACTThis article raises two questions about Robert Myers and Claudine Verheggen's terrific book, Donald Davidson's Triangulation Argument: A Philosophical Inquiry. The first question, concerning the first part of the book, is whether, starting from the assumption that a solitary individual cannot have thought contents, we can show that adding another individual to the picture cannot resolve the problem. The second question, concerning the second part, is whether a more sophisticated, decision-theoretic, Humean about the pro-attitudes can respond to the objections to the simple Humean view, and whether Davidson was not in fact just such a sophisticated decision-theoretic Humean.

Collective Intentionality PREPRINT

The Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Social Science, 2016

In this chapter, we focus on collective action and intention, and their relation to conventions, ... more In this chapter, we focus on collective action and intention, and their relation to conventions, status functions, norms, institutions, and shared attitudes more generally. Collective action and shared intention play a foundational role in our understanding of the social.

The three central questions in the study of collective intentionality are:

(1) What is the ontology of collective intentionality? In particular, are groups per se intentional agents, as opposed to just their individual members?
(2) What is the psychology of collective intentionality? Do groups per se have psychological states, in particular propositional attitudes? What is the psychology of the individuals who participate in collective intentional behavior? What is special about their participatory intentions, their we-intentions, as they are called (Tuomela and Miller 1988), as opposed to their I-intentions?
(3) How is collective intentionality implicated in the construction of social reality? In particular, how does the content of we-intentions and the intentional activity of individual agents create social institutions, practices and structures?

Individual and Collective Action: Reply to Blomberg

Journal of Social Ontology, 2019

Olle Blomberg challenges three claims in my book From Individual to Plural Agency (Ludwig, Kirk (... more Olle Blomberg challenges three claims in my book From Individual to Plural Agency (Ludwig, Kirk (2016): From Individual to Plural Agency: Collective Action 1. Vols. 2. Oxford: Oxford University Press.). The first is that there are no collective actions in the sense in which there are individual actions. The second is that singular action sentences entail that there is no more than one agent of the event expressed by the action verb in the way required by that verb (the sole agency requirement). The third, is that an individual intention, e.g. to build a boat, is not satisfied if you don't do it yourself. On the first point, I grant that Blomb-erg identifies an important distinction between simple and composite actions the book did not take into account, but argue it doesn't show that there are collective actions in the same sense there are individual actions. On the second point, I argue from examples that the collective reading of plural action sentences doesn't entail the distributive reading, which requires the sole agency requirement on singular action sentences. This settles the third point, since it entails that if you intend to build a boat, you are successful only if you are the only agent of it in the sense required by the verb.

Unconscious Inference Theories of Cognitive Achievement

by Kirk Ludwig and Wade Munroe

Inference and Consciousness, 2020

This chapter argues that the only tenable unconscious inferences theories of cognitive achievemen... more This chapter argues that the only tenable unconscious inferences theories of cognitive achievement are ones that employ a theory internal technical notion of representation, but that once we give cash-value definitions of the relevant notions of representation and inference, there is little left of the ordinary notion of representation. We suggest that the real value of talk of unconscious inferences lies in (a) their heuristic utility in helping us to make fruitful predictions, e.g., about illusions, and (b) their providing a high-level description of the functional organization of subpersonal faculties that makes clear how they equip an agent to navigate its environment and pursue its goals.

What is Minimally Cooperative Behavior

Minimal Cooperation and Shared Agency, 2020

Cooperation defines the social world. What are its limits? What draws the line between cooperatio... more Cooperation defines the social world. What are its limits? What draws the line between cooperation (even if not full cooperation) and mere coordination? What is its relation to joint intentional action? This chapter argues that minimal cooperation-in the sense of cooperation at play in our understanding of the human social world-coincides with minimal joint intentional action, where this is characterized in terms of members of a group having intentions directed at their bringing something about together in accordance with a common plan at the time of action-a shared intention. The strategy is to start with an account of full cooperation and then to consider what features can be discarded while some form of cooperation is retained and then to argue that the account of minimal conditions for shared intentional action captures the sense in which agents are still cooperating. The chapter considers cooperative activities in which there is a constitutive conflict of goals (e.g., competitive games), cooperation on regulating what are constitutively non-cooperative activities (the laws of war), forms of cooperation that make possible forms of conflict that are not embedded in them (quarreling), halfhearted or grudging effort (a work slowdown), failure to provide aid where needed (Bratman's Ayn Rand singers), or interference with others (partial sabotage of others' contributions). Finally, the chapter takes up the question whether a decision-theoretic notion of cooperation captures the ordinary social concept without appeal to shared intention (no), whether coercion is compatible with it (yes), and whether it requires rationality (no).

Proxy Assertion

The Oxford Handbook of Assertion, 2020

This paper analyzes the use of an authorized proxy to perform speech acts on behalf of her princi... more

Fodor's Challenge to the Classical Computational Theory of Mind

by Susan Schneider, Susan Schneider, and Kirk Ludwig

In The Mind Doesn ' t Work That Way , Jerry Fodor argues that mental representations have context... more In The Mind Doesn ' t Work That Way , Jerry Fodor argues that mental representations have context sensitive features relevant to cognition, and that, therefore, the Classical Computational Theory of Mind (CTM) is mistaken. We call this the Globality Argument. This is an in principle argument against CTM. We argue that it is self-defeating. We consider an alternative argument constructed from materials in the discussion, which avoids the pitfalls of the offi cial argument. We argue that it is also unsound and that, while it is an empirical issue whether context sensitive features of mental representations are relevant to cognition, it is empirically implausible.